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31 May 1952

Lt. Colonel Arthur C. Peterson  
Office of the Secretary of Defense  
Room 3E 1041, Pentagon  
Washington 25, D. C.

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Dear

I am requesting a number of former key intelligence officers and Military Attaches to give us, from their personal experience, ideas for a new Army intelligence system.

Since 1917 when the serious lack of any intelligence training first became apparent to the Army, no questions have been quite so controversial as the organization of intelligence generally and the methods of administering and training intelligence personnel.

The period following World War II was one of fruitful and constructive progress in the improvement and coordination of the intelligence effort at departmental and national level. All of us presently engaged in intelligence are proud of the progress made but feel that we still have an even greater task before us in reorganizing and improving intelligence from battalion to departmental level.

Of the numberless phases of the intelligence program open for discussion, your comments are requested on the two most important subjects detailed below:

(1) First, the advisability of reorganizing the intelligence organization within the Department of the Army. Some of the proposals include revival of the old Military Intelligence Service of World War II, creation of a corps, branch or technical service, or adoption of some facets of the British or German systems. It appears that a reorganization should be considered because (a) there is still a tendency to shun intelligence as a desirable career; (b) the AC/S, G-2, Department of the Army, under existing organization does not have the means or authority to control the procurement, assignment, and training of intelligence personnel as do the chiefs of the technical services; and (c) there is also the problem of authority and method for the AC/S, G-2 to properly coordinate the operations of all intelligence agencies below departmental level to produce an efficient, well-balanced overall intelligence effort.

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(2) Second, the means of selling or developing "intelligence consciousness" in commanders at all echelons. One of our chief difficulties today is the general continued lack of appreciation of intelligence by commanders. Despite the inclusion of intelligence training throughout the Army school system there is the human tendency to depreciate intelligence in favor of the ever-present problems of training, supply and administration.

Though the two problems detailed above are currently occupying our attention, we also solicit any remarks or suggestions you may have which will benefit the overall intelligence effort. Your advice and ideas will be greatly appreciated.

Sincerely,

/s/Frederick D. Sharp  
FREDERICK D. SHARP  
Colonel GS  
Executive

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