MORATORIUM F. S.

23 June 1943

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SUBJECT: An Agreement Between the U. S. Army and British GC and STS Concerning Cooperation in Matters Relating to Communication Intelligence.

1. On 23 May, 1943, General Stimson, A. S. G., of S. S. G. C., notified the Army that the subject agreement had been reached. A copy of this agreement has since been received and has been examined as to its bearing on the work of Op-20-G.

2. In general, the agreement is extremely broad and apparently is intended to result in complete collaboration. In effect, the U. S. Army assumes the main responsibility for the reading of Japanese military and air codes and ciphers, while the British assume the main responsibility of reading the German and Italian military and air codes and ciphers. Provision is made for complete exchange of all technical information concerning the detection, identification and interception of signals from and the solution of codes and ciphers used by the military and air forces of the Axis powers including secret services. The agreement also provides for complete exchange of all intelligence obtained, dissemination to be in those circumstances with certain rules mutually agreed upon and similar to those now in effect in the U. S. Navy.

3. It is believed that in entering this agreement, the War Department has overlooked the allocation agreement now in effect between the U. S. Army and the U. S. Navy which has been approved by the President. It is believed, furthermore, that if the agreement is literally interpreted by the Army, it could prove to impair our existing arrangement with the Army for the complete exchange of all technical information. However, in practice it may not prove to be objectionable.

4. The agreement which we have with the British is much less broad but has to date proven quite satisfactory and advantageous. We have agreed to collaborate with the British in certain specific fields only. Our arrangement for the exchange of technical information is also limited. Specifically we have agreed to: (a) full collaboration only upon the German submarine and Naval Cryptanalysis problems; (b) provision of only certain items of special analytical equipment developed by the United States; (c) supply of all Japanese Naval code and cipher key recoveries; (d) supply of certain intelligence from Japanese Naval Communications.
5. While in effect we actually collaborate on all technical matters, we are not bound by any agreement to do so. For example, although we have agreed to supply all recoveries we have not promised to supply our methods in making recoveries. We are, moreover, free to develop special analytical equipment for our own use without having to turn this over to the British. It is believed that the British might obtain this information if we turn it over freely to the Army. In the past, we have made a great many technical advances which we have shared freely with the Army. It appears now, however, that we may find ourselves in the position of having to withhold information from the Army, unless the latter agrees not to divulge any information obtained from us, as not being of Army origin.

6. The effect of the Army's agreement with the British establishes many assumptions whereby the British might obtain this information if we turn it over freely to the Army. In the past, we have made a great many technical advances which we have shared freely with the Army. It appears now, however, that we may find ourselves in the position of having to withhold information from the Army, unless the latter agrees not to divulge any information obtained from us, as not being of Army origin.

7. With regard to the allocation of work between the British and the Army, it is noted that the agreement provides that the Army will undertake all work on Japanese air codes and ciphers and that the resulting information will be freely exchanged. The allocation agreement between the U. S. Army and U. S. Navy makes no provision concerning work on air material. This results in the freedom of either party to work on this material, in cases where the services concerned are independent of each other. In the Pacific, however, the effect of the allocation is to assign Naval air work to the Navy and military air work to the Army. Actually, practically all air intelligence has been obtained by the Navy from its work on the Naval air communications which constitute most of the air traffic of the Japanese.

8. It is noted, furthermore, that the agreement provides for allocation and exchange of information on the secret service traffic. Work in this country on this material has been done by the Coast Guard which is under the Navy. As for clandestine work, no allocation was decided upon between the British and the Army, the decision being left for further discussion. The Navy should be consulted before the implied future agreement is reached, inasmuch as this has been allocated to the Coast Guard. In this connection, information has been received from the British that certain clandestine material, previously withheld by the F.B.I., be released in the future to a London representative of F.B.I. In a recent memorandum of 25 May, referred to above, he states that information received by the Navy from the Army should not be disseminated outside the War and Navy Departments except in accordance with the existing agreement with Great Britain, and under no circumstances should such information be passed to any other agency of the United States. It would appear that this is an effort to impose the British agreement upon us while at the same time failing to recognize a reciprocal obligation on the part of the Army insofar as dissemination of information produced by the Navy or Coast Guard is concerned.

9. Recommend no action with British or U.S. Army now on this subject.

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