

23 Jan 68

~~TOP SECRET UMBRA IV~~INTRODUCTION (CHART)

NSA

This portion of the briefing session will cover the Pueblo incident. It will be broken into five major categories similar to a paper prepared in response to questions asked by the committee. At the conclusion, we will critique the incident and discuss in general terms the potential of additional sensors to provide additional information or indicators to aid decision makers in anticipating an event similar to the Pueblo.

PRE-INCIDENT (CHART)

While there were no specific indicators available prior to the Pueblo operation such as increased alert posture, military redeployments, or an increase in forces, the general indicators that the North Koreans might harass an overt peripheral reconnaissance platform were evident [redacted] over a period of 2½ years before the deployment of the Pueblo. It is a matter of record that these indicators were summarized and constituted the basis for an NSA message to the JCS on 29 December 1967. In addition, an NSA message of 29 December alerted our US SCA sites [redacted] and appropriate SIGINT offices [redacted].

MILITARY POSTURE (CHART)

The east coast North Korean military posture at the time of

(b) (1)
 (b) (3)-50 USC 403
 (b) (3)-18 USC 798
 (b) (3)-P.L. 86-36

~~TOP SECRET UMBRA~~

~~TOP SECRET UMBRA~~b) (1)
b) (3)-50 USC 403
b) (3)-18 USC 798
b) (3)-P.L. 86-36

the incident was as follows (pause). Communications serving this posture consisted primarily of HF manual Morse, HF/VHF radiotelephone and [redacted] communications. [redacted]



SUMMARY OF THE INCIDENT (MAP)

Since the incident itself is well documented, I will just briefly describe the scenario. There were no SIGINT reflections of the Pueblo until she arrived off Wo'nsan on 22 January. The blue line represents early North Korean radar tracking on the Pueblo; the dotted black line represents the 12NM limit; the red and orange lines represent the reacting NKN vessels; the brown line represents the North Korean tracking of the Pueblo being escorted into Wo'nsan; the green line represents the NKA flight activity relating to the incident. The majority of the information on this chart is based on

~~TOP SECRET UMBRA~~

~~TOP SECRET UMBRA~~

intercepted HF manual Morse communications; there was also extensive intercept of VHF radiotelephone communications between the reacting ships and the shore, and the fighter pilots and ground controllers, which adds to the scenario in terms of actions being taken by the North Koreans relative to the incident.

(b) (1)
 (b) (3)-50 USC 403
 (b) (3)-10 USC 798
 (b) (3)-P.L. 86-36

COLLECTION POSTURE (MAP)

This map represents the SIGINT collection posture when the Pueblo was deployed. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] ACRP collection [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

SENSORS PROVIDING INFORMATION (CHART)

Two of the essential elements of information relating to the incident were the locations of the USS Pueblo and the North Korean vessels, and the activity of the North Korean units in the general area. The SIGINT available on these EEI's is noted in the subcategories indicated [REDACTED] As mentioned earlier the primary source of information on this incident


[REDACTED]

~~TOP SECRET UMBRA~~

CONCLUSION (CHART)

Our subsequent critique of the SIGINT available prior to the incident substantiates that other than general evidence of east coast sensitivity, there were no specific indicators available to forecast the precise intentions of the North Koreans. The collection of tactical communications [REDACTED] was enough to enable complete reconstruction of the incident from SIGINT. We feel,

[REDACTED]
[REDACTED] additional SIGINT sensors would have only provided us more of the same type of information on this chart. As indicated earlier, we are also



~~TOP SECRET FRODO~~



(b) (1)
(b) (3)-50 USC 403
(b) (3)-18 USC 798
(b) (3)-P.L. 86-36

~~TOP SECRET FRODO~~