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Grow Stolen Diary Incident Gives Support To Advocates of Separate G-2 Career Service

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The Grow stolen diary incident has focused attention on Army intelligence—its virtues and failings—and lent support to advocates of a G-2 career service.

In other words, how good is our military intelligence today? Is Maj. Gen. Robert W. Grow—whose compromised diary has given Communist propagandists a powerful weapon in the Cold War—a good example of our intelligence personnel? Or should we build a corps of specialists in this vital field?

These questions are being discussed at the Pentagon as an aftermath of the disclosure that America's military attache to Moscow kept a diary in which he told of his information-seeking activities in Russia and expressed his personal conviction we should attack the U.S.S.R. This diary was surreptitiously photographed by Communist agents and widely used as anti-American propaganda in Europe.

Those familiar with what has happened in military intelligence since the end of World War II agree that the changes have been all for the better.

Washington correspondents recall that just after Gen. Dwight W. Eisenhower returned to America after VE-day, he held a rather low opinion of our intelligence. Ike rated British as tops and listed the United States and Russia far down. The North Korean surprise attack and China's subsequent entry into the fight did not cause newsmen here to revise Eisenhower's summation.

Under its present chief, Maj. Gen. Alexander R. Bolling, however, G-2 has made a number of far reaching reforms. But it takes time to build. British intelligence, for example, is hundreds of years old. Britain has a hard corps of specialists in its G-2 service—something we never have had. One of the improve-



MAJ. GEN. ROBERT GROW

ments Bolling put over last year was authorization for intelligence specialization in the American Army.

General Grow, however, never had served as a military attache before his assignment to Moscow a year ago last summer. Moscow is the Army's top military attache post, rating a two-star general, compared to brigadiers in London, Paris and one or two other spots, and lesser ranking officers elsewhere. Grow's only prior intelligence experience, as far as his official military biography shows, was as head of the military mission to Iran, just before going to Russia after he had become a major and this was largely a training assignment.

Some critics feel that the Grow incident does not reflect against military intelligence, but against the Pentagon assumption that a good line major general can do anything. General Grow had been a successful combat commander during the war. Like another former cavalryman turned tankman—the late Gen. George Patton—he is an extro-

vert, good at meeting people, energetic, and positive in his views.

Should an officer with more intelligence experience have been named instead? On this there is dispute. Some feel that Grow—except for the diary incident—was a first-rate attache. A distinction can be made between attaches and other intelligence personnel. It is clear that the requirements for an attache to the NATO countries differ from those assigned behind the Iron Curtain and that a good "leg-man" abroad may not be a good intelligence analyst here.

There is agreement, however, that career specialization is necessary in the intelligence field. What we need is not a separate G-2 staff corps, most Army men feel, but a long-time buildup of a sizeable number of high-grade officers who rotate between intelligence and troop service, which is Bolling's plan. A G-2er who moves from one embassy to another, with an occasional intelligence staff assignment soon gets to be looked upon askance.

As one officer put it: "An intelligence officer should be able to do more than just know a tank when he sees one. He's got to have and keep enough military know-how to recognize what's new about it and write a comprehensive report that will be of value to our experts back home."

Advocates of this type of specialization have a precedent to back them. For years, the Navy has been recognized as the most adroit of the military forces in such fields as personnel, budget, base construction, and other logistical problems. One explanation for this has been that their ablest officers alternated between sea duty and the same specialty ashore. By the time they become admirals, the best of them were pretty good at both commanding sea forces and some specialty ashore.