Office Memorandum • United States Government

TO : COLONEL BIDWELL

DATE. 20 August 1954

FROM : SPECIAL STUDIES DIVISION

SUBJECT: Comments on "Codes and Ciphers," pp. 136-159.

- 1. The accomplishments in this field between World War I and Pearl Harbor are among the brightest aspects of military intelligence in the U. S. Army. Yet with all these accomplishments the war was opened with the most destructive surprise in our history. Clearly this was not due to a failure of Signal Corps intelligence. The failure will be found elsewhere.
 - 2. Detailed comments:
 - p. 139. Delete the word "consequential."
- p. 144, footnote. Here you infer that President Hoover might have been the one to cause Mr. Stimson to take the action he did. This is certainly not good history and the inference should be deleted unless you can show that President Hoover directed Mr. Stimson to take such action. Mr. Hoover is still living and his memory might suffice to get the answer. However, it is very doubtful because of the enormous responsibilities that he has had as well as because of his age. Your note is particularly bad inasmuch as you use evidence of his attitude while in charge of European relief as an indication of his probable reaction in this matter. The footnote should be changed.
 - p. 145, 6th line from bottom. Delete the word "inexpedient."
- p. 150. It is interesting to note that when General Malin Craig became Chief of Staff General Maughorne soon became Chief Signal Officer. He had been Chief Signal Officer of the I Army Corps in France while General Craig was Chief of Staff. He had also twice served General Craig as departmental of corps area Signal officer. I am quite sure that this close association was important in enabling General Maughorne to secure better support for Signal intelligence, a subject which had long been something more than a hobby with him.
 - p. 151, line 14 from top. Spelling of "hence"

(Mr. 1 Colmes

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