DOCID: 4129161

<u> |||-</u>

(b)(3)-P.L. 86-36

SECRET SPOKE

942011-1-1-0037 942031-1-2-0102 M = 417 1403

08/45-69

CATEGORY = 1

MESSAGE = 23734845

ZCZCRDB514 H GJJJJJSSSSS

00 | P171 Ø67233Ø

FM USM 838 TO GOLF ELEVENZPAPA\_USE 794B

ZEM

S E C R E T SCOKE

XXMM
ENPOIFFIGERS 29 2/GII/VCM/T1973-69 RPT 2/GII/VCM/T1973-69 TACREP PASEP ADDEE GOLF CELEVEN/ECHO SONGBIRD (282155Z) AVC, AVN, ALS/HIGH-G-H-M/B, I, Z, VIETNAMESE (NORTH) PLAINTEXT UNIDENTIFIED REAR SERVICE ELEMENT OPERATING IN LAGS ISSUES SITUATION REPORT XXCC

FM? ((U/I RSE OPER IN LAOS)) TO? ((U/I RSE OPER IN LAOS)) DTI? ((38 MAR 69)) ((M)) PREC? --- NR? ((M)) CK? ((M)) CCX (MDM)) AT ((AND)) LOST SIGHT. THERE MAS NO LONGER THE SOUND OF A MOTOR. AFTER THAT THEY SAID IT WAS LESS THAN HALF A MINUTE AFTER THE SOUND OF THE EXPLOSION AND THE MOTOR HAD ECHOED AWAY COMPLETELY. THE PEOPLE WHO TOKID US THAT THIS PLANE WHEN TOKIN MERE CIVILIANS. ((MHEN)) I ASKED 2 CIVILIAN PROSLYTING COMRADES, THE 2 COMMADES DID NOT DARE (CXMDM))—IS LIKE THAT (CXMDM))—IS LIKE THAT (CXMDM). THAT THIS PLANE WHEN TOKIN MERE CIVILIANS. (CMHEN))—IS LIKE THAT (CXMDM). TO THE CIVILIANS, THEY SAID THAT IT IS POSSIBLE TO GO THERE BUT IT WOULD TAKE 4 OR 5 DAYS. IT IS VERY DIFFICULT TO ENTER THIS AREA. THERE ARE ALSO SPECIAL FORCES. THERE IS NO MATER IN THIS AREA. AND ((ME MUST)) CARRY MATER FROM OUTSIDE, THEREFORE THE PROBLEM IS RELATIVELY COMPLICATED. YESTERDAY I SPOKE MITHSYOMRADE GOING TO SEARCH, BUT, PRESENTLY (WED) DO NOT YET HAVE THE REQUIREMENTS NECESSARY FOR ENTERING ((THE AREA)). AFTER THAT, AT #4#86 IN THE MORNING, FROM #233G TO #253GG, THERE RERE 2 AG6.S CIRCLING IN THE AREA OF THE MORNING, FROM #233G TO #253GG, THERE MERE 2 AG6.S CIRCLING IN THE AREA OF THE MERENANGE, AND AS FOR HELICOPTERS, THERE WERE NO SOUNDS OF MOTORS. THAT IS WHAT THE CIVILIANS SAID. ACCORDING TO OUR OPINIONS THE PILOTS WERE KILLED. I AM REPORTING THE ENEMY SITUATION. USUALLY IN THE MORNING, FROM ABOUT #6#3G TO #278GG, DURING THIS TIME, AND AT HOGHT THEY STRIKE STRONGLY (C-VAL). CAUSING) VEHICLES TO BURN. AROUND THIS TIME ((THEY)) ARE ACTIVE RIGHT AT THE AREA. AT NIGHT, PRINCIPAL ACTIVE, THAT IS TIME AFTERNOON AROUND THIS TIME THEY ARE ATTHE DAY. AS FOR RECOND. HAS SANCE SITUATION DURING THE DAY. ACTIVITY ARE INCREASED AT NIGHT, PRINCIPAL COMPANION TO PRINCIPAL ACCORDING THE AFTERNOON AROUND THIS TIME THEY ARE AND THE PRINCIPAL ACCORDING THE BEAVE. C-138, S. USUALLY FLY AT AN ALTITUDE OF #283 TO USUALLY COMPANION TO HERE THE PRINCIPAL ACCORDING THE PRINCIPAL ACCORDING THE MET CALL THE DAY. ACTIVETY ARE INCREASED AT NIGH

Poss. 98 MAR 69 # 14\$3 O-2A R.F. REX 8B T.L. WALTERS BB

SECRET SPOKE



POSITION APPEARS TO BE USUABLE BECAUSE HIGH EXPLOSIVE BOMBS HAVE BLOCKED THE GUN CREW ((ENPLACEMENTS)), AND ONE POSITION WAS HIT WITH A BUILDLE OF CLUSTER BOMBS. THIS POSITION IS STILL USABLE BUT IS NEARLY COVERED. THAT IS THE SITUATION OF ALL THE PROBLEMS. PRESENTLY ((WE)) ARE STILL OCCUPYING KILOMETER 61 ((2)) WITH 3 WEAPONS ((AND THO MEAPONS FOUGHT DURING THE NIGHT, MY JUDGEMENT ABOUT THE C-133,S AND F-4,S IS THAT THE F-3 IS THE ANTIAIRCRAFT ELEMENT WHICH IS ESSENTIAL BUT WHEN THERE WERE 2 TO 3 OTHER PLANES, AT THAT MOMENT THE ENEMY WAS CONCENTRATING TO STRIKE AND BLOCK THE VEHICLES, BUT, AT THE SAME TIME TO STRIKE POSITIONS. GENERALY SPEAKING MY WORK IS ALMOST FINISHED. THERE REMAINS ONLY THE PROBLEM OF STRIKING THE ENEMY ((WHEN THEY)) LAND ((FROM)) THE AIRWAYS, ((WHICH)) I HAVE NOT YET BEEN ABLE TO PROPAGATE, AND IN THE OPINION OF COMRADE BIEU ((1)) ((BIEEUR)), IT IS TO ORGANIZE TRAINING FOR THE TROOPS IN SHORT METHODS TO STRIKE THE ENEMY ((WHEN THEY)) LAND ((FROM)) THE AIRWAYS, THAT IS TO TRAIN INFANTRY. I HAVE NOT YET BEEN ABLE TO ((START)) THE TRAINING BECAUSE THEY ARE CONTINUALLY DIGGING FORTIFICATIONS. ((1)) U/I PERSONALITY ((3)) UNLOCATED ((3)) POSS REFERENCE TO MD 918 Ø81 OR MD 930 Ø19 MS?

FM? ---- TO? SOONG-HOONGF (EQ. 46.00M MHZ) XXHH 900 NNNNC NNNIC

(b) (1)

(b) (1)(b)(3)-50 USC 403 (b) (3) b 1 8 3  $\sqrt{3}$  c .  $\sqrt{2}$  9 8 8 6 - 3 6

(b) (3) - 50 USC 403

(b) (3) - P.L. 86 - 36