

COPY

September 5, 1940.

Major General J. O. Mauborgne
 Chief Signal Officer of the Army
 Fort Monmouth, Oceanport, New Jersey

My dear General:

An expedite radiogram for the Chief of Staff from General Strong (in London) has just been received by General Miles. General Strong wants to know whether the Chief of Staff is willing to agree to exchanging important Japanese, German and Italian intercept traffic and complete technical information as to the cryptographic systems used therewith. General Miles has authorized sufficient delay to enable me to write and ask you for a statement of your views. He stated that he did not believe that he could, under the circumstances, await your return Sunday.

While the matter was under consideration, he directed that Akin take the radiogram to Admiral Anderson of Naval Intelligence for a statement of the Navy's views. Admiral Anderson told Akin to tell General Miles that the Navy's "off-hand" answer to the whole project was an emphatic "No". He said, however, that he would later provide General Miles direct with a "considered answer". Admiral Noyes was present at the conference between Admiral Anderson and Akin. Admiral Noyes said very little, but was in seeming agreement with Admiral Anderson.

I am inclosing a copy of a memorandum that Akin and Friedman prepared and submitted to you several days ago. Commander Safford's comments, indicating the probable Navy attitude, are typed in the margin. It seemed possible that you would like to have this for consideration at this time.

Sincerely,

Glyde L. Eastman,
 Colonel, Signal Corps.

Attached:-
 Memorandum.

FROM FRIEDMAN'S FILES

D R A F T

PROPOSED EXCHANGE BASIS WITH THE BRITISH

A. CRYPTOGRAPHICSafford
agrees
to
this.

Nothing of a secret or confidential nature to be disclosed but the mechanics of such tactical cryptographic systems as the training editions of the division field code cipher devices M-94 and M-138, Air Ground Liaison Code, and Air Ground Fire Control Code may be exchanged. Specifically no information of any kind shall be transmitted to them with respect to the converter type M-134-A, B or C (CSP-388) nor should the existence or general principles of these machines be disclosed. There would be no objection to exchanging information with respect to the Hagelin machine known as type C-38.

B. CRYPTANALYSISSafford
does
not
agree.

It is presumed that the discussion of an exchange for this material would take place in this office. It is recommended that we exchange any and all material that we have on a basis of complete reciprocity, the same to be upon specific exchange of specific items and not upon the basis of an exchange of information of a generalized character. It is further recommended that any attempt at exchange of cryptanalytic material only be undertaken in a joint conference between the Army and the Navy

on the one hand and the British on the other. The fact should be kept in mind in this exchange that the British are not at war with Orange and questions of policy enter into whether or not disclosure of vital information with respect to Orange would be detrimental to the National Defense.

C. TRAINING MATERIAL

Safford
questions
advis-
ability.

It is recommended that similarly an exchange of training literature on the subject of cryptography and cryptanalysis be made on a reciprocal basis.

D. GENERAL CRYPTANALYTIC TECHNIQUE

Safford
opposes

It is recommended that there be a reciprocal exchange of information concerning mechanization and machinery for cryptanalytic procedures.

E. EXCHANGE OF INTERCEPT TRAFFIC MATERIAL

Safford
does not
oppose.

An exchange of traffic so as to provide the widest possible coverage of material of interest would be desirable. It would be of especial value to us to have traffic of a tactical nature from the German, Italian, and Japanese armies.