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MEMORANDUM FOR DIRECTOR, THE JOINT STAFF

SUBJECT: Plans of the Defense Communications Agency for Exercising Authority and Identifying Components of the Defense Communications System (U)

- REFERENCES: (a) Memo for the Director, NSA, Serial DJSM-1060-60, subject as above, dtd 20 December 1960.
- (b) JCS 222/222, subject: Plans for Exercising The Authority of The Chief, Defense Communications Agency (U), dtd 29 November 1960.
- (c) JCS 222/224, subject: Plan For The Identification And Activation of The Components of The Defense Communications System (U), dtd 6 December 1960.

1. A study of references b and c, as suggested in reference a, has raised several questions regarding certain provisions of inclosures 1, 2 and 5, although in general NSA is in accord with the tenor of the documents. Our concern lies in the lack of specific definition of the responsibilities of the Director, DCA as related to those of the Director, NSA. Our comments are presented, therefore, in the form of assumptions regarding these possibly conflicting responsibilities.

2. It is assumed that the Director, DCA in exercising his authority:

a. Will recognize the authority and responsibility of the Director, NSA, for preserving the physical and communications security of COMINT operations, particularly as such authority and responsibility applies to the closed SIGINT communications system (CRITICOMM).

b. Will not unilaterally divert indispensable communications circuitry necessary for the conduct of SIGINT operations. NSA is almost totally dependent upon communications facilities operated by other agencies for the normal conduct of SIGINT business. While NSA cannot be viewed literally as a tactical organization, nevertheless,

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the effectiveness of the COMINT/ELINT effort is largely dependent upon the continuous availability to NSA of large-scale world-wide telecommunication facilities.

c. Will recognize the authority of the DIRNSA to "control traffic and the cryptographic operations" of CRITICOMM as provided in DOD S-5100.19. In this context, a resolution of the word "supervise" in Section V para 3h of inclosure 1, is considered essential.

d. Will not unilaterally modify the provisions of DCID 7/1 ("Handling of Critical Intelligence") or DOD Directive S-5100.19 ("Implementation of NSCID #7").

e. Will recognize the authority of NSA in the field of COMSEC as provided in DOD C-5200.5. In this regard, it is felt that some ambiguity may exist in Section II and para 2f., Section V of inclosure 1.

f. Will distinguish COMSEC R/D from communications R/D in exercising his R/D coordinating authority. (Paras 5a. and c. of Section V, inclosure 1, and inclosure 5 generally refer). Generally COMSEC R/D programs of the Military Departments are included within their communications R/D programs. Provisions for COMSEC R/D authority are covered in DOD C-5200.5 and a forthcoming DOD Directive covering Policies and Procedures for Communications Security Research and Development. NSA is charged with the responsibility of coordinating all cryptosecurity R/D.

3. Members of my staff will be available to amplify the points made above and to assist your staff in any action required.

Cy. F. Enderlin:
 Chief, DCA
 OSD (S+L)
 OSD/OSO

L. H. Frost
 L. H. FROST
 Vice Admiral, USN
 Director

cc: DIR
 AG
 Reading File

TCOM
 CSEC-04
 R/D STED
 OPS

M/R: Self-explanatory. Coordinated with TCOM (Capt Enderlin); CSEC-04 (Lt Col Anderson); R/D STED (Mr Wolfand).

R. P. FLOYD/OPS/4994s/5 Jan 61/ej