

~~SECRET~~

*Slide Period*

[ 38 slides used in presentation  
as modified and delivered on  
26 April 1960 ]

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SLIDES FOR THIRD PERIOD

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COMMUNICATIONS SECURITY

~~Gentlemen, this period will be devoted to the subject of communications security, how it can be established and maintained.~~

*Several*

~~Three or four years ago there was being hammered into our ears over the radio in Washington a slogan concerned with automobile traffic safety. The slogan was: "Don't learn your traffic laws by accident." I think the slogan~~

~~useful as a sub-title for my talk, but I'll modify it a little--"Don't learn your COMSEC laws by accident." I begin my talk by reading the Webster~~

~~Dictionary definition of the word "accident". I know, of course, that~~

~~only a few of you will ever be directly concerned with COMSEC duties, but as potential future commanders of fighting units~~

*a dictionary*

~~"accident" should be of real interest in connection with~~

*the story I shall tell in*

~~a moment or two, so I will read Webster's definition, if you will bear with me.~~

"Accident: Literally a befalling; an event which takes place without one's foresight or expectation; an undesigned, sudden and unexpected event, hence, often an undesigned or unforeseen occurrence of an afflictive or unfortunate character; a mishap resulting in injury to a person or damage to a thing; a casualty, as to die by accident."

~~I will now make the definition relevant by reminding you of a minor~~

~~but nevertheless quite~~



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~~They also knew what his air escort would be, and~~  
~~so on.~~ It was relatively easy to bring about the "accident" Yamamoto was to  
suffer; ~~and it is obvious that~~ his death was no accident in the dictionary sense  
of that word--it was brought about.

~~because his communications were insecure.~~ The Yamamoto incident  
~~later gave rise to a somewhat amusing exchange of TOP SECRET telegrams between~~  
~~Tokyo and Washington, and after the war was all over certain of them turned up~~  
~~in the Forrestal Diaries, from which I will now read (Page 86):~~

*Quote* "The formal surrender took place on the deck of the U.S.S. Missouri  
off Tokyo Bay on September 2nd. The mood of sudden relief from long and  
breaking tension is exemplified by an amusing exchange a few days later  
of urgent TOP SECRET telegrams which Forrestal put into his diary. In  
the enthusiasm of victory someone let out the story of how in 1943  
Admiral Yamamoto, the Japanese Naval Commander-in-Chief and architect  
to the Pearl Harbor attack had been intercepted and shot down in flames  
as a result of the American ability to read the Japanese codes. It was  
the first public revelation of the work of the cryptanalytic division  
and it brought an anguished cable from the intelligence unit already  
engaged at Yokohama in the interrogation of Japanese Naval officers. The cable

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*said quote*

*(unclear)* "Yamamoto story in this morning's paper has placed our activities in  
^

very difficult position. Have meticulously concealed our special

*At this point Forrestal interpolated that* knowledge, we now become ridiculous." ^ They were even then questioning

the Japanese officer who had been responsible for these codes and he was

hinting that in the face of this disclosure he would have to commit

suicide. The cable continued: "This officer is giving us valuable

information on Japanese cryptosystems and channels and we do not want him

or any of our other promising prospects to commit suicide until after next

week when we expect to have milked them dry...." *Unquote.*

Washington answered with an operational priority TOP SECRET dispatch.

*Quote* "Your lineal position on the list of those who are embarrassed by the Yamamoto story is 5,692. All the people over whose dead bodies the story was going to be published have been buried. All possible schemes to localize the damage have been considered but none appears workable. Suggest that only course for you is to deny knowledge of the story and say you do not understand how such a fantastic tale could have been invented. This might keep your friend happy until suicide time next week which is about all that can be expected." *Unquote*

But not many years passed before the Japanese began to realize ~~the truth~~ *the truth* why and how what had happened to them had come about, and recently published books *by* ~~by Japanese~~ ~~Admiral Nomura, the last Commander in Chief of the Japanese Navy, said~~ ~~(this was said in an interrogation)~~

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~~SECRET~~*Japanese*

^ Navy officers come out quite openly with statements attributing their defeat to

poor COMSEC on their part, and excellent American COMINT and COMSEC. For example,

*I'll read you a paragraph from*

~~there is~~ Captain Fuchida's book entitled Midway: The Battle that Doomed Japan,

Chapter VIII, p. 131:

*Quote* "If Admiral Yamamoto and his staff were vaguely disturbed by

persistent bad weather and by lack of information concerning the doings

of the enemy, they would have been truly dismayed had they known the

actual enemy situation. Post-war American accounts make it clear that the

United States Pacific Fleet knew of the Japanese plan to invade Midway

even before our forces had started from home waters. As a result of some

amazing achievements of American intelligence, the enemy had succeeded

in breaking the principal code then in use by the Japanese Navy. In this

way the enemy was able to learn of our intentions almost as quickly as we

had determined them ourselves." *Unquote*

*Wenger  
story*

→ So much for ~~his~~ introduction to this period on COMSEC, and now  
(Here as an aside what Wenger told us to disbelief in decrypts.)  
let's get down to the matter itself.

# It is hardly necessary to tell you that with the advances made in the

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Aside from the much earlier Scytale used by the ancient Greeks, the earliest  
 45 cipher device known to history is the cipher disk, first described by an Italian  
 cryptographer named Alberti, who wrote a treatise on ciphers in Rome about 1470.

~~This is the oldest treatise on cryptography that has been known to exist.~~

45.1 The next slide shows a similar sort of wheel which appeared many years  
 later in a book by another Italian cryptographer, Porta, who recommends the  
 use of the cipher disk with keywords. I have the Porta <sup>book</sup> with me.

45.4 The next slide pictures the U.S. Army Cipher Disk, which was used in the  
 period 1914-1918, and which follows exactly the same principles that Alberti  
 recommended. It seems to have taken a long time for the Signal Corps to get  
 caught up with Alberti!

47 Now I know it takes a long time to nurse a patent through the United States  
 Patent Office, but Alberti's device was finally patented in 1924. Here it is.

48 Next is a picture of the Wheatstone Cryptograph, the first real improve-  
 ment on Alberti's device. I have the only <sup>original</sup> ~~copy~~ in the United States, maybe in  
 the world, and I've brought it with me. Sir Charles ~~Wheatstone~~ interested himself  
 in cryptography and invented his device in the latter part of the decade 1870.  
 It is not just a simple cipher disk. It consists of the ordinary alphabet on  
 the outside and a <sup>mixed</sup> alphabet on the inside; ~~the latter being a mixed sequence;~~  
 but there is one additional <sup>and</sup> important feature--the alphabet on the outside contains  
 27 places, the one on the inside, 26. There is a differential gear in the device  
 so that as you encipher a message and turn the big or "minute" hand to the letters  
 of the plain text, the small or "hour" hand advances one step for each complete

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*device* revolution of the "minute" hand, just as in a clock. <sup>Thus the cipher equivalents</sup> ~~At the close of this period~~  
change as you go 'round and 'round.  
~~those of you who would like to examine the device may do so.~~

~~Now~~ In 1917, in casting about for a field cipher device for use on the

Western front, our British allies resuscitated Wheatstone's principle, embodied

*device* it in a little different mechanical form, and made thousands of them. Here is

49 one of them and here is an American copy of the British model. It has a 27-unit

alphabet on the outside and a 26-unit one on the inside; but there is now one

additional and very important feature. You will notice that both alphabets can

now be made variable mixed sequences, whereas before, in the original Wheatstone,

only the inner alphabet could be varied. <sup>Now</sup> ~~In fact,~~ <sup>of these devices</sup> a good many were just about

to be issued to field units, not only British but also French and American. All the

~~top cryptographers of the Allied Forces were sure of the crypto security of the device.~~  
~~forces were to use it.~~ But even before they could be put into use it was shown

<sup>by a young upstart that its security wasn't what those cryptographers thought it was.</sup>  
~~that the security of the device was inadequate and they were withdrawn. I had~~

<sup>I was still at Riverbank when I proved its insecurity by solving five short messages</sup>  
~~something to do with demonstrating the insecurity of the device and when I~~

<sup>sent to Riverbank as a challenge. The first challenge message said in</sup> When I  
reached American GHQ in France about three months later I found I wasn't a bit

<sup>popular because those thousands of Wheatstone devices which had been issued</sup> had  
~~popular with certain British, French and American cryptologists. Reliance~~

<sup>to be withdrawn even before they had been put into use. Reliance therefore</sup>  
~~continued to be placed in codes.~~

Sometime in the 1890's

49.4 ~~Next comes the cipher cylinder.~~ A French Army reserve officer, Commandant

*device* Bazeries, tried to interest the French Army in a device which he called the

"Cryptographe Cylindrique", or cylindrical cipher. His device consisted of

a series of disks with a central hole so that they can be mounted upon the

shaft; each disk bears an alphabet (of 25 letters in this case) in disarranged

-8- "This cipher is absolutely unbreakable"

~~SECRET~~

sequence, and the mixed alphabets are all different, each bearing an identifying letter or number for assembling them upon the shaft in some key order, so that the correspondents have the same sequence of disks on their cylinders.

*encipher*  
You ~~put~~ your message ~~into cipher~~ 26 letters at a time (because there are 26 rings), by rotating the rings to align the letters of your plain text horizontally, whereupon for the cipher text you can choose any ~~other~~ one of the other 24-rows of cipher text. (Bazeries used a 25-letter alphabet.)

This principle seemed to be a very good one and messages in it appeared to be quite safe, but Bazeries never got anywhere in his attempts to get the Army

~~to adopt any of his ciphers, including his cylindrical cipher.~~

~~to adopt any of his ciphers, including his cylindrical cipher.~~

~~to adopt any of his ciphers, including his cylindrical cipher.~~

160 In 1915, an American Army officer, Captain Parker Hitt, ~~about~~ whom I have mentioned before, ~~told you~~, conceived the crypto-principle of the cipher cylinder independently.

160.1 He knew nothing about Bazeries. His device, however, took the form of strips, as you see. This was Hitt's ~~very~~ very crude first shot at it, and, as a gift

50.4 from him, it is among ~~my~~ the interesting items in *my* collection. Here is a better model, ~~one he~~ *also*

made in 1915, with the paper strips mounted on wood--wooden sliders. That

159 device was brought to the attention of the then *U.S. Army* Signal Corps Major Mauborgne,

in Washington, who ~~thought~~ *imagined* he'd thought up something new when he made a

cylindrical form of the thing, going back/ unknowingly to Bazeries' model.

*device*  
Here is Mauborgne's model; it is made of brass and is very heavy. And here's

50.3 the final form of the device, as adopted in 1922 by the U.S. Army. It became

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what we call Cipher Device type M-94, <sup>and was</sup> used by the Army, the Navy, the Coast

Guard, and the Treasury. A couple of years after the M-94 was put into service

a friend showed me a write-up of something he'd come across more or less accidentally

in the Library of Congress, among the papers of Thomas Jefferson. Jefferson was

the first to invent the cipher cylinder principle, and he anticipated the Frenchman,

50 Bazeries, by a century. Here is the first page of his description of his device,  
50.1

which he called "The Wheel Cypher." Here is the second page. You see his calculations

giving you at the bottom the number of permutations that his particular device

affords--a whale of a large number because Jefferson proposed a set of 36 disks.

In studying the degree of security provided by the M-94 both Army and Navy

cryptologists soon came to the conclusion that security would be much increased

*or variable*

by the use of changeable, instead of fixed alphabets. Among other versions, I had

one made which used metal rings on which we could mount slips of paper and fasten

them; thus we could change the alphabets as often as was felt necessary. Navy

*Between Army and Navy*

tried other versions. <sup>That was the beginning of the</sup> various forms of strip

*were developed and came to be*

cipher devices, used by the Armed Forces, and later by the State Department and

*U.S.*

50.11 the Treasury Department. Here is a picture of the final Army strip cipher device.

The strip ciphers carried an enormous amount of traffic *before and during World War II.*  
But they were so-called "hand-operated" or "pencil and paper" ciphers, whereas what we

54 ~~Next we come to~~ a machine called the Kryha, invented by a German, in about  
*First let's see*

the year 1925. According to its inventor the Kryha was the last word in the way of

mechanical cryptographs, and he tried to interest various governments in his

machine. There isn't time to explain the machine, but

*needed were machines  
or better devices.*

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~~SECRET~~

There is an outer alphabet and here an inner alphabet. The inner alphabet is mounted on a disk which is rotated angularly according to the toothed wheel which is in here. The alphabets can be rearranged if you wish, by taking the metal pieces on which they are printed into the slots. From a given starting point and with a given inner alphabet you start with the first letter to be enciphered, see what letter stands opposite to it, and write it down. Then you push this button and the wheel of disk will stop a certain number of spaces, one to seven, something like that, and you encipher the next letter, write down its equivalent, and give the button a push.

55

here is a dissertation on the number of permutations and combinations the Kryha machine affords, written by a German mathematician. All I have to say about it is that in this case, as in many others, merely the number of permutations and combinations which a given machine affords, like the birds that sing in the Spring, often have little to do with the case. Much depends upon just what kinds of alphabets are employed and exactly how they are employed. Large numbers of permutations and combinations don't frighten the cryptanalyst at all. For example, to give you a simple illustration, take a simple monoalphabetic substitution cipher. The number of alphabets that can be produced is factorial 26--that's a large, large number--403 quadrillions, 291,451 trillions, 126,605 billions, 635,584 millions and a few more, but you know as well as I that you don't solve the monoalphabetic substitution ciphers by an exhaustion method. There are very much simpler ways of <sup>solving them.</sup> ~~doing it.~~ Take

another example. Suppose you have a machine that provides hundreds of millions

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~~SECRET~~

of mixed alphabets for use in encipherment, that is, the alphabets are presented successively in a fixed sequence. Such a machine would give poor security because in heavy traffic many messages would be enciphered by the same sequence of alphabets, producing a condition which the cryptologist calls "depth". When this is the case he proceeds to solve the set of messages vertically, column by column, and when he's finished he can read the messages horizontally and eureka! the business is successfully terminated. When known alphabets are used the trick can be done with just two messages.

*In our various attempts to develop better.*

~~To return now to our general survey of crypto-machines,~~ it became clear

that there was a pressing need in the military and naval services for two types of automatic machines, ~~that is, machines which would get out of the~~

~~realm of hand-operated gadgets.~~ First, we needed a small <sup>mechanical</sup> machine for low

echelon or field use and ~~all-mechanical~~; second, we needed a larger, ~~and perhaps~~

electrically-operated machine for <sup>high-security,</sup> ~~mechanical~~ high-command use. Let us take

up the first of these two types and see what happened.

*Here's*

171 ~~I show you next a development model of a machine constructed by the~~

*about 1934*  
Signal Corps Laboratories, <sup>developed</sup> without guidance from Washington. The

Director of the Laboratories at that time was a great believer in autonomy

and he wasn't going to have Washington tell him anything about how things were

*in his laboratories*

to be done. <sup>When</sup> it came to developing a cipher machine, he decided that he

and his staff could produce a really good machine without the help of the *Washington*

cryptanalysts. So he proceeded on this basis to use up the tiny bit of money

that <sup>then</sup> was available--\$2,000. We in Washington were ~~not~~ not permitted even to know what

~~SECRET~~

was being built until the ~~final~~ model was completed and ready to be delivered to us. When we finally went to pick up the machine, I talked to Colonel So and So, who told me with some pride that his machine was all mechanical and that there was nothing in the way of an electrical machine or operation that you couldn't do mechanically. I asked: "Colonel, can you light a room mechanically?" To which he replied: "You've said enough--get out. There's the machine, take it

The Colonel never was given the opportunity to improve his model, with you." ~~The power source which in the model was designed to be operated by~~ because the crypto-principle was <sup>so</sup> very faulty ~~and the laboratories development~~ <sup>that we solved test messages in 20 minutes.</sup> ~~not only, but he never was given the opportunity to carry out that plan, because~~ came to a sudden and ignominious end. ~~The whole development represented a loss~~ ~~the crypto-principle was very faulty and it took very much time to read~~ That fiasco ~~which~~ wasted what little money we had for such business, ~~test messages put up by myself and the laboratories development~~

~~to an ignominious end. The whole development represented a loss of time and~~  
~~energy and moreover it wasted what little money we had for such business.~~  
~~But I'm glad to say that the chief of the laboratories was an unusual person,~~  
~~those who came later were much more inclined to take advice from persons~~  
~~experienced in the field of cryptology.~~

164.1

Now we come to a development which is of considerable interest to us. Here's a picture of a gentleman named Boris C. W. Hagelin, a Swedish engineer, who was responsible for the invention and development of one of the machines <sup>American field forces</sup> that all the <sup>A</sup>services used in World War II in great quantities. ~~Mr. Hagelin~~ <sup>adopting</sup> and I became very good friends after the war. I was opposed to <sup>adopting</sup> taking on Hagelin's device <sup>and I'm sure</sup> ~~for reasons that will presently become clear.~~ It wasn't a case of NIH--"not invented here" <sup>the</sup> ~~factor.~~ <sup>adopt them</sup> but the decision to <sup>have them made for and used</sup>

*was made about 1939 at*  
by the United States Army was a decision ~~on~~ a level higher than my own, and  
~~it turned out. I believe~~ that my superiors were right, for  
our troops at least had something for low-echelon crypto-communications, whereas  
if I'd had my way they'd have had nothing but pencil-and-paper ciphers, or the  
M-94 device, or the strip cipher device--all, *of which were entirely* too slow.

Now just a bit about Mr. Hagelin. He did what <sup>is</sup> best described as a  
hysteron-proteron. That's a four-bit word from the Greek meaning to do a thing  
"ass-backwards". I mean that usually you go into cryptographic work and then  
you have a nervous breakdown. He did it the other way <sup>'round.</sup> He had a nervous  
breakdown and *it was during his recovery that* ~~while he was recovering~~ he invented this machine ~~and~~ He made  
*nearly two* ~~several~~ million U.S. dollars from his invention. That's not at all a poor sort  
of hysteron-proteron if you're going to do one.

*model*  
68

Here's a picture of Hagelin's very first machine. I've brought one <sup>of them,</sup> ~~of his~~  
~~very first models,~~ in fact, number one, ~~for your inspection.~~ *It was* a present  
from Mr. Hagelin, for my museum. ~~This is a very interesting device.~~ From that  
prototype he built better models and interested the Signal Corps in them. As  
a consequence we built in America, for World War II, this six-wheel Hagelin  
machine, which many of you no doubt know as Converter M-209. *We built a large number*  
~~of these machines.~~  
~~groups and from this you can see what a big job it was.~~  
~~attitude toward this device is of very importance.~~ We built the M-209 according to  
American inch measurements and specifications, and with American tools, rather

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~~than European metric measurements and tools, and we built an astonishing number~~

of them--over one hundred and ten thousand, *in fact. They were used by the Army, the Navy, and the Marine Corps.*

~~Many of you may know that the M-209 had a serious, a very serious security~~

~~weakness, about which I'll say a few words later. This is a picture of one~~

*our M-209*

~~of the Hagelin machines as modified by~~ *a couple* ~~of some of our GI's in Italy. The M-209~~

70.3 has no printing mechanism and you know how resourceful GI's can be. *By scrounging* ~~a couple~~

~~of them scrounged parts here and there~~ *they* ~~and improved their machine to make it~~

a printing model. See, here's the keyboard, and here's the printing mechanism.

*They pasted*

Inside the cover ~~is~~ a cartoon of a couple of GI's getting ready to test a

home-made still for the production of you-know-what. The caption at the bottom

of the cartoon says: "Yes, but will the damned thing work?"

~~Now~~ *continued* Mr. Hagelin ~~proceeded~~ to improve his machine and *has produced several* ~~this is a side view~~

*models which*

~~is one of his latest models--the OX-52. It prints~~ not only the plain text but

also the cipher text, *some of them have electrically powered keyboards,* and ~~it incorporated a much improved ciphering mechanism,~~

*with associated driving mechanisms. However, all of these models have a* because the wheels, ~~instead of being permanently fixed upon the shaft, are~~

demountable and can be rearranged in 720 different ways. The stepping motion

for these wheels ~~is~~ complicated. We've studied this improved model for some

~~time and as of this moment we do not know how to solve ciphers produced by~~

this machine. ~~But it still has the very serious weakness, that when two messages~~

are in depth, that is, ~~as I've explained earlier,~~ when they are enciphered by

the same keying sequence, they are ~~readily~~ solvable. ~~If time permitted I~~

~~could show you how easily this is done, but you'll just have to take my word~~

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65 The next forward step was taken when Hagelin made the printing mechanism an integral part of the machine itself. Here is the keyboard, the printing mechanism is in here, and now the whole assembly is very much smaller and more compact.

57 Now I show a German machine known as the Enigma, <sup>the</sup> commercial model, which was available until Hitler came into power. ~~invented and put on the market in about 1923-24.~~ It comprised a keyboard, a light bank, a set of <sup>circuit changers</sup> ~~electric wheels~~ called rotors, and a ~~small~~ dry cell for

power. In this case the enciphering-deciphering circuitry is more complicated.

~~The current~~ <sup>The current</sup> goes from a key of the keyboard, ~~then through~~ <sup>to</sup> a contact on a fixed entry plate or stator, <sup>and then through</sup> ~~into~~ these stepping rotors, ~~and by means of~~ <sup>to</sup> a reflector or plate which sends the current <sup>but over a different path</sup> reversing ~~again~~, back through the cipher rotors to one of a bank of lights, ~~so that~~ the current goes through the rotors twice, which complicates things a good deal.

~~These reflector and reversing rotors are very important features of this machine.~~  
Each time a key is depressed at least one rotor steps forward and <sup>changes the circuits</sup> ~~the stepping of the rotors is such that the machine has a rather short cycle as~~ between the keys and the lamps. In World War II the Germans <sup>such things go, less than  $26^3$ ; it was a little less than  $23^3$  because of certain</sup> used a modification of the Enigma, but they lost the war nevertheless. ~~factors into which it isn't necessary to go.~~

~~I'm going to take the various developments of <sup>rotor machines</sup> ~~these machines~~ through World~~

~~War II. At the moment, and in period of time to anticipate German developments~~

<sup>Now</sup> ~~in this field,~~ I want to go directly to the American developments in rotor

71 machines. First, I show a picture of the late Mr. Edward H. Hebern, a

Californian, who seems independently to have thought of rotor machines. I

asked Mr. Hebern one day how he happened to get started on such things and he

said, "Well, you see I was in jail". I said: "In jail, what for?" He said:

~~SECRET~~

"Horse thievery." I asked him: "Were you guilty?", whereupon he said: "The jury thought so". It was while he was in jail, then, that Mr. Hebern conceived the idea of a cipher machine. Here is his very first model. It is possible that he built it as an item of occupational therapy while in jail, ~~but I think it more likely that he built it after he got out of jail.~~ It has a keyboard, a left-hand stator, that is, a ring of 26 stationery contacts arranged in a circular fashion to one of which the current goes when a keyboard key is depressed; a rotor of 26-points, and an exit stator of 26 contacts on this side. It is important to note that there was no reflector rotor; the type here is what we call a "straight through" rotor machine. You press a key and a lamp lights. There was just one rotor in his first model, which he built in 1922 ~~at 1922~~ for the <sup>Ku</sup>~~Kl~~ Klux Klan. Here is the first printing model made by

172

71.1

Mr. Hebern--still a one-rotor machine--with a keyboard and, now, an electric typewriter connected thereto. ~~One interesting thing about Mr. Hebern's rotors is worth noting. He didn't have absolutely fixed wiring, as in the German Enigma rotors, for these are detachable wires, showing that at an early date he conceived the idea of variable connections in rotors. This is an extremely important feature in any kind of a high-security rotor machine. This shows his next~~ <sup>development.</sup> ~~step.~~

71.2  
71.3

172.1

Now we have three rotors in cascade. This, too, was a very important step--the cascading effect was a great advance in connection with rotors. Here I

72

show his next development--a 5-rotor machine. ~~Here are the rotors removed from the machine to show you what they look like. They were still variable~~

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~~SECRET~~

~~connection-changers--you could take wires and rearrange them as and when you pleased. There is an interesting story connected with that model. The Navy Department was very much interested in cipher machines, much more so than the Army in those days, because they absolutely had to have secure means for speedier communications from Washington to the Fleet Commanders and, of course, for intra-fleet communications. The Navy thought this Hebern model a suitable machine and they <sup>had, for crypto developments</sup> ~~got an appropriation for the purpose~~, a large sum of money for those days, \$75,000. They proceeded then to negotiate with Mr. Hebern.~~

I was asked by the President of the Naval Board that had been appointed to study the Hebern machine to give him my personal opinion of its security. ~~I had no machine and the Navy had only two, both undergoing service tests. But I~~

~~I~~ <sup>one</sup> persuaded the War Department to purchase a machine from Mr. Hebern. ~~I set and studied it for some weeks--three or four weeks. The whole of my outfit then consisted of myself and a World War I veteran, an ex-prize fighter, with crossed-eyes, pug-nose and cauliflower ears; the only thing he could do was to type, and I may say that he could copy from draft letters or cipher text with absolute accuracy, but that's all he could do. The rest of it was up to me.~~

~~As I say, I studied the Hebern machine until an idea for a solution came to me. Suddenly one came to me. I tried it out and found it pretty good,~~ <sup>for three or four weeks without even a glimmer of</sup> ~~whereupon I went over to the Navy Section, which was then in charge of a~~

Lt. Struble, ~~who~~ now ~~is~~ Vice Admiral Struble, Retired, with an enviable service record. I said to Struble, "Lieutenant, I don't think that machine is quite as safe as you think it is." He said: "Oh, you're crazy!" I said: "Does

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this mean that you challenge me?" whereupon he said, "Yes". So I said:

"I accept." He asked: "Well, what do you want in the way of messages?"

I said: "How about ten messages put up on your machine?" He gave me the ten  
*with your own special rotors and wirings*

messages and ~~with some typing help from that ex-prize fighter~~ I worked on them

until I got to a place one day, at the close of business, when I had reduced

the ~~text~~ *the first line of* of one of the messages to simplest terms: I knew *only which* ~~that in the first~~

~~line of the text of that message~~ the letters which were the same *in that line* but I didn't

know what the letters actually were. Let us say, for

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~~Let me go back to the messages as I mentioned about the second one. I had a message, for example,~~

3<sup>d</sup>                      14<sup>th</sup>                      19<sup>th</sup> + 25<sup>th</sup>  
9<sup>th</sup>                      12<sup>th</sup>                      18<sup>th</sup>, 22<sup>d</sup>, 24<sup>th</sup>

instance, that the first, the seventh, the ninth letters were the same, whatever they were; the second, the seventeenth and the twenty-third were the same,

165 and so on. That's all I had when I left for home that evening. We were going

to some sort of a party, *but these identities were apparently deeply imbedded in my subconscious mind.* ~~and I had these letters in my mind, at least the ones that were identical and their positions.~~

As I was tying a black tie, it

suddenly came to me, and I can't tell you to this day just how or from where,

but the whole line of text fell into place with all the repetitions in the proper

place: "President of the United States." I could hardly wait to get to the

office <sup>next</sup> ~~in the morning,~~ <sup>when,</sup> and to my intense gratification, I found that my sub-

conscious guess was correct. I reconstructed the ten messages, turned them

over to Lt. Struble, and there was a considerable amount of excitement after I

showed him how I'd reasoned out a solution. The Navy Department cancelled the

order that they had placed; the Hebern Company, which had been selling stock <sup>at \$2.00</sup> ~~on the basis of great prospects,~~ <sup>of selling many machines to the Navy suffered a financial disaster &</sup> went to pieces. ~~the Navy Department~~

~~was ordered to buy the Hebern machine for the Navy, and he had to be taken back.~~ Mr.

Hebern, trying to recoup what he could from his unfortunate encounter with

an unknown cryptanalyst, <sup>Hebern Company</sup> bought stock in the Southern part of California at

40¢ and sold it in the northern part of the state at about \$2.00. The

California Blue Sky Laws didn't like that sort of conduct and Mr. Hebern spent <sup>another</sup>

<sup>giving him lots of time and opportunity to think up improve-</sup> ~~ment~~ <sup>ments</sup> on his machine. ~~He spent the money which he had made on the machine~~

~~He spent the money which he had made on the machine~~



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Despite my solution we thought that the Hebern principle was still a

*because the money was available,*  
 good one, and, Navy went ahead with Mr. Hebern after he got out of prison. He built  
 another model and soon after its delivery Mr. Hebern naturally wanted  
 172.10 ~~Here's a picture of the last machine he built for the Navy.~~ Hebern wanted

~~to get paid for it,~~ *that* but there was just one hitch--the machine

wouldn't work. ~~and~~ when this was pointed out to him he said: "Show me where

it says in the contract *that* it has to work", and when they couldn't, he was

paid off. The Navy then decided that they had had enough of Hebern and

went into research and development themselves, *establishing in Washington,*  
 a laboratory being established  
*in what was then called*

~~the~~ Navy Yard. Years later the Hebern heirs brought suit in the United

States Court of Claims against the United States for \$50,000,000, which was

*only a couple of years ago*  
 settled ~~last summer~~ at a considerable discount, \$30,000, just to get him off their necks.

*Now for a few words about*

~~I'm going to show you now a few slides of the Army developments in rotor-~~

type crypto-machines. ~~That~~ after the debacle I've told you about, was the first

~~shot that~~ we in the Signal Intelligence Service in the Office of the Chief

Signal Officer, in Washington, *had the cooperation of the Signal Corps Laboratories in*  
~~had~~ at developing a machine for the Army. *Here's a*  
*picture of it.*

170.7 ~~had a keyboard, a light bank, 5 rotors, and now an interesting feature--an~~

~~external keying mechanism. I had come to the conclusion that internal control~~

~~mechanisms for stepping rotors had a fundamental weakness; that is, I felt~~

~~that you must not make the rotors depend upon themselves for the stepping, and~~

~~I conceived the idea of having an external key, for example, a teletype tape,~~

~~which would step along and control the stepping of the rotors in random~~

~~fashion. These tapes were composed of a sequence of random characters so that~~

~~the rotor stepping was quite erratic, and that was our first shot at it..~~

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I think the principle is still quite safe, especially if the tapes aren't

~~overburdened in usage.~~ *[This is another view of the same machine--here is the*

~~tape-transmitter, the rotors, the keyboard, an electromatic typewriter, etc.~~

~~I think this was one of the very early models.]~~ We had boxes of about 100 key

~~tapes from which you could make the selection for the day according to the~~

~~keying document. A serious practical weakness, of course, was the necessity~~

~~for production and distribution of tapes.~~ *These* ~~The~~ machines functioned all right

but before even ten of them had been produced we had hit upon a new principle

for the control of the rotor stepping. I tried my very best to get ~~the Signal~~ *my division*

~~Corps~~ *chief* to change the development right there and then, and shift to the new type

of control. I was practically thrown out of ~~the office of the chief of the~~ *his office on my third try*

~~division~~ with the remark, "Go back to your den--you inventors are all alike. A

new and better idea every day. If we listened to you inventors we'd never

get anything out." So we had to put the idea on ice, that is, in secrecy *for a while.*

*About that time the Navy had its Mark I ECM, an*

172.4 ~~I will switch now to the Navy MARK I ECM, the electric cipher machine, designed,~~

developed and built ~~by the Navy~~ without any help from Mr. Hebern. ~~It had a~~

~~new type of control mechanism for rotor stepping, based upon the use of Bowden~~

~~wires or flexible cables. They were tricky and gave rise to a lot of difficulty~~

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~~SECRET~~

but over and beyond that the machine had a fatal security weakness. <sup>produced a</sup> ~~It had a~~  
~~sequence~~  
key/length of tremendous length but with only 15 different starting points.

You'll remember what I said about such a situation a few minutes ago.  
How this ~~came to be the case~~ I do not know ~~for~~ there wasn't any ~~coordination~~

*between Navy and*  
~~no~~ collaboration in those days ~~with~~ Army cryptologists--we didn't even know that  
such a machine had been  
~~the same such machine~~ built by Navy. Each service went its own way. When

there came a change in command in the Navy code and signal section, the new head  
*the security of the Mark I ECM wasn't good*  
decided that ~~that~~ development had gone far enough and he wanted some help from

the Army, if he could get it. He came to see me one day and told me that they

were in difficulty and needed new ideas, *Did we have any?* ~~if we had any~~. I said: "Well, we

have a good idea but it's secret." He asked: "Well, what do you <sup>or I</sup> have to do to get  
it released so that you can  
/tell me?" I told him: "I'll have to get permission from the Chief Signal

Officer", which I proceeded to do. I mention this specifically and ask that  
you believe that this was the situation in those days--there were <sup>cryptologic</sup> Army secrets  
<sup>Cryptologic</sup> and Navy secrets, and never the twain did meet. When I told the Chief Signal

Officer what Navy wanted, he promptly said: "Of course, let them have it".

<sup>we</sup> So <sup>a new</sup> I told the Navy about ~~the Army~~ idea for rotor control; ~~we~~ showed them the  
*involved. They liked it and by joint action of large number of new*  
circuitry ~~and after some delay the thing was adopted. The delay was caused by~~

~~Navy doubts that sufficient current~~  
~~could be obtained through sets of 16 or more rotors,~~

~~they were having contact troubles with their rotors. But the machines were built~~  
~~to do what electrical work had to be done.~~

*machines for the Navy and the Army were built*  
by the Teletype Corporation, a very competent organization, *The machines used the*  
~~and were highly~~

*Army cryptoprinciples and they were highly*  
173. <sup>A</sup> successful. Here is a picture of the MARK II ECM, Navy terminology, or the

SIGABA, Army terminology. If it hadn't been for the fact that we got together

*Army-Navy secret intercommunication*  
before we became belligerents in World War II, ~~it~~ would have been extremely

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difficult, ~~for the Army and the Navy to have had any inter-communication at all~~  
 in World War II. ~~The only thing that was used for communication was the ECM-SIGABA~~

~~which was used for communication with the British and the Navy~~

~~back in 1939. The ECM-SIGABA was used for communication with the British and the Navy~~

The ECM-SIGABA came into use just in good time, and it was used  
~~with great satisfaction on both sides. I might add, in closing that incident,~~

*during World War II.*

with great satisfaction on both sides. I might add, in closing that incident,

that, to the best of my knowledge, this is the only gadget that was withheld

*throughout World War II.*

from our British Allies, ~~although~~ They knew that we had a machine of this

character and although we knew all about their type of machine, in fact, the

Navy was using it for communication with the British, ~~and we were not~~

it was U.S. policy on the highest level in both the Army and the Navy to  
~~withhold our machine from the British. There was a struggle for several years~~

*them.*

withhold our machine from ~~the~~ British. ~~There was a struggle for several years~~

on this point until the recalcitrant people high up in both services began to

see the light. The trouble was that when the technicians assured them that messages

put up by this machine couldn't be read without having the current key list--

that we ourselves, in Army as well as Navy, had tried very hard to do so and

failed--they just wouldn't believe it. One reason for this adamant policy was

that they were daily getting the decrypts that were being produced from German,

Italian and Japanese messages and they just didn't feel like taking any chance.

"How can the technicians be so sure as they say they are?" they asked over and

over again. I don't know how many millions of dollars were spent ~~perhaps entirely needlessly,~~

in establishing means for inter-communication with the British. By this I mean

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that we had to develop, produce, and use an adaptor for our machine so that it could inter-communicate with the British TYPEX, and the British had to do the same for their machine to inter-communicate with the ECM-SIGABA. But by the end of 1953 we were able to convince the authorities that it would be all right and finally the British were allowed to have our machines until they could complete their developments and be on their own. I think it would be nice if

there were time to explain the crypto-principles of the ECM-SIGABA but suffice

it to say that we know of no case of solution of <sup>messages enciphered by it</sup> ~~this machine and system~~

~~throughout the war~~, and it is still in service as a high-grade off-line machine.

During its use in World War II there was one possible compromise which raised

quite a storm when it was discovered that some Frenchman had liberated a U.S.

Army truck and trailer--the latter carrying all the 28th Division's HQ cipher

machines and materiel. But the stuff was soon found where it had been dumped

<sup>in a nearby river</sup> ~~by the Frenchmen in a nearby river~~ <sup>who wanted only the vehicles and not their contents.</sup> The episode was one which caused the

Signal Officer and other officers to be tried by court martial. We had and

still have very strict rules indeed about safeguarding this gadget, and in

mentioning this point I should say that we weren't worried by the thought that

our messages could be read if the Germans would capture one. We were worried

by the thought that they would learn how good it was and would copy it--thus

cutting off our COMINT. I can hardly refrain from telling you one of the funny

things about our not giving the machine to the British when they needed <sup>and wanted</sup> it so

desperately. I mentioned the strict rules about safeguarding it--who could see

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the thing, who could service it, and so on, and we saw to it that these rules were strictly enforced. But there came a time in North Africa when all our maintenance men were knocked off and there was nobody to service the machines.

However, a very skillful British RAF Officer, an electrical engineer, was pressed into service and he maintained our SIGABAs there for a while. I'm sure you won't be astonished to learn that when he got back to London he built for the RAF a machine based upon the ECM-SIGABA principle!

I want to show you next the cipher machine which was used very extensively 74.1 by all the German Armed Forces in World War II. This was a modification of their commercial Enigma machine but an important modification, introduced when Hitler came into power, at which time the commercial model was withdrawn from the market. ~~SECRET~~

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~~of this machine, but we will not discuss it here.~~

~~you can see it better on the next slide. Here are the rotors--they are exactly the same physically as they were on the commercial model, but with different wirings of course. Now let's see what the modification was--the addition of a plug board by means of which one could change the connections between the keys of the keyboard and the lamps on the lightbank. There were 13 plugs and jacks and this number was not chosen by accident; they apparently had mathematicians figure out absolutely the best number of plugging arrangements for this particular machine. There were certain weaknesses in the German Military Enigma but the absolutely fatal weakness was that they couldn't, or at least they didn't, change their rotor wirings at all throughout the war. Without the rotor wirings we couldn't have done anything with their traffic; but with them we were able to read practically all of it.~~

~~This was the Enigma machine used by the German Army and Air Force.~~

~~The Naval Enigma was much like the~~

~~Army and Air Force machine except~~ that ~~it had one more wheel and the rotor wirings were different. It came back to the Enigma in the next period.~~

Now we come to the development of cipher machines for <sup>protecting</sup> teleprinter communications, <sup>the need for which,</sup> with the ever-increasing speed of communications, it was necessary to

~~speed up this business of protecting the contents of messages by~~ <sup>cryptography.</sup>

~~had been recognized even during World War I.~~

~~This was recognized a long time ago.~~ In 1919, for example, the A.T. & T. Company

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engineers, in collaboration with the Signal Corps, devised this modification of the then standard printing-telegraph machine to make it a printing-telegraph

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cipher machine, using circular key tapes of random characters. Great faith was placed in this machine but it was not put into use until the war was over. By that time I had come back from France, rejoined the Riverbank Laboratories and accepted a challenge to solve this kind of cipher system. It's too long a story to go into right now but as a result of the solution the Army dropped the project. I think it was, in a way, too bad, because when we had a <sup>desperate</sup> need for teleprinter ciphering in the early days of 1942 we actually had nothing except this thing. The big trouble, of course, was the production and distribution of these key tapes, and it is a problem which is still with us. Here's an early model of a machine for making key tapes. We improved such machines very greatly in the next year or two, so that we could produce hundreds of thousands of good tapes in a hurry. ~~Our modern key-tape manufacturing apparatus uses a key generator for producing electronically the random impulses for punching the tapes.~~

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#79

This is a rotor machine, the SIGCUM, which the Army developed in 1942-43 <sup>which was by both services</sup> and used very successfully to encipher teletype communications. It uses not perforated tapes but rotors which step in an erratic fashion, ~~but not as erratic as in the ECM-SIGABA. But even while in service, it had weaknesses,~~ Every once in a while, when we discovered new cryptanalytic techniques, we found that SIGCUM had weaknesses which could be exploited; whereupon we would proceed to tighten up things by changes in the method of usage or the method of stepping the rotors, and so on. The machines are still in use, doing valiant service because we were able to incorporate more and more improved features in it. ~~Its new designation~~

Now we have to say a few words about certain other types of ciphering apparatus. For example, it is necessary to send, with security, weather and situation maps, ~~and so it was desirable to have a machine which can encipher and decipher facsimile.~~ The generic name we gave to machines for ciphering facsimile was cifax. Here is one such machine that was developed by Army for the purpose,

183 called SIGMET. We also had need for machines for enciphering/telephone conversations, to which we gave machines with the generic name ciphony equipments, here's the first shot at it--

185 a development by the Bell Telephone Laboratories, called SIGJIP. It was a gyp in a way it gave you much more feeling of security than was warranted by the circumstances. Conversations enciphered by means of that thing could be read very readily and we all knew this but it was only an interim piece of equipment.

Bell The Telephone Company, proceeded with its work, in collaboration with engineers from the Signal Intelligence Service and the Signal Corps, developed a very high-grade ciphony system which became known as SIGSALY, and which was finally developed and was extremely successful, but of which there were seven, each terminal, cost over a million dollars, and there were seven of them.

The professional cryptologist is always amused by the almost invariable reference by the layman to "the German code", "the Japanese code", "the U.S. Navy code", etc. To give an idea as to how fallacious such a notion is, I will say that there are hundreds of systems in simultaneous use in our defense the communication services, of systems of all large governments. You not only have to have different kinds to meet specific types of communications but you have to divide up the traffic for two reasons:

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first, so as not to overload one system beyond the safety limit, and second, so

that not everybody can read everybody else's messages, <sup>even if they all have the same machine or cryptosystem.</sup> ~~even in the same family.~~

*There was a leak in connection with the Navy's success in the Battle of Midway and it*  
~~The Midway leak~~ happened primarily because this last principle wasn't in effect

at that time in U.S. Naval communications.

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This slide shows <sup>different</sup> the number of cryptographic systems in effect ~~on~~ <sup>in</sup> December 1951 ~~until~~ <sup>was just over 700,</sup> October 1945 in the U.S. Army alone. ~~There were literally hundreds~~

~~of them.~~ The next slide shows the number of holders of cryptographic materials <sup>it</sup> during the same period, December 1941 ~~October 1945,~~ <sup>was almost 6,000,</sup> and, mind you, this ~~is~~ <sup>was only</sup> in the ~~U.S.~~

~~the then~~ U.S. Army and U.S. Army Air Corps alone. It does not consider U.S. Navy, ~~which had~~ as great or ~~perhaps greater~~ <sup>nor</sup> distribution; the State Department, the Treasury, <sup>U.S. government</sup> and the many other agencies that use cryptography.

Keeping track of crypto-material and accounting for it is a big headache.

There is no way of getting around this that I know of and it is important that

the rules for the protection of the material be followed absolutely to the

letter. ~~It is going to show you any kind of slides~~ <sup>also</sup> The Japanese had very

definite and detailed rules for accounting for crypto-material. They were

<sup>enjoined</sup> ~~supposed~~ to burn the codebooks, the cipher keys, the cipher tables, and so on.

They were enjoined to scatter the ashes and then make a certificate, witnessed

by a fellow officer, as to the complete destruction of the material. ~~Occasionally~~

~~these certificates were sent by radio and then we would find a case like this,~~

~~where two chaps~~ ~~had certified the destruction by burning and the scattering of~~

~~the ashes.~~ <sup>one chap one day</sup> But ~~he~~ was observed by binoculars when he took a spade and dug a

hole, dumped the codebooks and the tables in that hole, and poured <sup>in</sup> some water.

~~that~~ Well, <sup>into the</sup> In due time, some of our people sneaked out, dug ~~up~~

hole, got out the material, ~~and~~ <sup>There</sup> brought it in, ~~and~~ <sup>and</sup> it <sup>it</sup> being dried out.

<sup>sort of</sup> This recovery of crypto-material helped a great deal because it saved us an

enormous amount of time <sup>and labor</sup> / to reconstruct that particular code <sup>and set of tables.</sup> ~~There were~~

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I have already mentioned that instances of this sort every now and then. By the way, the Japanese were

worried about ~~this business~~ of their security. <sup>crypto-</sup> Their ~~crypto~~ systems were very complex and they felt sure of their security. Yet they felt that something about their secrecy systems, <sup>^</sup> was wrong and the only thing ~~that~~ they could imagine

was that there were spies all 'round them. <sup>^</sup> We read and were amused by messages ~~There were messages all the time.~~

requiring the commands to go through their quarters and look under the beds

and into all closets, hunting for spies. Of course, that wasn't the case at

all; we were solving their codes and ciphers because they were not secure.

<sup>Some of</sup>

You have seen the important World War II developments in crypto-apparatus and now it's time I ~~told~~ <sup>showed</sup> you a bit ~~about~~ <sup>of</sup> the new ones, conceived, developed and in some cases produced by the now centralized cryptologic agency of the ~~United States Army, the United States Navy, the United States Air Force, the United States Army and the United States Navy, the National Security Agency.~~ In general the trend has

been toward these things: (1) making the machine more manageable as to size and

weight, by miniaturization, the use of transistors and other solid state com-

ponents, and by better packaging; <sup>(2)</sup> ~~next, by~~ making the machines more secure, by

incorporating better or more advanced crypto-principles, and <sup>(3)</sup> ~~particularly~~ by

simplifying the procedures. The aim of ~~this last set of improvements~~, simpli-

fication, is accomplished, wherever practicable, by eliminating as many features

and procedures which, because of operators' errors, lead to crypto-security

weaknesses. That is, we've been trying to make the machines as nearly

automatic <sup>and foolproof as possible,</sup> ~~as possible and practicable~~ as regards their keying and functioning,

so as to eliminate weaknesses caused by human error. We must take into account

the fact that the machines have to be operated by human beings, <sup>who</sup> ~~and human beings~~

occasionally ~~and inevitably~~ make mistakes, <sup>and who</sup> they are prone to errors of omission

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and commission. Experience has proved that in the past it has been these errors ~~and not so much technical weaknesses in the cryptosystems and machines themselves~~ that have made solution on a regular basis possible. ~~This sort of practical experience means that the keying procedures should be made simpler, and, if possible, entirely automatic so far as concerns the human operator and user of the machine and system. Complexities can be introduced, incorporated, or applied at NSA, where there are extremely well-trained and experienced crypto-engineers and their helpers.~~

You understand, I'm sure, that we depend for crypto-security not on keeping the construction or design of the machines deep secrets. This means that the machines must be based upon crypto-principles such that even if the machines fall into enemy hands, by capture or otherwise, without possession of the exact key for the day, for the period, or for each individual message itself, the enemy can never learn by cryptanalysis the contents of the messages, or at least he can't for a very large number of years. At the same time there is a real point in keeping the machine ~~apparatus, or system~~ itself in a classified status as long as possible, because in the case of well-designed crypto-apparatus if you don't ~~even~~ know what the machine looks like, or its general principles of ciphering, you can't even make a start at cryptanalysis, or, to be more accurate, it will take a considerable length of time and more or less involved study to ascertain what you must know before you can <sup>start</sup> ~~make~~ an attack on the messages with

some hope of success. In a nutshell, then, we keep the machines in a classified status as long as possible, first, in order to delay the enemy's real attack on the traffic, and second, to prevent a -33- potential enemy from duplicating the machines and turning our own weapons against us.

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status as long as possible, <sup>first,</sup> in order to delay the enemy's real attack on the traffic enciphered by the machines, <sup>and secondly,</sup> ~~But, of course, there's the other reason,~~ <sup>which is</sup> ~~I've already mentioned,~~ to prevent a potential enemy from copying our machines and turning our own weapons against us.

~~Now let's see pictures of some of the new apparatus, which will soon be ready for issue.~~

~~KL-7~~ For field use we now have in place of Converter M-209 a small off-line high security machine designated the ~~M-7~~ <sup>KL-7</sup>. It has a keyboard and prints the cipher text. For electric power it uses any 24-volt source. This machine is now the work-horse for tactical cryptocommunications, and, by the way, several thousands of them have been issued to our NATO allies.

~~KW-9~~ Next we have the KW-9, an on-line or off-line teletype encipherment machine that uses rotors instead of key tapes and is very much safer than the old SIGCUM ~~or KW-2 I showed you.~~ <sup>KW-26</sup> Here we have the new KW-26, which is in fact becoming the work-horse of fixed station teletype long-range communication systems. It is an on-line synchronous teletype cipher system with link-encryption, that is, so far as enemy intercept is concerned it is impossible to tell when the circuit is idle and when it is carrying a message.

This and the next slide are a bit out of order but I didn't have glass slides for them and have to use the small 35 mm. ones. This one showing the

~~(KL-36)~~ KL-36 is the one I mentioned before as having been developed for the Marine Corps.

The next one is the pneumatic rotor machine that we think would serve the needs ~~(KL-17)~~ better than the KL-36 and be far safer.

~~SECRET~~

~~X-27~~ Here's a machine designated the KW-3, now undergoing test. It is an off-line teleprinter cipher machine but it has all the conveniences of an on-line machine and eliminates some of the weaknesses of the latter. The machine generates the key as well as the indicators for messages. All the operator has to do is to type the address, punch a starting key on the machine, and then proceed to type

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off the plain text of the messages, whereupon a cipher tape is produced, which can be put on any teleprinter circuit for transmission. At the receiving center the operator puts the cipher tape into a reading head, the start button is pushed, the message sets up its indicator and key, and the tape produced is the plain text of the original message. The KW-3 will become the real work-horse of our Armed Forces high-command cryptocommunications.

X-28 Next I show the KW-37, designed for Navy Fox or broadcast transmissions, and now undergoing service test. It is a machine which embodies a teletype printer and uses an IBM card for keying purposes. So far as the ship is concerned, the radio operators aboard won't even see the cipher--the messages within the communication center aboard will be in plain language; the ciphering is done elsewhere on the ship. The system is a synchronous one, meaning that both ends of the circuit are constantly and automatically kept in step; also, and related to this fact is the fact that the system is such that the intercepting enemy can't tell when a message is being transmitted and when the circuit is idling, giving what we call "link security", a very important element in communication security.

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~~X-29~~ Next we have the KY-3, a ciphony or telephone security equipment. It has very high security and excellent quality, and is not a push-to-talk machine. It's range is 10-15 miles but this can be extended with good repeaters.

~~X-30~~ Here's the KY-8, a smaller version of the KY-3, occupying less than one cubic foot space and weighing between 10 and 15 pounds. It's for air-to-air and air-to-ground talk with high security.

~~X-31~~ Next we see the KY-9, a great improvement over its predecessors, one of which was the SIGSALY I mentioned a few minutes ago. It uses the vocoder principle, which yields talk that is intelligible but of poor quality. What it lacks in that respect it makes up by having excellent reliability. Moreover, you can use it on any commercial telephone circuit in the U.S. or circuits of equivalent quality abroad. For comparison as to size I show you again a SIGSALY terminal of World War II days, which cost over \$1,000,000. The KY-9 gives equal security and costs only about \$60,000.

~~X-32~~ Finally, I show you the KY-11, the crypto-portion of a microwave telephone system. We have this between Fort Meade and our former headquarters at the Navy Security Station in Washington where our COMSEC operations are conducted, and where also is located the Navy Security Group. The telephone micro-link is rented from the telephone company. We also have a similar link between the Navy Security Station and Arlington Hall Station where the headquarters of the Army Security Agency are located.

I'm sorry that I can't show you pictures of some of our new machines and anyhow it wouldn't do much good unless I <sup>had time to</sup> explain specifically what they are for and how they work, ~~and there just isn't time for all that.~~ I will say, however, that we now have machines for literal communications, such as the K.L-7, which has a keyboard and prints the cipher text. It uses any 24-volt source. Several thousand of them have been issued to our NATO allies. We have machines for on-line and off-line teleprinter ciphering, and we have one on-line synchronous teleprinter cipher system with link-encryption, that is, so far as enemy intercept is concerned, it is impossible to tell when the circuit is idling and when a message is being transmitted.

Next, we have <sup>new and better ciphony systems and</sup> ~~cryptosystems and~~ machines for protecting telephone communications. ~~These are what we call ciphony systems.~~ I told you a bit about SIGSALY of World War II days, each terminal of which <sup>and there were seven terminals.</sup> cost over \$1,000,000. But now we have ciphony machines of equal security, which are much, much smaller and cost a mere \$60,000 a piece.

Then we also have <sup>new</sup> cifax machines, for protecting facsimile transmissions.

~~SECRET~~

*Nowadays we place emphasis*  
~~In what I've just showed you'll notice the emphasis placed on telephone~~

security devices and systems, and on automatic teleprinting systems. The days of hand-operated devices is over, and those of semi-automatic off-line cryptographic machines are drawing to a close. And, last to be mentioned, NSA cryptographers are doing development work in division systems--enciphered television--which will doubtless come into use within a few years.

But with all these modern improvements I don't think the day has yet dawned when it can be said that human factors that make for crypto-insecurity have been altogether eliminated. Perhaps it's true that at the moment COMSEC technology can be said to be ahead of COMINT technology; but <sup>it is possible that</sup> ~~with ever increasing~~ speed of electronic analytic apparatus <sup>the COMINT gap can</sup> ~~the gap can and perhaps will~~ be closed, unless the COMSEC engineers keep pace with that apparatus. In short, it is the age-old battle between armor and armor-piercing projectiles. In the meantime, communicators must keep their guard up and enforce the rules supplied them for operating their crypto-equipments. <sup>first,</sup> ~~In closing this period~~ let me remind you, ~~of the following:~~ (1) that the establishment and maintenance of communications security is a responsibility of command; (2) that there aren't any short-cuts to achieving communications security; and (3) that the rules of COMSEC must be followed to the letter by everybody connected with COMSEC, but most especially by crypto-operating personnel. If these reminders are followed, the chances are good that you won't learn your COMSEC <sup>laws</sup> ~~rules~~ by accident!

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~~With the foregoing remarks I bring to a close my talk on COMINT and COMSEC.~~

If there is any last word or impression that I would like to leave with you

let it be that, in my opinion, COMSEC, though less spectacular and less interesting

than COMINT, is ~~by far~~ <sup>faces of the cryptologic coin.</sup> the more important of the two. There are two reasons for

this opinion. The first is that ~~success~~ in the conduct of modern large-scale

military operations, ground, sea, air, and para-military, <sup>COMSEC</sup> is of the highest

importance; <sup>because</sup> ~~to their success~~; without secure communications there can be little

~~or no secrecy~~, and without secrecy nearly every such operation is doomed. The

second reason is one that is not so obvious. It is that your COMINT successes

will soon be eliminated unless the communications over which the traffic and the

final results must pass to reach those who can use them are secure. Therefore,

COMSEC is doubly important, ~~once and~~ first, to protect our own plans and move-

ments, and ~~once again, or~~ second, to protect our COMINT product and sources. I'd

therefore like to present for your consideration and rumination the following

statement of what I'll immodestly call Friedman's Law--something patterned after

~~Professor~~ Parkinson's Law: Your cryptologic coin, like any other coin, has two

faces. If you're up against equal or even superior forces, and if the COMINT face

of the coin is bright and shiny, your chances of winning are good--maybe ~~and~~ at

times excellent; but if you let the COMSEC face of your coin become tarnished and

dull, you'll sure as hell lose.

<sup>Thank</sup>  
~~Thanking~~ you for your patience in listening to my rather lengthy

discourse and for your courtesy in paying such careful attention to what I

~~SECRET~~

have presented for your information, ~~let me invite~~ those of you who care to  
*are invited*  
examine some of my exhibits, to come up to the table here and we can look at  
them as long as you wish.

~~SECRET~~