SPECIAL REPORT

From: STANCICC Subcommittee on Intelligence and Security.
To: STANCICC.
Subj: Security Regulations.

1. FACTS.

The STANCICC Subcommittee on Intelligence and Security was directed by a memorandum, dated 17 December 1945, from the STANCICC Secretariat to this subcommittee, to consider the London SIGINT Board's "Explanatory Instructions and Regulations Concerning the Handling of Signal Intelligence" (short title, IRSIG) and offer recommendations thereon. The subcommittee met on 27 December 1945 for this purpose.

2. CONCLUSIONS.

The London SIGINT Board has indicated certain paragraphs of IRSIG upon which they think it essential that there be agreement between the two countries. The subcommittee discussed these paragraphs and offers the following comments:

4. The U.S. Army is in agreement with the British on the use of the words "Signal Intelligence", but the U.S. Navy prefers the words "Communication Intelligence".

6. It is the understanding of the subcommittee that, in effect, the word "MAUVE" indicates in the main that intelligence which has heretofore been called "diplomatic" in the United States, and that, in effect, the word "CREAM" indicates what has in the main been called "military". The subcommittee
suggests that the word "strategic" in the third line of this paragraph be changed to "diplomatic", that the phrase "of the highest security grade" in the fourth line be deleted, and that the phrase "but is usually in the IVORY category" be added to the final sentence.

6, 7, 8, and 9. The subcommittee is in general agreement with the principles expressed in paragraphs 6, 7, 8, and 9 except that it is agreed that plain language should normally fall into the IVORY category and only occasionally into the MAUVE or CREAM category, but that it must come under one of the three unless excepted by the provisions of paragraph 42, hereinafter.

10. The subcommittee suggests that this paragraph be rewritten as follows: "The rigid principle of dissemination is that each item of Signal Intelligence will be promulgated only to those authorities or individuals who must, of necessity, receive it for the adequate performance of their duties and who have been 'indoctrinated' and made aware of the source."

This suggestion follows from the subcommittee's opinions on paragraphs 32-41, q.v.

19. Captain Goodwin, Comdr. Hudson, Comdr. Bertollet, and Captain Martin believe that this paragraph is too absolute in its prohibition, the premise of the first clause being untenable. Because of the facts that the knowledge that a tactical advantage is only temporary is often unknowable in
advance, and that the taking of a tactical advantage based on SIGINT material may have far-reaching strategic consequences, they believe that the tone of paragraph 19 should be relaxed so that it expresses something in the nature of paragraph 9 of C.S.F. 1805, which is worded as follows: "The full effectiveness of communication intelligence cannot be realized unless operational use is made of it. When action is contemplated as a result of communication intelligence, the possibility of compromising the source should always be borne in mind and the action officer must weigh against this the tactical advantage to be gained. In general, momentary tactical advantage is not sufficient ground for risking the compromise of the ULTRA source. Whenever action is taken, studied effort must be made to ensure that such action cannot be traced or attributed to ULTRA information alone. In every case, where at all practicable, action against specific targets revealed by ULTRA shall be preceded by appropriate reconnaissance or other suitable camouflage measures to which the enemy can reasonably be expected to attribute our action." They believe that the operational use of communication intelligence can, in the final analysis, be properly controlled only by the area commander who is carrying out the dissemination of intelligence of this type and constantly watching the reaction of the enemy thereto and who is, therefore, best able to make the final decision in each case on its own merit. Colonel McKee
and Lt. Colonel Snow believe that the main principle expressed in paragraph 19 is essentially sound. They believe that any relaxation of the absolute prohibition would lead directly to multitudinous ill-considered and harmful operational uses of SIGINT.

32 to 41, inc. The subcommittee believes that for security reasons in peacetime traffic intelligence as well as special intelligence should be classified TOP SECRET and, in this light, recommends that paragraphs 32 to 37, inc., be redrafted to include provision for IVORY, and that paragraphs 38 to 41, inc., be cancelled. Consistent with this principle it further recommends that the term "Signal Intelligence" should be substituted for the term "Special Intelligence" in paragraphs 17, 19, 20, 21, 43, 44, 47, 49, 50, 52, 55-59 and sub-title, 60-62 and sub-title, and 63, and that certain other changes should be made in some of these paragraphs, as appropriate in the light of this change. The subcommittee recommends also that paragraph 31 be redrafted as appropriate in the light of this comment, and that the sub-titles over paragraphs 32 and 38 be deleted as unnecessary. The subcommittee recommends that there be added a paragraph setting forth the security grading (preferably TOP SECRET) of the terms "MAUVE", "CREAM", and "IVORY", and their meanings and connotations, and providing against the mention of these terms to persons not cleared for SIGINT.
34. The subcommittee interprets this paragraph to contemplate principally technical and administrative exchange among processing centers and, in this light, concurs.

42. The subcommittee suggests that a rewording of paragraph 42, as follows, would do much to render the entire IRSIG more universally applicable to future conditions, at present unforeseen or only partly foreseen: "With the approval of the Signal Intelligence Board (see para. 12), and despite any other provisions of these regulations, certain technical information, such as traffic analysis information, exchanged among SII:INT centers, boards and units, may be classified SECRET for purposes of such exchange and internal use. Similarly, and subject to the same approval, certain elementary traffic intelligence, such as D/F bearings, and certain plain language, usually from may be disseminated—(etc., as in original)."

45 and 52 (c). The subcommittee considers the administration of an oath a desirable additional feature.

52 (d). The Navy representatives of the subcommittee believe that provisions should be included that certain specified high commanders may keep permanent files of NAUVE, CREAM, and IVORY. The Army members comment that many of the provisions in paragraph 52 would require considerable modification for adoption for U.S. Army use in view of the U.S. Army's system of dissemination by Special Security Officers.
52 (f). This paragraph would not be necessary in U.S. regulations because regulations to cover this point are already existent.

53 and 54. The subcommittee agrees that the appropriate substance of these paragraphs should be embodied in paragraph 52, consistent with the recommendations on paragraphs 32-41, q.v.

3. RECOMMENDATIONS.

The subcommittee recommends that the comments offered in paragraph 2 be given to Group Captain Jones for transmission to the British Junior SIGINT Board.

The subcommittee recommends that, if these regulations are ever adopted for U.S. use, they be amended to fit the U.S. organizations and terminology.

4. COORDINATION.

No coordination with other subcommittees was deemed necessary.

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