LIVITED DISTRIBUTION

Summary of Mr. Kissinger--Le Duc Tho Paris
Peace Talks





DELTA CONTROLLED ITEIX





PARIS

Message #1

From:

Saigon

To: Paris

20 November 1972

Initial interview by South Vietnamese negotiator, Pham Dang Lam, with Henry Kissinger. Kissinger reported that he will raise all of the South Vietnamese objections to the draft treaty, but cautions South Vietnam that he holds little hope of obtaining all that South Vietnam asks on two key points:

1) the withdrawal of North Vietnamese troops, and 2) the changing of the composition of the National Council for Concord and Reconciliation.

Message #2

From:

Saigon

To: Paris

20 November 1972

Saigon reiterates conditions it will insist on:

1. North Vietnamese Troop Withdrawal

- Makeup of National Committee on Reconciliation and Concord
- 3. Makeup of International Conference

4. Respect for DMZ

Saigon also thought "the false air of optimism the U.S. Government is building up" should be dissipated.

Message #3

From: Paris

To: Saigon

20 November 1972

Kissinger informs the South Vietnamese that he had given Le Duc Tho the list of 69 modifications to the draft treaty. Le Duc Tho will respond to modifications at next meeting, but Kissinger cautions South Vietnamese to begin to plan for compromise.





LIMITED DISTRIBUTION



Message #4 From: Saigon To: Paris 21 November 1972

Saigon instructs representatives in Paris to "squeeze the most news out of Kissinger", to intensify deep backgrounders to press and friendly circles stressing Nixon Doctrine, and POWs exchange as bargaining issue.

Message #5 From: Paris To: Saigon 22 November 1972

General Haig briefed South Vietnamese that the North Vietnamese had rejected practically all of the requests for modification. General points demanded by the North Vietnamese:


- 1. Withdrawal of the U.S. and allied troops in addition to foreign civilians under contract to companies working under auspices of armed forces.
- 2. Establishment of the National Council within 15 days after signing, elections within 5 months, and the resignation of President Thieu two months before election.

Haig stated that Washington had report SVN "stalling for time" and warned against disasterous consequences if negotiations break down because of SVN actions.

Message #6 From: Paris To: Saigon 22 November 1972

Forwarding of texts of new articles proposed by North Vietnam. No comments on South Vietnamese reactions.





BIVOLED BIGINDEUTICA

TOP SECRET UMBRA

Message #7

From: Saigon

To: Paris

22 November 1972

Message contained instructions to Paris Delegation calling for condemnation of North Viet Nam's position and intransigeance. Message also indicates that SVN cannot consider other points of contention (DMZ, used up war material, etc.) until their two basic prinicples, "namely the North Vietnam troops and the National Council of Council and Concord" are being resolved.

Message #8

From: Saigon

To: Paris

22 November 1972

Responding to the North Vietnam proposals for change in Articles, Saigon states that South Vietnam cannot consider these points until the two basic problems are solved: 1) the withdrawal of North Vietnamese troops and, 2) a change in the composition and function of the National Council.

Message #9

From: Saigon

To: Paris

20 November 1972

Message contains SVN assessment of proposed NVN changes. SVN remains firm on NVN troop withdrawal, and National Council of Reconciliation & Concord. SVN also considers the linking of the release of POWs to the release of political prisoners an internal affair to be solved by the two SVN parties. Additional subjects covered in the message concern the DMZ, a reference to three Indochinese states, the wording of the preamble, insistence that the U.S. - GVN relationship be a separate agreement, the SVN version of the ICCS & protocol commissions.

DELTA CONTROLLO ITEMA

TOP SECRET UMBRA

TOP SECRET UMBRA DELTA COMMON TEM

Message #10 From: Paris To: Saigon . 18 November 1972

Paris requests essential points contained in President Nixon's letter to President Thieu.

Message #11 From: Saigon To: Paris 19 November 1972

Paris informed that the letter from President Nixon to President Thieu did not contain anything new concerning the U.S. position.

Message #12 From: Paris To: Saigon 22 November


Kissinger informs South Vietnamese that at the session for 22 November he plans to return to the question of North Vietnamese troop withdrawals. Acknowledging South Vietnamese reservations about a new U.S. proposal on the DMZ, Kissinger agreed to withhold presenting it until a formulation is forwarded from Saigon.

Message #13 From Saigon To: Paris 23 November 1972

Reports that Professor Nguyen Tien Nhung arrived in Paris to confer with Ambassador Pham Dang Lam and General Tran Van Don.

Message #14 From: Paris To: Saigon 23 November 1972

SVN negotiator reports on 22 November session with Mr. Kissinger. Mr. Kissinger asked SVN negotiator if instructions had been received from SAigon to which the SVN negotiator gave the tenor of their earlier position. Mr. Kissinger, according to the SVN negotiator launched an attack against an organized press and radio campaign presently being carried on in Saigon aimed at the U.S. Government and him (Mr. Kissinger) personally. Mr. Kissinger, according to the message, went on to take issue with SVN "Maneuver to gain time" SVN foot dragging, lack in Paris of SVN individual with "power to make quick decisions on the spot," and his obligation to negotiate according to my (Mr. Kissinger) best judgment. Mr. Kissinger indicated that NVN was already reviewing the Draft Protocol and



TOP SECRET UMBRA DILIA CONTROLLO ITEM

that Le Duc Tho could refuse to modify the draft in which case SVN will have impeded the signing of an agreement thereby having a disasterous effect when U.S. Congress reconvenes in January. The other option open to Le Duc Tho is to make modifications in which case the U.S. will have no choice but to accept the compromise solution.

The SVN negotiator reported his impression that the U.S. and NVN will reach an agreement which will be a little better than the present draft but which would not correspond to SVN desires.

Message #15 From: Saigon To: Paris 23 November 1972

Saigon asks that Kissinger be informed that as long as the two main problems are not solved--North Vietnamese withdrawal and the formation of the National Council--it is not useful to enter into the details of the other points. Saigon also requests that Kissinger be queried as to whether the North Veitnamese have rejected the South Vietnamese proposal for a "two phased" withdrawal of all foreign troops and a demobilization of the ARVN and NLF forces.

Message #16 From: Saigon To: Washington 24 November 1972 and Paris

Denies reports that Radio Saigon has launched a personal attack on Kissinger. Radio Saigon was only reviewing the press reports of the negotiations.

Message #17 From: Paris To: Saigon 23 November 1972

Paris forwards a recapitulation of the four Kissinger--Le Duc Tho meetings, listing proposed changes to the draft accords.

Message #18 From: Paris To: Saigon 23 November 1972

Paris advises Saigon that Le Duc Tho through Kissinger had responded negatively to two points, one of which concerned "on the basis of one-for-one and return to their native places."



/5

TOP SECRET UMB

PPT TA CONTRACTOR OF THE A A

Message #19

From: Paris

To: Saigon

24 November 1972

Kissinger informes South Vietnam that, contrary to his expectations, North Vietnam made no important concessions at the 23 November meeting and throughout all four meetings he has been able to obtain only a few modifications.

Because Le Duc Tho implied North Vietnam would make no further concessions, Kissinger stated that there are three options open to South Vietnam:

- 1. We maintain our position in full, thus risking a breakdown in negotiations.
- 2. Be content with what has been obtained thus far on the condition that North Vietnam concedes on a few additional points, namely, demobilization on a one-for-one basis, and a change in the wording for the establishment of the National Council.
- 3. Accept the agreement in its present form with the condition that South Vietnam will free political prisoners in exchange for a de facto withdrawal of North Vietnamese units in Military Region 1.

Kissinger expressed his preference for the second option and that continued support for SVN by the U.S. Government, Congress and public is more important to South Vietnam than satisfaction concerning clauses in the agreement.

Message #20 From: Paris To: Saigon 24 November 1972

The Paris Delegation advised Saigon that they were continuing to refuse the communist demand for release of political detainees at the same time as the release of POWs.

Message #21 From: Saigon To: Paris 24 November 1972

Saigon asked Paris to immediately respond to an earlier Saigon message.





oF

AN INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE, ACCORDING TO KISSINGER, LON NOL REPORTEDLY DOES NOT INTEND TO PARTICIPATE SO AS NOT TO BRING UP THE CASE OF (CEXILED PRINCE NORODOM)) SIHANOUK, AS FOR SOUVANNA PHOUMA, HE REPORTEDLY DOES NOT LIKE TO ((1 WD G)) HIS PRESENT SITUATION THAT IT SOUNDS AS THOUGH THE 1962 GENEVA ACCORDS IS TO BE BROUGHT AGAIN BEFORE ANOTHER CONFERENCE. CONCERNING THE PARTICIPATION OF JAPAN, KISSINGER REVEALED THAT HANDI DEMANDS THE PRESENCE OF INDIA (C VAL WITH) THE CANDIDACY OF JAPAN. IF WE WANT JAPAN TO PARTICIPATE IN THE CONFERENCE, WE MUST ALSO ADMIT INDIA. KISSINGER WISHES TO KNOW IMMEDIATELY THE OPINION OF OUR GOVERNMENT. ON THE DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE DRAFT AGREEMENT GIVEN ((US)) BY KISSINGER ON 19 OCTOBER AND THE TEXT BROUGHT BY ((THE U.S. DEPUTY MATIONAL SECURITY ADVISOR, GENERAL ALEXANDER M.)) HAIG, KISSINGER OPPOINTED OUT THAT THE LATTER IS UP TO DATE. THE KISSINGER DRAFT WAS O MODIFIED ON CERTAIN POINTS AFTER AN EXCHANGE OF VIEWS WITH NORTH VIETNAM. KISSINGER PROMISED TO RESTORE THE FORMER WORDING CONCERN-ING THE REPLACMENT OF MAR MATERIAL DESTROYED, DAMAGED, WORN OUT. AND USED UP. IT WAS ALSO AGREED THAT IMMEDIATELY AFTER EACH SESSION KISSINGER OR A MEMBER OF HIS DELEGATION WILL GIVE US AN ACCOUNT ((OF WHAT TRANSPIRED)). AMBASSADOR VUONG VAN BAC HAS ALREADY ARRIVED. TRAN KIM PHUONG IS EXPECTED MONDAY. W ((1)) DEPUTY SOUTH VIETNAMESE NEGOTIATOR AT THE PARTS PEACE TALKS. ACCORDING TO PRESS OF 8 SEP 72. XXHH S 870

#1)

而 NNNN

S

CLA

CLASS

#0656

ecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Litle 18, U.S e transmission or the revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

LASSIFIED

CONCORD)) WE FIRMLY OBJECT TO THE THREE EQUAL COMPONENTS AND MAKE SURE THAT IT HAS NO GOVERNMENTAL FUNCTIONS. WE MAY AGREE TO A

ON THE INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE WE HAVE DROPPED JAPAN INSISTED ON KEEPING CAMBODIA AND LAOS. ALSO WE WANT THE CONFERENCE TO BE CONVENED ONLY AFTER CEASE-FIRE AND TROOP OTHERWISE IT WOULD BE TWITHDRAWAL IN LAOS AND CAMBODIA ALSO. OTHERWISE IT WOULD THE OFFICIALIZATION OF THE PRG ((PROVISIONAL REVOLUTIONARY GOVERNMENT)).

5. I THINK KISSINGER IS TRYING TO COAX THE GVN ((GOVERNMENT VIETNAM)) INTO ACCEPTING NORTH VIETNAMESE DEMANDS. I THINK YOU SHOULD DISSIPATE THE FALSE AIR OF OPTIMISM THE U.S. GOVERNMENT BUILDING UP.

XXHH

500

#8319

Sunnn

CLASSIFIED WORK SHEE # U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE, 1972-460-250

PL 86-36/50 USC 3605

#3701/3001 3260142

Z 2 10 14 0Z NOV 72 ZYH

FM DIRNSA TO WHITE HOUSE (ATTN MR DAVID MCMANIS FOR SERIES CHECK) ZIM

SECTION ONE OF TWO

VIETNAMESE (SOUTH)

S

XXMME NPØ1-0072326

Z CZ CE XA4 92

Doc ID: 6549596 Doc Ref ID: A504075

ASSIFIED

ป_{ZZ}

ZNY MMNSH

EXCLUSIVELY FOR DELTA CONTROL OFFICER

WARNING: THE COMINT CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNUSUALLY SELSITIVE. O IF A USIB MEMBER (OR HIS SPECIALLY DESIGNATED DEPUTY) APPROVES THE USE OF THIS COMPARTMENTED ITEM IN A TOP SECRET CODEWORD L PUBLICATION. THE PRECISE COMINT SOURCE OR TARGET (WHICHEVER

TO IS SENSITIVE) SHOULD BE CONCEALED TO THE MAXIMUM DEGREE POSSIBLE O AND NO REFERENCE SHOULD BE MADE TO THE NSA DELTA REFERENCE SERIAL. ¶ IN ALL OTHER CASES. THIS MATERIAL MUST BE MAINTAINED UNDER DELTA

SECURITY CONTROLS. TRANSMITTED HEREWITH IS A SOUTH VIETNAMESE MESSAGE. NORMAL DISTRIBUTION FOR THIS MESSAGE IS IN THE DELTA SUBSERIES DOLL-VND. PLEASE ADVISE IF ANY LIMITATIONS OVER AND ABOVE EXISTING DELTA RESTRICTIONS ARE REQUIRED. THIS MESSAGE WAS

TRANSMITTED TO THE WHITE HOUSE ONLY.

3/00/DOLL-VND/T SOUTH VIETNAMESE NEGOTIATORS REPORT FIRST KISSINGER BRIEFING

XXCC PARIS: SOUTHVIETNAMESE DELEGATION. ((AMBASSADOR)) PHAM DANG LAM

FRENCH

E TO 20 NOV 72 2120H PRESIDENCY: ((PRESIDENTIAL SAIGON: S ADSSISTANT)) HOANG DUC NHA

MINSTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS

26/PDVN/TM

TERNAL AGENCY USE ONLY

CLASSIFIED WORK

```
WITH (DR. HENRY A. )) KISSINGER AT 1830 HOURS. KISSINGER INFORMED
  US THAT HIS MEETING WITH LE DUC THO LASTED FROM 1030 HOURS TO 1600
 HOURS. LE DUC THO OPENED THE SESSION WITH A LONG STATEMENT IN
 WHICH HE ACCUSED THE UNITED STATES OF HAVING BROKEN ITS PROMISE TO
 SIGN THE AGREEMENT ON 31 OCTOBER. KISSINGER RESPONDED BY RECALLING
 THAT IT HAD BEEN CLEARLY SPECIFIED THAT EVERYTHING WHICH WAS AGREED
 TO BETWEEN HIM AND LE DUC THO WAS TO BE REFERRED TO SAIGON.
 AT THE RESUMPTION OF THE SESSION ((IN THE )) AFTERNOON. LE DUC THO
oldsymbol{\Omega} asked kissinger what changes our side desired to make to the text
    THE DRAFT AGREEMENT. KISSINGER THEN GAVE A LISTING OF THE
 SIXTY - NINE MODIFICATIONS WHICH WE HAVE REQUESTED, THE LIST WHICH
() WAS GIVEN ((TO GENERAL HAIG)) BY ((U.S. AMBASSADOR ELLSWORTH))
 BUNKER AT SAIGON. LE DUC THO TOOK NOTE ((OF OUR LIST)) WITH
 SARCASTIC COMMENT ON THE SO-CALLED TECHNICAL NATURE OF THESE
 MODIFICATIONS. IN HIS TURN LE DUC THO ASKED KISSINGER HOW THE
 CESSATION OF HOSTILITIES IN LAOS AND CAMBODIA COULD COINCIDE WITH
OA CEASEFIRE IN SOUTH VIETNAM. "WITH SIMULTANEOUS STATEMENTS
☐ ((ANNOUNCING A CEASEFIRE)) BY BOTH SIDES", ANSWERED KISSINGER.
LE DUC THO ALSO POSED QUESTIONS ABOUT THE ORGANIZATION OF THE
CONTROL COMMISSIONS AND ABOU THE MANNER IN WHICH THE U.S.
O ENVISIONED THE REPATRIATION OF THE POW'S. ON THE FIRST POINT.
lacktriang Kissinger insisted upon the Necessity for signing of different
 PROTOCOLS AT THE SAME TIME AS THE ((SIGNING OF )) THE CEASEFIRE
 AGREEMENT. DURING THE BREAK BETWEEN SESSIONS, KISSINGER BROUGHT
 TO/LE DUC THO'S ATTENTION THE PRIME IMPORTANCE WHICH THE GOVERNMENT
    ((THE REPUBLIC)) OF VIETNAM ATTACHED TO THE QUESTION OF NORTH
 VIETNAMESE TROOPS IN SOUTH VIETNAM. HE EMPHASIZED THAT THE SATIS-
 FACTORY SETTLEMENT OF THIS QUESTION WOULD FACILITATE THE
  SOLUTION OF OTHER PROBLEMS. LE DUC THO LET IT BE UNDERSTOOD
 THAT IF WE RAISED THIS QUESTION HE WOULD AGAIN OPEN THAT OF
 POLITICAL PRISONERS. WE MADE THE OBSERVATION THAT THESE WERE TWO
 DIFFERENT PROBLEMS. IN ANY CASE. ((SHOULD)) HANOI COMMIT ITSELF
 TO WITHDRAWING ALL THEIR TROOPS. THE LIBERATION OF POLITICAL PRISONERS
 COULD BE EXAMINED.
      PARTICULARLY REGARDING THE WITHDRAWAL OF NORTH VIETNAMESE
```

WITH AMBASSADOR PHUONG BAC AND NGUYEN XUAN PHONG. WE MET TODAY

PARTICULARLY REGARDING THE WITHDRAWAL OF NORTH VIETNAMESE
TROOPS AND THE CNCR ((NATIONAL COUNCIL FOR CONCORD AND RECONCILIATION))
THERE ARE THE MODIFICATIONS PROPOSED BY KISSINGER:

Ш ХХНН

<u>II</u> 9ØØ

ິດ #37Ø1 ທ

NNNN

of the Espionage Laws, Title 18, U.S. person is prohibited by law.

WARNING: THE COMINT CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNUSUALLY SENSITIVE.

IF A USIB MEMBER (OR HIS SPECIALLY DESIGNATED DEPUTY) APPROVES

THE USE OF THIS COMPARTMENTED ITEM IN A TOP SECRET CODEWORD
PUBLICATION, THE PRECISE COMINT SOURCE OR TARGET (WHICHEVER
IS SENSITIVE) SHOULD BE CONCEALED TO THE MAXIMUM DEGREE POSSIBLE
AND NO REFERENCE SHOULD BE MADE TO THE NSA DELTA REFERENCE SERIAL.
IN ALL OTHER CASES, THIS MATERIAL MUST BE MAINTAINED UNDER DELTA

SECURITY CONTROLS.

TRANSMITTED HEREWITH IS A SOUTH VIETNAMESE MESSAGE.

NORMAL DISTRIBUTION FOR THIS MESSAGE IS IN THE DELTA SUBSERIES OF DOLL-VND. PLEASE ADVISE IF ANY LIMITATIONS OVER AND ABOVE EXISTING DELTA RESTRICTIONS ARE REQUIRED. THIS MESSAGE WAS TRANSMITTED TO THE WHITE HOUSE ONLY.

VIETNAMESE (SOUTH) FRENCH XXMMENPØ2F0072326 3/00/DOLL-VND/T -72

SOUTH VIETNAMESE NEGOTIA RS REPORT FIRST KISSINGER RIEFING

. .

XXCC

ON THE QUESTION OF NORTH VIETNAMESE TROOPS, KISSINGER PROPOSED TWO FORMULATIONS AT THE ME TIME, NAMELY:

1. THE WITHDRAWAL OF ALL FORCES -- U.S., ALLIED, AND NON-

□ SOUTH VIETNAME SE: ((AND))

2. A DEMOBILISATION OF TROOPS ON A ONE-FOR-ONE BASIS AND

RETURNING THEM TO THEIR PLACE OF BIRTH.

MOREOVER, THE PRINCIPLE THAT THE ARMED FORCES OF EACH
COUNTRY MUST REMAIN WITHIN THEIR NATIONAL FRONTIERS WAS ALSO PROPOSED
IN THE CHAPTER ((REFERRING TO)) LAOS AND CAMBODIA. ACCORDING TO
KISSINGER THE COMMUNIST SIDE WOULD BE OBLIGED TO ACCEPT AT LEAST ONE
OF THESE THREE FORMULAS.

CONCERNING THE CNCR, THE MODIFICATIONS PROPOSED HAVE BEEN (B VAL TREATED) ((AS FOLLOWS)):

1. THE DESIGNATION IN VIETNAMESE -- WHICH RECOMES "ADMINISTRATIVE ORGAN" RATHER THAN "GOVERNING APPARATUS."

2. THE COMPOSITION -- TO REPLACE THE THREE COMPONENTS BY RE-PRESENTATIVES OF ALL POLITICAL INCLINATIONS IN SOATH VIETNAM.

3. THE FUNCTION-- IT WILL BE SPECIFIED THAT THE CNCR WILL HAVE AS ITS PRINCIPAL TASK THE ORGANIZING OF ELECTIONS, ((AND)) IN ADDITION, THE PROMTION OF THE APPLICATION OF THE AGREEMENT FOR NATIONAL RECONCILIATION AND CONCORD AND DEMOCRATIC LIBERTIES U(INCLUDING A REFERENCE TO MAINTAINING THE CEASEFIRE AND THE PRESERVATION OF PEACE).

MOREOVER, KISSINGER PROPOSED PURELY AND SIMPLY THE PHRASE RELATIVE TO THE INSTALLATION OF THE COMMITTEES AT LOWER LEVELS. IN CAS E OF A REFUSAL BY NORTH VIETNAM, HE WILL THEN PROPOSE OUR FORMULA, NAMELY ((THAT)) AFTER THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE CNCR, THE TWO SOUTH VIETNAMESE PARTIES WILL DISCUSS THE DETAILS OF THE ORGANIZATION AND FUNCTION OF THE CNCR.

KISSINGER LET US KNOW THAT THE ONLY MODIFICATION ASKED BY US WHICH ON HE DID NOT PRESENT TO LE DUC THO ((WAS THAT)) CONCERNING THE ICCS FOR THE REASON ALREADY MENTIONED IN OUR CABLE YESTERDAY.

KISSINGER ASSURED US THAT WE CAN COUNT ON INDONESIA. KISSINGER WILL MEET WITH ((INDONESIAN PRESIDENT)) SUHARTO IN BRUSSELS ON WEDNESDAY MORNING AND WILL TAKE THIS OPPORTUNITY TO PRESS INDONESIA TO INSTALL AN EMBASSY IN SAIGON AS SOON AS POSSIBLE.

I LET KISSINGER KNOW THAT WE ARE NO LONGER INSISTING ON THE CANDIDACY OF JAPAN AS A MEMBER OF THE INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE BUT THAT WE STILL INSIST ON THE PARTICIPATION BY CAMBODIA AND LAOS.

KISSINGER REPEATED THAT NEITHER LON NOL NOR SOUVANNA PHOUMA WISHED TO PARTICIPATE IN IT. HE AGAIN ASKED UNDER THESE CIRCUMSTANCES HOW WE PLAN TO HAVE THESE TWO COUNTRIES PARTICIPATE.

TOMORROW AFTER OU LE DUC THO WILL GIVE HIS RESPONSE TO THE USIXTY-NINE REQUESTS FOR MODIFICATIONS. KISSINGER AGAIN CAUTIONED US AGAINST THE ILLUSION THAT THE COMMUNIST SIDE WILL ACCEPT ALL OR MOST OF THESE MODIFICATIONS. KISSINGER ASKED US TO PLAN RIGHT NOW ON COMPROMISE SOLUTIONS. IN ANY CASE HE NEEDS TO KNOW THE ANSWER OF OUR GOVERNMENT AS SOON AS POSSIBLE AFTER THE REACTIONS OF LE DUC THO WILL HAVE BEEN GIVEN TO US. IN THE MEANTIME

WKISSINGER ASKED US TO COMMUNICATE TO HIM BEFORE WEDNESDAY A MEMORANDUM BY OUR GOVERNMENT ON THE DRAFT PROTOCOLS ((REGARDING)) ICCS AND THE JOINT MILITARY COMMISSIONS, WHICH HE PROMISED TO DELIVER TO LE ODUC THO ON ((WEDNESDAY)) AT THE LATEST.

TOP SECRET UMBRA

PL 86-36/50 USC 3605

United in any

the L 5

information affecting the National

the

contains in 3, 794 and

sheet on 793,

CLASSIFIED WORK

1972-460-250

GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE:

INTERNAL

FORM FOR

PZ CZ CE XC923

#3025 3261500

ZNY MMNSH

ZZ DE

Z 211455Z NOV 72 ZYH

FM DIRNSA

TO WHITE HOUSE (AITN MR DAVID MCMANIS FOR SERIES CH. ZEM

E T UMDRA DELTA CONTROLLED ITEM EXCLUSIVE FOR DELTA CONTROL OFFICER

WARNING: THE COMINT CONTENED HEREIN IS UNUSUALLY SESTIVE. IF A USIB MEMBER (OR HIS SPECIALLY DESIGNATED DEPUTY) APPROVES THE USE OF THIS COMPARTMENTED ITEM IN A TOP SECRET CODEWORD PUBLICATION, THE PRECISE COMINT SOURCE OR TARGET (WHICHEVER IS SENSITIVE) SHOULD BE CONCEALED TO THE MAXIMUM DEGREE POSSIBLE AND NO REFERENCE SHOULD BE MADE TO THE NSA DELTA REFERENCE SERIAL. IN ALL OTHER CASES, THIS MATERIAL MUST BE MAINTAINED UNDER DELTA SECURITY CONTROLS.

TRANSMITTED HEREWITH IS A SOUTH VIETNAMESE DIPLOMATIC MESSAGE. NORMAL DISTRIBUTION FOR THIS MESSAGE IS IN THE DELTA SUBSERIES DOLL. PLEASE ADVISE IF ANY LIMITATIONS OVER AND ABOVE EXISTING DELTA RESTRICTIONS ARE REQUIRED. THIS MESSAGE WAS TRANSMITTED TO THE WHITE HOUSE ONLY.

VIETNAMESE (SOUTH) ENGLISH XXMME NP Ø1F0072326 3/00 /DOLL-VND /T AVS, AVN, KUS/FORP/B,D.

SAIGON GIVES INSTRUCTIONS TO REPRESENTATIVES IN PARIS CONCERNING KISSINGER-THO TALKS

XXCC

SSIFI

AIGON: HOANG DUC NHA ((SPECIAL ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT)) 21 NOV 72 1830 FR SAIGON: TO PARIS: DELEGATION --3300/PTT/BT/TM

TOP SECRET.

REFERENCE YOUR CABLE NR. 026/PDVN((1)). I HAVE WELL STOOD CONTENT OF FIRST MEETING. ANYWAY WE CANNOT GIVE UNDERSTOOD CONTENT OF FIRST MEETING. IMMEDIATE ANSWERS TO WHAT U.S. GOVERNMENT HAS REQUESTED. ON THE CONTRARY WE SHOULD INSIST HARD ON OUR CRUCIAL POINTS. HANOI AND U.S. GOVERNMENT ARE TRYING TO GET OUR ON THE SPOT APPROVAL. I THINK THAT YOURSELF, SPECIAL ASSISTANT ((NGUYEN PHU)) DUC((2)), AMBASSADORS ((TRAN KIM)) PHUONG((3)) AND ((VUONG VAN)) BAC((4)) SHOULD SQUEEZE THE MOST NEWS OUT OF KISSINGER AFTER EACH MEETING SO THAT WE AT HOME HAVE ALL THE DATA TO WORK WITH. (C VAL TODAY) PLAY THE GAME REAL COOL. AS FOR DEEP BACKGROUNDERS ((SIC)) TO PRESS OR FRIENDLY CIRCLES SUGGEST: INTENSIFY THEM. 1.

DRIVE HARD ON MERIT OF NIXON DOCTRINE NOW ESPECIALLY IN THE LIGHT OF THIS AGREEMENT. HIT ON CENTRAL POINT NAMELY, ARE THE LIVES OF FIVE HUNDRED POW'S WORTH THE RISK OF SACRIFICING SEVENTEEN MILL ION AND A HALF SOUTH VIETNAMESE?

3. ON QUESTION WHETHER U.S. GOVERNMENT WILL BE ABLE TO GET BACK ITS POW'S SUGGEST YOU THROW OUT HYPOTHESIS ACCORDING TO WHICH GOVERNMENT OF SOUTH VIETNAM MIGHT BE WILLING TO EX-CHANGE ALL ITS NORTH VIETNAMESE POW'S NAMELY THIRTY EIGHT THOUSAND AGAINST FIVE HUNDRED AMERICAN POW'S. BEST REGARDS.

((1)) SUBMITTED FOR SERIES CHECK ON 20 NOV 72.

((2)) SPECIAL ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS, ACCORDING TO COLLATERAL 3 JUL 71. TO WEDNESDAY MORNING, 22 NOV ACCORDING TO TO ARRIVE IN PARIS 201945Z NOV 72.

3/00 DOLL-VND/T551-72, 201945Z NOV 72. SOUTH VIETNAMESE AMBASSADOR TO WASHINGTON ACCORDING TO ((3))3/00/VND/T54-72 2715Ø1Z JUN 72.

SOUTH VIETNAMESE AMBASSADOR TO GREAT BRITAIN, ACCORDING TO COLLATERAL OF 10 JUL 72. ((4))

TI 21 NOV 72 1223Z

XXHH

DELTA

the meaning of the Espionage Laws, unauthorized person is prohibited by information affecting the National Defense of the 1798, the transmission or the revelation of which

FORM FOR INTERNAL AGENCY USE

94 and

Title 18, U.S.C., law.

contains information affecting the National Defense of 1, 794 and 798, the transmission or the revelation of with

This work sheet on Sections 793.

```
Kaa99@Kaa99@Kaa99@Kaa99@Kaa99@Kaa99@Kaa99@Kaa99@Kaa99@Kaa99@Kaa99
  &KAA99@KAA99@KAA99@KAA99@ZCZCKAA99@PRB 889
\BoxZZ
Ш
                                    PL 86-36/50 USC 3605
L DE
            #0664 3270730
S
WZNY MMNSH
   220730Z NOV 72 ZYH
   /DIR NSA
    WHITE HOUSE
 ZEM
```

Doc Ref ID: A504075aau sunna synna ayyuka ay

Doc ID: 6549596

TEM SECTION ONE OF TWO TRANSMITTED HEREWITH IS A DELTA CONTROLLED MESSAGE. PLEASE ADVISE IF ANY LIMITATIONS ON DISTRIBUTION ARE REQUIRED. OTHIS MESSAGE WAS TRANSMITTED TO THE WHITE HOUSE ONLY. Ш LVIET NAMESE (SOUTH) S U 3/00/DOLL -VND/- 72 GENERAL HAIG BRIEFS SOUTH VIETNAMESE FOLLOWING SECOND KISSINGER-THO MEETING FR: PARIS: SOUTH VIETNAMESE DELEGATION: ((AMBASSADOR)) PHAM DANG LAM 22 NOV 72 0340 TO: SAIGON: PRESIDENT'S OFFICE; ((PRESIDENTIAL ASSISTANT))

HOANG DUC NHA; AND FOREIGN MINISTRY FLASH ()THE SECOND MEETING ((BETWEEN DR. HENRY A.)) KISSINGER AND LE DUC THO TOOK PLACE TODAY BETWEEN 1500 HOURS AND 2100 HOURS. ((IN AS MUCH AS)) KISSINGER AND ((U.S. DEPUTY ASSISTANT ■SECRETARY OF STATE FOR EAST ASIAN AND PACIFIC AFFAIRS WILLIAM H.))

SULLIVAN HAD TO GO IMMEDIATELY AFTER (C VAL THE MEETING) TO S ◆BRUSSELS. IT WAS ((THE DEPUTY NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISOR.) $\overline{\mathsf{O}}_{\mathsf{GENERAL}}$ ALEXANDER M.)) HAIG, WHO GAVE US AN ACCOUNT ((OF THE MEETING)). WITH A TAUT AIR HAIG ANNOUNCED THAT THE NORTH VIETNAMESE HAVE REJECTED JUST ABOUT ALL OF OUR REQUESTS FOR MODIFICATIONS. WORSE YET. THEY HAVE RETURNED TO THEIR POSITION ((FROM)) BEFORE 8 OCTOBER ON KEY PROBLEMS. IN EFFECT:

1. ON THE QUESTION OF WITHDRAWAL OF NORTH VIETNAMESE TROOPS. LE DUC THO REJECTED ALL THREE FORMULATIONS -- NAMELY, THE WITH-DRAWAL OF ((ALL)) FORCES (C VAL EXCEPT) SOUTH VIETNAMESE. ODEMOBILISATION ON A ONE-FOR-ONE BASIS AND RETURN TO THEIR INATIVE LAND. ((AND)) THE PRINCIPLE THAT THE ARMED FORCES OF MEACH COUNTRY MUST REMAIN WITHIN ((THEIR RESPECTIVE)) NATIONAL ONLY DID THE NORTH VIETNAMESE MAINTAIN THE

EXACT WORDING CONCERNING THE WITHDRAWAL OF U.S. AND ALLIED

TROOPS, BUT THEY ALSO DEMANDED THE DEPARTURE OF ALL FOREIGN

AGENCY USE ONLY

THIS FORM FOR INTERNAL

Doc ID: 61466 ANSC RENDER 500 NTRACT WITH COMPANIES WORKING UNDER THE AUSPICES OF THE ARMED FORCES (ACCORDING TO HAIG, 35 COMPANIES WILL BE AFFECTED).

2. UNDER THE CNCR ((NATIONAL COUNCIL FOR CONCORD AND RECONCIL-

OIATION)), THEY REJECTED ALL MODIFICATIONS RELATING TO THE

LAPPELLATION (IN VIETNAMESE AS WELL AS IN ENGLISH), THE

OCOMPOSITION, AND THE FUNCTION (EXCEPT FOR THE REFERENCE TO

MAINTAINING THE CEASEFIRE AND PRESERVING THE PEACE), AND

MAINTAINED THE LOWER-LEVEL COMMITTEES. MOREOVER, THEY

DEMANDED THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE CNCR WITHIN 15 DAYS,

 \square ELECTIONS WITHIN 5 MONTHS, AND, ((MOST)) NOTEWORTHY, THE

RESIGNATION OF PRESIDENT ((THIEU)) 2 MONTHS BEFORE THE ELECTIONS.

IN ADDITION, THEYSMAINTAINED THE TERM GENERAL ELECTIONS AND

THE CLAUSE "FROM THE ENFORCEMENT OF THE CEASEFIRE TO THE

FORMATION OF THE GOVERNMENT" INSTEAD OF "TO THE COMPLETION

OF THE POLITICAL PROCESS," AS PROPOSED BEFORE.

3. ON THE SUBJECT OF THE DMZ, THE NORTH VIETNAMESE REFUSED ANY TO THE SERVENCE TO ARTICLE XXIV OF THE GENEVA ACCORDS AND PROPOSED OF THE FOLLOWING NEW WORDING, WHICH REPLACES THE FIRST OPARAGRAPH OF ARTICLE X: "AS STIPULATED BY THE 1954 GENEVA

AGREEMENTS ON VIETNAM, THE MILITARY DEMARCATION LINE BETWEEN

THE TWO ZONES AT THE 17TH PARALLEL IS ONLY PROVISIONAL AND

NOT A POLITICAL OR TERRITORIAL BOUNDARY. PENDING REUNIFICATION,

SOUTH AND NORTH VIETNAM SHALL RESPECT THE DEMILITARIZED ZONE

AND (C VAL DECIDE) THE MODALITIES FOR THE MOVEMENT ACROSS THE

PROVISIONAL MILITARY DEMARCATION LINE."

CONCERNING POW'S, THE NORTH VIETNAMESE ARE NOW TYING THE

OLIBERATION OF U.S. PRISONERS TO A SIMULTANEOUS RELEASE OF

DEPOLITICAL PRISONERS, AS LE DUC THO GAVE KISSINGER TO UNDERSTAND

ON YESTERDAY DURING THE BREAK.

THE OTHER POINTS, THE NORTH VIETNAMESE ARE ALSO MAINTAINING
THE ORIGINAL TEXT. THUS, THEY REFUSE TO RESTORE THE WORDS
"USED UP" WITH RESPECT TO THE REPLACEMENT ((OF WAR)) MATERIEL,
WILLHOUT GIVING ANY EXPLANATION. THEY REFUSED TO OMIT THE WORD
"THREE" FROM THE PHRASE "THREE INDOCHINESE COUNTRIES." ACCORDING
TO HAIG THEY DO NOT, NONETHELESS, SEEM TO INSIST ON MAINTAINING
THIS TERM.

60.250

ZEM

T UMBRA DELTA CONTROLLED ITEM FINAL SECTION OF TWO TRANSMITTED HEREWITH IS A DELTA CONTROLLED MESSAGE. PLEASE ADVISE IF ANY LIMITATIONS ON DISTRIBUTION ARE REQUIRED. THIS MESSAGE Was transmitted to the white house only. INVIET NAMESE (SOUTH) FRENCH/ENGLISH 4 3/00/DOLL -VND/T - 72 OTHE NATIONAL COUNCIL OF NATIONAL RECONCILIATION AND CONCORD WILL

ORGANIZE FREE AND DEMOCRATIC GENERAL ELECTIONS PROVIDED FOR IN ARTICLE XI.B AND DECIDE THE PROCEDURES AND MODALITIES OF THESE ELECTIONS. THE INSTITUTIONS FOR WHICH THE GENERAL ELECTIONS ΩARE TO BE HELD WILL BE AGREED UPON THROUGH CONSULTATIONS BETWEEN THE TWO SOUTH VIETNAMESE PARTIES. THE GENERAL ELECTIONS WILL BE HELD WITHIN FIVE MONTHS OF THE CEASE-FIRE. TWO MONTHS BEFORE THE GENERAL ELECTIONS MR. NGUYEN VAN THIEU WILL RESIGN. THE NATIONAL OCOUNCIL OF RECONCILIATION AND CONCORD WILL ALSO DECIDE THE TPROCEDURES AND MODALITIES OF SUCH LOCAL ELECTIONS AS THE TWO SOUTH VIETNAMESE PARTIES AGREE UPON. "ARTICLE XIII. THE QUESTION OF VIETNAMESE ARMED FORCES IN SOUTH VIETNAM SHALL BE SETTLED BY THE TWO SOUTH VIETNAMESE PARTIES IN

A SPIRIT OF NATIONAL RECONCILIATION AND CONCORD, EQUALITY, AND MUTUAL RESPECT, WITHOUT FOREIGN INTERFERENCE, IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE POSTWAR SITUATION. AMONG THE QUESTIONS TO BE DISCUSSED $oldsymbol{arphi}_{ exttt{BY}}$ THE TWO SOUTH VIETNAMESE PARTIES ARE STEPS TO REDUCE THE DEFFECTIVES OF THE ARMED FORCES OF THE TWO PARTIES AND TO DEMOBILIZE THE TROOPS BEING REDUCED.

"ARTICLE XIV. SOUTH VIETNAM WILL PURSUE A FOREIGN POLICY OF PEACE WAND INDEPENDENCE, RESPECT THE MILITARY PROVISIONS OF THE 1954 TOGENEVA AGREEMENTS ON VIETNAM, WHICH PROHIBIT THE JOINING OF ANY ✓MILITARY ALLIANCE OR MILITARY BLOC OR THE MAINTENANCE BY FOREIGN Opowers of military bases, troops, military advisers and military PERSONNEL ON ITS TERRITORY; IT WILL MAINTAIN RELATIONS WITH ALL

the transmission or

This work sheet contains information affecting the Sections 793, 794 and 798, the transmission or

```
Deoliditripes, Darkespective of their political and social systems,
 ACCEPT ECONOMIC AND TECHNICAL AID FROM ANY COUNTRY, WITH NO
 POLITICAL CONDITIONS ATTACHED. THE ACCEPTANCE OF MILITARY AID
 BY SOUTH VIETNAM IN THE FUTURE SHALL COME UNDER THE AUTHORITY OF
 THE GOVERNMENT SET UP AFTER THE GENERAL ELECTIONS IN SOUTH VIET-
"NAM DESCRIBED ON ARTICLE IX B."
n((1)) 3/00/DOLL-VND/T-72, IN PROCESS; MESSAGE REPORTS BRIEFING
₹BY
    GENERAL ALEXANDER M. HAIG ADVISING AMBASSADOR LAM OF PROCEEDINGS
OF THE SECOND ROUND OF TALKS BETWEEN DR. HENRY A. KISSINGER AND
 LE DUC THO.
TI 22 NOV 72 05 15Z
1500
ິກ #Ø667
INNNNKAA993KAA993KAA993KAA993KAA993KAA993KAA993KAA993KAA993KAA993KAA993KAA993KA
🔾 A 993KAA993KAA993KAA993KAA993KAA993KAA993ZCZCKAA993DDF Ø14
 PP
                                            PL 86-36/50 USC 3605
               #0001 3271130
 DE
WZNY MMNSH
Ū.
SZEM
S
▼COMP ALFA
0 02 0
  #0001
NNNNKAA994KAA994KAA994KAA994KAA994KAA994KAA994KAA994KAA994KAA994KAA994KAA994KAA994KAA994KAA994KAA994KAA994KAA994KAA994KAA994KAA994KAA994KAA994KAA994KAA994KAA994KAA994KAA994KAA994KAA994KAA994KAA994KAA994KAA994KAA994KAA994KAA994KAA994KAA994KAA994KAA994KAA994KAA994KAA994KAA994KAA994KAA994KAA994KAA994KAA994KAA
Ш
   Kaa994Kaa994Kaa994Kaa994Kaa994Kaa994Kaa994Kaa994Kaa994Kaa994Kaa994Kaa994Kaa99
ū
  (KAA994KAA994KAA994KAA994KAA994KAA994ZCZCKAA994DDF248
ASSI
ASSI
UDE
               #0001
                      3271420
 ZNY MMNSH
  ZEM
ⅢCOMP ALFA
ASSIFI
  Ø2 Ø
```

 $\overline{\mathbf{0}}$ NNNNKAA995KAA995KAA995KAA995KAA995KAA995KAA995KAA995KAA995KAA995KAA995KAA995KA 5ZCZCKAA995DDF3ØØ

PF DE

#0001 3271510

ZNY MMNSH

#0001

10 12 .01 22

ZZ 0666 3270901 DE

ZNY MMNSH

Z 220900Z NOV 72 ZYH

FM DIRNSA

TO WHITE HOUSE

ZEM

L

S

S 4

0

111

S

4

S

CONTROLLED ITEM SECTION ONE OF TWO TRANSMITTED HEREWITH IS A DELTA CONTROLLED MESSAGE. PLEASE ADVISE IF ANY LIMITATIONS ON DISTRIBUTION ARE REQUIRED. THIS MESSAGE WAS TRANSMITTED TO THE WHITE HOUSE ONLY. FRENCH/ENGL ISH VIETNAMESE (SOUTH)

3/00/DOLL - VND /T-72

SOUTH VIETNAMESE FORWARD TEXTS OF NEW ARTICLES PROPOSED BY LE DUC THO IN PARIS

FR: PARIS: SOUTH VIETNAMESE DELEGATION: ((AMBASSADOR)) PHAM

22 NOV 72 Ø3ØØ

TO: SAIGON: PRESIDENT'S OFFICE: ((PRESIDENTIAL ASSISTANT)) HOANG DUC NHA; AND FOREIGN MINISTRY FLASH 28/PD VN/IM PUR SUANT TO OUR TELEGRAM NUMBER 27/PDVN/TM OF 22 NO VEMBER 1972: ((1)) (B VAL HERE ARE) THE TEXTS OF THE NEW ARTICLES VIII AND IX PROPOSED BY LE DUC THO. THE FORMER ARTICLE IX BE COMES THE NEW ARTICLES IX. X. XI, XII, XIII, AND IV IN THE NORTH VIET NAMESE DRAFT.

"CHAPTER III. CAPTURED AND DETAINED PERSONNEL OF THE PARTIES. "ARTICLE VIII.A. THE RETURN OF MILITARY AS WELL AS CIVILIAN PERSONNEL CAPTURED AND DETAINED IN VIETNAM SHALL BE CARRIED OUT SIMULTANEOUSLY WITH AND COMPLETED ON THE SAME DAY AS THE TROOP WIT HDRAWAL MENTIONED (C VAL IN) ARTICLE V. THE PARTIES SHALL EXCHANGE OD MPLETE LISTS OF THE ABOVE MENTIONED CAPTURED AND DETAINED PERSONNEL ON THE DAY OF THE SIGNING OF THIS AGREEMENT. "B. THE PARTIES SHALL HELP EACH OTHER TO GET INFORMATION ABOUT THOSE MILITARY AS WELL AS CIVILIAN PERSONNEL OF THE PARTIES MISSING IN ACTION TO DETERMINE THE LOCATION AND TAKE CARE OF THE GRAVES OF THE DEAD SO AS TO FACILITATE THE EXHUMATION AND REPATRIATION OF THE REMAINS AND TO TAKE SUCH OTHER MEASURES AS MAY BE REQUIRED TO GET INFORMATION ABOUT THOSE STILL CONSIDERED MISSING IN ACTION.

"CHAPTER IV. THE EXERCISE OF THE SOUTH VIETNAMESE PEOPLE'S

RIGHT TO SELF-DETERMINATION.

"ART ICLE IX. THE GOVERNMENT OF THE DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM AND THE GOVERNMENT OF THE U.S.A. UNDERTAKE TO RESPECT THE FOLLOWING PRINCIPLES FOR THE EXERCISE OF THE SOUTH VIET-NAME SE PEOPLE'S RIGHT TO SELF-DETERMINATION.

"A. THE SOUTH VIETNAME SE PEOPLE'S RIGHT TO SELF-DETERMINATION IS SACRED ((AND)) INALIENABLE AND SHALL BE RESPECTED BY ALL

COUNTRIES.

"BA THE SOUTH VIETNAMESE PEOPLE SHALL DECIDE THEMSELVES THE POLITICAL FUTURE OF SOUTH VIETNAM THROUGH GENUINELY FREE AND DEMOCRATIC GENERAL ELECTIONS UNDER INTERNATIONAL SUPERVISION. , THE UNITED STATES DECLARES THAT IT RESPECTS THE SOUTH VIET-NAMESE PEOPLE'S RIGHT TO SELF-DETERMINATION; IT IS NOT COMMITTED TO ANY POLITICAL TENDENCY OR TO ANY PERSONALITY IN SOUTH VIETNAM AND IT DOES NOT SEEK TO IMPOSE A PRO-AMERICAN GOVERNMENT SA IGO N.

<u>uu</u>

Defense of the revelation of a

National

affecting the Natio the transmission or

ns information c

sheet contains Sections 793, 7

work 字 1972

∞,

FORM

 \overline{S}

"ART ICLE X. THE TWO SOUTH VIETNAMESE PARTIES UNDERTAKE TO RESPECT THE CEASEFIRE AND MAINTAIN PEACE IN SOUTH VIETNAM, SETTLE ALL MATTERS OF CONTENTION THROUGH NEGOTIATIONS, AND AVOID ALL ARMED CONFLICT.

"ART ICLE XI. IMMEDIATELY AFTER THE CEASE-FIRE, THE TWO SOUTH VIET NAMESE PARTIES WILL ACHIEVE NATIONAL RECONCILIATION AND CONCORD AND ((XM)) HATRED AND ENMITY, PROHIBIT ALL ACTS OF REPRISAL AND DISCRIMINATION AGAINST INDIVIDUALS OR ORGANIZATIONS THAT HAVE COLLABORATED WITH ONE SIDE OR THE OTHER: ENSURE THE DEMOCRATIC LIBERTIES OF THE PEOPLE, PERSONAL FREEDOM OF SPEECH, FREEDOM OF THE PRESS, FREEDOM OF MEETING, FREEDOM OF ORGANIZATION, FREEDOM OF POLITICAL ACTIVITIES, FREEDOM OF BELIEF, FREEDOM OF MOVEMENT, FREEDOM OF RESIDENCE, FREEDOM OF WORK, RIGHT TO PROPERTY OWNER SHIP. AND RIGHT TO FREE ENTERPRISE.

"ARTICLE XII. IMMEDIATELY AFTER THE CEASEFIRE, THE TWO SOUTH VIET-NAMESE PARTIES SHALL HOLD CONSULTATIONS IN A SPIRIT OF NATIONAL RECONCILIATION AND CONCORD, EQUALITY, MUTUAL RESPECT, AND MUTUAL NO N-EL IMINATION TO SET UP AN ADMINISTRATIVE STRUCTUVE, CALLED THE NATIONAL COUNCIL OF NATIONAL RECONCILIATION AND CONCORD. OF THREE EQUAL SEGMENTS. THE COUNCIL SHALL OPERATE ON THE PRINCIPLE OF UNANIMITY. AFTER THE NATIONAL COUNCIL OF NATIONAL RECONCILIATION AND CONCORD HAS ASSUMED ITS FUNCTIONS, COUNCILS AT A LOWER LEVELS WILL BE FORMED. THE TWO SOUTH VIETNAMESE PARTIES SHALL FORM THE NATIONAL COUNCIL OF NATIONAL RECONCILI-ATION AND CONCORD WITHIN 15 DAYS AND SIGN AN AGREEMENT ON IN-TERNAL MATTERS OF SOUTH VIETNAM AS SOON AS POSSIBLE, NOT LATER THAN 3 MONTHS AFTER THE CEASEFIRE COMES INTO EFFECT, IN KEEPING WITH THE SOUTH VIETNAMESE PEOPLE'S ASPIRATIONS FOR PEACE, INDEPENDENCE, AND DEMOCRACY.

"G. THE NATIONAL COUNCIL OF NATIONAL RECONCILIATION AND CONCORD HAS THE TASK OF PROMOTING THE TWO SOUTH VIETNAMESE PARTIES" IMPLEMENTATION OF THE SIGNED AGREEMENTS, ACHIEVEMENT OF NAT IO NAL RECONCILIATION AND CONCORD, AND ENSURING DEMOCRATIC L IBERTIES.

880 #0666

NNNN

2 S S 4

468-222

GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE, 1972

CLASSIFIED WORK SHEET

RELEASED FOR TRANSMISSION PL 86-36/50 USC 3605 SS VON STU ZZ U DE #0667 3270901 ZNY MMNSH Z 220900Z NOV 72 ZYH FM DIRNSA TO WHITE HOUSE ZEM L S E C R E T UMBRA DELTA CONTROLLED ITEM FINAL SECTION OF TWO □ TRANSMITTED HEREWITH IS A DELTA CONTROLLED MESSAGE. PLEASE ADVISE IF ANY LIMITATIONS ON DISTRIBUTION ARE REQUIRED. THIS MESSAGE WAS TRANSMITTED TO THE WHITE HOUSE ONLY. VIETNAMESE (SOUTH) FRENCH/ENGLISH 3/00/DOLL-VND/T-72 THE NATIONAL COUNCIL OF NATIONAL RECONCILIATION AND CONCORD WILL ORGANIZE FREE AND DEMOCRATIC GENERAL ELECTIONS PROVIDED FOR ARTICLE XI.B AND DECIDE THE PROCEDURES AND MODALITIES OF THESE ELECTIONS. THE INSTITUTIONS FOR WHICH THE GENERAL ELECTIONS ARE TO BE HELD WILL BE AGREED UPON THROUGH CONSULTATIONS BETWEEN THE TWO SOUTH VIETNAMESE PARTIES. THE GENERAL ELECTIONS WILL BE HELD WITHIN FIVE MONTHS OF THE CEASE-FIRE. TWO MONTHS BEFORE THE GENERAL ELECTIONS MR. NGUYEN VAN THIEU WILL RESIGN. THE NATIONAL COUNCIL OF RECONCILIATION AND CONCORD WILL ALSO DECIDE THE PROCEDURES AND MODALITIES OF SUCH LOCAL ELECTIONS AS THE TWO SOUTH VIETNAMESE PARTIES AGREE UPON. "ARTICLE XIII. THE QUESTION OF VIETNAMESE ARMED FORCES IN SOUTH VIETNAM SHALL BE SETTLED BY THE TWO SOUTH VIETNAMESE PARTIES IN A SPIRIT OF NATIONAL RECONCILIATION AND CONCORD, EQUALITY, AND MUTUAL RESPECT, WITHOUT FOREIGN INTERFERENCE, IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE POSTWAR SITUATION. AMONG THE QUESTIONS TO BE DISCUSSED BY THE TWO SOUTH VIETNAMESE PARTIES ARE STEPS TO REDUCE THE EFFECTIVES OF THE ARMED FORCES OF THE TWO PARTIES AND TO on DEMOBILIZE THE TROOPS BEING REDUCED. "ARTICLE XIV. SOUTH VIETNAM WILL PURSUE A FOREIGN POLICY OF PEACE AND INDEPENDENCE, RESPECT THE MILITARY PROVISIONS OF THE 1954 GENEVA AGREEMENTS ON VIETNAM, WHICH PROHIBIT THE JOINING OF ANY MILITARY ALLIANCE OR MILITARY BLOC OR THE MAINTENANCE BY FOREIGN POWERS OF MILITARY BASES, TROOPS, MILITARY ADVISERS AND MILITARY PERSONNEL ON ITS TERRITORY; IT WILL MAINTAIN RELATIONS WITH ALL COUNTRIES, IRRESPECTIVE OF THEIR POLITICAL AND SOCIAL SYSTEMS, ACCEPT ECONOMIC AND TECHNICAL AID FROM ANY COUNTRY, WITH NO POLITICAL CONDITIONS ATTACHED. THE ACCEPTANCE OF MILITARY AID BY SOUTH VIETNAM IN THE FUTURE SHALL COME UNDER THE AUTHORITY OF 5 THE GOVERNMENT SET UP AFTER THE GENERAL ELECTIONS IN SOUTH VIET-NAM DESCRIBED ON ARTICLE IX B. ((1)) 3/00/DOLL-VND/T-72, IN PROCESS; MESSAGE REPORTS BRIEFING BY GENERAL ALEXANDER M. HAIG ADVISING AMBASSADOR LAM OF PROCEEDINGS THE SECOND ROUND OF TALKS BETWEEN DR. HENRY A. KISSINGER AND LE DUC THO. TI-22 NOV 72 Ø515Z 500 #Ø447

```
NNN NKAA 006KAA 006KAA 006KAA 006KAA 006ZCZCKAA 006EXC 046
```

ZZ DE

#8252 3271640

ZNY MMNSH

Z 221635Z NOV 72 ZYH

OFM DIRNSA

LLTO WHITE HOUSE (ATIN MR DAVID MCMANIS FO SERIES CHECK)

M MZEM

EXCLUSIVE FOR DELTA CONTROL OFFICER

WARNING: THE COMINT CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNUSUALLY SENSITIVE.

AIF A USIB MEMBER (OR HIS SPECIALLY DESIGNATED DEPUTY) APPROVES THE USE OF THIS COMPARTMENTED ITEM IN A TOP SECRET CODEWORD PUBLICATION, THE PRECISE COMINT SOURCE OR TARGET (WHICHEVER IS SENSITIVE) SHOULD BE CONCEALED TO THE MAXIMUM DEGREE POSSIBLE AND NO REFERENCE SHOULD BE MADE TO THE NSA DELTA REFERENCE SERIAL. IN ALL OTHER CASES. THIS MATERIAL MUST BE MAINTAINED UNDER DELTA

WSECURITY CONTROLS.

TRANSMITTED HEREWITH IS A SOUTH VIETNAMESE DIPLOMATIC MESSAGE. ≪NORMAL DISTRIBUTION FOR THIS MESSAGE IS IN THE DELTA SUBSERIES ODOLL-VND. PLEASE ADVISE IF ANY LIMITATIONS OVER AND ABOVE EXISTING DELTA RESTRICTIONS ARE REQUIRED. THIS MESSAGE WAS

TRANSMITTED TO THE WHITE HOUSE ONLY.

VIET NAMESE (SOUTH) ENGLISH

MXXMMENPØ1F0072327

3/00/DOLL -VND/T

AVS, AVN, KUS/FORP/.

SAIGON INSTRUCTS ITS SPECIAL TASK FORCE IN PARIS CONCERNING OPROPOSED MODIFICATIONS TO DRAFT PEACE PROPOSAL

远XXCC

OFR SAIGON: ((PRESIDENT'S OFFICE;

PRESIDENTIAL ASSISTANT))

HOANG DUC NHA 22 NOV 72 -

PARIS: ((SOUTH VIETNAMESE

DELEGATION)) IMMEDIATE 2738/PTT/BT/TM

TOP SECRET.

YOU THAT I HAVE WELL RECEIVED AND UNDERSTOOD THEIR CONTENT. AFTER PREPORTING TO PRESIDENT ((THIEU)) AND NSC ((THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL)), I CONVEY TO YOUR TASK FORCE THE FOLLOWING DECISIONS:

- I. WE TAKE NOTE OF NORTH VIETNAM'S REJECTION OF OUR PROPOSED MODIFICATIONS. THIS SHOWS THE STRONG INTRANSIGEANCE OF NORTH VIETNAM IN THE FACE OF OUR GOODWILL.
- THE GVN ((GOVERNMENT OF SOUTH VIETNAM)) REALIZES THAT NORTH VIETNAM HAS NOT SHOWN ANY GOODWILL IN CONSIDERING OUR MODIFICATIONS IN THE PRINCIPLES AS WELL AS IN THE DETAILS. ${}^{\omega}$ consequently, we believe that as long as the two basic principles, NAMELY THE NORTH VIETNAM TROOPS AND THE CNRC ((NATIONAL COUNCIL FOR CONCORD AND RECONCILIATION)). WHICH WE HAVE SUGGESTED ARE NOT BEING RESOLVED. AND AS LONG AS NORTH VIETNAM IGNORES OUR POINTS MAND MAINTAINS THEIRS. IT IS NOT POSSIBLE FOR THE GOVERNMENT OF SOUTH VIETNAM TO CONSIDER THE OTHER POINTS WHICH NORTH VIETNAM MAS JUST PROPOSED. IN OTHER WORDS, IF NORTH VIETNAM MAINTAINS $\overline{\mathbb{O}}$ ((ITS)) Intransigeance, then we cannot solve the whole problem. ONLY WHEN THEY SOLVE OUR TWO BASIC PROBLEMS CAN WE SEE SOME HOPE FOR FURTHER CONSIDERATION OF OTHER POINTS: NAMELY THE QUESTION OF THE DEMILITARIZED ZONE, REFERENCE TO "USED UP" ((WAR MATERIALS)), MAND LOCATION OF CHAPTER ONE. ALSO, THERE IS NO POSSIBILITY AND REASON TO GO INTO THE DETAILS WHEN THE BASIC PRINCIPLES ARE NOT BEING RESOLVED.
- 3. PLEASE COMMUNICATE THOSE VIEWS OF THE GOVERNMENT OF SOUTH OVIETNAM TO THE U.S. GOVERNMENT SIDE.
- 4. I TAKE THIS OCCASION TO STRESS AGAIN THAT AS THE TASK

 FORCE OVER THERE, YOU ((ARE TO)) REPORT BACK HOME YOUR ASSESSMENTS

 AND PROPOSITIONS REGARDING POINTS WE CAN CONSIDER FOR MODIFICATIONS,

 OF COURSE WITH THE UNDERSTANDING THAT THE BASIC PRINCIPLES ARE MET.

 AT HOME NSC WILL ALSO ASSESS AND CONSIDER MODIFICATION ((OF THE))

 OTHER POINTS I MENTIONED PREVIOUSLY. I WOULD THEN FLY OVER THERE

 TO BRING LATEST INSTRUCTIONS. BUT I STRESS HERE THAT I WILL COME

 ONLY WHEN NORTH VIETNAM SHOWS GOODWILL AND RESOLVES OUT TWO MAIN

 PRINCIPLES. BEST REGARD

Q((1)) BOTH MESSAGES WERE SUBMITTED FOR SERIES CHECK 22 NOV 72.

匹 XX HH

ଭ ଓ 45 Ø

#8252

πετείνα ασσυνά ασστητητικά δαστητά 782

Sections 793, 794 and 798, the transmission or the revelation of which in any me

VIETNAMESE (SOUTH) ENGLISH XXMMENPØ1F0072327 3/00/DOLL-VND/T -72 AVS,AVN,KUS/FORP/.

SAIGON INSTRUCTS ITS SPECIAL TASK FORCE IN PARIS CONCERNING PROPOSED MODIFICATIONS TO DRAFT PEACE PROPOSAL

(XXCC FR SAIGON: ((PRESIDENT'S OFFICE; PRESIDENTIAL ASSISTANT)) HOANG DUC NHA 22 NOV 72 - -TO PARIS: ((SOUTH VIETNAMESE DELEGATION)) IMMEDIATE 2738/PTT/BT/TM Stort or this recoelation of School in any falament to see recombody. A permenting the

REFERENCE YOUR CABLES 27 AND 28/PDVN.((1)) I WISH TO INFORM YOU THAT I HAVE WELL RECEIVED AND UNDERSTOOD THEIR CONTENT. AFTER REPORTING TO PRESIDENT ((THIEU)) AND NSC ((THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL)). I CONVEY TO YOUR TASK FORCE THE FOLLOWING DECISIONS:

1. WE TAKE NOTE OF NORTH VIETNAM'S REJECTION OF OUR ROPOSED MODIFICATIONS. THIS SHOWS THE STRONG INTRANSIGEANCE OF

NORTH VIETNAM IN THE FACE OF OUR GOODWILL.

2. THE GVN ((GOVERNMENT OF SOUTH VIETNAM)) REALIZES THAT NORTH VIETNAM HAS NOT SHOWN ANY GOODWILL IN CONSIDERING OUR MODIFICATIONS IN THE PRINCIPLES AS WELL AS IN THE DETAILS. CONSEQUENTLY. WE BELIEVE THAT AS LONG AS THE TWO BASIC PRINCIPLES. □ NAMELY THE NORTH VIETNAM TROOPS AND THE CNRC ((NATIONAL COUNCIL) FOR CONCORD AND RECONCILIATION)). WHICH WE HAVE SUGGESTED ARE NOT BEING RESOLVED, AND AS LONG AS NORTH VIETNAM IGNORES OUR POINTS AND MAINTAINS THEIRS. IT IS NOT POSSIBLE FOR THE GOVERNMENT OF SOUTH VIETNAM TO CONSIDER THE OTHER POINTS WHICH NORTH VIETNAM HAS JUST PROPOSED. IN OTHER WORDS, IF NORTH VIETNAM MAINTAINS ((ITS)) INTRANSIGEANCE. THEN WE CANNOT SOLVE THE WHOLE PROBLEM. ONLY WHEN THEY SOLVE OUR TWO BASIC PROBLEMS CAN WE SEE SOME HOPE FOR FURTHER CONSIDERATION OF OTHER POINTS: NAMELY THE QUESTION OF THE DEMILITARIZED ZONE, REFERENCE TO "USED UP" ((WAR MATERIALS)), AND LOCATION OF CHAPTER ONE. ALSO, THERE IS NO POSSIBILITY AND REASON TO GO INTO THE DETAILS WHEN THE BASIC PRINCIPLES ARE NOT BEING RESOLVED.

3. PLEASE COMMUNICATE THOSE VIEWS OF THE GOVERNMENT OF SOUTH VIETNAM TO THE U.S. GOVERNMENT SIDE.


4. I TAKE THIS OCCASION TO STRESS AGAIN THAT AS THE TASK FORCE OVER THERE, YOU ((ARE TO)) REPORT BACK HOME YOUR ASSESSMENTS AND PROPOSITIONS REGARDING POINTS WE CAN CONSIDER FOR MODIFICATIONS. OF COURSE WITH THE UNDERSTANDING THAT THE BASIC PRINCIPLES ARE MET. AT HOME NSC WILL ALSO ASSESS AND CONSIDER MODIFICATION ((OF THE)) OTHER POINTS I MENTIONED PREVIOUSLY. I WOULD THEN FLY OVER THERE TO BRING LATEST INSTRUCTIONS. BUT I STRESS HERE THAT I WILL COME 5 ONLY WHEN NORTH VIETNAM SHOWS GOODWILL AND RESOLVES OUT TWO MAIN ? PRINCIPLES. BEST REGARDS.

((1)) BOTH MESSAGES WERE SUBMITTED FOR SERIES CHECK 22 NOV 72.

XXHH

450 #8252

NNNN



SECTION ONE OF TWO EXCLUSIVE FOR DELTA CONTROL OFFICER

WARNING: THE COMINT CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNUSUALLY SENSITIVE.
IF A USIB MEMBER (OR HIS SPECIALLY DESIGNATED DEPUTY) APPROVES
THE USE OF THIS COMPARTMENTED ITEM IN A TOP SECRET CODEWORD
PUBLICATION, THE PRECISE COMINT SOURCE OR TARGET (WHICHEVER
IS SENSITIVE) SHOULD BE CONCEALED TO THE MAXIMUM DEGREE POSSIBLE
AND NO REFERENCE SHOULD BE MADE TO THE NSA DELTA REFERENCE SERIAL.
IN ALL OTHER CASES, THIS MATERIAL MUST BE MAINTAINED UNDER DELTA
SECURITY CONTROLS.

TRANSMITTED HEREWITH IS A SOUTH VIETNAMESE DIPLOMATIC MESSAGE.
NORMAL DISTRIBUTION FOR THIS MESSAGE IS IN THE DELTA SUBSERIES
DOLL-VND. PLEASE ADVISE IF ANY LIMITATIONS OVER AND ABOVE
EXISTING DELTA RESTRICTIONS ARE REQUIRED. THIS MESSAGE WAS
TRANSMITTED TO THE WHITE HOUSE ONLY.

VIET NAMESE (SOUTH) ENGLISH /XXMMENPØ1F0072327 3/00/DOLL-VND/T -72 AVS, AVN, KUS/FORP/.

SAIGON MAKES INITIAL ASSESSMENT OF PROPOSED NORTH VIETNAMESE CHANGES TO DRAFT PEACE PROPOSAL

XXCC

FR SAIGON: OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT; ((PRESIDENTIAL ASSISTANT))
HOANG DUC NHA 22 NOV 72 2200

TO PARIS: AMBASSADOR PHAM DANG LAM IMMEDIATE 3308/PTT/BT/TM

TOP SECRET

REFERENCE YOUR CABLES 27 AND 28/PDVN. ((1)) I WISH TO CONVEY TO YOU OUR PRELIMINARY ASSESSMENT ON THE CHANGES PROPOSED BY TO NORTH VIETNAM:

WE REMAIN FIRM ON THE PROBLEMS OF NORTH VIETNAM TROOP WITHDRAWAL AND THE CNRC ((COUNCIL OF NATIONAL RECONCILIATION AND AS I HAVE INDICATED IN MY TELEGRAMS 3275, DATED 19 NOVEMBER, ((2)) AND 2711, DATED 20 NOVEMBER, ((3)) WE TAKE CARE OF NORTH VIETNAM TROOPS BY FIRST THE WITHDRAWAL OF NVA AS NON-SOUTH VIETNAMESE FORCES AND SECOND BY DEMOBILIZATIONS AND SENDING ((TROOPS)) BACK TO THEIR NATIVE PLACES. WE INSIST ON ADMINISTRATIVE ORGAN IN CHARGE OF ELECTIONS FOR THE CNRC AND NOT THE NCNRC ((NATIONAL COUNCIL OF NATIONAL RECONCILIATION AND CONCORD)). WE DELETE THE REFERENCE TO THREE EQUAL SEGMENTS. WE ALSO BDELETE THE REFERENCE TO THE ENSURING OF DEMOCRATIC LIBERTIES, PERSONAL FREEDOM, ETC. BECAUSE WE VIEW THAT, IN CASE OF AN AGREEMENT, WE ARE STILL ENTITLED TO GOVERN OUR COUNTRY WITH OUR EXISTING LAWS. WE DELETE GENERAL AND REPLACE IT BY NATIONWIDE. WE DO NOT AGREE ON A TIME FRAME FOR THOSE ELECTIONS.

2. AS FOR THE NORTH VIETNAM DEMAND TO LINK THE RELEASE OF PRISONERS OF WAR TO POLITICAL PRISONERS, WE VIEW THIS AS OUR INTERNAL AFFAIRS AND ((WE BELIEVE)) THAT THE TWO SOUTH VIETNAMESE PARTIES WILL SOLVE THIS QUESTION BETWEEN THEMSELVES.

- 3. ON THE QUESTION OF THE DEMILITARIZED ZONE, WE HAD PROPOSED ALMOST THE SAME WORDING BUT WE INSIST ON CHANGING ITS PLACE.

 NORTH VIETNAM WANTED IT TO BE PUT BACK IN THE ORIGINAL PLACE BECAUSE THEY CONSIDER THAT ONLY THE U.S. AND THE DRV ((DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM)) ((WILL)) SIGN THIS AGREEMENT. WE INSIST ON THE WORD PERMANENT BEFORE POLITICAL. HOWEVER, WE MIGHT CONSIDER THE REST OF THE STATEMENT.
 - 4. WE ARE FIRM ON DELETING THE REFERENCE TO THREE INDOCHINESE STATES.
- 5. ON THE PREAMBLE, WE MAINTAIN OUR WORDING, NAMELY, THE PARTIES PARTICIPATING IN THE PARIS CONFERENCE ON VIETNAM.
- 6. WE MAINTAIN THAT THE CHAPTER RELATING TO U.S.-DRV RELATIONS SHOULD BE A SEPARATE AGREEMENT WHICH THE GVN ((GOVERNMENT OF BOUTH VIETNAM)) MIGHT ACKNOWLEDGE.
- THE PRECEDING ARE JUST OUR PRELIMINARY REACTIONS CONCERNING ITHE PROPOSED CHANGES BY NORTH VIETNAM. AS INDICATED IN MY TELEGRAM 2738((4)) WE SHOULD NOT ENGAGE IN THE WORKING OUT OF DETAILS WHEN OUR BASIC POINTS ARE NOT RESOLVED. IN OTHER WORDS, WE CANNOT AS OF NOW ANSWER THE QUESTIONS RAISED BY THE U.S. AS TO KNOWING WHAT POINTS WE ARE GOING TO STICK TO. WHAT POINTS WE MIGHT COMPROMISE, AND WHAT POINTS WE MIGHT DROP. AS YOU HAVE BRIGHTLY POINTED OUT TO ((GEN. ALEXANDER M.)) HAIG, WE ARE NOT TRYING TO STALL FOR TIME; RATHER, NORTH VIETNAM IS BEING EXTREMELY FROM YOUR WORKING SESSIONS WITH US AT HOME, YOU INTRANSIGEANT. AND THE TASK FORCE OVER THERE CAN ANSWER THE U.S. SIDE ON OUR BASIC POINTS. HOWEVER, IN THE MEANTIME CABLE BACK YOUR PROPOSED MODIFICATIONS ON POINTS YOU DEEM CAN BE CHANGED. HHXX

ллп 900 #8581

ииии

1.)

(1)

PL 86-36/50 USC 3605

Z CZ CEX CØ49

ZZ DE #

#8582/8295 3271829

ZNY MMNSH

Z 221825Z NOV 72 ZYH

19 FM DIRNSA

TO WHITE HOUSE (ATTN MR DAVID MCMANIS FOR SERIES CHOCK)

TOPOEORET UMBRA DELTA CONTROLLED ITEM

FINAL SECTION OF TWO

EXCLUSIVE FOR DELTA CONTROL OFFICER

WARNING: THE COMINT CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNUSUALLY SENSITIVE.
IF A USIB MEMBER (OR HIS SPECIALLY DESIGNATED DEPUTY) APPROVES
THE USE OF THIS COMPARTMENTED ITEM IN A TOP SECRET CODEWORD
PUBLICATION, THE PRECISE COMINT SOURCE OR TARGET (WHICHEVER
IS SENSITIVE) SHOULD BE CONCEALED TO THE MAXIMUM DEGREE POSSIBLE
AND NO REFERENCE SHOULD BE MADE TO THE NSA DELTA REFERENCE SERIAL.
IN ALL OTHER CASES, THIS MATERIAL MUST BE MAINTAINED UNDER DELTA
SECURITY CONTROLS.

i

۱. ۱

TRANSMITTED HEREWITH IS A SOUTH VIETNAMESE DIPLOMATIC MESSAGE. NORMAL DISTRIBUTION FOR THIS MESSAGE IS IN THE DELTA SUBSERIES DOLL-VND. PLEASE ADVISE IF ANY LIMITATIONS OVER AND ABOVE EXISTING DELTA RESTRICTIONS ARE REQUIRED. THIS MESSAGE WAS TRANSMITTED TO THE WHITE HOUSE ONLY.

VIET NAME SE (SOUTH) ENGLISH XXMME NPØ2 FOO 72327 3/00/DOLL-VND/T -72 AVS, AVN, KUS/FORP/.

SAIGON MAKES INITIAL ASSESSMENT OF PROPOSED SAIGON NORTH VIETNAMESE CHANGES TO DRAFT PEACE PROPOSAL

XXCC

8. ON THE ICCS AND PROTOCOL COMMISSIONS, OUR TECHNICAL STAFF IS STILL WORKING ON OUR OWN VERSIONS WHICH, WHEN COMPLETED, WILL BE FORWARDED TO YOU AS WELL AS TO THE U.S.

9. NGUYEN PHU DUC((5)) WILL BE BRINGING YOU THE TEXT OF THE DRAFT AGREEMENT AS REVISED BY THE GVN AND WILL POINT OUT CLEARLY OUR CHANGES AND THE REASONS FOR THOSE CHANGES.

((1)) BOTH ITEMS WERE SUBMITTED FOR SERIES CHECK ON 22 NOV 72.

- ((2)) AN UNPUBLISHED MESSAGE, AVAILABLE IF REQUIRED, IN WHICH SAIGON INFORMED PARIS THAT A LETTER FROM PRESIDENT NIXON TO PRESIDENT THIEU DID NOT CONTAIN ANYTHING NEW AND WAS ESSENTIALLY WHAT GENERAL HAIG TOLD THIEU.
- ((3)) SUBMITTED FOR SERIES CHECK 20 NOV 72.

((4)) SUBMITTED FOR SERIES CHECK 22 NOV 72.

((5)) SPECIAL ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT, SCHEDULED TO ARRIVE IN PARIS ON THE EVENING OF 22 NOV 72, ACCORDING TO 3/00/VND/T98-72, IN PROCESS.

TI 22 NOV 72 1516Z

XX HH

45Ø #8582

WHITE HOUSE ONLY

NNNN

DELTA CONTROLLED ITEM

TOP SECRET UMBRA

0

UL 0 O Q الے

0

798, 794 and Sections 793,

NNNN

53 VIZ ROV 25 02

PL 86-36/50 USC 3605

ZCZCPRA239 #Ø654 328Ø21Ø

DE #Ø654 328Ø Ø ZNY MMNSH Ø Z 23Ø148Z NOV 72 ZYH FM DIRNSA TO WHITE TE HOUSE/(ATTN: MR.D. MCMANIS) (FOR A SERIES CHECK)

3/00/DOLL-YND/T -72
TRANSMITTED HEREWITH IS A SOUTH VIETNAMESE DIPLOMATIC
MESSAGE. PLEASE ADVISE IF ANY LIMITATIONS ON DISTRIBUTION ARE
REQUIRED. THIS MESSAGE WAS TRANSMITTED TO THE WHITE HOUSE ONLY. AMESE (SOUTH) /FRENCH TH VIETNAMESE AMBASSADOR IN PARIS REPORTS ON FIRST OF TWO 22

PARIS: SOUTH VIETNAMESE DELEGATION; ((AMBASSADOR)) PHAM DANG DTO 22 NOV 72 2400

```
Doc ID: 6549596 Doc Ref ID: A504075
                                                 ORIG. PREC. IMMEDIATE
        SAIGON: PRESIDENT'S OFFICE; ((SPECIAL ASSISTANT)) HONG DUC
                                                 ORIG SERIAL 29/PD N/TM
      W NHA; AND FOREIGN MINISTRY
        TOP SECRET.
      WE HAD TWO MEETINGS TODAY WITH ((DR. HENRY A. )) KISSINGER, AT 1245
      OHOURS AND AT 1945
      O HOURS RESPECTIVELY. BERORE (C VAL AND ) AFTER HIS MEETING WITH LE DUC
      < THC.
        DURING THE FIRST MEETING KISSINGER INFORMED US OF WHAT TE PLANS
        TO DO AT TODAY'S SESSION
        WITH LE DUC THO: HE IS RETURNING TO THE QUESTION OF NOR! H VIETNAMESE
        TROOP WITHCRAWALS AND
      O HOPES TO OBTAIN AN AGREEMENT ON TWO OF THE THREE FORMALATIONS PROPOSED.
      ш
        HE WILL REJECT THE
        NEW NORTH VIETNAMESE WORDING IN ARTICLE VIII.
      WHICH LINKS THE LIBERATION
      Ø OF POW'S TO THE

✓ FREEING OF POLITICAL PRISONERS. ON THE CNCR ((COUNCIL FUR
      SNATIONAL RECONCILATION AND CONCORD))
        HE HAS RESIGNED HINSELF TO THE FORMER ENGLISH TERM "ADMINSTRATIVE
        STRUCTURE," FOR
        WHICH THE VIETNAMESE TRANSLATION WILL BE "COW CAAU HANH CHANH."
      ш OF THE CNCR, HE WILL TRY AGAIN ((WITH THE)) FORMULA: "REPRESENTATIVES IN TENDENCINE TO ALL PLITICAL
        TENDENCIES IN SOUTH VIETNAM. WHOSE MEMBERS SHALL BE CHOSEN EQUALLY BY
      OTHE TWO PARTIES."
      o in as much as the communists refuse to omit the phrase Relating to
      THE ESTABLISHMENT OF
      OLOWER LEVEL COMMITTEES. HE WILL PROPOSE REPLACING
         THIS PHRASE WITH: "AFTER THE ESTABLISHMENT
                     THE TWO SOUTH VITNAMESE PARTIES WILL DISCUES DETAILS
           THE CNCR,
      OF ORGANIZATION AND PUNCTION OF THIS ORGANIZATION." IN ADDITION, HE SHOWED US A NEW FORMULA
      UI
      CONCERNING THE DMZ
       ((DEMILITARIZED ZONE)), WHICH HE INTENDS TO SUBMIT TO LE DUC THO.
      OAS WE MADE RESERVATIONS ON
      THIS FORMULA. HE AGREED TO POSTPONE ((PRESENTATION)) WHILE WAITING
      FOR US TO GIVE HIM OUR
      J FORMULATION. CONCERNING "GENERAL ELECTIONS". KISSINGER RECALLED THAT THE
        VIETNAMESE REJECTED THE TERM "NATIONAL" UNDER THE PRETEXT THAT
      THIS WORD CONVEYED THE IDEA

OF THE AREA RATHER THAN THE NATURE OF THE ELECTIONS. ACCORDING TO
       LE DUC THO, PROVINCIAL
      WELECTIONS ORGANIZED (C VAL OVER) ALL ((1 WD G)) TERRITORY COULD BE
      OCALLED "NATIONAL
      SELECTIONS." TO AVOID THE TERM "GENERAL ELECTIONS." WE CULL SPEAK OF
        "ELECTIONS FOR
        NATIONAL INSTITUTIONS." HOWEVER, KISSINGER FEELS THAT THIS FORMULA
        BRINGS TO WIND MORE
        ((THE IDEA OF)) CONSTITUANT ELECTIONS AND THAT, AFTER ALL, IT WOULD BE
        BETHER TO CPT FOR THE TERM "GENERAL ELECTIONS."
        BEFPRE FINISHING. KISSINGER INSISTED ON HIS NEED TO KNO!! AS
        SOON AS POSSIBLE AND IN
        GOOD TIME, OUR GOVERNMENT'S COMMENTS ON THE NORTH VIETNAMESE
        RESPONSES AND AGAINST THE U.S. PROPOSALS.
A TELEGRAM ON THE SECOND SETING WITH KISSINGER WILL SOLLOW. WE CALL
        YOUR ATTENTION
        PARTICULARLY TO THE TENOR OF OUR SECOND MEETING WITH KISSINGER.
        TI 22 NOV 72 2300Z
        900
        #Ø654
```

Ш

ഗ S


NNNN

J, U.

18,

Defense

798,



• U

W L (1) (1) within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title 18, U. nanner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law. INTERNAL the United States P. R. of

AGENCY USE ONLY

THIS EORM

CLASSIFIED WORK SHEET

NNNN

ELEASED FOR TRANSMISSION

PL 86-36/50 USC 3605

ZZ DE

#0659 3280526

ZNY MMNSH

Z 230525Z NOV 72 ZYH

FM DIRNSA

TO WHITE HOUSE (ATTN MR. D. MCMANIS/FOR A SERIES CHECK)

ZEM

ITEM SECTION ONE OF TWO TRANSMITTED HEREWITH IS A DELTA CONTROLLED WESSAGE. PLEASE ADVISE IF ANY LIMITATIONS OVER AND ABOVE EXISTING RESTRICTIONS ARE REQUIRED. THIS MESSAGE WAS TRANSMITTED TO THE WHITE HOUSE ONLY.

VIETNAMESE (SOUTH) FRENCH

3/00/DOLL-VND/T-72

SOUTH VIETNAMESE NEGOTIATOR REPORTS ON SECOND 22 NOVEMBER

MEETING WITH MR. KISSINGER IN PARIS

FR: PARIS: SOUTH VIETNAMESE DELEGATION; ((AMBASSAUOR)) PHAM DANG 23 NOV 72 Ø1ØØ

TO: SAIGON: PRESIDENT'S OFFICE; ((PRESIDENTIAL ASSISTANT)) HOANG DUC NHA: AND FOREIGN MINISTRY IMMEDIATE 30/PDVN/TM TOP SECRET.

KISSINGER BEGAN BY ASKING US WHETHER WE HAD RECLIVED INSTRUCTIONS FROM SAIGON. WE THEN INFORMED HIM OF THE TENOR OF YOUR MESSAGE NUMBER 2738 PTT/BT/TM OF 22 NOVEMBER.

WE STRESSED THAT IN VIEW OF THE INTRANSIGEANCE AND TOTAL ABSENCE GOODWILL ((ON THE PART OF THE)) COMMUNIST SIDE, WE FEEL THAT WE MUST HOLD TO OUR POSITION ON THE TWO KEY PROBLEMS. THESE TWO PROBLEMS MUST BE RESOLVED (C VAL BEFORE) WE ARE ABLE TO APPROACH THE OTHERS.

((THIS EVOKEL)) A COMPLETELY UNEXPECTED REACTION ON THE PART OF KISSINGER, WHO LAUNCHED INTO A VIOLENT ATTACK AGAINST WHAT HE CALLED AN ORGANIZED PRESS AND TRADIO CAMPAIGN PRESENTLY BEING CARRIED ON IN SAIGON AIMED AT THE U.S. GOVERNMENT AND HIM PERSONALLY, AS WELL AS AGAINST OUR STRATEGY IN THE MATTER OF NEGOTIATIONS. THIS STRATEGY IS BASEL, ((ACCORDING TO)) HIM, ON TWO FALSE POSTULATES, NAMELY: "FIRST, PRESIDENT NIXON DOES NOT MEAN WHAT HE SAYS AND, SECOND, HIS EMISSARY (KISSINGER) MISREPRE-SENTS HIS VIEWS.

HE ALLUDED TO THE SENDING OF SPECIAL ASSISTANT NGUYEN PHU DUC TO WASHINGTON. KISSINGER BELIEVES THAT OUR GOVERNMENT IS TRYING TO MANEUVER TO GAIN TIME, A MANEUVER WHICH HE TERMED SUICIDAL. HE REPROACHED OUR GOVERNMENT'S NON-COOPERATIVE ATTITUDE AND CITED AS AN EXAMPLE THE FACT THAT THE PROTOCOLS WERE COMMUNICATED TO OUR GOVERNMENT BY ((THE U.S. DEPUTY NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISOR,

GENERAL ALEXANDER M.)) HAIG, MORE THAN 2 WEEKS AGO AND THAT WE HAVE NOT YET MADE KNOWN OUR POINT OF VIEW. HE ALSO STRESSED THE FACT THAT ((EITHER)) WE DO NOT WANT TO OR ARE NOT PREPARED TO GIVE HIM THE POINTS OF COMPROMISE OR TO

INDICATE TO HIM WHAT IS ESSENTIAL FOR US AND WHAT IS NOT ((ESSENTIAL) AMONG THE 69 REQUESTS FOR MODIFICATIONS, IN ORDER TO ALLOW HIM

TO CONDUCT NEGOTIATIONS.

ACCORDING TO HIM, SAIGON SENDS THREE AMBASSADORS JUST TO SUPERVISE WHEN IT REALLY NEEDS SOMEONE WITH THE POWER TO MAKE QUICK DECISIONS ON THE SPOT. UNDER THESE CIRCUMSTANCES, HE WARNED US THAT HE WILL BE OBLIGED TO GO AHEAD AND NEGOTIATE "ACCORDING TO MY BEST JUDGMENT." HE INFORMED ((US)) THAT HE RECEIVED PRECISE INSTRUCTIONS FROM PRESIDENT NIXON ON THIS SUBJECT.

GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1972-470-540

States within the meaning manner to an unauthorized of the Espionage Laws, Title 18, U.S.C., person is prohibited by law.

THIS FORM FOR INTERNAL AGENCY USE ONLY

CLASSIFIED WORK SHEET

AT THE MEETING THIS AFTERNOON HE ALREADY SUBMITTED TO NORTH VIETNAM THE DRAFT PROTOCOL AS A WORKING DOCUMENT. THE RESULT, ACCORDING TO HIM, WILL BE THAT WE WILL FIND OURSELVES FACED WITH A FAIT ACCOMPLI AS ((WE DID)) 6 WEEKS AGO. THIS TIME WE WILL NOT HAVE ANY VALID REASON TO ACCUSE THE U.S. OF NEGOTIATING WITHOUT CONSULTING US.

ACCORDING TO KISSINGER, TWO CASES COULD ARISE: EITHER LE DUC THO WILL MAINTAIN HIS TOTAL REFUSAL TO MODIFY THE DRAFT AGREEMENT, OR, WHAT IS MORE PROBABLE, HE WILL END UP, AS ON & OCTOBER, MAKING (B VAL CONCESSIONS). IN THE FIRST CASE, SAIGON WILL HAVE GAINED A TACTICAL VICTORY BY SUCCEEDING IN IMPEDING THE SIGNING OF THE AGREEMENT, BUT THE EFFECT OF THIS STATE OF AFFAIRS WILL NOT BE SLOW IN REVEALING ITSELF AS DISASTROUS WHEN CONGRESS RECONVENES THE FIRST OF NEXT JANUARY. IN THE SECOND CASE THE U.S. WILL HAVE NO OTHER CHOICE BUT TO ACCEPT THE COMPROMISE SOLUTION, EVEN IF THIS SOLUTION IS NOT SATISFACTORY TO US. IT WILL THEN BE TOO LATE FOR US TO STOP THE COURSE OF EVENTS. IN SHORT, KISSINGER IS LETTING US CHOUSE WHETHER TO COOPERATE WITH HIM BY MAKING OUR POINTS OF VIEW KNOWN DURING THE COURSE OF THE NEGOTIATIONS OR TO RISK HAVING TO ACCEPT A FAIT ACCOMPLI. CONSIDERS AN OPEN CONFRONTATION BETWEEN WASHINGTON AND SAIGON AS INEVITABLE IF THE NEGOTIATIONS ARE CARRIED OUT WITHOUT OUR COLLABORATION.

AFTER KISSINGER HAD FINISHED HIS LENGTHY OUTBURST, WE EXPRESSED OUR SURPRISE ON THE SUBJECT OF HIS REACTION AND REMINDED HIM THAT THE PRINCIPLE OF COOPERATION BETWEEN THE U.S. GOVERNMENT AND THE GOVERNMENT ((OF SOUTH)) VIETNAM HAS NEVER BEEN QUESTIONED, AND THAT WE ARE HERE TO COOPERATE.

750 #0659

NNNN

```
RUEASED FOR TRANSMISSION
         PL 86-36/50 USC 3605
Δ
u.
S
S
   ZZ
4
   DE
                 #0660 3280526
   ZNY MMNSH
   Z 230525Z NOV 72 ZYH
    FM DIRNSA
   TO WHITE HOUSE (ATTN MR. D. MCMANIS/FOR A SERIES CHECK)
ZEM
ш
                                                NTROLLED ITEM FINAL SECTION OF TWO
   TRANSMITTED HEREWITH IS A DELTA CONTROLLED MESSAGE. PLEASE
    ADVISE IF ANY LIMITATIONS OVER AND ABOVE EXISTING RESTRICTIONS
    ARE REQUIRED. THIS MESSAGE WAS TRANSMITTED TO THE WHITE HOUSE
S
4
    VIET NAME SE (SOUT H)
                               FRENCH
    3/00/DOLL-VND/T-72
    WE INFORMED KISSINGER THAT WE CONSIDER AS UNFAIR THE UNFOUNDED
   ATTACKS AGAINST OUR GOVERNMENT; INDEED, ((THERE IS)) NOTHING ((WHICH)) PERMITS ((HIM)) TO ASSERT THAT OUR GOVERNMENT IS TRYING TO BUY TIME. ALSO, AT NO TIME DID WE CALL INTO QUESTION
Δ
   THE WORDS OF PRESIDENT NIXON OR THOUGHT THAT KISSINGER HAD EXCEEDED NIXON'S INSTRUCTIONS. THE FACT IS THAT THE KEY
    PROBLEMS ARE SO VITAL TO US THAT WE ARE OBLIGED TO HOLD
   FIRMLY TO OUR POSITION ON THEM. WE REMINDED HIM ALSO THAT IN RECENT WEEKS WE HAVE SUBMITTED TO
    THE U.S. GOVERNMENT MANY MEMORANDA CONTAINING ALTERNATIVES ON
    VAR IOUS PROBLEMS. THAT IN ITSELF IS SUFFICIENT PROOF OF OUR
    DESIRE TO COOPERATE.
    KISSINGER REPLIED BY SAYING THAT THE POSITIONS EXPOSED IN THESE
    MEMORANDA ARE MAXIMUM POSITIONS, ON WHICH WE CANNOT HOPE TO OBTAIN COMPLETE SATISFACTION. HE REPEATED THAT HE NEEDS TO KNOW
    NOW JUST HOW FAR WE CAN GO IN THE WAY OF COMPROMISE ON EACH
    IMPORTANT QUESTION AND THE LESS IMPORTANT POINTS, WHICH COULD
    (B VAL FINALLY) BE ABANDONED WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF A PACKAGE
S
    DE AL .
   WE HAVE THE IMPRESSION THAT DESPITE THE APPARENT INTRANSIGEANCE (B VAL OF LE DUC THO), THE U.S. AND NORTH VIETNAM WILL REACH AN AGREEMENT WHICH WILL BE A LITTLE BETTER THAN THE PRESENT DRAFT,
4
    BUT WHICH WOULD NOT CORRESPOND WITH WHAT WE DESIRE, WHETHER WE
   LIKE IT OR NOT. KISSINGER'S ACCUSATIONS AND WARNINGS, WHICH WE HAVE NOTED, (B VAL WERE) INTENDED TO JUSTIFY ACTIONS OF THE U.S. IN SUCH AN EVENTUALITY. TO AVOID FURNISHING SUCH A PRETEXT, TWE
ш
    SUGGEST:
    1. CENTERING OUR PROPAGANDA AGAINST COMMUNIST INTRANSIGEANCE.
    THE PREAMBLE.
```

DROPPING THE LESS IMPORTANT POINTS IN ORDER TO BE ABLE TO HOLD TO THE TWO KEY QUESTIONS. THESE INCLUDE, FOR EXAMPLE, THE COMPOSITION OF THE ICCS: PARTICIPATION BY CAMBODIA AND LAOS IN THE INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE: THE FORMULA FOR "COMPLETION OF THE POLITICAL PROCESS;" ARTICLE VII, ((ON THE)) RELATIONSHIP ((BETWEEN THE)) U.S. AND THE DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM; ARTICLES XVI AND XVII; AND EVEN THE DESIGNATION OF PARTIES IN

ON OTHER POINTS: CONCERNING, FOR EXAMPLE, THE TERM "GENERAL"
ELECTIONS," WE FEEL THAT WE CAN ACCEPT THE WORD "GENERAL"
IF WE OBTAIN SATISFACTION ON THE CNCR, IT BEING WELL UNDERSTOOD THAT WE REJECT ALL OTHER COMMUNIST DEMANDS CONCERNING THE RESIG-NATION OF PRESIDENT ((THIEU)) AT A SET TIME BEFORE THE ELECTIONS, ETC.; OR, FOR EXAMPLE, THE QUESTION OF THE RELEASE OF POLITICAL PRISONERS WHICH WE CAN TIE ((1 WD G)) AGREEMENT BY NORTH VIETNAM TO WITHDRAW ALL NORTH VIETNAMESE TROOPS.

WE HOPE TO RECEIVE INSTRUCTIONS AS SOON AS POSSIBLE.

TI 23 NOV 72 Ø1577. 500

#0660

ഥ

4

NNNN

This work sheet contains information offers of

PL 86-36/50 USC 3605

CLASSIFIED

ZCZCEXB714

DE #3511/3051 3281530

ZNY MMNSH

Z 231525Z NOV 72 ZYH

FM DIRNSA

WHITE HOUSE (ATTN MR DAVID MCMANIS FOR SERIES CHECK) TO

ZEM

=

SSILIED

<

EXCLUSIVE FOR DELTA CONTROL OFFICER

SECTION ONE OF TWO

WARNING: THE COMINT CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNUSUALLY SENSITIVE. IF A USIB MEMBER (OR HIS SPECIALLY DESIGNATED DEPUTY) APPROVES THE USE OF THIS COMPARTMENTED ITEM IN A TOP SECRET CODEWORD PUBLICATION, THE PRECISE COMINT SOURCE OR TARGET SENSITIVE) SHOULD BE CONCEALED TO THE MAXIMUM DEGREE POSSIBLE AND NO REFERENCE SHOULD BE MADE TO THE NSA DELTA REFERENCE SERIAL. IN ALL OTHER CASES, THIS MATERIAL MUST BE MAINTAINED UNDER DELTA SECURITY CONTROLS.

TRANSMITTED HEREWITH IS A SOUTH VIETNAMESE DIPLOMATIC MESSAGE. NORMAL DISTRIBUTION FOR THIS MESSAGE IS IN THE DELTA SUBSERIES DOLL-VND. PLEASE ADVISE IF ANY LIMITATIONS OVER AND ABOVE EXISTING DELTA RESTRICTIONS ARE REQUIRED. THIS MESSAGE WAS TRANSMITTED TO THE WHITE HOUSE ONLY.

VIETNAMESE (SOUTH) FRENCH XXMMENPØ1F0072328 3/00/DOLL-VND/T -72

SAIGON INSTRUCTS PARIS NEGOTIATORS REGARDING KISSINGER-THO MEETINGS

XXCC

FR ((SAIGON:)) PRESIDENT'S OFFICE: ((PRESIDENTIAL ASSISTANT)) HOANG DUC NHA 23 NOV 72 1900 TO PARIS: ((DELEGATION)); AMBASSADOR

PHAM DANG LAM IMMEDIATE 2749/PTT/BT/TM TOP SECRET.

PURSUANT TO YOUR CABLE 30/PDVN OF 22 NOVEMBER:

THE GOVERNMENT ((OF SOUTH)) VIETNAM REAFFIRMS AND ASKS YOU TO COMMUNICATE TO ((DR. HENRY A.)) KISSINGER OUR POSITION ON NEGOTIA-TIONS IN PROGRESS. AS LONG AS THE TWO FUNDAMENTAL PROBLEMS--NAMELY, THE WITHDRAWAL OF ALL NORTH VIETNAMESE TROOPS AND THE FORMATION OF THE CNCR -- ARE NOT RESOLVED, WE FEEL THAT IT IS NOT USEFUL TO ENTER INTO THE DETAILS OF THE OTHER POINTS. INTRANSIGEANCE HAS PUT US IN A DEAD END SITUATION. KISSINGER PLAINLY THAT WE ASK HIM TO DISCUSS WITH THE NORTH VIETNAMESE THE TWO FUNDAMENTAL PROBLEMS ON WHICH WE HAVE EXPRESSEN OUR DISTINCT POSITION IN OUR RECENT MEMORANDUM GIVEN TO THE U.S. GOVERNMENT ON 18 NOVEMBER LAST AND THAT WE DEMAND AN ANSWER FROM HANOI ((1 WD G)) (B VAL ON THE TWO) KEY POINTS. ONCE THESE TWO POINTS ARE RESOLVED, IT WILL MORE USEFUL TO DISCUSS THE OTHER POINTS, SUCH AS THE STATUS OF THE DMZ ((DEMILITARIZED ZONE)), THE WORDING OF ARTICLE I. ETC. IF HANOI CONTINUES TO MAINTAIN THAT NORTH O VIETNAMESE TROOPS HAVE THE RIGHT TO REMAIN IN THE SOUTH, ON THE ONE HAND, AND IF THEY CONTINUE TO KEEP ((THE WORDING)) "COW CAAU CHINH QUYEEN", ((1)) THE THREE EQUAL COMPONENTS, ETC., ON THE OTHER, THEN THE GOVERNMENT ((OF SOUTH)) VIETNAM WILL NOT ON THIS POINT, PLEASE BE ABLE TO PUT FORTH ANY MORE INITIATIVES. ASK KISSINGER EXPLICITLY WHETHER NORTH VIETNAM HAS (B VAL CONSENTED) OR NOT TO ABANDON THE REFERENCE TO THE THREE EQUAL COMPONENTS.

PLEASE ASK KISSINGER ABOUT THE RESULTS OF THE CONVERSATION BETWEEN PRESIDENT ((THIEU)) AND ((AMBASSADOR ELLSWORTH)) BUNKER ON 19 NOVEMBER. IN THIS CONVERSATION PRESIDENT ((THIEU)) ADVANCED THE FOLLOWING IDEA AND ASKED THE U.S. GOVERNMENT TO EXPLORE THIS IDEA WITH NORTH VIETNAM. IN A FIRST PHASE BETWEEN NORTH VIETNAM AND SOUTH VIETNAM AND BETWEEN THE COMMUNISTS AND THE ALLIES, THE U.S. AND ALLIED FORCES (B VAL WILL BE) OBLIGED TO WITHDRAW FROM SOUTH VIETNAM WITHIN 60 DAYS, ((AND)) THE NORTH VIETNAMESE FORCES WILL ALSO WITHDRAW COMPLETELY FROM SOUTH VIETNAM WITHIN THE SAME TIME FRAME. WHILE THE FARVN ((ARMED FORCES OF THE REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM)) WOULD DEMOBILIZE ITS MANPOWER BY THE SAME NUMBER AS THE TOTAL NUMBER OF NORTH VIETNAMESE TROOPS ALREADY WITHDRAWN. IN A SECOND PHASE --I.E. THE PHASE BETWEEN FARVN AND NLF ((NATIONAL LIBERATION FRONT)) TROOPS -- THE FARVN AND NLF TROOPS WILL, GRADUALLY AND WITH THE AGREEMENT OF THE PARTIES, REDUCE THEIR MANPOWER, DEMOBILIZE THE TROOPS THUS REDUCED, AND RETURN THEM TO THEIR PLACE OF BIRTH. THIS REDUCTION AND DEMOBILIZATION WILL BE SIMULTANEOUS AND EQUAL ((IN APPLICATION)) FOR THE GOVERNMENT ((OF SOUTH)) VIETNAM AND THE NLF. PLEASE ASK KISSINGER WHETHER HE HAS INFORMED THE NORTH VIETNAMESE IF SO. WHAT IS THEIR RESPONSE? XXHH

900 #3511

CLASSIFIED

NNNN

PL 86-36/50 USC 3605 SIFIED ZCZCEXB715 S 4 DE #3512/3051 3281530 ZNY MMNSH Z 231525Z NOV 72 ZYH FM DIRNSA TO WHITE HOUSE (ATTN MR DAVID MCMANIS FOR SERIES CHECK) ZEM 1 EXCLUSIVE FOR DELTA CONTROL OFFICER FINAL SECTION OF TWO S CLAS

WARNING: THE COMINT CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNUSUALLY SENSITIVE.

IF A USIB MEMBER (OR HIS SPECIALLY DESIGNATED DEPUTY) APPROVES
THE USE OF THIS COMPARTMENTED ITEM IN A TOP SECRET CODEWORD
PUBLICATION, THE PRECISE COMINT SOURCE OR TARGET (WHICHEVER
IS SENSITIVE) SHOULD BE CONCEALED TO THE MAXIMUM DEGREE POSSIBLE
AND NO REFERENCE SHOULD BE MADE TO THE NSA DELTA REFERENCE SERIAL.
IN ALL OTHER CASES, THIS MATERIAL MUST BE MAINTAINED UNDER DELTA
SECURITY CONTROLS.

TRANSMITTED HEREWITH IS A SOUTH VIETNAMESE DIPLOMATIC MESSAGE. NORMAL DISTRIBUTION FOR THIS MESSAGE IS IN THE DELTA SUBSERIES DOLL-VND. PLEASE ADVISE IF ANY LIMITATIONS OVER AND ABOVE EXISTING DELTA RESTRICTIONS ARE REQUIRED. THIS MESSAGE WAS TRANSMITTED TO THE WHITE HOUSE ONLY.

VIETNAMESE (SOUTH) FRENCH XXMMENPØ1F0072328 3/00/DOLL-VND/T -72

SAIGON INSTRUCTS PARIS NEGOTIATORS REGARDING KISSINGER-THO MEETINGS

XXCC

SSIFI

3. NIXON HAS SENT A LETTER TO PRESIDENT ((THIEU)) IN THE SAME TONE THAT KISSINGER EMPLOYED WITH YOU. PRESIDENT ((THIEU)) IS GOING TO ANSWER ((THE LETTER)) AND I WILL SEND YOU THE MAIN POINTS ((OF THAT)) RESPONSE.

4. PLEASE COMMUNICATE WITH KISSINGER IMMEDIATELY AFTER RECEIVING THIS TELEGRAM, ACCORDING TO THE INSTRUCTIONS IN PARAGRAPHS 1 AND 2. PLEASE CABLE ME THE RESULTS IMMEDIATELY. ((1)) VIETNAMESE FOR "GOVERNING STRUCTURE."

TI 23 NOV 72 1222Z

HHXX


500

S

#3512

TOP SECRET UNDITA

is work theat contains information allocation lies frainmol listeness of 15 Sections 753, 794 and 758, the teasurement of the constants of



eaming of the Espionage Laws, Title 18 at 5 C horized person is prohibited by law CLASSIFIED PL 86-36/50 USC 3605 ZZ DE #0655 3290319 ZRY MMKSH CLASSIFIED Z 240320Z NOV 72 ZYH FM DIRNSA TO WHITEHOUSE (ATTH: MR. D. MCMANIS FOR A SERIES C) ZEM CLASSIFIED SECTION ONE OF TWO 3/00/DOLL-VND/T HEREVITH IS A SOUTH VIET MESSAGE. PLEASE ADVIS ASSIFIED INITATIONS ON DISTRIBUTION ARE REQUIRED. THIS VIETNAMESE

LASSIFIED

PHAM DANG LAN 23 TO SAIGORE PRESIDENT'E OFFICE; ((PRESIDENTIAL ASSISTANT)) HOANG DUC HHAS AND FOREIGN MINISTRY IMMEDIATE TOP SECRET. HERE IS A RECAPITULATION OF THE RESULTS OF THE FOUR KISSINGER--LE DUC THO MEETINGS. AS PRESENTED TO US AT THE BEGINNING OF OUR MEET-ING TODAY, THURSDAY, WITH KISSINGER. WE WILL DRAW YOUR ATTENTION IN PARTICULAR TO THE TENOR OF THIS AZETING AS THE SUBJECT OF A FOLLOWING TELEGRAM. WITH REFERENCE TO THE U. . GOVERNMENT'E REVISED DRAFT AGREEMENT DATED 14 NOVEMBER (DOCUMENT NO. 4): 1. THE COMMUNISTS REJECTED THE PREAMBLE PROPOSED BY TH U.F. AS SPECIFIED IN THE DRAFT AGREEMENT AND ARE NOW DEMANDING THE OLD FORM; ((I.E.)) "THE GOVERNMENT OF THE U.S.A. AND THE GOVERNMENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM AND THE GOVERNMENT ((OF THE)) DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM

Ж С SSIFI AND THE PROVISIONAL REVOLUTIONARY GOVERNMENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF SOUTH VIETHAM."

AMAPTER I. ARTICLE I. THE NEW WORDING ACCEPTED BY WORTH VIETWAM ((IS)) 1"ALL COUNTRIES SMALL RESPECT THE INDEPENDENCE. SOVER-

EIGHTY, ETC."

"MAINTENANCE OF THE CEASEFIRE, PRESERVATION OF PEACE.

625

#9655

NUMN

CLASSIFIED

CLASSIFIED

CLASSIFIED

Ж	EID: 6549596 Doc Ref ID: A504075	,,
	The second secon	•
1		<u>ن</u> بر
温		
证		_ :
SS		C^*
18		
เบ)	
ì		
}		,
		į
品	PL 86-36/50 USC 3605	0
正正	fruon	
38,) · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·)
4	ZZ T	
įΰ		1
ĺ	DE #2656 3298319	, A
		· .
0	ZNY MMNSH	., :
回	E CANADA	7.
SSIFIED	Z 240320Z NOV 72 ZYH	
S	e Sanotter and Ar Tru	()
1	FM DIRNER	:
O) · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·	C
-	TO WHITEHOUSE (ATTN: MR. D. MCMANIS FOR A SERIES C)	C RODA
1		- 0
۵	ZEM	
SIFIE		
Sign	TO POLICIO DELITA CONTROLLES ITEM	
M	noform	\bigcirc
id id	FINAL SECTION OF TWO	Ļ
1	et.co.	
	3/06/DOLL-VND/T -72	(
'n		O g
回	TRANSMITTED HEREWITH IS A SOUTH VIET MESSAGE. PLEASE ADVISE	
SIFIE		O_{i}
55	IF ANY LIMITATIONS ON DISTRIBUTION ARE REQUIRED. THIS	\sim
		O,
10	MESSAGE WAS TRANSMITTED TO THE WHITE HOUSE ONLY.	\sim
		\bigcirc
	METERNAMESE (OUTH) FRENCH, ENGLISH	~
		O .,
	FOR SOVEREIGNTY AND INDEPENDENCE," THE REST ((REMAINS)) UNCHANGED.	\sim
100		Ų.

A. HERE THE COMMUNISTS REED TO MENTION ONLY THE RTIES PART-

O

DESIGNATED PARTICULARLY THE FOUR SIGNATORIES. AS IN THE PREAMBLE.

15. NEW ARTICLE 17. THE FORMER ARTICLE 12 BECOMES THE NEW ARTICLE 17 WITHOUT CHANGE.

16. NEW ARTICLE 18. ALIAS FORMER ARTICLE 13. THE ONLY CHANGE IS

THE OMISSION OF THE WORD "GUARANTEE" FROM THE EXPRESSION

"INTERNATIONAL GUARANTEE CONFERENCE" IN PARAGRAPHS B AND C. IN

PARAGRAPH E OF THE SAME ARTICLE, REPLACE "THE PRINCIPLE OF RESPECT

FOR SOVEREIGHTY" BY "RESPECT FOR THE PRINCIPLE OF SOVEREIGHTY

H OF THE SAME ARTICLE. IN THE LAST PHRASE REPLACE "THE INTERNATIONAL

OF SOUTH VIETNAM" ON THE MORTH VIETNAMESE PROPOSAL. IN PARAGRAPH

GUARANTEE CONFERENCE" WITH "THE INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE PROVIDED

FOR IN ARTICLE 19."

IT. NEW ARTICLE 19. ALIAS FORMER ARTICLE 14. IN THE SECOND

PARAGRAPH. AFTER "THE U. 3. A. AND THE DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC

OF VIETNAM", ADD "ON BEHALF OF THE PARTIES PARTICIPATING

IN THE PARIS CONFERENCE ON VIETNAM, WILL PROPOSE, ETC."

18. CHAPTER VII. NEW ARTICLE 28, ALIAS FORMER ARTICLE 15. PARA-

GRAPH (C VAL A) ((WILL BE)) MODIFIED AS FOLLOWS: "THE PARTIES

PARTICIPATING IN THE PARIS CONFERENCE ON VIETNAM SHALL STRICTLY

RESPECT THEIR OBLIGATIONS UNDER THE 1934 GENEVA AGREEMENTS ON

CAMBODIA AND THE 1962 GENEVA AGREEMENTS ON LAOS AND THE

RECOGNIZED THEREING I. E. THE INDEPENDENCE, SOVEREIGHTY, UNITY,

AND TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY OF THE COUNTRIES. THEY SHALL RESPECT THE

HEUTRALITY OF CAMBODIA AND LAOS.

THE PARITES PARTICIPATING IN THE PARIS CORFERENCE ON VIETNAM

undertake to (C val refrain) from using the territory of Cambodia

AND THE TERRITORY OF LACS TO ENCROACH ON THE SOVEREIGHTY AND

SECURITY OF ONE ANOTHER AND OF OTHER COUNTRIES."

IN PARAGRAPH D OF THE SAME ARTICLE, THE WORD "THREE" IS

OMITTED FROM THE EXPRESSION "THE THREE INDOCHINESE COUNTRIES."

19. HEW ARTICLE 21. THE FORMER ARTICLES 16 AND 17 BECOME THE

NEW ARTICLES 21 AND 22. WITHOUT CHANGE.

28. CHAPTER IX. THE FORMER ARTICLE IS BECOMES THE NEW ARTICLE

23. THE LAST PHRASE, "EUBSEQUENTLY A FRENCH TEXT WILL BE PREPARED

n for reference," has been omitted.

J TI 24 HOV 72 81272

966

#9656



Sections 793, 734 and 7

O

TO THE REAL PROPERTY OF THE PARTY OF THE PAR



18

YAMO ZOUCH ETHIN

DELTA CONTROLLED TA

PL 86-36/50 USC 3605

Z CZ CZ XD 63Ø

ZZ DE #8267 3291330

ZNY MMNSH

Z 241329 NOV 72

FM DIR NSA

TO WHITE HOUSE (ATTN MR DAVID MCMANIS FOR SERIES CHECK)
ZEM

TOPSECRETUMERA DELTA CONTROLLED

EXCLUSIVE FOR DELTA CONTROL OFFICER

WAR NING: THE COMINT CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNUSUALLY SENSITIVE. IF A USIB MEMBER (OR HIS SPECIALLY DESIGNATED DEPUTY) APPROVES

THE USE OF THIS COMPARTMENTED ITEM IN A TOP SECRET CODEWORD
PUBLICATION, THE PRECISE COMINT SOURCE OR TARGET WHICHEVER
IS SENSITIVE) SHOULD BE CONCEALED TO THE MAXIMUM DEGREE POSSIBLE
AND NO REFERENCE SHOULD BE MADE TO THE MSA DELTA REFERENCE SERIAL.
IN ALL OTHER CASES, THIS MATERIAL MUST BE MAINTAINED UNDER DELTA
SECURITY CONTROLS.

TRANSMITTED HEREWITH IS A SOUTH VIETNAMESE DIPLOMATIC MESSAGE.
NORMAL DISTRIBUTION FOR THIS MESSAGE IS IN THE DELTA SUBSERIES
DOLL-VND. PLEASE ADVISE IF ANY LIMITATIONS OVER AND ABOVE
EXISTING DELTA RESTRICTIONS ARE REQUIRED. THIS MESSAGE WAS
TRANSMITTED TO THE WHITE HOUSE ONLY.

VIETNAMESE (SOUTH) FRENCH, ENGLISH XXMME NP01F0072329
3/00/DOLL-VND/T -72

AMBASSADOR LAM IN PARIS RESPONDS TO QUERY BY PRESIDENT THIEU'S SPECIAL ASSISTANT

XXCC

TO SAIGON: PRESIDENT'S OFFICE;

(PRESIDENTIAL SSISTANT))

HOANG DUC NHA FLASH 33/PDVN/TII

TOP SECRET.

REFERENCE YOUR TELEGRAM NUMBER 2762/PTT/ST DATED 24 NOV 72.
WE PUT THAT QUESTION TO KISSINGER YESTERDAY ((AND)) HE RESPONDED
THAT LE DUC THO HAD REJECTED IT ENTIRELY, AS ((HE DID)) THE SIMPLE
FORMULA "ON THE BASIS ONE FOR ONE AND RETURN TO THEIR NATIVE
PLACES."
TI 24 NOV 72 Ø948Z
XXHH

35¢ #8267

DELTA COMMON TEM

MINISTER OF THE CONTRACT OF TH

MININ

TOPCHA

#18

0

ш

EHS FORM FOR INTERNAL AGENCY USE ONL

PL 86-36/50 USC 3605

RELEASED FOR TRANSMISSION



```
SZZ CO
S DE
            *0662 3290701
ZNY WMNSH
 Z 240700Z NOV 72 ZYH
```

M DIRNSA TO WHITE HOUSE (ATTN: MR. D. MCMANIS FOR A SERIES CHECK)

ZEM R & T UMBRA SECTION ONE OF THREE WHITE HOUSE ONLY W TRANSMITTED HEREWITH IS A DELTA CONTROLLED MESSAGE. PLEASE ADVISE IF ANY LIMITATIONS ON DISTRIBUTION ARE REQUIRED. THIS MESSAGE WAS TRANSMITTED TO THE WHITE HOUSE ONLY.

3 3/00/DOLL-VND/T -72

VIETNAMESES (SOUTH) FRENCH

SOUTH VIETNAMESE REPORT TONE OF KISSINGER BRIEFING, FEW SIGNI-FICANT NORTH VIETNAMESE CONCESSIONS IN DRAFT CHANGES

FLASH

32/PDVN?TM

FR PARIS: DELEGATION: ((AMBASSADOR)) 24 NOV 72 0230Z PHAM DANG LAM

TO SAIGON: PRESIDENT'S OFFICE; ((PRESIDENTIAL ASSISTANT)) :1 HOANG DUC NHA; ALSO SENT TO

FOREIGN WINISTRY

TOP SECRET.

IN A TONE VERY GRAVE AND DIFFERENT FROM THAT WHICH HE EMPLOYED S O YESTERDAY. ((DR. HENRY A.)) KISSINGER INFORMED US THAT, CONTRARY TO HIS EXPECTATIONS. THE NORTH VIETNAMESE MADE NO IMPORTANT CONCESSIONS TODAY EXCEPT THOSE CONCERNING THE DMZ ((DEMILITARIZED ZONE)) AND PROVISIONS ON CAMBODIA AND LOAS. HE RECOGNIZES THAT AFTER FOUR MEETINGS WITH LE DUC THO, HE HAS BEEN ABLE TO OBTAIN ONLY A FEW MODIFICATIONS. ROUGHLY SPECAKING. ASIDE FROM THE NEW - WORDING ON THE DMZ. WHICH, WITHOUT BEING TOTALLY SATISFACTORY. IS BETTER THAN THE FORMER TEXT, AND ON CAMBODIA AND LAOS, WHICH MENTIONS EXPRESSLY THE OBLIGATIONS OF NORTH VIETNAM DERIVED ((FROM THE)) GENEVA AGREEMENTS OF 1954 AND 1962, THE OTHER SIGN-DIFICANT CHANGES CONCERN:

\$ 1. ARTICLES 1 AND 9.C., WHICH NO LONGER REFER PARTICULARLY TO THE 4 U.S.

2. ARTICLE 7-- RESTORATION OF THE WORDS "DESTROYED" AND "USED UP". REFERING TO THE REPLACMENT OF WAR MATERIEL.

3. ARTICLE 12.8. THE FUNCTIONS OF THE CNCR ((COUNCIL FOR NATIONAL RECONCILIATION AND CONCORD)) NO LONGER INCLUDE "MAINTENANCE OF CEASEFIRE AND PRESERVATION OF PEACE.

ш 4. ARTICLE 14. BETTER WORDING.

5. ARTICLE 20. NORTH VIETNAM AGREED TO OMIT THE WORD "THREE" FROM " "THREE INDOCHINESE COUNTRIES. " KISSINGER INFORMED US THAT LE DUC STHO GAVE HIM TO UNDERSTAND THAT WE SHOULD NOT EXPECT ANY FURTHER " "CONCESSIONS" ON THE PART OF NORTH VIETNAM. KISSINGER URGENTLY REQUESTED THAT WE EXPLAIN TO OUR GOVERNMENT THE EXTREMELY SERIOUS SITUATION THE U.S. GOVERNMENT AND THE GOVERNMENT ((OF SOUTH)) 0 VIETNAM ARE IN BECAUSE OF THIS STATE OF AFFAIRS.

THREE POSSIBILITIES ARE TO BE CONSIDERED, ACCORDING TO KISSINGER. FIRST OPTION: WE MAINTAIN OUR POSITION IN FULL, THUS RISKING A BREAKDOWN IN NEGOTIATIONS. IN THIS CASE THE WAR WILL CONTINUE WITH THE PRESENT U.S. SUPPORT FOR 2 OR 3 MONTHS. AFTER WHICH WE CAN BE CERTAIN THAT MILITARY ASSISTANCE COULD NO LONGER BE MAINTAINED.

SECOND OPTION: WE ARE SATISFIED WITH WAHT WE HAVE OBTAINED ON CONDITION THAT NORTH VIETNAM GIVES ((US)) SATISFACTION ON A FEW ADDITIONAL POINTS. KISSINGER THINKS THAT WE WILL BE ABLE TO REQUEST THE REINTRODUCTION OF THE FORMULA FOR DEMOBILIZATION ON A ONE-FOR-ONE BASIS (BUT WITHOUT REFERENCE TO *RETURN TO THEIR

いっしゅ おいじかいきほうしょくい

. Lavs, Tito 18, . . . pr a . hite ' LV !

ADDITIONAL POINTS. KISSINGER THINKS THAT WE WILL BE ABLE TO REQUEST THE REINTRODUCTION OF THE FORMULA FOR DEMOBILIZATION ON A ONE-FOR-ONE BASIS (BUT WITHOUT REFERENCE TO "RETURN TO THEIR NATIVE PLACES," WHICH THE NORTH VIETNAMESE REJECT CATEGORICALLY), AS WELL AS ADDING THE TERM "EQUALLY APPOINTED BY THE TWO PARTIES" AFTER THE WORDS "THREE EQUAL SEGMENTS." IN ANY CASE, SHOULD THE NORTH VIETNAMESE REFUSAL LEAD TO A BREAKDOWN, WE WILL BE IN A BETTER POSTURE TO DENOUNCE THE COMMUNIST BAD FAITH AND INTRANSIG-



EANCE AND PROVE THAT THE COMMUNISTS DO NOT SINCERELY DESIRE PEACE (C VAL BUT) ONLY ((DESIRE)) THE DEPARTURE OF THE U.S.

THIRD OPTION: WE ACCEPT THE AGREEMENT IN ITS PRESENT FORM, WITH AN UNDERSTANDING ACCORDING TO WHICH WE AGREE TO FREE POLITICAL PRISONERS IN EXCHANGE ((FOR THE)) DE FACTO WITHDRAWAL OF NORTH VIETNAMESE UNITS IN MR ((MILITARY REGION)) I WITHIN A FRAMEWORK CALLED THE "REDEPLOYMENT OF THE FORCES OF LIBERATION." IN THIS CASE, WE WILL DEMAND THE WITDRAWAL OF THE GREATEST POSSIBLE NUMBER OF NORTH VIETNAMESE TROOPS-- TOO.OOO FOR EXAMPLE. IF THE NORTH VEITNAMESE REFUSE SUCH AN UNDERSTANDING, THEY WILL BEAR THE RESPONSIBILITY ((FOR THE)) BREAKDOWN ((IN NEGOTIATIONS)); WHILE IN THE FACE OF PUBLIC OPINION, WE WOULD AT LEAST HAVE MADE THE

MAXIMUM PROOF OF OUR GOODWILL.

MISSINGER DOES NOT HIDE HIS PREFERENCE FOR THE SECOND OPTION FOR

THE FOLLOWING REASONS:

FIRST, THE U.S. GOVERNMENT WILL HAVE A SOLID BASIS FOR CONTINUED ASSISTANCE TO THE GOVERNMENT ((OF SOUTH)) VIETNAM.

780 #0662

NNNN

CLASSIFI

__ :::

€ <

E D

CLASSIFIED WORK SHEET

뜨 S

S 4

RELEASED FOR TRANSMISSION

PL 86-36/50 USC 3605

ZZ ш DE

#0563 3290701

ZNY MMNSH

Z 240700Z NOV 72 ZYH

FM DIRNSA

TO WHITE HOUSE (ATTN: MR. D. MCMANIS FOR A SEKIES CHECK)

< ZEM

C R E T UMBRA SECTION TWO OF THREE WHITE HOUSE ONLY TRANSMITTED HEREWITH IS A DELTA CONTROLLED MESSAGE. PLEASE ADVISE IF ANY LIMITATIONS ON DISTRIBUTION ARE REQUIRED. THIS MESSAGE WAS TRANSMITTED TO THE WHITE HOUSE ONLY. 3/00/DOLL-VND/T -72

SECOND. FOR KISSINGER THE QUESTION OF NORTH VIETNAMESE TROOPS IS VOT A DECISIVE FACTOR; FOR EVEN IF THE QUESTION IS SEITLED ON -- PAPER, NORTH VIETNAM WILL STILL BE ABLE NOT TO CARRY OUT ((THE AGREEMENT)), AS IN THE CASE OF LADS. ((WHAT IS)) ESSENTIAL IS THAT THE U.S. GOVERNMENT IS DETERMINED TO REACT WITH EXTREME VIOLENCE AGAINST ANY VIOLATION ((OF THE)) AGREEMENT BY WORTH - VIETNAM. KISSINGER, IN FACT, LED LE DUC THO TO UNDERSTAND O CLEARLY THIS POINT ON SEVERAL OCCASIONS.

SHOULD WE TAKE THE SECOND OPTION, THE U.S. GOVERNMENT WILL MAKE A UNILATERAL STATEMENT ON THE QUESTION OF NORTH VIETNAMESE

TROOPS, FOR WHICH THE DRAFT ((TEXT)) FOLLOWS:

"THE QUESTION OF VIETNAMESE ARMED FORCES IN SOUTHE VIETNAM--111 "THE U.S., WITH THE CONCURRENCE OF THE REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM, TAKES NOTE OF THE FOLLOWING STATEMENTS MADE BY SPECIAL ADVISOR LE DUC THO IN THE COURSE OF THE NEGOTIATIONS WITH Dr. KISSINGER: "'OHE FORCES IN SOUTH VIETNAM THAT HAVE COME FROM NORTH VIETNAM CONSIST OF SOUTH VIETNAMESE WHO REGROUPED IN NORTH - VIETNAM PLUS NORTH VIETNAMESE WHO WENT SOUTH AS VOLUNIEERS AND □ ORGANIZED THEMSELVES INTO UNITS.(27 SEPTEMBER 1972)*

"THE REGULAR ARMY OF NORTH VIETNAM IS IN NORTH VIETNAM.

(27 SEPTEMBER 1972)'

"'NOT ONLY SHOULD MILITARY EFFECTIVES BE REDUCED, BUT THE SOLDIERS SHOULD BE DEMOBILIZED AND RETURNED TO THEIR NATIVE PLACE. (10 OCTOBER 1972)

"'WE PUT DOWN A PROVISION SAYING THAT THE WAY TO REUNIFY THE COUNTRY IS THROUGH PEACEFUL MEANS AND STEP-BY-STEP RESTORATION THROUGH AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE TWO SIDES. THEN HOW CAN THERE BE A USE OF MILITARY MEANS BY ONE SIDE AGAINST THE OTHER SIDE? 4 (27 SEPTEMBER 1972)'

AFTER THE RESTORATION OF PEACE ((Q WD G)) THE ENFORCEMENT A CEASEFIRE (C VAL IF THE) TWO SOUTH VIETNAMESE PARTIES ARE BOUND BY A REAL SPIRIT OF PEACE AND WANT TO PRESERVE LASTING PEACE; THEN THIS QUESTION CAN BE RESOLVED EASILY. (27 SEPTEMBER 1972)

TH U.S., WITH THE CONCURRENCE OF THE REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM, INTERPRETS THESE STATEMENTS AS MEANING THAT NORTH VIETNAM DOES NOT CLAIM THE RIGHT TO MAINTAIN ARMED FORCES IN SOUTH VIETNAM. AS IDR THE U.S. AND THE REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM, ARTICLE 13 OF THE AGREEMENT, WITH REGARD TO DEMOBILISATION, AND ARTICLE 15, WITH REGARD TO THE DEMILITARIZED ZONE, MAKE CLEAR THAT NO OUTSIDE STATE HAS THE RIGHT TO MAINTAIN FORCES IN SOUTH VIETNAM AND NO PROVISION

FORM FOR INTERNAL

affecting the National Defense of the University State, the transmission or the revelation of which is any

IN THE AGREEMENT IMPLIES SUCH A RIGHT. THIS CONSTITUTES ONE OF THE ESSENTIAL PREMISES ON WHICH THIS AGREEMENT IS BASED."

MANY TIMES KISSINGER INSISTED ON THE FACT THAT CONTINUED SUPPORT BY THE U.S. GOVERNMENT, CONGRESS, AND ((PUBLIC)) OPINION IS MORE IMPORTANT FOR THE GOVERNMENT ((OF SOUTH)) VIETNAM THAN SATISFACTION CONCERNING CLAUSES IN THE AGREEMENT.

WE REMINDED ((HIM)) THAT IT IS THE NORTH VIETNAMESE INTRANSIGEANCE WHICH IS THE CAUSE OF THE PRESENT SERIOUS SITUATION CONCERNING NEGOTIATIONS. KISSINGER STATED THAT HE HAS NO INTENTION OF BLAMING ✓ IT ON THE GOVERNMENT ((OF SOUTH)) VIETNAM, BUT THE FACT IS THAT THE U.S. GOVERNMENT AND THE GOVERNMENT ((OF SOUTH)) VIETNAM ((NOW)) U FACE THE NECESSITY OF CHOOSING BETWEEN THESE THREE OPTIONS. WE ALSO STRESSED THAT IT IS MORE DIFFICULT NOW THAN IN OCTOBER TO ACCEPT AN AGREEMENT WHICH ALMOST THE SAME AS THE INITIAL DRAFT. IN EFFECT, ON THE ONE HAND, HANDI HAS ALREADY REVEALED THE TENOR THIS AGREEMENT, ((WHILE)) ON THE OTHER HAND, THE POPULATION OF SOUTH VIETNAM HAS MANIFESTED ITS UNANIMOUS OPPOSITION PRINCIPALLY AGAINST THE ABSENCE OF ANY MENTION RELATIVE TO THE WITHDRAWL OF NORTH VIETNAMESE TROOPS AND AGAINST THE DISGUISED COALITION of FORMULA. WE RECALLED THAT PRESIDENT NIXON HIMSELF STATED THAT ▼ THE U.S. GOVERNMENT WILL NEVER SIGN THE AGREEMENT AS LONG AS

→ THE AMBIGUITIES SUBSIST AND THE VITAL QUESTIONS REMAIN UNRESOLVED, UNHICH IS THE CASE WITH THE PRESENT DRAFT, FOLLOWING THE REFUSAL OF COMMUNISTS TO BRING IN THE NECESSARY CHANGES. KISSINGER STATED THAT HE UNDERSTANDS PERFECTLY OUR INTERNAL PROBLEMS. BUT THAT IT IS A MATTER OF CHOICE RENDERED (C VAL INESCAPABLE) BY PULICIFICAL REALITIES IN THE U.S.

WE ASKED KISSINGER WHETHER THE CALENDAR GIVEN BY ((U.S. DEPUTY NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISER)) GENERAL ((ALEXANDER M.)) HAIG, DURING HIS RECENT VISIT TO SAIGON, HAD BEEN SENT TO LE DUC THO. HE ANSWERED AFFIRMATIVELY. WE EXPRESSED OUR CONCERN AND POINTED OUT THAT THE COMMUNISTS HAVE PLAYED AND CONTINUE TO PLAY ON THE DEADLINE SET BY THE U.S. KISSINGER RETORTED BY CLAIMING THAT FOR THE U.S. GOVERNMENT THERE IS NO DEADLINE EXCEPT THAT OF NEXT 3 JANUARY FIRMLY SET BY NORTH VIETNAMESE.

35*0* #2563

۵

S

<1


C NANN

1


bionage Laws, Title 18, prohibited by law.

RELEASED FOR TRANSMISSION ASSIFIE PL 86-36/50 USC 3605 #0664 3290701 DE Z 240700Z NOV 72 ZYH FM DIRNSA OTO WHITE HOUSE (ATTN: MR. D. MCMANIS FOR A SERIES CHECK) ШZEM UMBRA FINAL SECTION OF THREE WHITE HOUSE ONLY TRANSMITTED HEREWITH IS A DELTA CONTROLLED MESSAGE. PLEASE ADVISE OF ANY LIMITATIONS ON DISTRIBUTION ARE REQUIRED. THIS MESSAGE WAS TRANSMITTED TO THE WHITE HOUSE ONLY. **J**3/00/D0LL-VND/T -72 WE THEN ASKED KISSINGER WHETHER HE FORESEES FURTHER MEETINGS WITH THE NORTH VIETNAMESE. KISSINGER INFORMED US THAT HE WILL ASK TO MEET ((1 WD G)) IN A TETTE-A-TETE WITH LE DUC THO IN ORDER TO WARN HIM ABOUT THE SUBJECT OF THE RISK OF AN IMMINENT BREAKDOWN ((IN NEGOTIATIONS)) IF NORTH VIETNAM MAINTAINS ITS INTRANSIGEANCE. THE WILL LET LE DUC THO UNDERSTAND THAT IN THIS CASE THE U.S. HGO VERNMENT "WILL REACT WITH VIOLENT MEANS." KISSINGER WILL PROPOSE TO LE DUC THO A FIFTH MEETING FOR NOON ON SATURDAY. IF THERE IS MANY PROGRESS. HE WILL STAY UNTIL MONDAY AT THE LATEST. IF NOT, HE OWILL RETURN TO WASHINGTON ON SUNDAY MORNING. HE GAVE US AN APPOINTMENT FOR TOMORROW AT 1830 HOURS AND ASKED US TO BRING THE RESPONSE OF OUR GOVERNMENT ON THE THREE OPTIONS CENUMERATED ABOVE AS WELL AS ANY SUGGESTIONS OUR GOVERNMENT ((MAY HAVE)) FOR MEETING THIS SITUATION. KISSINGER ADDED THAT. ACCORDING TO HIS SOURCES. HANOI IS MORE INTRANSIGEANT AT THIS TÎME BECAUSE IT IS SURE TO BE ABLE TO PLAY ON THE DEADLINE OF 3 JANUARY TO RENDER INEVITABLE A CONFRONTATION BETWEEN SAIGON AND WASHINGTON. IN VIEW OF THE EXTREMELY IMPORTANT CONSEQUENCES OF ONE OR ANOTHER OF THE THREE OPTIONS LEFT TO US, WE SUGGEST REPLYING TO KISSINGER THAT BOTH THE U.S. AND ((SOUTH)) VIETNAMESE GOVERNMENTS WILL HAVE TO CONSULT EACH OTHER IN ORDER (B VAL TO ARRIVE) AT A COMMON POSITION IN THE FACE OF THIS NEW SITUATION. FOR OTHIS REASON. ANOTHER SERIES OF MEETINGS BETWEEN KISSINGER AND LE DUC THO MAKES IMPERATIVE THE TIME TO PERMIT CONSULTATIONS BETWEEN WASHINGTON AND SAIGON. THESE CONSULTATIONS CAN BEGIN DURING THE FORTHCOMING VISIT OF SPECIAL ASSISTANT NGUYEN PHU DUC IN WASHINGTON. OTI 24 NOV 72 0444Z <u>₩</u>36Ø **└**#Ø664 55


nn n v



WE WANT TO MAKE IT CLEAR THAT ((WITH)) OPTION 2 OF COURSE CONTINUE TO HOLD TO THE POSITION IN ARTICLE 8.C THAT IS, TO REFUSE THE COMMUNIST DEMAND FOR RELEASE POLITICAL DETAINEES AT THE SAME TIME AS ((THE RELEASE OF)) POK*S NOV 72 8925Z THIS FORM FOR INTERNAL AGENCY USE ONLY 139 #9669 MANA ASSIFIED



SUMMARY OF KISSINGER - LE DUC THO
NEGOTIATIONS IN PARIS




to be a mentioned the mention of the mention of the second

24 November 1972

#22 To Paris from Saigon

Saigon reiterated its stand that the two key issues, withdrawal of NVN troops and the formation and prerogatives of the National Council of Concord and Reconciliation, remain unresolved and that these two points represented life or death for 17 million South Vietnamese. Until such time as agreement on these points was achieved, Saigon believed it could no longer make any initiatives, and that a strategic decision would have to be made since it affected the survival of the South Vietnamese Nation. The SVN delegation was told to advise Kissinger of the decision of the SVN Government and "ask him one last time if he has explained to the North Vietnamese" Thieu's proposals of 19 November.

DELTA CONTROLLED ITEM



Doc ID: 6549596 Doc Ref ID: A5040<u>7</u>5

TOP SECRET UMBRA

LIMITED DISTRIBUTION

#23 To Saigon from Paris

24 November 1972

This message consisted of the text of a message President Nixon sent to Mr. Kissinger in Paris for his use and forwarding (unless Kissinger had strong feelings otherwise) to President Thieu. President Nixon's message indicated that the domestic political situation could bring about a cut off of all military and economic assistance as early as 1 February 1973. The message went on to say that there is strong sentiment for the U.S. to go it alone and make a separate deal with NVN for the return of our POWs. Also, the President reiterated his determination to take massive action against NVN in the event they break the agreement, indicated that we had reached a crossroads because of the political reality in the U.S., and opined that the option of continuing the war was no longer open.

TOP SECRET UMBRA -DELTA CONTROLLED ITEM

LIMITED DISTRIBUTION

24 November 1972


#24 To Saigon from Paris

This message reviews a meeting between Mr. Kissinger and South Vietnamese delegate Nguyen Phu Duc and Pham Dang Lam conducted on the 24th. According to the message, Mr. Kissinger informed Le Duc Tho in an hour long private session that a breakdown in negotiations by North Vietnam would lead to massive retaliation by the U.S. Although both Kissinger and Tho had agreed to meet on the 25th, Kissinger was planning to ask that the session be cancelled and postponed one week because to hold the session under the present circumstances would lead to a breakdown in negotiations.

Kissinger warned that by Thursday evening SVN will have to decide between going forward together with the U.S. or to go its separate way, in which case the U.S. would make separate arrangements for release of POW's, and aid to SVN would be cut off. Kissinger insisted that Duc be in Washington as soon as possible to meet with President Nixon, and offered Duc a trip to Washington on his plane. Kissinger indicated that it would do no good to use Nixon's adversaries, since they would criticize President Nixon but would not support you (SVN). The options open to SVN according to Kissinger were to 1) rejected everything; 2) accept the draft agreement with a few modifications; or 3) give satisfaction to the Communist side on the political prisoners issue in exchange for a de facto withdrawal. The SVN delegate reiterated their previous concerns, including their proposal of 19 November. Kissinger repeated that Le Duc Tho rejected it on the pretext that there were no NVN troops in SVN.

The message closed with an urgent plea from the SVN delegate that the SVN government "take a clear and distinct position."





25 November 1972

#25 To Paris from Saigon

Presidential Assistant Hoang Duc Nha in Saigon asked the Paris delegates to tell Dr. Kissinger to continue to fight for the two SVN points. Unity of purpose was urged, "throwing in the sponge" was condemned, and the gravity of the situation (life and death for SVN) was stressed.

The presentation of this appeal directly to Kissinger prior to his meeting with Le Duc Tho was for inclusion in the SVN official archives.

Nguyen Phu Duc was to remain in Paris until he received orders from President Thieu.




24 November 1972

#26 To Saigon from Paris

Special Presidential Assistant Nguyen Phu Duc submitted the following evaluations to Saigon:

- 1. Although there is truth to the claim of lack of congressional support on the question of aid, the U.S. government does not want to create support. Nguyen Phu Duc argued that there was no support for operations in Cambodia in 1970 nor for renewed bombing and mining of NVN, but such operations were conducted.
- 2. Forced to choose between signing the proposed agreement or withdrawal of U.S. aid, SVN should choose to die as martyrs for the cause for which they have fought so long.
- 3. If the U.S. wants to negotiate for the return of their POW's, SVN will be ready to offer all assistance, i.e. offering to free 38,000 political prisoners.
 - 4. Withdrawal of U.S. troops is not a problem.
- 5. SVN should ask the U.S. not to attack it publicly since this would bring counter-attacks.

Nguyen Phu Duc asked for Thieu's approval of these evaluations and asked for final instructions before departing for Washington. In regard to Kissinger's complaint that SVN newspapers were attacking him, Nguyen Phu Duc was of the opinion that regardless of the merit of the accusations the matter should not be inflamed.








25 Nov 72

#27 To: Paris Fr: Saigon


Referring to a previous telephone conversation, Saigon asked Pham Dang Lam to stress to their friend, presumably Mr. Kissinger, that nobody in Saigon had said anything, in fact, Saigon had had the information ministry deny UPI dispatches saying Saigon attacked Kissinger.

#28 Tô: Saigon Fr: Paris 25 Nov 72

This message consisted of the text of a Pham Dang Lam memorandum delivered to Kissinger at 0915 25 November. The memorandum dited communist negativism, intransigence and a distegard for SVN views. It stressed that since the communists consider negotiations just another aspect of the fighting "our side must meet the challenge in pursuing our common efforts." Mr Kissinger was urged to push for the two SVN points so that the immense sacrifice of SVN and the US will not have been in vain. The memo closed with an acknowledgement of US political problems and SVN appreciation for the past efforts of the US government to secure congressional and public support for a "just peace".







LIMITED DISTRIBUTION


OFLIA CONTROLLED ITEM

25 Nov 72

#29 To; Saigon From: Paris

Pham Dang Lam informed Saigon that he had delivered a memorandum (see previous item) to Kissinger at 0915 on the 25th. At that time, Kissinger advised Lam that he would remind Tho that the two (SVN) questions are the cause of the present deadlock. Kissinger further indicated that in view of the attitude of the SVN government, he would discuss procedural as opposed to substantive matters with Tho to avoid a possible breakdown. Tho agreement to a new series of meetings might not be forthcoming according to Kissinger and again warned SVN of the consequences. Kissinger cited a press report covering the last Kissinger-Tho meeting and asked that Saigon stop revealing what he has communicated to the South Vietnamese on negotiations.

LIVELD DISTRIBUTION



This work sheet contains information aff. Sections 793, 794 and 798, the trans

```
Doc ID: 654959
                           504075
PL 86-36/50 USC 3605
     S DE
                       #8359 3291906
      OZNY MMNSH
```

Z 24 185 6Z NOV 72 3

FM DIRNSA

TO WHITE HOUSE (ATTN MR DAVID MCMANIS FOR SERIES CHECK) ASSIFI

ZEM

EXCLUSIVE FOR DELTA CONTROL OFFICER

WARNING: THE COMINT CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNUSUALLY SENSITIVE. USIB MEMBER (OR HIS SPECIALLY DESIGNATED DEPUTY) APPROVES THE USE OF THIS COMPARTMENTED ITEM IN A TOP SECRET CODEWORD PUBLICATION, THE PRECISE COMINT SOURCE OR TARGET (WHICHEVER IS SENSITIVE) SHOULD BE CONCEALED TO THE MAXIMUM DEGREE POSSIBLE NO REFERENCE SHOULD BE MADE TO THE NSA DELTA REFERENCE SERIAL. CLASSIFIED

IN ALL OTHER CASES, THIS MATERIAL MUST BE MAINTAINED UNDER DELTA SECURITY CONTROLS. TRANSMITTED HEREWITH IS A SOUTH VIETNAMESE DIPLOMATIC MESSAGE.

NORMAL DISTRIBUTION FOR THIS MESSAGE IS IN THE DELTA SUBSERIES DOLL-VND. PLEASE ADVISE IF ANY LIMITATIONS OVER AND ABOVE

EXISTING DELTA RESTRICTIONS ARE REQUIRED. THIS MESSAGE WAS TRANSMITTED TO THE WHITE HOUSE ONLY.

ASSI VIET NAMESE (SOUTH)

XXMMENP Ø1F00 72329

3/00/DOLL -V ND /T -72

AVS, AVN, KUS/FORP-Y/B,D.

SPECIAL ASSISTANT TO PRESIDENT THIEU TO MEET WITH PRESIDENT NIXON RE "STRATEGIC DECISION" TO BE MADE BETWEEN THE TWO CLASSI PRESIDENTS

XXCC

PRESIDENT'S OFFICE; SAIGON:

((SPECIAL ASSISTANT)) HOANG DUC

NHA 24 NOV 72

ASSIFIED TO PARIS: ((SOUTH VIETNAMESE

DELEGATION)); AMBASSADOR PHAM

DANG LAM 3332/PTT/BT/TM

nation affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws. Fitle 19, U.S.C. the transmission or the revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law

FORM FOR INTERNAL AGENCY USE ONLY

REFERENCE YOUR CABLE NRS. 31/PDVN((1)) AND 32/PDVN((1)).

FOLLOWING DELIBERATIONS BY THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

AND TAKING INTO ACCOUNT YOUR SUGGESTIONS, I HAVE THE HONOR TO

INFORM YOU OF THE FOLLOWING.

- THE GOVERNMENT OF SOUTH VIETNAM STATES THAT THE TWO KEY POINTS FOR A JUST PEACE AND AN HONORABLE SOLUTION OF THE CONFLICT, WHICH ARE ALSO THE POINTS OF LIFE OR DEATH FOR 17 MILLION SOUTH VIETNAMESE -- NAMELY, THE RETREAT OF NORTH VIETNAMESE TROOPS AND THE FORMATION AND PREROGATIVES OF THE CNCR ...((NATIONAL COUNCIL OF CONCORD AND RECONCILIATION)) -- ARE NOT YET RESOLVED. ON THE CONTRARY, NORTH VIETNAM STILL REMAINS INTRANSIGENT AND STILL RESERVES THE RIGHT TO STAY IN SOUTH VIETNAM EVEN AFTER THE GENEROUS PROPOSAL MADE BY PRESIDENT ((THIEU)) AND TRANSMITTED ▼ TO THE U.S. GOVERNMENT ON 19 NOVEMBER, THE SUBSTANCE OF WHICH WAS COMMUNICATED TO YOU IN MY WIRE NR. 2749/PTT/BT/TM((1)). THE OTHER HAND NORTH VIETNAM STILL ADHERES TO THE CNCR AS A "COW CAAU CHINH QUYEEN" ((2)) WITH THREE EQUAL MEMBERS. THE CNCR AT LOWER LEVELS, GENERAL ELECTIONS, ETC., NOT INCLUDING THE ODDEMAND THAT PRESIDENT (CTHIEU)) RESIGN. THE GOVERNMENT OF SOUTH VIETNAM REAFFIRMS THAT AS LONG AS THESE TWO KEY PROBLEMS ARE NOT RESOLVED WE CAN NO LONGER MAKE ((ANY)) INITIATIVES. IF HANOI AGREES TO MODIFY ITS POSITION ON THESE POINTS. THEN THERE IS □ HOPE AND WE CAN CONSIDER OTHER MODIFICATIONS.
- 2. IN LIGHT OF HANOI'S INTRANSIGENCE AND THE IMPOSSIBILITY

 OF GETTING THEM TO COOPERATE, THE GOVERNMENT OF SOUTH VIETNAM

 DEEMS THAT THE DECISION TO BE MADE IS OF A STRATEGIC NATURE,

 ESPECIALLY SINCE IT AFFECTS THE SURVIVAL OF THE SOUTH VIETNAMESE

 NATION. CONSEQUENTLY, THE SOUTH VIETNAMESE GOVERNMENT FEELS THAT

 A STRATEGIC DECISION TO DECIDE UPON THE STRATEGY FOR AND NATURE

 OF PEACE AND WAR IS ESSENTIAL BETWEEN THE TWO PRESIDENTS OF

 SOUTH VIETNAM AND THE UNITED STATES. IN THIS CONTEXT, THE

 PRESIDENT ((THIEU)) WILL GIVE THE NECESSARY INSTRUCTIONS FOR

 NGUYEN PHU DUC IN VIEW OF HIS DISCUSSIONS WITH ((PRESIDENT)) NIXON.

Doc ID: 6549596 PPEASEIDAD VYSE ((DR. HENRY A.)) KISSINGER OF THESE INDECISIONS OF THE GOVERNMENT OF SOUTH VIETNAM FOR THE OFFICIAL ASSIFI RECORDS AND ASK HIM ONE LAST TIME IF HE HAS EXPLAINED TO NORTH VIETNAM THE PRESIDENT ((THIEU))'S PROPOSAL OF 19 NOVEMBER WHICH COMMUNICATED TO YOU IN MY CABLE NR. 2749. THE RESPONSE OF NORTH VIETNAM? SPECIAL ASSISTANT ((NGUYEN PHU)) DUC SHOULD WAIT FINAL INSTRUCTIONS FROM THE PRESIDENT ((THIEU)) BEFORE LEAVING FOR THE UNITED STATES. KINDLY CABLE THE RESULTS IMMEDIATELY.

((1)) SUBMITTED FOR SERIES CHECK ON 23 NOV 72. SIFIEL VIETNAMESE FOR "GOVERNING STRUCTURE".

XXHH U 700 700 #8359 PL 86-36/50 USC 3605 CLASSIFIED
N TO DE N 00 MMNSH ZYH

72 145 3Z

ZES -2 03 0 #0 1 0 9 4287 3291914 SVC

NNNNKAA 155KAA 155KAA 155KAA 155

24

ZEM

O SVC 0109/329

NOV

```
Doc ID: 6549596 Doc Ref ID: A504075
                        PL 86-36/50 USC 3605
CLASSIFIED
                   #0651 3300016
    ZNY MMNSH
 CLASSIFIED
    Z 250010Z NOV 72 ZYH
    FM DIRNSA
    TO WHITE HOUSE/(ATTN: MR. D. MCMANIS FOR A SERIES CHECK)
 □ ZEM
 田田田のの
                                 <del>DRA</del> SECTION ONE OF TWO <del>DELTA</del>
    3/00/DOLL-VND/T
    TRANSMITTED HEREWITH IS A SOUTH VIET AM DIPLOMATIC
 MESSAGE. PLEASE ADVISE IF ANY LIMITATIONS ON DISTRIBUTION ARE

OR REQUIRED. THIS MESSAGE WAS TRANSMITTED TO THE WHITE HOUSE ONLY.

VIETNAMESE (SOUTH) FRENCH, ENGLISH 22
    PRESIDENT NIXON'S MESSAGE TO MR. KISSINGER RELAYED FROM
    PARIS TO SAIGON
    XXCC
```

PARIS: SOUTH VIETNAMESE DELEGATION ((AMBASSADOR))

PHAM DANG LAM 24 NOV 72

CLASSIFIED SAIGON: PRESIDENT'S OFFICE; ((PRESIDENTIAL ASSISTANT))

HOANG DUC NHA FLASH 34/TM

TOP SECRET. SSIFIED

PLEASE PRESENT IMMEDIATELY TO PRESIDENT (THIEU)) THE

FOLLOWING MESSAGE FROM PRESIDENT NIXON TO ((DR. HENRY A.))

KISSINGER, WHICH WAS COMMUNICATED TO US BY THE LATTER DURING

PUCBALIZED BOILEO SULLVIES ENERNABISOD & TIS

meaning of the Espianage Laws, Title 18 U.S.C.

the transmission of the revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by lay

I with sneet of nitural information affecting the National Defense of the United States within 18 section 792, 795, and manner to an unitervelation of which in any manner to an unit

THIS FORM FOR INTERNAL AGENCY USE CINEN

SSIFI

11_

PERSONAL PROPERTY.

DRIJ POR INTERNAL AGENCY USE ONLY

THIS EVENING MEETING WITH US AT 1900 HOURS.

"24 NOVEMBER 1972.

"TO HENRY A. KISSINGER

"FROM THE PRESIDENT

"I HAVE CHECKED TODAY AS TO THE ATTIDUE OF THE LEADING

PLACE ONCE AGREEMENT IS REACHED, WE HAVE INFORMED THEM

OF THE KEY PROVISIONS IN THE OCTOBER 8 AGREEMENT ((:)) THE RETURN

OF OUR POW'S, A CEASEFIRE, AND A FORMULA UNDER WHICH THIEU

REMAINS IN POWER AND ALL SOUTH VIETNAMESE HAVE AN OPPORTUNITY

PARTICIPATE IN A FREE ELECTION TO DETERMINE WHAT GOVERNMENT

THEY WANT FOR THE FUTURE. THE RESULT OF THIS CHECK INDICATES

THAT THEY WERE NOT ONLY UNANIMOUS BUT VEHEMENT IN STATING

THEIR CONCLUSIONS THAT IF SAIGON IS THE ONLY ROADBLOCK FOR

REACHING AGREEMENT, ON THIS BASIS THEY WILL PERSONALLY LEAD

THE FIGHT WHEN THE NEW CONGRESS RECONVENES ON JANUARY 3

TO CUT OFF ALL MILITARY AND ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE TO

SAIGON. MY EVALUATION IS THAT THE DATE OF THE CUT-OFF WOULD BE I

FEBRUARY. THEY FURTHER BELIEVE THAT UNDER THE CIRCUMSTANCES WE HAVE

NO CHOICE BUT TO GO IT ALONE AND TO MAKE A SELARATE DEAL WITH NORTH

VIETNAM FOR THE KETURN OF OUR POW AND FOR OUR WITHDRAWAL. THESE

ARE MEN WHO HAVE LOYALLY SUPPORTED THE U.E. ON 3 NOVEMBER, CAMBODIA,

DELAOS, AND 8 MAY. THEY HAVE GREAT AFFECTION FOR THE SOUTH VIETNAMESE

PEOPLE AND GREAT RESPECT FOR PRESIDENT ((THIEU)) PERSONALLY, BUT THEY

POINT OUT THAT THE VOTES IN THE SENATE THIS PAST YEAR FOR APPROA-

PRIATIONS FOR SUPPORT OF THE EFFORT IN VIETNAM HAVE BEEN WON ONLY BY

inauthorized person is pronibited by law.

GREAT EFFORT AND BY VERY SMALL MARGINS. THEY ALSO POINT OUT THAT THIS TIME THE HOUSE CANNOT SAVE APPROPRIATIONS. BECAUSE THE SENATE WOULD BLOCK ANY HOUSE MOVE TO RESTORE FUNDS WHICH. INCIDENTALLY, IN VIEW OF THE MAKE- P OF THE NEW HOUSE. IS HIGHLY UNLIKELY. (N BY SIMPLY LETTING THE APPROPRIATIONS BILL DIE IN CONFERENCE. THIS MESSAGE. UNLESS YOU HAVE STRONG FEELINGS OTHERWISE. SHOULD BE PASSED ON THROUGH THE SOUTH VIETNAMESE NEGOTIATORS TO THIEU. TELL HIM THE FAT IS IN THE FIRE. IT IS TIME TO FISH OR CUT BAIT. WE DO NOT WANT TO GO IT ALONE. I PERSONALLY WANT TO STAND BY THIEU AND THE SOUTH VEITNAMESE GOVERNMENT BUT AS I HAVE TOLD HIM IN THREE SEPARATE MESSAGES, WHAT REALLY COUNTS IS NOT THE AGREEMENT BUT MY DETERMINATION TO TAKE S MASSIVE ACTION AGAINST NORTH VIETNAM IN THE EVENT THEY BREAK THE AGREEMENT. THE NORTH VIETNAMESE TROOPS IN THE SOUTH MEAN ABSOLUTELY

 $\hfill\square$ NOTHING IN THAT EVENTUALITY. IF THEY (C VAL HAD NO) FORCES $\hfill\square$

THERE AT ALL

Doc ID: 6549596 Doc Ref ID: A504075

ທ

STARTED TO BEGIN. THE WAR WOULD BE RESUMED AND THE OUTCOME WOULD BE

 $\frac{\ln l}{\ln L}$ VERY MUCH IN DOUBT. YOU MUST TELL THIEU THAT I FEEL WE HAVE NOW

S (1) REACHED THE CROSSROADS, WHETHER HE TRUSTS ME AND SIGNS WHAT I HAVE

DETERMINED IS THE BEST AGREEMENT WE CAN GET AND WE HAVE TO GO IT

ALONE AND END OUR OWN INVOLVEMENT IN THE WAR IN THE BEST TERMS WE

CAN GET. I DO NOT (C VAL GIVE) HIM THIS VERY TOUGH OPTION BY PERSONAL $\overline{0}$

TO DESIRE. BUT BECAUSE OF THE POLITICAL REALITY IN THE UNITED STATES.

XXHH

инии

Dec ID: 6549596 Doc Ref ID: A504075

720 SFI #651

A W

 \mathcal{L}

N

CLASSIFIED TO NO.

0653 3300016

ZNY MMNSH

OZ 250010Z
SFM DIRNSA Z 250010Z NOV 72 ZYH

TO WHITE HOUSE/(ATTN: MR. D. MCMANIS FOR A SERIES CHECK)

-72

ZEM

3/00/DOLL -VND/T

TRANSMITTED HEREWITH IS A SOUTH VIET AM DIPLOMATIC

MESSAGE. PLEASE ADVISE IF ANY LIMITATIONS ON DISTRIBUTION ARE

REQUIRED. THIS MESSAGE WAS TRANSMITTED TO THE WHITE HOUSE ONLY.

OF THE STAGE ADVISE IT ANY CIMITATIONS ON DISTRIBUTION ARE

LET THE PROPERTY OF THE PROPERTY

IS NOT POSSIBLE FOR ME, EVEN WITH THE MASSIVE MANDATE I PERSONALLY

RECEIVED IN THE ELECTION, TO GET THE SUPPORT FROM A HOSTILE CONGRESS

CONTINUE THE WAR WHEN THE NORTH VIETNAMESE ON OCTOBER & OFFERED

WAS) FAR BETTER THAN BOTH THE HOUSE AND AGREEMENT WHICH

the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title 18, U.S.C. hich in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

THE SENATE BY RESOLUTION AND DIRECTIVE TO THE PRESIDENT DURENG THIS

LAST SESSION INDICATED THEY THOUGHT WE OUGHT TO ACCEPT. TELL THIEU

CONTROL CANNOT KEEP THE LID ON HIS STRONG SUPPORTERS IN THE HOUSE AND SENATE

MUCH LONGER. THEY ARE TERRIBLY DISTURBED BY WHAT THEY READ AND HEAR

ABOUT OF SAIGON. IT IS TIME FOR US TO DECCDE TO GO FORWARD TOGETHER

OF TO GO OUR SEPARATE WAYS. IF WE GO SEPARATE WAYS. ALL THAT WE FOUGHT

FOR SO MANY YEARS WILL BE LOST. IF ON THE OTHER HAND, HE WILL JOIN US

IN GOING FORWARD ON THE COURSE I HAVE LAID OUT, WE CAN. OVER THE LONG

PULL , WIN A VERY SIGNIFICANT VICTORY. THE THIRD OPTION OF OUR TRYING

TO CONTINUE TO GO FORWARD TOGETHER ON THE BASIS OF CONTINUING THE WAR

IS SIMPLY NOT OPEN. THE DOOR HAS BEEN SLAWMED SHUT AND FAST BY THE

IONG TIME SUPPORTERS OF THE HARD LINE IN VIETNAM IN THE HOUSE AND

SENATE WHO CONTROL THE PURSE STRINGS."

A TELEGRAM WILL FOLLOW ON OUR CONVERSATION WITH KISSINGER AFTER
THE MEETING.

TI 24 NOV 72 2146Z

CLASS CLASS

#0654 3300155

Z 250150Z NOV 72 ZYH

TO WHITE HOUSE/(ATTN: MR. D. MCMANIS FOR A SERIES CHECK)

< ZEM

S

ITEM-SECTION ONE OF TWO 0 P C E -72 3/00/DOLL-VND/T

TRANSMITTED HEREWITH IS A SOUTH VIETNAM DIPLOMATIC MESSAGE. PLEASE ADVISE IF ANY LIMITATIONS ON DISTRIBUTION ARE REQUIRED.

THIS MESSAGE WAS TRANSMITTED TO THE WHITEHOUSE ONLY.

■ VIETNAMESE (SOUTH) FRENCH

SOUTH VIETNAM WILL BE CUT OFF."

KISSINGER TO POSTPONE WORK MEETING WITH LE DUC THO ONE WEEK,

PRESSES SOUTH VIETNAMESE FOR OPTION DECISION

□ FR PARIS: DELEGATION: ((AMBASSADOR))

PHAM DANG LAM

Ø TO ((SAIGON:)) PRESIDENT'S OFFICE; 24 NOV 72 233ØZ FLASH ((PRESIDENTIAL ASSISTANT)) HOANG DUC NHA

TOP SECRET.

ACCOMPANIED BY ((SOUTH VIETNAMESE PRESIDENTIAL)) ASSISTANT NGUYEN PHU DUC. WE HAD A MEETING TODAY WITH ((DR. HENRY A.)) KIS-SINGER FROM 1830 ((HOURS)) TO 2030 ((HOURS)) . KISSINGER BEGAN BY ASKING US WHAT ANSWER WE HAD RECEIVED (C VAL FROM) SAIGON PURSUANT TO HIS COMMUNICATION YESTERDAY. WE GAVE HIM A MEMORANDUM ALONG THE LINES OF YOUR MESSAGE 332/PTT/BT/M. KISSINGER MANIFESTED VISIBLE

O DISCONTENT ((WHILE)) READING THE MEMO. HE THEN DREW FROM HIS POCKET A MESSAGE ADDRESSED TO HIM BY PRESIDENT NIXON AND WHICH HE READ TO US. AFTERWARDS HE INFORMED US THAT HE HAD MET (B VAL LE DUC) THO TODAY IN PRIVATE CONVERSA-TION FOR AN HOUR TO LET HIM KNOW THAT A BREAKDOWN IN NEGOTIATIONS BY NORTH VIETNAM WOULD LEAD TO MASSIVE RETALIATION BY THE U. S. KISSINGER AND THO HAD AGREED TO HOLD ((1 WD G)) A WORK SEESION TOMORROW AT NOON. HOWEVER, INASMUCH AS THE MESSAGE WHICH WE GAVE HIM TODAY DOES NOT CONTAIN THE ((SOUTH)) VIETNAMESE GOVERNMENT'S ANSWER ON THE THREE OPTIONS, HE IS PLANNING TO ASK THAT THE SESSION BE CANCELLED FOR TOMORROW AND POSTPONED ONE WEEK. ACCORDING TO HIM. SO TO HOLD THE SESSION TOMORROW UNDER THE PRESENT CIRCUMSTANCES WOULD S RESULT IN A BREAKDOWN ((IN THE NEGOTIATIONS). HE WILL MEET LE DIC THO TOMORROW IN A NOTHER PRIVATE CONVERSATION TO ASK TO POSTPONE THE MEETING UNTIL NEXT SATURDAY. HE (B VAL WARNED) US THAT BETWEEN NOW AND THURSDAY EVENING OUR GOVERNMENT WILL HAVE TO ANSWER CLEARLY (AS TO)) WHICH OPTION WE SHALL CHOOSE. HE TOLD US UNEQUIVOCALLY THAT: "WE HAVE REACHED A CROSSROAD: WE WILL GO FORWARD TOGETHER OR WE WILL GO OUR SEPARATE WAYS. IF YOU DO NOT GO ALONG WITH US. WE WILL HAVE A SEPARATE ARRANGEMENT WITH NORTH VIETNAM ON THE RELEASE OF POW S AND THE WITHDRAWAL OF U.S. TROOPS. IN THIS CASE U.S. AID TO

KISSINGER ADDED, "YOU ARE PLAYING A DELAYING GAME ON AN INFLEX-IBLE DEADLINE: TIME IS RUNNING OUT FOR YOU. NOW DEBATE IS SENSE-LESS, MEMORANDA ARE FUTILE, AND WORKING SESSIONS ARE USELESS."

KISSINGER OFFERED ASSISTANT NGUYEN PHU DUC AND AMBASSADOR((TRAN

ş

24

AGENCY

468-222

GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE.

FOR

WORK

FRIENDS AND WHO ARE YOUR ADVERSARIES.

THEY DO NOT SUPPORT YOU. NEXT JANUARY YOU WILL KNOW WHO ARE YOUR

NNNN

S

⋖

O

S

S ⋖

۵

ASSIFIE

۵

SIFIE

S ⋖ 78Ø

#Ø654

person is prohibi ates within the meaning manner to an unauthoris This work sheet contains information affecting the National Sections 793, 794 and 798, the transmission or the U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE:

ZZO OZZ

INTERNAL

FORM FOR

THIS

of the Espianage

of the United States within the

PL 86-36/50 USC 3605

DE ZNY MMNSH

#0658 3300155

Z 250150Z NOV 72 ZYH

OFM DIRNSA

што white house/(atin: mr. D. mcmanis for a series check)

IL ZE M

ASSIFIED

rem final section of two 3/00/DOLL-VND/T -72

₹TRANSMITTED HEREWITH IS A SOUTH VIETNAM DIPLOMATIC MESSAGE. PLEASE JADVISE IF ANY LIMITATIONS ON DISTRIBUTION ARE REQUIRED. OTHIS MESSAGE WAS TRANSMITTED TO THE WHITEHOUSE ONLY.

KISSINGER RECALLED THE THREE OPTIONS WITH WHICH WE ARE FACED:

FIRST OPTION. REJECT EVERYTHING.

SECOND OPTION, ACCEPT THE DRAFT AGREEMENT AS IT IS, WITH THE FEW MODIFICATIONS ALREADY MENTIONED. IN THIS CASE KISSINGER DELIEVES HE CAN OBTAIN TWO MORE MODIFICATIONS, ONE CONCERNING THE MNORTH VIETNAMESE TROOPS BY ADDING THE PRINCIPLE OF DEMOBILIZATION LON A ONE-FOR-ONE BASIS, AND THE OTHER CONCERNING THE COMPOSITION MOF THE CNCR ((COUNCIL FOR NATIONAL RECONCILIATION AND CONCORD)). THE TERM "THREE CONPONENTS" WILL BE KEP, BUT WITH THE INSERTION "EQUALLY APPOINTED BY BOTH SIDES." IN THIS CASE ALSO KISSINGER OFEELS THAT IT WOULD BE POSSIBLE TO REACH AN UNDERSTANDING ON THE QUESTION OF NORTH VIETNAMESE TROOPS. ACCORDING TO THIS UNDERSTAND-ING, THE GOVERNMENT ((OF SOUTH)) VIETNAM WOULD LIBERATE A CERTAIN NUMBER OF POLITICAL PRISONERS IN EXCHANGE ((FOR THE)) DE FACTO WITHDRAWAL OF A CERTAIN NUMBER OF NORTH VIETNAMESE TROOPS IN MILITARY REGION I, WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF "REDEPLOYMENT OF ILIBERATION FORCES." SHOULD WE ACCEPT THIS OPTION, THE U.S. GOVERN-ITMENT WILL MAKE A UNILATERAL STATEMENT ON THE QUESTION OF VIETNAMESE MARMED FORCES, THE TEXT OF WHICH WAS SENT TO YOU YESTERDAY. THIRD OPTION, GIVE SATISFACTION TO THE COMMUNIST SIDE ON THE QUESTION OF THE RELEASE OF POLITICAL PRISONERS, WHICH JWILL BE ACCOMPLISHED UNDER THE SAME CONDITIONS AND IN THE SAME TIME OFRAME AS THE RELEASE OF POW'S. ON THE OTHER POINTS, ACCEPT THE AGREEMENT AS IS. IN EXCHANGE FOR THIS CONCESSION, ASK THE COMMUNISTS FOR A DE FACTO WITHDRAWAL, PURSUANT TO AN UNDERSTANDING, OF A LARGE NUMBER OF NORTH VIETNAMESE TROOPS - FOR EXAMPLE, 150,000. ACCORDING TO KISSINGER. THIS OPTION HAS EVERY CHANCE OF BEING PREJECTED BY NORTH VIETNAM.

KISSINGER AGAIN STRESS THAT WE CAN NO LONGER DETAIN THE MO-LMENT OF DECISION. WE HAVE ONLY ONE MORE WEEK TO CHOOSE. AFTER THAT

WIT WILL BE TOO LATE.

((INASMUCH)) AS KISSINGER MENTIONED MANY TIMES THE ABSENCE OF (C VAL A CLEAR) ANSWER FROM OUR GOVERNMENT ON THE CONCRETE QUESTIONS WHICH HE POSED AND SEES IN THAT A PROOF OF A DILATORY MANEUVER, I INTERVENED TO BRING THINGS INTO FOCUS BY POINTING OUT THAT THE ANSWER THAT KISSINGER EXPECTS FROM SAIGON DOES NOT ((MERELY)) CONCERN CONCRETE QUESTIONS BUT, IN REALITY, A CHOICE ON WHICH HANGS THE DESTINY OF 17.000.000 SOUTH VIETNAMESES. UNDER THESE CIRCUMSTANCES IT IS COMPLETELY UNDERSTANDABLE THAT PRESIDENT ((THIEU)) AND OUR GOVERNMENT MUST WEIGH ALL THE CONSEQUENCES BEFORE MAKING A DECISION IN ONE DIRECTION OR ANOTHER. FOR HIS PART ASSISTANT NGUYEN PHU DOC ASKED WHETHER THE FORMULA

FOR WITHDRAWAL AND DEMOBILIZATION IN TWO PHASES. DISCUSSED BY PRES-

FORM !

OFF

Title 1 law.

CLASSIFIED WORK

IDENT ((THIEU AND AMBASSADOR ELLSWORTH)) BUNKER ON 19 NOVEMBER, HAD IN FACT BEEN GIVEN TO THE NORTH VIETNAMESE AND WHAT THEIR REACTION WAS. KISSINGER REITERATED THAT LE DUC THO REJECTED IT ON THE PRETEXT THAT THERE ARE NO NORTH VIETNAMESE TROOPS IN SOUTH VIETNAM, ONLY SOUTH VIETNAMESE OR THE DESCENDENTS OF SOUTH VIETNAMESE (WHO)) REGROUPED IN NORTH VIETNAM IN 1954. ASSISTANT LDUC DEFENDED THE POSITION OF OUR GOVERNMENT ON THIS QUESTION AS WWELL AS ON THE OTHER. KISSINGER REPEATED WHAT HE HAD SAID; THAT UIS. THAT IT IS NO LONGER THE TIME FOR DISCUSSIONS, BUT FOR SDECISIONS. LET US INSIST ONCE AGAIN ON THE EXTREMELY SERIOUS NATURE OF THE SITUATION AND THE URGENCY FOR OUR GOVERNMENT TO TAKE A CLEAR AND DISTINCT POSITION IN FULL KNOWLEDGE OF THE CASE. TI 24 NOV 72 2232Z

720

CLASSIFIED #2002

NNNN

CLASSIFIED

CLASSIFIED

CLASSIFIED

This work sheet contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title 18, U.S.C., Sections 793, 794 and 798, the transmission or the revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

THIS FORM FOR INTERNAL AGENCY USE ONLY

U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1972-470-540

CLASSIFIED WORK SHEET

NNNN

ш 420 - ₩0659

L

CLAS

#25

actions /93, /94 and /98, the transmission of the revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibit

Sections 793, 7

Work

```
FASED FUR CHANSMISSEL
                              PL 86-36/50 USC 3605
      o ZZ
      ODE
                                                                                            *3660 3300628
      Z ZNY MMNSH
Z 255620Z NOV 72 ZYH
                 FM DIRNSA
TO WHITE HOUSE (ATTN: MR. D. MCMANIS FOR A SERIES CHECK)
   TRANSMITTED HEREWITH IS A SOUTH VIETNAM DIPLOMATIC MESSAGE.

PLEASE ADVISE IF ANY LIMITATIONS ON DISTRIBUTION ARE REQUIRED.

THIS MESSAGE WAS TRANSMITTED TO THE WHITE HOUSE ONLY.

OVIETNAMESE (SOUTH) FRENCH 3/00/DOLL-VND/T -72

OSOUTH VIETNAMESE SPECIAL PRESIDENTIAL ASSISTANT SUBMITS

EVALUATION OF KISSINGER-THO MEETINGS TO PRESIDENT THIEU

FR PARIS. SOUTH VIETNAMESE DELECTIONS (1865)
     EVALUATION OF KISSINGER-THO MEETINGS TO PRESIDENT THIEU

OF PARIS: SOUTH VIETNAMESE DELEGATION; ((SPECIAL --

PRESIDENTIAL ASSISTANT)) NGUYEN PHU DUC

TO SAIGON: PRESIDENT'S OFFICE; ((PRESIDENTIAL 24 NOV 72 0100

ASSISTANT)) HOANG DUC NHA

FLASH 36/PDV
ASSISTANT)) HOANG DUC NHA

FLASH 36/PDVN/TM

DYNSUANT TO DUR TELEGRAM NO. 35/PDVN/TM OF 24 NOVEMBER, I HAVE THE
HONOR OF SUBMITTING TO PRESIDENT ((THIEU)) AND THE NSC ((NATIONAL
SECURITY COUNCIL)) THE FOLLOWING EVALUATIONS:

AT THE PRESENT TIME NEITHER NORTH VIETNAM NOR THE U.S. WANT TO
CHANGE THE SUBSTANCE OF TEIR DRAFT AGREEMENT. ((DR. HENRY A.))

KISSINGER INVOKED THE ABSENCE OF CONGRESSIONAL SUPPORT ON THE
GUESTION OF AID. THIS IS TRUE TO A GREAT DEGREE. HOWEVER, THE
FACT IS THAT THE U.S. GOVERNMENT DOES NOT WANT TO EXCITE AND
CREATE SUPPORT, BECAUSE HE DECLARED TO US THAT HE CONSIDERS THIS
AGREEMENT AS A GREAT VICTORY FOR OUR SIDE.

IN COMPARISON, ONE RECALLS THAT EVEN THE U.S. MILITARY OPERATIONS
HIN CAMBODIA IN 1970 AND THE RENEWED BOMBINGS AND THE MINING OF
HORTH VIETNAM THIS YEAR (B VAL DID NOT) CREATE NOTEMORTHY ADVERSE
REACTIONS AGAINST THE U.S. GOVERNMENT IN U.S. PUBLIC OPINION—ON
THE CONTRARY, IN ANY CASE, PRESIDENT NIXON AS ADDPTED A FORCIBLE
OF ATTITUDE TOWARD US ON THIS QUESTION AND TELLS US THAT MILITARY AND
THE CONTRARY, IN ANY CASE, PRESIDENT NIXON AS ADDPTED A FORCIBLE
OF EBRUARY IF WE REFUSE TO SIGN THIS AGREEMENT.

HE EXORTS US TO ACCEPT THE TEXT OF THE PRESENT DRAFT AS IS, ON
MITH ((1 MD G)) (C VAL MORE) NEGLIGIBLE MODIFICATIONS; IF NOT,
THE U.S. WILL MAKE A SEPARATE AGREEMENT WITH NORTH VIETNAM, FOR THE
ORTHORY OF THEIR PON'S AND U.S. WITHDRAWAL.

IN FEEL THAT. FACED WITH THIS SITUATION. WE ARE OBLIGED TO PRESENT
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                FLASH 36/PDVN/TM
WITH ((1 MD G)) (C VAL MORE) NEGLIGIBLE MODIFICATIONS; IF NOT.
THE U.S. WILL MAKE A SEPARATE AGREEMENT WITH NORTH VIETNAM, FOR THE
RETURN OF THEIR POW'S AND U.S. WITHDRAWAL.

I FEEL THAT, FACED WITH THIS SITUATION, WE ARE OBLIGED TO PRESENT
TO PRESIDENT NIXON OUR CONVICTION THAT EVEN THOUGH WE HAVE FULL
CONFIDENCE IN (B VAL THE LOYALTY) AND FRANKNESS OF THE U.S. GOVERN-
MENT, (C VAL WE) KNOW THE COMMUNISTS BETTER THAN THEY BECAUSE OF
OUR PREVIOUS EXPERIENCES. WE KNOW THAT ACCEPTANCE OF THIS AGREEMENT
IN ITS PRESENT FORM WILL BRING CERTAIN DEATH TO FREE SOUTH VIETNAM.
O WE ALSO KNOW THAT A COMPLETE AND SUDDEN HALT OF U.S. AID WILL BRING
THE SAME RESULT. IN THE FACE OF THIS CHOICE, WE PREFER TO DIE AS
MARTYRS FOR THE CAUSE FOR WHICH WE HAVE FOUGHT SO LONG. HOWEVER,
IF THE U.S. WANTS TO NEGOTIATE FOR THE RETURN OF THEIR POW'S. WE
WILL BE READY TO OFFER ALL OF OUR ASSISTANCE, EVEN AT THE PRICE OF
(B VAL GREAT SACRIFICES) TO HELP THEM ACHIEVE THIS GOAL, OFFERING
TO FREE 38,000 POLITICAL PRISONERS IN SOUTH VIETNAM IN EXCHANGE
FOR 500 U.S. POW'S.

THE U.S. GOVERNMENT SUGGESTS THAT WE USE THIS TRUMP CARD IN
EXCHANGE FOR THE DE FACTO WITHDRAWAL OF THE NYA ((NORTH VIETNAMESE
ARMY)) IN A MAY PARALLEL TO THE SIGNING OF THE PRESENT DRAFT
AGREEMENT, BUT WE PREFER TO USE THIS WOST IMPORTANT TRUMP CARD TO
HELP OUR FRIENDS RECOVER THEIR POW'S RATHER THAN SIGN AN AGREEMENT
WITHOUT HAVING OBTAINED SATISFACTION ON OUR (C VAL TWO) KEY
QUESTIONS.

AS FOR THE WITHDRAWAL OF U.S. TROOPS. THAT IS NOT A PROBLEM. THUS.
    QUESTIONS.

AS FOR THE WITHDRAWAL OF U.S. TROOPS, THAT IS NOT A PROBLEM. THUS, THE PRINCIPAL GOALS OF THE U.S. GOVERNMENT INDICATED IN TODAY'S
   LETTER FROM PRESIDENT NIXON CAN BE ACHIEVED IN THIS MANNER.

O ALL THAT WE ASK IS THAT HE GIVE US A CHANCE TO MAKE THE NIXON

ODOCTRINE SUCCEED, (THAT DOCTRINE) WHICH OUR TROOPS AND OUR PEOPLE

HAVE ALREADY BEGUN TO SHOW THE VALUE OF IN SPLENDID FASHION BY

REPULSING THE ENEMY OFFENSIVE THIS YEAR UNDER WELL KNOWN CIRCUM-
                STANCES,
 STANCES,

WE SHALL ALSO ASK HIM NOT TO ATTACK US PUBLICLY, FOR THIS WOULD

OBLIGE US ALSO TO JUSTIFY OURSELVES PUBLICLY WITH MUCH MORE VIGOR

AND DETAIL THAN WE HAVE (B VAL HERETOFORE) USED. THIS WOULD

WE BRING ABOUT A PUBLIC CONFRONTATION THAT WE SINCERELY WANT TO AVOID.

PLEASE SUBMIT THESE IDEAS TO PRESIDENT ((THIEU)), AND ASK HIM

IF HE APPROVES OF THEM, GIVE ME HIS FINAL INSTRUCTIONS BEFORE MY
DEPARTURE FOR WASHINGTON.

DEPARTURE FOR WASHINGTON.

KISSINGER INDICATED TO ME TODAY THE DESIRE OF PRESIDENT NIXON TO SEE WE IN WASHINGTON AS SOON AS POSSIBLE AND SAID THAT MY DELAY COULD BE INTERPRETED BY THEMSELVES AS A "DILATORY MANEUVER" AND SIGN OF ILL-WILL.

KISSINGER COMPLAINED BITTERLY ABOUT THE ATTACKS AGAINST HIM IN CERTAIN ((SOUTH)) VIETNAMESE NEWSPAPERS AND SAID OPENLY THAT THESE ATTACKS ARE BEING INSTIGATED BY THE GOVERNMENT ((OF SOUTH))

WYIETNAM. WHATEVER WAY BE THE (B VAL MERIT) OF THIS ACCUSATION,
I FEEL THAT IT IS BETTER (C VAL NOT TO) INFLAME MATTERS IN THIS
                AREA.
TI 25 NOV 72 0319Z
                900
#0660
```

States in any nited

INTERNAL

S DE

#0667 3301205

ZNY MMNSH Z 251205Z NOV 72 ZYH

FM DIRNSA TO WHITE HOUSE (ATTN: MR. D. MCMANIS FOR A SERIES CHECK)

ZEM

W TRANSMITTED HEREWITH IS A SOUTH VIETNAMESE DIPLOMATIC MESSAGE. NORMAL DISTRIBUTION FOR THIS MESSAGE IS IN THE SUBSERIES - PLEASE ADVISE IF ANY LIMITATIONS OVER AND ABOVE EXIST-100 ING RESTRICTIONS ARE REQUIRED. THIS MESSAGE WAS TRANSMITTED TO

THE WHITE HOUSE ONLY. VIETNAMESE (SOUTH) ENGLISH 3/00/VND/T -72

AVS. KUS/OPIN. FORP/B.O.
THIEU.S PRESS SECRETARY DENIES ROLE IN KISSINGER SLANDER FR ((SAIGON:)) PRESIDENT & OFFICE: ((PRESIDENTIAL)

PRESS SECRETARY)) HOANG DUC NHA

TO PARIS; ((DELEGATION;)) AMBASSADOR 25 NOV 72 FLASH 2768/PTT/BT PHAM DANG LAM

AS PER OUR TELEPHONE CONVERSATION, I WOULD LIKE YOU TO STRESS TO OUR FRIEND ((1)) THAT SO FAR NOBODY IN SAIGON INCLUDING ME MAS NOT ((SIC)) SAID ANYTHING ON WHAT IS GOING ON. I CONFIRM THIS, AS A MATTER OF FACT, I HAD THE INFORMATION MINISTRY DENY THE UP! ((UNITED PRESS INTERNATIONAL)) DISPATCH SAYING THAT

RADIO SAIGON ATTACKED OUR FRIEND. LATELY THE FOREIGN PRESS HAS TRIED TO CONTACT ME, BUT I HAVE REFUSED TO SEE THEM.

SO, PLEASE TELL OUR FRIEND THAT I UNDERSTAND THE PROBLEM FULLY AND AM NOT FOOLISH ENOUGH TO PLAY IN THE HANDS OF COMMUNISTS. HE SHOULD RATHER REALIZE THE COMMUNIST TRICK TO PREEMPT THE ISSUE AND ASSURE FOR THEMSELVES THE FIRST WORDS. HE SHOULD NOT ATTRIBUTE EVERYTHING THEY SAY TO ME. I AM NOT GOD ALMIGHTY IN

SAIGON. TELL HIM I WILL SEND HIM A LETTER VIA ((PRESIDENTIAL @ ASSISTANT)) NGUYEN PHU DUC ON THIS. I DO NOT LIKE TO BE SLANDERED

MAND ACCUSED.

((1)) POSSIBLY REFERS TO DR. HENRY A. KISSINGER, WHO HAD BEEN DESCRIBED BY RADIO SAIGON AS HAVING OVERSTEPPED THE INSTRUCTIONS GIVEN HIM BY PRESIDENT NIXON, ACCORDING TO A UPI DISPATCH OF

21 NOV 72.

TI 25 NOV 72 1022Z .

@ 480

M

W #0567

O @ الي

NNNN

#27

õ

in

Doc ID: 65495**96** Doc Ref ID: A504075 PL 86-36/50 USC 3605 □ ZNY MMNSH I ZEM O COMP ALFA 020 #0001 NNNNKAA 19 7KAA 19 7ZCZCKAA 19 7PRB 3 73 ZZ #2669 3301259 ZNY MMNSH Z 25 125 1Z NOV 72 ZYH FM DIR NSA O TO WHITE HOUSE (ATTN: MR. MCMANIS, MR. FAZIO FOR A SERIES CHECK) ZEM TRANSMITTED HEREWITH IS A SOUTH VIETNAMESE MESSAGE. NORMAL DISTRIBUTION FOR THIS MESSAGE IS IN THE DELTA SUBSERIES. PLEASE ADVISE IF ANY LIMITATIONS OVER AND ABOVE EXISTING RESTRICTIONS ARE REQUIRED. THIS MESSAGE WAS TRANSMITTED TO THE WHITE HOUSE ONLY. VIETNAMESE (SOUTH) FRENCH, ENGLISH 3/00/DOLL-VND/T TEXT OF MEMORANDUM GIVEN TO KISSINGER BY SOUTH VIENTNAMESE IN PARIS TFR PARIS: SOUTH VIETNAMESE DELEGATION; ((AMBASSADOR)) PHAM DANG 25 NOV 72 1000 LAM

TO SAIGON: PRESIDENT'S OFFICE; ((PRESIDENTIAL ASSISTANT)) HOANG

DUC NHA IMMEDIATE 37/PDVN/TM

TOP SECRET

THE TEXT OF THE MEMORANDUM WHICH I GAVE TO KISSINGER THIS MORNING AT 0915 HOURS:

"THROUGH THE ACCOUNTS GIVEN BY DR. KISSINGER OF HIS MEETINGS
WITH LE DUC THO SINCE NOVEMBER 20, ((19)) 72 THE GOVERNMENT OF THE
REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM NOTES THAT THE COMMUNIST SIDE HAS ADOPTED A
PURELY NEGATIVE ATTITUDE AND HAS DISPLAYED ABSOLUTE INTRANSIGENCE.

#28

AS A MATTER OF FACT THE COMMUNIST SIDE HAS REFUESED TO TAKE SERIOUSLY INTO ACCOUNT THE POINTS OF VIEW OF THE GOVERNMENT OF ☐ THE REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM, "POINTS" OF VIEW WHICH THE U.S. GOVERN-MENT HAS RECOGNIZED AS LOGICAL AND REASONALBE WHEN IT HAS ACCEPTED $lack extsf{T}$ TO PRESENT THEM TO THE COMMUNIST SIDE IN THE ABOVE MENTIONED MEETINGS. THE GOVERNMENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM CONSIDERS THAT SINCE NEGOTIATIONS ARE FOR THE COMMUNIST JUST ANOTHER ASPECT OF THE FIGHTING, OUR SIDE MUST MEET THE CHALLENGE IN PURSUING OUR COMMON EFFORTS AS THIS DECISIVE STAGE TO WIN THE PEACE AS OUR ${oldsymbol \Omega}$ men have done on the battlefields in all these past years. The GOVERNMENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM WISHES TO STRESS THAT IN ASKING FOR NEW EFFORTS ON THE PART OF DR. KISSINGER TO PRESS THE COMMUNIST SIDE TO SETTLE THE (C VAL TWO) UNRESOLVED KEY ISSUES. □ NAMELY THE PROBLEM POSED BY THE PRESENCE OF NORTH VIETNAMESE TROOPS IN SOUTH VIETNAM ((XM)) ((VIETNAM))ESE PEOPLE. IT IS NOT PROMPTED BY ANY MOTIVES OTHER THAN THE DESIRE TO REACH A GUENUINE CEASEFIRE AND HONORABLE AND LASTING PEACE SO THAT THE IMMENSE SACRIFICES MADE BY THE SOLDIERS AND PEOPLES OF SOUTH VIETNAM AND OF THE UNITED STATES WILL NOT BE MADE IN VAIN. THE GOVERNMENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM UNDERSTANDS THE INTERNAL POLITICAL PROBLEMS FACING THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES AND IS ALL THE MORE DEEPLY GRATEFUL FOR THE EFFORTS OF OTHE U.S. GOVERNMENT IN SECURING CONTINUED CONGRESSIONAL AND PUBLIC SUPPORT FOR OUR COMMON EFFORTS TO ESTABLISH A JUST AND LASTING PEACE. AS IT IS A LIFE OR DEATH MATTER FOR THE 17,000,000 □ SOUTH VIETNAMESE PEOPLE. WE DEEPLY HOPE THAT NO EFFORT WILL BE SPARED DURING THE COMING DAYS TO OVERCOME NORTH VIETNAMESE INTRANSIGENCE WHICH IS THE ONLY OBSTACLE TO PEACE.

"SINCERELY YOURS

"PHAM DANG LAM"
TI 25 NOV 72 1042Z

#0669

55 Ø

EXCLUSIVE FOR DELTA CONTROL OFFICER

WARNING: THIS COMINT IS UNUSUALLY SENSITIVE. F A USIB MEMBER OR

HIS DESIGNATED DEPUTY APPROVES USE OF THIS ITEM IN A TOP SECRET

CODEWORD REPORT, THE COMINT SOURCE OR TARGET WHICHEVER IS SEN-

SITIVE WILL BE CONCEALED AND NO REFERENCE MADE TO THE DELTA SERIES

OR THIS MATERIAL WILL BE MAINTAINED UNDER DELTA SECURITY CONTROLS.

VIETNAMESE (SOUTH) FRENCH

XXMMENPØ1F007233Ø

3/00/DOLL-VND/T -72

KISSINGER REPORTEDLY UNSURE NORTH VIETNAMESE WILL AGREE TO NEW

SERIES OF TALKS

XXCC

DELEGATION; ((AMBASSADOR))

(#29)

PHAM DANG LAM 25 NOV 72 1100

TO SAIGON: PRESIDENT' OFFICE;

((PRESIDENTIAL ASSISTANT))

HOANG DUC NHA IMMEDIATE 38/PDVN/TM

TOP SECRET.

PURSUANT TO YOUR TELEGRAM 2765/PTT/BT/TM:

AMBASSADOR ((TRAN KIM)) PHUONG AND I WENT TO THE U.E.

AMBASSADOR'S RESIDENCE THIS MORNING AT Ø915 HOURS TO GIVE A

MEMORANDUM TO ((DR. HENRY A.)) KISSINGER, THE TEXT OF WHICH

YOU WILL RECEIVE BY SEPARATE TELEGRAM.

KISSINGER INFORMED US THAT HE WILL (B VAL REMIND) LE DUC

THO, DURING THE MEETING ARRANGED FOR 1000 HOURS TODAY, THAT THE

TWO QUESTIONS ARE THE CAUSE OF THE PRESENT DEADLOCK. HOWEVER,

HE WILL NOT ENTER INTO DISCUSSIONS ON SUBSTANTIVE MATTERS BUT

WILL LIMIT HIMSELF TO THE PROCEDURAL QUESTION IN ORDER TO AVOID

A BREAKDOWN SHOULD "LE DUC THO MAKE AN OFFER HE COULD NOT ACCEPT,

GIVEN THE ATTITUDE OF THE GOVERNMENT ((OF SOUTH)) VIETNAM."

KISSINGER IS NOT SURE THAT LE DUC THO WILL AGREE TO A NEW

ERIES OF MEETINGS. THAT WILL THEN BE THE BREAKDOWN ((N

NEGOTIATIONS)) OF WHICH HE (C VAL HAS ALREADY) WARNED US ((AS TO))

THIS FORM FOR INTERNAL AGENCY USE ONLY

CLASSIFIED WORK SHEET

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 1972 -- 460.

THIS FORM FOR INTERNAL AGENCY USE ONL

ON THIS POINT. HE INFORMED US THAT THE NORTH VIETNAMESE HAVE (B VAL DEALT ANOTHER TRICK) (IN AN ARTICLE BY)) (C VAL LELANT) IN THE HERALD TRIBUNE ((DESCRIBING)) WHAT WENT ON DURING THE LAST MEETING ((BETWEEN)) KISSINGER AND LE DUC THO. HE BELIEVES THAT THIS WAS BROUGHT ON BY A DEEP BACKGROUNDER (C VAL BY) PRESS SECRETARY ((HOANG DUC)) NHA TO THE ENGLISH-LANGUAGE PRESS. KISSINGER ASKS THAT SAIGON (C VAL STOP) REVEALING, N THE FORM OF

ON THE SUBJECT OF THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE NEGOTIATIONS.

A BACKGROUNDER OR IN ANY OTHER FORM, WHAT HE HAS COMMUNICATED TO

HE MADE AN APPOINTMENT FOR NOON TO INFORM US OF THE RESULTS OF HIS CONVERSATIONS WITH LE DUC THO. HE PLANS TO RETURN TO WASHINGTON THIS EVENING OR TOMORROW MORNING.

TI 25 NOV 72 1013Z

XXHH

CLASSIFIED

ASSIFIED

Doc ID: 6549596 Doc Ref ID: A504075

SUMMARY OF KISSINGER-LE DUC THO
NEGOTIATIONS IN PARIS

Doc ID: 16549596 Doc Ref ID: A504075



#30 From: Paris To: Saigon 25 Nov 72

Mr. Kissinger informed the South Vietnamese that Le Duc Tho had agreed to postpone further sessions until 4 December.


The South Vietnamese were warned by Kissinger that yesterday's letter from President Nixon had been personally dictated by the President and that "When I leave on Sunday, I shall be under instructions to proceed and to drive the matter to a conclusion. Nothing is to be gained by delaying".


After general discussions of Vietnam's place in the world, the South Vietnamese Ambassador summarized the meetings as more courteous and relaxed than the previous sessions, "but Kissinger remains firm on the deadlines".

#31 From: Saigon To: Paris 26 N

26 Nov 72

Presidential Assistant Hoang Duc Nha will arrive in Paris on Monday, 27 November. Special Assistant Nguyen Phu Duc will be departing Paris for the US on Tuesday, 28 November.







Doc ID: 6549596 Doc Ref ID: A504075



Message #32

FROM: Saigon

TO: Paris

27 November 1972

A letter which the South Vietnamese press secretary is apparently taking to Paris will supposedly stress that the internal political solution for South Vietnam should be left "wholly to the Vietnamese themselves." The letter adds that the U.S. should only discuss matters with the North Vietnamese that directly concern them, concluding that the time has come "to Vietnamize the negotiations."



```
NNNNKAA214LULUNAA214PRB479
ED
 ZZ
  DE
             #0665 3310356
```

Doc Ref ID: A504075

Doc ID: 6549596

ZEM

3/CO/DOLL -VND/

HOUSE ONLY.

XXCC

VIET NAMESE (SOUTH)

ZNY MMNSH

Z 260350Z NOV 72 ZYH

FM DIRNSA

25 NOVEMBER KISSINGER MEETINGS

PHAM DANG LAM

FRENCH

SOUTH VIETNAMESE NEGOIATOR IN PARIS REPORTS ON

PARIS: SOUTH VIETNAMESE DELEGATION; ((AMBASSADOR))

NOV

72

PL 86-36/50 USC 3605

O TOP SECRET.

OUR MEETING TODAY WITH ((DR. HENRY A.)) KISSINGER ON LASTED FROM 1430 HOURS TO 1630 HOURS. SPECIAL ((PRESIDENTIAL)) C ASSISTANT NGUYEN PHU DUC WAS ALSO PRESENT.

KISSINGER INFORMED US THAT DURING HIS MEETING THIS MORNING FROM 1000 HOURS UNTIL NOON WITH LE DUC THO, HE Urgorously insisted on our two vital points, while passing IN REVIEW THE RESULTS ((OF THE)) MEETINGS THESE LAST DEW DAYS WITH NORTH VIETNAM. ACCORDING TO KISSINGER. THAT O AROUSED VIOLENT REACTIONS ON THE PART OF LE DUC THO.

AFTER AN HOUR OF ACRIMONIOUS (C VAL ABUSE), LE DUC THO AGREED NONETHELESS TO THE U.S. PROPOSAL TO POSTPONE UNTIL 4 ■ DEMCEMBER THE WORK SESSION PLANNED FOR TODAY. KISSINGER HAD PREVIOUSLY GIVEN LE DUC THO TO UNDERSTAND THAT THERE WOULD lacklockdot be massive retaliation in the event of a breakdown in O NEGOTIATIONS PROVOKED BY A NORTH VIETNAMESE REFUSAL TO POSTPONE THE SESSION.

KISSINGER AGREED WITH LE DUC THO THAT THE TWO SIDES WILL ABSTAIN FROM COMMENTING ON THE NEGOTIATIONS UNTIL ${oldsymbol \Omega}$ 4 DECEMBER. HE CONSEQUENTLY ASKED US TO AVOID SPEAKING OF ANY DEADLINE OR LACK OF PROGRESS. I INFORMED KISSINGER THAT SAIGON HAD OFFICIALLY DENIED THE BRITISH AGENCY DISPATCH ATTRIBUTING TO A HIGH SOUTH VIETNAMESE PERSONALITY CLOSE TO ☐ THE INDEPENDENCE PALACE INFORMATION ACCORDING TO WHICH THE KISSINGER - LE DUC THO MEETINGS HAVE MADE NO PROGRESS. KISSINGER SAID THAT HE GREATLY APPREICATED THIS DENIAL, WHICH HE CALLED CONSTRUCTIVE AND TIMELY.

CONCERNING THE NEXT WEEKLY SESSION ((AT THE HOTEL MAJESTIC ON AVENUE)) KLEBER ON THURSDAY, 30 NOVEMBER, IT WAS AGREED BETWEEN HIM AND LE DUC THO THAT NORTH VIETNAM AND THE U.S. WILL MAKE TEMPERATE SPEECHES. HE HOPES THAT WE WILL DO LIKEWISE.

This work sheet contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title 18, U.S.C., Sections 793, 794 and 798, the transmission or the revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law

FORM FOR INTERNAL AGENCY USE ONLY

S GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 1972

Doc ID: 654156 INGERETADDAED407HAT, FOR THE REST, PRESIDENT ((NIXON))

WILL MEET WITH MR. ((NGUYEN PHU)) DUC AND HIM ((1 WD G)) WHAT

KISSINGER HAS ALREADY TOLD US. HE PARTICULARLY DREW OUR ATTENTION

TO THE FACT THAT THE MESSAGE WHICH HE GAVE US YESTERDAY HAD BEEN

PERSONALLY DICTATED BY PRESIDENT NIXON HIMSELF AND THAT WE

"MUST TAKE IT EXTREMELY SERIOUSLY INTO CONSIDERATION."

KISSINGER STRESSED THAT THE SERIES OF MEETINGS BEGINNING
NEXT 4 DECEMBER WILL BE THE LAST AND THAT WE MUST NOT EXPECT
ANOTHER POSTPONEMENT.

HE WARNED US AGAINST A STRATEGY CONSISTING, FOR US, OF LETTING THE U.S. SIGN THE AGREEMENT AND THEN SCREAMING FOR SATISFACTION (C VAL OR) "AFTERWARDS GO ALONG WITH US RELUCTANTLY, FOR THIS WILL HAVE DISASTROUS EFFECTS; BECAUSE IT WILL TAKE AWAY THE MORAL SUPPORT, AND THE U.S. CAN NO LONGER BE PROUD OF THE AGREEMENT." IN THIS CASE, THE U.S. GOVERNMENT WILL HAVE DIFFICULTIES PERSUADING CONGRESS TO CONTINUE AID.

KISSINGER RETURNED AGAIN TO THE SUBJECT OF THE NEXT

((ROUND OF)) NEGOTIATIONS TO SAY: "BEYOND NEXT WEEK WE WILL

BE IN DEEP TROUBLE. WHEN I LEAVE ON SUNDAY, I SHALL BE UNDER

I INSTRUCTIONS TO PROCEED AND TO DRIVE THE MATTER TO A CONCLUSION.

NOTHING IS TO BE GAINED BY DELAYING.

KISSINGER THEN ANSWERED A NUMBER OFQUESTIONS POSED BY
NGUYEN PHU DUC. HERE IS THE TENOR OF THE ANSWERS ON THE MOST
IMPORTANT POINTS:

ON THE QUESTION OF UNDER WHAT CIRCUMSTANCES AND HOW THE U.S. WILL REACT TO VIOLATIONS OF THE AGREEMENT, KISSINGER INFORMED ((US)) THAT:

THE U.S. WILL OVERREACT VIOLENTLY TO THE FIRST VIOLATION."

THAT COULD BE ((EITHER)) A VIOLATION OF THE CEASEFIRE,

A VIOLATION OF THE DMZ ((DEMILITARIZED ZONE)), OR A VIOLATION

OF THE CLAUSES CONCERNING THE REINFORCEMENT OF COMMUNIST

TROOPS IN SOUTH VIETNAM. THE U.S. WILL REACT PRINCIPALLY

AND FROM GUAM. A U.S. MILITARY COMMAND WILL BE ESTABLISHED IN THAILAND TO KEEP AN EYE ON THE CEASEFIRE IN INDOCHINA. ON THE QUESTION OF THE LEGAL BASIS FOR A NEW U.S. INTERVENTION AFTER THE CEASEFIRE, KISSINGER REPLIED THAT THE U.S. PRESIDENT WILL ALWAYS FIND AN EXCUSE FOR ACTING OR NOT ACTING. HE BELIEVES THAT IF THE AGREEMENT CAN BE OBSERVED FOR ONE YEAR, WE WILL BE ABLE TO OBTAIN A SITUATION SIMILAR TO KOREA. 85 €

INTERVENTION COMING FROM THAILAND, FROM THE PACIFIC,

#9665 NNNNZCZCKAA2 15 AX A 848

Doc ID: 6549596 Doc Ref ID: A504075

ZZ PL 86-36/50 USC 3605

DE #Ø666 331Ø356

ZNY MMNSH

Z 260350Z NOV 72 ZYH

FM DIRNSA

TO WHITE HOUSE (ATTN: MR. D. MCMANIS FOR A SERIES CHECK)

ZEM

TOPSECRET UMBRA DELTA CONTROLLED ITEM SECTION TWO OF THREE

3/00/DOLL-VND/ -72

TRANSMITTED HEREWITH IS A SOUTH VIETNAMESE DIPLOMATIC

MESSAGE. PLEASE ADVISE IF ANY LIMITATIONS ON DISTRIBUTION

ARE REQUIRED. THIS MESSAGE WAS TRANSMITTED TO THE WHITE

HOUSE ONLY.

ON THE QUESTION OF WHAT IMPORTANCE VIETNAM HAS FOR THE U.S.,

((DUC ASKED)): "YOU TOLD ((US)) VIETNAM IS IMPORTANT FOR THE

U.S. HOW IMPORTANT?" KISSINGER ANSWERED BY CITING THE

EXAMPLES OF THE DETERMINATION OF PRESIDENT NIXON IN ISRAEL,

JORDAN, ((AND)) PAKISTAN TO SHOW THAT THE PRESIDENT OF THE

U.S. IS ALWAYS READY TO SUPPORT ITS ALLIES, EVEN AT THE RISK

OF INCURING INTERNAL OR EXTERNAL DISAPPROVAL. HE ALSO RECALLED

19 MAY 1972, WHEN PRESIDENT NIXON ORDERED THE BOMBING OF

NORTH VIETNAM AND THE MINING ((OF NORTH VIETNAMESE))

PORTS, ACTING AGAINST THE ADVICE OF A MAJORITY OF THE NATIONAL

SECURITY COUNCIL. HE SAID THAT VIETNAM HAS BECOME "THE

USYMBOL OF U.S. FOREIGN POLICY. THE U.S. CANNOT LET SOUTH VIETNAM

DOWN, CANOT LET SOUTH VIETNAM BE SWALLOWED BY THE COMMUNISTS,

BECAUSE 50,000 AMERICANS HAVE DIED IN VIETNAM AND MORE THAN

1.000,000 HAVE FOUGHT IN VIETNAM."

TO THE QUESTION ((AS TO)) WHY THE DIFFICULTIES SURMOUNTED LAST MAY WOULD BECOME INSURMOUNTABLE NEXT JANUARY, KISSINGER ANSWERED THAT IN THE PAST IT WAS POSSIBLE TO ACT THANKS TO THE PROMISE OF AN AGREEMENT BRINGING AN END TO THE WAR. IT IS NO LONGER POSSIBLE, FOR WE HAVE BEEN ABLE TO OBTAIN AN AGREEMENT, THE TERMS OF WHICH ARE BETTER THAN WHAT THE U.S. CONGRESS ASKED IN EXCHANGE FOR A U.S. DISENGAGEMENT,

30

```
QUESTION: HOW DOES KISSINGER SEE THE SITUATION AFTER

THE CEASEFIRE, UNDER THE HYPOTHESIS ((THAT THE)) ACCORDS

(WILL BE)) SIGNED? KISSINGER SAID THAT AT THE SIGNING,

NIXON WILL MAKE A STATEMENT CONTAINING THREE POINTS:
```

- 1. THE U.S. RECOGNIZES THE GOVERNMENT OF VIETNAM AS THE ONLY LEGAL GOVERNMENT IN SOUTH VIETNAM.
- 2. ((THE U.S.)) DOES NOT RECOGNIZE THE RIGHT OF ANY FOREIGN TROOPS TO BE PRESENT IN SOUTH VIETNAM.
- 3. ANY VIOLATION OF THE ACCORDS WILL PROVOKE A REACTION OF EXTREME VIOLENCE ON THE PART OF THE U.S.

PRESIDENT NIXON WILL MEET WITH PRESIDENT ((THIEU))
WITHIN 2 WEEKS FOLLOWING THE SIGNING OF THE ACCORDS, TO

PREAFFIRM U.S. - SOUTH VIETNAMESE SOLIDARITY.

KISSINGER ADDED THAT THE POST WAR AID MECHANISM WILL

OF THE ACCORDS.

TO A QUESTION CONCERNING THE CEASEFIRE IN-PLACE,

KISSINGER INFORMED ((US)) THAT THE U.S. INFORMATION SERVICE

HAS SET UP A MAP INDICATING THE POSITION OF EACH COMMUNIST

REGIMENT, EACH POSITION CIRCUMSCRIBED BY A CIRCLE WITH

A RADIUS OF 5 KILOMETERS. THIS MAP SHOWS ((AS)) EXCEPTIONS

GUANG NGAI AND BINH DINH PROVINCES, ((WHERE)) THE COMMUNISTS

OCCUPY VERY LITTLE TERRITORY AND EVEN LESS POPULATION.

KISSINGER IS PREPARED TO SHOW ASSISTANT DUC THIS MAP

IN WASHINGTON.

ON THE QUESTION OF FUTURE ELECTIONS IN SOUTH

VIETNAM, KISSINGER BELIEVES THAT NO ELECTION IS POSSIBLE
WITHIN A YEAR PECAUSE OF THE UNANIMITY RULE. MOREOVER,

IT IS RATHER THE COMMUNISTS WHO HAVE EVERY REASON TO DREAD
ELECTIONS OR REFERENDUM.

#30

#Ø666

DE #Ø667 3310206

ZNY MMNSH

7 Z 260350Z NOV 72 ZYH

▼ FM DIRNSA

TO WHITE HOUSE (ATTN: MR. D. MCMANIS FOR A SERIES CHECK)
ZEM

TOFSECRET UMBRA DELTA CONTROLLED ITEM FINAL SECTION OF THREE

3/00/DOLL-VND/ -72

TRANSMITTED HEREWITH IS A SOUTH VIETNAMESE DIPLOMATIC

MESSAGE. PLEASE ADVISE IF ANY LIMITATIONS ON DISTRIBUTION

ARE REQUIRED. THIS MESSAGE WAS TRANSMITTED TO THE WHITE

HOUSE ONLY.

ON THE QUESTION OF THE COMPOSITION OF ICCS, KISSINGER
THINKS THAT IT IS TOO LATE TO MODIFY IT. MOREOVER, HE
THINKS THAT COMMUNIST COUNTRIES LIKE HUNGARY AND POLAND
ARE PREFERABLE TO MEUTRAL COUNTRIES LIKE SWEDEN,
DENMARK, AND AUSTRIA, THE GOVERNMENTS OF WHICH ARE LEFTIST
AND HOSTILE TO OUR CAUSE. HE ADDED ((THAT THE)) U.S.

HAS MEANS OF ACTING ON POLAND, WHICH NEEDS U.S. TECHNICAL
ASSISTANCE.

ON THE QUESTION OF THE ATTITUDE ((OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF)) CHINA AND THE SOVIET UNION, KISSINGER

DISCLOSED THAT THESE TWO COUNTRIES HAVE EXERTED A MODERATING INFLUENCE ON HAMOI. BECAUSE OF (C VAL THE REALITY)

((OF)) THEIR ((SITUATION)), PEKING DOES NOT WANT NORTH

VIETNAM ((TO BECOME AN)) ALLY OF MOSCOW ON THE INDOCHINESE

PENINSULA AND BECOME A THREAT ((TO HER)) SOUTHERN FLANK.

FOR THIS REASON SHE HAS NO INTEREST IN INTRODUCING AN IMMENSE QUANTITY OF ARMS INTO NORTH VIETNAM. AS FOR THE

IMMENSE QUANTITY OF ARMS INTO NORTH VIETNAM. AS FOR THE SOVIET UNION, SHE IS ADHERING TO ((A POLICY OF)) AVOIDING ONFRONTATION WITH THE U.S. IN A REGION ((SO)) FAR AWAY AS LONG AS THE COMMUNIST REGIME IN NORTH VIETNAM IS ABLE

#30

FAVOR OF THE FOUR INDOCHINESE STATES. BOTH THE SOVIET
UNION AND ((THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF)) CHINA KNOW THAT
THE U.S. WILL NOT LET THEM HAVE A FREE HAND IN INDOCHINA. BUT
IF THE U.S. IGNORES VIETNAM, THESE CURBS WILL NO LONGER
EXIST.

RETURNING TO THE QUESTION OF SIGNING THE AGREEMENT,
KISSINGER ASKED US EARNESTLY "NOT TO DEPRIVE THOSE WHO
HELP YOU THE PRIDE OF WHAT THEY HAVE ACHEIVED." HE
POINTED OUT THAT IN THE EVENT OF AN OPEN CONFRONATION
((BETWEEN)) SAIGON AND WASHINGTON, THE U.S. PUBLIC WILL ARRIVE AT
THE CONCLUSION THAT EITHER THE U.S. GOVERNMENT HAD BETRAYED SOUTH
VIETNAM OR THAT SOUTH VIETNAM IS SHOWING ITS INGRATITUDE.

IN EITHER CASE THE EFFECT WOULD BE EQUALLY DISASTROUS.

THE TONE ((OF THE)) DISCUSSIONS WAS MORE COURTEOUS

AND THE ATMOSPHERE MORE RELAXED THAN DURING THE PRECEDING

MEETINGS, BUT KISSINGER REMAINS FIRM ON THE DEADLINES.

480

#2667

#30

NNNNKAE 528 KAP 528 KA

#Ø677

NNNNKAB539KAB539KAB539KAB539KAB539KAB539KAB539KAB539KAB539KAB539

aning of the Espionage Laws, Title 18, U.S.C., norized person is prohibited by law.

United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title 18, U. in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

affecting the National Defense of the

LASSIFIED

PL 86-36/50 USC 3605

ASSIFIED

\$6663 3320455

ZNY MMUSH

口 Z 278455Z NOV 72 ZYH

U PM DIRMSA

TO WHITE HOUSE

ZEM

TOPSSORET HARRA

3/00/VND/T -78

TRANSMITTED MEREWITH IS A S. VIETNAMESE DIPLOMATIC MESSAGE.

PLEASE ADVISE IF ANY LIMITATIONS ON DISTRIBUTION ARE REQUIRED.

THIS HESSAGE WAS TRANSMITTED TO THE WHITE HOUSE ONLY.

VIETRAMESE (SOUTH) FRENCH --

SAIDER CALLS FOR "VIETHAMIZATION" OF PEACE TALKS

esudity ions

FR SAIGON: PRESIDENT OFFICE; CHIEF OF CADINET

(#32)

ons 793, 794 and 798, the transmission of the revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibit

		1421	7A 13 /	D # 57	7 (2) 11	3 7 7	
Doc ID::6549596	Doc Dof II	1 - ARSWA AA	<i>7</i> 143.5	4Det 🕰	1 . HU	1.25	47.702
DUC 1D., 03+73,70	DOC IXCLID	, AJUTU	71.3				

PARISI SOUTH VIETHAMESE DELEGATION; AMBASSADOR PHAN DANG LAM

HOLD FOR ((PECIAL)) ASSISTANT ((NGUYEN PHU)) DUC

AND ((PRESIDENTIAL PRESS)) SECRETARY ((HOANG DUC))

NNA. FLASH 2771/PTT/VP

TADD TO THE LETTER ((1)) A PART PRESENTING (C VAL FIRM))

OF ARGUMENTS WHICH STRESS THAT THE U. .A. SHOULD NOT ALLOW ITSELF

OF TO BE WORKED INTO AN AWAWARD POSITION WHILE CONTINUING

TO ALLOW ITSELF TO BE BULLIED BY THE COMMUNISTS INTO DISCUSSING

AN INTERNAL POLITICAL SOLUTION FOR SOUTH VIETNAM WITH THEM.

OF RATHER, LEAVE THIS RESPONSIBILITY WHOLLY TO THE VIETNAMESE

THEMSELVES.

"THE U.S.A. SHOULD ONLY DISCUSS WITH THE COMMUNISTS
SUCH THINGS AS MILITARY QUESTIONS OR OTHER MATTERS WHICH
DIRECTLY CONCERN THE U. .A., AND ((THE U. .A. SHOULD))
CATEGORICALLY REPER THE COMMUNISTS TO DISCUSS WITH US
ALL OTHER QUESTIONS CONCERNING THE VIETNAMESE; AS THE
RUSSIANS AND THE CHINESE HAVE DONE UNTIL NOW BY TURNING THE

AND SUPPORTING WHAT THE LATTER SAY. IT IS A MISTAKE OF THE PART

BALL OVER TO HAHOI AND THE MLF ((MATIONAL LIBERATION FRONT))

of the u. . A. to want to do everything on Behalf of the

((1 WD G)) VIETNAMESE.

T.	S !	nec	E S S	SAR Y	, 1	0 V	IET	PHA	M I Z	E 1	r He	NE	EG O	r ta	rio	ys	Jus	T 7	AS	71	Ξ.					-
IJ	• 1	•A•	HA	s v	IET	Чар	IZ	ED	THE	: ¥#	₽R•	*		•				-			:					
		A	CKS	ONL	eds.	E Y	OUF	8 8	e ci	EPP	ľ A	ND	UNI	DER:	ST A	nd I	NG	((٥F	TH	15	NE	SSA	GE)	١,	
						· · ·		•																		• .
ζ,	())))	Pos	SIB	LY	A R	EF	RE	n Ce	70	A	LE	TTI	ER I	be i	NG	CAR	RI	CD.	TO	P	RI	S			
B.	Y]	AOH	NG	DUC	e H	Α.												. •				:				
							_						٠.						•	•						•
	I (27	HOV	72	9	13]	Z		, .										•			•	•			
5;	25																									
S A	960	33																								
									•																	
	***	-																								
																								•		•
																						•				
N.	4 ii i	3																								
				,															;					-	•	
		•		٠																•	•				·	¥
									. -		÷											٠.,			•	21 1. 5
	į	and the second	٠٠.	•				 		-		i	4.				_							•		
	1												· •									ند				
:									*.*										*							i.
م محمر	1	を					 1. ,	4							·.	:										The second second

Doc ID: 6549596 Doc Ref ID: A504075

SUMMARY OF VIETNAMESE PEACE TALKS

Doc ID: 6549596 Doc Ref ID: A504075

MESSAGE #33

FROM: Paris TO:

Saigon 27 November 1972

Paris informs Saigon that Presidential Secretary Hoang Duc Nha's plane had broken-down in Tel Aviv and would be late in arriving in Paris.

MESSAGE #34

FROM: Paris

TO:

Saigon 27 November 1972

Hoang Duc Nha informs Saigon that he had just arrived in Paris.


MESSAGE #35

FROM:

Saigon TO: Paris 27 November 1972

President Thieu directs Nguyen Phu Duc and Ambassador Tran Kim Phuong to go to Washington while Hoang Duc Nha to return to Saigon.





Message #36

Saigon From:

To: Paris

27 November 1972

President Thieu directs Hoang Duc Nha to reserve sufficient time to work with Nguyen Phu Duc adding that a delay in Duc's departure for Washington is not important.

Message #37

From: Saigon

To: Paris 27 November 1972

Informs Paris that Col. Vo Van Cam will try to telephone "the secretary" in order to discuss very important matter.

Message #38

Paris From:

Saigon To:

28 November 1972

Nguyen Phu Duc is scheduled to arrive in Washington at 1800 Tuesday.

Message #39

From: Paris

To: Saigon 28 November 1972

Hoang Duc Nha forwards to Saigon the proposed conclusion to a letter from President Thieu to President Nixon. The letter, in part, states that the acceptance of the draft accords as they now stand will frustrate and defeat the common basic purpose of the U.S. and South Vietnam. The article goes on to reiterate Saigon's basic two points: namely the withdrawal of North Vietnamese forces and the composition of the National Council of Reconciliation and Concord.

Message #40

From: Saigon

To: Paris 28 November 1972

Saigon queries possibility of returning to the 8 May proposal as a solution to the impasse.

Message #41

From: Saigon

To: Paris

28 November 1972

Saigon agrees to the draft proposal of the conclusion to the letter to President Nixon.



TOP SECRET UMBRA DUTA COMO INCIDA

Message #42

From: Paris

To: Saigon

28 November 1972

Paris reports no objection to returning to the 8 May formula, but feels the position will be difficult since the North Vietnamese have already rejected it.

Message #43

From: Saigon

To: Paris

28 November 1972

Relays information that President will meet with Nguyen Phu Duc on Wednesday at 3:00 p.m. If Duc misses the appointment it is doubtful that another could be arranged.

Message #44

From: Paris

To: Saigon

28 November 1972

Informs Saigon of departure time of Duc and Phuong for Washington and Nha for Paris Saucon.



TOP SECRET UMBRA DELTA CONTROLLO ITEM

Message #45


From: Saigon

To: Paris

28 November 1972

Saigon reiterates its proposal of returning to the 8 May formula as the method of achieving peace. They add that during Mr. Kissinger's first visit to Saigon, he put forward the idea "of returning to the 8 May formula after the election."

EO 3.3b(3) PL 86-36/50 USC 3605



Message #47

From:

Saigon

29 November 1972

Saigon informed that Hoang Duc Nha will depart Paris on 29 November and will arrive in Saigon on 30 November. Nha has requested that the press be diverted from Ton Son Nhut airport.

Message #48

From: Paris

To: Washington 29 November 1972

Instructs Nguyen Phu Duc to stress the moral side of the matter, especially the last two pages of a letter apparently from President Thieu to President Nixon.

Message #49

Saigon From:

To: Washington 29 November 1972

Saigon's Washington Ambassador is instructed to cable the news of the talks between President Nixon and Nguyen Phu Duc immediately following the interview.

Message #50

From: Washington To: Saigon

29 November 1972

Nguyen Phu Duc files preliminary report on session with President Nixon and Mr. Kissinger stating that he had elucidated various aspects of the South Vietnamese position and would forward the details by coded message. Duc also informs Saigon that on 30 November he is scheduled to meet again with the President and Mr. Kissinger.

Message #51

From: Washington To: Saigon

30 November 1972

Nguyen Phu Duc reports that President Nixon informed him that the next negotiating session in Paris would be the last. Duc then outlined Saigon's three main objections to the draft accords present form: 1) withdrawal of the NVA forces, 2) the composition and functions of the National Council for Reconciliation and Concord and 3) South Vietnam's opposition to the PRG as a parallel government. President Nixon then instructed Mr. Kissinger to make an effort in the direction of the South Vietnamese requests. Kissinger then proposed three changes in the wording of clauses in the draft accord.





Message #52 From:

From: Saigon

To: Washington

30 November 1972

Saigon complains about tardy reporting from SVN delegation in Washington. Saigon is ready to have "messages quickly in the clear" rather than late.

Message #53 From: Saigon To: Washington 30 November 1972


Saigon asked its Washington representatives to apologize to the U.S. Government for delays which were caused by technical difficulties. Instructions for the meeting with President Nixon and Mr. Kissinger indicated that the SVN delegation should 1) reiterate that the withdrawal of NVA remains unresolved as does the composition function and prerogatives of the CNCR, 2) stress that until these two points are resolved no internal political solution between SVN and NLF could be achieved 3) show good will and be receptive to new ideas, 4) ask that the 8 May military solution be reconsidered or altered so that the U.S. military disengagement could be achieved leaving SVN to continue their fight and negotiate with the NVN and NLF on internal political questions. Under such a solution, the United States would then only have to seriously carry out military and economic Vietnamization and take retaliatory steps in case of a violation by NVN.



Doc 10: 6549596 Doc Ref ID: A504075 meaning of the Espianage Laws, Title 18, PL 86-36/50 USC 3605 LU ហ ":":3/:335 S ZZ DE #3086 3322000 OZNY MMNSH Z 271945Z NOV 72 FM DIRNSA TO WHITE HOUSE (ATTN MR DAVID MCMANIS FOR SERIES CHECK) O ZEM LEXCLUSIVE FOR DELTA CONTROL OFFICER WARNING: THE COMINT CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNUSUALLY SENSITIVE. ₹THE USE OF THIS COMPARTMENTED ITEM IN A TOP SECRET CODEWORD PUBLICATION, THE PRECISE COMINT SOURCE OR TARGET (WHICHEVER IS SENSITIVE) SHOULD BE CONCEALED TO THE MAXIMUM DEGREE POSSIBLE AND NO REFERENCE SHOULD BE MADE TO THE NSA DELTA REFERENCE SERIAL. IN ALL OTHER CASES, THIS MATERIAL MUST BE MAINTAINED UNDER DELTA SECURITY CONTROLS. W TRANSMITTED HEREWITH IS A SOUTH VIETNAMESE DIPLOMATIC MESSAGE. NORMAL DISTRIBUTION FOR THIS MESSAGE IS IN THE DELTA SUBSERIES DOLL-VND. PLEASE ADVISE IF ANY LIMITATIONS OVER AND ABOVE S EXISTING DELTA RESTRICTIONS ARE REQUIRED. THIS MESSAGE WAS TRANSMITTED TO THE WHITE HOUSE ONLY. VIETNAMESE (SOUTH) XXMMENPØ1F0072332 3/00 /DOLL - VND /T -72 AVS/FORP-Y/B. FRESIDENTIAL SECRETARY HOANG DUC NHA'S FLIGHT DELAYED IN TEL AVIV W XXCC S FR DELEGATION; MAJOR PARIS: ((NGUYEN VAN)) HUNG((1)) 27 NOV 72 1155 ((OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT)) TO SAIGON: MAJOR NGUYEN BINH THIEU((1)) I JUST TALKED TO AMBASSADOR ((PHAM DANG LAM)) AND HE INFORMED ME OF THE FOLLOWING: THE AIRPLANE BROKE DOWN EN ROUTE (AT TEL AVIV) AND ((PRESIDENTIAL)) SECRETARY ((HOANG DUC NHA)) WILL ARRIVE AT THE VERY EARLIEST AT 1700 HOURS PARIS TIME, 2400 HOURS SAIGON TIME. THUS. INFORM THE CHIEF OF CABINET ((COL. VO VAN CAM)) OF THIS. I REPEAT: ACCORDING TO THE AIRLINE COMPANY, 1700 HOURS PARIS TIME IS THE VERY EARLIEST THAT THE SECRETARY CAN ARRIVE HERE AND AT PRESENT THE PLANE HAS BROKEN DOWN IN TEL AVIV. THUS COL. ((VO VAN)) CAM CAN TALK WITH THE SECRETARY NO LATER THAN 2400 HOURS FROM SAIGON. ((1))NOT FURTHER IDENTIFIED. HOANG DUC NHA WAS SCHEDULED TO ARRIVE IN PARIS MONDAY NOON, PARIS TIME, ACCORDING TO A MESSAGE OF 26 NOV, BEING SERIES

TI 27 NOV 72 1055Z W XXHH **₹** 45 Ø #3Ø86

CHECKED.



PL 86-36/50 USC 3605

B

TOP SECRET UNDRA

GAMMA CONTROLLED ITEM

Z CZ CE XD 746

DE DE

SNNNN

#3133 3322040

ZNY MMORN

0 272033Z NOV 72 ZYH

FM DIRNSA EXCLUSIVELY FOR

TO CIA MR HELMS

SSO DIA SECRETARY LAIRD, ADM MOORER AND

VADM DE POIX

OSTATE ∕R CI MR RS CLINE FOR SECRETARY ROGERS

WHITE HOUSE MR KISSINGER

ZEM

TOPSEORET UMBRA NOFORN GAMMA CONTROLLED ITEM

WAR NING: THIS COMINT IS EXTREMELY SENSITIVE AND IS TO BE SEEN ONLY BY INDIVIDUALS FORMALLY CLEARED FOR THE SPECIFIC REFERENCED SUBSERIES. THIS INFORMATION WILL NOT BE USED IN ANY PUBLICATION MESSAGE OR BRIEFING UNLESS IT REMAINS UNDER GAMMA CONTROLS.

ŴXXMME NPØ1F0072332 ≪3/00/Z -GOUT/T 256-72

SOUTH VIETNAMESE PRESIDENTIAL SECRETARY ARRIVES IN PARIS

XXCC

PARIS: ((PRESIDENTIAL SECRETARY))
HOANG DUC NHA 27 NOV 72 1920
TO SAIGON (VO VAN C M) -- Ø51/PDVN

PLEASE INFORM PRESIDENT ((THIEU)) THAT I HAVE JUST ARRIVED IN PARIS. BECAUSE OF MECHANICAL TROUBLE, I WAS 7 HOURS LATE. I AM STARTING TO WORK NOW. PLEASE ((B VAL STAND BY)) AND PRESENT ((THIS)) TO PRESIDENT ((THIEU)) IMMEDIATELY.

TI 27 NOV 72 1822Z

XX HH

500 #3133 ≟

TOP SECRET UNBRA

#34

U. S.

MNINIA

PL 86-36/50 USC 3605

ZCZCEXD741

#3087 3321948 ,_DE

UZNY MMNSH

Z 271946Z NOV 72 ZYH

FM DIR NSA

TO WHITE HOUSE (ATTN MR DAVID MCMANIS FOR SERIES CHECK)

TRANSMITTED HEREWITH IS A VIETNAMESE DIPLOMATIC MESSAGE. PLEASE ADVISE IF ANY LIMITATION ON DISTRIBUTION ARE REQUIRED. THIS MESSAGE WAS TRANSMITTED TO THE WHITE HOUSE ONLY.

VIETNAMESE (SOUTH) XXMME NPØ 1F00 72332 3/00/VND/T -72 AVS/FOR P-Y/B.

≅PRESIDENTIAL SECRETARY HOANG DUC NHA TO RETURN TO SAIGON FROM PARIS: PRESIDENTIAL SSISTANT DUC AND AMBASSADOR PHUONG TO GO TO WWASHINGT ON

(M) XXCC

FR SAIGON: ((CHIEF OF CABINET))

VO VAN CAM 27 NOV 72 2310

PARIS: AMBASSADOR ((PHAM DANG LAM)) FLASH

PLEASE RELAY THE FOLLOWING DIRECTIVE FROM THE PRESIDENT: ((SPECIAL)) SSISTANT ((NGUYEN PHU)) DUC AND AMBASSADOR S((TRAN KIM)) PHUONG RE ENOUGH TO GO TO WASHINGTON. MA((I))PRELYING ON THEM TO T KE SUFFICIENT PAPERS AND DOCUMENTS TO CONTINUE ON ORKING AND DISCUSSING.

((PRESIDENTI L)) SECRETARY ((HOANG DUC)) NHA MUST RETURN TO

SAIGON ((FROM PARIS)) TO REPORT AND WORK.

27 NOV 72 1506Z

 \mathbb{Q}_{XXHH} 500


#3087

AND THE PROPERTY OF THE PROPERTY OF THE PARTY OF THE PART

```
PL 86-36/50 USC 3605
          2 CZ CEXD 753
      OU
      DE
                #3158 3322151
      ZHY HEORN
      0 272132Z NOV 72 ZYH
      FN DIRNSA EXCLUSIVELY FOR
      TO CIA MR HELMS
     OSSO DIA SECRETARY LAIRD, ADM MOORER AND
     WVADM DE POIX
     LSTATE /R CI MR RS CLINE FOR SECRETARY ROGERS
     UN HITE HOUSE MR KISSINGER
     UZEM
                    E T UMBRA NOFORN CANISA CONTROLLED
      WARNING: THIS COMINT IS EXTREMELY SENSITIVE AND IS TO BE SEEN ONLY
     CBY INDIVIDUALS FORMALLY CLEARED FOR THE SPECIFIC REFERENCED
      SUBSERIES. THIS INFORMATION WILL NOT BE USED IN ANY PUBLICATION
      MESSAGE OR BRIEFING UNLESS IT RENAINS UNDER GAMMA CONTROLS.
     Ш
 LVIETNAMESE (SOUTH)
     OXXMME NPØ 1F00 72332
     43/00/Z -GOUT /T 257-72
     AVS/FOR P/B.
     CHIEF OF CABINET CAN TO TELEPHONE PRESIDENTIAL SECRETARY NHA IN
 8
      PARIS ON IMPORTANT N TTER
     CFR STREET
                    ((OFFICE OF THE
          SAIGON:
           PRESIDENT)): MAJOR ((NGUYEN BINH))
           THIEU((1)) 27 NOV 72
     OID
          PARIS: DELEGATION: MAJOR
     S
           ((NGUYEN VAN)) HUNG((~))
S04201-2-3
           REQUEST THAT YOU REPORT TO PRESIDENTIAL SECRETARY (CHOANG
     QUE WHAD ((THE FOLLOWING)):
 0
           COL. ((VO VAN)) CAM ((2)) WILL ((TRY TO)) TELEPHONE THE
      SECRETARY TONIGHT AT 2000 HOURS SAIGON TIME BY EVERY MEANS.
      MILITARY OR CIVILIAN TELEPHONE ... ANY GOOD SYSTEM WILL BE USED ,
 O
     PIN ORDER TO DISCUSS
                           VERY IMPORTANT ((MATTER)). REQUEST THAT
     THE SECRETARY BE PRESENT THERE TO TALK TO COL. CAN.
     LACKNOULEDGE YOUR UNDERSTANDING ((OF THIS REQUEST)).
 0
     in((1)) NOT FURTHER IDENTIFIED.
     UN((2)) PRESIDENT THIEU'S CHIEF OF CABINET.
     ♥TI 27 NOV 72 1041Z
     HHXXL-
V500
      #3158
```

Doc ID: 6549596

UJ



PL 86-36/50 USC 3605 CLASSIFIED NNNN

TA CONTROLLED ITEN

CLASSIFIED DE

0665 3330239

ZNY MMNSH

Z 280235Z NOV 72

FM DIRNSA

CLASSIFIED TO WHITE HOUSE

ZEM

3/00/VND/T

-72

CLASSIFIED TRANSMITTED HEREWITH IS A VND MESSAGE. PLEASE ADVISE IF ANY LIM-

ITATIONS ON DISTRIBUTION ARE REQUIRED. THIS MESSAGE WAS

TRANSMITTED TO THE WHITE HOUSE ONLY.

VIETNAMESE

(SOUTH)

SPECIAL ASSISTANT NGUYEN PHU DUC TO DEPART PARIS

FOR WASHINGTON ON TUESDAY

((PRESIDENTIAL ASSISTANT)) HOANG DUC NHA 28 NOV 72 Ø22Ø

TO SAIGON: PRESIDENT'E OFFICE; ((CHIEF OF CABINET)) COL. VO VAN

This work sheet contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title 18, U.S.C. Sections 793, 794 and 798, the transmission of the revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

THIS FORM FOR INTERNAL AGENCY USE ONLY

CLASSIFIED WORK SHEET

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1972-460-250

CLASSIFIED

THIS FORM FOR INTERNAL AGENCY USE ONLY

WITH REFERENCE TO YOUR TELEGRAM, ((1)) SPECIAL ASSISTANT ((NGUYEN PHU))

DUC WILL DEPART ((PARIS)) FOR WASHINGTON ON TUESDAY, (B BAL 28)

((NOVEMBER)) AT NOON, I.E. TESDAY AT 1909 HOURS SAIGON TIME, AND

WILL ARRIVE IN WASHINGTON ON TUESDAY AT 1800 HOURS WASHINGTON TIME,

I. E. WEDNESDAY AT Ø6ØØ HOURS SAIGON TIME.

THE WHITE HOUSE HAS CONFIRMED THAT PRESIDENT NIXON WILL PECEIVE SPECIAL

ASSISTANT DUC ON WEDNESDAY. REGARDS.

((1)) REFERS TO AN UNNUMBERED MESSAGE FROM COL. VO VAN CAM IN SAIGON.

DATED

ď

しいい

ī

していい

1

コメリ

J J

n 280910 NOV 72, TO AMBASSADOR PHAM DANG LAM IN PARIS. THE TEXT OF THIS

MESSAGE READS: "REQUEST THE AMBASSADOR INFORM ((ME)) OF THE TIME THAT ASSISTANT DUC IS TO LEAVE FOR WASHINGTON. RESPECTFULLY."

300

#Ø665

NNNN



ZNY MMNSH

ZZ

DE

Z 280439Z NOV 72 ZYH

#0664 3330441

FM DIRNSA

TO WHITE HOUSE

ZEM

I/QNV\cc\E

TRANSMITTED HEREWITH IS A VND/T MESSAGE. PLEASE ADVISE IF ANY

LIMITATIONS ON DISTRIBUTION ARE REQUIRED. THIS MESSAGE WAS

TRANSMITTED TO THE WHITEHOUSE ONLY.

DRAFT OF CONCLUSION TO LETTER TO PRESIDENT NIXON SENT FROM PARIS

FOR PRESIDENT THIEU'S APPROVAL

VIETNAMESE (OUTH) ENGLISH --

FR PARIS: SOUTH VIETNAMESE DELEGATION; ((PRESIDENTIAL PRESS

SECRETARY)) HOANG DUC NHA 28 NOV 72 Ø21Ø

SAIGON: PRESIDENT' OFFICE: ((CHIEF OF CABINET))

VO VAN CAM FLASH 052/PD VN/P

```
((THIEU)) IMMEDIATELY.
```

"TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC FROM HOANG DUC NHA.

"HERE IS THE PROJECTED CONCLUSION ((TO THE)) LETTER ((TO PRESIDENT

NIXON)). PLEASE GIVE US YOU FINAL OPINION ((ON IT)).

"CONCLUSION

"DEAR MR. PRESIDENT,

"I CONVEY TO YOU IN ALL CANDOR MY VIEWS ON THE MAJOR ASPECTS OF THE

PENDING PEACE SETTLEMENT IN THE SPIRIT OF THE VERY CLOSE AND CON-

FIDENT RELATIONSHIP WHICH HAS ENABLED US TO OVERCOME TOGETHER SO

MANY DIFFICULTIES IN THE PAST FOUR YEARS.

"THE BLOOD WHICH HAS BEEN SHED BY SO MANY SOLDIERS OF OUR TWO

COUNTRIES FLIGHTING SIDE BY SIDE HAS FORGED UNBREAKABLE BONDS OF

FRIENDSHIP BETWEEN OUR TWO NATIONS. WE OWE TO THEM TO ENSURE THAT THE

SACRIFICES THEY HAVE MADE WILL CONTRIBUTE TO THE KIND OF PEACE

THEY GAVE THEIR LIVES TO BRING ABOUT.

"THOSE BRAVE MEN HAD BEEN CALLED UPON TO FIGHT TO REPEL

THE UNDE ((XM)) NORTH VIETNAMESE AGGRESSION IN ORDER

TO ENABLE THE PEOPLE OF SOUTH VIETNAM TO LIVE IN FREEDOM.

AND TO ESTABLISH GENUINE PEACE AND

STABILITY FOR THIS PART OF THE WORLD. TO THAT EFFECT, OUR TWO

GOVERNMENTS, IN MANY SUMMIT CONFERENCES AND NUMBEROUS STATEMENTS,

TABLE DESTABLE WITH WITH DIDDOOF OF OID CEDITON E. C. HAT TACK TO MAL

SURE THAT AGRESSION SHOULD NOT BE (C VAL REWARDED) AND THAT THE

PEOPLE OF SOUTH VIETNAM ARE ENTITLED TO EXERT THEIR RIGHT TO SELF

OF THE PROPERTY OF THE PRESSURE OF VIOLENCE

AND THREAT OF FORCE. AND FREE FROM ANY EXTERNAL INTERFERENCE.

TOR THE REASONS I ((GAVE)) EXPLAINED ABOVE, THE DRAFT AGREEMENT WHICH

THE COMMUNISTS ATTEMPT TO IMPOSE ON US CANNOT BY ANY OBJECTIVE

STANDARD FULFILL THESE CRITERIA. ON THE CONTRARY, THEY WILL

NEGATE ALL THE EFFORTS AND SACRIFICES WE HAVE MADE FOR SO LONG.

 $rac{\Box}{\Box}$ "I WOULD LIKE TO POINT OUT ((1 WD G)) THAT THE VIEWS I EXPRESS HERE

O ARE NOT MERELY MY PERSONAL ONES. THEY REFLECT THE FIRM CONVICTION OF

THE 17 MILLION AND A GALF OF THE PEOPLE OF THE REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM,

IN EVERY WALK OF LIFE, AS EXPOUNDED FORCEFULLY AND UNMISTAKABLY BY

面 THEIR (B VAL ELECTED) LEADERS AT ALL LEVELS, IN THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY,

 $\stackrel{\mathcal{D}}{\mathfrak{O}}$ the supreme court, the provincial and village councils throughout

THE LAND, AS WELL AS DIRECTLY AND SPONTANEOUSLY IN POPULAR AND

SPONTANEOUS DEMONSTRATIONS THROUGHOUT THE COUNTRY,

UPON THE KNOWLEDGE OF THE 9 POINTS IN THE COMMUNIST DRAFT AGREEMENT

PUBLISHED BY THE NORTH VIETNAMESE AGGRESSORS IN THEIR RADIO BROADCAST

LAST MONTH.

"NO ONE CAN DENY THAT SOUTH VIETNAM IS THE VICTIM OF A

BLATANT AGRESSION COMMITTED BY NORTH VIETNAM. THEREFORE, ANY

ARE AN OBSTACLE TO PEACE FOR RESUSING THE TERIMS IMPOSED BY THE AGGRESSORS IS A MOST CRUEL IRONY.

"I AM AWARE THAT, FROM THE STANDPOINT OF THE U.E., THIS PROTRACTED WAR IN A FARAWAY LAND HAS BEEN TAXING TOO HEAVILY YOUR HUMAN AND NATURAL RESOURCES. THEREFORE, THIS CANNOT GO ON INDEFINITELY. THAT IS WHY YOU HAVE AROUSED GREAT AD-MIRATION THROUGHOUT THE WORLD AND STRONG SUPPORT IN THE U.S. BY THE NIXON DICTRINE, WHEREBY THE U.S. WILL CONTINUE TO HONOR ITS COMMITMENTS ABROAD, AND WILL HELP OTHER PEOPLES 5 TO DEFEND THEMSELVES, EACH MENACED COUNTRY BEING EXPECTED TO PROVIDE THE MANPOWER AND TO DISPLAY THE DETERMINATION IN ITS SELF-DEFENSE. IN THIS REGARD, YOU HAVE CONSIDERED THE CLASSIFIEL REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM AS THE TEST CASE OF ((THE)) NIXON DICTRINE.

700

#.0664



-ASSIFIED

PL 86-36/50 USC 3605

CHASS TED STATE OF ST

#0665 3330441

Z 280439Z NOV 72 ZYH

FM DIRNSA

TO WHITE HOUSE

ZEM

FINAL SECTION OF TWO

3/00/VND/T -72

TRANSMITTED HEREWITH IS A VND/T MESSAGE. PLEASE ADVISE IF ANY

LIMITATIONS ON DISTRIBUTION ARE REQUIRED. THIS MESSAGE WAS

TRANSMITTED TO THE WHITEHOUSE ONLY.

"I AM PROUD TO SAY THAT ((THE)) SOUTH VIETNAMESE

PEOPLE HAVE DONE FULLY THEIR SHARE IN THIS JOINT UNDERTAKING.

A TIME WHEN THE U. . HAS WITHDRAWN HALF A MILLION OF ITS

TROOPS, THE SOUTH VIETNAMESE ARMED FORCES AND PEOPLE HAVE

Ŋ

SIFIED Ú

CLA

SIFIED S

SSIFIED

CLASSIFIED

ARMAMENTS SUPPLIED BY THE COMMUNIST POWERS. THE AGGRESSORS HAVE BEEN GREATLY WEAKENED BY THAT SETBACK. THE NIXON DOCTRINE HAS BEEN FULLY VINDICATED. WHAT REMAINS IS ONLY TO ACHIEVE WHAT HAS BEEN MOSTLY DONE ALREADY, TO FULFILL OUR COMMON GOALS OF PEACE WITH HONOR, AND A GENUINE AND LASTING PEACE FOR SOUTHEAST ASIA.

NSTEAD, THE ACCEPTANCE OF THE SETTLEMENT, AS THE COMMUNISTS NOW TRY TO IMPOSE ON US, WILL FRUSTRATE AND DEFEAT OUR COMMON BASIC PURPOSES, BECAUSE IN THAT SETTLEMENT THE COMMUNIST AGGRESSORS REFUSE TO ACCEPT THE OBLIGATION TO WITHDRAW THEIR TROOPS CONCURRENTLY WITH THE WITHDRAWAL ALLIED TROOPS FROM SOUTH VIETNAM. THE DRAFT AGREEMENT ALSO DISCARDS THE ESSENTIAL PRINCIPLES OF THE 1954 GENEVA AGREEMENT, BY THE REFUSAL OF HANOI AMONG OTHER THINGS TO ACKNOWLEDGE THE PRINCIPLE THAT THE TWO STATES OF VIETNAM, DEMARCATED BY THE 17TH PARALLEL HAVE TO RESPECT THE DMZ AS WELL AS EACH OTHER* TERRITORY. FURTHERMORE, IN THE DRAFT AGREEMENT NORTH VIETNAM ARROGATES THE RIGHT TO IMPOSE A POLITICAL SOLUTION THE PEOPLE OF SOUTH VIETNAM, WHICH IS BOTH CONTRARY THE 1954 GENEVA AGREEMENT AND TO THE FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES

THIS FORM FOR INTERNAL AGENCY USE ONLY

CLASSIFIED WORK SHEET

U S GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 1972-

INTERNATIONAL LAW, UNDER WHICH NO STATE IS ENTITLED TO

Ī.

ũ

SSIFI

THIS FORM FOR INTERNAL AGENCY USE ONLY

INTERFERE IN THE INTERNAL AFFAIRS OF ANOTHER STATE. UNDER THESE CIRCUMSTANCES ONE CAN HARDLY WONDER 1/1HY THE NORTH VIETNAMESE AGGRESSORS WHO HAVE BEEN SO UNCOOPERATIVE DURING FOUR YEARS OF PEACE TALKS IN PARIS NOW CLAMOR SO LOUDLY FOR THE PROMPT SIGNATURE OF THE DRAFT AGREEMENT WITHIN VERY CLOSE DEADLINES.

AM AWARE THAT THE U. E. CONGRESS LOOKS ON FOREIGN AID WITH MISGIVINGS. BUT I HAVE NO DOUBT THAT WITH YOUR FORCEFUL AND PERSUASIVE LEADERSHIP. YOU CAN GAIN SUPPORT FOR WHAT NEEDS TO BE DONE TO SAFEGUARD FREEDOM AND THE LONG RANGE SECURITY OF THE FREE WORLD, AS YOU HAVE DONE ON MANY PREVIOUS OCCASIONS IN RECENT YEARS. AND EARLIER THIS YEAR.

"THE U.S. GOVERNMENT HAS RIGHTLY STATED THAT VIETNAM HASBECOME A SYMBOL OF U. . FOREIGN POLICY, AND THAT THE KIND OF SETTLEMENT FOR VIETNAM WILL DETERMINE THE KIND OF PEACE IN OTHER ((PARTS)) OF THE WORLD. IN FACT, THE NATIONS OF THE WORLD ARE WATCHING CLOSELY THE KIND OF PEACE IN VIETNAM TO DETERMINE THEIR COURSES OF ACTION IN THE PRESENT AND IN THE FUTURE.

"THE ISSUE THEREFORE GOES MUCH BEYOND VIETNAM ITSELF. BUT THE VIETNAMESE PEOPLE CANNOT DO LESS THAN TO CONVEY

TO YOU. IN UTMOST SINCERITY AND FRANKNESS THEIR VIEWS

ON THIS VITAL MATTER, ON THE BASIS OF THEIR LONG AND INTIMATE EXPERIENCES WITH COMMUNIST TOTAL ITARIANISM AND EXPANSIONISM. AND BECAUSE THEY WILL HAVE TO LIVE OR DIE UNDER THE SETTLEMENT TO BE CONCLUDED WITH THE COMMUNISTAGGRESSORS. NO MATTER WHAT ACTION YOU FEEL YOU HAVE TO TAKE UNDER THE CIRCUMSTANCES, I WISH TO ASSURE YOU, MR. PRESIDENT, THAT THE VIETNAMESE PEOPLE AND MYSLEF ARE DEEPLY GRATEFUL FOR WHAT YOU HAVE DONE IN RELATION TO VIETNAM IN RECENT YEARS. I HOPE AND PRAY THAT OUR GRATITUDE WILL GO FAR BEYOND IT, AND FUTURE GENERATIONS IN VIETNAM WILL REMEMBER YOU AS THE LEADER OF A GREAT ALLIED NATION WHICH WILL BRING ABOUT LASTING PEACE IN FREEDOM FOR VIETNAM AND SOUTHEAST ASIA."

O TI 28 NOV 72 0226Z

<u>т</u> ххнн


600

#0665

CLASS

DELTA CONTROLLED ITEM

This work sheet contains info



SECRET

#40

THIS FORM FOR INTERNAL AGENCY USE ONLY

CLASSIFIED WORK SHEET

CLASSIFIED

FOR THE TASK FORCE'S CONSIDERATION:

"SHOULD THE SUBJECT OF THE 8((XG))5 SOLUTION BE RAISED

(C VAL PRESIENT THIEU) OFFERS THE FOLLOWING SUBJECTS

WITH THE ALLY? WOULD IT BE OF ANY ADVANTAGE TO US? IF

(C VAL THAT) SOLUTION IS PICKED, WOULD (C VAL IT RESOLVE

THE MATTER) FOR ALL THREE SIDES? SHOULD (C VAL THAT)

SOLUTION BE DISCUSSED IN WASHINGTON OR NOT?"

CLASSIFIED

ANSWER (C VAL PRESIDENT THIEU) BEFORE LEAVING ((FOR WASHINGTON)).

TI 28 NOV 72 Ø333Z

180

#Ø671

NNNN

CLASSIFIED


CLASSIFIED

This work sheet contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title 18, U.S.C. Sections 793, 794 and 798, the transmission or the revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

THIS FORM FOR INTERNAL AGENCY USE ONLY

⇔ U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1972-

CLASSIFIED WORK SHEET



This work sheet contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title 18, U.S.C., Sections 793, 794 and 798, the transmission or the revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

((WE)) AGREE TO THE ((DRAFT OF THE)) CONCLUSION ((TO THE LETTER TO PRESIDENT NIXON AS RELAYED EARLIER

FROM PARIS FOR PRESIDENT THIEU'E APPROVAL)).

2. IF THE TASK FORCE FEELS THAT IT WOULD BE USEFUL. O PLEASE ADD THE FOLLOWING IDEA IN THE CONCLUSION:

"THE PEROPLE AND THE GOVERNMENT OF ((OUTH)) VIETNAM ARE WELL AWARE THAT THE QUESTION OF SIGNING THE PEACE, WITHDRAWING U.S. TROOPS, AND RECOVERING U. . PRISONERS IS AN IMPORTANT REQUIREMENT FOR THE U.E. PEOPLE ((AND IS)) BEYOND A POLITICAL QUESTION OF SERVING U. . INTERESTS IN THE WORLD. NEVERTHELESS, FOR THE VIETNAMESE PEOTLE, IT IS NOT A QUESTION OF POLITICS OR OF SIMPLE INTERESTS, IT IS RATHER A QUESTION OF LIFE OR DEATH FOR 17 AND A HALF MILLION ((VIETNAMESE PEOPLE)) IN THE PRESENT AND ASSIFIE

FOR THEIR FUTURE GENERATIONS."

TI 28 NOV 72 Ø512Z

#42

ZNY MMNSH

NZ 280954Z NOV 72 ZYH

FM DIRNSA

TO WHITE HOUSE

CLASSIFIED TANK

TOPSECRET UMBRA 3/00/VND/T -72

)TRANSMITTED HEREWITH IS A VND/T MESSAGE. PLEASE ADVISE IF

ANY LIMITATIONS ON DISTRIBUTION ARE REQUIRED. THIS MESSAGE WAS

TRANSMITTED TO THE WHITE HOUSE ONLY.

VIETNAMESE (OUTH) FRENCH, ENGLISH --

SAIGON RELAYS SECHEDULE FOR NGUYEN PHU DUC TO MEET PRESIDENT

NEXON

FR SAIGON: ((PRESIDENT'CABINET)); COL. VO VAN CAM 28 NOV 72 1640 # 42

TO PARIS: SOUTH VIETNAMESE DELEGATION; HOANG DUC NHA IMMEDIATE 2790/

PTT/VP

LI. I HAVE RECEIVED AND SUBMITTED YOUR TELEGRAM NO. 41/PDVN/TM. IT

WILL BE THE SUBJECT OF DISCUSSION WITH THE MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS,

TRAN VAN LAM. THIS EVENING.

2. AMBASSADOR ((ELLSWORTH)) BUNKER CAME TO COMMUNICATE THE FOLLOWING

MESSAGE TO RESIDENT ((THIEU)). PLEASE INFORM (, PRESIDENTIAL))

ASSISTANT ((NGUYEN PHU)) DUC.

"PRESIDENT NIXON HAS ASKED ME TO INFORM YOU THAT HE HAS (B VAL NOW)

☐ SET ASIDE 3:00 P.M. ON WEDNESDAY, NOVEMBER 29 (WASHINGTON TIME)

TO MEET WITH MR. DUC. PRESIDENT NIXON ANTICIPATES THAT MR. DUC WILL BE AVAILABLE FOR THAT MEETING AND HOPES THAT MR. DUC WILL, FOR THIS

WEEK IS SO FULL THAT IF THE APPOINTMENT IS MISSED, THERE MAY NOT

BE ANOTHER OPPORTUNITY FOR HIM TO MEET WITH MR. DUC."

REGARDS.

300

#Ø675

CLASSIFIED

ZNY MMNSH

CLASSIFIED Z 280955Z NOV 72 ZYH

FM DIRNSA

TO WHITE HOUSE

ZEM

CLASSIFIED

CLASSIFIED

CLASSIFIED

3/00/VND/T -72

HEREWITH IS A VND/T MESSAGE. PLEASE ADVISE IF

ANY LIMITATIONS ON DISTRIBUTION ARE REQUIRED. THIS MESSAGE

WAS TRANSMITTED TO THE WHITE HOUSE ONLY.

VIETNAMESE (SOUT) FRENCH

NGUYEN PHU DUC AND TRAN KIM PHUONG TO LEAVE PARIS FOR

WASHINGTON; HOANG DUC NHA TO RETURN TO SAIGON FROM PARIS

PARIS: ((SOUTH VIETNAMESE DELEGATION)); HOANG DUC NHA

NOV 72 Ø94Ø

PRESIDENT' CABINET; COL. VO VAN CAM SAIGON:

054/PD VN/P

This work sheet contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title 18, U.S.C., Sections 793, 794 and 798, the transmission or the revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

THIS FORM FOR INTERNAL AGENCY USE ONLY

CLASSIFIED WORK SHEET

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1972-

SPECIAL ASSISTANT ((NGUYEN

NNNN

CLASSIFIED

CLASSIFIED

This work sheet contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title 18, U.S.C., Sections 793, 794 and 798, the transmission or the revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

THIS FORM FOR INTERNAL AGENCY USE ONLY

4 U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1972-460-250

CLASSIFIED WORK SHEET

SSI 4 ZCZ CEX C439 U

#8428 3332122

ZNY MMNSH

Z 28212ØZ NOV 72 ZYH

FM DIRNSA Ш

TO WHITE HOUSE (ATTN MR DAVID MCMANIS FOR SERIES CHECK) IL ZEM

ZZ DE

IED D L.

> (U)

1 TRANSMITTED HEREWITH IS A VIETNAMESE DIPLOMATIC MESSAGE. PLEASE ADVISE IF ANY LIMITATION ON DISTRIBUTION ARE REQUIRED. THIS MESSAGE WAS TRANSMITTED TO THE WHITE HOUSE ONLY.

VIETNAMESE ((SOUTH)) FRENCH XXMME NPØ1 F00 72333 3/00/VND/T

AVS, AVN, KUS/FORP/.

SOUTH VIETNAMESE CABINET CHIEF ISSUES INSTRUCTIONS PRIOR TO SVN S () OFFICIALS MEETING WITH U. S. PRESIDENT

() FR SAIGON: ((OFFICE OF THE)) PRESIDENT; ((COL.)) VO VAN CAM 28 NOV 72 1850H

AMBASSADOR PHAM DANG LAM IMMEDIATE 2793/PTT/VP

FOR ASSISTANT ((NGUYEN PHU)) DUC AND AMBASSADOR ((PHAM DANG)) LAM; IF ASSISTANT DUC IS ALREADY EN ROUTE, PLEASE FORWARD.

"PURSUANT TO YOUR RESPONSE CONCERNING THE 8 MAY SOLUTION WITH
A VIEW TO PROVING THAT OUR GOVERNMENT DOES NOT CATEGORICALLY OPPOSE OF A VIEW TO PROVING THAT OUR GOVERNMENT DOES NOT CATEGORICALLY OPPOSE
OF ALL OPTIONS PROPOSED BY THE U.S. GOVERNMENT, WE THINK THAT YOU SHOULD,
NEVERTHELESS, PROPOSE TO PRESIDENT NIXON THE IDEA OF RETURNING TO
HIS SOLUTION OF MAY 8. IT IS UNDERSTOOD THAT HE ((NIXON)) WILL REPLY
OTO YOU THAT THE COMMUNISTS HAVE ALREADY REJECTED IT. YOU HAVE, AS
A RETORT, THAT THE COMMUNISTS REJECT EVERYTHING EXCEPT A SOLUTION TOTALLY ADVANTAGEOUS FOR THEM, THUS ALLOWING THEM TO WIN. INSIST IN THE TALKS THAT EVEN IF ((WE)) RETURN TO THE 8 MAY SOLUTION ONLY THE USA AND THE COMMUNISTS HAVE ANYTHING TO GAIN. NAMELY, THE USA WILL SECURE THE LIBERATION OF ALL U.S. PRISONERS AND WITHDRAWAL OF U.S. TROOPS WITHIN 4 MONTHS AND THE COMMUNISTS WOULD SECURE A TOTAL CESSATION OF BOMBING AND MINING IN ADDITION TO WITHDRAWAL OF U.S. TROOPS AND PERHAPS ALSO OTHER ALLES WITHIN 4 MONTHS. OF U.S. TROOPS AND PERHAPS ALSO OTHER ALLIES WITHIN 4 MONTHS. FOR US, WE WILL ALWAYS BE IN A DISADVANTAGEOUS POSITION. NAM NAMELY, THE CESSATION OF THE BOMBING AND MINING OF NORTH VIETNAM IN ADDITION TO THE WITHDRAWAL OF U.S. TROOPS AND PERHAPS OTHER ALLIED BUT NOT THE WITHDRAWAL OF NORTH VIETNAMESE TROOPS. EVEN WITH A CEASE-FIRE THROUGHOUT ALL OF INDOCHINA WITH INTERNATIONAL SUPERVISION, PROVIDED FOR IN THE SOLUTION, WE STILL ARE ACCEPTING GREAT RISKS BECAUSE THAT WILL NOT PREVENT NORTH VIETNAM FROM REVITALIZING ITSELF, CONTINUING TO RECEIVE AID FROM THE COMMUNIST BLOC, PURSUING NEW INFILTRATIONS, PLOTTING A VIOLATION OF THE CEASE-FIRE, AND PREPARING A NEW OFFENSIVE." U) OFFENSIVE. S

I REMIND YOU THAT DR. KISSINGER, IN HIS FIRST VISIT TO SAIGON, FORWARD THE IDEA OF RETURNING TO THE 8 MAY FORMULA AFTER THE ELECTION.

O XX HH

600 #8428

回回

LUS

|-|PI |U| |C| |C|

\$2.50.000

CHE

EO 3.3b(3) PL 86-36/50 USC 3605



XXMMENP 01F0072334 00 /Z3-GOUT /T263-72

SOUTH VIETNAMESE PRESIDENTIAL ASSISTANT RETURNS TO SAIGON FROM PARIS XXCC U) FR PARIS: DELEGATION: SPECIAL SECRETARY TRAM NGOC BICH 29 NOV 72 1500 SAIGON: OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT: I TO DIRECTOR OF THE CABINET COLONEL VO VAN CAM

PLEASE BE INFORMED THAT MONSIEUR HOANG DUC NHA TOOK A PLANE TODAY, WEDNESDAY, NOVEMBER 29, ((AIR FRANCE)) FLIGHT AF 192, AND ((WILL)) ARRIVE IN SAIGON ON THURSDAY, NOVEMBER 30. ACCORDING TO L HIS WISH. PLEASE DIVERT THE PRESS AT TAN SON NHUT AIRPORT. TI 29 NOV 72 1400Z U) HM X **4500**

MNNN

#3067

ZCZCEXAØ29

DE

ED

CLASSIFI

#3108 3341734

OZNY MMORN

10 29 17 10Z NOV 72 ZYH

FM DIRNSA EXCLUSIVELY FOR

TO CIA MR HELMS

SSO DIA SECRETARY LAIRD, ADM MOORER AND

OVADM DE POIX

STATE/RCI MR RS CLINE FOR SECRETARY ROGERS

OWHITE HOUSE MR KISSINGER

MOCODN

THIS COMINT IS EXTREMELY SENSITIVE AND IS TO BE SEEN ONLY WARN ING: BY INDIVIDUALS FORMALLY CLEARED FOR THE SPECIFIC REFERENCED INSUBSERIES. THIS INFORMATION WILL NOT BE USED IN ANY PUBLICATION MESSAGE OR BRIEFING UNLESS IT REMAINS UNDER GAMMA CONTROLS.

SVIETNAMESE (SOUTH) OXXMMENPØ IFOO 72334 3/00/Z-GOUT/T 265-72 AVS, KUS, LFR/FORP/B.

SOUTH VIETNAMESE PRESIDENTIAL ASSISTANT IN PARIS ISSUES INSTRUCTIONS TO SPECIAL ASSISTANT IN WASHINGTON

TXXCC

WFR PARIS: S

((PRESIDENTIAL

ASSISTANT)) HOANG DUC

NHA 29 NOV 72

WASHINGTON: AMBASSADOR

TRAN KIM PHUONG FLASH 57/PD VNCH/PA

PLEASE ADVISE SPECIAL ASSISTANT NGUYEN PHU DUC THAT I SUGGEST IN YOUR MEETING THIS AFTERNOON TO PLEASE STRESS THE LAST PART OF THE LETTER. PAGES 15-17. PLACE THE STRESS ON THE MORAL SIDE OF WITHE MATTER. LTI 29 NOV 72 09 1 1Z

WXXHH W 200

43108

GAMMA CONTROLLED NOFORN

ō

affecting the National

ZCZCEXA028

H3107 3341710

LZNY MMNSH

WOO 291703Z NOV 72 ZYH

WFM DIRNSA

TO WHITE HOUSE (ATTN MR DAVID MCMANIS FOR SERIES CHECK)

ZEM

TO P. S. F. G. R. F. T. LMORDA

TRANSMITTED HEREWITH IS A VIETNAMESE DIPLOMATIC MESSAGE.
PLEASE ADVISE IF ANY LIMITATION ON DISTRIBUTION ARE REQUIRED.

OTHIS MESSAGE WAS TRANSMITTED TO THE WHITE HOUSE ONLY.

OXXMMENPØ1F0072334 O3/00/VND/T -72

AVS. KUS/FORP/B.D.

OSAIGON ASKS THAT RESULTS OF MEETING BETWEEN VIETNAMESE SPECIAL ENVOY AND PRESIDENT NIXON BE SENT IMMEDIATELY AFTER INTERVIEW

XXCC

150 #3107

OFR SAIGON: COL. VO VAN CAM 29 NOV 72 2150H WASHINGTON: AMBASSADOR TRAN KIM PHUONG IMMEDIATE 2830/PTT/VP

PRESIDENT ((THIEU)) IS AWAITING NEWS OF THE TALKS BETWEEN ((SPECIAL)) ASSISTANT NGUYEN PHU DUC AND PRESIDENT NIXON. PLEASE ((SEND)) A CABLE BY PLAIN LANGUAGE TELEX IMMEDIATELY AFTER THE UNITERVIEW. I WILL BE ON WATCH CONTINUALLY STARTING TODAY.

TI 29 NOV 72 Ø911Z XXHH

WHITE HOUSE ONLY

TOP SECRET UMBRA

```
PL 86-36/50 USC 3605
ZZ
          #0666 3350815
DE
ZNY MMMSH
Z 300312Z NOV 72 ZYH
FM DIRNSA
TO WHITE HOUSE
ZEM
TRANSMITTED HEREWITH IS A VND/T MESSAGE.
PLEASE ADVISE IF ANY LIMITATIONS ON DISTRIBUTION ARE REQUIRED.
THIS MESSAGE WAS TRANSMITTED TO THE WHITE HOUSE ONLY.
3/00/VND/T
                -72
VIETNAME SE (SOUTH)
NGUYEN PHU DUC GIVES INITIAL REPORT FOLLOWING MEETING
WITH PRESIDENT NIXON
```

FR WASHINGTON: SOUTH VIETNAMESE EMBASSY; ((PRESIDENTIA

ASSISTANT)) NGUYEN PHU DUC 29 NOV 72 2055

TO SAIGON: PRESIDENT' OFFICE; CHIEF OF CABINET VO VAN CAM --

FOR YOUR INFORMATION, HAVE COME FROM A LONG MEETING WITH

PRESIDENT NIXON AT THE WHITE HOUSE ((WHICH LASTED)) FROM 1500

TO 1730 HOURS. DR. KISSINGER AND GENERAL HAIG ASSISTED AT THE

MEETING. AMBASSADOR ((TRAN KIM)) PHUONG WAS AT MY SIDE.

I PRESENTED YOUR LETTER TO PRESIDENT NIXON, WHO READ IT WITH

GREAT CARE, AND THEM I ELUCIDATED VARIOUS ASPECTS OF OUR POSITION.

IMMEDIATELY FOLLOWING THIS MEETING I HELD A DISCUSSION FOR AN HOUR

AND A HALF WITH DR. KISSINGER IN HIS OFFICE. THE ATMOSPHERE

WAS CORDIAL. THE DETAILS OF THE CONVERSATIONS WILL BE SENT

((TO YOU)) BY CODED WESSAGE.

TOMORROW I WILL HAVE ANOTHER MEETING WITH KISSINGER AT 0915

HOURS FOLLOWED BY ANOTHER MEETING WITH PRESIDENT NIXON AT 1130

HOURS, RESPECTS. ((1))

((1)) THE ABOVE MESSAGE FROM WASHINGTON WAS PRECEDED BY A

MESSAGE TO THE SVN EMBASSY IN WASHINGTON FROM COL. VO VAN CAM

IN SAIGON DATED 300935 NOV, NO. 2275/TELEX. CAM' MESSAGE READ

AS FOLLOWS: "IMMEDIATELY AFTER THE AUDIENCE ((WITH PRESIDENT

NEXON)) PLEASE: 1. CABLE ME THE PRUGRAM OF ((PRESIDENTIAL))

ASSISTANT NGUYEN PHU DUC. 2. AWAIT THE URDERS (OF)) PRESIDENT

((THIEU))." AT APPROXIMATELY 17812 HOURS 30 NOV, THE CODE CLERK

AT THE WASHINGTON EMBASSY RESPONDED TO COL. VO VAN CAM*

THAT "PRESIDENT ((THIEU)) S IMPATIENTLY AMAITING ASSISTANT

DUC'S MESSAGES" BY SAYING THAT SHE WAS WORKING ALONE AND WOULD

TRANSMIT THE MESSAGE JUST AS SOUN AS SHE COULD GET IT

ENCIPHERED.

TI 30 NOV 72 0155Z

395

THIS FORM FOR INTERNAL AGENCY USE ONLY

CLASSIFIED PL 86-36/50 USC 3605 CLASSIFIED TO NO STATE #0679 3351210

ZNY MMNSH

CLASSIFIED Z 301210Z NOV 72 ZYH

FM DIRNSA

TO WHITE HOUSE

ZEN

CLASSIFIED HEREWITH IS A VND/T MESSAGE. PLEASE ADVISE IF

ANY LIMITATIONS ON DISTRIBUTION ARE REQUIRED. THIS MESSAGE

WAS TRANSMITTED TO THE WHITE HOUSE ONLY.

CLASSIFIED 3/00/DOLL-VND/T

VIETNAMESE (OUT H) FRENCH

THIEU'S SPECIAL ENVOY REPORTS TALKS WITH NIXON

WAHSINGTON: ((OUTH VIETNAMESE EMBASSY;

SPECIAL PRESIDENTIAL ASSISTANT))

This work sheet contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title 18, U.S.C., Sections 793, 794 and 798, the transmission or the revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

ASSIFIED TO ((AIGON)): PRESIDENT'S OFFICE; CHIEF OF CABINET,

COL. VO VAN CAM URGENT 55/C/TKP/W/264/TLX

PURSUANT TO MY TELEGRAM NO. 263 OF 29 NOVEMBER:

PRESIDENT NIXON SAID THAT THE NEXT NEGOTIATING SESSION

IN PARIS WILL BE THE LAST, AND THAT UNLESS THE AGREEMENT IS

SIGNED, CONGRESS WILL CUT OFF AID TO SOUTH VIETNAM.

I PRESENTED, WITH INSISTENCE AND WITH DETAILED ARGUMENT,

OUR POSITION OF THE THREE FUNDAMENTAL PROBLEMS:

- 1. WITHDRAWAL OF THE NVA ((NORTH VIETNAMESE ARMY));
- 2. COMPOSITION AND FUNCTIONS OF THE CNRC (NATIONAL

COUNCIL FOR RECONCILIATION AND CONCORD)); AND

3. OUR OPPOSITION TO THE PRG ((PROVISIONAL REVOLUTIONARY

SSIFIED GOVERNMENT)) AS A GOVERNMENT PARALLEL TO GVN ((GOVERNMENT

OF SOUTH VIETNAM)).

CLASSIFIED

NIXON SAID FIRST OF ALL THAT WHAT IS ESSENTIAL FOR

THE REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM IS THE SUPPORT OF THE U. . GOVERNMENT AS WELL AS THE DETERMINATION OF THE U.E. ((TO RESORT TO))

VIOLENT REPRISALS AGAINST NORTH VIETNAM IN CASE OF VIOLATIONS,

AND NOT THE CLAUSES OF AN AGREEMENT WHICH, ACCORDING TO

WORDS, IS "JUST A PIECE OF PAPER" DEVOID OF IMPORTANCE.

AT THAT ((POINT)) I DREW HIS ATTENTION TO THE GRAVE

REPERCUSSIONS ON THE MORALE OF THE ARVN ((ARMY OF THE

REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM) AND THE PEOPLE OF SOUTH VIETNAM,

WHO STAND TO COMPROMISE EVERYTHING SHOULD WE NOT BE ABLE TO

EXPLAIN THAT THE AGREEMENT IS A SUCCESS FOR OUR CAUSE,

AND WE CANNOT DO THAT IF SATISFACTION IS NOT GIVEN TO THESE

FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES.

NIXON THEN GAVE INSTRUCTIONS TO ((DR. HENRY A.))

OKISSINGER TO MAKE AN EFFORT IN THE DIRECTION REQUESTED AS

POSSIBLE.

WITH NIXON'S APPROVAL, KISSINGER PROPOSED THE FOLLOWING

O FOR US:

1. CONCERNING THE NVA, HE WILL SEEK TO ADD TO ARTICLE

15, ON THE DMZ ((DEMILITARIZED ZONE)), THE PHRASE: "RESPECT

EACH OTHER'S TERRITORY IN ACCORDANCE WITH ARTICLE 24 OF

THE GENEVA AGREEMENT." IN ANOTHER CONNECTION IN THE NEW

ARTICLE 13, THE PHRASE "THE QUESTION OF VIETNAMESE ARMED

FORCES IN SOUTH VIETNAM SHALL BE SETTLED BY THE TWO

SOUTH VIETNAMESE PARTIES" COULD BE MODIFIED TO READ:

"THE QUESTION OFS SOUTH VIETNAMESE ARMED FORCES IN SOUTH

VZETNAM, ETC."

2. HE WILL TRY TO HAVE THE WORDS PROVISIONAL REVOLUTIONARY

GOVERNMENT ELIMINATED FROM THE TEXT OF THE AGREEMENT.

sheet contains information affecting the National Detense of the United States within the meaning of the is 793, 794 and 798, the transmission or the revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized perso CONCERNING THE CNCR, ALL THAT HE WOULD BE ABLE

INSTEAD OF

"GOVERNMENTAL STRUCTURE." ((1))

((1)) REMAINDER OF TEXT NOT PRESENTLY AVAILABLE.

TO OBTAIN THE WORDS "ADMINISTRATIVE STRUCTURE"

TI 30 NOV 72 0905Z

500

CLASSIFIED

CLASSIFIED #Ø679

NNNN

CLASSIFIED

CLASSIFIED

CLASSIFIED

This work sheet contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title 18, U.S.C., Sections 793, 794 and 798, the transmission or the revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

THIS FORM FOR INTERNAL AGENCY USE ONLY

CLASSIFIED WORK SHEET

A U S GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1972-

794

meaning of the

the

护

Doc Ib: 6549596 Doc Ref ID: A504075

PL 86-36/50 USC 3605

ZCZCEXD 967

O ZZ **□** DE #8299 3351643

ZNY MMNSH

Z 301640Z NOV 72 ZYH

of FM DIRNSA

TO WHITE HOUSE (ATTN MR DAVID MCMANIS FOR SERIES CHECK)

ZEM

UMBRA DELTA CONTROLLED

EXCLUSIVE FOR DELTA CONTROL OFFICER

WARNING: THE COMINT CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNUSUALLY SENSITIVE. IF A USIB MEMBER (OR HIS SPECIALLY DESIGNATED DEPUTY) APPROVES IM THE USE OF THIS COMPARTMENTED ITEM IN A TOP SECRET CODEWORD PUBLICATION, THE PRECISE COMINT SOURCE OR TARGET (WHICHEVER IS SENSITIVE) SHOULD BE CONCEALED TO THE MAXIMUM DEGREE POSSIBLE AND NO REFERENCE SHOULD BE MADE TO THE NSA DELTA REFERENCE SERIAL. IN ALL OTHER CASES, THIS MATERIAL MUST BE MAINTAINED UNDER DELTA SECURITY CONTROLS.

TRANSMITTED HEREWITH IS A SOUTH VIETNAMESE DIPLOMATIC MESSAGE. NORMAL DISTRIBUTION FOR THIS MESSAGE IS IN THE DELTA SUBSERIES DOLL-VND. PLEASE ADVISE IF ANY LIMITATIONS OVER AND ABOVE EXISTING DELTA RESTRICTIONS ARE REQUIRED. THIS MESSAGE WAS TRANSMITTED TO THE WHITE HOUSE ONLY.

;855,-.303 (SOUTH) XXMMENPØ1F0072334 FRENCH 3/00/DOLL-VND/T

THIEU'S SPECIAL ENVOY REPORTS TALKS WITH PRESIDENT NIXON ((1))

XXCC

0

L

u_

S On

0

CO

1

WASHINGTON: ((SOUTH VIETNAMESE FR EMBASSY)); ((SPECIAL PRESIDENTIAL ASSISTANT)) NGUYEN PHU DUC 30 NOV 72 0100 PRESIDENT'S OFFICE; SAIGON: CHIEF OF CABINET; COL. VO VAN CAM URGENT 55/C/TXP/W/264/TLX

...NONE OF THE OTHER WORDS IN THE TEXT CAN BE CHANGED, IN-CLUDING THE WORDS "THREE COMPONENTS" WHICH WILL THUS REMAIN. IN EXCHANGE FOR THE MODIFICATIONS INDICATED ABOVE, HE SAID THAT WE MUST ACCEPT THE OTHER PORTIONS OF THE TEXT, AS IS, IN A GENERAL PACKAGE. IF POSSIBLE, PLEASE GIVE ME YOUR INSTRUCTIONS FOR A RESPONSE TO THE U.S. GOVERNMENT TOMORROW MORNING (30 NOVEMBER 1972) IN WASHINGTON. I PRESENTED TO PRESIDENT NIXON YOUR PROPOSAL FOR A RETURN TO THE SOLUTION ADVOCATED ON 8 MAY AND FOR VIETNAMIZATION OF THE PEACE BY DIRECT NEGOTIATIONS BETWEEN ES. ((PRESIDENT)) NIXON REPLIED THAT IT IS TOO IN HIS WORDS "WE HAVE NO MORE TIME. WE PASSED THE VIETNAMESE PARTIES. LATE FOR THAT NOW. THAT PERIOD." CON THAT PERIOD." CONCERNING THE EXCHANGE OF 10,000 NORTH VIETNAMESE PRISONERS FOR U.S. POWS, NIXON SAID THAT HANOI HAD ALREADY REFUSED. ON THE SUBJECT OF YOUR MEETING WITH NIXON TO DISCUSS THE NEGOTIA-TIONS, HE SAID THAT SUCH A MEETING IS NOT POSSIBLE UNTIL AFTER THE ACCORD IS SIGNED. AT THAT TIME HE WOULD BE VERY HAPPY TO RECEIVE YOU HERE TO CONFIRM HIS SUPPORT FOR YOU. NEVERTHELESS, HE GAVE US NEVERTHELESS, HE GAVE US THESE PROMISES IN CASE AN ACCORD IS SIGNED:

1. MILITARY AND ECONOMIC AID TO SOUTH VIETNAM.

THE U.S. AIR FORCE WILL RESUME BOMBING IN CASE OF COMMUNIST VIOLATIONS.

3.

HE STANDS FIRMLY WITH YOU. HE HAS UNDERSTANDINGS WITH RUSSIA AND PEKING ON LIMITA-TIONS OF

TIONS OF COMMUNIST AID TO NORTH VIETNAM.

AT THIS TIME ((PRESIDENT)) NIXON ALSO BROACHED THE QUESTION OF THE VIETNAMESE PRESS AND SUGGESTED THAT I WOULD BE BETTER IF THE DIFFERENCES OF VIEW BETWEEN THE TWO GOVERNMENTS REMAINED SECRET AT THIS TIME IN THE COMMON INTEREST

100 ((1)) CONTINUATION OF MESSAGE SUBMITTED EARLIER TODAY WITH THE SAME SERIAL NUMBER.

TI 30 NOV 72 0905Z

HHXX O

PL 86-36/50 USC 3605

IL ZZ m DE #8344 3351920 M ZNY MMNSH Z 301918 NOV 72

FM DIRNSA ☼TO WHITE HOUSE (ATTN MR DAVID MCMANIS FOR SERIES CHECK) ZEM

TRANSMITTED HEREWITH IS A VIETNAMESE DIPLOMATIC MESSAGE. IN PLEASE ADVISE IF ANY LIMITATION ON DISTRIBUTION ARE REQUIRED. THIS MESSAGE WAS TRANSMITTED TO THE WHITE HOUSE ONLY.

VIETNAMESE (SOUTH) XXMMENPØ1F0072335 3/00/VND/T OAVS/FORP/B.

PRESIDENT THIEU PREPARING DIRECTIVE FOR PRESIDENTIAL ASSISTANT DUC IN WASHINGTON

XXCC

COL. VO VAN CAM, FR SAIGON: CHIEF OF THE PRESIDENT 3Ø NOV 72 1945 CABINET

TO WASHINGTON: AMBASSADOR TRAN

IMMED TATE 2282/TLX KIM PHUONG

THE PRESIDENT HAS DIRECTED ((ME TO)) REPORT CLEARLY TO THE AMBASSADOR ((THE FOLLOWING)):

THE TEXT OF ((PRESIDENTIAL)) ASSISTANT ((NGUYEN PHU)) DUC'S MESSAGE THAT THE PRESIDENT'S OFICE FINISHED RECEIVING MAT 1800 HOURS SAIGON TIME ARRIVED TOO LATE BECAUSE IT HAD TO THE PRESIDENT'S OFFICE FINISHED DECRYPTING IT LBE ENCRYPTED. MAT 1815 HOURS. THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL MET AT 1700 HOURS MAND IS STILL IN SESSION. THE PRESIDENT IS STILL PREPARING A CDIRECTIVE WHICH ((I)) WILL SEND AT ONCE UPON ITS COMPLETION. THE PRESIDENT DIRECTED THE TELEX BUREAU IN WASHINGTON

 $^{ extstyle e$ CARRY OUT ((THIS DIRECTIVE)). THUS, REQUEST THAT THE AMBASSADOR PAY SPECIAL ATTENTION TO THE PROBLEM OF TIMELINESS AND WHEN WE ASK ((THE BUREAU)), ((IT)) MUST REPORT TO THE AMBASSADOR AND CARRY

OUT ((THE REQUEST)). TI 30 NOV 72

₩ХХНН

(M) 35 Ø M #8344

0

W NNNN

(confidential unstablished) CONTINUATION SHEED other parts as is. Please stress that we are encouraged by the good will of the U.S. Government but the fundamental problems are not yet resolved .. 3) Please state that President [THIEU] reaffirms that the two key problems namely the presence of the NVA and the composition as well as the functions and prerogatives of the CNCR [National Council of Concord and Reconciliation] -- are problems of life and & death for us. We want to see them resolved and we demand that North Vietnam be explicit about them, as indicated in our memo of 18 November. Please present this ax side following the line of President [THIEU]'s letter to [President] NIXON. Kindly stress to REMEMBERED [President] NIXON that these two problems are equal. That is to say that on the principle plan in the agreement as well as in reality, if the problem of the presence of the NVA is not resolved, there M can be MUM no internal political solution between us and the NLF [National Liberation Front] and (On this point employ the arguments in the letter.) For this reason there are now only two paths left. MXEXXMUNXXIMUMX Either [2] these two problems (C val for) peace in the agreement according to our proposals in the memb of 18 November and which we have explained, defended and EXHMMENT elaborated on for months and recently in the letter; or reject these two probelms because they are incompatible, (4) For these reasons and to show a maximum of good will and not to appears an obstacle to a cease-fire, peace, and the return of prisoners before Christmas, we ask again that the U.S. reconsider the military solution of 8 May. Thus the U,S. dan obtain its objectives, that is, a retreat of troops, a cease-fire under international control, and the return of POWs. While we will be at an extreme disadvantage, (Cy val but) we will accept sacrifices. On this point please point out that this solution will be extremely aximiss advantageous for the U.S. and NVN. An although disadvantageous for us, we are prepared to accept it. Also, still in the sense of this solution, if the U.S. thinks of other alternatives, we will be happy to welcome the ideas. Some alternatives may be different variations combinations or permutatelons of the basic 8 May solution. / also, please insist that if the sense of this solution [is] accepted, the U.S. would then achieve military disengagement and we alone will continue our fight. And that we will negotate directly with NVN and the NLF on the internal UN 59 (Supproduction And Andrews St. 1888 St. 18

SUMMARY OF VIETNAMESE PEACE TALKS

Message #54 From: Washington To: Saigon 30 November 1972

Ambassador Tran Kim Phuong and Nguyen Phu Duc report that they are scheduled to meet Mr. Kissinger and General Haig on Friday, 1 December at 1030. Duc will depart for Saigon on Saturday morning and Phuong will leave for Paris on Saturday afternoon.

Message #55 From: Washington To: Saigon 30 November 1972

Duc reports that during his meeting with Mr. Kissinger on 30 November he continued to insist on South Vietnam's fundamental questions, whereas Kissinger responded that it was not possible to obtain any change beyond those mentioned yesterday. Kissinger again asked SVN to provide a list of priorities, "defining those points on which we place the most importance and others on which we can effect a compromise." President Nixon informed Duc that the agreement was to be signed by 22 December at the latest and that he would meet with President Thieu prior to the signing, "not to negotiate, but to personally give formal assurances of support."

Message #56 From: Saigon To: Washington 1 December 1972

In this message, Saigon advised the SVN delegation in Washington that the U.S. Government had not found a way "to defend us (SVN) against the Communists." Saigon further indicated that in any effort to place SVN objections in priority order, the questions of NVN withdrawal and the CNRC were of equal priority and that resolution of all other questions was contingent upon these two issues.

Special Assistant Duc was instructed to return to Saigon to report to the Government, while Ambassador Phuong was instructed to go to Paris to brief and assist Lam.



DELTA CONTROLLED ITEM

Message #57 From: Washington To: Saigon 1 December 1972

Nguyen Phu Duc will arrive in Saigon on 4 December.

Message #58 From: Paris To: Saigon 4 December 1972

Mr. Kissinger informs South Vietnamese that he has received instructions to conclude negotiations this week on the basis of option two--demobilization on a one-for-one basis and modifications in the wording of the article creating the National Council for Reconciliation and Concord. Kissinger also reconfirmed that the U.S. has decided to sign the agreement on 21 December.

Message #59 From: Saigon To: Paris 4 December 1972

Saigon informs Paris that at this time it has no additional instructions, pending the completion of the NSC meeting.

Message #60 From: Paris To: Saigon 4 December 1972

The South Vietnamese delegation in Paris requests instructions in the event that the draft protocol is agreed to and presented to the plenary session for discussion this Thursday. Ambassador Lam suggests three courses of action which are open to South Vietnam:

- 1. boycott the session
- attend the session without participating in the discussion
- 3. attend the session and participate in the discussion

Message #61 From: Paris To: Saigon 5 December 1972

Mr. Kissinger informs the South Vietnamese that North Vietnam has rejected all of the modifications to the draft agreement as proposed by the U.S. Kissinger added that at today's work session he will make no more new proposals and that "In case they accept option 2, we will settle. In case they maintain their demands- we are going to suspend the negotiations."



DELTA CONTROLLED ITEM

Message #62 From: Paris To: Saigon 5 December 1972

Ambassador Lam informs Saigon that the work session scheduled for 5 December between Mr. Kissinger and Le Duc Tho had been postponed until 6 December. Lam speculates that the session may have been cancelled to avoid a breakdown in the negotiations and would also allow the U.S. to seek the intervention of a third party in an attempt to persuade North Vietnam to accept modifications to the draft accords.

Message #63 From: Saigon To: Paris 5 December 1972

Saigon informs Paris that the National Security Council is awaiting the report on the second Kissinger-Le Duc Tho meeting before forwarding its opinion. (Saigon had apparently not received the earlier message stating that the scheduled 5 December meeting had been cancelled.)

Message #64 From: Saigon To: Paris 6 December 1972

Saigon requests that Mr. Kissinger be reminded that he had promised in Washington that he would use all his efforts to persuade the North Vietnamese to accept modifications that the South Vietnamese feel are essential to solve the two basic questions regarding the accords. According to Hoang Duc Nha these basic questions are: 1) the withdrawal of the NVA to North Vietnam, 2) no PRG as a parallel government coexisting with the GVN, and 3) the National Council of Reconciliation and Concord.

Message #65 From: Paris To: Saigon 6 December 1972

Mr. Kissinger informed the South Vietnamese that Le Duc Tho remains firm in his opposition to any change in the draft accords and, in fact, withdrew all of North Vietnam's earlier concessions. Kissinger added that if South Vietnam desires to make any changes to the 8 October draft "then we must make reciprocal concessions." Another meeting is scheduled for Thursday and if North Vietnam maintains its position, a breakdown in the negotiations is inevitable because the U.S. will not sign the 8 October draft as it now stands.

Kissinger concluded his briefing by emphasizing to the South Vietnamese that it is in their best interests to become advocates of a common agreement rather than push for an agreement only between the U.S. and North Vietnam.

DELTA CONTROLLED ITEM

Message #66 From: Saigon To: Paris 7 December 1972

Saigon reiterates its position regarding modifications to the draft accords. Ambassador Lam is instructed not to give a yes or no response to any question by Mr. Kissinger about the possibility of a separate agreement between the U.S. and North Vietnam. The object is to avoid "Kissinger cornering us into being the first to suggest an agreement."

Message #67 From: Paris To: Saigon 7 December 1972

Ambassador Lam requests confirmation of and instructions for comment on an alleged interview with the SVN Foreign Minister which will appear in the 8 December issue of the New York Times. According to Lam, the Foreign Minister stated that South Vietnam is prepared to sign the ceasefire and is ready to free "civil prisoners" to aid the U.S. in recovering POWs.

Message #68 From: Paris To: Saigon 7 December 1972

In reference to Item #66, Ambassador Lam explains to Saigon that Mr. Kissinger only brought up President Thieu's letter incidently and did not appear to be seeking a pretext for justifying a separate agreement between the U.S. and North Vietnam. Lam added that Kissinger had earlier clarified the only reasons that would oblige the U.S. to seek a separate agreement, namely, "political realities in the event that it would be impossible to arrive at a common accord."

Message #69 From: Paris To: Saigon 7 December 1972

Mr. Kissinger informs the South Vietnamese that the 7 December meeting did not register any progress, although Le Duc Tho did modify the North Vietnamese position of yesterday when they demanded upholding the unabridged version 8 October draft. Kissinger added that at the meeting on 8 December, if Le Duc Tho does not attempt "to test" the points on administrative structure, the DMZ, and demobilization, "Kissinger will ask for an adjournment and will return to Washington for consultations." Lam concluded the report to Saigon by stating that Kissinger continues to believe that the South Vietnamese Government is adopting a strategy of letting the U.S. act alone without making an active contribution.



Message # 70 From: Saigon To: Paris 8 December 1972

Saigon sends new instructions to Paris, revealing compromise on some key points such as agreeing to the elimination from the text the words "administrative structure". Saigon also states that if agreement is on the equal demobilization by both sides then "we have no objection to freeing all socalled political prisoners."

Message #71 From: Paris To: Saigon 9 December 1972

Mr. Kissinger informs the South Vietnamese that he feels he will be able to obtain from the North Vietnamese:

- 1. deletion of "administrative structure"
- relinquishment of the demand for discussion on a new status for the DMZ
- renunciation of the request for withdrawal of foreign civilian personnel
- 4. some concession on the question of reciprocal non-violation of territory.

Kissinger also told the South Vietnamese that, "In the next 48 hours, we will reach the point of either breaking up or accepting what we could achieve at that time".

Message #72 From: Saigon To: Paris 9 December 1972

Saigon informs Paris that the NSC is scheduled to meet and will forward instructions as soon as possible.

Message #73 From: Saigon To: Paris 9 December 1972

Saigon rejects all points presented in item #71, stating that a South Vietnamese compromise on the release of political prisoners is a great sacrifice and only will be considered if North Vietnam accepts all of South Vietnam's proposals. Saigon also reiterates its firm opposition to the PRG playing any role in the agreement, either by signing or being mentioned in the preamble.



DELTA CONTROLLED ITEM

Message #74 From: Saigon To: Paris 9 December 1972

Saigon clarifies its position on the signing of the agreement, basically adhering to the "two sides" formula with the US-SVN on one side and North Vietnam-NLF on the other. The message added that the NLF is considered as comprising part of the Communist side and "will be designated as the NLF, not as the PRG".

Message #75 From: Saigon To: Paris 9 December 1972

Paris reports on 9 December Kissinger briefing. After giving a brief summary of his session with the North Vietnamese, Mr. Kissinger displayed his displeasure at a South Vietnamese memorandum (the text in item #73) stating that anytime he attempts to consult with the South Vietnamese on negotiation tactics, Saigon insists on raising points already rejected by North Vietnam. Kissinger concluded his briefing by stating that he is convinced that an agreement not entirely satisfactory to SVN "is still better than being without an agreement".

Ambassador Lam concluded his report by stating that with Kissinger remaining so long in Paris and General Haig's return to Washington to brief the President, it is his impression that next week's meetings could well be the last.



To: 11 December 1972 Message #76 From: Paris Saigon

Ambassador Lam requests instructions as to whether he should approach Maurice Schumann regarding Schumann's statements concerning France's role in the reconstruction of Vietnam. Lam adds that since North Vietnam and the NLF have responded favorably to Schumann's statement, "The French press considers our silence to date as reticence toward France."

Message #77 From: Saigon To: Paris 9 December 1972

Final point of message #73 (previously unreadable). Saigon again insists that if the problem regarding North Vietnamese troops remains unresolved, "it is impossible to arrive at an agreement."

Message #78 From: Paris To: Saigon 11 December 1972

Mr. Kissinger requests that in President Thieu's speech before Parliament he address the negotiations in general terms without making any specific proposals. Kissinger believes this approach would gain South Vietnam the support of U.S. public opinion, especially if President Thieu states he is ready to aid in obtaining the release of U.S. POWs.

Message #79 Paris To: Saigon 11 December 1972 From:

Mr. Kissinger informed the South Vietnamese that the 11 December meeting again resulted in no progress. Le Duc Tho expressed his opposition to a four-party signing of the accord, suggesting the U.S. and North Vietnam sign one copy of the agreement with the PRG mentioned in the preamble and South Vietnam and the NLF sign another copy with the preamble omitted. North Vietnam then openly speculated on the inevitable and imminent confrontation between Washington and Saigon.

Kissinger will return to Washington immediately following the 12 December meeting. Ambassadors Porter and Sullivan will meet with the North Vietnamese on 13 December and Sullivan will remain in Paris for two more days, if necessary, to discuss protocol arrangements.



Doc ID: 6549596 Doc Ref ID: A504075

TOP SECRET UNDRA

DELTA CONTROLLED ITEM

Message #80 From: Paris To: Saigon 12 December 1972

Ambassador Porter briefed the South Vietnamese on the three sessions held on 12 December. Porter emphasized that even though no further date had been set for meetings with Le Duc Tho, Kissinger's departure from Paris did not signify a break in the negotiations. However, Porter added, Washington will stay in touch with Hanoi to see "what we can do with them." Ambassador Lam also reported that negotiations have reached a decisive stage and that Washington seems to have decided to deal directly with Hanoi without consulting the South Vietnamese. Lam concluded that "from now on it will be through normal diplomatic channels between Saigon and Washington that we will obtain information on the progress of the negotiations."

Message #81 From: Saigon To: Paris 13 December 1972

Saigon repeats its statement that as long as the vital points are not resolved " it is useless to discuss details."

Ambassador Phuong is instructed to return to Saigon before flying on to Washington.

In his speech tomorrow at the plenary session, Ambassador Lam is directed to "present the ideas of President Thieu in his message concerning the truce", and to "make much of the stir created by this offer in the press."



TOP SECRET UMBRA DELTA CONTROLLED ITEM


Message #82 From: Saigon To: Paris 12 December 1972

In answer to Ambassador Lam's question regarding SVN relations with France (Item #76), Saigon states that relations with France have never been any problem and "if the problem arises now, we will have to revaluate our relations".

Message #83 From: Paris To: Saigon 13 December 1972

Mr. Kissinger, prior to departing Paris, informed South Vietnamese that he did not know if or when he would be returning to Paris adding that, "this was not a breakdown, and that he did not foresee an important development before Christmas".





MORMAL DISTRIBUTION FOR THIS MESSAGE IS IN THE DELTA

SUBSERIES . PLEASE ADVISE IF ANY

LIMITATIONS OVER AND ABOVE EXISTING RESTRICTIONS

ARE REQUIRED. THIS MESSAGE WAS TRANSMITTED TO THE

WHITE HOUSE ONLY.

3/00/VND/T -72

NAMESE (FLASH) FRENCH

TOUTH VIETNAMESE AMBASSADOB IN WASHINGTON REPORTS PLANS

FOR FRIDAY MORNING MEETING WITH KISSINGER: TRAVEL PLANS

AMBASSADOR TRAN KIM PHUONG 30 NOV 72 2230

TO SAIGON: PRESIDENTIAL PRESS SECRETARY HOANG DUC NHA;

POLITICAL ASSISTANT LUONG NHI KY FOR REPORTING

TO FOREIGN MINISTRY -- 269/BIS/W/VP/TLX

TOMORROW MORNING, FRIDAY 1 DECEMBER, AT 1030 HOURS
SPECIAL ASSISTANT ((NGUYEN PHU)) DUC AND I WILL HAVE A MEETING

WITH DR. ((HENRY A.)) KISSINGER AND GENERAL (ALEXANDER

M.)) HAIG. SPECIAL ASSISTANT DUC WILL TAKE A FLIGHT FOR

SAIGON ON SATURDAY MORNING ((2 DECEMBER)). I WILL REMAIN

IN WASHINGTON TO AWAIT YOUR INSTRUCTIONS UNTIL SATURDAY

AFTER NOON.

ON SATURDAY AFTERNOON AT 1700 HOURS I WILL TAKE A

FLIGHT FOR PARIS AND WILL ARRIVE THERE ON SUNDAY MORNING

TO BRIEF AMBASSADORS ((TRAN VAN)) LAM AND ((VUONG VAN))

BAC. IF YOU HAVE INSTRUCTIONS CONTRARY TO THE POINTS IN

THE ABOVE MENTIONED PLAN. PLEASE LET ME KNOW AS SOON AS

n Possible. REGARDS.

TI 1 DEC 72 0501Z

DELTA SONTROLLED HEN

NNNNKA A520KA A520KA A520KA A520KA A520KA A520KA A520ZCZC KA A520PRB 932

ШDE #0668 3361257 ZNY MMNSH

▼Z Ø11255Z DEC 72 ZYH

FM DIRNSA

O #0000

TO WHITE HOUSE (ATTN D. MCMANIS/FOR A SERIES

UMBRA DELTA CONTROLLED ITEM SECTION ONE OF TWO

TRANSMITTED HEREWITH IS A VND/T MESSAGE. PLEASE ADVISE IF ANY LIMITATIONS ON DISTRIBUTION ARE REQUIRED. THIS MESSAGE

WAS TRANSMITTED TO THE WHITE HOUSE ONLY

VIETNAMESE (SOUTH) FRENCH

0 3/00/DOLL-VND/T -72

NGUYEN PHU DUC REPORTS RESULTS OF 30 NOVEMBER MEETINGS WITH PRESIDENT NIXON, DR. KISSINGER, AND GEN HAIG FR WASHINGTON: ((SOUTH VIETNAMESE EMBASSY)); ((SPECIAL

PRESIDENTIAL ASSISTANT)) NGUYEN PHU DUC -- 30 NOV 72 2230 TO SAIGON: PRESIDENT'S OFFICE; ((PRESIDENTIAL)) PRESS

SECRETARY HOANG DUC NHA URGENT 269/W/VP/TLX

TODAY I HAD A MEETING WITH ((DR. HENRY A.)) KISSINGER FOR MORE THAN AN HOUR. AMBASSADOR ((TRAN KIM)) PHUONG WAS WITH ME. ((GENERAL ALEXANDER M.)) HAIG WAS AT KISSINGER'S SIDE. I PRESENTED WITH

DINSISTENCE OUR POINT OF VIEW ON THE FUNDAMENTAL QUESTIONS. KISSINGER REPLIED THAT HE HAD ALREADY DISCUSSED THESE PROBLEMS AT LENGTH WITH INTHE OTHER SIDE AND THAT IT WAS NOT POSSIBLE TO OBTAIN ANY CHANGES BEYOND THOSE HE MENTIONED YESTERDAY. MOREOVER, IT IS NOT EVEN CERTAIN THAT WE WOULD BE ABLE TO OBTAIN COMPLETE SATISFACTION ON ALL

OF THESE LIMITED CHANGES. WE MUST BARGAIN AND WE MUST THEREFORE ESTABLISH A LIST OF PRIORITIES, DEFINING THOSE POINTS ON WHICH WE PLACE THE MOST IMPERTANCE AND OTHERS ON WHICH WE CAN EFFECT $oldsymbol{arphi}$ a compromise. In any event, he said that it is not possible to ODEMAND EXPLICITLY THE WITHDRAWL OF NVA ((NORTH VIETNAMESE ARMY))

FORCES WHICH ARE ALREADY IN SOUTH VIETNAM. CONCERNING THE CNCR

((COUNCIL FOR NATIONAL CONCORD AND RECONCILIATION)), HE MAINTAINED

THE SAME POSITION AS HE DID YESTERDAY. CONCERNING THE MENTION OF

THE PRG ((PROVISIONAL REVOLUTIONARY GOVERNMENT)), HE SAID THAT

THE OTHER SIDE STILL INSISTS ON MENTIONING THE PRG AT LEAST IN

OTHE PREAMBLE. BUT WE CAN TRY TO DETACH THE PREAMBLE (B VAL BY MAKING A UNILATERALSATEMENT, DESPITE THE SIGNING OF THE

AGREEMENT .

I THEN APPROACHED THE ((QUESTION OF)) APPLYING THE SOLUTION 8 MAY AND THE VARIOUS (B VAL POSSIBILITIES) OF THIS SOLUTION.

SOLUTION TO LE DUC THO, WHO ENERGETICALLY THRUST IT ASIDE,

BECAUSE THE COMMUNISTS WANT ABSOLUTELY TO TIE THE POLITICAL

GUESTIONS TO THE MILITARY QUESTIONS.

KISSINGER ASSURED ME AGAIN THAT THE U.S. HAS NO INTENTION TO LEAVE SOUTH VIETNAM IN THE HANDS OF THE COMMUNISTS. FOR REPRISALS ((AGAINST THE)) COMMUNISTS, THE U.S. GOVERNMENT CAN INVOKE MANY CLAUSES IN THE AGREEMENT, NOTABLY THOSE ON NO REINFORCEMENTS, RESPECT OF THE DMZ, RESPECT FOR THE (B VAL TERRITORY OF LAOS AND CAMBODIA), AND CEASE-FIRE.

I EVCKE ANOTHER ASPECT OF THE PROBLEM: HE SAID THAT RUSSIA

AND PEKING WANT TO FIND IN THIS AGREEMENT A MEANS OF ALLOWING

MORTH VIETNAM ((TO WITHDRAW)) FROM SOUTH VIETNAM WITHOUT LOSING

FACE AND OF LEAVING THE RESPONSIBILITY IN THE SOUTH TO THE NLF

((NATIONAL LIBERATION FRONT)). FOR THIS REASON, THERE IS AN UNDERSTANDING BETWEEN RUSSIA AND THE U.S. GOVERNMENT ON THE LIMITATION

WOULD BE FREE TO SEND MASSIVE QUANTITIES OF ARMAMENTS TO NORTH

VIETNAM, AT A TIME WHEN THE U.S. GOVERNMENT WILL NOT BE ABLE TO

FURNISH AID BECAUSE OF OPPOSITION IN CONGRESS. ON THE OTHER HAND,

IF PRESIDENT ((THIEU)) DECIDES TO AGREE TO THE ACCORD, NIXON

WILL BE HAPPY TO MEET WITH PRESIDENT ((THIEU)) AT MIDWAY ((ISLAND))

BEFORE THE SIGNING OF THE ACCORD. SHORTLY AFTER THE SIGNING OF


THE ACCORD, THERE WILL BE A CONFERENCE OF ALLIED COUNTRIES,

INCLUDING ((SOUTH)) KOREA, THAILAND, THE PHILIPPINES, ETC.

Π ee⊚

₩0668

▼ NNNNK ^ ^ =



HE REASSURED ME THAT THIS AGREEMENT DOES NOT CONSTITUTE A POISON PILL. AS WE FEAR. IF PRESIDENT ((THIEU)) DECIDES TO ACCEPT THE AGREEMENT, HE-WILL BE HAPPY TO RECEIVE PRESIDENT ((THIEU)) AT MIDWAY. NOT TO NEGOTIATE BUT TO PERSONALLY GIVE PRESIDENT ((THIEU)) FORMAL ASSURANCES OF SUPPORT AND OF HIS DETERMINATION ((TO EFFECT)) REPRISALS IN THE EVENT OF VIOLATIONS. AS WELL AS THE U.S. GOVERNMENT'S POSITION TO RECOGNIZE ONLY THE GVN ((GOVENMENT OF VIETNAM)) IN SOUTH VIETNAM. THE DATE OF THE SIGNING OF THE AGREEMENT WILL BE 22 DECEMBER AT THE LATEST. IF GVN REFUSES TO SIGN THE AGREEMENT. IT WILL BE THE END OF THE ALLIANCE. AT THAT MOMENT ECONOMIC AND MILITARY AID WILL STOP. HE REPEATED THAT WHAT COUNTS IS THE ALLIANCE AND PLEDGE TO REMAIN AT OUR SIDE SHOULD WE SIGN. CONCERNING THE POINTS IN DISPUTE. HE SUGGESTED THAT QUE ESTABLISH A PRIORITY LIST. HE SAID THAT THE U.S. GOVENMENT E WILL TRY TO OBTAIN THE MOST POSSIBLE. BUT NOT EVERYTHING CAM PE OBTAINED. NIXON SEEMED DETERMINED AND ASKED ME TO TRANSMIT TO PRESIDENT ((THIEU)): "PRESIDENT THIEU MUST NOT BREAK THE

TOMORROW AT 1030 HOURS, I WILL HAVE A FINAL WORK SESSION WITH KISSINGER ON THE PROBLEM OF PRIORITY LIST. PLEASE CABLE INSTRUCTIONS. AFTER THAT SESSION I PLAN TO TAKE THE FIRST AVAILABLE PLANE TO SAIGON LEAVING WASHINGTON SATURDAY MORNING.

AMBASSADOR PHUONG PLANS TO LEAVE SATURDAY EVENING FOR PARIS WITH A VIEW TO BRIEFING AMBASSADOR ((PHAM DANG)) LAM IN PREPARATION FOR MONDAYS'S SESSION.

■ TI 1 DEC 72 Ø5Ø1Z


ALLIANCE."

Doc ID: 6549596 Doc Ref ID: A504075

ASSIFI 300

#0669

NNNNKAB 879 KAB 879 KA DTD F588



ZNY MM MSH

LASSIFIED

TOP SECRET UMBRAWHITE HOUSE ONLY

DELTA CONTROLLED ITEM

PL 86-36/50 USC 3605

Ozcz ce żc 672

LDE #32

#3217 3362005

UZNY MMNSH

MZ Ø12ØØ1Z DEC 72 ZYH

▼FM DIRNSA

TO WHITE HOUSE (ATTN MR DAVID MCMANIS FOR SERIES CHECK)

UZEM

O P G E C R E T UMBRA DELTA CONTROLLED ITEM

EXCLUSIVE FOR DELTA CONTROL OFFICER

QWARNING: THE COMINT CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNUSUALLY SENSITIVE.

LIF A USIB MEMBER (OR HIS SPECIALLY DESIGNATED DEPUTY) APPROVES

LIHE USE OF THIS COMPARTMENTED ITEM IN A TOP SECRET CODEWORD

DPUBLICATION, THE PRECISE COMINT SOURCE OR TARGET (WHICHEVER

SIS SENSITIVE) SHOULD BE CONCEALED TO THE MAXIMUM DEGREE POSSIBLE

AND NO REFERENCE SHOULD BE MADE TO THE NSA DELTA REFERENCE SERIAL.

IN ALL OTHER CASES, THIS MATERIAL MUST BE MAINTAINED UNDER DELTA

USECURITY CONTROLS.

TRANSMITTED HEREWITH IS A SOUTH VIETNAMESE DIPLOMATIC MESSAGE.
NORMAL DISTRIBUTION FOR THIS MESSAGE IS IN THE DELTA SUBSERIES
ODOLL-VND. PLEASE ADVISE IF ANY LIMITATIONS OVER AND ABOVE
MEXISTING DELTA RESTRICTIONS ARE REQUIRED. THIS MESSAGE WAS
TRANSMITTED TO THE WHITE HOUSE ONLY.

OVIET NAMESE (SOUT H) XXMMENPØ1F0072336

3/00 DOLL-VND/T -72

UAVS, AVN, KUS/FORP /B,D,O.

FURTHER INSTRUCTIONS FROM THIEU TO SPECIAL ENVOY AND AMBASSADOR IN WASHINGTON

□ xxcc

S

FR SAIGON: PRESIDENT'S OFFICE;

((PRESIDENTIAL PRESS

SECRETARY)) HOANG DUC NHA 1 DEC 72

TO WASHINGTON: ((EMBASSY)):

AMBASSADOR TRAN KIM PHUONG IMMEDIATE 3384/PTT/BT

ATTENTION SPECIAL ASSISTANT ((NGUYEN PHU)) DUC AND AMBASSADOR ((TRAN KIM)) PHUONG.

PURSUANT TO YOUR TELEGRAM NR. 269, I HAVE THE HONOR TO IN-

FORM YOU OF PRESIDENT ((THIEU))'S DECISIONS.

1. AFTER SEVERAL CONSECUTIVE INTERVIEWS WITH ((PRESIDENT))
NIXON AND (OR. HENRY A.)) KISSINGER, WITH ARGUMENTS AND VERY
OLEAR EXPLANATIONS BY THE GOVERNMENT OF SOUTH VIETNAM ASKING
THE U.S. GOVERNMENT, IN CONJUNTION WITH THE SOUTH VIETNAMESE
GOVERNMENT, TO DEFEND THE LOGICAL AND REASONABLE POSITION AND
THE INTERESTS OF THE SOUTH VIETNAMESE IN THE FACE OF THE UNFAIR


#56

DELIA COMMONIO HEM

WHITE HOUSE ONLY


√ #3217

TOP SECRET UMBRA



Doc岬: 6549596 CLASSIFIED CLASSIFIED CLASSIFIED CLASSIFIED TI #Ø664 PANAM NNNN 120 Ø -SPECIAL DEC FL IGHT 72 ASSISTANT 84 1 · ON ASSISTANT MONDAY To NGUYEN THE MORNING FORE IGN PHU DUC MINISTER. DECEMBER WILL ARR IVE AT Ø945 SAIG ON 274/W/VP/TLX HOURS. NO N

> This work sheet contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title 18, U.S.C., Sections 793, 794 and 798, the transmission or the revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.





Doc Ref ID: A504075

PL 86-36/50 USC 3605

CLASSIFIED ZZ ZZ

#0659 3390509

ZNY MMNSH

04 05 05 Z DEC 72 ZYH ZZS

FM DIRHSA

TO WHITE HOUSE

ZEM

TRANSMITTED HEREWITH IS A SOUTH VIETNAMESE MESSAGE. NORMAL

DISTRIBUTION FOR THIS MESSAGE IS IN THE DELTA SUBSERIES.

PLEASE ADVISE IF ANY LIMITATIONS OVER AND ABOVE EXISTING

RESTRICTIONS ARE REQUIRED. THIS MESSAGE WAS TRANSMITTED TO

THE WHITE HOUSE ONLY.

VETNAMESE (SOUTH -

'do/doll-vnd/t-72

PARIS: SOUTH VIETNAMESE DELEGATION;

TO SAIGON: PRESIDENT'S OFFICE; ((PRESIDENTIAL ASSISTANT)) 43/PDVN/TM

TOP SECRET

DR. KISSINGER ARRIVED THIS EVENING AT 2300 HOURS WITH HIS USUAL

STAFF. HE MADE NO STATEMENT TO THE PRESS. IMMEDIATELY THEREAFTER USEN WITH HIM AT THE U.E.

AMBASSADOR'S RESIDENCE.

KISSINGER BEGAN BY ASKING US WHETHER WE HAD RECEIVED INSTRUCTIONS

FROM SAIGON. REPLIED THAT OUR GOVERNMENT IS AWAITING THE RETURN OF

SPECIAL ASSISTANT NGUYEN PHU DUC TO HAVE A COMPLETE REPORT OF HIS

MEETINGS WITH PRESIDENT NIXON.

KISSINGER THEN INFORMED US THAT AS FAR AS HE WAS CONCERNED, HE HAD
RECEIVED FROM PRESIDENT MIXON, DURING A FINAL INTERVIEW YESTERDAY IN
KEY BISCAYNE, INSTRUCTIONS TO CONCLUDE NEGOTIATIONS DURING THIS WEEK
ON THE BASIS OF OPTION TWO (REFERENCE OUR MESSAGES 32/PDNV PDVN/TM OF
23 NOVEMBER AND 35/PDVN/TM OF 24 NOVEMBER). HE REAFFIRMED WHAT
PRESIDENT NIXON HAD TOLD SPECIAL ASSISTANT NGUYEN PHU DUC; NAMELY,
THE U.S. GOVERNMENT HAS DECIDED TO SIGN THE AGREEMENT ON TWENTY-ONE
DECEMBER.

INCIDENTALLY, HE INFORMED US OF THE REACTIONS OF PRESIDENT NIXON

REGARDING THE TELEVISION BROADCAST IN WHICH FOREIGN MINISTER TRAN

VAN LAM STATED THAT NVA((NORTH VIETNAMESE ARMY)) TROOPS MUST LEAVE SOUTH VIETNAM BEFORE THE SIGNING OF THE AGREEMENT. ACCORDING TO KISSINGER. PRESESIDENT NIXON. WHO PERSONALLY VIEWED THIS BROADCAST OVER THE TELEVISION. ((1 WD G)) IT IMMEDIATELY IN ORDER TO EXPRESS HIS DISCONTENT, BEING OF THE OPINION THAT SUCH A CONDITION IS WELL (B VAL BEYOND) THE GVN (GOVERNMENT OF VIETNAM) POSITION AND EXPOSES TO BROAD DAYLIGHT THE PROFOUND DIVERGENCE BETWEEN SAIGON AND WASHINGTON. I (B VAL INTERRUPTED) TO SAY THAT THE INTENTION OF THE FOREIGN MINISTER WAS NOT TO PROVOKE A PUBLIC CONFRON-TATION WITH THE U. . BUT TO GIVE KISSINGER AN ARGUMENT FOR BRINGING PRESSURE TO BEAR ON THE COMMUNIST SIDE. HE REPLIED THAT. REGARDLESS OF SAIGON' INTENTION. PRESIDENT NIXON HAD INSTRUCTED HIM TO DISCLOSE NOTHING MORE TO US ON THE TENOR OF THE CONVERSATIONS WITH LE DUC THO IF WE ARE GOING TO ((ALLOW OR)) PROVOKE LEAKS (REGARDING THE NEGOTIA-TIONS)).

I HAD PREVIOUSLY COMPLAINED THAT THE ORTF ((FRENCH RADIO-TELEVESION ORGANIZATION)), CHANNEL TWO HAD REVEALED PART OF THE INTERVIEWS OF SPECIAL ASSISTANT NGUYEN PHU DUC IN WASHINGTON CONCERNING THE POSSIBLE MEETING ((BETWEEN)) PRESIDENT NIXON AND PRESIDENT THIEU.

TOMORROW KISSINGER WILL HAVE A PRIVATE MEETING WITH LE DUC THO IN THE MORNING, DURING WHICH HE WILL PRESENT OPTION TWO. A WORK SESSION

IS PLANNED FOR THE AFTERNOON.

FINAL ISSUE OF THE NEGOTIATIONS.

OF THE NEGOTIATIONS.

I REMINDED KISSINGER THAT OUR

I REMINDED KISSINGER THAT OUR GOVERNMENT'E POSITION WAS FULLY

KISSINGER BELIEVES THAT ON WEDNESDAY WE SHALL HAVE SETTLED THE

BROUGHT OUT BY SPECIAL ASSISTANT NGUYEN PHU DUC. IN ANY CASE, IF WE

RECEIVE INSTRUCTIONS FROM SAIGON BEFORE HIS MEETING WITH LE DUC THO,

WE WILL COMMUNICATE THEM IMMEDIATELY TO HIM.

((1)) DEPUTY SOUTH VIETNAMESE NEGOTIATOR AT THE PARIS CONFERENCE ON

VIETNAM. ACCORDING TO COLLATERAL OF 8 SEP 1972.

4 DEC 72 ØØ33Z


700

Ø659

เททท

DELTA CONTROLLED HEM

CLASSIFIE



FR SAIGON: OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT; (EPECIAL ____ Ø4 DEC 72 1220

TOP SECRET

REFERENCE YOUR MESSAGE NR 43.

I HAVE THE HONOR TO INFORM YOU AS FOLLOWS:

1. THE NSC((NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL)) IS WAITING FOR A BRIEFING

FROM SPECIAL ASSISTANT ((NGUYEN PHU)) DUC TO BE BROUGHT UP TO DATE

ON THE DETAILS OF THE DISCUSSIONS. AFTER THE NSC MEETING, WHICH IS

SCHEDULED FOR THIS AFTERNOON SAIGON TIME, I SHALL SEND YOU NEW

INSTRUCTIONS. HOWEVER. UNLESS THE SPECIAL ASSISTATAT REPORTS OTHER-

WISE THE SPIRIT OF THE NSC.

INSTRUCTIONS TO DUC AND ((WASHINGTON AMBASSADOR TRAN KIM)) PHUONG

AND WHICH PHUONG DISCLOSED TO YOU, REMAINS IN FORCE. THIS IS FOR

YOUR INFORMATION;

AS FOR KISSINGER. PLEASE TELL HIM THAT OTHER THAN WHAT SPECIAL

ASSISTANT DUC DISCUSSED WITH PRESIDENT NIXON THE GVN ((GOVERNMENT

OF VIETNAM)) HAS NO OTHER INSTRUCTIONS FOR YOU AT THIS TIME.

BEST REGARDS.

Ø4 DEC 72 Ø525Z





#60

Doc 113. 6549594M DSHRef ID: A504075 Z 041600Z DEC 72 😘 FM DIRNSA TO WHITE HOUSE (ATTN MR DAVID MCMANIS FOR SERIES CHEEK) ZEM ZCZ CEXC854 PL 86-36/50 USC 3605 ₩ ZZ #8204 3391605 O DE O ZNY MMNSH Z: **04 16**00Z DEC 72 FM DIRNSA TOTO WHITE HOUSE CATTN MR DAVID MCMANIS FOR ZEM EXCLUSIVE FOR DELTA CONTROL OFFICER

WARNING: THE COMINT CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNUSUALLY SENSITIVE. IF A USIB MEMBER (OR HIS SPECIALLY DESIGNATED DEPUTY) APPROVES THE USE OF THIS COMPARTMENTED ITEM IN A TOP SECRET CODEWORD PUBLICATION, THE PRECISE COMINT SOURCE OR TARGET (WHICHEVER IS SENSITIVE) SHOULD BE CONCEALED TO THE MAXIMUM DEGREE POSSIBLE AND NO REFERENCE SHOULD BE MADE TO THE NSA DELTA REFERENCE SERIAL. IN ALL OTHER CASES, THIS MATERIAL MUST BE MAINTAINED UNDER DELTA SECURITY CONTROLS.

TRANSMITTED HEREWITH IS A SOUTH VIETNAMESE DIPLOMATIC MESSAGE. NORMAL DISTRIBUTION FOR THIS MESSAGE IS IN THE DELTA SUBSERIES DOLL-VND. PLEASE ADVISE IF ANY LIMITATIONS OVER AND ABOVE EXISTING DELTA RESTRICTIONS ARE REQUIRED. THIS MESSAGE WAS TRANSMITTED TO THE WHITE HOUSE ONLY.

VIETNAMESE (SOUTH) XXMMENPØ1F0072339 3/00/DOLL-VND/T -72 AVS, KUS/FORP/B.

SOUTH VIETNAM MAY ADOPT ONE OF THREE POSTURES IF A TEXT OF THE ACCORD IS SUBMITTED AT THE NEXT PLENARY SESSION OF THE PARIS PEACE TALKS

XXCC.

FR

PARIS: DELEGATION; ((AMBASSADOR))

PHAM DANG LAM 4 DEC 72 1215H

PRESIDENT'S OFFICE: SAIGON:

((PRESIDENTIAL ASSISTANT))

HOANG DUC NHA FLASH 44/PDV N/TM

TOP SECRET

IN THE EVENT THAT ((DR. HENRY A.)) KISSINGER AND LE DUC THO SHOULD DEFINITELY AGREE ON THE TEXT OF THE ACCORD BEFORE THURSDAY, WHICH IS LIKELY, IT IS ANTICIPATED THAT THE PROTOCOL DRAFTS WILL BE SUBMITTED FOR DISCUSSION AT THE PLENARY SESSION NEXT THURSDAY AT THE HOTEL MAJESTIC, OR AT THE FOLLOWING SESSION. KISSINGER HAS ALREADY CONSIDERED THIS PROCEDURE, AND AMBASSADOR ((WILLIAM J.)) PORTER, IN HIS LAST SPEECH, ALLUDED TO THIS IN SPEAKING OF THE NEW ROLE THE PARIS MEETINGS WOULD BE CALLED ON TO PLAY CONCERNING THE CARRYING OUT OF THE ACCORD.

IN THIS CASE WE CAN CHOOSE BETWEEN THREE ATTITUDES:
1. BONGOTT THE SESSION BY OUR ABSENCE, WHICH WOULD INDICATE

A BREAK ON OUR PART. 2. ATTEND THE SESSION WITHOUT PARTICIPATING IN THE DISCUSSION ON THE PROTOCOL DRAFTS, WHICH WOULD SURELY BE INTERPRETED, AS WELL, AS A DESIRE ON OUR PART TO DISSOCIATE OURSELVES FROM THE AGREEMENT.

ATTEND AND PARTICIPATE IN THE DISCUSSION, WHICH IMPLIES ACCEPTANCE ((6G)) THE AGREEMENT.

IT IS EVIDENT THAT OUR ATTITUDE AT THE NEXT SESSION DEPENDS ON THE DECISION OUR GOVERNMENT MAKES ON THE NEGOTIATIONS IN THEIR BECAUSE OF THE URGENCY ((OF THE SITUATION)), I HAVE THE ENT IRETY. HONOR TO GB VAL REQUEST EARNESTLY) THAT INSTRUCTIONS BE DULY SENT TO US SO THAT WE MAY ACT IN CONFORMITY WITH GOVERNMENT POLICY.

TI 4 DEC 72 1135Z

#82.04

XXHH 65Ø

THIS FORM FOR INTERNAL AGEBLY UST ONLY

PL 86-36/50 USC 3605

ZZ DE

#0659 3400433

ZNY MMNSH

Z 050432Z DEC 72 ZYH

FM DIRNSA
TO WHITE

TO WHITE HOUSE

ZEM

TRANSMITTED HEREWITH IS A SOUTH VIETNAMESE MESSAGE. NORMAL

DISTRIBUTION FOR THIS MESSAGE IS IN THE DELTA SUBSERIES.

PLEASE ADVISE IF ANY LIMITATIONS OVER AND ABOVE EXISTING

RESTRICTIONS ARE REQUIRED. THIS MESSAGE WAS TRANSMITTED

TO THE WHITE HOUSE ONLY.

VIETNAMESE (SOUTH) FRENCH.

3/do/DOLL-VND/T-72

KISSINGER BRIEFS SOUTH VIETNAMESE IN PARIS AFTER 4 DECEMBER

FR: PARIS: SOUTH VIETNAMESE DELEGATION; ((AMBASSADOR)) PHAM DANG

LAM -- 5 DEC 72 0045

TO: SAIGON: PRESIDENT' OFFICE; ((PRESIDENTIAL ASSISTANT))

HOANG DUC NHA IMMEDIATE 45/PDVN/TM

TOP SECRET

((DR. HENRY A.)) KISSINGER RECEIVED THE TASK FORCE IN FULL ((AT))

2130 HOURS, AFTER HIS TWO MEETINGS, THE ONE A CONFIDENTIAL CON-

VERSATION WITH LE DUC THO IN THE MORNING AND THE OTHER IN THE

AFTERWOON, A WORK SESSION WITH THE WORTH VIETNAMESE.

KISSINGER QUESTIONED US ONCE AGAIN AS TO WHETHER WE HAD RECEIVED

ANY INSTRUCTIONS FROM SAIGON SINCE YESTERDAY, TO WHICH I REPLIED

THAT, UNTIL NEW ORDERS ((ARE RECEIVED)), THE POSITION LAID DOWN BY

SPECIAL ((PRESIDENTIAL)) ASSISTANT NGUYEN PHU DUC DURING HIS MEETINGS

IN WASHINGTON REMAINED VALID.

KISSINGER THEN BRIEFLY GAVE US AN ACCOUNT OF HIS TWO MEETINGS.

ACCORDING TO KISSINGER, DURING THE MORNING MEETING WITH LE DUC THO,

THO MADE A LONG INDICTMENT AGAINST THE U.E. FOR THE THREATS UTTERED

O BY KISSINGER LAST WEEK (MASSIVE RETALIATION BY THE U.E. IN THE EVENT

OF A BREAK IN THE NEGOTIATIONS INSTIGATED BY HANOI).

IT WAS ONLY IN THIS AFTERNOON. SESSION THAT KISSINGER PROPOSED OPTION
2 TO LE DUC THO: THAT IS. THE PRESENT DRAFT AGREEMENT WITH THE FOL-

LOWING MODIFICATIONS:

MAINTAIN ARTICLE 8.C.:

TWO SOUTH VIETNAMESE PARTIES;

REJECT HANOI DEMAND TO INCLUDE FOREIGN CIVILIAN PERSONNEL CHARGED

WITH THE FUNCTION OF MAINTAINING WAR MATERIEL AMONG FOREIGNERS WHO

MUST BE SENT HOME UNDER ARTICLES;

ADD "ONE-FOR-ONE BASIS (B VAL AND) RETURN TO THEIR NATIVE PLACES"

TO THE CLAUSE ON THE DEMOBILIZATION OF THE RESPECTIVE FORCES OF THE

<u>'</u>)

STRUCTURE" AND THE ADDITION OF "EQUALLY APPOINTED BY BOTH SIDES"

THE CORRECT TRANSLATION IN VIETNAMESE OF THE TERM "ADMINISTRATIVE

AFTER THE TERM "THREE EQUAL SEGMENTS"; ((AND))

ADD "AND RESPECT EACH OTHER" TERRITORY" TO ARTICLE 15, ON THE DMZ

((DEMILITARIZED ZONE)).

NONETHELESS, ACCORDING TO KISSINGER, LE DUC THO REJECTED ALL OF THESE

MODIFICATIONS AND DEMANDED IN ADDITION:

SSIF

il. OMIT PARAGRAPH C OF ARTICLE 8 CONCERNING POLITICAL PRISONERS WHO
WERE TO BE RELEASED AT THE SAME IIME AS THE POW'E.

- 2. THE SENDING HUME OF FOREIGN CIVILIAN PERSONNEL CHARGED WITH THE FUNCTION OF MAINTAINING OF WAR METERIEL WITHIN THE SAME TIME FRAME AS THE U.S. FORCES.
 - RESTORING THE FORMER WORDING OF ARTICLE 1, CHAPTER I; THAT IS: "
 THE U.S. RESPECTS THE INDEPENDENCE, SOVEREIGNLY, UNITY AND TERRITORIAL

INTEGRITY OF VIETNAM. AS RECOGNIZED BY THE 1954 GENEVA AGREEMENTS ON

CLASSIFIED

LASSIFIED

LASSIFIED

ASSIFIED

LE DUC THO LET IT BE UNDERSTOOD THAT IF THE U. . IS NOT IN AGREEMENT,
THEN THE UNLY SULUTION IS TO RETURN TO THE DRAFT AGREEMENT OF 8
OCTOBER.

THINGS STOPPED AT THAT POINT. KISSINGER AND LE DUC 140 AGREED 10 HOLD A WORK SESSION 10MORROW AFTERNOON 10 GIVE EACH SIDE TIME 10 REFLECT.

WE THEN ASKED KISSINGER WHICH TACTIC HE WILL EMPLOY TOMMORROW. HERE

IS HIS ANSWER: "IN CASE THEY ACCEPT OPTION 2 TOMORROW, WE WILL (B VAL SETTLE). IN CASE THEY MAINTAIN THEIR DEMANDS, WE ARE GOING TO SUSPEND THE NEGOTIATIONS. I WILL NOT MAKD ANY MEW PROPOSALS. IF THEY DO NOT CHANGE, I DO NOT CHANGE, TOO."

IN THE FIRST CASE -- THAT IS, ACCEPTANCE OF OPTION 2 BY HANUI -- THE U.

S. WILL NOT MAKE PUBLIC IMMEDIATELY THE FACT THAT THE AGREEMENT HAS

BEEN DEFINITIVELY CONCLUDED. WHILE AWAITING THE RESULTS OF TUMORROW

AGTERNOON SESSION WITH THE WORTH VIETNAMESE. KISSINGER ASKED AND

((1 WK G)) MANY TIMES THAT SAIGON ABSIAIN FROM ANY STATEMENT OR COM-

MENTARY ON NEGOTIATIONS IN PROGRESS, IN ORDER NOT TO (B VAL INCUR)

THE RESPONSIBILITY IN THE EVENT OF A RUPTURE.

KISSINGER ASKED IN TURN OUR OPINION AS 10 LE DUC THU: E ANSWER TOMORROW:

AS FOR HIMSELF, HE THINKS THAT THE WORLH VIETNAMESE WILL HARDEN THEIR

DELTA CONTROLLED HEM

S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE:

Laws, Title 18, U.S.C.,

PL 86-36/50 USC 3605

ZZDE

#0660 3400433

CLASSIFIED ZNY MMNSH

Z 050432Z DEC 72 ZYH

FM DIRNSA

TO WHITE HOUSE

LASSIFIED TEM

CLASSIFIED

FINAL SECTION OF TWO

HEREWITH IS A SOUTH VIETNAMESE MESSAGE. NORMAL

DISTRIBUTION FOR THIS MESSAGE IS IN THE DELTA SUBSERIES.

PLEASE ADVISE IF ANY LIMITATIONS OVER AND ABOVE EXISTING

CLASSIFIED RESTRICTIONS ARE REQUIRED. THIS MESSAGE WAS TRANSMITTED

TO THE WHITE HOUSE ONLY.

VIETNAMESE (SOUTH) FRENCH

3/00/DOLL-VND/T-72

KISSINGER BRIEFS SOUTH VIETNAMESE IN PARIS AFTER 4 DECEMBER

METTINGS WITH NORTH VIETNAMESE

SOUTH VIETNAMESE DELEGATION; ((AMBASSADOR)) PHAM DANG

5 DEC 72 0045

#61

SAIGON: PRESIDENT'E OFFICE; ((PRESIDENTIAL ASSISTANT)) HOANG DUC NHA IMMED IATE 45 /PD VN/TM TOP SECRET POSITION. BECAUSE THEY ARE CONVINCED BY THE TRAIN OF EVENTS THAT A CONFRONTATION BETWEEN SAIGON AND WASHINGTON WILL BE INEVITABLE AND THAT ALL THAT REMAINS FOR HANOI IS TO AWAIT THE CUTTING OFF OF ALL SUPPORT AND ASSISTANCE ((BY THE)) U. . IN ANY CASE, ACCORDING TO KISSINGER, THREE POSSIBILITIES COULD ARISE: EITHER HANOI INSISTS THAT WASHINGTON BRING PRESSURE TO BEAR ON SAIGON WITH A VIEW TO THE ACCEPTANCE OF THE DRAFT AGREEMENT OF 8 OCTOBER AS IS: OR HANOI REFUSES TO SIGN ANYTHING AND PREFERS TO WAIT FOR CONGRESS TO BRING AN END TO AID TO SOUTH VIETNAM: OR HANOI ACCEPTS A SEPARATE AGREEMENT WITH THE U. . LIMITED TO THE RELEASE OF U.E. POW'E IN EX-CHANGE FOR THE WITHDRAWAL OF U.E. TROOPS AND THE END OF U.E. MILITARY 188 AID. KISSINGER ASSURED US THAT IN THE FIRST CASE. THE U. . WILL REFUSE TO IMPOSE ON SAIGON THE DRAFT AGREEMENT OF 8 OCTOBER WITHOUT CHANGE. NOT BECAUSE THIS DRAFT IS BAD, BUT BECAUSE OUT GOVERNMENT HAS PLEDGED ALL OF ITS PRESTIGE IN THE CAMPAIGN WITH A VIEW TO MODIFYING THE

ATTITUDE, IT IS BECAUSE IT IS ENCOURAGED BY ALL OF THESE REVELATIONS

TOLD KISSINGER THAT IN OUR OPINION IF HANUI ADUPTS AN INTRANSIGEANT

APREEMENT.

THIS FORM FOR INTERNAL AGENCY USE ONLY

CLASSIFIED WORK SHEET

AGREEMENT EVEN BEFORE THE END OF THIS WEEK. KISSINGER AGREED THAT IT

IS WORTHLESS FOR WASHINGTON AND SAIGUN TO THROW THE RESPNSIBILITY

ON EACH OTHER FOR THE LEAKS. THE ESSENTIAL THING NOW IS THAT THE U. .

GOVERNMENT AND THE GOVERNMENT OF SOUTH VIETNAM REMAIN UNITED IN ORDER

TO FACE ANY EVENTUALITY.

WE HAVE THE IMPRESSION THAT THE APPARENT HARDENING BY HAWOI IS ONLY

A SHAM TACTIC TO SEE TO WHAT DEGREE THE U. . IS IMPALIENT TO CON-

CLUDE AN AGREEMENT. WE SHALL HAVE NO FURTHER DOUBTS, IN ANY CASE,

CLASSIFIED TOMORROW EVENING OR WEDNESDAY EVENING AT THE LATEST.

480

#0660

NNNN

PL 86-36/50 USC 3605

ZCZ CEXB508 ZZ DE

#3023 3401440

ZNY MMNSH

Z Ø51435Z DEC 72 ZYH

FM DIRNSA

WHITE HOUSE (ATTN MR DAVID MCMANIS FOR SERIES CHECK)

ZEM

EXCLUSIVE FOR DELTA CONTROL OFFICER

WARNING: THE COMINT CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNUSUALLY SENSITIVE. A USIB MEMBER (OR HIS SPECIALLY DESIGNATED DEPUTY) APPROVES THE USE OF THIS COMPARTMENTED ITEM IN A TOP SECRET CODEWORD PUBLICATION, THE PRECISE COMINT SOURCE OR TARGET (WHICHEVER IS SENSITIVE) SHOULD BE CONCEALED TO THE MAXIMUM DEGREE POSSIBLE AND NO REFERENCE SHOULD BE MADE TO THE NSA DELTA REFERENCE SERIAL. IN ALL OTHER CASES, THIS MATERIAL MUST BE MAINTAINED UNDER DELTA SECURITY CONTROLS.

TRANSMITTED HEREWITH IS A SOUTH VIETNAMESE DIPLOMATIC MESSAGE. NORMAL DISTRIBUTION FOR THIS MESSAGE IS IN THE DELTA SUBSERIES DOLL-VND. PLEASE ADVISE IF ANY LIMITATIONS OVER AND ABOVE EXISTING DELTA RESTRICTIONS ARE REQUIRED. THIS MESSAGE WAS TRANSMITTED TO THE WHITE HOUSE ONLY.

VVVVIETNAMESE (SOUTH) XXMMENPØ1F007234Ø 3/00/DOLL-VND/T -72 AVS, AVN, KUS/FORP/B, D.

AMBASSADOR LAM SEES POSSIBLE U.S. FIRE OF THIRD PARTY TO HELP COUNTER NORTH VIETNAMESE INTRANSIGENCE

XXCC

SOUTH VIETNAMESE PARIS: DELEGATION; ((AMBASSADOR)) PHAM DANG LAM 5 DEC 72 1245Z PRESIDENT'S OFFICE; SAIGON: ((PRESIDENTIAL SECRETARY)) HOANG DUC NHA IMMEDIATE 46/PDVN/M

SECRET

CONCERNING THE PROPOSAL OF THE AMERICAN SIDE, LE DUC THO AGREED TO POSTPONE UNTIL TOMORROW MORNING THE WORKING SESSION FOR THIS AFTERNOON AT 1500 HOURS. THE REASON FOR THE CANCELLA-PIDN OF TODAY'S SESSION COULD BE TO (B VAL AVOID) A BREAK CAUSED BY NORTH VIETNAM'S INTRANSIGENCE. THE U.S. COULD PUT THIS RESPITE OF 36 HOURS TO GOOD USE BY TRYING TO MAKE NORTH VIETNAM SEE REASON THROUGH THE INTERVENTION OF A THIRD PARTY. HHXX #62

C: CORRECT TITLE LINE TO READ AMBASSADOR LAM SEES POSSIBLE U.S. USE OF THIRD PARTY TO HELP COUNTER NORTH VIETNAMESE INTRANSIGENCE

400

#3023

NNNN

#62

PRINTING OFFICE

GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE.

INTERNAL

CLASSIFIED WORK SHEE

the transmission or

persor

ASS

NNNN

Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title 18 lation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

\<u>\text{8}</u>

INTERNAL AGENCY


JRIM FOR


na

U.S.C.,

CLASSIFIED WORK

#63





CLASSIFIED Z Ø6Ø831Z DEC 72 ZYH

FM DIRNSA

TO WHITE HOUSE

ZEM

TRANSMITTED HEREWITH IS A SOUTH VIETNAMESE

MESSAGE NORMAL DISTRIBUTION FOR THIS MESSAGE IS IN

THE DELTA SUBSERIES. PLEASE ADVISE IF ANY

CLASSIFIED LIMITATIONS OVER AND ABOVE EXISTING RESTRICTIONS

ARE REQUIRED. THIS MESSAGE WAS TRANSMITTED TO THE

WATTE HOUSE ONLY.

VIETNAMESE (OUTH) FRENCH

3/00/DOLL-VND/T-72

Espionage Laws, Title 18, U.S.C.,

THIS FORM FOR INTERNAL AGENCY USE ONL'

NEW ARTICLE 15 CONCERNING THE DMZ((DEMILITAR-

IN ACCORDANCE WITH ARTICLE 24 OF THE 1954 GENEVA AGREEMENT); 3--

ZONE)), HE WILL ADD: (AND RESPECT EACH OTHER'E TERRITORY

manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by it

mation affecting the National Defense of the Onlined States, 8, the transmission or the revelation of which in any manns (

SSIFIED WORK SHEET

INSISTED ON THE TERMS (ALL OTHER NON- OUTH VIETNAMESE TROOPS - - -)

IN THE ARTICLE THAT DEALS WITH THE WITHDRAWAL OF FOREIGN

TROOPS, CONFORMING TO THE JOINT COMMUNIQUE FROM MIDWAY IN JULY 1969.

CONCERNING OUR OPPOSITION TO THE CONCEPT OF TWO PARALLEL GOVERNMENTS IN

SVN, DR. KISSINGER PROMISED TO HAVE THE WURDS PRG REMUVED FROM ALL THE

TEXT. PLEASE ASK HIM IF HE HAS USED HIS EFFORTS IN THIS SENSE.

AS FOR THE CNRC, MR. DUC TOLD HIM THAT THE GVN IS KEEPING TO ITS

PROPOSALS.

THE ESSENTIAL THING IS THAT DR. KISSINGER MUSI PRESENT THESE PROPOSALS

WITH FORCE AND CONVICTION AND NOT MERELY FOR FURM SAKE.

YESTERDAY RADIO HANOI TAKING UP AN EDITORIAL FROM THE NEWSPAPER NHAN

DAN MAINTAINED THAT THE NVA HAS THE RIGHT TO REMAIN IN SVN BECAUSE

VIETNAM IS ONE ((NATION)). ANUTHER REASON TO INSIST ON THE WITHDRAWAL

OF THE NVA. BEST REGARDS.

Ø6 DEC 72 Ø6Ø5 Z

800

#Ø67Ø







CLASSIFIED PL 86-36/50 USC 3605

ZZ #0661 3420347 DE

ZNY MMNSH

Z Ø7Ø348Z DEC 72 ZYH

FM DIRNSA

ASSIFIED TO WHITE HOUSE/ATTN: MR. D. MCMANIS FOR A SERIES CHECK

ZEM

SECTION ONE OF TWO

3/00/DOLL-VND/T

TRANSMITTED HERE WITH IS A VND/T

MESSAGE. PLEASE ADVISE IF ANY LIMITATIONS ON

DISTRIBUTION ARE REQUIRED. THIS MESSAGE WAS

CLASSIFIED TRANSMITTED TO THE WHITE HOUSE ONLY.

VIETNAMESE

FRENCH

(ALTIDAS)

KISINGER BRIEFS SOUTH VIETNAMESE ON 6 DECEMBER MEETINGS

WITH NORTH VIETNAMESE IN PARIS

FR PARIS: SOUTH VIETNAMESE DELEGATION; ((AMBASSADOR)) PHAM DANG

#65

LAM

DEC 12 2236

IMMEDIATE

TO SAIGON: PRESIDENT' OFFICE; ((PRESIDENTIAL ASSISTANT))

47/PD VN/IM

HOANG DUC NHA

TOP SECRET.

THE MEETING TODAY BETWEEN KISSINGER AND LE DUC THO LASTED

FROM 1030 HOURS TO 1530 HOURS. KISSINGER RECEIVED US AT 1900 HOURS.

WE IMMEDIATELY ASKED HIM WHAT HAD BEEN THE RESULT OF

THE EFFORTS WHICH

HE HAD PROMISED TO MAKE DURING THE MEETINGS WITH SPECIAL

ASSISTANT NGUYEN PHU

DUC IN WASHINGTON, PARTICULARLY ON THE THREE POINTS:

- 1. THE WITHDRAWAL OF NORTH VIETNAMESE TROOPS.
- 2. THE EXCLUSION OF ANY MENTION OF THE PROVISIONAL REVOLUTIONARY

GOVERNMENT IN THE AGREEMENT.

3. THE DMZ.

KISSINGER RECALLED HAVING PROMISED SPECIAL ASSISTANT NGUYEN PHU DUC TO

DO HIS BEST ON ONLY THE LAST POINTS. ON THE FIRST POINT, AND HAIG IS

LAGREEMENT WITH HIM, KISSINGER IS SAID TO HAVE INFORMED

SPECIAL ASSISTANT

34 and 798, the transmission or the revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person

work sheet contains inform ections 793, 794 and 798, Doc ID: 6549596 Doc Ref ID: A504075

NGUYEN PHU CUC THAT HE COULD NOT HARBOR ANY ILLUSION . OF THE IWO

THINGS, EITHER

REQUEST TO CHANGE ARTICLE 13 SOLELY BY CHANGING "VIETNAMESE

ARMED FORCES" TO

"SOUTH VIETNAMESE ARMED FORCES." SUCH A FORMULA WOULD NOT RESOLVE

ANYTHING,

BUT WOULD BE DANGEROUS IN THE SCNCE THAT NORTH VIETNAMESE TROOPS ARE

NOT AFFECTED

BY THE DEMOBILIZATION. OR COMBINE THE FORMULA "THE QUESTION OF

SOUTH VIETNAMESE

ARMED FORCES, ETC." WITH THE ADDITION TO ARTICLE 3

"WITHDRAWAL OF ALL NON- OUTH

VIETNAMESE TROOPS." THIS ADDITION HAS ALREADY BEEN CATEGORICALLY

RE JECTED

BY LE DUC THO. KISSINGER ADDED THAT DURING

HIS MEETINGS WITH THE NORTH

VETNAMESE ON 27 NOVEMBER, THIS SINGLE QUESTION OF NORTH

VIETNAMESE

CLASSIFIED

TROOPS TOOK UP THREE ENTIRE SESSIONS; ALL ALTERNATIVES

HAVE BEEN TRIED WITHOUT

SUCCESS. YESTERDAY HE RAISED THIS SAME QUESTION ANEW,

BUT THE NORTH VIETNAMESE

CLASSIFIED

ASSIFIED

THIS FORM FOR INTERNAL AGENCY USE ON

CLASSIFIED WORK SHEET

HE ((KISSINGER)) DWELT FOR AS MUCH AS 3 OF THE 5 HOURS THAT

YESTERDAY'S

MEETING LASTED WITHLE DUC THO ON POINT 2

REGARDING THE PRG ((PROVISIONAL

REVOLUTION ARY GOVERNMENT)). THE RESULTS WERE EQUALLY

NEGATIVE. LE DUC THO

IS VEHEMENTLY OPPOSED TO ANY MODIFICATION OF THIS SUBJECT.

REGARDING THE 3RD POINT, I.E. THE ADDING OF "RESPECT EADH

OTHER'S TERRIOTY

IN ACCORDANCE WITH ARTICLE 24," THERE WAS A SIMILAR VIGOROUS

OPPOSITION ON THE

PART OF THE NORTH VIETNAMESE.

AFTER THIS PRELIMINARY, KISSINGER GAVE US AN ACCOUNT OF HIS

MEET ING

WITH LE DUC THO TODAY.

IN A SOLEMN TONE, HE STATED THAT LE DUC THO HELD (B VAL ENTRIELY) TO

HIS INTRANSIGEONT POSITION. WHEN KISSINGER MADE ANY NEW PROPOSAL, HE


((CTHO))

#Ø661

900

_S⊧

THIS FORM FOR INTERNAL AGENCY USF ONLY



ZNY MMNSH

SY
Z Ø7Ø348Z DEC 72 ZYH

FM DIRNSA

TO WHITE HOUSE/ATTN: MR. D. MCMANIS FOR A SERIES CHECK

ZEM

OF TOPSECRET DELTA CONTROLLED HEN

OF TOPSECRET DELTA CONTROLLED HEN

OF TWO

3/00/DOLL-VND/T -72

TRANSMITTED HERE WITH IS A VND/T

MESSAGE. PLEASE ADVISE IF ANY LIMITATIONS ON

DISTRIBUTION ARE REQUIRED. THIS MESSAGE WAS

TRANSMITTED TO THE WHITE HOUSE ONLY.

HELD STRICTLY TO THE POSITION WHICH HE ADOPTED DURING THE EARLIER SESSIONS.

ACCORDING TO KISSINGER, LE DUC THO HAS GONE BACK

#65

O ON ALL OF HIS EARLIER

CONCESSIONS (REFERENCE OUR CABLE NO. 22/PDVN/IN DAIED

23 NOVEMBER), AND HE

IS NOW DEMANDING THAT THE ACCORD (C VAL BE RETAINED)

IN ITS 8 OCTOBER FORM.

IF WE DESIRE OTO AFFECTANY CHANGE TO II, WE MUSI MAKE

RECIPROCAL CONCESSIONS

A (A DIRECT ALLUSION TO THE FREEING OF POLITICAL PRISONERS).

KISSINGER INFORMED US 1 HA1 HE WILL MEET AGAIN WITH LE DUC

THO TOMORROW

AT 1500 HORS. IN THE VENT THAT THE NORTH VIETNAMESE

MAINTAIN THE SAME

POSITION AS TODAY, A BREAK-DOWN WILL BE INEVITABLE SINCE THE

U.S.HAS NO

INTENTION OF REUTRNING TO THE 8 OCTOBER DRAFT ACCURD,

AS IT STANDS.

((XG)) (C VAL KISSINGER) WILL THEN RETURN TO WASHINGTON THIS

ER IDAY.

HE ((KISSINGER)) SAID THAT WE SHOULD NOT REJUICE ((OVER A PUSSIBLE

3READK-DOWN

ADV-DOMA

WILL BE JUST AS DISASIURUS

AS IF THE BREAK-DOWN WERE PROVOKED BY US. IN FACT, "WE

WILL (C VAL BEGIN) TO

WORK IN A DIFFERENT FRAMEWORK." AT THIS POINT HE MENTIONED

THE LETTER FROM

LASSIF PRESIDENT ((THIEU)) TO PRESIDENT NIXON AND ASKED IF THIS

LETTER FROM

PRESIDENT ((TIEU)) TO PRESIDENT NIXON AND ASKED IF THIS LETTER

(C VAL IMPLIED)

THAT WE WERE SUGGESTING THAT THE U.E. WAKE A SEPARATE

AGREEMENT WITH HANUI

ON THE LIBERATION OF POW. IN EXCHANGE OFR THE DISENGAGEMENT

OF THE U.S.

WHETHER OR NOT THE CUMDITION FOR THE CESSATION OF U. .

O MILITARY AID TO GVIN

((GOVERNEMT OF SOUTH VIETWAM)) WERE INCLUDED IN SUCH A

SEPARATE AGREEMENT,

THE RESULTS WILL BE THE SAWE. CONGRESS WILL PUT AN END TO

ALL KNDS OF U.S.

MILLITARY AID AS SOON AS THE U.S. PUW'S ARE FREED AND

U. S. TROUPS ARE REPATRIATED.

THIS FORM FOR INTERNAL AGENCY USF ONLY

```
VIETNAM IN THE
```

EVENT OF A SEPARATE AGREEMENT AS OPPOSED TO A COMMON AGREEMENT.

IN THE FIRST

CASE, HANOI WOULD RETAIN FULL FREEDOW OF ACTION, WITH

NO RESTRICTION REGGARDING

THE REINFORCEMENT AND SUPPLY OF (C VAL THE NORTH VIETNAMESE)

FORCES IN THE

SOUTH. ((IT WOULD HAVE)) NO OBLIGATION TO RESPECT THE DMZ

Q ((DEMILITRAIZED

ZONE)) ((OR)) THE BORDERS OF LAUS AND CAMBUDIA. DURING THIS

TIME THE U.S. WILL

HAVE BEEN RID OF ALL INVOLVEMENT WITH REGARD TO SOUTH VIETNAM

AND INDOCHINA.

IN OTHER WORDS, SOUTH VIETNAM, LAOS, AND CAMBODIA WILL BE

U LEFT BY THEMSELVES

TO FACE NORTH VIETNAM ((WHICH WILL HAVE THE))

UNRESTRICTED AID OF MOSCOW

AND PEKING. ON THE OTHER HAND, IN THE CASE OF A SINGNING OF A COMMON

APREEMENT

BY ALL PARTIES ((INCLUDING SOUTH VIETNAM)), THE

U.S. WILL BE BOUND FOR AN

 Ω TO INDOCHINA. THE AGREEMENT WILL

CONSITITUTE A LEGAL BASIS FOR THE U.E. TO INTERVENE.

INCLUDING MILITARILY, TO

MAKE NORTH VIETNAM RESPECT THE AGREEMENT

((AND TO PERMIT THE U. .)) TO

CONTINUE TO FURNISH MILITARY AID TO SOUTH VIETNAM.

T KISSINGER EMPHAASIZED THAT THIS IS THE REAL

PROBLEM (THE REAL ISSUE) .

THE REST IS OF LITTLE IMPORTANCE (RRELEVANT),

EVEN IF WE OBTAIN SOME CHANGES.

FOR EXAXAMPLE, THE ADDITION OF "RESPECT FOR

EACH OTHER'S TERRIOTRY."

IN RESPONSE TO MY QUESTION AS TO WHETHER HE

((KISSINGER)) HAD

RENEWED EFFORTS ON THE THREE POINTS MENTIONED

IN YOUR CABLE ((NO.)) 2884/

PTT/VP/TM, KISSINGER REPLIED THAT IT IS NO, TOO LATE TO BE MAKING

NEW PROPOSALS

(27VAL WITHOUT) INVOLVING CONCESSIONS ON OUR PART.

NOW DEPENDS UPON THE ATTITUDE OF THE

NORTH VIETNAMESE, WHICH WILL BE

CLASSIFIED

CLASSIFIED

CLASSIFIED

CLASSIFIED

NNNN

CLASSIFIED #Ø662

Doc ID: 6549596 Doc Ref ID: A504075
NOWN TOMORROW EVENING.

This work sheet contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title 18, U.S.C., Sections 793, 794 and 798, the transmission or the revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

1.

1.1

(1)

ш

PL 86-36/50 USC 3605

□ ZCZCEXCØ9Ø ш ZZ #3063 3421503 DF ZNY MMNS Z 071500Z DEC 72 ZYH FM DIRNSA

TO WHITE HOUSE (ATTN MR DAVID MCMANIS FOR SERIES CHECK) ZEM

CONTROLLED EXCLUSIVE FOR DELTA CONTROL OFFICER

WARNING: THE COMINT CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNUSUALLY SENSITIVE A USIB MEMBER (OR HIS SPECIALLY DESIGNATED DEPUTY) APPROVES THE USE OF THIS COMPARTMENTED ITEM IN A TOP SECRET CODEWORD PUBLICATION, THE PRECISE COMINT SOURCE OR TARGET (WHICHEVER IS SENSITIVE) SHOULD BE CONCEALED TO THE MAXIMUM DEGREE POSSIBLE AND NO REFERENCE SHOULD BE MADE TO THE NSA DELTA REFERENCE SERIAL. IN ALL OTHER CASES, THIS MATERIAL MUST BE MAINTAINED UNDER DELTA SECURITY CONTROLS.

TRANSMITTED HEREWITH IS A SOUTH VIETNAMESE DIPLOMATIC MESSAGE.

NORMAL DISTRIBUTION FOR THIS MESSAGE IS IN THE DELTA SUBSERIES

DOLL-VND. PLEASE ADVISE IF ANY LIMITATIONS OVER AND ABOVE

EXISTING DELTA RESTRICTIONS ARE REQUIRED. THIS MESSAGE WAS TRANSMITTED TO THE WHITE HOUSE ONLY.

(SOUT H) VIETNAMESE FRENCH XXMMENP Ø1F0072342 3/00 /DOLL -V ND /T

SAIGON INSTRUCTS PARIS NEGOTIATORS TO AVOID ANY IMPLICATION THAT SAIGON SUGGESTS U.S. SIGN SEPARATE AGREEMENT WITH NORTH VIETNAM

XXCC

LAS

S

PRESIDENT'S OFFICE; SAIGON: ((PRESIDENTIAL ASSISTANT))
ARIS: ((SOUTH VIETNAMESE HOANG DUC NHA 7 DEC 72 1800 PARIS: DELEGATION)); AMBASSADOR PHAM IMMEDIATE 2894/PTT/BT/TM

TOP SECRET.

REFERENCE YOUR CABLE NR. 47.

WE WISH TO DRAW YOUR ATTENTION TO ((1 WD G)) FOLLOWING POINTS:

1. ACCORDING TO YOUR REPORT, THE U.S. IS THINKING OF RESOLVING THE QUESTION OF THE NVA ((NORTH VIETNAMESE ARMY)) BY TWO
FORMULAS; EITHER TO REQUEST A SINGLE MODIFICATION TO ARTICLE 13

BY CHANGING "VIETNAMESE ARMED FORCES" TO "SOUTH VIETNAMESE
ARMED FORCES," OR BY COMBINING THIS FORMULA WITH THE ADDITION TO
ARTICLE 3 ((OF)) "WITHDRAWAL OF ALL NON-SOUTH VIETNAMESE TROOPS."
YOU ARE TO EMPHASIZE THAT THE POSITION OF THE GVN ((GOVERNMENT OF
SOUTH VIETNAM)) ON THE QUESTION OF THE NVA IS THAT THIS QUESTION
SHOULD BE RESOLVED BY BOTH OF THESE FORMULAS, AND NOT BY ONE OF
THE TWO. ARTICLE 3 WITH THE ADDITION WOULD BE AIMED AT THE
NORTH VIETNAMESE TROOPS, AND ARTICLE 13, WITH THE MODIFICATIONS
INDICATED IN THE 18 NOVEMBER GVN MEMO WOULD SETTLE THE QUESTION
OF GVN AND NLF ((NATIONAL LIBERATION FRONT)) TROOPS, AND WOULD BE
AIMED AT THE ELEMENTS OF NORTH VIETNAM WHICH ARE INCORPORATED AIMED AT THE ELEMENTS OF NORTH VIETNAM WHICH ARE INCORPORATED INTO THE NLF UNITS.

2. ACCORDING TO YOUR REPORT, KISSINGER, IN SAYING "WE WILL HAVE TO WORK IN A DIFFERENT FRAMEWORK, "(B VAL WANTS TO IMPLY THE IDEA THATT THE GVN HAS SUGGESTED THAT THE U.S. MAKE A SEPARATE AGREEMENT. ACCORDING TO PRESIDENT ((THIEU'S)) INSTRUCTIONS, IF KISSINGER EVER RAISES THE SAME QUESTION, DO NOT GIVE HIM A YES OR NO RESPONSE. THE OBJECT IS TO AVOID HIS ((KISSINGER)) CORNERING US INTO BEING THE FIRST TO SUGGEST A AGREEMENT. ON THE CONTRARY, YOU ARE TO ASK HIM THE REASON FOR THE QUESTION, AS WELL AS THE IDEA THAT HE IS FORMULATING ON THIS PROBLEM. THEN CABLE ME AND PRESIDENT ((THIEU)) WILL GIVE YOU THE NECESSARY INSTRUCTIONS. AROUE ALL AVOID GIVING GIVE HIM A YOU THE NECESSARY INSTRUCTIONS. ABOVE ALL, AVOID GIVING KISSINGER A PRETEXT FOR CORNERING US AND TELL HIM THAT YOU RE-QUIRE INSTRUCTIONS ((FROM)) PRESIDENT ((THIEU)). 7 DEC 72 1127Z

600 #3 Ø63

L.

ZCZ CE XC 122

DE

#3191 3422023

ZNY MMNSH

Z 072020Z DEC 72 ZYH

FM DIRNSA

TO WHITE HOUSE (ATTN MR DAVID MCMANIS FOR SERIES CHECK)

ZEM

0

1

S

30

1

U

2

ZZ

E T UMDRA DELTA CONTROLLED

EXCLUSIVE FOR DELTA CONTROL OFFICER

WARNING: THE COMINT CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNUSUALLY SENSITIVE. IF A USIB MEMBER (OR HIS SPECIALLY DESIGNATED DEPUTY) APPROVES THE USE OF THIS COMPARTMENTED ITEM IN A TOP SECRET CODEWORD PUBLICATION, THE PRECISE COMINT SOURCE OR TARGET (WHICHEVER IS SENSITIVE) SHOULD BE CONCEALED TO THE MAXIMUM DEGREE POSSIBLE AND NO REFERENCE SHOULD BE MADE TO THE NSA DELTA REFERENCE SERIAL. IN ALL OTHER CASES, THIS MATERIAL MUST BE MAINTAINED UNDER DELTA SECURITY CONTROLS.

TRANSMITTED HEREWITH IS A SOUTH VIETNAMESE DIPLOMATIC MESSAGE. NORMAL DISTRIBUTION FOR THIS MESSAGE IS IN THE DELTA SUBSERIES DOLL-VND. PLEASE ADVISE IF ANY LIMITATIONS OVER AND ABOVE EXISTING DELTA RESTRICTIONS ARE REQUIRED. THIS MESSAGE WAS TRANSMITTED TO THE WHITE HOUSE ONLY.

(SOUTH) VIETNAMESE XXMMENP Ø1F0072342 3/00 /D OLL - VND /T -72 AVS, KUS/FORP, OPIN/B.

SVN DELEGATION. PARIS. ASKS SAIGON FOR CONFIRMATION OF AND INSTRUCTIONS FOR COMMENT ON ALLEGED INTERVIEW WITH SVN FOREIGN MINSTER

XXCC

TO

PARIS: DELEGATION; ((AMBASSADOR)) PHAM DANG LAM 7 DEC 72 1830Z

SAIGON: OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT

SPECIAL ASSISTANT HOANG DUC NHA FLASH 526/PD VN /MAE /94

SECRET.

THE NEW YORK TIMES CORRESPONDENT IN PARIS INFORMS US THAT TOMORROW THIS NEWSPAPER WILL PUBLISH AN INTERVIEW WITH THE MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS TRAN VAN LAM. IN THIS INTERVIEW THE FOREIGN MINISTER STATES THAT THE GVN (GOVERNMENT OF SOUTH VIETNAM) IS READY TO FREE CIVIL PRISONRS TO AID THE U.S. IN RECOVERING ITS PRISONERS OF WAR. IN THE SAME INTERVIEW THE FOREIGN MINISTER ALSO STATED THAT THE GVN WOULD AGREE TO SIGN THE CEASE-FIRE ((AGREEMENT)). PLEASE CONFIRM THIS INTER-VIEW AND PROVIDE US WITH COMPLETE INSTRUCTIONS FOR COMMENTS TO THE PRESS. PUBLICATION OF THIS INTERVIEW WILL SURELY PROVOKE REACTIONS ON THE PART OF THE U.S., WHICH INSISTED THAT OUR GOVERNMENT ABSTAIN FROM ANY OFFICIAL STATEMENTS WHILE THE PRIVATE TALKS ARE GOING ON, PARTICULARLY STATEMENTS PUBLICLY EXPOSING A DIVERGENCE ((OF OPINION)) BETWEEN SAIGON AND WASHINGTON.

TI 7 DEC 72 1825Z

XXHH

600

#3191

unauthorized

FOR

CLASSIFI

PRINTING OFFICE: 1971 440-408

67

CLASSIFIED

PL 86-36/50 USC 3605

ZZ

DE

#0653 3430417

ZNY MMNSH

CLASSIFIED

Z Ø8Ø415Z DEC 72 ZYH

FM DIRNSA

TO WHITE HOUSE (ATTN MR D MCMANIS/FOR A SERIES CHECK)

ZEM

HEREWITH IS A VND/T MESSAGE. PLEASE ADVISE IF ANY

LIMITATIONS ON DISTRIBUTION ARE REQUIRED. THIS MESSAGE WAS

TRANSMITTED TO THE WHITE HOUSE ONLY.

VIETNAMESE (SOUTH)

3/00/DOLL-VND/T-72

AMBASSADOR LAM ANSWERS SAIGON CONCERN REGARDING KISSINGER*

CLASSIFIED REMARKS ABOUT A SEPARATE U. -NVN AGREEMENT

FR: PARIS: VIETNAMESE DELEGATION; AMBASSADOR PHAM DANG LAM

7 DEC 72 2300

SAIGON: OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT; MR. HOANG DUC NHA

FLASH 49/PDVN/TM

This work sheet contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title 18, U.S.C., Sections 793, 794 and 798, the transmission or the revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

THIS FORM FOR INTERNAL AGENCY USE ONLY

TOP SECRET

CLASSIFIED

CLASSIFIED

CLASSIFIED WORK SHEE

THIS FORM FOR INTERNAL AGENCY USE ONL'

REFERENCE YOUR TELEGRAM NO 2894/PTT DATED 7 DECEMBER. IN RESPONSE

TO YOUR TWO QUESTIONS:

1. KISSINGER UNDERSTANDS FULLY THAT WE DESIRE THE ADDITION OF BOTH

PHRASES AT THE SAME TIME. SINCE NVN((NORTH VIETNAM)) HAS DEFINITELY

REJECTED THE FORMULA (WITHDRAWAL OF ALL NON-EOUTH VIETNAMESE

FORCES." WE CANNOT HOPE THAT THEY WILL AGREE TO CHANGE ARTICLE

13, AS WE ARE ASKING. MOREOVER, KISSINGER TOLD US THAT IT IS

NOW ABSOLUTELY IMPOSSIBLE TO GET THE NVN TO AGREE TO ANY ALLUSION

F THE PRESENCE OF NORTH VIETNAMESE TROOPS EVEN BY REFERRING TO

THEM IN A VAGUE FORMULA OR INDIRECTLY.

2. TODAY KISSINGER WILL NOT RETURN TO THIS QUESTION. YESTERDAY

HE BROUGHT UP PRESIDENT ((THIEU)) E LETTER ONLY INCIDENTALLY AND

HE DID NOT APPEAR TO BE SEEKING A PRETEXT FOR JUSTIFYING A

POSSIBLE SEPARATE AGREEMENT ((BETWEEN THE U.E. AND NVN)).

THE REASONS WHICH WOULD OBLIGE THE U.E. TO ENVISION SUCH A

SEPARATE AGREEMENT HAVE ALREADY BEEN CLEARLY ELUCIDATED BY

KISSINGER: THEY ARE THE U. . POLITICAL REALITIES IN THE EVENT

THAT IT WOULD BE IMPOSSIBLE TO ARRIVE AT A COMMON ACCORD. HE

ALSO EXPOUNDED IN DETAIL UPON THE CONSEQUENCES OF A SEPARATE

AGREEMENT. ONE POINT IS CERTAIN: U. . MILITARY AID WILL BE

BREDUGHT TO AN END. IN OTHER WORDS, WE CANNOT HOPE TO CARRY ON

THE WAR ALONE AND STILL BENEFIT FROM U. . AID. FURTHERMORE, THE

. . WOULD NOT HAVE ANY LEGAL BASIS FOR INTERVENTION IN THE EVENT

OF A NEW INVASION BY NVN.

TI 8 DEC 72 0121Z

35Ø

#0653

aws, Title 1 ed by law.

THIS FORM FOR INTERNAL AGENCY USE ONLY

CLASSIFIED

PL 86-36/50 USC 3605

LASSIFIED DE

0657 3430531

ZNY MWNSH

Z Ø80530Z DEC 72 ZYH

CLASSIFIEL FM DIRNSA

TO WHITE HOUSE

ZEN.

TRANSMITTED HEREWITH IS A

WESSAGE. PLEASE ADVISE IF ANY LIMITATIONS ON

DISTRIBUTION ARE REQUIRED. THIS MESSAGE WAS

TRANSMITTED TO THE WHITE HOUSE ONLY.

VIETNAMESE (SOUTH)

3/00/D0LL-VND/T-72

TATLE: KISSINGER BRIEFS SOUTH VIETNAMESE ON SEVEN DECEMBER

MERTING WITH LE DUC THO

FR: PARIS, SOUTH VIETNAMESE DELEGATION; ((AMBASSADOR)) PHAM DANG

だ TOP SECRET

U PROGRESS.

ऽ≱¶CT, ETC.")

TO: SAIGON: PRESIDENT'S OFFICE; ((PRESIDENTIAL ASSISTANT)) HOANG

WE JUST SPENT AN HOUR ((WITH DR. HENRY A. KISSINGER)) FROM 2030 TO 2130 HOURS. ACCORDING TO KISSINGER, HIS MEETING TODAY WITH LE DUC THO, WHICH LASTED FROM 1500 TO 1900 HOURS, DID NOT REGISTER ANY

YESTERDAY NORTH VIETNAM HAD GONE BACK ON ALL THE CONCESSIONS WHOCH

THEY HAD PREVISOUSLY MADE AND DEMANDED UPHOLDING THE UNABRIDGED TEXT

OF THE DRAFT AGREEMENT OF & OCTOBER, OR ELSE WITH SOME CHANGES BUT

((ONLY)) ON THE CONDITION THAT ARTICLE &C BE CMITTED AND THAT THE

U.S. AGREE TO INCLUDE THE CLAUSE ((ON THE)) WITHDRAWAL OF FOREIGN

CIVILIAN PERSONNEL IN ARTICLE 3. KISSINGER REJECTED BOTH ALTERNATIVES.

TODAY LE DUC THO MODIFIED HIS POSITION SLIGHTLY; HE IS NO LONGER GOING

BACK ON ALL THE CONCESSIONS, BUT INSISTS ON THE FOLLOWING POINTS:

ARTICLE 1 MUST BE RESTORED IN ITS FORMER WORDING (DURING PRE
1DUS MEETINGS, BETWEEN 20 AND 27 NOVEMBER ((1 WD G)), LE DUC THO HAD

AGREED TO A NEW ARGICLE 1 WORDED AS FOLLOWS: "ALL COUNTRIES SHALL RE-

IN CHAPTER SEVEN, ON CAMBODIA AND LAGS, LE DUC THO ASKED TO HAVE

OMITTED THE WORDS"THEIR OBLIGIATIONS UNDER, ETC.," IN THE NEW ARTICLE

FERENCE ON VIETNAM SHALL STRICTLY RESPECT THE 1954 GENEVA AGREEMENTS ON CAMBODIA AND THE 1962 GENEVA AGREEMENTS ON LOAS, ETC."

ARTICLE 15, ON THE DMZ ((DEMILITARIZED ZONE)). LE DUC THO ASKED

TO ADD AFTER "SOUTH AND NORTH VIETNAM SHALL RESPECT THE DMZ ON EITHER SIDE OF THE PROVISIONAL MILITARY DEMARCATION LINE" A PHRASE DRAWN UP THUSLY: "NORTH VIETNAM AND SOUTH VIETNAM SHALL DISCUSS THE STATUS

OF THE DMZ." KISSINGER IMMEDIATELY REJDCTED THIS AMENDMENT.

SSI

NMENT)) IN THE PRDAMBLE.

REGARDING OUR (C VAL OWN) MODIFICATIONS, LE DUC THO: 1. REFUSED TO
CHANGE THE TERM"ADMINSTRATIVE STRUCTURE; "2. REJECTED THE PROPOSAL

((1 WD G))((PROVIDING THAT)) 90 DAYS BE ALLOWED FOR DEMOBILIZATION;

3. OPPOSED AMENDING ARTICLE 15 ((WITH TH)) PHRASE "RESPECT EACH

OTHER'S TERRITORY" AND WOULD NOT AGREE TO THE VARIATION PROPOSED BY
KISSINGER, "NOT USE FORCE AGAINST EACH OTHER;"((AND)) 4. REFUSED TO
OMIT MENTION OF THE PRG((PROVISIONAL REVOLUTIONARY GOVER-

THESE POINTS, HE WOULD FOREGO DEMANDING OMISSION OF ARTICLE 8 C.

KISSINGER INFORMED US THAT A RESTRICTED SESSION IS PLUNNED FOR TOM
ORROW AT 1500 HOURS BETWEEN KISSINGER, ((GENERAL ALEXANDER M.))HJIG

(CAND DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE FOR FAR EAST AND PACIFIC

AFFAIRS WILLIAM H.)) SULLIVAN ON ONE SIDE AND LE DUC THO, XUAN THUY

AND ((VICE FOREIGN MINISTER)) NGUYEN CO THACH ON THE OTHER.

TO OUR QUESTION ((AS TO)) WHICH TACTIC HE WILL ADOPT TOMORROW, KISSINGER REPLIED THAT HE WILL MAKE NO NEW PROPOSILS. IF LE DUC THO DOES
NOT TRY TO TEST THE POINTS ON ADMINISTRATIVE STRUCTURE, THE DMZ, AND
DEMOBILIZATION, KISSINGER WILL ASK FOR AN ADJOURNENT AND WILL RETURN

TO WASHINGTON FOR CONSULTATIONS.

AFTER THIS EXPOSE', KISSINGER ASKED US WHAT WE THOUGHT OF A PURE

) AND SIMPLE SUPPRESSION OF THE TERM "ADMINISTRATIVE STRUCTURE"" WE

ANSWERED THAT THE FUNCTIONS OF THE CHRC (COUNCIL FOR NATIONAL RECON-

CILIATION AND CONCORD)) MUST BE EXPRESSLY LIMITED TO THE ORGANIZATION

OF ELECTIONS.

900

€657

NNNN

LASSIFIED



CLASSIFIE

CLASSIFIED

CLASSIFIED

CLASSIFIED

CLASSIFIED

VIETNAMESE (SOUTH)

3KdO/DOLL-VND/I-72

PL 86-36/50 USC 3605

#0659 3430531

ZNY MmnSH

Ø8Ø53ØZ DEC 72 ZYH

FM DIRNSA

TO WHITE HOUSE

ZEM

HEREWITH IS A VND/T

MESSAGE. PLEASE ADVISE IF ANY LIMITATIONS ON

DISTRIBUTION ARE REQUIRED. THIS MESSAGE WAS

TRANSMITTED TO THE WHILE HOUSE ONLY.

REMINDED KISSINGER THAT WE STILL CONSIDER AS VITAL THE PROBLEMS

H S S S C This work sheet contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title 18, U.S.C., Sections 793, 794 and 798, the transmission or the revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law

CLASSIFIED WORK SHEE

THIS FORM FOR INTERNAL AGENCY USE ONLY

OF WITHDRAWAL OF NORTH VIETNAMESE TROOPS AND THE STATUS OF THE CARC

FOR REASONS BROUGHT. OUT AT GREAT LENGTH BY SPECIAL ((PRESIDENTIAL))

ASSISTANT NGUYEN PHU DUC DURING THE OTHER MEETINGS IN WASHINGTON.

KISSINGER REPEATED VIGOROUSLY WHAT HE HAD ALREADY TOLD US MANY TIMES:

"THERE ARE ONLY TWO BASIC QUESTIONS. HOW CAN THE U. . BEST DEFEND
YOU: BY CONTINUING THE PRESENT WAR OR WITH THE OCTOBER DRAFT AGREEMENT
WITH SOME CHANGES? IF THE PRESENT WAR CONTINUES, IT WILL BE WITHOUT
US," HE SAID, "FOR IN A FEW MONTHS THE U. . CUNGRESS WILL FORCE US
TO WITHDRAW." ON THE OTHER HAND WITH AN AGREEMENT THE U. . WILL BE LE-

GALLY UBLIGATED TO DEFEND SUUTH VIETHAM AND TO PRESERVE PEACE IN IN-

▼ DOCHINA.

HE EVOKED THE CASE OF SOUTH KOREA. SUPPOSING NORTH KOREA SENDS

TROOPS AGAINST SOUTH KOREA, U. . PUBLIC OPINION WOULD APPROVE U.E.

INTERVENTION AND WOULD SUPPORT SUCH AN ACTION; BECAUSE, INSOFAR AS

THE U.S. IS BOUND BY AN AGREEMENT, THE HONOR OF THE A.E. WOULD BE

AT STAKE.

MISSINGER ASSURED US THAT HE IS NOT NAIVE ENOUGH to BELIEVE IN

THE GOOD FAITH OF NORTH VIETNAM UR THAT THE POLITBURO IN HONOI HAS

ABANDONED THE REALIZATION OF OBJECTIVES SET DOWN IN THE WILL OF HO

CHI MINH. YET ONE MUST TAKE INTO ACCOUNT UNRELENTING POLITICAL REALIZATION WHICH WE SHALL HAVE TO FACE UP

TO IS THAT, FOR STRICTLY BUDGETARY REASONS, THE AIR FORCE BASED IN_

NAMESE TERRITORAL WATERS WILL UNDERGO A TWO-THIRDS REDUCTION.

((THIS IS)) WITHOUT COUNTING THAT BY NEXT MARCH THE POLITICAL SITUATION

WILL BE IMPOSSIBLE. SUCH A SITUATION WILL CERTAINLY NOT ESCAPE THE

THAILAND WILL BE REDUCED BY FIFTY PERCENT AND NVAL FORCES IN VIET-

ATTENTION OF THE POLITBURO IN HANOI. WHAT KIND OF AGREEMENT CAN WE

HOPE TO OBTAIN THEN?

Doc ID: 6549596 Doc Ref ID: A504075

WE REPLIED THAT WE ARE PERFECTLY CONSCIOUS OF U.E. POLITICAL REALI-

TIES BUT THAT. INASMUCH AS THE DRAFT AGREEMENT TOUCHES ON PROBLEMS

VITAL TO SOUTH VIETNAM, WE ARE COUNTING ON THE U.S. GOVERNMENT TO

VIGOROUSLY DEFEND OUR LOGICAL AND REASUNABLE POINT OF VIEW.

MISSINGER CONTINUES TO BELIEVE THAT OUR GOVERNMENT IS ADOPTING A

STRATEGY CONSISTING OF LETTING THE U. . ACT ALONE WITHOUT MAKING AN

ACTIVE CONTRIBUTION.

S

WE REPLIED THAT OUR POSITON IS WELL KNOWN TO DR. KISSINGER AND THAT

OUR GOVERNMENT IS RELYING ON HIM TO DEFEND IT BEFORE THE COMMUNISTS.

RETURNING TO THE ATTITUDE OF OUR GOVERNMENT, KISSINGER DEPLORED

THE FACT THAT PRESIDENT NIXON HAS RECEIVED NO REACTION FROM ((OUR))

GOVERNMENT SINCE THE RETURN TO SAIGON OF SPECIAL ASSISTANT NGUYEN

PHU DUC. THE INVITATION BY PRESIDENT NIXON TO MEET WITH PRESIDEN

((THIEU)) HAS NOT EVEN BEEN ACKNOWLEDGED.

ANSWERED THAT WAS NOT A MATTER OF DELIBERATE ATTITUDE ON OUR PART.

KISSINGER REPROACHED US MOREOVER FOR ASKING HIM TO ALWAYS INSIST

ntains information affecting the National Defense of the Unit 194 and 798, the transmission or the revelation of which in a

This work sheet contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title 18, U.S.C., Sections 793, 794 and 798, the transmission or the revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited 1, 1 1 2.7

ON THE SAME POINTS WITH THE SAME ARGUMENTS; HE IS NOT IN A POSITION TO DICTATE CONDITIONS TO NORTH VIETNAM HE CONCLUDED BY HOPING THAT SAIGON UNDERSTANDS THE NECESSITY OF A CLOSE AND TRUSTING COUPERATION BETWEEN GOVERNMENT AND THE GOVERNMENT OF ((OUTH)) VIETNAM, WHICH ALONE CAN SAVE SOUTH VIETNAM.

Ø8 DEC 72 Ø128Z

900

CLASSIFIED

CLASSIFIED

#0659

DENN

CLASSIFIED

CLASSIFIED

CLASSIFIED

CLASSIFIED WORK SHEET

26 Ø #£277

PL 86-36/50 USC 3605

NNNN

DELTA CONTROLL

MZCZCEXC184	
ZZ DE #8277 3431703	
ZNY MMNSH Z 081700Z DEC 72 ZYH	
FM DIRNSA	
TO WHITE HOUSE CATTN MR I)

TO WHITE HOUSE (ATTN MR DAVID MCMANIS FOR SERIES CHECK) ZEM

TOPSECRET UMBRA DELTA CONTROLLED ITEM EXCLUSIVE FOR DELTA CONTROL OFFICER

WARNING: THE COMINT CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNUSUALLY SENSITIVE.

IF A USIB MEMBER (OR HIS SPECIALLY DESIGNATED DEPUTY) APPROVES
THE USE OF THIS COMPARTMENTED ITEM IN A TOP SECRET CODEWORD
PUBLICATION, THE PRECISE COMINT SOURCE OR TARGET (WHICHEVER
IS SENSITIVE) SHOULD BE CONCEALED TO THE MAXIMUM DEGREE POSSIBLE
AND NO REFERENCE SHOULD BE MADE TO THE NSA DELTA REFERENCE SERIAL.
IN ALL OTHER CASES, THIS MATERIAL MUST BE MAINTAINED UNDER DELTA
SECURITY CONTROLS.

TRANSMITTED HEREWITH IS A SOUTH VIETNAMESE DIPLOMATIC MESSAGE. NORMAL DISTRIBUTION FOR THIS MESSAGE IS IN THE DELTA SUBSERIES DOLL-VND. PLEASE ADVISE IF ANY LIMITATIONS OVER AND ABOVE EXISTING DELTA RESTRICTIONS ARE REQUIRED. THIS MESSAGE WAS TRANSMITTED TO THE WHITE HOUSE ONLY.

VIET NAMESE (SOUT H)
XXMMENPØ1F0072343
3/00/DOLL-VND/T -72
AVS.AVN.KUS/FORP/B.D.

SAIGON ISSUES INSTRUCTIONS TO PARIS DELEGATION; INDICATES WILLINGNESS TO FREE POLITICAL PRISONERS

XXCC

FR SAIGON: ((PRESIDENTIAL ASSISTANT))

HOANG DUC NHA 8 DEC 72 2110

TO PARIS: DELEGATION; AMBASSADOR

PHAM DANG LAM -- 2908/PTT/BT/TM

TOP SECRET

PURSUANT TO YOUR CABLE NR. 49.

I HAVE THE HONOR TO INFORM YOU OF THE FOLLOWING.

1. IN ARTICLE 1, WE DO NOT AGREE WITH THE RESTORATION OF THE FORMER WORDING. WE HOLD THE FOLLOWING WORDING "ALL COUNTRIES SHALL RESPECT, ETC."

- 2. CONCERNING CHAPTER 7, WE AGREE TO DELETE THE WORDS "THEIR OBLIGATIONS UNDER, ETC." AND REPLACE THEM WITH THE PHRASE AS SUGGESTED. THIS CHANGE RENDERS THE ARTICLE LESS PRECISE BUT WE FEEL THAT WE CAN ACCEPT IT TO SHOW OUR GOOD WILL.
- 3. ON ARTICLE 15 ON THE DMZ ((DEMILITARIZED ZONE)), WE MAINTAIN OUR POSITION AS INDICATED IN THE 18 NOVEMBER MEMO AND AS ELABORATED BY SPECIAL ASSISTANT ((NGUYEN PHU)) DUC AT THE MEETING IN WASHINGTON. IN PARTICULAR, THE WORD "PERMANENT" MUST BE RESTORED BEFORE "POLITICAL OR TERRITORIAL BOUNDARY" AND REFERENCE MUST BE MADE TO ARTICLE 24 OF THE GENEVA AGREEMENT AFTER THE WORDS "RESPECT EACH OTHER(('S)) TERRITORY".
- 4. IF NECESSARY, WE CAN ELIMINATE FROM THE TEXT THE WORDS "ADMINISTRATIVE STRUCTURE". HOWEVER, THE NATURE AND PREROGATIVES OF THE CNRC ((NATIONAL COUNCIL OF RECONCILIATION AND CONCORD)) MUST BE DEFINED AS INDICATED IN OUR 18 NOVEMBER MEMO.
- FEVOLUTIONARY GOVERNMENT)) MUST NOT FIGURE ANYWHERE IN THE AGREEMENT; NEITHER IS THE PREAMBLE NOR THE SIGNATURES. WE REMIND YOU THAT THIS IS ANOTHER VITAL POINT, (B VAL THAT IS), WE WILL NEVER ACCEPT TWO GOVERNMENTS IN SOUTH VIETNAM. IF THERE IS AGREEMENT ON THE TEXT, SIGNATURE COULD BE BY THE U.S. GOVERNMENT AND THE DRV ((DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM)) ONLY, IN THE NAME OF THE "PARTIES TO THE PARIS CONFERENCE". THE GVN ((GOVERNMENT OF SOUTH VIETNAM)) AND THE NLF ((NATIONAL LIBERATION FRONT)) WILL MAKE SIMULTANEOUS UNILATERAL STATEMENTS OF ADHERENCE TO THE ACCORD. THIS ((WOULD BE DONE)) TO AVOID THE PRG SIGNING AS ((A)) GOVERNMENT IN THE TEXT OF THE AGREEMENT. IN THE SAME MANNER, WE WILL NOT ACCEPT THE PARTICIPATION OF THE PRG IN THE INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE WHICH WOULD FOLLOW THE SIGNING OF THE AGREEMENT.
- 6. WE ALSO REJECT THE PROPOSAL TO SET A 90-DAY DELAY FOR DEMOBILIZATION, RECALL THAT THE QUESTION OF DEMOBILIZATION WAS MADE EXPLICIT IN MY TELEGRAM NR. 2749 DATED 23 NOVEMBER AND IN RESIDENT ((THIEU'S)) LETTER TO ((PRESIDENT)) NIXON. TO WIT: IN A FIRST PHASE WHEN ALL ALLIED TROOPS WILL WITHDRAW IN 60 DAYS, ALL NORTH VIETNAMESE TROOPS ALSO WILL WITHDRAW COMPLETELY DURING THE SAME PERIOD. THEN, WE WILL DEMOBILIZE OUR ((TROOP)) STRENGTH BY A NUMBER EQUAL TO THE TOTAL NUMBER OF NVN TROOPS WITHDRAWN. IN A SECOND PHASE WHEN THE TWO SOUTH VIETNAMESE PARTIES WILL DISCUSS INTERNAL POLITICAL QUESTIONS, WE WILL DEMOBILIZE PARALLEL TO AND IN (C VAL PARTIAL ACCORDANCE WITH) THOSE NLF UNITS THAT CAME FROM THE SOUTH. IN THIS CONTEXT OF DOUBLE DEMOBILIZATION. WE HAVE NO OBJECTION TO FREEING ALL SO-CALLED POLITICAL PRISONERS. THUS, ARTICLE 8C COULD BE ABANDONED IN EXCHANGE FOR THE POINTS ((MENTIONED)) ABOVE THAT WE CONSIDER INDISPENSABLE. PLEASE EMPHASIZE TO (CDR. HENRY A.)) KISSINGER THE IMPORTANCE OF OUR CONCESSION AND THAT THIS CONSTITUTES, AMONG OTHER THINGS, OUR ACTIVE CONTRIBUTION AND A GREAT SACRIFICE.
- 7. ON THE POINT RAISED BY KISSINGER, NAMELY, THAT WE HAVE NOT YET REPLIED TO THE INVITATION FROM NIXON TO PRESIDENT (CTHIEU), PLEASE TELL HIM THAT THIS INVITATION IS CONDITIONAL TO PRESIDENT (CTHIEU))'S AGREEING TO SIGN THE ACCORD. DISCUSSIONS ON THE ACCORD ARE NOW IN PROGRESS, CONSEQUENTLY, PRESIDENT (CTHIEU)) CANNOT YET REPLY TO THE INVITATION.

TI 8 DEC 72 1404Z

HHXX

85 Ø

85 ØØ

5Ø

85 Ø

#8277

PL 86-36/50 USC 3605 CLASSIFIED N DE #0659 3440757

ZNY MMNSH

Z Ø9Ø755Z DEC 72 ZYH ZZS

< FM DIRNSA

TO WHITE HOUSE (ATTN: MR. D. MCMANIS FOR SERIES CHECK)

ASSIFIED ITEM SECTION ONE OF THREE

TRANSMITTED HEREWITH IS A VND/T MESSAGE. PLEASE ADVISE IF ANY

LIMITATIONS ON DISTRIBUTION ARE REQUIRED. THIS MESSAGE WAS

TRANSMITTED TO THE WHITE HOUSE ONLY.

TO VIETNAMESE (OUTH) FRENCH

XXXMMENPØ1-0072344

3/00/DOLL-VND/T -72

SOUTH VIETNAMESE REPORT KISSINGER BRIEFING AFTER EIGHT DECEMBER

```
SSIFIED
```

FR PARIS: SOUTH VIETNAMESE DELEGATION; ((AMBASSADOR)) PHAM DANG

🗘 LAM 9 DEC 72 0200

TO SAIGON: PRESIDENT'E OFFICE; PRESIDENTIAL ASSISTANT HOANG

DUC NHA FLASH 50/PDVNTM

TOP SECRET.

THE RESTRICTED SESSION ((BETWEEN DR. HENRY A.)) KISSINGER AND

LE DUC THO TODAY LASTED FROM 1500 HOURS TO 1900 HOURS. LIKE LAST

NIGHT, ((OUR)) DISCUSSION WITH HIM BEGAN AT 2030 HOURS AND ENDED AT

2145 HOURS. WE LET HIM KNOW THAT WE HAD JUST RECEIVED AN IMPORTANT

MESSAGE FROM SAIGON BUT THAT WE PREFERRED TO LISTEN FIRST TO HIS

ACCOUNT ((OF THE SESSION WITH THO)). KISSINGER THEN GAVE US A BRIEF

EXPOSE ON WHAT HAPPENED:

LE DUC THO INSISTED ONCE AGAIN ON THE ADOPTION OF THE TEST OF

ITHE DRAFT AGREEMENT AS DETERMINED ON 8 OCTOBER. HE REITERATED HIS

DEMAND FOR THE OMISSION OF ARTICLE 8.C., THE WITHDRAWAL OF FOREIGN

CIVILIAN PERSONNEL, AND THE DISCUSSION ON A NEW STATUS FOR THE DMZ

((DEMILITARIZED ZONE)). ALL OF THESE DEMANDS WERE REJECTED BY

KISSINGER. LE DUC THO OPPOSED ONCE AGAIN, MOREOVER, THE AMENDMENT

"RESPECT EACH OTHER'S TERRITORY," AS WELL

AS THE VARIATION "SHALL NOT USE FORCE AGAINST EACH OTHER." THE

ONLY CONCESSION WHICH THO WOULD BE READY TO MAKE IS TO OMIT THE

ASSI

ED

WHEN ASKED ABOUT LE DUC THO'

THIS FORM FOR INTERNAL AGENCY USE ONLY

WORDS "ADMINISTRATIVE STRUCTURE" IN THE EVENT THE U.E. AGREES TO THE MENTION OF THE PRG ((PROVISIONAL REVOLUTIONARY GOVERNMENT)) IN THE PREAMBLE. IN THIS ALSO, THO WOULD NOT SEE ANY DISADVANTAGE AS TO WHETHER IT BE SPECIFIED IN THE FORM OF A FOOTNOTE THAT THE PREAMBLE DOES NOT IMPLY RECOGNITION OF THE ORGANIZATIONS WHICH ARE MENTIONED THEREIN.

KISSINGER AND THO AGREED ON ANOTHER SESSION TOMORROW AFTERNOON AT

WE ASKED KISSINGER TO STATE PRECISELY HIS THOUGHTS ON THE SUBJECT

OF THE 90 DAYS TO BE ALLOWED WITH REGARD TO DEMOBLIZATION, WHICH HE

PROPOSED YESTERDAY AND WHICH THO HAD REJECTED. KISSINGER CONFIRMS

THAT THIS 90-DAY DELAY WAS INDEED PROPOSED BY HIM. HIS INTENTION

IS TO TIE THEREBY THE DEMOBILIZATION TO THE SETTLEMENT OF THE

POLITICAL ISSUES ((FOR WHICH)) THE SAME DELAY HAS IN EFFECT BEEN

FORESEEN IN ARTICLE 12.A. (NEW). HOWEVER, NOW THAT SAIGON AND HANOI

ARE REJECTING THIS DELAY, THE QUESTION NO LONGER PRESENTS ITSELF.

KISSINGER ANSWERED THAT ALTHOUGH THO DISPLAYED COMPLETE INTRANSIGEANCE
ON THE QUESTION OF THE WITHDRAWAL OF NORTH VIETNAMESE TROOPS "HE
CONTINUES TO REJECT CATEGORICALLY THE FORMULA 'NON-EOUTH VIETNAMESE
TROOPS' AS WELL AS ((ANY)) MENTION OF 'RETURN TO NATIVE PLACES'."

ATTITUDE DURING TODAY'E SESSION.

KISSINGER THINKS THAT HE WILL BE ABLE TO OBTAIN FROM THO:

SSI

CLA

5

- 1. DELETION OF "ADMINISTRATIVE STRUCTURE;"
- 2. RELINQUISHMENT OF THE DEMAND FOR DISCUSSION ON A NEW STATUS
 FOR THE DMZ:
- 3. RENUNCIATION OF THE REQUEST FOR WITHDRAWAL OF FOREIGN CIVILIAN PERSONNEL; ((AND))
- 4. PERHAPS SOME CONCESSION ON THE QUESTION OF RECIPROCAL NON-VIOLATION OF TERRITORY.

MAKING THE POINT OF THE NEGOTIATIONS, KISSINGER TOLD US: "IN THE NEXT 48 HOURS, WE WILL REACH THE POINT OF EITHER BREAKING UP OR ACCEPTING WHAT WE COULD ACHIEVE AT THAT TIME."

RETURNING TO OUR VITAL PROBLEMS, HE INSISTED ON THE FACT THAT HE

HAS SEIZED EVERY OPPORTUNITY TO RAISE THESE QUESTIONS AGAIN AND

AGAIN. NOTHING BUT THE QUESTION OF THE WITHDRAWAL OF NORTH VIETNAMESE

TROOPS OCCUPIED FOUR SESSIONS DURING THE PRESENT ((EERIES OF))

MEETINGS. HE PROMISED TO CONTINUE TO STRUGGLE WITH THIS SAME PROBLEMS.

YET HE PERSISTS IN TELLING US IN ALL SINCERITY AND IN CONFIDENCE

THAT THERE IS HOPE OF OBTAINING SATISFACTION ONLY ON THE FOLLOWING
POINTS:

- 1. CONCERNING MENTION OF THE PRG IN THE PREAMBLE, ADD A FOOTNOTE SPECIFYING THAT THIS MENTION DOES NOT SIGNIFY RECOGNITION OF THE PRG. 2. ON ARTICLE 1, THE POSSIBILITY OF OBTAINING SOMETHING IN
- EXCHANGE FOR A RETURN TO THE FORMER WORDING, ((AS)) DEMANDED BY

who the memory of the Equangy Laws, 106:18, 0 S.C. co. or oparitectord person is prohibited by law.

CLASSIFIED IS A REFERENCE TO THE GENEVA (B VAL ACCORDS) OF 1954, THE PHRASE HAS

NORTH VIETNAM. (KISSINGER BELIEVES THAT (B VAL INASMUCH) AS THERE

NO MORE BASIS THAN (1WDG)) CLAUSE OF STYLE).

ХХНН

900

CLASSIFIED #Ø659

CLASSIFIED NNNN

CLASSIFIED

CLASSIFIED

This work sheet contains information affecting the Uniformal Defended of the United State.
Sections 793, 794 and 799, the Hausmission of the revolution of educitions are entered.

XXCC

This work sheet contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title 18, U.S.C., Sections 793, 794 and 798, the transmission of the revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

CLASSIFIED WORK SHEE

RESTORATION OF THE WORDS "DESTROYED AND USED UP" REGARDING

THE REPLACEMENT OF WAR MATERIEL (ALREADY AGREED TO IN PRINCIPLE BY NORTH VIETNAM).

4. ON THE SUBJECT OF THE CNRC ((COUNCIL FOR NATIONAL RECONCILIATION AND CONCORD)). THE ONLY POSSIBLE CONCESSION ON THE PART OF NORTH VIENTAM IS THE OMISSION OF THE WORDS "ADMINISTRATIVE ASIDE FROM ABANDONING "MAINTENANCE OF THE CEASE-FIRE AND THE PRESERVATION OF PEACE" IN THE LIST OF FUNCTIONS OF THIS

- 5. ADOPTION OF THE EDITION OF THE NEW ARTICLE 15 ON THE DMZ AS WORDED IN THE MODIFIED DRAFT AGREEMENT, ((WHICH WAS)) THE SUBJECT OUR CABLE NO. 31/PDVN/TM DATED 23 NOVEMBER.
- IMPROVEMENT OF THE RELATIVE DISPOSITIONS OF CAMBODIA AND LAOS FROM THE STANDPOINT OF STRENGTHENING THE REQUIREMENT FOR NORTH VIETNAM TO RESPECT THE GENEVA ACCORDS OF 1954 AND 1962.
 - 7. THE POSSIBILITY OF REDUCING THE DELAY BETWEEN THE CEASE-FIRE IN VIETNAM AND THE CEASE-FIRE IN LAOS AND CAMBODIA.

WE THEN PRESENTED TO KISSINGER THE MEMO ENUMERATING THE SEVEN POINTS CONTAINED IN YOUR MESSAGE WHILE STRESSING THE SCOPE OF THE CONCESSION WHICH WE WILL BE READY TO MAKE (C VAL ON THE SUBJECT OF)

ICLE 8.C. IF WE OBTAIN SATISFACTION ON ALL OF THE POINTS WHICH

WE HAVE RAISED.

ORG AN IZATION.

Doc ID: 6549596 INQER READ04THE MEMO CLOSELY, SAYING THAT HE WAS PLEASED TO SEE

THAT OUR GOVERNMENT WAS NOW DISPLAYING THE WILL TO COOPERATE WITH THE CLASSIFIED U.S. GOVERNMENT EVEN THOUGH ON MANY POINTS OUR POSITION REMAINS UNCHANGED.

ASSIFIE

THIS FORM FOR INTERNAL AGENCY

CLASSIFIED WORK SHEE

8

REFERENCE TO THE GENEVA ACCORD OF 1954 WHILE AT THE SAME TIME DEMANDING

KISSINGER THEN MADE POINT-BY-POINT COMMENTS:

ON THE DELETION OF "ADMINISTRATIVE STRUCTURE. "KISSINGER REPEATED THAT ALL THAT WE COULD HOPE IS THAT THIS TERM WILL NO LONGER BE INCLUDED IN ARTICLE (B VAL 12) A. (NEW).

IMPOSSIBILITY OF OBTAINING ANY CHANGE OTHER THAN REMOVING THE ((FOLLOWING)) FUNCTIONS FROM THIS ORGAISM: "MAINTENANCE OF THE CEASE7FIRE AND PRESERVATION OF THE PEACE."

FOR THE REST, CONCERNING THE CNRC, ((HE REITERATED)) THE

ON ARTICLE 1, KISSINGER BELIEVES THAT, FOR THE REASONS BROUGHT OUT ABOVE, WE WILL ULTIMATELY FIND A WAY TO AGREE TO THE FORMER WORDING, ON CONDITION THAT NORTH VIETNAM OFFER SOMETHING IN RETURN. KISSINGER ((MADE KNOWN HIS)) PLAN TO PROPOSE, SHOULD THE OCCASION ARISE, ANOTHER FORMULA: "THE U.S.A. AND OTHER COUNTRIES LASSIFIED (3 VAL SHALL) RESPECT, ETC.," AND ASKED OUR OPINION.

ON ARTICLE 15, KISSINGER REMINDED ((US)) THAT THE WORD ?PERMANENT"

BOES NOT APPEAR IN PARAGRAPH 6 OF THE FINAL DECLARATION OF THE

GENEVE CONFERENCE OF 1954 AND THAT, CONSEQUENTLY, WE CANNOT REQUEST

EXCLUDED.

CLASSIFIED WORK SHEE

BOUNDARY." ACCORDING TO KISSINGER, REFERENCE TO THE 1954 GENEVA ACCORD

IS MORE IMPORTANT TO US THAN THE INSERTION OF THE WORD "PERMANENT."

KISSINGER PROMISED TO INSIST AGAIN ON "RESPECT EACH OTHER'S

TERRITORY." BUT HE THINKS IT USELESS TO RETURN TO THE QUESTION ((OF

THE)) REFERENCE TO ARTICLE 24, IN VIEWNOF THE INTRANSIGEANCE OF

NORTH VIETNAM. MOREOVER, IN HIS OPINION, THE REFERENCE TO ARTICLE

24 IS EVEN DISADVANTAGEOUS FOR US, FOR IN TERMS OF THIS ARTICLE, THE

ARMED FORCES OF EACH PARTY WILL BE HELD TO RESPECT THE TERRITORY

PLACED UNDER THE MILITARY CONTROL OF THE OTHER PARTY. IN VIEW OF

THE PRESENT MILITARY SITUATION IN THE FIELD, THIS ARTICLE WILL

LIMIT OUR FREEDOM OF ACTION.

AS FOR MENTION OF THE PRG, KISSINGER REMINDED US WHAT HE HAD

JUST TOLD US ABOUT THE CATEGORICAL REFUSAL BY NORTH VIETNAM TO THE

DELETION OF THIS MENTION FROM THE PREAMBLE. TO AVOID IMPLICATION OF

THE RECOGNITION OF THE PRG, THE ONLY SOLUTION IS THE FOOTNOTE

SUGGESTED ABOVE. (B VAL KISSINGER) ADDED THAT IT IS IMPOSSIBLE TO

EXCLUDE THE PRG FROM THE INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE FOR THE (C VAL

TWOFOLD) REASON THAT THE AGREEMENT WILL BE CONCLUDED BETWEEN ALL

PARTIES AT THE ((PLENARY)) MEETINGS IN PARIS AND THAT MOSCOW AND

PENING WILL NEVER PARTICIPATE IN THE CONFERENCE IF THE PRG IS

This work sheet contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title 18, U.S.C., Sections 793, 794 and 798, the transmission or the revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

THIS FORM FOR INTERNAL AGENCY USE ONLY

CLASSIFIED WORK SHEET

CLASSIFIED

DE

#0661 3440757

CLASSIFIED ZNY MMNSH

090755Z DEC 72 ZYH ZZS

FM DIRNSA

TO WHITE HOUSE (ATTN: MR. D. MCMANIS FOR SERIES CHECK)

SSIFIED ZEM

FINAL SECTION OF THREE

TRANSMITTED HEREWITH IS A VND/T MESSAGE. PLEASE ADVISE IF ANY

LIMITATIONS ON DISTRIBUTION ARE REQUIRED. THIS MESSAGE WAS

LIMITATIONS ON DISTRIBUTION ARE READ LIMITATION ARE READ LIMITATION

VIETNAMESE (SOUTH) FRENCH

XXMMENP03F0072344

3/OD/DOLL-VND/T -72

SOUTH VIETNAMESE REPORT KISSINGER BRIEFING AFTER EIGHT DECEMBER

This work sheet contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title 18, U.S.C., Sections 793, 794 and 798, the transmission of the revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

XXCC

IN THE PREAMBLE OF THE AGREEMENT. IT WILL BE UP TO US TO CHOOSE BETWEEN

THE TWO FORMULAS "THE U. . GOVERNMENT, ON BEHALF OF THE GOVERNMENT

OF ((SOUTH)) VIETNAM" (B VAL OR) "THE U.S. GOVERNMENT, WITH THE

CONCURRENCE OF THE GOVERNMENT OF ((OUTH)) VIETNAM, ETC." IN HIS

OPINION, THE FORMULA "WITH THE CONCURRENCE" COMMITS US LESS. FURTHER,

OTHE U.S. WILL, IN THIS CASE, DECLARE, N AN UNEQUIVOCAL MANNER, THAT

THE U. DOES NOT RECOGNIZE THE PRG.

REGARDING THE WITHDRAWAL OF NVA ((NORTH VIETNAMESE ARMY)) TROOPS

IN TWO PHASES. KISSINGER. IN VIGOROUS TERMS, STRESSED ONCE AGAIN

THAT THERE IS NOTHING WHICH CAN BE DONE ABOUT IT - "NO POSSIBILITY

WHAT SOEVER ."

WITH REGARD TO ARTICLE 8.C., BEFORE KISSINGER COULD MAKE HIS

COMMENTS. WE DREW HIS ATTENTION TO THE FACT THAT THE COMMUNIST SIDE

SEEMS TO ATTACH THE UTMOST IMPORTANCE UPON THE OBTAINING OF

THE RELEASE OF POLITICAL PRISONERS AT THE SAME TIME AS ((THE RELEASE

U OF)) POW'S: IT IS LOGICAL THEREFORE TO ASK THEM THE MAXIMUM IN

EXCHANGE FOR THE OMISSION OF THIS ARTICLE.

KISSINGER RECOGNIZED THAT WE HAVE MADE AN EFFORT BUT THAT. IN THE

EYES OF THE NORTH VIETNAMESE. THE IMPORTANCE OF ARTICLE 8.C. WOULD

NOT JUSTIFY SUCH CONCESSIONS AS AN AGREEMENT BY HANOI TO WITHDRAW

rk sheet contains information affecting the revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohitons 793, 794 and 798, the transmission or the revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohitons.

PROPOSED THE OMISSION OF ARTICLE 8.C. IN EXCHANGE FOR THE WITHDRAWAL OF 100,000 NORTH VIETNAMESE TROOPS. THIS PROPOSAL WAS NOT TAKEN SERIOUSLY BY LE DUC THO. WHO FOUND THAT THE WITHDRAWAL OF 100.000 TROOPS TO BE TOO HIGH A PRICE WITHOUT, IN ANY CASE, COUNTERPROPOSING ANOTHER FIGURE. KISSINGER THINKS THAT IT IS IN OUR INTEREST TO TREAT THIS QUESTION ON A DE FACTO BASIS: SHOULD WE AGREE, KISSINGER Uwill leave le duc tho to understand that in the event hanoi withdraws A CERTAIN NUMBER OF ITS TROOPS, SAIGON WILL FREE A CERTAIN NUMBER OF POLITICAL PRISONERS. KISSINGER ASKED US TO GIVE HIM SAIGON. ANSWERS BEFORE HIS MEETING AT 1500 HOURS TOMORROW WITH LE DUC THO, ON THE FOLLOWING POINTS: 1. CONCERNING THE MODALITY OF THE SIGNING OF THE AGREEMENT. WHICH OF THE TWO FORMULAS DO WE PREFER. "ON BEHALF" OR "WITH THE CON-CURRENCE OF THE GOVERNMENT OF ((OUTH)) VIETNAM." IT BEING UNDER-STOOOD THAT THE SAME FORMULA WILL BE APPLIED TO THE COMMUNIST SIDE? DO WE AGREE TO THE PURE AND SIMPLE DELETION OF "ADMINISTRATIVE STRUCTURE?" 🕽 DO WE AUTHORIZE KISSINGER TO TREAT THE QUESTION OF ARTICLE

8.C. ON A DE FACTO BASIS, AS PROPOSED ABOVE?

ALL OF ITS TROOPS (C VAL OR EVEN) A LARGE NUMBER. HE HAD ALREADY

Doc ID: 6549596 Doc Ref ID: A504075

WHAT CONCESSION DO WE WANT TO ASK IN EXCHANGE, EXCEPT ON POINTS

ALREADY CATEGORICALLY REJECTED BY NORTH VIETNAM?

WE KEENLY STRESS THE NECESSITY OF ANSWERING US BEFORE 1400 HOURS

TOMORROW. WE PARTICULARLY DRAW YOUR ATTENTION ON THIS PHRASE OF

KISSINGER'S: "IN THE NEXT 48 HOURS, ETC." LASSIFI

REGARDING THE RECENT MEETING WITH ((FRENCH FOREIGN MINISTER

O MAURICE)) SCHUMANN AND ((PRESIDENT GEORGES)) POMPIDOU, KISSINGER,

IN RESPONSE TO A QUESTION WE ASKED HIM, REPLIED THAT THESE MEETINGS

TOOK PLACE AT THE REQUEST OF THE FILE OF THE PROPERTY OF THE NEGOTIATIONS. TOOK PLACE AT THE REQUEST OF THE FRENCH, WHO WISHED TO KNOW THE

XXHH

660


#0661

CLASSIFIED

CLASSIFIED NNNN

ion of which This work sheet contains information affecting the National Defense of Sections 793, 794 and 798, the transmission or the revelation of when the sections of the revelation of what the sections of the section of the s

the transmission or t



XXMMENPØ1F0072344

3/00/VND/T -72

NATIONAL SECRUITY CONUCIL TO MEET IN SAIGON; INSTRUCTIONS TO BE PARIS NEGOTIATOR LATER

XXCC

CLASSIFIED HOANG DUC NHA 9 DEC 72 1600

TO PARIS: ((SOUTH VIETNAMESE DELEGATION)); AMBASSADOR PHAM DANG

FLASH 2921/PTT/BT

I AM IN RECEIPT OF YOUR TELEGRAM NO. 050.

THE NSC ((NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL)) IS GOINT TO MEET AND YOU CAN COUNT ON A CABLE OF INSTRUCTIONS AS SOON AS POSSIBLE. IS A DELAY, TRY TO GET KISSINGER TO UNDERSTAND. REGARDS.

XXHH

CLASSIFIED 150

#Ø663

CLASSIFIED NNNN

This work sheet contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title 18, U.S.C., Sections 793,794 and 798, the transmission or the revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

⇒ U S GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1972—460-250

Doc ID! 6549596 Doc Ref ID: A504075 PL 86-36/50 USC 3605 0 Ш Z CZ CEXD 650 (I) ZZ #3078 3441635 ZNY MMNSH () Z Ø9163ØZ DEC 72 ZYH FM DIRNSA TO WHITE HOUSE (ATTN MR DAVID MCMANIS FOR SERIES CHECK) ZEM OEXCLUSIVE FOR DELTA CONTROL OFFICER Ш L WARNING: THE COMINT CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNUSUALLY SENSITIVE. TO IF A USIB MEMBER (OR HIS SPECIALLY DESIGNATED DEPUTY) APPROVES OTHE USE OF THIS COMPARTMENTED ITEM IN A TOP SECRET CODEWORD PUBLICATION. THE PRECISE COMINT SOURCE OR TARGET (WHICHEVER IS SENSITIVE) SHOULD BE CONCEALED TO THE MAXIMUM DEGREE POSSIBLE AND NO REFERENCE SHOULD BE MADE TO THE NSA DELTA REFERENCE SERIAL. IN ALL OTHER CASES. THIS MATERIAL MUST BE MAINTAINED UNDER DELTA SECURITY CONTROLS. TRANSMITTED HEREWITH IS A SOUTH VIETNAMESE DIPLOMATIC MESSAGE. NORMAL DISTRIBUTION FOR THIS MESSAGE IS IN THE DELTA SUBSERIES DOLL-VND. PLEASE ADVIS IF ANY LIMITATIONS OVER A! ABOVE EXISTING DELTA RESTRICTIONS ARE REQUIRED. THIS MESSAGE WAS TRANSMITTED TO THE WHITE HOUSE ONLY. VIETNAMESE (SOUTH) FRENCH XXMMENP@1F0072344 3/00/DOLL -V ND/T -72 Ш L SAIGON FORWARDS INSTRUCTIONS TO PARIS NEGOTIATOR IN RESPONSE TO KISSINGER QUERIES OF 8 DECEMBER S < xxcc SAIGON: PRESIDENT'S OFFICE: ((PRESIDENTIAL ASSISTANT)) HOANG DUC NHA 9 DEC 72 2020 TO PARIS: ((SOUTH VIETNAMESE

DELEGATION)): AMBASSADOR

PHAM DANG LAM FLASH 3474/PTT/BT/TM

Doc ID: 6549596 OP SECRE T. A504075 REFERENCE YOUR CABLE NR. 50/PDVN:

THE DECISIONS OF PRESIDENT ((THIEU)) REGARDING THE POINTS

TO ANSWER KISSINGER ((ARE)):

H.

(1)

1. CONCERNING THE MODALITY FOR SIGNING, WE DO NOT ACCEPT OTHE FORMULA "ON BEHALF" (C VAL OR) ((THE FORMULA)) "THE THE CONCURRENCE." WE ARE STICKING STRONGLY TO OUR FORMULA; NAMELY, THAT THE PRG ((PROVISIONAL REVOLUTIONARY GOVERNMENT)) SHOULD PLAY NO PART IN THE AGREEMENT, NEITHER IN THE PREAMBLE NOR IN THE SIGNING. SHOULD THEY AGREE ON A TEXT FOR THE AGREMENT ON MODALITY, THE SIGNING COULD BE BY THE TWO SIDES, THAT IS, THE GVN ((GOVERNMENT II) OF SOUTH VIETNAM)) AND THE USG ((U.S. GOVERNMENT)) ON ONE SIDE AND THE GOVERNMENT OF NORTH VIETNAM AND THE NLF ((NATIONAL LIBERATION EXCEPTION OF NORTH VIETNAM AND THE NLF ((NATIONAL LIBERATION)) (1) FRONT)) ON THE OTHER, IT BEING AGREED THAT THE PREAMBLE WOULD (1) BEGIN WITH "THE PARTIES AT THE CONFERENCE." AS FOR THE PARTICIPATION OF THE PRG IN THE INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE, WE MAINTAIN JUST AS STRONGLY OUR CATEGORICAL OPPOSITION. IF THE PRG PARTICIPATES AS OA GOVERNMENT, THE GVN WOULD NOT PARTICIPATE; BECAUSE THE PARTICIPATION OF THE GVN AT THE SIDE OF THE PRG WOULD BE

EQUIVALENT TO OUR SANCTIONING THE PRG. ((1))
2. THE OMISSION, PURE AND SIMPLE, OF "ADMINISTRATIVE STRUCTURE" IS NOT ENOUGH. IN CONFORMITY WITH OUR 1? NOVEMBER ((2)) MEMO CONCERNING THE NATURE AND FUNCTIONS OF THE CNRC ((COUNCIL OF NATIONAL RECONCILIATION AND CONCORD)), IT IS ESSENTIAL THAT THE ((FOLLOWING)) BE OMITTED: THREE EQUAL SEGMENTS OF THE CNRC, ((REFERENCE)) TO LOWER ECHELONS, GENERAL ELECTIONS, ETC.

3. THE QUESTION OF TREATING ARTICLE 8.C. ON THE BASIS OF
A DE FACTO WITHDRAWAL OF TROOPS IS INADMISSABLE. THE FUNDAMENTAL
OPRINCIPLE IS THAT THE NVA ((NORTH VIETNAMESE ARMY)) (C VAL MUST)
BE WITHDRAWN TO NORTH VIETNAM AFTER THE CEASE-FIRE. OUR POSSIBLE
RELINQUISHMENT OF ((ARTICLE)) 8.C. IS A VERY GREAT SACRIFICE, WHICH
(B VAL WOULD NOT BE) (C VAL CONSENTED TO) UNLESS ALL OF (C VAL OUR)
PROPOSALS ARE ACCEPTED BY THE OTHER SIDE.

4. VE MAINTAIN OUR WORDING ON ARTICLE ((1 WD G)), BUT (B VAL INSTEAD) OF "AS RECOGNIZED (B VAL BY)" USE "AS STIPULATED IN." THE ARTICLE ((SHOULD)) READ AS FOLLOWS: "ALL COUNTRIES SHALL RESPECT THE INDEPENDENCE, SOVEREIGNTY, UNITY AND TERRITORIAL UNITY OF VIETNAM AS STIPULATED IN THE 1954 GENEVA ACCORDS ✓ ON VIETNAM."

CONCERNING ARTICLE 15 ON THE DMZ ((DEMILITARIZED ZONE)), WE FIRMLY MAINTAIN OUR POSITION; THAT IS, WE HOLD TO THE WORDS "PERMANENT," "RESPECT EACH OTHER'S TERRITORY," AND THE REFERENCE ARTICLE 24 OF THE GENEVA AGREEMENT. TO ABANDON THE WORD "PERMANENT" WOULD BE LIKE GRANTING NORTH VIETNAM THE RIGHT TO ONE ((UNIFIED)) VIETNAM UNDER THE HEGENONY OF HANOI. ((3))

((1)) AT Ø91431Z DEC, AMBASSADOR PHAM DANG LAM SENT THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE TO HOANG DUC NHA IN SAIGON: "REFERENCE YOUR TELEGRAM NR. 3474/PTT. THE INSTRUCTIONS GIVEN YESTERDAY ((8 DECEMBER)) SPOKE OF THE SIGNING OF THE AGREEMENT ONLY BY THE U.S. AND THE DRV ((DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM)) IN THE NAME OF THE PARTIES TO THE PARIS CONFERENCE, WITH SEPARATE ACCESSIONS BY THE GVN AND THE NLF. TODAY'S ((9 DECEMBER)) INSTRUCTIONS SEEM TO IMPLY A SIGNING BY ((ALL)) FOUR ((PARTIES)). PLEASE CLARIFY."

((2)) GARBLED IN TEXT; COULD READ 17, 18, OR 19 NOVEMBER.
((3)) THIS MESSAGE WAS NOT SIGNED OFF BY THE ORIGINATOR HOANG DUC NHA; IT IS THUS POSSIBLE THAT THERE WILL BE ADDITIONAL (1) (1) TEXT TO THIS MESSAGE LATER. IF FURTHER TEXT IS RECEIVED;

IT WILL BE ISSUED AS SOON AS RECEIVED.

TI 9 DEC 72 1318Z **HHXX**

9Ø Ø #3078

DELTA CONTROLLED

SSI NNNN

U hl

TRANSMITTED HEREWITH IS A SOUTH VIETNAMESE DIPLOMATIC MESSAGE. PLEASE ADVISE IF ANY LIMITATION ON DISTRIBUTION ARE REQUIRED. THIS MESSAGE WAS TRANSMITTED TO THE WHITE HOUSE ONLY. O

TO WHITE HOUSE (ATTN MR DAVID MCMANIS FOR SERIES CHECK)

(1) VIETNAMESE (SOUTH) FRENCH XXMMENPØ1 F0072344 3/00/VND/T

Z Ø91715Z DEC 72 ZYH

DE

ZEM

FM DIRNSA

SAIGON ATTEMPTS TO CLARIFY POSITION ON POSSIBLE SIGNING OF AGREEMENT

XXCC 1 FR PRESIDENT'S OFFICE; SAIGON: CLASSIFI ((PRESIDENTIAL ASSISTANT)) HOANG DUC NHA 9 DEC 72 2350 ((SOUTH VIETNAMESE TO PARIS: DELEGATION)); AMBASSADOR PHAM DANG 3475/PTT/BT FLASH

REFERENCE YOUR TELEGRAM NR. 51. WE WISH TO CLARIFY FOR YOU THAT IN THE EVENT OF AGREEMENT THE TEXT OF THE AGREMENT, THE MODALITY FOR SIGNING WOULD BE "TWO SIDES" FORMULA. ON THE ONE SIDE THERE WOULD BE THE USG (KUNITED STATES GOVERNMENT)) AND THE GVN ((GOVENMENT OF SOUTH THAT IS, THE LEGITIMATE GOVERNMENTS, AND ON THE OTHER SIDE ((WOULD BE)) THE GOVERNMENT OF NORTH VIETNAM AND THE NLF ((NATIONAL LIBERATION FRONT)). THE NLF IS CONSIDERED AS COMPRISING PART OF THE COMMUNIST SIDE AND WILL BE DESIGNATED AS THE NLF, NUMERICALLY, THERE WOULD BE FOUR SIGNATURES, -NOT AS THE PRG. THERE WOULD BE NO MENTION OF THE PRG IN THE TEXT OF THE AGREMENT. THE PREAMBLE WOULD BEGIN WITH "THE PARTIES TO THE CONFERENCE, THIS IS IN ORDER TO AVOID MENTION OF THE PRG IN THE TEXT OF THE AGREMENT. THIS FORMULA IS AN ACCURATE APPLICATION OF OUR BASIC PRINCIPLE OF CATEGORICAL NON-RECOGNITION OF THE PRG. TI 9 DEC 72 1606Z HHXX300

NNNN

#3084

AS

CLASSIFIED WORK SHEET

CLASSIFIED PL 86-36/50 USC 3605 ZZ CLASSIFIED DE #0657 3450429 ZNY MMNSH Z 100425Z DEC 72 ZYH

FM DIRNSA

CLASSIFIED TO WHITE HOUSE (ATTN: MR. D. MCMANIS FOR A SERIES CHECK)

ZEM

TRANSMITTED HEREWITH IS A VND/T MESSAGE. PLEASE ADVISE IF ANY

TRANSMITTED HEREWITH IS A VND/T MESSAGE. PLEASE ADVISE IF ANY

LIMITATIONS ON DISTRIBUTION ARE REQUIRED. THIS MESSAGE WAS TRANS
MITTED TO THE WHITE HOUSE ONLY.

FRENCH VIETNAMESE (SOUTH)

XXMMENPØ1-0072345

3/00/DOLL-VND/T -72

SOUTH VIETNAMESE NEGOTIATOR IN PARIS INFORMS SAIGON OF KISSINGER

BRIEFING FOLLOWING NINE DECEMBER MEETING WITH NORTH VIETNAMESE SSIFI

XXCC

FR PARIS: SOUTH VIETNAMESE DELEGATION; ((AMBASSADOR)) PHAM DANG

9 DEC 72 2300 LAM

TO SAIGON: PRESIDENT OFFICE; ((PRESIDENTIAL)) ASSISTANT HOANG

DUC NHA IMMEDIATE 52/PD VN/TM

TOP SECRET.

THIS MORNING AFTER OUT TELEPHONE CONVERSATION, WE IMMEDIATELY INFORMED DR. ((HENRY A.)) KISSINGER OF THE IMPORT OF THE RESPONSES OF THE GVN ((GOVERNMENT OF SOUTH VIETNAM)) ON THE FOUR QUESTIONS PUT BY HIM YESTERDAY WHILE PROMISING TO GIVE HIM A MEMORANDUM AS SOON AS WE RECEIVED THE COMPLETE TEXT OF THE MESSAGE COMING FROM SAIGON.

AS THE MESSAGE ARRIVED AFTER HIS DEPARTURE FOR HIS MEETING WITH LE

DUC THO, WE ASKED A MEMBER OF HIS DELEGATION TO TAKE OUT MEMORANDUM

TO HIM IN THE MIDDLE OF THE SESSION.

THIS EVENING AFTER HIS MEETING WITH LE DUC THO, WHICH ENDED AT

1830 HOURS. KISSINGER INVITED US TO COME TO SEE HIM AT 2015 HOURS.

HE TOLD US THAT HE HAD INDEED RECEIVED OUR MEMORANDUM, BUT THAT HE

WOOLD FIRST GIVE US AN ACCOUNT OF THE SESSION. HE DESCRIBED TODAY'E

MEETING AS ((BEING)) WITHOUT PROGRESS:

LE DUC THO RAISED ONCE AGAIN THE QUESTION OF ARCTICLE 8.C. DEMANDING.

TO 2 MONTHS. HE CONTINUED TO (B VAL LODGE COMPLAINTS) ((WITH A VIEW LODGE) TO THE DEPARTURE OF FOREIGN CIVILIAN PERSONNEL.

ON THE DMZ ((DEMILITARIZED ZONE)), LE DUC THO NO LONGER INSISTS

ON THE ADDITION OF THE PHRASE "NORTH VIETNAM AND SOUTH VIETNAM

WILL DISCUSS ON ((IC)) THE STATUS OF THE DMZ" BUT ((HE)) PROPOSES

ANOTHER SIMILAR FORMULA, NAMELY "NORTH VIETNAM AND SOUTH VIETNAM WILL

CONCERNING DEMOBILIZATION, LE DUC THO AGREES ONLY TO REPLACE THE 90-DAY DELAY WITH "AS SOON AS POSSIBLE."

AGREE ON REGULATIONS ON MOVEMENTS ACCROSS THE DMZ."

CASE, HE WILL RETURN TO WASHINGTON TUESDAY EVENING.

AS FOR KISSINGER, HE BROUGHT UP FOR DISCUSSION THE QUESTIONS
RAISED BY US. ((THEY WERE)) AGAIN REJECTED BY LE DUC THO. KISSINGER
INFORMED US THAT, CONTRARY TO HIS ((EARLIER)) EXPECTATIONS, HE IS
REMAINING IN PARIS TO MEET LE DUC THO AGAIN ON MONDAY. IN THE EVENT
OF ANY PROGRESS, THERE WOULD BE ANOTHER SISSION ON TUESDAY. IN ANY

THERE WILL BE NO SESSION TOMORROW ((UND AY)), BUT U.E. AND NORTH
VIETNAMESE EXPERTS WILL COMPARE THE TESTS OF THE DRAFT AGREEMENT
((HELD BY)) BOTH SIDES.

AS PROMISED, THE VIETNAMESE LANGUAGE TEXT PROVIDED BY NORTH VIETNAM

KISSINGER INFORMED US THAT GENERAL ((ALEXANDER M.)) HAIG IS LEAVING

SSIFI

KISSINGER THEN BROUGHT UP OUR MEMORANDUM. WITH AN AIR

OF BEING VISIBLY DISAPPOINTED AND IN A DISCOURAGED TONE, HE SAID

SIMPLY: "I DO NOT KNOW WHAT TO SAY." THEN HE ADDED THAT HE HAD PUT

ASIDE ALL OF HIS AFFAIRS IN WASHINGTON IN ORDER TO DEVOTE ALL OF

HIS TIME TO TRY TO OBTAIN THE BEST POSSIBLE AGREEMENT. BUT EACH

TIME HE CONSULTS US ON NEGOTIATION TACTICS, SAIGON TELLS HIM TO

PRESENT THE SAME DEMANDS ALREADY CATEGORICALLY REJECTED BY NORTH

EVIETNAM. (C VAL UNDER) SUCH CIRCUMSTANCES HE DOEW NOT KNOW WHAT

TO DO. HE REMINDED US THAT UP TILL (B VAL NOW) HE HAS SPARED NO

EFFORT IN DEFENDING OUR POSITION. HE BELIEVES THAT ON CERTAIN POINTS--

FOR EXAMPLE. (B VAL OMISSION) OF THE TERM "ADMINISTRATIVE

STRUCTURE"-- THE RESULTS OUGHT TO HAVE SATISFIES US. HE REFERRED TO

THE MEETINGS HE HAD IN WASHINGTON WITH (C VAL SPECIAL ASSISTANT)

NGUYEN PHU DUC, WHO WAS OPPOSED TO BOTH THE TERM "ADMINISTRATIVE"

AND THE TERM " TRUCTURE". NOW THAT HE HAS OBTAINED THE

 $\stackrel{\square}{\sqsubseteq}$ ELIMINATION OF THESE TWO TERMS, HE HEARS THAT IT IS INSUFFICIENT.

<ti>₹11 9 DEC 72 2339Z

XX#H

ada

#Ø657

Z 100425Z DEC 72 ZYH

DIRNSA

CLASSIFIED TO WHITE HOUSE (ATTN: MR. D. MCMANIS FOR A SERIES CHECK)

ZEM

TRANSMITTED HEREWITH IS A VND/T MESSAGE. PLEASE ADVISE IF ANY

CLASSIFIED LIMITATIONS ON DISTRIBUTION ARE REQUIRED. THIS WESSAGE WAS TRANS-

MITTED TO THE WHITE HOUSE ONLY.

VIETNAMESE (SOUTH) FRENCH

CLASSIFIED XXMMENPØ2F0072345

3/00/DOLL TVND/T -72

SOUTH VIETNAMESE NEGOTIATOR IN PARIS INFORMS SAIGON OF KISSINGER

EFING FOLLOWING NINE DECEMBER MEETING WITH NORTH VIETNAMESE xkdc

FORESEEING WHAT COULD (B VAL COME ABOUT) IN THE NEXT ((FEW))

Doc ID: 6549596 Doc Ref ID: A504075

ASSIFIED

ASSIFIED

KISSINGER THEN FOREWARNED US: "YOU WIND UP LOSING PRESIDENT NIXON'S

SUPPORT. PERHAPS YOU CAN BE LUCKY AGAIN AND BE SAVED BY HANDI'S

INTRANSIGEANCE. BUT PEOPLE IN THE U.S. WOULD NOT UNDERSTAND WHY

YOU DID NOT ACCEPT (B VAL AN) AGREEMENT WITH UNLIMITED ECONOMIC AID,

PRACTICALLY UNLIMITED MILITARY AID, UNLIMITED U.S. CIVILIAN

PERSONNEL WORKING IN YOUR ARMY."

WE ANSWERED KISSINGER BY CALLING HIS ATTENTION ((TO THE FACT)) THAT

INASMUCH AS THE COMMUNIST SIDE IS ADOPTING A TOTALLY INTRANSIGEANT

ATTITUDE, THERE COULD NEVER BE A QUESTION OF GVN GIVING SATISFACTION

TO THEIR DEMANDS, EVEN LESS SO IN VIEW OF OUR POSITION BEING ((SO))

LOGICAL AND REASONABLE. KISSINGER REPEATED THAT HE IS NOT

IGNORANT OF THE FACT THAT HANDI IS STILL PURSUING ITS DESIGNS. YET

THE QUESTION IS TO KNOW WHICH IS THE BETTER WAY TO DEFEND SOUTH

VIETNAM. HE IS CONVINCED THAT AN AGREEMENT NOT ENTIRELY SATISFACTORY

TO US IS STILL BETTER THAN ((BEING)) WITHOUT AN AGREEMENT. AMBASSADOR

((TRAN KIM)) PHUONG WILL FULLY REALIZE ALL OF THESE DIFFICULTIES AS

SOON AS HE RETURNS TO WASHINGTON, WHEN CONGRESS IS PREPARING TO

RECONVENE, ADDED KISSINGER.

WITH THE UNUSUAL PROLONGING OF KISSINGER'S STAY IN PARIS (THE FIRST

TIME SUCH A STAY HAS LASTED MORE THAN A WIIK), AND WITH THE

PRECIPITOUS RETURN OF HAIG TO WASHINGTON, WE HAVE THE IMPRESSION THAT

NEXT WEEK'S MEETINGS COULD WELL BE THE LAST.

ASSIFIED WORK SHE

٦


3

6

This work sheet contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title 18, U.S.C., Sections 793, 794 and 798, the transmission or the revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

(1) (1) (1) (2) (1) THIS FORM FOR INTERNAL AGENCY USE ONLY

1) & U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1972-460-250



DELTA CONTROLLED

Doc ID: 6549596 Doc Ref ID: A504075

No USE

CLASSIFIED WORK SHEET

Doc D: 6549596 Doc Ref ID: A504075 PL 86-36/50 USC 3605 meaning of the **_** DELTA Ц ZCZCEXC352 ZZ DE #3058 3461850 2 ZNY Z 111840Z DEC 72 FM DIRNSA WHITE HOUSE (ATT TO MR DAVID MCMANIS FOR SERIE CHECK ZEM HMDRA CONTROLLED EXCLUSIVE_FOR DELTA CONTROL OFFICER WARNING: THE COMINT CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNUSUALLY SENSITIVE.

IF A USIB MEMBER (HIS SPECIALLY DESIGNATED PUTY) APPROVES
THE USE OF THIS COMPARTMENTED ITEM IN A TOP SECRET CODEWORD n information affecting tho PUBLICATION, THE PRECISE COMINT SOURCE OR TARGET (WHICHEVER IS SENSITIVE) SHOULD BE CONCEALED TO THE MAXIMUM DEGREE POSSIBLE AND NO REFERENCE SHOULD BE MADE TO THE NSA DELTA REFERENCE SERIAL. IN ALL OTHER CASES, THIS MATERIAL MUST BE MAINTAINED UNDER DELTA SECURITY CONTROLS. 794 and TRANSMITTED HEREWITH IS A SOUTH VIETNAMESE DIPLOMATIC MESSAGE. NORMAL DISTRIBUTION FOR THIS MESSAGE IS IN THE DELTA SUBSERIES DOLL-VND. PLEASE ADVISE IF ANY LIMITATIONS OVER AND ABOVE EXISTING DELTA RESTRICTIONS ARE REQUIRED. THIS MESSAGE WAS TRANSMITTED TO THE WHITE HOUSE ONLY. 뀨 VIETNAMESE (SOUTH) XXMME NP Ø1F0072346 3/00 /D OLL - VND /T -72 FURTHER INSTRUCTIONS FORWARDED FROM SAIGON TO PARIS NEGOTIATOR RESPONSE TO KISSINGER QUERIES OF 8 DECEMBER CONTINUATION OF MESSAGE PRESIDENT'S OFFICE; SAIGON: NUMBER ((PRESIDENTIAL ASSISTANT)) HOANG 9 DEC 72 DUC NHA PARIS: ((DELEGATION;)) AMBASSADOR ((FLASH)) PHAM DANG LAM 34 74 /PTT /BT /TM MOREOVER, ((1)) ((ANY)) REFERENCE TO THE FINAL DECLARATION OF THE GENEVA (B VAL CONFERENCE) IS INAPPROPRIATE, FOR IT HAS NO 6. IN CONCLUSION, PRESIDENT ((THIEU)) AFFIRMS ONCE AGAIN THAT AS LONG AS OUR THREE VITAL PROBLEMS - NAMELY, THE WITHDRAWAL OF NORTH VIETNAMESE TROOPS, THE NATURE AND FUNCTIONS OF THE CNRC ((COUNCIL OF NATIONAL RECONCILIATION AND CONCORD)), AND OUR OPPOSITION TO THE (B VAL MENTION) OF THE PRG ((PROVISIONAL REVOLUTIONARY GOVERNMENT)) AS A GOVERNMENT - ARE NOT RESOLVED, IT IS IMPOSSIBLE TO ARRIVE AT AN AGREEMENT. ON THE POINT OF THE WITHDRAWAL OF NORTH VIETNAMESE TROOPS, IF ((DR. HENRY A.)) KISSINGER THINKS THAT THERE IS "NO POSSIBILITY WHATSOEVER," WE ALSO THINK THAT AS LONG AS THERE IS NO REASONABLE AND ACCEPTABLE FORMULA TO RESOLVE THIS QUESTION, AS WELL AS THE TWO OTHER VITAL QUESTIONS, (B VAL THERE IS) "NO POSSIBILITY WHATSOEVER" NEITHER ((SIC)) OF ACCEPTING 2 Title

COMMUNIST DEMANDS.

PLEASE UNDERSCORE THE TOTAL INTRANSIGEANCE OF THE COMMUNISTS IN REFUSING TO DEAL WITH OUR VITAL PROBLEMS.

"THE NEXT 48 HOURS, ETC.," IS NO CONCERN ALSO, THE QUESTION OF OF OURS.

((1)) LAST PART OF MESSAGE 3474/PTT/BT/TM OF 9 DEC 72, NOT PREVIOUSLY AVAILABLE.

XXHH 45 Ø #3058

1


:0

DELTA CONTROLLED

NNNN

meaning of the Espionage Lavys, ş States within

USE



VIETNAMESE

(SOUTH)

FRENCH

#78

78 6

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 1972

This work sheet contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title 18, U.S.C.

```
Doc 1D: 6549596
                Doc Ref ID: A504075
```

SOUTH VIETNAMESE NEGOTIATOR FORWARDS KISSINGER SUGGESTION

TO PRESIDENT THIEU

PARIS: SOUTHVIETNAMESE DELEGATION; ((AMBASSADOR))

PHAM DANG LAM 11 DEC 72 2200

TO SAIGON: PRESIDENT OFFICE; R(PRESIDENTIAL ASSISTANT))

> HOANG DUC NHA FLASH 55/PDVN/TM

TOP SECRET.

OF

WITH REGARD TO PRESIENT ((THIEU)) MESSAGE TOMORROW

BEFORE PARLIAMENT, ((DR. HENRY A.)) KISSINGER HAS EARNESTLY

ASKED THAT WE ADVISE PRESIDENT ((THIEU)) OF THE FOLLOWING:

IN VIEW OF LE DUC THO' ATTITUDE THESE PAST FEW DAYS,

AND PARTICULARLY AT TODAY'E SESSION WHERE THE NORTH

VIETNAMESE APPEARED TO SHOW A DESIRE TO AWAIT A PRETEXT

FOR THROWING UPON THE GVN ((GOVERNMENT OF SOUTH VIETNAM))

THE RESPONSIBILITY FOR A POSSIBLE BREAK-DOWN ((IN THE

NEGOTIATIONS)) AND THUS PROVOKING A GENERAL OUTCRY

((THIEU'S)) MESSAGE TOMORROW HE APPROACH THE MATTER

THE NEGOTIATIONS IN GENERAL TERMS WITHOUT MAKING

SPECIFIC PROPOSALS. THIS IS IN ORDER THAT, IN THE CASE

THE SYMPATHY OF U.E. PUBLIC OPINION BY THEN STATING THAT CLASSIFIED

HE IS READY TO HELP THE U. . TO RECOVER ((TS)) POW'E.

KISSINGER STRESSES THAT HE IS MAVING THIS

EXTREMIS IN OUR INTERNAL AFFAIRS, BUT BECAUSE HE FEELS
THAT IT IS IN OUR INTEREST.

I WILL REPORT ON A

I WILL REPORT ON ((TODAY')) MEETING IN THE FOLLOWING

MESSAGE.

ASSIFIED NNNN

CLASSIFIED

This work sheet contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title 18, U.S.C., Sections 793, 794 and 798, the transmission of the revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

CLASSIFIED WORK SHEET

CLASSIFIED PL 86-36/50 USC 3605 DE #0657 3470746 ZNY MMNSH

120745Z DEC 72 ZYH

FM DIRNSA

TO WHITE HOUSE (ATTN MR. D. MCMANIS/FOR A SERIES CHECK) SSILIET

ZEM

TRANSMITTED HEREWITH IS A VND/T MESSAGE. PLEASE ADVISE IF ANY

 $\frac{\Box}{\underline{\underline{\underline{\underline{U}}}}} \text{Limitations on distribution are requ} \\ \underline{\underline{\underline{\underline{U}}}} \\ \underline{\underline{\underline{U}}} \\ \underline{\underline{\underline{U}}} \\ \underline{\underline{U}} \\$ LIMITATIONS ON DISTRIBUTION ARE REQUIRED. THIS MESSAGE WAS

UVIETNAMESE (SOUTH)

3/OD/DOLL-VND/T-72

KISSINGER BRIEFS SOUTH VIETNAMESE ON ELEVEN DECEMBER

MEETING WITH LE DUC THO

FR PARIS: VIETNAMESE DELEGATION; AMBASSADOR PHAM DANG LAM

-- 11 DEC 72 2330

TO SAIGON: OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT: HOANG DUC NHA

FLASH 56/PDVN/IM

TOP SECRET

HERE IS WHAT KISSINGER TOLD US FOLLOWING HIS MEETING TODAY WITH

CLE DUC THO. NO PROGRESS AT ALL. LE DUC THO RETURNED ((1 WD G)) ON

THE QUESTION OF THE WITHDRAWAL OF FOREIGN CIVILIAN PERSONNEL. THE

ONLY CONCESSION, IF IT CAN BE CALLED THAT, IS THAT LE DUC THO

AGREES TO THE U.S. INSTITUTING A "EEPARATE UNDERSTANDING" TO

WITHDRAW THESE PERSONNEL WITHIN TWO MONTHS. AS FOR THE DMZ

((DEMILITARIZED ZONE)), LE DUC THO REPLIED THAT HE HAD NOT YET

RECEIVED INSTRUCTIONS FROM HANOI. THINGS STOPPED THERE FOR THE

MOMENT. WHEN HE AGAIN SPOKE, KISSINGER SUGGESTED TAKING UP THE

QUESTION OF THE PROCEDURES FOR SIGNING. AFTER A DISCUSSION, LE

DUC THO LET IT BE UNDERSTOOD THAT HE WOULD AGREE TO THE FOLLOWING

☐ PROCEDURE: THE U.E. GOVERNMENT AND THE DRV((DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF

OVIETNAM) WILL SIGN THE ACCORD WITH THE PREAMBLE BEGINNING WITH

THE U. . GOVERNMENT IN CONCERT WITH THE GVN (GOVERNMENT OF

VIETNAM)) ETC., ETC., THE DRV IN CONCERT WITH THE PRG ((PROVISIONAL

REVOLUTIONARY GOVERNMENT)) ETC., ETC." IMMEDIATELY AFTER THE

SIGNING THE U.S. WILL MAKE A STATEMENT CLEARLY EMPHASIZING THAT

IT DOES NOT RECOGNIZE THE PRG. THE GVN WILL SIGN ALONE ANOTHER TEXT OF THE ACCORD, WITH THE PREAMBLE CUT OFF. THE NLF ((NATIONAL CLIBERATION FRONT)) WILL ALSO SIGN ALONE A THIRD, COUNTERPART TEXT OF THE ACCORD, THAT IS TO SAY, WITHOUT PREAMBLE AND MENTION OF THE PRG. THE THREE DOCUMENTS CONSTITUTE THE ACCORD. THUS. THERE WILL NOT BE A CEREMONY OF A FOUR-PARTY SIGNING. THE ACCORD REQUIRING THE GVN' SIGNATURE WOULD BE RETURNED TO US BY YOU ONCE IT WAS SIGNED. AFTER HIS REPORT. KISSINGER GAVE US HIS IMPRESSION OF LE DUC THO AND COMPANY WHOM HE FOUND TODAY LITTLE INCLINED TO DISCUSS SERIOUSLY, CERTAIN AS THEY ARE THAT TIME IS ON THEIR SIDE. THEY OPENLY SPECULATED ON THE INEVITABLE AND IMMINENT CONFRONTATION BETWEEN SAIGON AND WASHINGTON. ((AMBASSADOR)) PORTER, WHO WAS PRESENT FOR THE FIRST TIME, WAS ENTIRELY OF THE SAME OPINION. IT IS IN THIS CONTEXT THAT KISSINGER MADE THE SUG-GESTION WHICH WAS THE SUBJECT OF OUR MESSAGE NUMBER 55/PDVN/IM. HE IS SORRY THAT THE U.E. GOVERNMENT AND THE GVN WERE NOT ABLE TO REACH A ((1 WD G)) JOINT POSITION. THAT WOULD HAVE ALLOWED PLACING OTHE BLAME FOR A BREAK ON NORTH VIETNAM, SHOULD THE OCCASION ARISE. HE ((DR. KISSINGER)) INFORMED US THAT IN ANY CASE HE WILL LEAVE PARIS FOR WASHINGTON IMMEDIATELY AFTER HIS MEETING WITH LE DUC THO, WHICH IS SCHEDULED FOR 1500 HOURS TOMORROW. HE WILL LEAVE AMBASSA-DORS PORTER AND SULLIVAN TO MEET IN THE MORNING WITH XUAN THUY AND

NGUYEN CO THACH TO SEE IF THERE IS A POSSIBILITY FOR PROGRESS.

IF NEED BE, SULLIVAN WILL STAY IN PARIS FOR TWO MORE DAYS TO

O
DISCUSS THE PROTOCOL.

SO WE CAN REPLY TO THE U. . DELEGATION, PLEASE GIVE US INSTRUCTIONS
ON THE FOLLOWING QUESTIONS:

ON THE ! OFFOMING GOEDITOND:

- 1. OUR REACTION VISAVIS THE PROCEDURES FOR SIGNING, AS OUTLINED
- ABOVE. FOR OUR PART WE RECALLED THE FOUR-PARTY SIGNING PROCEDURE

AND THE NON-MENTION OF THE PRG AS PROPOSED BY THE GVN, REFERENCE

YOUR MESSAGE NUMBER 3474/PTT/BT/TM. KISSINGER REPLIED THAT IT IS

ABSOLUTELY IMPOSSIBLE TO GET A FOUR-PARTY SIGNING AND NOT TO

MENTION THE PRG IN THE PREAMBLE AND IN THE SIGNATURE;

- 2. COMMENTS FROM OUR GENERAL STAFF ON THE NEW TEXTS OF THE
- PROTOCOLS. REFERENCE OUR MESSAGE NUMBER 53/PDVN/IM((1));
- 3. OBSERVATIONS ON THE VIETNAMESE TEXT OF THE DRAFT ACCORD,

SAME REFERENCE AS ABOVE;

- 4. YOUR ADVICE ON LE DUC THO'E PROPOSAL TO INCLUDE THE CLAUSE ON
- THE REPATRIATION OF FOREIGN CIVILIAN PERSONNEL IN A SEPARATE

O UNDERSTANDING RATHER THAN IN THE TEXT.

了((1)) MESSAGE IN QUESTION, WHICH IS IN PROCESS, IS THE COMPLETE

VIETNAMESE TEXT OF THE DRAFT ACCORD.

T1-12 DEC 72 0452Z

#Ø657

NNNN

CIBO DA CABSV ISBRIBIO DO CIGO AID

This work sheet contains infernative autoring the trajecust before a differential the recovered of the 19 promage Laws, Tab. 18, 415 C., Sections 793, 794 and 793, the recoverage of decree of electric devices on any manner to an innantive and presents prohibited by law.

1 3 Ch. CHERT TO PRINTED OFFICE 1972 A60.250

CLASSIEIED WOLD SHIFE

PL 86-36/50 USC 3605

TOP SECRET UMBRA

DELTA COMPROLLED TIEM

Z CZ CE XC516

UAI

П

i

55

⋖

ZZ DE #3001 3480255 ZNY MMNSH

Z 130245Z DEC 72 ZYH

WHITE HOUSE ONLY

TO WHITE HOUSE (ATTN MR DAVID MCMANIS FOR SERIES CHECK)
ZEM

TOPSEORET UNDRA DELTA CONTROLLED ITEM

EXCLUSIVE FOR DELTA CONTROL OFFICER

WARNING: THE COMINT CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNUSUALLY SENSITIVE.

IF A USIB MEMBER (OR HIS SPECIALLY DESIGNATED DEPUTY) APPROVES

THE USE OF THIS COMPARTMENTED ITEM IN A TOP SECRET CODEWORD

PUBLICATION, THE PRECISE COMINT SOURCE OR TARGET (WHICHEVER

IS SENSITIVE) SHOULD BE CONCEALED TO THE MAXIMUM DEGREE POSSIBLE

AND NO REFERENCE SHOULD BE MADE TO THE NSA DELTA REFERENCE SERIAL.

IN ALL OTHER CASES, THIS MATERIAL MUST BE MAINTAINED UNDER DELTA SECURITY CONTROLS.

TRANSMITTED HERE TH IS A SOUTH VIETNAMESE PLOMATIC MESSAGE.

NORMAL DISTRIBUTION FUR THIS MESSAGE IS IN THE DELTA SUBSERIES

DOLL-VND. PLEASE ADVISE IF ANY LIMITATIONS OVER AND ABOVE

EXISTING DELTA RESTRICTIONS ARE REQUIRED. THIS MESSAGE WAS

TRANSMITTED TO THE WHITE HOUSE ONLY.

VIETNAMESE (SOUTH) FRENCH XXMMENPØ1F0072348 3/00/DOLL-VND/T -72

AMBASSADOR PORTER BRIEFS SOUTH VIETNAMESE DELEGATION ON TWELVE DECEMBER MEETINGS WITH NORTH VIETNAMESE

XXCC

SSIFIE

<

FR PARIS: SOUTH VIETNAMESE DELEGATION;

is work sheet contains infor Sections 793, 794 and 798 CLASSIFIE

J.ASSIFIED

1 /2 - 31 11-11

LASSIFIED

TOP SECRET

TODAY IT WAS PORTER WHO GAVE US A BRIEFING ON THE THREE MEETINGS BETWEEN HIM AND SULLIVAN ON ONE SIDE AND XUAN THUY AND NGUYEN CO THACH ON THE OTHER, THE SECOND BETWEEN U.S. AND NORTH VIETNAMESE EXPERTS, AND FINALLY THE MEETING BETWEEN KISSINGER AND LE DUC THO, WHICH TOOK PLACE IN THE AFTERNOON FROM 1500 TO 1945 HOURS. AS FOR THIS LAST MEETING, PORTER REPORTED THAT THERE WAS NO CHANGE IN THE NORTH VIETNAMESE ATTITUDE. LE DUC THO REFUSED ALL CHANGES TO ARTICLE 15 ON THE DMZ (CDEMILITARIZED ZONE)). HE AGAIN BROUGHT UP THE QUESTION OF ARTICLE 8 C ON POLITICAL DETAINEES AND ARTICLE 5 RELATIVE TO FOREIGN CIVILIAN PERSONNEL, STATING THAT IF HE KEPT COMING BACK TO THESE POINTS IT WAS BECAUSE WE OURSELVES ARE RAISING NEW PROBLEMS. AS FOR THE PORTER-XUAN THUY MEETING, IT WAS DEVOTED TO CLARIFYING THE UNDERSTANDING ON LAOS AND CAMBODIA. ACCORDING TO PORTER, THE QUESTION IS NOT YET RESOLVED BECAUSE OF NUMEROUS DIFFICULTIÉS. ESPECIALLY ON LAOS. FINALLY, THE U.S. AND NORTH VIETNAMESE EXPERTS CONTINUED WITH THE COMPARISON OF THE ENGLISH AND VIETNAMESE TEXTS.

CONTRARY TO THE DECISION MADE YESTERDAY BY KISSINGER TO RETURN IMMEDIATELY TO WASHINGTON AFTER THIS AFTERNOON'S MEETING, A NEW AND SHORT MEETING WILL BE HELD TOMORROW IN THE MORNING, FOLLOWING WHICH KISSINGER WILL LEAVE PARIS.

NO DATE IS SET FOR THE RESUMPTION OF THE KISSINGER-LE DUC THO MEETINGS. HOWEVER, PORTER MADE IT CLEAR THAT THIS IS NOT A BREAK: WASHINGTON WILL STAY IN TOUCH WITH HANOI TO SEE "WHAT WE CAN DO WITH THEM." FROM NOW ON IT WILL THUS BE THROUGH NORMAL DIPLOMATIC CHANNELS BETWEEN SAIGON AND WASHINGTON THAT WE WILL OBTAIN INFORMATION ON THE PROGRESS OF THE NEGOTIATIONS. FOR THIS PURPOSE AMBASSADOR ((TRAN KIM)) PHUONG WILL HAVE TO GET IN TOUCH WITH THE STATE DEPARTMENT AND COMMUNICATE AFTERWARDS WITH OUR GOVERNMENT.

BEFORE LEAVING PARIS, KISSINGER INSTRUCTED PORTER TO REPEAT TO US WHAT HE HAS ALREADY TOLD US SEVERAL TIMES. HERE IN SUBSTANCE "THROUGH THREE WEEKS OF CONTACTS IN PARIS VERY IS HIS MESSAGE: LITTLE OF A CONSTRUCTIVE NATURE COMES FROM SAIGON. FREQUENTLY HE (KISSINGER) IS LEFT WITHOUT ANY GUIDANCE. THE SPECIAL BRIEFINGS HE GAVE PRODUCE NO RESULT." WE REPLIED STRESSING THE FACT THAT OUR POSITION ON THE PROBLEMS OF SUBSTANCE HAS BEEN FULLY STATED, IN PARTICULAR IN OUR PRESIDENT'S LETTER TO PRESIDENT NIXON. IT WAS STRESSED IN THIS LETTER AS WE HAVE DONE OURSELVES IN VARIOUS MEMORANDA. THAT IT IS USELESS TO BRING UP QUESTIONS OF DETAIL WHEN PROBLEMS OF SUBSTANCE ARE NOT YET RESOLVED. PORTER ADDED THAT KISSINGER COMPLAINED "THAT THERE WAS LACK OF RESPONSE FROM SAIGON TO WASHINGTON EVEN AT THE HIGHEST LEVEL." AS FOR PRESIDENT NIXON'S INVITATION TO MEET WITH PRESIDENT THIEU, WE HAVE ALREADY EXPLAINED TO KISSINGER THE REASON OUR CHIEF OF STATE IS NOT YET IN A POSITION TO REPLY TO IT.

OUR IMPRESSION IS THAT THINGS HAVE REACHED A DECISIVE STAGE. WASHINGTON NOW SEEMS TO HAVE DECIDED TO DEAL DIRECTLY WITH HANDI WITHOUT CONSULTING US. AMBASSADOR PHUONG AND AMBASSADOR ((VUONG VAN)) BAC ARE WAITING INSTRUCTIONS FROM THE PRESIDENT. PARTICULARLY AMBASSADOR PHUONG WHO WANTS TO KNOW WHETHER HE IS TO RETURN DIRECTLY TO WASHINGTON OR VIA SAIGON.

XX H H 70⁄0

700 #3001

DELTA CONTROLLED ITEM

#80



PL 86-36/50 USC 3605

ZCZCEXC523

SSIFIE

M

0

DE

ZNY MMNSH

FM DIRNSA

TO WHITE HOUSE (ATTN MR DAVID MCMANIS FOR SERIES CHECK) ZEM E T UMBRA DELTA CONTROLLED ITEM EXCLUSIVE FOR DELTA CONTROL OFFICER M

131425Z DEC 72 ZYH

¥3004 3481427

WAR NING: THE COMINT CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNUSUALLY SENSITIVE. IF A USIB MEMBER (OR HIS SPECIALLY DESIGNATED DEPUTY) APPROVES THE USE OF THIS COMPARTMENTED ITEM IN A TOP SECRET CODEWORD PUBLICATION, THE PRECISE COMINT SOURCE OR TARGET (WHICHEVER IS SENSITIVE) SHOULD BE CONCEALED TO THE MAXIMUM DEGREE POSSIBLE AND NO REFERENCE SHOULD BE MADE TO THE NSA DELTA REFERENCE SERIAL. IN ALL OTHER CASES, THIS MATERIAL MUST BE MAINTAINED UNDER DELTA SECURITY CONTROLS.

TRANSMITTED HEREWITH IS A SOUTH VIETNAMESE DIPLOMATIC MESSAGE. NORMAL DISTRIBUTION FOR THIS MESSAGE IS IN THE DELTA SUBSERIES DOLL-VND. PLEASE ADVISE IF ANY LIMITATIONS OVER AND ABOVE EXISTING DELTA RESTRICTIONS ARE REQUIRED. THIS MESSAGE WAS TRANSMITTED TO THE WHITE HOUSE ONLY.

VIETNAMESE (SOUTH) FRENCH XXMMENPØ1F0072348 3/00/DOLL-VND/T S

SAIGON SAYS NOTHING MORE TO DISCUSS UNTIL "VITAL POINTS" RESOLVED: PHUONG TO GO TO SAIGON BEFORE RETURNING TO WASHINGTON, BAC TO GO BACK TO LONDON FROM PARIS

PRESIDENT'S OFFICE; SAIGON: ((PRESIDENTIAL ASSISTANT)) HOANG DUC NHA 13 DEC 72 RIS: ((SOUTH VIETNAMESE 13 DEC 72 1640 DELEGATION)); AMBASSADOR PHAM DANG LAM FLASH 2965/PTT/BT/M

WE WISH TO CONFIRM TO YOU THAT OUR GOVERNMENT STILL HOLDS THE POSITION THAT AS LONG AS THE VITAL POINTS ARE NOT RESOLVED IT IS USELESS TO DISCUSS DETAILS.

PLEASE TELL AMBASSADOR ((TRAN KIM)) PHUONG TO TAKE THE FIRST PLANE FOR SAIGON, I REPEAT BAC WILL RETURN TO LONDON. I REPEAT, SAIGON. AMBASSADOR ((VUONG VAN))

PRESENT THE IDEAS OF PRESIDENT ((THIEU)) IN ((HIS)) MESSAGE CONCERNING THE TRUCE IN YOUR SPEECH TOMORROW ((AT THE PLENARY SESSION OF THE PEACE TALKS)). MAKE MUCH OF THE STIR CREATED #81 BY THIS OFFER IN THE PRESS ETC. ...

REGARD S. TI 13 DEC 72 0920Z

XXHH 500 #3004

PSSIF

DELTA CONTR

NNNN

the transmission and

of the Espionage Laws, person is prohibited by

USE

FORM FOR INTERNAL

SHEET

CLASSIFIED WORK

U.S.C 18

GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFF

Ū.D

LASSIFIED

ZNY MMNSH

Z 131810Z DEC 72 ZYH

☐ FM DIRNSA

TO WHITE HOUSE (ATTN MR DAVID MCMANIS FOR SERIES CHECK)

ZEM

EXCLUSIVE FOR DELTA CONTROL OFFICER

WARNING: THE COMINT CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNUSUALLY SENSITIVE. IF A USIB MEMBER (OR HIS SPECIALLY DESIGNATED DEPUTY) APPROVES THE USE OF THIS COMPARTMENTED ITEM IN A TOP SECRET CODEWORD PUBLICATION. THE PRECISE COMINT SOURCE OR TARGET (WHICHEVER IS SENSITIVE) SHOULD BE CONCEALED TO THE MAXIMUM DEGREE POSSIBLE AND NO REFERENCE SHOULD BE MADE TO THE NSA DELTA REFERENCE SERIAL. IN ALL OTHER CASES, THIS MATERIAL MUST BE MAINTAINED UNDER DELTA SECURITY CONTROLS.

TRANSMITTED HEREWITH IS A SOUTH VIETNAMESE DIPLOMATIC MESSAGE. NORMAL DISTRIBUTION FOR THIS MESSAGE IS IN THE DELTA SUBSERIES DOLL-VND. PLEASE ADVISE IF ANY LIMITATIONS OVER AND ABOVE EXISTING DELTA RESTRICTIONS ARE REQUIRED. THIS MESSAGE WAS TRANSMITTED TO THE WHITE HOUSE ONLY.

VIETNAMESE (SOUTH) XXMMENPØ1F0072348 3/00/DOLL -VND /T AVS.LFR/FORP/B.

THIEU RESPONDS TO PARIS DELEGATION QUERY RE SOUTH VIETNAMESE STANCE ON FRENCH FOREIGN MINISTER'S STATEMENT

XXCC

OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT; SAIGON: ((PRESIDENTIAL PRESS SECRETARY)) HOANG DUC NHA 12 DEC 72 2030H TO (CD ELEGATION)); AMBASSADOR PHAM DANG LAM FLASH 3499/PTT/BT/M SECRET.

PURSUANT TO YOUR TELEGRAM NR. 533, PRESIDENT ((THIEU))'S TOEAS ARE AS FOLLOWS.

THE ROLE OF FRANCE IN SOUTH VIETNAM IS NOT A PROBLEM FOR US. CONSIDERING THE GOOD RELATIONS OUR TWO GOVERNMENTS HAVE HAD FOR IF THE PROBLEM ARISES NOW, WE WILL HAVE TO A LONG TIME. O REEVALUATE OUR RELATIONS. THE COMMUNISTS RESPONDED SOLELY FOR ROPAGANDA PURPOSES AND THE FRENCH GOVERNMENT MUST REALIZE THAT.

TI 12 DEC 72 1322Z ASSI

XXHH 300

#3074


#82

of the United States within the meaning of the manner to an unauthorized the revelation of which in any contains information affecting the National Defense

FORM FOR INTERNAL AGENCY USE ONLY

CLASSIFIED WORK SHEET

GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE, 1972-460-250



TOP SECRET.

((DR. HENRY A.)) KISSINGER DEPARTED ORLY ((AIRPORT)) THIS
EVENING AT 2100 HOURS AFTER HIS MEETING WITH LE DUC THO.
HE TOLD US BEFORE HIS DEPARTURE THAT NOTHING NEW CAME OUT OF THIS
MEETING. THE COMMUNISTS ARE STILL SEEKING TO GAIN TIME.

IN A BRIEF STATEMENT TO THE PRESS AT THE AIRPORT HE

((KISSINGER)) MERELY SAID THAT HE WOULD STAY IN CONTACT WITH

LE DUC THO IN ORDER TO DETERMINE WHETHER ANOTHER MEETING

IS NECESSARY. HE ALSO TOLD US THAT IT WAS NOT KNOWN IF AND

WHEN HE WILL RETURN TO PARIS. NEVERTHELESS, HE SAID EXPLICITLY

THAT THIS WAS NOT A BREAK-DOWN, AND THAT HE DID NOT FORESEE AN

IMPORTANT DEVELOPMENT BEFORE CHRISTMAS.

CONCERNING THE ((AVENUE)) KLEBER SESSION ((OF THE PEACE TALKS)) TOMORROW, I WILL PRESENT THE IDEAS OF PRESIDENT ((THIEU)) ON THE TRUCE, THE OPENING OF NEGOTIATIONS BETWEEN THE VIETNAMESE PARTIES. AND THE LIBERATION OF POW'S.

AMBASSADOR ((THAN KIM)) PHUONG WILL LEAVE PARIS TOMORROW

MORNING AND WILL ARRIVE IN SAIGON FRIDAY EVENING BY AIR VIETNAM

FLIGHT 687 FROM BANGKOK. AMBASSADOR ((VUONG VAN)) BAC RETURNED

TO LONDON TODAY.

TH 13 DEC 72 2202Z

THIS FORM FOR INTERNAL AGENCY

CLASSIFIED WORK SHEE

300

NNNN

This work sheet contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title 18, U.S.C., Sections 793, 794 and 798, the transmission or the revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

CLASSIFIED WORK SHEET

THIS FORM FOR INTERNAL AGENCY USE ONLY

₩ U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1972—460-250