

DISPOSITION FORM**~~TOP SECRET~~**

FILE NO.

SUBJECT

NSA Lecture and Policy Statement

TO COMP
PROD
COMSEC
R/D
SEC
TNG

FROM P/P

DATE 26 Oct. 1954 COMMENT NO. 1
Major Dean, P/P, 60605/j1

1. Inclosed is a draft copy of a lecture to be given by Captain Holtwick, USN, Special Assistant, on 17 November 1954 at the Armed Forces Staff College, Norfolk, Virginia. In addition to this text, thirty-six photographic slides will be shown as visual aids to the lecturer. A second inclosure is a proposed draft of the Director's lecture policy to be issued by the Chief of Staff.

2. It is requested that you review that portion of the lecture text, pertaining to your function, for accuracy and expression and review the proposed lecture policy. Any additional observations and suggestions which you may have regarding the entire presentation are also solicited.

3. It is requested that all copies be returned with comments prior to 29 October 1954.

4. Downgraded to CONFIDENTIAL when inclosures are removed.

John J. Davis
JOHN J. DAVIS
For: Colonel, Arty

Incl:
a/s**~~TOP SECRET~~**

Declassified and approved for release by NSA on 07-23-2014 pursuant to E.O. 13526

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GENTLEMEN:

It is a pleasure to present to you a brief outline of the organization, functions and responsibilities of the National Security Agency and its place in the National structure. The Director, NSA, wishes me to extend his warmest regards and to express the hope that this presentation will serve, in a small way, to inform you of the internal workings of this unique source of intelligence information.

Although the classification of this lecture is TOP SECRET, the past or present successes or failures in the field of Communications Intelligence cannot be discussed, and should not form the basis for questions. This limitation always has been observed due to the vulnerability of this effort to careless or intentional disclosures. Knowledge that one's communications are being read by the enemy leads to swift and drastic changes which may nullify months or even years of painstaking work. In recognition of this danger, the President of the United States approved an Act on 13 May 1950, referred to as Section 798, Title 18, U.S. Code, which was enacted "to enhance further the security of the United States by preventing disclosures of information concerning the cryptographic systems and the communications intelligence activities of the United States". For these reasons, this presentation will be somewhat limited, but, it is intended to describe the NSA organization, functions, responsibilities and relationships as completely as possible within the time allotted.

The National Security Agency is concerned with two major efforts, namely, communications intelligence and communications security. In addition, it operates its own research and development function in support of both communications intelligence and security. To avoid confusion, we shall consider communications intelligence first and the other subjects in order.

Before proceeding, it is important that we have a common understanding of the nature of communications intelligence and the meaning of several related terms.

CHART #1

With this brief description of COMINT, we will now consider the organization, functions and responsibilities of the National COMINT effort.

CHART #2

In October 1952, the President recognized the United States communications activities as a national responsibility and designated the Secretaries of State and Defense as a Special Committee of the National Security Council for COMINT. He directed this Special Committee, with the assistance of the Director of Central Intelligence, to establish policies governing COMINT activities and to keep the President advised of such policies through the Executive Secretary of the NSC. The President further designated the Department of Defense as Executive Agent of the Government, for the production of COMINT information, and directed the establishment of the National Security Agency. In accordance with this direction, Security Council Intelligence Directive No. 9, Revised, was published in December 1952. In this document, the Special Committee provided for many changes in the COMINT structure including the reconstitution of the United States Communications Intelligence Board (USCIB).

USCIB was first established in July 1948, superseding the State, Army and Navy COMINT Board. As reconstituted on 28 November 1952, it is a body acting for and under the NSC Special Committee. Membership includes: The Director, CIA, who is the permanent Chairman, without vote, the Director, NSA, and one representative each from State, Defense, FBI, Army, Navy, Air Force and CIA.

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USCIB advises and makes recommendations to the Secretary of Defense on COMINT matters falling under the jurisdiction of the Director, NSA. On matters not under the jurisdiction of NSA, USCIB:

- (1) Coordinates the COMINT activities of all departments and agencies,
- (2) Considers and recommends COMINT policies of common interest, including security standards and practices, and
- (3) Investigates and studies the standards and practices of departments and agencies in the use and protection of COMINT information.

USCIB decisions are binding on the Secretary of Defense and all other departments and agencies.

The National Security Agency (NSA) was established in October 1952 by the Secretary of Defense to provide an effective, unified organization and control of U.S. COMINT activities. It is a successor to the Armed Forces Security Agency (AFSA) established by the Secretary of Defense in May 1949. AFSA was established to coordinate the Service COMINT efforts. NSA, on the other hand, is an integration of activities formerly carried on by the Army, Navy, and Air Force, and was established to achieve greater efficiency, economy, and effectiveness in the conduct of these sensitive operations.

Basic COMINT policies and procedures were promulgated by the National Security Council Intelligence Directive No. 9, Revised, of December 1952, familiarly known as NSCID No. 9. Detailed COMINT responsibilities of the Director, NSA, and the Military Departments were set forth in a Secretary of Defense Memo of December 1952 entitled Implementation of NSCID No. 9.

Responsibilities of the Director, NSA, include:

CHART #3
CHART #2

In summary, COMINT is a National responsibility. The NSC Special Committee establishes basic COMINT policies and advises the President concerning them. Under the Special Committee, USCIB advises the Secretary of Defense on COMINT under the jurisdiction of NSA. On COMINT matters not under NSA jurisdiction, USCIB coordinates activities, recommends policies and investigates Security standards and practices. The Department of Defense is the Executive Agent for COMINT activities. Under the Secretary of Defense and in accordance with USCIB policies, the Director, NSA, operationally and technically controls all U.S. COMINT facilities.

To effect this control, the Director has developed a unique organization which is an integrated rather than a joint entity. All personnel, Army, Navy, Air Force, and civilian, are fused into a composite unit under the direction and control of the Director who is a career commissioned officer of the armed services, appointed by the Secretary of Defense after consultation with the JCS. He serves for a minimum of 4 years, is eligible for reappointment, and enjoys at least 3-star rank during his incumbency.

The Agency organization includes: a Directorate, a Staff, an Operating level and several Field Activities.

NSA is a line and staff organization. The Director exercises direct line control to the operating elements. The Staff provides guidance on specialized matters and thereby provides background information for the Director's decisions.

These decisions are the basis for instructions to the operating elements. Procedures for implementing the instructions are formed by the Staff, usually in coordination with the Operating elements. The Chiefs of Staff elements are responsible for furnishing the functional guidance required. The principles of the operating elements are responsible for the application of the functional guidance which they receive.

CHART #4b

NSA Field Activities are located in: (see chart). The Chiefs of these activities are charged, as personal representatives of the Director, (see chart).

Military personnel requirements of NSA are met by the Services within the allotment set by the Secretary of Defense for each Service. Presently employed at NSA are:

CHART #5

Totals by Service and grade are as follows:

CHART #6

The numbers of personnel engaged within the major subdivisions of the organization are:

CHART #6b

The relationships of NSA to the Services and their COMINT Agencies are portrayed on this chart:

CHART #7

The chain of command stems from the Secretary of Defense through the Departments and Agencies to the Operating Elements. Operational and Technical control is exercised by the Director, NSA, over the Service COMINT Activities.

Totals of personnel, intercept positions and stations throughout the world that are engaged in COMINT activities are given below: (on Chart 7).

The objective of this far-flung COMINT organization is to satisfy the intelligence requirements of the consumer within its capabilities. These requirements are levied and met in several ways. A list of National intelligence requirements in order of priority is prepared by the USCIB Intelligence Committee and forwarded to NSA with the approval of the Board. This list is modified, as necessary, to fit the peculiar capabilities of the COMINT activity. Upon receipt, NSA translates these requirements into COMINT targets for assignment to the various field units throughout the world.

CHART #8

COMINT intelligence requirements of Field Commanders are satisfied in the field in two ways, namely, Close-Support and Cross-Servicing. Close-Support is that support provided to a military commander in satisfaction of the immediate operational requirements of combat forces under his command for COMINT information relative to foreign forces directly opposing or of direct tactical concern to the commander. When the need for close support is justified and made known, the Director may delegate operational control to a subordinate COMINT unit for close support of a designated commander. Technical control including methods, operational procedures, etc. of these units remains with the Director.

Cross-Servicing is the means whereby the needs of one COMINT consumer may be satisfied by another department or agency participating in the National COMINT effort.

Thus, a commander may levy a requirement on any COMINT unit for information being produced by that unit, instead of being limited to the COMINT resources of his own Service. In this manner, an Army Commander in the field and a Navy Commander operating in adjacent waters can receive required Air Force-produced COMINT at the same time it is given to Air Force Commanders in the area.

CHART #9

As a result of these arrangement, COMINT information flows to the consumer whether at a National level or in the field, with the least possible delay.

In order to accomplish these tasks, thousands of highly skilled personnel and costly equipment are strategically placed throughout the world. This vast network requires the ultimate in communications to insure that the product is delivered in the shortest possible time. Some idea of the magnitude of this operation can be gained from the following statistics:

- CHART #10
- CHART #11
- CHART #12
- CHART #13

But, COMINT operations are only part, albeit an important one, of the NSA responsibilities. In addition to COMINT operations, NSA also has responsibilities and functions in the field of Communications Security, or COMSEC.

CHART #14

COMSEC may be defined as:

CHART #15

As shown on the chart, NSA administers its assigned responsibilities under the direction of the Secretary of Defense and is guided by the policies of the USCSB.

NSA responsibilities were established by the NSC in its Directive No. 168 of October 1953. This directive, restated provisions of a previous Presidential Directive and promulgated new provisions.

CHART #16

As constituted by the Special Committee of the NSC, USCSB is composed of one representative from each of the following:

CHART #17

~~COMSEC~~ COMSEC

As Executive Agent for all ~~COMSEC~~ matters, Defense is directed to:

CHART #18

The Director, NSA, acts for the Executive Agent in the fields of crypto-security, transmission security, physical security and cover and deception. It is his responsibility to:

CHART #19

In addition to these national responsibilities, the Director has been assigned international COMSEC responsibilities in support of NATO.

CHART #20

As shown on the chart, the NATO Communications Electronics Coordinating Section (CECS) is responsible to the Standing Group for the production, distribution, accounting and security of NATO cryptomateriel. CECS has

[Redacted]

In 1953, the Secretary

of Defense designated [Redacted]

[Redacted]

NSA furnishes two members to the CECS COMSEC Panel which performs COMSEC planning and coordinates activities in the safeguarding of NATO cryptomateriel.

In implementation of his COMSEC responsibilities, the Director produces and distributes COMSEC materials throughout the world. In the interest of speed, economy, and flexibility of operation, present production and distribution of COMSEC materials are dispersed among the following locations:

CHART #21

In anticipation of COMSEC requirements during a possible emergency, it is planned to further extend this dispersion to the following points:

CHART #21

Some appreciation of the magnitude of the COMSEC functions and responsibilities can be gained from the following statistics:

CHART #22

Because of the peculiar requirements of COMINT and COMSEC, the NSC has authorized and directed the Director, NSA, to conduct an NSA Research and Development program.

Within NSA, the Office of Research and Development implements all programs for research and development of cryptologic equipment and methods. The civilian head of R/D is a Deputy Director of NSA and is accountable to the Director for the fulfillment of the R/D function.

R/D at NSA is organized in support of major cryptologic operational functions. Included among its various components are:

CHART #23

The cost of these R/D activities is represented by the following:

CHART #24

NSA maintains many and devious channels for the administrative support of its operations. The Director is authorized to make requests of the JCS, the Military Departments, and other governmental agencies and activities for information and assistance which he requires.

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Accordingly, to obtain certain Service logistic support of its operation, NSA prepares and sends a detailed list of all required items to the appropriate Service. Dollar cost is not included. The Service includes these items in its own budget. A similar procedure is followed in requisitioning certain items, from other governmental agencies. All other operating costs, of NSA, are prepared and submitted in the following manner. Each NSA element prepares and forwards a cost estimate to the NSA Program and Budget Advisors. With the advice of this body, the Director reviews and approves an unclassified budget estimate and forwards it to the Army in two sections, namely, R/D and Maintenance and Operations. The Army includes these estimates in its own budget. NSA then prepares a detailed classified budget covering the same material for the approval of the Secretary of Defense. By this procedure, NSA justifies that part of the Army budget pertaining to NSA support. Upon Defense approval, NSA still must justify its budget before Congress when that body considers the Military estimates for the new Fiscal Year. All NSA monies, which are made available by Congress, are funded to NSA through the Army Signal Corps. Throughout this procedure, NSA controls its funds at all times.

A similar procedure is followed in the case of NSA civilian personnel. All NSA civilians are accounted for by the Army and not identified with NSA. For this purpose, NSA reports its civilian employee status periodically to the Army.

NSA communications link requirements are submitted to the Director, Communications Electronics who levies the Services as appropriate. These requirements include such data as: a list of required terminals, estimated traffic loads, etc.

The establishment of the many COMINT overseas stations involves the negotiations of Base Rights with the various foreign governments concerned.

In addition to the requirements submitted by the separate services, NSA submits a COMINT base requirements list annually to Defense (OSD) with an information copy to the DCE. These requirements correspond to the NSA Intercept Installation Deployment Plan and are coordinated informally with the Service Cryptologic Agencies. After approval, Defense passes the list to the JCS. The JCS forward the list of the JCS Executive Agent, who prepares implementing papers for review by State. State forwards the requirements to the Chief of Mission in the Nation concerned for preliminary negotiations to obtain agreement in principal and to designate national negotiators.

After agreement in principal has been reached, the Chief of Mission delegates the detailed negotiations to the JCS Area Commander. The Command negotiators are assisted by an NSA technical advisor and, when appropriate, by advisors from the Service Cryptologic Agency concerned.

As previously stated, NSA Field Activities have been established at various points throughout the world. This action was accomplished with the approval of the several Defense Executive Agents as requested by the Director, NSA. Logistic support of these activities is furnished by the appropriate Service Commanders at the direction of the Area Executive Agent.

The requirements for intercept positions and processing facilities are levied by NSA on the Services in its Intercept Deployment Plan. These intercept requirements are prepared by the NSA Operating element and reflect consumer intelligence requirements. U.S. Intercept Requirements were submitted to the Secretary of Defense for approval. Upon approval, these requirements were forwarded to the service cryptologic agencies by NSA for implementation under the Intercept

Deployment Plan. Subsequent changes are forwarded to the Service concerned for implementation.

Operational and technical control of U.S. COMINT facilities is exercised by the Director, NSA, either directly to the field units or through the Chief of the Agency concerned. Technical Control and Routine Operational Control instructions are sent directly to the field unit concerned. These instructions include such things as: techniques, methods and procedures used in intercept and analysis; task assignments, and the routine employment of personnel and facilities. Non-routine instructions are sent directly to the Chief of the COMINT Agency concerned for implementation. These instructions include task assignments and operational instructions requiring administrative or logistical action beyond mere employment of personnel and facilities available and ready for use and task assignments involving a major change of effort.

A great deal of internal and external coordination and planning in the cryptologic effort is accomplished through a wide variety of Boards, Panels and Committees. A few of these are:

- CHART #25
- #26
- #27
- #28
- #29
- #30
- #31
- #32
- #33

All NSA domestic activities which have been outlined are conducted in Washington at the U.S. Army Arlington Hall Station and at the Naval Security Station. The present facilities have served their purpose during the years of NSA growth and development but are now inadequate. The need for additional space,

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dispersion of governmental activities, and unification of NSA elements under one roof made a move necessary. Accordingly, the NSA organization will move into new quarters at Fort Meade, Maryland. The initial move will be made in January, 1955, and the final move in the fall of 1956.

The new site of approximately 200 acres will include an operations building, BOQ's and troop housing.

CHART #34

The operations building is represented here by the architects drawing.

CHART #35

It will cost:

CHART #36

(read statistics)

In addition to the operations building, several 500 man barracks and BOQ's will be provided to completely house the NSA Service personnel and a Wherry Housing project is being planned to accommodate NSA families.

CONCLUDING STATEMENTS

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POLICY ON LECTURES

1. Recently the Director approved in concept the request of the Commandant Armed Forces Staff College, Norfolk, Virginia for an NSA presentation which would be broader in scope than past presentations. Plans and Policy in coordination with Training and other activities will assemble material including visual aids and narrative suitable for use in this presentation. It is anticipated that similar or identical presentations may be required annually at the National War College and the Service War Colleges. Senior officials of the agency will be selected to deliver the NSA presentation at these schools. This memorandum is intended as a guide to assist the NSA representative who is responsible for a particular presentation.

2. Lecturers should avoid mentioning and attempt to suppress interrogation along the following specific lines:

a. COMINT Successes (Past, Present and Future): The urge to advertise NSA by reference to past COMINT successes may have great appeal. This practice must be avoided on the grounds of security. In addition, it is normally considered bad taste for a lecturer to overtly compliment the agency which he represents. The approved presentation material will contain a security limitation statement which will explain why discussion of successes must be avoided. If the subject is introduced by the audience it is suggested that they be reminded of this security statement and then be referred to such standard library references as "The Black Chamber", "The Pearl Harbor Report", and "War in the Ether." Extracts from these references should not be quoted and their content should not be evaluated.

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b. UKUSA Third Parties, etc. Any discussion of UKUSA relations and other foreign liaison activity, should be avoided. While this does not constitute a codeword security violation, it does exceed the need to know of the audience and could easily lead to misunderstanding, i.e., we trade secrets with foreign nationals which we withhold generally from US officials. Questions along this line should be parried by the admission that in some cases we arrange for the procurement of traffic which is intercepted by other than US sources.

c. Clearance, indoctrination and COMINT Service: In the services the determination of who is to receive COMINT items is a command responsibility. Any reference to means, the purpose, or to whom the various services provide access to COMINT is not an appropriate subject for comment by NSA representatives. Queries along this line should be answered by referring the individual to his own service channels and notifying him that when a genuine need to know exists, the individual must be cleared and indoctrinated before the COMINT material can be provided to him.

d. Polygraph: The use of the polygraph by NSA has been the subject of considerable criticism and adverse publicity for the agency. Direct discussion should be avoided. If it cannot be avoided, the lecturer should emphasize two main points. First, NSA is doing all within its power to use these machines intelligently and without embarrassment to its employees. Second, the machines, together with National Agency Checks, provide a valuable economical, and reliable means for clearing new employees on a temporary basis, prior to the completion of full background investigations.

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e. ELINT: NSA's charter does not cover electronics intelligence activities. We do liaison with cleared individuals of the proper ELINT activities (usually ANEEG) particularly when unidentified signals (those which may be communications or Electronic in nature) are being investigated. A question may be pointed at the allegation that NSA is actively seeking responsibility for and/or control of ELINT as part of its missions and functions. This allegation should be directly and summarily denied.

f. International COMSEC: NSA activities in support of NATO, SHAPE, DACLANT, etc., may be discussed. Foreign requests for specific COMSEC aid should not be discussed. Specific interrogations of this nature will best be countered by denying personal knowledge of any such negotiations.