

File~~SECRET~~Serial: 00724
8 NOV 1954col.
Bidwell

Colonel Bruce W. Bidwell, USA (Ret.)
Office of the Chief of Military History
Room 1D635, The Pentagon
Department of the Army
Washington 25, D. C.

Dear Colonel Bidwell:

Receipt of your letter of 2 November 1954 is acknowledged.

I concur with General Mauborgne in thinking that some mention of the collaboration with the British in the communication intelligence field would be warranted in your history of the Military Intelligence Division and I therefore enclose a brief statement pertaining thereto.

It may be that General Mauborgne "feared that the Navy was about to send over one of these machines and steal Army thunder" but this is certainly not in accordance with the account contained in the official AEA history, nor is it in accordance with my quite clear recollection of the events in question, gained from first-hand contact with them. Indeed, my recollection is that the Navy was quite reluctant about the whole business of collaboration and had to be persuaded more or less to go into it. In any case, I think that part of the story of small consequence and I hope you will agree in the propriety of omitting questionable data of that sort.

Thank you for your information regarding Fabyan and his authorship. The situation is as I explained to you on the telephone: he never wrote anything but letters; he had the writings of others copyrighted in his name.

May I reiterate that we would like very much to have a copy or two of your history when it is issued, these to be for our official library?

Sincerely,

Declassified and approved for release by NSA on 03-27-2014 pursuant to E.O. 13526

WILLIAM F. FRIEDMAN
Special Assistant

Incl: cc: AG
a/s C/S
S/ASST (Mr. Friedman) ~~_____~~
M/R: Self-explanatory

~~SECRET~~

Captain McDonald, USAF/60493/5Nov54/can

00724

8 NOV 1954

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Discussions between the Army and the Navy in regard to crypt-analytic cooperation with the British began in the summer of 1940, and after detailed consideration of the matter the Director of Naval Communications and the Chief Signal Officer recommended to their respective superiors that a mission consisting of two officers from the Army Signal Intelligence organization and two from the Navy Communication Intelligence organization be sent to London to initiate collaboration. The recommendation was accepted and in January 1941 the mission left, taking with them two "Purple" machines, data for employing them in reading the Japanese highest-level diplomatic traffic, and certain other material. (The Japanese "Purple" cryptosystem and machine had been solved by Army cryptanalysts headed by Mr. Friedman; this was a feat the British cryptanalysts had given up.) In exchange, the U.S. got from the British such valuable information in connection with German and Italian systems. Army and Navy collaboration with the British began on an active basis soon thereafter and reached the point where in 1944 the two Services were in touch by radio, on a daily 24-hour basis, with the British organization. Agreements were entered into between the U.S. and the U.K. whereby the U.S. had primary responsibility for communication intelligence activities in the Pacific, the U.K. had similar responsibility in the Atlantic and in Europe. Results and technical data were exchanged freely, under certain strict controls.

~~SECRET~~

Inclosure

MEMO ROUTING SLIP

REF ID: A70113
FOR USE FOR APPROVALS, DISAPPROVALS,
CONCURRENCES, OR SIMILAR ACTIONS

1	NAME OR TITLE RADM FROST	INITIALS F	CIRCULATE
	ORGANIZATION AND LOCATION g/s	DATE	COORDINATION
2	7012 Friedman		FILE
			INFORMATION
3			<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> NECESSARY ACTION
			NOTE AND RETURN
4			SEE ME
			SIGNATURE

REMARKS

- The g-v history is to be classified SECRET.
- Herewith draft of a proposed para on US-UK collaboration, condensed from some of our official historical documents.

FROM NAME OR TITLE

ORGANIZATION AND LOCATION

DATE

4 Nov 54

TELEPHONE

DD FORM 1 FEB 50 95

Replaces DA AGO Form 895, 1 Apr 46, and AFHQ Form 12, 10 Nov 47, which may be used.

16-48487-4 GPO

MEMO ROUTING SLIP

NECESSARY FOR APPROVALS, DISAPPROVALS,
CORRECTIONS, OR SIMILAR ACTIONS

1 NAME OR TITLE	INITIALS	CIRCULATE
<i>Mr. Friedman</i>		
ORGANIZATION AND LOCATION	DATE	COORDINATION
2		FILE
		INFORMATION
3		NECESSARY ACTION
		NOTE AND RETURN
4		SEE ME
		SIGNATURE

REMARKS

1. I am familiar with existing policies on release of FBI. I must get some material. Do you consider it appropriate to stretch this policy on unclassified histories? If so, go ahead.

FROM NAME OR TITLE	DATE
ORGANIZATION AND LOCATION	TELEPHONE
<i>o/s</i>	

MEMO ROUTING SLIP

NEVER USE FOR APPROVALS, DISAPPROVALS,
CONCURRENCES, OR SIMILAR ACTIONS

1	NAME OR TITLE RADM FROST	INITIALS		CIRCULATE
	ORGANIZATION AND LOCATION c/s	DATE		COORDINATION
2				FILE
				INFORMATION
3				NECESSARY ACTION
				NOTE AND RETURN
4				SEE ME
				SIGNATURE

REMARKS

1. Last Sept, I had the task of reviewing Col. Bidwell's draft memo of History of Mil Int Dir - I see letter attached.
2. Herewith a personal ltr to me from Col. Bidwell, requesting certain info. re a US-UK exchange of Tech material in 1940.
3. I agreed that the episode was very important & probably should be included. Disclosure of the deal was made in the course of Pearl Harbor Investigation.

FROM NAME OR TITLE J (over)	DATE 2 Jul 54
ORGANIZATION AND LOCATION	TELEPHONE

REF ID: A70110
4. Gen. Mambona, ~~and~~ Boston's
faulty — there was complete
coordination between A & N on
this deal + I was in on the
negotiations between the two
Services.

5. Rec I be authorized to
write up the episode + submit
for your approval.

J.

2 November 1954

Mr. William A. Friedman
National Security Agency
Washington 25, D. C.

Dear Sir:

I wish to express my sincere appreciation for the very kind comments you recently made in connection with the Code and Cipher chapter of my draft MID History covering the peacetime years (1919-1941). They are already proving to be most helpful in my current final revision task. May I ask your further indulgence in order to clear up another point?

The following statement was contained in General Mauborgne's letter of comment:

"I suggest that one or more paragraphs be inserted in the present text to cover the fact that I persuaded Secretary Stimson to let the Army send one of the Army-designed Japanese diplomatic code-breaking machines to the British High Command in London together with certain experts to demonstrate the use thereof, since we feared that the Navy was about to send over one of these machines and steal Army thunder. Mr. Friedman can give the entire story and state just what we got from the British in return -- a most important swap worth recording on the pages of history."

I agree with General Mauborgne that this exchange should be mentioned and hope that you may see fit to fill out the gap for me, including the time element.

Incidentally, Mr. Fabyan did publish two books in regard to his Bacon decipherment effort. They are presently very difficult to locate but I secured both of them through the Department of the Army inter-library loan service. I only made full note of one of them, however, as follows:

George Fabyan, The Keys for Deciphering the Greatest Work of Sir Francis Bacon (Geneva, Ill. 1916).

Sincerely yours

Bruce W. Bidwell
BRUCE W. BIDWELL
Colonel U.S.A. Ret.

7-11-54

~~SECRET~~

Serial: 00605

17 SEP 1954

~~SECRET~~

Major General A.C. Smith, USA
 Office of the Chief of Military History
 Department of the Army
 Washington 25, D. C.

Dear Sir:

The draft of a "History of the Military Intelligence Division, Department of the Army General Staff," has been reviewed by Mr. William F. Friedman of this Agency. He has indicated a few amendments in pencilled notes on the manuscript, and adds the comment that, though very brief, the history does cover what he regards as the most important features and developments of the period 1919-1941.

In case there is need to consult him further in this connection Mr. Friedman will be glad to confer with Colonel Midwell. He can be reached on Extension 60493.

Sincerely,

L. H. FROST

L. H. FROST
 Rear Admiral, U. S. Navy
 Chief of Staff

Incl: Ms

cc: AG
 C/S
 S/ASST (Mr. Friedman)

M/R: Manuscript "History of the Military Intel. Div., Dept of the Army General Staff" forwarded to Mr. Friedman for his comments because of his familiarity with the subject. Herewith comments and return of Ms.

 Capt McDonald, USAF/60493/15Sept54/can

~~SECRET~~DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF MILITARY HISTORY
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

IN REPLY REFER TO: HIS

23 AUG 1954

Director,
National Security Agency
Washington 25, D. C.
ATTN: Mr. William F. Friedman

Dear Sir:

Inclosed herewith are draft copies of two sections (Initial Readjustment, pp. 1-30; Codes and Ciphers, pp. 136-159) of a "History of the Military Intelligence Division, Department of the Army General Staff," covering the period 1919-1941, prepared by Col. Bruce W. Bidwell, Infantry, U.S.A.

Your comments, both general and specific, concerning the material contained in these documents are requested in order that the subject may be developed in the most comprehensive and accurate manner possible. In spite of the fact that careful attention has been given to research in original records, it is realized that there are gaps in the story. Because of your familiarity with the subject it is believed that you can make a substantial contribution to this important work. When completed it will fill a void now existing in American military history.

A self addressed envelope is inclosed for the return of the document with your comments.

Sincerely,

A. C. SMITH
Major General, USA
Chief, Military History

- 2 Incls.
1. Ms
2. Return envelope

~~SECRET~~

A17

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Extract from "History of the Military Intelligence Division, Department of the Army General Staff," covering the period 1919-1941, prepared by Col. Bruce W. Bidwell, Infantry, USA*

Early in July 1940, when it first became apparent that President Roosevelt intended to appoint Mr. Stimson to be the new Secretary of War, both Brig Gen Sherman Miles, ACoFS, G-2, and Maj Gen Joseph O. Mauborgne, Chief Signal Officer, were exceedingly apprehensive that this action might cause a serious curtailment in the rapidly developing Army communications intelligence effort. General Mauborgne, therefore, proceeded to visit the White House in order to discuss this matter with Maj Gen Edwin M. Watson, the Military Aide. As a result, it was indicated that the President desired the Army to continue with this effort and the War Department received instructions "not to let Secretary Stimson know that this was being done." See: Memo, Edward A. Tamm to Director, 5 Jul 40, File 62-9798-88, Records of FBI, Washington, D. C.

*Sent for review in ltr 23 Aug 54 by Maj Gen A.C. Smith, Chief, Military History to Director, NSA, Attn: Mr. William F. Friedman

~~SECRET~~