APPENDIX B
PRINCIPLES OF SECURITY AND DISSEMINATION

INTRODUCTION

1. These principles shall be the basis of all regulations for the
security and dissemination of Communications Intelligence issued by or
under the authority of WIIIB or LIIB and other appropriate authorities
of the Governments of the two parties. The scope and phrasing of such
regulations may vary in accordance with requirements of the parties,
agencies, departments, and ministries to whom they are designed to apply,
but all shall be in accord with these basic principles in every respect
and shall observe the standards herein as a minimum. As an aid to uniform
interpretation, each party shall forward all pertinent Board regulations
and directives to the other for information.

2. Conservation of CAINNT sources is of supreme importance and
there is no time limit for their safeguarding. It is essential that the
production, exploitation, and dissemination of CAINNT, resultant intelli-
genence, and related technical information and material be specially con-
trolled as specified herein.

DEFINITIONS

3. Communications Intelligence

a. Communications Intelligence (CAINNT) shall be construed to
mean technical and intelligence information derived from foreign commu-
nications and communications systems by other than the intended recipients.

b. CAINNT activities shall be construed to mean those activities
which produce CAINNT by the interception and processing of foreign communi-
cations passed by radio, wire, or other electromagnetic means, with specific
exceptions stated below, by the study of foreign communications systems and
by the processing of foreign encrypted communications, however transmitted.
Interception comprises search, intercept, and direction finding. Processing comprises range estimation, transmitter/operator identification, signal analysis, traffic analysis, cryptanalysis, decryption, study of plain text, the fusion of these processes, and the reporting of results.

3. c. Foreign communications are defined as all communications except:

   (1) Those of the Governments of the U.S. and the British Commonwealth.

   (2) Those exchanged among private organizations and nationals, acting in a private capacity, of the U.S. and the British Commonwealth.

   (3) Those of nationals of the U.S. and British Commonwealth appointed or seconded by their Governments to serve in international organizations.

   d. COMINT concerning weather is meteorological information (hydrometeorological data and all information concerning meteorological organizations and activities) which is derived from foreign communications, except information and data which is used for recognized weather purposes and which is derived from those portions of broadcasts (the schedules of which have been published by the World Meteorological Organization (WMO) or made internationally available by a recognized civil weather organization) which contain:

      (1) unenciphered WMO codes or

      (2) no code or cipher or disguised indicatives or

      (3) weather codes which have been made internationally available by recognized civil weather organizations.

   e. Special weather intelligence is that COMINT concerning weather which is assigned to the weather sub-category of Category II. The purpose of this sub-category is to handle separately that COMINT concerning weather which may be disseminated to users who do not require access to other codeword COMINT.
3. "Y" is tactical COMINT produced by units which are designated to provide close support for the commanders of combat forces. (See Appendix P.)

g. COMINT and COMINT activities as defined herein shall not include:

(1) Intercept and processing of unencrypted written communications, except written plain text versions of communications which have been encrypted or are intended for subsequent encryption.

(2) Intercept and processing of press, propaganda and other public broadcasts, except for encrypted or "hidden meaning" passages in such broadcasts.

(3) Certain operations conducted by U.S., U.K., or Commonwealth security authorities.

(4) Censorship.

(5) The peacetime exercise of 'Y' resources in NATO commands, which involves the interception, analysis and exploitation only of radio transmissions (albeit "foreign") on networks established or used for exercises within or between those commands, provided that:

(a) 'Y-Type' information produced during the exercise or revealed in post-exercise analysis, and information about the 'Y' resources involved, is adequately safeguarded by NATO security regulations paralleling those for wartime 'Y' operations, and the U.S. and U.K. retain the right to express their views to the Command concerned as to the adequacy of the security classification applied.

(b) Techniques used in the production of exercise 'Y' during the exercise do not exceed in complexity the COMINT techniques involved in producing Category II(X) COMINT as defined in Annexure III.

(6) The interception and study of non-communications transmissions (ELINT).
4. Types of COMINT

There are two types of COMINT: Crypt Intelligence and Traffic Intelligence. They are defined as follows:

a. Crypt Intelligence is that COMINT which results from cryptanalysis or decryption including the solution of speech and facsimile security systems.

b. Traffic Intelligence is that COMINT produced by all means except cryptanalysis or decryption of intercepted communications.

5. Categories

For purposes of security handling and control, COMINT is divided into categories and sub-categories. (See Annexure B1)

a. COMINT is assigned to one of the following three categories as agreed between USIB and LSIB.

(1) Category III COMINT is that COMINT the unauthorized disclosure of which would risk extremely grave damage to national interests and specifically to COMINT activities and which, therefore, requires handling under special rules affording the highest degree of security protection.

It is classified TOP SECRET, and is designated by a distinctive codeword.

(2) Category II COMINT is that COMINT the unauthorized disclosure of which would risk serious damage to national interests and specifically to COMINT activities, but for which a less rigid standard of security is adequate. It is classified SECRET and is designated by a distinctive codeword.

(3) Category I COMINT is that COMINT the unauthorized disclosure of which would risk little or no damage specifically to COMINT activities and to which, therefore, normal security classification procedures may be used.

It will be classified at least CONFIDENTIAL and will not be designated by a codeword.

b. As mutually agreed by USIB and LSIB, separate sub-categories of COMINT may be established within Categories III and II in order to permit
differentiation in the processing, dissemination, exchange or use of material.

6. Technical Material
   Technical material is understood to mean data concerning:
   a. Cryptographic systems.
   b. Communication systems, procedures and methods.
   c. Methods and equipment designed for COMINT activities and
      information related to any of the above.

7. Information related to COMINT or COMINT Activities — That informa-
   tion, other than COMINT itself, which reveals, directly or by implication,
   the existence or nature of any U.S. or U.K. COMINT activity.

8. COMINT Channels — A method or means expressly authorized for
   handling or transmission of COMINT and information related to COMINT activities
   whereby the information is provided exclusively to those persons who are appro-
   priately cleared and indoctrinated for access to COMINT.

9. Codewords
   Codewords, as used herein, are designators assigned to identify
   the source as COMINT; to distinguish between the COMINT categories and
   sub-categories; and to facilitate the application of regulations for the
   dissemination and use of COMINT.

10. Suitable Cover
    Suitable cover is the concealment of any relationship between an
    action and the COMINT which motivates or influences the decision to take the
    action. It is achieved:
    a. By ascribing the action to:
       (1) existing intelligence from a non-COMINT source, or
       (2) existing non-COMINT sources which could, beyond reason-
          able doubt, have produced the information leading to the action, or
    b. By the existence of non-COMINT sources to which the action could
       be expected beyond reasonable doubt to be attributed.
c. By the existence of a situation in which the action could be expected beyond reasonable doubt to be attributed to non-COMINT sources, or of a situation in which the action taken is so plausible that it would not be attributed to its COMINT source.

11. Proper Authority

The term "proper authority", as used herein, shall be the level of authority permitted to authorize usage of the several categories of COMINT during hostilities and in special and emergency situations. The determination to make these exceptions and the authority to grant these exceptions shall lie only with senior officers and officials at levels to be established by USIB or LSIB.

12. Indoctrination

Indoctrination is instruction as to the nature of COMINT and the security regulations and practices which govern the handling of COMINT material and COMINT activities.

13. Debriefing

Debriefing is the process of reminding persons no longer authorized to have access to COMINT or COMINT activities that they continue to be bound by all security regulations pertaining thereto. The debriefing shall include cautions that there is no time limit on the requirement to maintain security and that public disclosure does not free the individual from his obligation.

14. Hazardous Activities

Hazardous activities are those which place a person in a position where he runs a substantial risk of being captured or otherwise subjected to interrogation.

15. Exposed Areas

Exposed areas are those which are susceptible of being quickly overrun or those wherein the local political or military situation is such as to pose a distinct threat to the security of COMINT activities conducted therein.
ASSIGNMENT OF COMINT TO CATEGORIES

16. In assigning COMINT to Categories (see paragraph 5), the following considerations will apply:
   a. The difficulty of solution or intercept to include:
      (1) Sensitivity of techniques employed in solution and exploitation.
      (2) Sensitivity of source of intercept.
      (3) Relationships to other COMINT.
   b. The advantages to be gained versus the risk of disclosure and consequent damage through utilization under a given category taking into consideration the following factors:
      (1) The potential loss of intelligence.
      (2) The extent to which the target country is capable of improving the security of the communications in question.
      (3) The security grading given to contents by the country originating the traffic involved.
      (4) How wide the dissemination of certain COMINT should be to permit essential use of the intelligence contained therein.
      (5) The capability of certain Third Party COMINT groups to exploit the COMINT in question with the attendant security risks beyond the direct control of U.S. and U.K. authorities.
      (6) The value of providing technical guidance or COMINT information to Third Party COMINT activities to insure receipt from them of unique intercept and critical COMINT information not otherwise available.

17. UNIB and LEB shall have prepared and maintained in current status mutually agreed lists to indicate COMINT placed in the several categories and in such sub-categories as may be established.

CLASSIFICATION AND CODEWORDS

18. Separate and distinctive codewords shall be employed to designate Category III and Category II COMINT and each sub-category thereof.

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Category I COMINT shall not be designated by a codeword. Codewords shall be replaced when in the opinion of either USIB or LSIB a requirement exists for a change.

19. Documents and Technical material which reveals actual or prognosticated success, progress, scale and direction of effort, or other sensitive details about the production of COMINT shall bear the classification or the classification and codeword appropriate to the highest category or sub-category of COMINT to which they relate and shall be handled accordingly, even though such documents and technical material may not contain COMINT as such.

20. Raw traffic (i.e., intercepted traffic showing no evidence of processing for COMINT purposes beyond sorting by clear address elements, elimination of unwanted messages and the inclusion of a case number and/or an arbitrary traffic designator) shall be classified not lower than CONFIDENTIAL, and is understood not to be any specific category of COMINT and need not be designated by a codeword.

21. Codewords. The fact that codewords are used to designate COMINT categories shall not be made known to non-indoctrinated persons nor shall these codewords be used in the presence of non-indoctrinated persons.

SECURITY

22. All persons, including intercept operators, to be assigned to duties involving categories of COMINT other than Category I shall be indoctrinated. Recipients of Category I COMINT only will not be indoctrinated. Producers of Category I COMINT only need not be indoctrinated.

23. Every effort shall be made to restrict the number of persons indoctrinated for COMINT to the essential minimum.

24. It shall be permissible for persons who have access only to a lower category or sub-category of COMINT to work within Agencies or Centers in which there are located other persons engaged in the production or exploitation of a higher category or sub-category of COMINT, only so
long as due precaution shall be taken (by providing segregated, secure areas or otherwise) to ensure that the activities and knowledge of such persons are confined to the COMINT material and activities to which they are authorized to have access.

25. Except as determined by USIB or LSIB, all persons to be assigned to duties involving COMINT shall be the subject of security investigation and clearance. As an aid to promoting uniform minimum standards of eligibility, each party shall inform the other of the standards prescribed by it for this purpose.

26. Under extraordinary conditions, as determined by USIB or LSIB, it may be essential for an individual to take up duties involving COMINT before the requisite investigation can be completed. In such cases, the person concerned may be suitably indoctrinated on the authority only of senior officers or officials as designated by the respective parties. In all such cases, steps shall be taken to ensure that security investigations and clearances are completed as soon as possible after indoctrination.

27. All persons who have been indoctrinated for COMINT shall be debriefed when they no longer have the requisite need-to-know.

28. Each party shall ensure that complete lists of indoctrinated persons are maintained.

29. USIB and LSIB shall keep each other fully informed of the approximate number of indoctrinated persons in each of the departments, ministries, agencies, and offices receiving COMINT, by category or sub-category where applicable.

30. No national of one party shall be permitted access to the COMINT organizations or to the Categories III and II COMINT of the other party, unless he has been approved by his parent organization or Board and has been properly indoctrinated. Such access shall be limited to the categories or sub-categories of COMINT agreed by his parent organization or Board.
31. Every effort shall be made to ensure that no person who has a knowledge of current value about COMINT, except recipients of Category I only, such that his capture or interrogation could be a substantial risk to the security of COMINT, shall be assigned to or engage in hazardous activities. All possible action shall be taken to discourage or prevent any individual with a knowledge of current value about COMINT, except recipients of Category I only, from engaging in hazardous activities in any unofficial capacity at any time. Security principles governing participation in hazardous activities are set forth in Annexure B2.

32. Collection, processing, and dissemination of COMINT in exposed areas shall be undertaken only after a careful evaluation of the advantages to be gained and the risk to the security of COMINT. Security principles governing the conduct of COMINT activities in exposed areas are set forth in Annexure B2.

33. Except as implicitly involved in the operation of paragraphs 34-37, and 39 below, codeword material shall remain exclusively in the custody of indoctrinated persons, secure from examination by non-indoctrinated persons.

**DISSEMINATION AND USE OF COMINT**

34. **General**
   
a. The basic principle governing the dissemination of COMINT is the "need-to-know". Each item of COMINT shall, therefore, be made known only to those individuals who require it in the performance of their duties.

b. Except as specifically provided in paragraphs 34d and 35-37 below each item of COMINT shall be made known only to persons who are indoctrinated and authorised to have access to the particular category or sub-category of COMINT to which such item appertains. Such persons may include nationals of collaborating British Commonwealth countries (Canada, Australia and New Zealand).
34. c. Except as provided hereafter, no action which could compromise the COMINT source may be taken on the basis of Category III or Category II (including sub-categories thereof) COMINT.

d. In accordance with the normal practices as regards intelligence information of similar classification, Category I COMINT may be disseminated to non-indoctrinated persons, including foreign nationals, and action may be taken thereon. However, whenever feasible, it is desirable to keep Category I COMINT in COMINT channels and to devise suitable cover before action is taken. When removed from such channels, this material should not contain references to, or otherwise disclose the existence of higher categories of COMINT.

e. The need may arise, in individual cases of special sensitivity, or more generally, for either party to handle COMINT items, or information related to COMINT or COMINT activities, in a more restricted manner than required by the provisions of this Appendix and its Annexures. In such cases the other party will, on request, provide similar handling for the specific items concerned.

35. **Special Usage**

a. As specified by either Board, suitably indoctrinated persons may use Category II or Category III COMINT in the preparation of intelligence appreciations, studies and estimates, and such additional documents as may be specified by either Board, issued at TOP SECRET classification (Category II COMINT at SECRET classification) but without COMINT codewords, provided that the statements contained in them are so generalized that they cannot be traced to their COMINT origin. These documents may be released to or discussed with Third Party nationals according to normal national security regulations. Specific COMINT detail must be restricted to supporting papers carrying the appropriate COMINT codeword and circulated and handled accordingly (i.e. not released to or discussed with Third Party nationals).
35. b. As specified by either Board, information derived from Category II or Category III COMINT, for which there is suitable cover, may be entered without the COMINT codeword in the following types of classified documents: departmental and theater plans, maps, and target folders, but only in such form as does not indicate or reveal the COMINT origin.

c. Upon determination by proper authority that suitable cover exists and that the advantage to be gained clearly outweighs the possible risk of loss of the COMINT source and consequently of valuable intelligence, action may be taken on the basis of Category II or Category III COMINT. In determining the "proper authority" for this paragraph (see paragraph 11) particular attention will be paid to the need for the authority to be such that the consequences of the possible loss of the COMINT source will be taken

d. As specified by either Board, technical instructions based upon Category II or Category III COMINT may be issued to non-indoctrinated intercept operators (including D/F, RFP operators, and the like) without use of the appropriate codeword, if in such form and of such nature as to give no indication of the specific COMINT origin, and provided they are essential to the tasks of those concerned.

e. Category II or Category III COMINT material, exclusive of end product, may be handled by indoctrinated persons within COMINT collection or processing agencies without the use of the appropriate codeword.

f. As specified by either Board, weather forecasts or conclusions based in whole or in part on analysis of maps, etc., on which Special Weather Intelligence material has been plotted, may be issued to non-indoctrinated persons who require such information in the performance of their duties,
provided the form of issue gives no indication whatever of the COMINT origin.

35. g. Certain less sensitive Category II COMINT designated by USIB and LSIB may be assigned to a sub-category to permit more effective utilization (see paragraph 5b of Annexure B1). Upon determination by proper authority that it is in the national interest, or necessary for the protection of armed forces, action, without cover, may be taken on this material and it may be included in non-codeword documents, and it may be disseminated without codeword to non-indoctrinated persons, including foreign nationals, provided: (1) that the material is classified at least SECRET; (2) that direct evidence of the specific COMINT source -- communication data such as frequencies, callsigns, network identifications, etc., -- is omitted except in cases where that data is prerequisite to its use by the non-indoctrinated persons involved and (3) that as much other detail is omitted as is consistent with effective use. Whenever action is taken or dissemination made under the provisions of this paragraph, NSA and COMINT, through technical channels, will undertake to keep the other party informed, at least in general terms, of the material involved.

h. When required for 'Y' planning purposes the U.S. and U.K. national 'Y' authorities may furnish technical material to the level of the sub-category mentioned in paragraph g above to SACEUR and SAACLANT for provision on a need-to-know basis to Third Party nationals in SACEUR and SAACLANT commands. Such material will not carry a COMINT codeword.

1. Sub-paragraph 34d above applies with respect to special usage of Category I COMINT.

36. Emergency

a. In an extreme emergency Category III COMINT may be disseminated to non-indoctrinated persons, including foreign nationals, and action without cover may be taken, based solely on that COMINT, provided that proper authority has determined that such utilization is necessary to counter an imminent threat to vital national interests.

b. In an emergency Category II COMINT, including Special Weather Intelligence, may be disseminated to non-indoctrinated persons, including foreign nationals, and action without cover may be taken based solely on that
OCMINT, provided that proper authority has determined that such utilisation is necessary to the national security or, in the case of a military commander, to the security of forces under his command.

36. c. The decision to execute the provisions of paragraphs a and b above shall be made only after a determination that the advantages to be gained clearly justify the risk of compromise of the source. Due regard shall also be given to:

(1) The relative value of the particular OCMINT source involved and the possibility that its compromise may lead to the loss of other OCMINT sources.

(2) The possible repercussions on current and future operations and also on other commands and areas.

d. In order to minimize the risk of compromise the following precautions shall be observed:

(1) A studied effort shall be made to insure, insofar as possible, that the action taken cannot be attributed to information obtained from a OCMINT source. Suitable cover, if not available, shall be arranged (e.g. air reconnaissance) if time permits.

(2) A minimum number of non-indoctrinated personnel shall be given the information, and

(a) when practicable the information shall be so presented that it cannot be traced to OCMINT as a source, or

(b) if it is necessary to cite OCMINT as the source in order to validate the information, the specific OCMINT source shall be revealed only when absolutely necessary.

(3) The minimum amount of information necessary to justify the contemplated action shall be revealed.

e. If communications by electrical means are involved they must be enciphered in the most secure cryptographic system available.

f. If time permits the commander or official making this decision should consult with his supporting OCMINT authority for technical advice.

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36. g. Whenever any of the provisions of sub-paragraphs 36a or 36b, above, are executed, USIB and LSIB will keep each other informed. This information shall contain a description of the COMINT material involved, and, in general terms, the extent and nature of the action taken. If Third Parties are involved USIB and LSIB will consult beforehand if time allows.

h. Sub-paragraph 35g above, applies with respect to emergency usage of the material in the sub-category of Category II described therein.

i. Sub-paragraph 34d, above, applies with respect to emergency usage of Category I COMINT.

37. Hostilities

a. It is recognized that in the event of hostilities certain material will be downgraded. In connection with the mutually agreed lists referred to in paragraph 17, USIB and LSIB will agree upon types of materials suitable for downgrading during hostilities. When hostilities appear imminent or occur the two Boards will immediately consult upon downgrading measures to be taken.

b. Category III COMINT designated by USIB and LSIB as “conditionally releasable COMINT” may be disseminated to non-indoctrinated persons in NATO commands, including foreign nationals. The conditions specified in Appendix F must be observed.

c. Category II COMINT may be disseminated to ‘Y’-indoctrinated persons in NATO commands in accordance with special security regulations in Appendix F provided it is not expressly excluded by USIB and LSIB.

d. In an extreme emergency Category III COMINT may be disseminated to non-indoctrinated persons, including foreign nationals, and action without cover may be taken, based solely on that COMINT, provided that proper authority has determined that such utilisation is vital to the successful prosecution of the war. Prior to invoking this provision, due consideration shall be given to the conditions described in sub-paragraphs 36c-36f.
37. a. In an emergency Category II COMINT may be disseminated to nonindoctrinated persons, including foreign nationals, and action without cover may be taken, based solely on that COMINT, provided the proper authority has determined that such utilization is necessary to the national security or, in the case of a military commander, to the security of forces under his command. Prior to invoking this provision, due consideration shall be given to the conditions described in sub-paragraphs 36a-36f.

Whenever any of the provisions of sub-paragraphs 37d and 37e, above, are executed, USIB and LSIB will keep each other informed. This information shall contain a description of the COMINT material involved, and, in general terms, the extent and nature of the action taken.

b. In the event of hostilities the proper authority may direct the appropriate COMINT organization responsible for providing his support to downgrade to Category I that material in the sub-category of Category II described in paragraph 35g which is relevant to the situation. Such information may then be disseminated or action be taken thereon in accordance with the procedures established for Category I COMINT. The cognizant COMINT organization will immediately, without prior consultation with higher authority, make available as Category I such material of this sub-category as is required. USIB and LSIB will keep each other informed of downgrading actions taken.

c. Sub-paragraph 34d, above, applies with respect to wartime usage of Category I COMINT. Whenever suitable 'Y' channels are available, they will be used for this dissemination.

PROCEDURES

38. The appropriate classification and codeword shall:

a. Appear on every sheet of paper which contains or discloses Category III or II COMINT or a sub-category thereof, and be applied to documents and technical material as defined in paragraph 39. Except as provided in paragraphs 35-37, above, this rule applies to maps and charts on which are plotted data and information derived from these categories of COMINT.
38. b. Be encrypted in the text of every encrypted communication conveying Category III or II COMINT and appear in plain language at the head of the decrypted version. This rule shall apply in all instances except as provided in paragraphs 35-37, above, and under the following conditions:

(1) COMINT organizations may, without encrypting the appropriate codeword in the encrypted text, transmit TOP SECRET and SECRET technical matter over cryptographic channels or ciphers expressly and exclusively provided for such technical matters.

(2) COMINT organizations and intercept or D/F stations may, at the discretion of the officer in charge and after full consideration of the risks involved to the source, omit the classification and the appropriate codeword from its work-sheets and similar documents used exclusively within each agency or station. The classification may be omitted from raw traffic passed between agencies or from intercept and D/F stations to agencies.

39. Category III COMINT and related technical material shall not be transmitted in plain language except as follows:

a. Sealed, by safe-hand channels, over routes specifically approved by USIB or LSIB.

b. Over completely protected local communication systems exclusively internal to agencies or offices producing or utilizing COMINT.

c. Over landlines specifically approved in each instance by USIB or LSIB.

40. Category II COMINT and related technical material shall not be transmitted in plain language except as provided in paragraph 39 above, or by protected postal channels internal to, or under exclusive control of, the U. S., the U. K. or other collaborating British Commonwealth countries.

41. Category I COMINT and related technical material should be transmitted by COMINT or 'I' channels wherever possible, but may be transmitted by conventional channels used for intelligence materials of similar classification.
It may be transmitted in plain language by a means exposed to interception only when there is no suitable means of secure communications available and when there is an urgent operational need to do so. Whenever possible such plain language transmissions should be in the form of operational orders so worded that the subject matter cannot be traced specifically to COMINT as its origin.

42. Raw traffic may be transmitted in plain language as provided in paragraph 39, above. Raw traffic classified CONFIDENTIAL may also be transmitted in accordance with the normal procedure for this classification, except that when transported across the territory of the country originating the traffic, it shall be with the express sanction of USIB or ISIB. This sanction will be granted only in cases of compelling need.

43. Except as provided in paragraphs 35-37, above:

a. Category III COMINT and related technical material transmitted in encrypted form shall be encrypted in special cryptographic channels expressly provided for these subjects.

b. Category II COMINT and related technical material transmitted in encrypted form shall be encrypted in special cryptographic channels expressly provided for these subjects, those listed in paragraph a., above, or in the most secure cryptographic channel available.

c. However, in the case of cryptographic systems mutually approved for the purpose, the transmission of COMINT, related technical material and raw traffic over the same channel is authorized, provided that such channels are reserved for these subjects exclusively.

44. In order to facilitate a concerted effort directed toward the determination and assessment of the causes and effects of known or presumed COMINT compromises or losses, it is agreed that:

a. Whenever any breach of its COMINT security regulations or any other circumstance which in fact has, or can be presumed to have, compromised COMINT or COMINT codewords, or to have revealed COMINT successes to unauthorized
persons, becomes known to either party, it shall inform the other by means of a report embodying the pertinent facts and conclusions in each case, except that when the party concerned concludes that there is a good reason to believe that such compromise or revelation has not reached and will not, in fact, reach foreign nationals, no report need be made to the other party.

b. Whenever a significant change occurs in foreign cryptographic or communications security, the party discovering such change shall notify the other. Each party shall then analyze and assess the known and suspected circumstances having a bearing upon the change; these analyses and assessments shall be exchanged by the parties; and each party shall thereafter keep the other fully informed of any additional information bearing upon the case.