DAMAGE ASSESSMENT OF THE COMPROMISE OF OPERATIONAL INTELLIGENCE BROADCAST MESSAGES ON BOARD USS PUEBLO (AGER-2)
Damage Assessment of Compromise of Operational Intelligence

Broadcast Messages on Board USS PUEBLO (AGER-2)

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17 March 1969
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INTRODUCTION

The purpose of this study was to examine copies of messages believed to have been aboard USS PUEBLO at the time of her capture by North Korea on 23 January 1968. These messages were received by PUEBLO via the WESTPAC Operational Intelligence Broadcast (GOPI) for the period 5-23 January. The file of traffic examined is believed to be a duplicate of that held by PUEBLO except for a two-day period (8-9 January) which was not available for study. The examination was conducted to assess the damage to U.S. intelligence programs and operations that might have occurred through the loss of this specific series of highly classified messages.

During the evaluation process it was assumed that North Korea in particular and all communist countries in general would eventually benefit by this compromise of across-the-board intelligence material. For esti­mative purposes, it was assumed that the enemy has or can develop the necessary expertise to exploit all aspects of the disclosed information to the maximum extent. In the practical sense, however, the North Koreans will probably not be able to exploit the entire volume within a useful period of time. By comparison, if the entire message series has been made available to the USSR maximum exploitation within a relatively short period should be expected. Other communist countries, especially North Vietnam, could then be expected to reap the benefits and take appropriate precautions.

The assessment was accomplished by analyzing the 7-8,000 messages in the light of eight categories of information. Assessment on an individual message basis was not attempted. GOPI traffic that may have been carried on board PUEBLO prior to sailing was not examined.

The volume of information that was disclosed on any one category as represented by numbers of messages is difficult to determine in all cases. Summary type messages often ran the gamut of information categories, rarely reporting on a single incident or subject. Technical analysis and assessment of the GOPI broadcast messages was not attempted as not being within the purview of the study group.
II. SUMMARY

The acquisition of a nearly complete three-week file of GOPI message traffic is without a doubt extremely valuable to the Communists. The traffic covers a wide spectrum of intelligence subject matter, and provides an excellent overview of U.S. communications intelligence collection and processing requirements, interest, and collection capabilities in Southeast Asia. However, the volume of the compromised material, the subjective format, and the general perishability of combat intelligence are factors which prevent rapid enemy exploitation of these types of materials. For these reasons some of the compromised material was of doubtful tactical intelligence value to the enemy. Assessment summaries by categories follow.

Air Defense and General Air Activity - Intelligence on Communist and Cambodian air activity is contained in a variety of reports ranging from TACREPs to end-product summaries. The reports cover all phases of air activity, but a large portion of the air-related reports concern North Vietnamese air defense. The majority of North Vietnamese air defense reports are tactical in nature used to support friendly operations in Southeast Asia and were consequently of short term value. A lesser number of reports were summaries, which covered subjects of longer term interest such as a

These reports displayed a thorough knowledge of the subject matter, including information on subordination, order of battle, past history, and unusual activity.

Maritime Forces - Intelligence on Communist and Cambodian maritime activity is contained in a variety of messages from a number of sources ranging from detailed reports of shipping activity originated by intercept sites to analytical summaries by national-level agencies. The reports cover all phases of maritime activity, but a large portion of the coverage concerns merchant shipping operations in and around Southeast Asia. The reporting of Communist Far Eastern naval activity reveals great attention to detail by intercept sites monitoring Communist naval communication circuits. The several references contained in the traffic

Ground Forces - The timing of the compromise of national level SIGINT summaries and Army-Theater level daily and weekly intelligence summaries and estimates was significant. The enemy launched the Tet offensive in Vietnam on 31 January 1968. Study of these top level intelligence papers provided the enemy a good picture of U.S. intelligence capabilities in battle. The estimative process and the
relative value of captured documents, prisoner interrogation, agents and special intelligence was revealed to the enemy.

The loss of ALCRITICOM messages divulged the U.S. Army SIGINT collection organization, except Southeast Asia, and the Special Security organization for dissemination of special intelligence. This information provides a windfall to the enemy intelligence operations analysis of U.S. strategic intelligence resources.

Electronic Warfare - Messages contained in the GOPI traffic provided detailed information regarding U.S. capabilities to intercept and exploit North Vietnamese communications associated with air, surface-to-air and early warning/air surveillance defenses. While these communications provided extensive information on a variety of defense operations, they were also exploited to provide threat advisory warnings to U.S. aircraft and to develop electronic order of battle.

U.S. capabilities to provide electronic warfare support through the intercept of radar and IFF emissions were also revealed.

In addition to providing threat advisory warnings, messages in the GOPI traffic also disclosed U.S. efforts to actively counter NVN defenses through the employment of radar and VHF communications jamming.

Political, Economic, and Sociological - Most of the political, economic and sociological information deals with some aspect of the Vietnamese War and is contained in daily and weekly intelligence summaries originated by DIRNSA, CINCPACFLT and SSO MACV. The overall intelligence loss included three types of compromise involving: (1) identification of U.S. intelligence interests; (2) revelation of the extent of the U.S. intelligence effort; and (3) compromise of the status of U.S. knowledge.

In the areas of North Vietnamese economic aid some sources and methods were revealed. Our detailed interest in the progress of the Cultural Revolution in Communist China was also revealed. Conceivably the enemy could take steps to deny some of this information by tightening his communications procedures. An enemy could also

Concerning infiltration, it is revealed that the U.S. was well informed (through ARDF) on the movement of major enemy combat units in South Vietnam, but it also showed that we knew very little of how enemy manpower was sent to the combat theater or the scope of this input. The major U.S. breakthrough in this area did not occur until approximately one month later.
Through the GOPI traffic it was shown that the U.S. had only a limited knowledge of the Communist logistics system for sending supplies to support the war in South Vietnam in early 1968. At this time we were only beginning to grasp the organization and functions of the General Directorate of Rear Services apparatus of the North Vietnamese.

After review of all this material, the Vietnamese Communists would be impressed by the scope of U.S. intelligence operations but would probably also conclude that their vital interests in terms of infiltration of troops and supplies into the South had not been seriously impaired. They would probably also conclude that the doctrine of operational necessity far out-weighs any increased security measures that would be necessary in order to deny this type of information to the U.S.

Weather - Intercepted weather data originated at and North Vietnamese civil and military facilities comprise more than 20% of the GOPI message traffic. The information from these reports is used to support friendly operations in Southeast Asia, and in some cases is used as a basis for intelligence analysis. A denial of this weather data could result in serious damage to U.S. air and surface operations over and near communist-held territory.

Friendly Operations - The existence of many U.S. operations and projects was disclosed by GOPI traffic onboard PUEBLO. The extent of detail about each varied considerably - from mention of the codename or nickname to a gross account of a mission objective, concept of operation and evaluation of effectiveness. Much of the intelligence detail was perishable but its value to the enemy rests in the revelation of the depth of U.S. collection programs, the evaluation processes of data, and dissemination and use of the final products. PUEBLO GOPI traffic provided an indication of U.S. success in exploiting enemy communications and the heavy dependence on COMINT in tactical operations. COMBAT APPLE and mission results summaries and bi-weekly operations reports from SECGRUDDETUs afloat are prime examples. Particularly damaging were messages from senior levels of command which revealed areas and degree of interest and sometimes may have been a reflection of national policy or military strategy.

Mission schedules, usually for the short term, when combined with mission results summaries permitted an accurate description of U.S. reconnaissance programs. On the other hand, enemy operational requirements will probably override security considerations in some areas and thus permit continued collection against some targets.

Miscellaneous - Nuclear - A report derived from conclude that the device was airdropped, that the altitude of the burst was between 3,000 and 25,000 feet and that it probably was a thermonuclear failure. All of the reported information on had been reported in the press by AEC news releases except the altitude of the burst, therefore it is believed that no damage to future collection programs will result.
III. ASSESSMENT

A. Air Defense and General Air Activity

1. Air Defense

Information contained in over 200 reports reveals the capability and areas of interest of portions of the U.S. SIGINT collection effort against the air defense organizations of North Vietnam and Cambodia. The reports include mission summaries of airborne collectors as well as reports from ground collection stations of all the military services. The reports demonstrate a capability to analyze the air defense structure of the target country and to use this information to provide real time tactical mission support and to estimate the system's capabilities and weaknesses in addition to using it to view other areas of activity, for instance radar tracking of bomber movements.

North Vietnam - Intelligence on North Vietnamese air defense was contained primarily in DTV Air Summaries from Mission Summaries from USA-32, Mission Summaries from VQ-1 detachment, Danang and COMBAT APPLE Mission Results from Numerous other reports such as TACREP's, SPO'Ts, CRITICs, and other serialized SIGINT reports as well as technical data from the SCA sites also provided an insight into U.S. knowledge of their organization and procedures and the degree of U.S. intelligence exploitation of this information.

Fighters - Information concerning North Vietnamese fighters included:

- Preflight schedules
- Take off and recovery times
- Numbers active
- Pilot billet numbers
- Home base and primary and alternate recovery bases.
- Alert status
- Nationality of pilots (North Korean, North Vietnamese, etc.)
- Rotation of aircraft to and from China
- Pilot-controller relationships
- CAP areas
- Tactics
- Aircraft characteristics and performance through pilot references to speeds, altitudes, fuel checks, instrument readings and armament expenditures.
- Mig losses
- Navigational and recovery procedures
- IFF usage
- Methods used by analysts to determine aircraft type
Types of equipment deployed and active
Capabilities of equipment

Enemy command channels and organizations.

Movement of AAA units
Subordination of AAA units
Operator communications concerning sightings, shootdowns and the capture of downed aircrews.
Cambodia - Cambodian air defense reports included:

Border violations by U.S. aircraft.
Attack on Cambodian village by U.S. aircraft.

2. General Air Activity

Air activity other than air defense was generally similar for all of the target countries. It included civil and military transport movements and international flights entering or leaving a country.

Of the following information, the most detailed and perhaps the most revealing was contained in the 5th AF week1, brief which is a recap of the briefing given the Commander, 5th AF. The report apparently used all sources which could be released at the top secret codeword level. Although the report does not reveal technical analytic methods or specific sources, it combines all of the best available intelligence on each subject and discloses the degree of knowledge possessed. Analysis of the information in the detail in which it was presented in the 5th AF report and the Daily SIGINT Summaries could give the Communists a fair estimate of the success of our intelligence effort against communist air targets.

North Vietnam - A specific exception to the routine transport activity was detailed summaries of the attack on the Lima site at Phou Pha Thi, Laos by North Vietnamese AN-2's. That incident was covered in
more detail in the GOPI traffic than any one other incident. Reports ranged from COMINT reports by individual collection sites to summary type reports. Information included the function of the site, details of the shootdowns by Air America helicopters and preliminary PTD analysis of the crashed AN-2's.

Most of the reporting on air activity was either air defense related or covered other activity such as bomber and transport movements which had been reflected in air defense communications. The ability of each of the countries to deny the U.S. this information then depends on their ability to either close down the communications concerned or to pass the information by a more secure means. Since the continuation of their air defense system depends on communications, they will have to use a more secure means of communicating in order to prevent the U.S. from collecting the type of information which appeared in the GOPI traffic. Air defense communications must be simple and timely in order to be effective. The complexity of any encryption system that is employed must not be so great that it impedes the flow of information to the degree that it is no longer useful. Automatic encryption devices are costly and require complex communications equipment as well as a long installation time. Simpler systems are vulnerable to exploitation and are difficult for operators to use, since they are not automatic and usually require manual encoding and decoding of messages. The bulk of the intelligence that is available through the intercept of these communications is therefore timely and valuable to the U.S. but is difficult for the target country to conceal. Each of the countries involved probably already has
a program for securing its air defense communications but economic and technical limitations prevent a more rapid implementation. This being the case, the acquisition of the GOPI intelligence will probably point out the areas of greatest loss and may serve to reassign or reaffirm priorities in their air defense overhaul. The emphasis may be shifted to areas where security can be achieved rapidly at modest expense such as aggressive COMSEC training for their communications operators. Measures such as this would have a degrading effect on intelligence collection in specific areas, however probably would not have an overwhelming effect on the entire collection effort.

Little overall change in intelligence collection capability against the air defense structure of the countries involved should be expected except as a result of changes in structure and equipment evolving from programmed modernization. Some immediate effect may be felt as the result of "tightening up" should North Korea give the GOPI intelligence to the other countries concerned. This "tightening up" could take the form of improved security practices, emission control, frequency changes, etc. and could cause a loss in timeliness in areas such as advisory warning and other real time tactical support, but probably would have little effect on long term collection efforts.
B. MARITIME FORCES

Information of a maritime nature contained in the GOPI message traffic covers a wide spectrum of intelligence. The traffic includes numerous reports from intercept sites which are comprehensive and detailed, and which, over a three-week period, may well indicate a site's collection capability. The traffic also contains reports originating at intermediate processing centers, such as ______ which summarize and highlight intelligence for specific collection categories. Other levels of intelligence reporting are apparent in traffic originating at the fleet level and at the national level. A summary of the contents of various types of GOPI message traffic of a maritime nature follows.
Review and analysis of the GOPI traffic of a maritime nature provides an excellent overview of U.S. communications intelligence collection and processing needs, interests, and priorities for information of a maritime nature. It also reveals the degree of detail of collection effort, an indication of the resultant manpower required to accomplish this task. Since almost complete reporting for the three-week period at the various hierarchal levels (intercept site, intermediate processing site, fleet, national) is contained in the traffic, it is possible to determine what use of specific information is made at each level and the degree of interest evidenced at each level for information category types. The times of processing and the dispatch with which information is transmitted are obvious from date-time group information on each message. The failure to report information known by Communist nations to have occurred indicate gaps in U.S. collection capability.
it was detected provides an excellent indication of U.S. collection capability for such an effort. The reporting of other activity reveals great attention to detail and the considerable dependence of the U.S. collection effort on communications intelligence as a source of such information. The detailed and
detailed

Provided with data such as is enumerated above, Communist nations could take precautions to improve the security of their maritime operations, if they considered such precautions worth the cost and effort required. A simple tightening up of security measures by the Communists on communications nets would result in a marked decrease in the U.S. intelligence collection effort.

Denial by the Communist nations of the type of information contained in the GOPI message traffic would greatly reduce the efficiency of U.S. communications intelligence collection programs. The considerable quantity and detail of information obtained

could easily be denied if the Communists established more stringent rules over radio utilization. Similarly, a reduction in naval-type communications could be effected which could cause a considerable loss to the U.S. intelligence collection effort.

By virtue of possessing this message traffic, the Communist nations have available to them an overview of U.S. communications intelligence collection and processing needs, interests, and priorities. This suggests that they, therefore, could apply comprehensive security controls over such communications at a time of their own choosing.
C. Ground Forces

The GOPI messages of greatest potential value to enemy ground force intelligence were the MACV-J2 Daily Intelligence Summaries (DISUM's) and Weekly Intelligence Estimate Updates (WIEU's) issued during the period 2-22 January 1968. Other documents affecting ground force intelligence include: NSA Southeast Asia SIGINT Summaries; NSA technical messages; and intercepted communist forewarning transmissions. These documents provided a good basis for evaluating the overall U.S. combat intelligence state-of-the-art. The GOPI compromise occurred just prior to a major country-wide enemy offensive in Vietnam. The TET offensive was launched on 30 January 1968, just seven days after the capture of the PUEBLO.

Evaluation of the compromise should consider the nature of the war during and immediately following the period of compromise. During January 1968 the enemy in South Vietnam was positioning his forces for the TET Offensive and generally avoiding contact with allied forces except in the KHE SANH area. Enemy troop and logistics preparations for the TET Offensive began as early as October 1967 when two NVA divisions, the 304th and 320th, reinforced the DMZ front area. These two divisions moved into the battle area under a way-station communications command and control system.

The main assault of the enemy TET Offensive was thwarted by the end of February. The enemy then repositioned his regular forces which until late March had been mostly uncommitted and launched a series of assaults against Saigon during May and June. Following a pause in July, another series of lower intensity attacks were conducted in August. During the last nine months of 1968 Allied forces began a series of counterattacks which seriously degraded enemy offensive capabilities. Enemy personnel and weapons losses in South Vietnam for 1968 were unusually high.

In March of 1968, the enemy CDRS* again accelerated the movement of men and material to South Vietnam. Control was exercised by way-stations using low-powered voice radios, transmitting exploitable codes. During 1968 the CDRS communications became, and remains a highly valuable source of information to U.S. forces in the field. Enemy tactical communications increased the use of radio means, using low-level ciphers and codes which increased the value of SIGINT to a great degree by early 1969 as compared to early 1968.

The outcome of the war and enemy behavior since February 1968 indicates that the ground war in Vietnam was not affected by the compromise. The compromise is significant as concerns the U.S. intelligence apparatus designed to support ground forces not only in Vietnam but throughout the world. The compromise of DISUM's and WIEU's gave the enemy an insight into MACV's combat intelligence procedures, and the analytical and estimative capabilities of a U.S. Army Theater level head.

* - General Directorate of Rear Services

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quarters in combat.

The individual intelligence items were not singularly important; however, the compiled and analyzed formats of the reports would have great value. The enemy was aware that captured documents, equipment and personnel were exploited; he knew that agents were employed, aerial photography utilized and order of battle maintained, but after the compromise he saw them pieced together. From knowledge of this process, he would be able to determine the strong and weak points in his security. He could also determine gaps or strong and weak points in Allied intelligence capabilities. In addition, he could determine the methods of Allied tactical reaction to various intelligence information.

The DISUM's and WIEU's made many references to captured documents as intelligence sources. The listing of Combined Document Exploitation Center (CDEC) control numbers indicated a sophisticated system for this purpose. Conceivably the enemy could institute additional security measures to defend against loss of documents.

Information resulting from the interrogation of prisoners and ralliers was also greatly in evidence in the DISUM's and WIEU's. From comparing the dates of capture with the dates the information was obtained, it probably was obvious that the individuals were divulging information readily and with an apparent minimum of resistance. The enemy may attempt to indoctrinate his personnel to counter this source of intelligence in the future.

Agent-obtained information as reported in the DISUM's and WIEU's was probably not specific enough to compromise individuals or networks. The agent's name, code names or numbers access, method or operation, specific location or other incriminating data were not stated. In some cases it may have been possible to associate location, event and time to an individual known by the enemy to have had access. However this would have been a long, arduous process and unlikely to have been successful.

COMINT intercepts from the Ministry of Public Security and Central Research Directorate, both in Hanoi and from various unlocated and unidentified intelligence entities were among the GOPI material. These intercepts, which were obtained from 1964 to January 1968, revealed U.S. knowledge of
The messages described activity of CHICOM forces in NVN and indicated the U.S. level of knowledge.

The externals and body of several NSA technical messages lucidly revealed order of battle information on U.S. Military Intelligence elements. A 4 January NSA technical message listed a distribution which included world-wide locations of Army and Air Force Special Security Offices (SSO's). A 17 January NSA technical message conveyed routing instructions for internal DA offices to include ACSI and Intelligence Threat Analysis Group (ITAG) as well as several European SSO's. An 18 January NSA technical message explains in detail the YANKEE serialization. ALCRITICOM 1-68, 3 January from NSA lists callsign changes and locations of AFA units in and CONUS. ALCRITICOM 3-68, 15 January and ALCRITICOM 4-68, 17 January both from NSA list callsign changes and locations of various CRITIC stations including some SSO's. The primary order of battle for the U.S. Army SIGINT collection organization, and the organization for dissemination of special intelligence was neatly divulged.

The bulk and detail of the SIGINT collection station reports provide the enemy with clear evidence of a collection means of which he was already well aware. The routing of these messages, and the final national level and Army-Theater level analysis provided a good view on the U.S. special intelligence system and its capability to support ground combat operations. This information is of a strategic and long-range nature, and will stimulate the enemy to devise means, methods and doctrine to thwart or exploit this capability.

During almost 14 months of ground combat in South Vietnam since the compromise, there is no evidence to indicate that enemy ground forces have implemented countermeasures based on the captured GOPI documents.

The impact of the compromise on infiltration and logistics in Southeast Asia is treated in section III-E of this report.
D. ELECTRONIC WARFARE

A substantial number of the 7,000-8,000 messages transmitted over the GOPI broadcast contained information relative to or obtained from U.S. efforts in the area of Electronic Warfare. From these messages considerable insight is available relative to U.S. ECM techniques (both passive and active), capabilities, limitations, and the tactical employment of Electronic Warfare. Although the majority of traffic is primarily concerned with Southeast Asia, it can be inferred that the same techniques and capabilities can be used in other geographic areas.

Radar Intercept - Reports such as the mission summaries and a SIGINT Trend Analysis Report issued by VQ-1 Detachment Danang provide information relative to U.S. capabilities and efforts to intercept and analyze non-communications signals. Information revealed in these reports included:

Electronic Order of Battle - U.S. efforts to develop and maintain electronic order of battle for North Vietnam is evidenced in a variety of tactical reports and summaries. Two of the more significant reports containing information relative to this aspect of Electronic Warfare are USJ-794's "Weekly Air Defense Wrap-up" and daily "DRV Air Summary." Both of these summaries contain specially formatted sections listing EOB for SAM, early warning/air surveillance CGI, and coastal surveillance sites engaged in surface tracking. Detailed information contained in these summaries regarding U.S. efforts/capabilities to identify and locate SAM sites and other radar tracking entities include:
ECCM - Although considerable information reflecting U.S. efforts and capabilities to intercept and exploit radar and IFF emissions was revealed in the GOPI messages, attempts to counter these capabilities through extensive modification or complete replacement of present equipments would be difficult and costly, particularly on a short term basis.
Radar Jamming - Eighteen messages included in the GOPI traffic provided an excellent picture of U.S. ECM tactics and procedures. These detailed reports included technical assessments of the effectiveness of U.S. jamming against North Vietnamese air surveillance, GCI, fire control and missile control radars. ECM tactics of EB-66 type aircraft (as disclosed by shifting from chaff drops to active jamming) were apparent from traffic. Additionally, the functions and capabilities of specific ECM equipments carried aboard aircraft were revealed.

Based on information obtained from this traffic regarding U.S. tactics and procedures, the enemy may decide to incorporate selected modifications or alter his tactics in an attempt to degrade the effectiveness of U.S. jamming.

Communications Jamming - U.S. efforts to actively counter the NVN CCI capability through the employment of ALQ-55 VHF communications jamming equipment are reflected in a CTF 77 message promulgating the rules of engagement for communications jamming and in various air summary sections of the post flight mission reports.

The CTF 77 message states in essence that AAWC and/or Strike Support Ship will request the initiation of VHF communications jamming attack on airborne Mig aircraft. The request to cease jamming would be initiated by the same units when the threat no longer exists.
The summaries indicated requests made for activation/termination of jamming including the reasons for the requests and on occasion, estimates of the effectiveness of the jamming.

While these messages provide detailed information on the employment of the ALQ-55 against tactical voice communications, the disclosure should not be particularly detrimental since the North Vietnamese are probably aware of U.S. jamming tactics due to their frequent employment.

Advisory Warnings - Information in the GOPI message traffic revealed U.S. efforts to provide advisory warnings to U.S. aircraft.

and COMBAT APPLE mission reports reflect the issuance of threat advisory warnings to U.S. aircraft when intercept of NVN tactical voice communications indicated the fighters posed a threat or were about to engage U.S. aircraft.

A mission summary reflects the passing of a surface-to-air missile (SAM) warning to U.S. aircraft based intercept of guidance emissions and tracking communications from a SAM site in the VINH area.

An exchange of message traffic between SEVENTHFLTL units and a spot item revealed the issuance of a border violation warning to a U.S. aircraft. Basis for the warning was identified as intercept of NVN air defense tracking reflecting a hostile (U.S.) aircraft penetrating the NVN/CHICOM border.

These messages clearly reveal U.S. capabilities to exploit North Vietnamese defense communications including the The loss of any one of these sources would degrade U.S. warning capabilities. Compromise of the source of tracking information is potentially the most damaging as this data represents a significant source of information on.

Assessment - Since major changes in all exploitable facets of active emitters (parameters, operational characteristics, and techniques) obviously cannot be effected in a short period of time, overall ELINT collection capabilities should not be substantially reduced. Some changes might be expected to occur from the compromise of the information contained in the GOPI traffic; however, these changes would probably appear in gradual steps which could probably be countered as they occurred.
Intercept could also be denied through the practice of emission control when reconnaissance platforms are known to be in the area. However, since the emitters must radiate to provide required defense information, countries of interest would probably not deny themselves this information at the expense of signal intercept.

The potential for damage to communications intercept is greater. Increased security procedures including emission control could result in intelligence loss. However, it can be expected that the requirement will continue to exist to pass the information that is exploited from present forms of communications with overall loss of intelligence being dependent upon a particular country's capability to develop/produce or acquire secure communications equipment and codes.
E. POLITICAL, ECONOMIC, AND SOCIOLOGICAL (to include information on:
foreign relations; internal security, manpower/infiltration, imports/
exports and logistics).

Most of the significant information in this category was contained in
daily and weekly intelligence summaries originated by DIRNSA, CINCPACFLT
and SSO MACV. Lesser amounts of significant information were contained in
traffic originated by the CNO, USM-808 (Phu Bai, South Vietnam).

For example, DIRNSA originated messages believed to be on board the
PUEBLO included nineteen South East Asia SIGINT summaries for the period
1 to 22 January. CINCPACFLT messages included some sixteen COMMINSUMS
covering the period 2-22 January, plus one message containing 6 items quoted
from the DIA advance INISUM (170046Z) of 17 January 1968, SSO MACV origi-
nated messages included eleven daily intelligence summaries (DISUM's) and
two Weekly Intelligence Estimate Updates (WI:Ell's).

The number of messages containing significant political, sociological,
economic items transmitted on the WESTPAC operational intelligence broad-
cast (GOPI) during the period amounted to approximately 800 messages.

The intelligence information lost in this category is of several var-
ieties. First there is considerable information which clearly identifies
specific U.S. intelligence interests and areas of interest; second, certain
details revealing the depth and breadth of the U.S. intelligence collec-
tion and analytical techniques as applied in January 1968 have been com-
promised; and third or last, certain U.S. intelligence hypotheses, esti-
mates and/or situation judgements based on the information then available
have been compromised. However, after careful review and consideration of
Vietnamese Communist behavior since the capture of the PUEBLO, one impres-
sion remains foremost; that is, that up to the present time we have not
encountered any evidence to indicate that the compromise of the materials
in the GOPI traffic has had any measurable effect on our ability to gather
intelligence in Southeast Asia.

The paragraphs which follow identify the intelligence losses in this
category. Where practical an attempt has been made to discuss and evalu-
ate the loss of information and assess the impact this loss might have on
existent or planned U.S. operations and intelligence programs. One such
impact might be the ability of an enemy to deny us this information in
the future.

1. A special U.S. interest in locating and identifying becomes very apparent. It is quite clear that cer-
tain are designated "high interest", and that when are designated "high interest" an at-
tempt is made to secure The messages also reveal "high interest." These include whether the whether
there is any report of and whether there have been any instruc-
tions from the

One message reveals that consideration
is given to conducting is of special interest.

The chief losses concerning this collection program are: (1) the detail which we devote to following the subject and (2) the sources we use to obtain "tip-off" information may be of special interest.

Armed with this information the enemy could take certain precautions and be more secretive in requesting special handling or expeditions and thus deny us some of our tip-off information.
Intercepts of messages such as those cited have provided valuable information on North Vietnamese

If apprised of the fact that we intercept this type of data and consider it useful; (and it is apparent that we do since it is highlighted in our intelligence summaries) it would be relatively easy for the North Vietnamese to deny this data in the future by

4. U.S. intelligence interest is apparent from the detailed manner in which we report fragmentary information concerning the communications intercepts provide us information on;

Such information, if made available to Peiping, would probably result in an effort on their part to improve and tighten their communications security procedures. Such a tightening would probably result in denying some of the information that the U.S. finds useful.

5. In the area of foreign relations the only report of substance among the GOPI messages was the MACV DISUM No. 21-68 which discusses an NLF document captured in Binh Duong province and a NVA cadre's notebook taken in Hau Nghia province, both in South Vietnam. The first item reveals NLF determination not to negotiate with the "Thieu-Ky clique" but a willingness to enter into discussions with the U.S. in order to reach a solution which will amount to an "honorable defeat" for the Americans. The second document discusses NVN support of the NLF, the favorable circumstances for a general offensive and uprising and the firm expectation that the Communists will have defeated the Allies by mid-summer 1968.

No analytical discussion follows the summarization of either of

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these documents. Consequently, the enemy would have no clear idea of our attitude regarding their authenticity or relevance to our view of the progress of the war.

6. Manpower and Infiltration. This subject is the one most extensively treated in the compromised materials. Virtually every DISUM and SIGINT Summary and a major portion of the USM-808 spot reports deal with the movement of enemy personnel in North Vietnam, South Vietnam and Laos. While these reports indicate that the U.S. was well informed (through ARDF) of the movements of major enemy combat units in South Vietnam, it also shows that we knew very little of how enemy manpower was sent to the combat theater or the scope of this input. It is extremely fortunate that these materials did not become available to the Communists as little as one month later, because by then a major breakthrough in SIGINT was significantly increasing our understanding of the workings of the North Vietnamese infiltration system.

One of the major infiltration themes running through all this material is the deployment of the NVA 304th and 320th divisions from their garrisons in the North Vietnamese panhandle to their positions in the vicinity of Khe Sanh in South Vietnam's Quang Tri province. It is clear from this data that we were aware that major forces were being sent south in late 1967 and had correctly determined their identity and missions by January 1968.

These materials further reveal that we were aware that a system of infiltration way stations—labeled Alfa through Echo—had been established to facilitate the movement of the 304th and 320th. We recognized that these were temporary entities that were disestablished once the main force units had arrived at their destinations.

What is most remarkable about these reports of infiltration activity, however, is that they show that we were not aware of the major movement of manpower which had begun in mid-winter 1967/68—other than that involved in these two divisional structures. There is no discussion of the groups of replacement personnel which were then being dispatched to expand existing military units in the South and to compensate for the losses that would occur in the 1968 Tet offensive.

The reports do contain scattered references to the commo-liaison stations (T-1, T-2, T-3, T-4, and T-15 are noted) that we subsequently came to recognize as the basic elements of the manpower pipeline. Two infiltration group numbers were mentioned (228 and 231) as being associated with enemy units which had been sent to the III Corps area, but there is no indication that we knew that all groups were numbered and that these numbers revealed destinations. Finally, the reports contained a few references to the two-watt radios used in the infiltration system, but did not show that we regularly exploited these communications or realized their significance relative to the movement of enemy personnel.
On the topic of manpower, apart from infiltration, the captured intelligence reports contained only limited data. There are two significant items, both related to the question of Communist recruiting problems in South Vietnam. The first is a CAS report discussing Viet Cong difficulties in procuring manpower in the III Corps area (MACV DISUM 20-68) and the second is a report of a prisoner interrogation which also revealed Viet Cong recruiting efforts in Communist Military Region 2 (MACV DISUM 21-68). Our knowledge of enemy manpower procurement in the South has always been limited and it is possible that the Communists would only be amused by what was contained in these reports.

7. Logistics. Like the infiltration of personnel, these materials show that the U.S. had only a limited knowledge of the Communist system for sending supplies to support the war in South Vietnam as of early 1968. At that point we were only beginning to grasp the organization and functions of the General Directorate of Rear Services apparatus that had been created by the North Vietnamese outside of their borders. We were aware of the 559th Transportation Group in Laos -- the principal forward logistical authority for the war -- and of one of its chief subordinates, the 70th Transportation unit.

We were not aware of the elaborate system of Binh Trams, work-camps, warehouses, transshipment points and commo-liaison stations which were already in being by the time these materials were compromised. They reveal that we did intercept, on an intermittent basis, some readable communications which show the movement of specific types and quantities of war-related material. They also include at least one collateral report (in DISUM 12-68) from an agent source which discusses enemy efforts to move supplies into South Vietnam via Cambodia. On the whole, however, these materials would probably suggest to the Vietnamese Communists that we had only a limited grasp of their logistics system by January 1968.

8. One message originated by CNO quoted a CIA CIB item on Laos stating, "The king fearing the loss of Nam Bac would threaten the approaches to the royal capital at Luang Prabang had pressured the military into over extending itself in order to defend the area. This had resulted in a general weakening of the government's defense posture throughout Laos, most significantly in the South." "The loss of Nam Bac is more a reflection of the lack of decisive leadership within the Royal Laotian Army than an indication that the communists have embarked on a larger offensive role in Laos."

This item contains analytical judgements which could be embarrassing to the U.S. government if they were made known to the government of Laos.

9. Security. Vietnamese Communist officials examining these materials would have to conclude that the U.S. is privy to substantial quantities of the operational traffic broadcast by its tactical elements in South Vietnam and to occasional transmissions in the North. Moreover, they would be
impressed that the U.S. has an efficient exploitation program for captured personnel and documents. They would probably conclude, however, that increased security measures to deny this information to the U.S. in future are not feasible.

The operational requirements of combat and support units in the South almost certainly prohibit the adoption of coding for all but the most important traffic. In the North the same practical considerations apply, particularly in the fastbreaking traffic related to air operations.

It is possible that after reviewing this material that the Communists might take steps to reduce the volubility of their troops who fall into allied hands and to limit the amount of paper being produced by field units.
F. WEATHER

The GOPI traffic contained about 2500 messages containing weather data which had been intercepted from North Vietnamese and North Vietnamese Civil, Civil Air, Military Air, Shipping, Naval and communications. Since measures are taken to conceal the weather information by the transmitting facility such as simple encryption and daily changing identifiers, a certain amount of technical analysis must be performed by the intercept site in order to put the weather information in a usable form for the consumer.

The weather information from these reports is used to support air operations in SEA and in some cases used as a basis for intelligence analysis.
G. FRIENDLY OPERATIONS

The existence of many U.S. operations and projects was disclosed by the GOPI traffic onboard PUEBLO. The extent of detail about each varied widely - from a mere mention of the operation or project, usually by codename or nickname, to a gross account of its objective, concept of operation, and evaluation of effectiveness. Much of the intelligence detail contained in any one message was often perishable and would be of little value to any but an on-the-scene observer. Its value to a remote observer, either in time or distance, rests in the revelation of the degree of detail the U.S. is capable of collecting, the significance attached to a particular intelligence target, and the use to which such intelligence would be put. Thus, the major impact of loss of information relating to U.S. operations and projects is not necessarily disclosure of their existence but disclosure of details of such operations or projects. In some cases, disclosure of a collection program to the enemy probably was not especially damaging since he undoubtedly realized its existence already. On the other hand, PUEBLO GOPI traffic has provided the enemy with some measure of U.S. success in exploiting his communications for tactical use. Mission results summaries and bi-weekly operations reports from afloat detachments are prime examples. Particularly damaging were the messages from higher levels of command which granted approval or requested information relating to operational concepts. These obviously revealed a degree of interest which may have been a reflection of national policy or military strategy.

The following paragraphs describe the degree of disclosure of details of some U.S. operations and projects and attempt to assess the damage to such operations that exploitation of the disclosed information may have in the future.

COMBAT APPLE - Mission results summaries in the form of approximately 17 messages originated by USA 32 provided a comprehensive insight into the objective and results obtained by COMBAT APPLE reconnaissance missions. These formatted reports consistently included the following information: The mission number, times on station of the mission aircraft, general location while on station, significant enemy activity noted during the mission, observed SAM activity and report of alerts and warnings.

Analysis of these messages reveal additional information related to the U.S. collection programs, including the importance of ELINT and COMINT to the overall intelligence picture. In addition, the degree of success in integrating derived ELINT and COMINT and their use in tactical operations is obvious. Preliminary reports issued by USA 32 based on information obtained from COMBAT APPLE mission aircraft while still on station indicate the flow of such intelligence on a real time basis. Coupled with the report element of warnings and alerts by COMBAT APPLES mentioned above, this provides a reasonably accurate picture of the function of COMBAT APPLE. Significant enemy
activity which was reported in all the mission results summaries nearly always included DRV air and SAM activity and demonstrated a capability of COMBAT APPLE to collect effectively against these targets.

Proof that enemy communications related to SAM and air activity over North Vietnam are being exploited on a real time basis is not considered as being particularly damaging to the U.S. intelligence efforts since the enemy must continue to communicate in one way or another. These communications are not especially suitable for shifting to land lines. On the other hand, evidence of the volume of information provided by these communications will probably cause the Vietnamese to tighten up their communications procedures and at the same time consider shifting to secure communications in the distant future if the equipment becomes available. Operation of COMBAT APPLE missions will probably not be affected to a great degree in the future. However, their effectiveness as collectors of air and air defense intelligence may be seriously reduced. This in turn would significantly degrade effectiveness of U.S. air operations in Laos and North Vietnam.

Some mission results summaries originated by USA-32 disclosed a considerable amount of detail of operation and capability of these missions. These formatted reports revealed the mission name, area of operation, and time of the missions. In addition to operational information, these summaries contained significant intelligence concerning Vietnamese, Chinese and North Korean pilot activity in Southeast Asia, ground controllers at various airfields in North Vietnam, tactical fighter communications, transport and helicopter communications, and NVN SAM communications. Taken in toto, these mission summaries reveal the depth of U.S. knowledge of the North Vietnamese Air Force, its operations and capabilities.

As in the case of COMBAT APPLE, evidence that NVN air communications are being exploited is not considered especially damaging. However, the intimate detail and depth of knowledge of the NVN Air Force that has been made possible through the collection will probably cause the Vietnamese to tighten up their communications procedures and may eventually cause them to shift to secure communications if the equipment becomes available.

Continued operation of missions in the Gulf of Tonkin will probably not be affected by disclosure of this information. The greatest impact of the loss will probably be noted in decreased effectiveness of U.S. air operations against North Vietnam through the absence of detailed and timely knowledge of MIG reactions and SAM launchings. Knowledge of non-tactical aircraft (transports and some helicopters) movements will probably be least affected.

Primary damage to the operations probably occurred in the disclosure of information concerning the
degree of SIGINT support provided strike and recce forces over North Vietnam. Nearly 40 SEA Strike/Rece Alert and schedule messages originated by NSAPACREP VIETNAM provided a detailed description of U.S. air operations over North Vietnam and Laos. These are formatted reports and contain all the daily strike details necessary to inform SIGINT support stations of impending air operations. Elements included in the messages were: number and type of aircraft scheduled, callsigns, targets and times over target, composition of and flak suppression forces, communications frequencies, forces that would execute land and water approaches, schedules for SIGINT support platforms such as COMBAT APPLE, and

In addition, in excess of 30 strike advisory messages originated by SIGINT detachments provided daily schedules giving target, time over target, force composition and callsigns. This message traffic demonstrated a degree of interest and requirement for operational information by SIGINT elements in the area in order to provide effective COMINT support. Although none of these messages were SI, they nevertheless provided the modus operandi of daily U.S. bombing operations and support activity over North Vietnam which conceivably would also be used elsewhere if the situation warranted.

Two lengthy messages provided extensive information on project a concept for coordinating operations of individual SIGINT units for supporting various naval commands operating in a single tactical force. The USN message outlined the concept and objective and enumerated prerequisites. Requested comments and suggestions after having presented the complete concept. Although knowledge of the existence of this project would be of little value to the enemy, these messages nevertheless provide more detail into the inner workings of the SIGINT community and its practical applications to the support of naval forces afloat.

A total of 18 messages originated by AFSCC were included in the GOPI traffic. These evaluations addressed strike activity over North Vietnam with particular emphasis on determination of the effectiveness of U.S. ECM efforts on a strike-by-strike basis. Types of information included in all these messages were total force composition, mission, target(s), description of the potential and active threats to the force, the EW aircraft assigned to support the strike force including call-signs, orbit areas, and times, and resume of strike activity and results, and a most detailed estimate of the ECM effectiveness. In some cases, effectiveness and reliability of self-protection pods were evaluated as well.

These very detailed messages disclosed the heavy reliance being placed on electronic warfare and revealed ECM tactics and evaluation processes being employed in Southeast Asia. They would be of invaluable assistance to any country possessing the necessary technological competence in arriving at an advantageous position in the one-upmanship of electronic warfare. If so evaluated, disclosure of
information contained in these messages could result in a significant degradation of U.S. ECM efforts and an accompanying decrease in effectiveness of tactical air strikes.

- Schedules for missions against southern North Vietnam for eight days were included in the GOFI traffic. These daily schedules included launch and recovery times, area of operation of each mission, force composition, mission codename and were entitled "Support" messages. Individual mission objectives and concept of operations were not included. Since these were relatively short term schedules they would be of little value to the enemy from an operational standpoint. On the other hand, they do demonstrate the nature of the missions and might make it possible for the enemy to interdict this type mission in the future.

- Some 78 messages originated by COMPAIRRECON ONE DETACHMENT (VQ-1 DET) at Danang revealed a high level of knowledge of the North Vietnamese Air Force. Over 50 of these messages were mission summaries in which the following type information was reported: mission departure base and time, orbit position and times, recovery base and time, tracking, SAM associated communications, North Vietnam air activity, North Vietnamese air surveillance communications intercept, number of COMINT positions operational and volume of intercept obtained. Additionally, considerable "on board analysis" was performed and included in the reports which assisted and improved the real time support rendered by the missions. In addition to these summaries, there were several spot item reports on significant activity of high interest. Also, an incomplete five-part message, a SIGINT Trend Analysis Report - STAR, provided in-depth analysis of a comparative nature of several facets of North Vietnam air and air defense activity.

This VQ-1 DET traffic disclosed a high degree of understanding of the North Vietnamese Air Force operations and tactics. However, being based in large part on intercept of operational air communications, it is unlikely that the Vietnamese can reduce the intelligence take to a great degree. Some areas such as exploitation of air defense tracking, IFI, radar, and pilot billet suffixes (PBS) may be susceptible to increased security measures and thereby be denied U.S. collectors. In general, continued execution of missions can be expected to be useful with only minimal loss of effectiveness.

Non-Specified Operations - Several messages from addressed two separate operational incidents which occurred in close proximity to North Vietnam and revealed considerable detail of the employment of COMINT and ELINT by naval forces afloat and operation of the NDTS.* These messages the role of embarked SECREDETs as sources of border violation warnings was noted along with the interplay of ship's radar, COMINT, ELINT, and NDTS. One of the incidents involved a TAOS missile launch at a MIG-21 and in the description of the engagement considerable insight into the rules of engagement and means of identifying the target as hostile could be gained.

*Naval Tactical Data System
A series of at least seven bi-weekly operations reports originated by various SECGRUDETS afloat provided excellent information relating to their mission, operation and effectiveness. Included in these reports were highlights of the period, specific support rendered the ship's CIC, peculiar comms intercept allocations, statement of volume and quality of intercept, and general comments on equipment performance.

Employment of MK-36 Destroyers in North Vietnam was mentioned in at least two messages of the GOPI traffic -- once in connection with the presence of foreign merchant ships in Haiphong and once in a discussion of suitable interdiction targets described by name. No significant details of the MK-36 were disclosed; however, high level interest and concern for the safety of foreign merchant ships in Haiphong was evident.

A U.S. proposal for destruction of North Vietnamese coastal radars was discussed to considerable length in a CINCPACFLT message. Expression of concern over the possibility of introduction of SSM's into North Vietnam pointed out an intelligence gap. In addition, feasibility of a campaign to locate and destroy SSM's was discussed. Inferred in the discussion was a high degree of technical knowledge of Soviet SSM's.

Loss of information relating to operation of SECGRUDETS, the NIDS, and the MK-36 Destroyer will probably not seriously affect U.S. operations in the near future. On the other hand, evidence of

Reconnaissance Missions - Numerous operational messages concerning reconnaissance missions were included in the GOPI traffic. Types of missions were

in addition to other missions described elsewhere in this
report under specific mission headings. The type of information lost included routes, times, and altitudes of individual missions. Also, in the case of [_________] mission codenames, IFF codes, mission purpose, and recovery data were given. All information was of short term interest and would be of little if any value to enemy planners except to provide additional information on U.S. reconnaissance policy and methodology. No significant effect on future U.S. reconnaissance operations of this nature is expected to occur.
H. MISCELLANEOUS

1. Nuclear - A report summarizing the CHICOM nuclear test was in the GOPI traffic. This report indicated the fact that the weapon was airdropped, the altitude at which it was detonated (3,000 to 25,000 feet) and that it was probably the failure of a thermonuclear device.

The information in the above report is of little technical value to the CHICOMs. The fact that U.S. agencies CHICOM nuclear tests has appeared in AEC news releases and in some cases the news releases specified the and speculated on the type of device that had been detonated. In the case of all of the information which was in the above report, except the altitude, appeared in AEC news releases.

The loss of the information in the above report will have no effect on future debris collection programs.

3. NSAPACREP Vietnam - The existence of the NSAPACREP Vietnam was compromised by the loss of the WESTPAC broadcast materials. Prior to the loss of the PUEBLO the existence of this organization was tightly held in the U.S. SIGINT community, and even the name was classified CONFIDENTIAL.

The loss of this information should not affect the U.S. SIGINT effort in Vietnam and Southeast Asia.
IV. CONCLUSIONS

A. A major factor in the compromise was the disclosure of U.S. intelligence capability to collect from multiple sources, process and evaluate, and disseminate large volumes of information on a near real time basis to military forces in the field and naval forces afloat in time of war.

B. A second major factor in the compromise was the inclusion of SIGINT technical data, field and national SIGINT reports, and operational intelligence on the same broadcast.

C. Information and intelligence products from the various hierarchal levels (intercept site, intermediate processing site, fleet/theater, national) contained in the GOPI traffic indicated the use made of specific information at the various levels and their degree of interest in specific subject areas.

D. The extreme detail of many intelligence reports and the large volumes of technical information transmitted to and from field stations disclosed the level of effort afforded collection of SIGINT.

E. The content of individual messages was in large part perishable or of transitory value; however, analysis of all compromised messages would reveal methods of operation, collection, and analysis.

F. Operations summaries originated by SECGRUDETs afloat provided excellent information relating to collection and use of COMINT by forces afloat and contributed to the compromise.

G. The existence, technical capabilities, manning, and areas of coverage of many SIGINT sites and detachments were disclosed through transmission of technical information, personnel clearance and intelligence reports. A comprehensive analysis of the GOPI traffic would reveal extensive command and control information of the SIGINT community.

H. Because the loss of PUEBLO occurred at a time when enemy ground activity in South Vietnam was at a relatively low level (prior to the Tet offensive), the intelligence reporting from Southeast Asia contained in the GOPI message traffic was also reduced. Similarly, intelligence on activity reported during this period was minimal due to the normal seasonal operational lull which takes place at that time of the year.
J. The meanings of the codenames and nicknames listed in Attachment B are compromised.
V. RECOMMENDATIONS

1. That all members of the intelligence community take immediate steps to review their procedures for the handling of messages containing SIGINT information. Particular care should be taken in applying the need-to-know principal and limiting addressees.

2. That the OPINTEL broadcast be restricted to purely operational intelligence reports and all technical data be excluded. Further, that subscribers to the OPINTEL broadcast be severely restricted to those units afloat which have a clear requirement for such information. Additionally, consideration should be given to the use of privacy devices on OPINTEL broadcasts. These could include the use of "stunt boxes" designed to print only those messages specifically addressed to the receiving station.

3. That an additional broadcast or point-to-point links be established to provide technical support to SIGINT collectors. Operational intelligence reports would not be included on these broadcasts.

4. That the USIB advise the Department of State of the compromise of the information that the U.S. government is involved in an active program to intercept and read the communications of Southeast Asian countries.

5. That on-board message handling procedures be established whereby non-essential traffic is destroyed shortly after receipt rather than being retained for an arbitrary period, such as 30 days.

6. That appropriate service security organizations be informed of the personnel listed in Attachment A and their connection with sensitive intelligence. Also, that the agencies notify these personnel that they might become targets for concentrated exploitation.

7. That equipment and material (e.g., teletype paper) for high-risk areas be designed/obtained with such physical characteristics to assist in their prompt destruction. Water-soluble or highly inflammable paper is an example. Also, that destruction plans of units liable to enter high-risk areas contain provisions for immediate, "in extremis" actions (such as open fires), in the event time does not permit destruction by normal, procedural methods.

8. That continued use of the codewords and nicknames in Attachment B be reviewed by the cognizant organizations.
ATTACHMENT A

NAMES OF PERSONNEL WITH COMINT ASSOCIATIONS APPEARING IN GOPI TRAFFIC

Names of personnel with COMINT associations appearing in the GOPI message traffic held by USS PUEBLO at the time of its capture are listed below with the circumstances for their appearance in the traffic.

1. Security clearance information

   LOUTEN, Thomas M., GS-ll, Cleared Top Secret, CAT III COMINT.

   HARRIS, F. S., LTJG, USNR.
   COLE, I. C., LT, USN.
   DAUGHERTY, R. E., CTC, USN.
   CAVALLI, C. J., CT2, USN.
   BRITTON, F. M., CT3N, USN.
   ARNOLD, R. R., CT3N, USN.
   NOBLE, D. D., CPL, USMC.
   POINDEXTER, R. B., CT3N, USN.
   RIDGEWAY, R. L., CT3N, USN.
   EGGERS, D. E., CPL, USMC.
   PEGUES, W. M., CT2, USN.
   VALENTAS, D. W., CT3, USN.
   DARAGHY, F. R., CT3, USN.
   NELSON, R. J., CT3, USN.
   CAIRES, R. J., CT3N, USN.

   All cleared Top Secret CRYPTO, CAT III COMINT. (Composition of)

   WAGNER, F. J., CT2, USN, cleared Top Secret CRYPTO.
   CAT III COMINT, transferred from to NSGDET

   ARCHEBELLE, Jack W., CTC, USN. and
   PERRY, Edward O., CT3N, USN, cleared Top Secret CRYPTO.
   CAT III COMINT, transferred to as relief for:
   ROBARGE, CTC and
   SCOTT, CT3N

   MONTGOMERY, James E., CT3, cleared Top Secret CRYPTO,
   CAT III COMINT, transferred to as relief for:
   WILLIAMS, CT2

   GARRETT, Dennis W., CT3, and
   THOREN, Kenneth W., CT3, cleared Top Secret CRYPTO, CAT
   III COMINT, transferred to CTG 708, as reliefs for:
   STRAUMAN, CT3
   BOUMA, CT3
LEWIS, Steven W., CT2, cleared Top Secret Crypto, Cat III COMINT, transferred to ______ as relief for:

SHRIVER, CT2, transferred to ______ as relief for:

ALLEN, CT3

FOWLER, J. F., CT2, cleared Top Secret Crypto, Cat III COMINT, transferred to NAVSECGRUDET, ______ as relief for:

SCHUETZ, CT3

LANGE, H. J., IV, CTSN. ______ and

RUPP, W. H., CTSN. cleared Top Secret Crypto, Cat III COMINT, transferred to ______ as reliefs for:

ROBINSON, CTSN

GLENN, CTSN

GRIGGS, David T., GS-18, Special Consultant to MACSA, indoctrinated for CAT III COMINT to visit Yankee Station.

BRINGLE, William F., VADM, USN, ______ COMSEVENTHFLT and

STOKOE, J. E., LT, USN, ______ Flag Lieutenant indoctrinated for CAT III COMINT, to visit various commands in Seventh Fleet.

HYLAND, J. J., ADM, USN, CINCPACFLT

OSTERHOUT, R. S., CAPT, USN

BREGGAR, W. E., LCDR, USN and

SHERRY, R. J., CTC indoctrinated for CAT III COMINT. ADM HYLAND also indoctrinated TANGO/KILO/INDIA/OSCAR/PAPA. SHERRY authorized access to CRYPTO. COMINT encryption schedule listed.

McCAULEY, BRIAN, CAPT, USN ______ Fleet Ops Off, CINCPACFLT

RAYSON, Paul E., LCDR, USN ______ Asst Srk Force Officer and

GINDER, Jesse L., LT, USN ______ Ltg Analyst indoctrinated for CAT III COMINT. LT GINDER also indoctrinated TANGO/KILO. To visit various commands in Seventh Fleet.

VANDERBECK, E. A., LCDR, USN, ______ COMFAIRECONRON ONE cleared Top Secret CRYPTO, CAT III COMINT, deployed to Danang in support of ______ operations.

PETERS, V. W., LCDR, USN ______ EC121M EWAC, COMFAIRECONRON ONE

KEMPF, T. L., LT, USN ______ Intel Officer

BURGESS, L. L., LEUJG, USN ______ EW Eval

PALMER, M. D., ATL, USN ______ Enl Operator

BEST, D. J., CTSN, ______ Tech Elint

LUNDBERG, R. B., CTSN, USN

CHRISTMAN, C. T., Civ., Tech Support Rep and

WHITE, B. J., Civ., Electro Systems Rep

Clear top secret CRYPTO, CAT III COMINT, deployed to Danang in support of ______ operations.
MORRIS, J. M., LCDR, USN, cleared Top Secret, CAT III COMINT, to attend Talos Arm Conference as CTF77 reps.

MANNERZ, J. M., CAPT, USN, Ops Officer, CTF 77

BENDER, A. F., CDR, USN, Civ Officer cleared Top Secret, CAT III COMINT.

SHOLL, Theodore G., LCDR, USN, COMASWFORPAC, indoctrinated for CAT III COMINT to attend Sea of Japan Transit Intelligence Planning Conference, COMNAVFORJAPAN.

FORSTER, George W., CTC, USN, indoctrinated for CAT III COMINT, transferred to

MEYER, Gerald P., ENS, USNR, Cleared Top Secret, CAT III COMINT.

MILLER, Elvoyd C., CTL, USN, indoctrinated for CAT III COMINT, transferred to

KAPOS, Ervin (N), Civ, OEG REP SEACAG, indoctrinated for CAT III COMINT.

BISSEN, Paul Jr., SFC, MEARLE, Jeffrey W., SP4, USA, O'HEARN, Timothy C., SP4, USA and CASH, Robert W., PFC, USA, cleared Top Secret CRYPTO, CAT III COMINT to visit

EPES, H. H., JR., RADM, USN

AULT, F. W., CAPT, USN

ALDERTON, D. W., CAPT, USN

LORANGER, D., CAPT, USN

KISER, C. J., CAPT, USN

BUTLER, J. D., CDR, USN

HAYES, S. M., CDR, USN

SMITH, C. R., JR., CDR, USN

RATTE, P. W., CDR, USN

WILLETT, J. A., LCDR, USN

PARDOE, J. I. JR., LCDR, USN

AUSTIN, D. V., LT, USN

BANKOWSKI, M. J., LT, USN and JACKSON, G. L., LT, USN certified indoctrinated for CAT III COMINT (Personnel of COMCARDIV ONE).

SOMERVELL, Willis L., JR., CAPT, USN, OIC NAVWARESFAC, NORVA cleared Top Secret CRYPTO, CAT III COMINT, to visit various commands in Far East.

LANNING, Melvin T., AGCS, USN, cleared Top Secret CRYPTO, CAT III COMINT. To visit various commands in Far East.
2. Military Orders

ROBARGE, George A., CTC, USN, ordered to duty to NAVCOMMSTA with NAVSECGRUDET.

KILKINNEY, James E., CTSN, USN at modification of orders.

MANZ, Henry N., CT2, USN, at ordered to duty SERWSCOLCOM, NTC, GLKES.

3. Administrative Matters

LEE, CT2
VALLANCE, Alex (N), CT2 both from

SMITH, T. W., CTSN
BEEBE, N. L., CTSN, both from

TUGGLE, CTSN
CARE, CTSN
WAGNER, F. J., CT1, all from

HARRIS, LTJG
BOLLING, LCDR
COCCEI, ENS, all from

MITCHEL, LTJG from

BRANDT, CTSN, from

JACK, Norman W., from 509th RR GP

HOSKINS, LT, conducted liaison with Seventh Fleet 10-13 December concerning DRV NAVSUM.

BENSON, William D., CDR, USN, COMPHIBPAC request for CAT III COMINT clearance.

CURRIE, Glenn K., LTJG, USN, COMNAVPHIL requested to furnish information for COMINT clearance.

FURTADO, Francis J., LCDR, USN, COMNAVPHIL advised clearance determination pending.

McCLELLAN, Charles A., LCDR, USN, COMNAVPHIL granted authority to indoctrinate for CAT III COMINT.

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A-4
ADAMS, James N., RM3, USN, granted authority to indoctrinate for CAT III COMINT.

ORSIK, Walter A., LCDR, USN, COMNAVPHTL advised clearance determination pending.

STEINBRINK, Earl E., LCDR, USN, COMNAVPHTL advised clearance determination pending.

COOK, Creighton W., CAPT, USN, CINCPACFLT granted emergency authority to indoctrinate for CAT III COMINT.

CAMPION, Robert F., Jr., CDR, USN, COMNAVPHTL granted emergency authority to indoctrinate for CAT III COMINT.

MASON, James M., CAPT, USN, COMNAVPHTL granted authority to indoctrinate for CAT III COMINT.

FITCH, Kenneth R., LT, USN, advised investigative action initiated on an expedite basis.

WANAMAKER, Gregory, LT, USN, assumed duties as OIC, USN

BRAGUNIER, William, LTJG, USN,

SMALL, James L., LT, USN, assumed duties as OIC,

MOSHER, Robert E., CT3, USN, NAVSECGRUDET, request for authority to indoctrinate for CAT III COMINT.
Codenames and nicknames appearing in GOPI traffic 5-23 January 1968.