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**INAME: MOODY, Juanita**

**Text w/Tape:**

**IPLACE: Pawleys Island, SC; Ms. Moody's home**

**VIEWER: FRAHM, Jill E.**

**[Tape 1, Side 1]**

**Frahm:** Okay. It is June 20, 2001, and I'm interviewing Juanita Moody in her home in Pawleys Island, South Carolina. This is Oral History 2001-28. The interviewer is Jill Frahm, and this oral history is classified Secret unless otherwise said at the end of the tape. To start with, can I back up and ask you a couple of questions about World War II? First, where did you work during the war? Where were you actually working?

**Moody:** You mean as far as the target?

**Frahm:** Both the target... I assume you were at Arlington Hall.

**Moody:** I was at Arlington Hall, and I worked the German problem in World War II.

**Frahm:** What happened when the German part of the war ended? Did you move to the Japanese, or did you stay finishing things up?

**Moody:** Oh, I stayed because I was working on a problem that stayed there until the end of the Japanese war. We actually were at that time producing intelligence against the Japanese target from the German one-time pad that I had been involved in digging into.

**Frahm:** That one that you were working on that you weren't supposed to.

**Moody:** That's right. We worked that problem after hours after we put in our regular work, and my assignment at that time was on the keyword system which was the Japanese diplomatic. We also supported the people that we were sending over to Bletchley Park on the ENIGMA problem, so the... our military young men who came in and got orientation in our area before they went to Bletchley, and we gave them backup and support. Of course, I also had to be familiar with the ENIGMA Problem, but I worked the keyword problem, and we worked the unsolved one-time pad problem in the wee hours of the night. Actually, from the time I started working before the war ended, I worked every waking moment. I never required... I did not require very much sleep, and I didn't want to be anywhere else. And there was so much to do, and so much to learn that that's the only thing I wanted to do, and that's what I did.

**Frahm:** Where did you live? Except you were living at work, where did you go to sleep?

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**Moody:** Oh, I slept... first of all I started out at the Arlington Farms in a little room. It looked (B% about four) room, and some time after that I was able to finagle getting into an apartment by subleasing from one of our Army officers and his wife who were going... he was going, I believe, to OCS, and I subleased his apartment, but when he got back he got an overseas assignment, and I spoke with the landlord to let a friend in and I continued to keep that apartment. And that was within walking distance of Arlington Hall.

**Frahm:** Oh, that's convenient.

**Moody:** Before that I had to depend on bus transportation.

**Frahm:** Which shift did you work?

**Moody:** I worked every shift. There was no... I think most of the time my assigned shift was the day shift, but I worked the evening shift until the wee hours. So I remember that I used to stop off on my way home to my apartment at a bakery in Buckingham and get something... a hot bun or something. The baker would let us come in the back door and he'd arranged to have something coming out of the oven around one and two in the morning when he'd be putting... getting his bakery goods ready for the next day, and we could get something then. I walked... the streets were dark. There was no crime; there was no problem. I walked anywhere and everywhere over the streets of Arlington (2G) any hour of the day or night in those days. And at Bletchley we either had to walk or catch a bus. There were very few people that had automobiles, and if they did, gasoline was rationed, so that's the (2-3G) up.

**Frahm:** Do you remember the designator for the office you were in at all?

**Moody:** No. I... that was not important to me, and I really... I think that we were called "B" something, maybe B2, but I don't know. Does that make any sense to you?

**Frahm:** That sounds right.

**Moody:** Because I think we even kept those old designators after the war for a while. But, you know, it didn't really make that much difference to me as a cryptanalyst.

**Frahm:** Before we leave World War II was there anything that you... ?

**Moody:** Well, as far as I'm concerned, I worked all FSA all the time. I got a tremendous education of World War II. First of all, I was plunked down in amongst a large number of college professors. We robbed the campuses throughout the country to staff Arlington Hall in those days, and so I had the opportunity to work with a lot of very fine people. But I found that immediately that the field of cryptanalysis was wide open, and I actually was hired as a clerk. And in very short order from the time I came into the German section I became a supervisor of what they called the "hit" desk, and we were using such as was available; machine IBM equipment to split bits of additive, sort it and collate it, and I... and what was necessary was to make assumptions as to what the messages might be saying. The German

language seemed fairly easy, as languages go, to pick up, and I just memorized a lot of it. I'd go through all the plaintext to pick up lingo that was being used in the enciphered messages which were of a higher classification. That's why they were enciphered... are encoded, so I reached the point that I... there were two ladies who were Ph D's and who had been university professors, and I was moved into their job pretty shortly thereafter. My experience in World War II, particularly in all of the handwork that we had to do, I had sat for days and days and looked at millions of digits and even gone back three and four days after seeing a stream of digits and been able to make an entry into a new introduction in their procedures. And after we got into the GEE one-time pad, a German named Alex (B% Pringle) – he was an Army officer – and I went to what was then our engineers and helped them build a machine that would generate one group of key at a time. It was a very crude thing, and we had (B% slugs) for printing the key as we would generate it, and every once in a while they would come loose from the machine and come flying across the room and hit us. That wasn't very pleasant.

**Frahm:** No, I guess not.

**Moody:** That is really what inspired me to spend what turned out to be the best of my career, trying to get, first of all, what we called machine... well, we called them mechanical aids, and then we called it automation, and special purpose equipment, and on to special purpose computers, and computers. And that is when I became determined that if I had anything to say about it, it's what I would do.

**Frahm:** Right. Do you have any idea... and this is kind of dipping back because I'm interested in pursuing that, what you're saying about computers. Ah, one thing that I have not found anywhere is how people... it was determined who stayed and who left after the war. Because in some... a couple of oral histories we have about people during the war they had said they knew people who wanted to stay but couldn't.

**Moody:** That's a very interesting question. When the war ended General (B% Cordman [Corderman?]) called us altogether out on the grounds at Arlington Hall and said... gave us a little speech and thanked everybody for their efforts and said, "I don't really mean to be saying here's your hat, what's your hurry?" but that's the way it is," or words to that effect. You may have heard that.

**Frahm:** Some people may (XB) (cut off).

**Moody:** Everybody went away thinking that's what... you know, that was good-bye. Actually most of them had just assumed anyway. I had assumed that I... at the end of the war I would leave. I had come there for the specific purpose of helping out in the war and get on with the life that I had planned for myself. And as a matter of fact, I did actually go in and speak with my supervisor and say, "I'm going." That was Dr. (B% Karl Krensky). I don't think you ever heard of him, one of the finest people I've ever met and one who had

inspired me a great deal. And there we're going to get into... I'm jumping ahead a little bit.

**Frahm:** That's fine. Don't have to take these questions in any particular order.

**Moody:** Well, that is how I was invited to stay after World War II, and I suspect that other people may have had the same story. I know, for instance, Ann Caracristi did resign and leave, and she came back later.

**Frahm:** I've sort of drawn the conclusion too, if you got on a problem that was continuing like the Russian problem, you just kind of kept going.

**Moody:** Well, some people did that. But Dr. Krensky said to me, "Juanita, what are you going to do?" I said, "I'm going to get a... I'm going to go ahead with my life as I had planned it. I'm going back to continue my education and do what I've sort promised my mother. I'm just going to do that, and I also have"... and he knew that I had a friend from college who had been overseas at the war, and I had always hoped that he made it through the war and got back home, and one day we could get married. I had corresponded with him throughout the war, but never even had a telephone conversation; did not see him for 42 months. But he was still out there and hopefully coming home from the war now that it was over. Krensky said to me, "Juanita, I never thought I'd find myself trying to talk someone into going back to school, but I'm going to do everything I can to persuade you that you're making a mistake if you leave this agency." He said, "If I've ever seen anyone that's found their niche, it's you, and you already have the equivalent of several Ph D's in cryptology, in cryptanalysis, and in what goes with it. I would like to beg you to stay on. What would it take to convince you not to go?" I said that I've got to go, you know. I never even thought that I would consider this. And he kept on pleading with me, and I must admit it was very flattering to hear these words from someone I respected so much. I said, "I'll tell you what it will take. Let me go and work with the people in"... I'm not even sure we called it R&D then, but it was the engineers, those people that I had met when (B% Alex) and I were trying to build a machine and people I had met who were running the IBM machines that we had and so forth, because I had worked back and forth with the people who were trying to develop mechanical aids, and the people who were operating and running the facilities that were doing it. "I'd like," I said, "the equivalent of a sabbatical. Give me a year to go and work with those people because there are so many things that could be done to help out in cryptanalysis and mechanize a lot of these operations." And he said, "Well, let me talk to my boss," who was Hugh Erskine. And I do believe that was still something "B." I believe that Hugh Erskine was like B23 then.

**Frahm:** That sounds right.

**Moody:** And they were sort of making noises I think then about possibly doing something about the East European problem. So anyway, he came back and said, "Sure, you can go." And I went, and I was having the time of my life.

**Frahm:** What sort of things did you work on? What were you (XB)... (cut off)

**Moody:** Well, I immediately started working with a machine that... where we could use a tape and add and subtract with a tape-driven... you know, the IBM was card-driven and there were limitations on what you could do with that. And somewhere in that they had put the... I can't remember now just when that was... I think while we were thrashing around about what we'd do, Erskine had also said there was some... it was said there was a class that he sent Walter Sharp and me to do... to study and make sure we understood and knew all about what IBM equipments were available and what they could do, because the IBM people were then talking to us at NSA about making further strides.

**Frahm:** So this was at IBM?

**Moody:** Yes, so I worked... I've studied then... went to a course as well as working in what was then our labs. And one day they came to me and said, "Sorry to interrupt you." I didn't get... I was there only about six months, but we're getting our priorities in order, and we are going to have our first priority is the Soviet problem, and our second priority next to that is the Yugoslav problem, and you've been chosen to be the chief of that, and you have to accept it. We just can't let you go on with this...

**Frahm:** Can't let you have that much fun.

**Moody:** That's right. That was the closest thing to... over three weeks of any kind of freedom I ever had in my career in the agency.

**Frahm:** Any idea why (B% ever) they picked you for the Yugoslav problem?

**Moody:** Oh, because of my experience and the things I had done on the German problem, and the fact that already I was working on a machine which later was the first generation of a whole group of machines that I developed, because I went on and did that as well as heading up the Yugoslav problem. And so I became chief of that, and we... it was a high priority and fun problem. We had no... we had one person that knew the Serbo-Croatian language, and I had her teaching, and teaching, and teaching others that we called in a lot of people who had other language. And what I did is I went to the school... we had people sitting in the school then waiting... I guess... people had left, and we actually already had started hiring while I was on the Yugoslav problem, and several people who had German language capability I was able to convert to Serbo-Croatian language. One of them was Charlie Schultz who later became the economic advisor to the President and so forth. Alice Sachakliaan stood out because she was to become what I have always considered the finest combination of the cryptanalyst and linguist that I ever met at the agency.

**Frahm:** How do you spell her last name? Do you have any idea?

**Moody:** Ah, S-a-c-h-a-k-l-i-a-a-n (spelled). I never misspelled it. I didn't... knew how to spell her maiden name which was Kiotian. I had to keep people's names... spelling... I couldn't always remember people's names, but I

always tried to spell them correct, because I had a lot... we had so many different, you know, people... so many different ethnic backgrounds.

**Frahm:** So, you were working with machines against the Yugoslav problem.

**Moody:** Oh, yes, and finally I developed a whole series of equipments, and the people in the lab, the R&D people... in fact, the first one that we developed together was the one we called "Mathew." We named it from Mit Mathews. Did you ever hear of Mit Mathews, the chief of that?

**Frahm:** Oh, yes.

**Moody:** He should be on the wall [referring to the Hall of Honor].

**Frahm:** No, he is not, and I... (cut off)

**Moody:** He should very definitely be on the wall.

**Frahm:** I think he was nominated, and I don't know, I wasn't part of the people that did the evaluation.

**Moody:** And then I went on laying out the speci... I would develop specifications for equipments that... what... requirements and help them work out the specifications. There was a school of thought in R&D that they knew better than we about that. Mit and I used to argue about that, but we got on great because I would... we'd go back and forth about it, but anyway we developed...

**Frahm:** Something called change.


**Moody:** ... a whole series of... well, it was a good, healthy kind of back and forth, you know. And so we developed these equipments called "Mathew", and then "Mark," "Luke," and "John." All six generations of special-purpose equipments which later was to be applied against the entire East European problem which... I can't remember the exact date, but eventually they decided I should be the chief of that entire area.

**Frahm:** Did the different blocs... the different countries in the Eastern Bloc, were their problems similar? Did they use... the different countries (B% were they similar)?

**Moody:** Oh, they were, but... (cut off)

**Frahm:** Obviously, the language was different, but was the cryptology similar?

**Moody:** Well,



me how I ever came up with this, specifically the monome-dinome approach. Am I getting too far out of classification here?

**Frahm:** No.

**Moody:** And I told him, and he had never seen those documents, and he spent the rest of his life off and on looking for those. He never did find them. And I never had time to go back. I knew what I had seen, and I remembered it, and I didn't really need... you know. It had served its purpose for me. But anyway, so that's sort of the story of how I stayed around. I can't tell you the other people. I assume that the same kind of things happened to them, that someone invited them and said, hey, you must stay.

**Frahm:** So you are chief of the Eastern Bloc countries, and you continue your interest in computing or what... (cut off)

**Moody:** Oh yes, forever. Yeah, that was my (B% life). My career long ago was to do everything I could. I had a dream, sort of, and I remember I described it one time back in the fifties when the... right after the NSASAB was organized, and they were ask... they invited several young people to talk to them about what we thought the agency's needs were, and I described what I saw as the goal to take all processes, whether they be cryptanalytic processes, or research and diagnosis, and whether for traffic analysis, or language purposes, when anyone would have the need to go back to the copy as it was intercepted from the moment the signal was captured on the air and order that material in such a way that everybody could get into and share that (B% better) instead of sending, as we did in those days, our intercepts down to the machine where it would be punched up. If three different cryptanalysts tried to solve the problem, that message would get edited and sent to the machine room and punched up three different times. However many traffic analysts... if a linguist needed to go back to see the copy, they had to dig around to try to find that message, and my dream was to have all of that available in "automated form" I called it then, which, you know... (cut off)

**Frahm:** Still called that?

**Moody:** ... and that would be computerized. And so I talked about that, and I remember that I got congratulations afterward from one of the people who was sitting in that room that day, and later dropped by to talk to me was Bill Baker who was to remain... have you ever heard of Dr. Bill Baker? He was the President of Bell Labs, and he was on the NSA Scientific Advisory Board, and that's how he and I got to know each other. And from then on we talked off and on the rest of my career, including when I had left the agency, he invited me down to the West Wing of the White House to his office to say good-bye. But I knew him very well, worked with him off and on forever after that.

**Frahm:** Now, you were involved with ALLRED, weren't you, and... ?

**Moody:** Oh yes, ALLRED every... at... did I delve in the oral history that you listened to... did I talk about the free hand?

**Frahm:** (xm)

**Moody:** Well, the Agency... General Canine had a group of outside experts come in and study the problems of the agency and make recommendations for organizing our efforts. And they came up with the "70-90" organization. And I was not... I was very disappointed that they organized it according to process rather than according to target. It made it difficult because I felt that everybody needed to be working closer together rather than sorted out in rooms, and the fact that they had traffic analysis in one organization and cryptanalysis in another. So later on we had another study called the Hoover Commission Report in which they recommended much... they recommended that NSA be given more money and more emphasis on... against the Soviet problem in particular. The report itself... I believe the Brownell Report preceded the Hoover Commission Report. Brownell had recommended that, you know, a lot of work be done in our general area, and this Hoover Report I had never heard of, but I was at that time working for Dr. Bill Ray and had been moved out to Fort Meade and was chief of a branch, acting chief of a division as well as the 70-rep at Fort Meade. And our Director was overseas – General Canine – on a trip and Dr... no, General... sorry... General Erskine, who was an Assistant Secretary of Defense, came out on a visit to Fort Meade, and Frank Raven and I were representing 70 and 90 in the session with him, and early on after he asked me a few questions, he excused everyone else in the room and started asking me very specific questions. One of the questions he asked me was, "This is going to be given a free hand on the Soviet problem. What would you do?" And I said, "General, don't talk to me about a free hand. I can't even get a little old million dollar machine that I've been begging for for two years." (1G) he said, "Well, you have read the Hoover Commission Report, haven't you, Mrs. Moody? That's going to change. Haven't you read the report?" And I said, "No, Sir." And he got up to leave, and he said, "Well, I'll assure you you're going to get your little old million dollar machine. I'll be talking to you more later," and (he) left. I called Arlington Hall to get anyone I could to tell them what had happened and told them what he had said, and said, "Have you"... and I asked Dr. Sinkov – I got him on the phone – and said, "Have you read this report?" And he said no. A few minutes later he called me back and said, "General Erskine just called and he wants you to come for a visit in his office on Monday," and so forth. I can't remember where Dr. Tordella was that day. I know that I was scrounging around to try to get anyone I could to tell, you know, what had happened. If I did talk to Dr. Ray back at the Hall, and he told me to talk to Sinkov. It was late in the day. After a while it was after hours. Well, they discovered that the report had come in to Plans and Policy and that (B% Ray Austin) had filed it and none of us had seen it; it hadn't been circulated to those of us in the Production Organization. They sent me over that evening in a staff car to get the copy, and I stayed around and read it that night and did all I could over the weekend. We all prepped for this, and I did go down and visit with General Erskine. And I believe Dr. Sinkov and General Erskine and Frank Raven, I



believe, was present at that meeting. Shortly thereafter Arthur Levinson and I were asked to write the... I was asked to assist Arthur Levinson in writing up what we would do if we were given free hand. And this ultimately led to the organization of ADVA and GENS, and Levinson was put in charge of the Office of Advanced Studies, and I went to work for him. In that organization... and I want to say while we are talking about people that I've, you know... as you mentioned you'd be asking me about people that I worked for... Arthur Levinson was perfect for that job. He did give us free hand. We all made a commitment to work together – he and the chiefs that he chose – and give it a five-year go no matter what happened. And during that five-year period I was offered other jobs on several occasions but always kept my word to stick with Arthur, and that's where we developed a lot of the technical backbone of the agency. We worked with our R&D people and people on the outside from the other agencies, and we did a great deal of work to develop what turned out to be what I loosely have called the "technical backbone" of the Agency. I had one problem in particular under my direction that enjoyed a very high priority but was smaller than some of the others, and I chose Cecil Phillips as my deputy, and he and I endeavored... we had a lot of success on that problem. I will not go into it; it was a very sensitive problem. I can't go into the details, but we used that because I could get money, some money, and because it was a size that we could cope with to attempt to take an intercept from the time it was captured and recorded and first of all send it in electrically to the agency where we attempted to order that material so that everyone who had a need to see that signal for whatever reason could get to the information they needed and up to and including actually doing cryptanalysis. We actually solved some of the... we broke codes with our programs. But the first attempt at sending it in electrically... and we had to argue. I mean it was not an easy thing to accomplish. First of all, the telecom people thought I was wild or mad. And I then, as I frequently did, learn to go when I'd run up against a brick wall, I'd go to Dr. Tordella to tell him what I was trying to do, and almost always he supported what I was trying to do. I never confronted him in front of anybody else in case he didn't agree with me. I went and said, look, they're giving me a hard time. Anyway, he supported me. But we... he had a lot of influence from the time I met him on, and as you know was, I think, sort of the "Father of the Agency" for many years. We had, I think, very good success. Cecil stayed with me during that five years, and I think you know something about his background and his career. And I even took on intercept systems, all kinds of processing, analysis systems. Later in my career I even sponsored a video file approach to information handling for the Central Reference organization.

**Frahm:** What do you mean, video file?

**Moody:** Well, I was attempting... I believe we called that a video... I'm trying to think what we called it then, but we wanted to take documents in Central Reference and put them and record them so that we could go in and out of them in an automated way rather than having to use hand files. That was

the one thing I did in that area, otherwise most of my efforts were always aimed at, like I say, from the intercept site. And I sat at... I went to the field many times and sat with the intercept operator to see what they were experiencing, and I'm a little bit hampered here because of, again, the classification.

**Frahm:** Dave Hatch... (cut off)

**Moody:** The one very particular intercept system that I sponsored, I'm hesitant to go into the details, but it was for a very difficult... (cut off)

**Frahm:** Dave Hatch wanted me to tell you that the next time you're up at Fort Meade, please let us know so we can talk to you in a classified area about this



so we go into a conference room and talk about things.

**Moody:** It was not easy getting people to accept these aids. At one point when I was in charge of -724 I had some very stubborn but bright analysts who didn't want to be bothered with what I was doing, and I learned at an early age that competition is good for the soul, so I had... I gave the same problem to someone who was accepting the help that we could get from our various (B% equipment) – IBM computers – and let the others go on by hand and pretty soon they were fighting for the help that I was trying to force upon them. So, you know, I let them see from experience that that was a good thing that we could do in an office like the Office of Advanced Studies. We could, you know, I had the opportunity to do projects like that. Is this what you're... ?

**Frahm:** Oh, yes! Yes, ah, by the way, what was your one-million dollar computer that you got? Can you tell me, was that DUTCHESS?

**Moody:** It was DUTCHESS, a machine called DUTCHESS, and I can give...

**Frahm:** Do you see yourself as one of the pioneers in... ?

**Moody:** I certainly do, yes. I believe that I had the... well, I don't want to seem immodest, and maybe I'm not, but I don't believe anyone ever had the opportunity or the knowledge and experience in the total SIGINT process from one end to the other that I had. But I made a lot of this for myself, but I was allowed to do it by some wonderful people who put me in the right positions and allowed me to do it.

**Frahm:** We need to stop a second.

**Moody:** I've lived and worked with... for the... for all... from the rest of those days, and here I want to say a few things too. I know you're going to ask me about... you had a question about classes and War Colleges and all.

**Frahm:** Yeah. Can I stop for a second? I need to turn the tape. (TR Note: recorder

shut off here.)

[End of Tape 1, Side 1]

[Tape 1, Side 2]

**Moody:** (cuts in)... you know, here I was out there, he said, "You're trying to tell us what our requirements are," and I said, "Absolutely." And we went round and round and round, and of course ultimately we got to be great friends and worked together, and I wish... I still wish somebody would turn up the (B% Herman)-Moody Report that we wrote in '73, because if you ever want to see, you know, there is where I got to document... in fact, we worked together. We agreed on a total system concept for the agency.

**Frahm:** Well, we have an archivist that if the thing is in archives, she can find it. Unfortunately, she is about to retire, and I'm trying to convince her not to.

**Moody:** Well, ask her to find this report. It was 1973. It was... we did a study for the... it was... they called us an independent committee or something like that. He was the chairman and I was the co-chairman, and we had the meanest, hardest-headed people in the Agency on that panel.

**Frahm:** Like who?

**Moody:** Like Herman (1G), Deeley, ah, who were the others? That's enough, I think. I used to chair the... his father was dying about that time, and he was away some and I would have to chair the thing, and I had a hockey stick to call the meeting to order because... but we came up with a report that we were very proud of. Which had a lot to do with the reorganization of the agency that came up with the A, B, C, and so forth, organization. And (B% maybe it was time.)

**Frahm:** Okay. We're back on. You were going to talk about training. And today when somebody moves into upper management they go to the war colleges or get some sort of leadership training. When I became a team chief they sent me off for training. Did you get any sort of managerial training like that?

**Moody:** Well, General Canine was the greatest leader I ever knew, and he made our agency. He took it all the way from, you know, really not much to a national agency. And he (B% carted) in a lot of outside help, and he also personally decided who went to something he called "executive development." And I got a letter signed by General Canine which said I have decided that you are one of the people that one of these days you will be... or had the capability of becoming one of the key people in this Agency, but you've got to do what I tell you, and I'm going to tell you what you have to do. And so he started me. So, yes, we had some... we had what was supposed to be the best management consultants and advisors in the country.

**Frahm:** They came to the agency, or did you (XB)?

**Moody:** Yeah, and what he did though, the best thing that came out of this was, he threw us together from all different elements of the agency so that I was sitting shoulder-to-shoulder with people from all different organizations in

the agency, so that way we got to know each other. And we made fun of some of it because a lot of it was not... it was not directly applicable, but it was very... it really was a growing up experience. I always wanted to go to the War College, but... and I was nominated by the agency three times but turned down because I was a woman.

**Frahm:** When was this?

**Moody:** Well, during the course of my career. You know, nobody in my... Sally Botsai was the first woman to be able to go to the War College.

**Frahm:** Which was in the seventies, I think.

**Moody:** Yeah. You had to be... there were two requirements: you had to be a male; you also could not be over 35, and I remember a friend of mine telling me the last time I was nominated that he had stood up and said, one of these days there's going to be another reason why Juanita can't go to the War College. That was a very unforesighted thing, because if there was anybody who ever should have had the War College experience, it was me in the Cuban crisis, but I made out anyway. Because there I met every commander and the rest, you know, I never believed there were so many stars in our (B% culture).

**Frahm:** Who else was sent to these classes by General Canine?

**Moody:** Buffham, Caracristi... everybody who became a chief of anything.

**Frahm:** Raven, Budenbach?

**Moody:** Yeah. I don't remember being in the class with them, but I remember being in classes with people from (B% CSEC), and R&D, and all that. I met several people that also helped... who've helped us build a lot, because I went out and worked at working with people in the other departments wherever they worked, in the communications security area, in the R&D, and... well, personnel... wherever they were I tried to find out who they were and what they were doing, and you find out there's some people that can get things done and some who couldn't. I always had a great intolerance with excuses, and one head that I had, if I called some other... another department and asked them a question, and they couldn't give me an answer, I would ask them for the name, rank and serial number of their immediate supervisor. And it's amazing how much action you could get if you did that.

**Frahm:** How did you feel when you moved up into management? Did you want to do that, or were you... (cut off)

**Moody:** I thought I was perfectly happy where I was. Dr. Bill Ray insisted that it was time for me to give up my worksheets and kept on, and I had so much, again, respect for him that I agreed, and because even though I had the... I was a manager of sorts – I was a manager of cryptanalysis – he wanted me to take on more than that, and so I guess he put me in charge of a branch, you know, that... I mean it was... by then the demands were getting to the point that I wouldn't be able to actually keep up doing my work. And I had

this theory that I needed to be able to show the people who worked for me how to do the things that I asked them to do. I remember one of our directors once commented to me: you know, the thing I like about you is that you practice show-how. And that's what I wanted to do, and I knew I wouldn't be able to do as much of that. But it worked out.

**Frahm:** Were there any particularly effective managers you worked for that you might have looked up to?

**Moody:** Oh, yes. I looked up to (B% Karl Krensky) was the first one that I... you know, that stood out in my opinion, and Dr. Ray; of course I mentioned Levinson who was so very good in what General Canine called the "erudite atmosphere of ADVA;" of course Dr. Tordella; Oliver Kirby I thought was... I had a great regard for him. As far as our directors go, I... in the course of my career I had very close contact with our directors: Canine, General Blake. General Blake was the first director in my opinion, or in my experience, who had a good appreciation for, and practiced, good leadership in understanding of intelligence and intelligence requirements, particularly on the national level. We had a lot of people I ran into who, if they were military, they seemed to... they understood the local commanders' needs and everything, you know. They didn't go much beyond that, but General Blake impressed me, and he was... it was a godsend to have him there in the Cuban crisis and in the days leading up to it. General Phillips was a very impressive manager, but he didn't stay with us very long. I've often wondered what a difference it might have made if he could have stayed there, but the Air Force plucked him out of the job and took him for a systems command job, and that's when General Blake came in. And then General Lew Allen was tremendous and great in intelligence work and intelligence orientation and very good in all technical fields of NSA. He was the last Director I worked for in... I was (2-3G).

**Frahm:** I've been... I've only met a couple but they're all different. They're all... (cut off)

**Moody:** I could also give you a list of the worst, but...

**Frahm:** In your previous oral histories you kind of stopped with your career after the Cuban Missile Crisis. How long did you stay as chief of the... what was it, G Group, G4? I forget.

**Moody:** Ah, it was "B"... ah...

**Frahm:** That's right. It was "B" then.

**Moody:** Dr. Ray died right after the Cuban crisis, and they left me in that job without... as an independent office – and there were two groups – so there was an independent office; there was "A" and "B" in the independent office. I don't know why because I had certainly had horrendous responsibility, but I stayed there until '66. But the Cuban Missile Crisis was a great experience. I felt at the time, while it was happening, that somehow I had spent all of my career getting ready for that crisis. It was just like... somehow everything that I had done had helped point me to be in the best position possible,

knowledge-wise, to know how to proceed in that crisis. And we did get many, many accolades about what we did there. And by then I had materials coming in... we actually were getting information to our customers before it was getting to the people it was meant to be going... meant to go to. I won't... I can't go into that again, you see. I wish I could, but I can't.

**Frahm:** That's always a nice feeling.

**Moody:** (XB). But... and I had and was enjoying some of the benefits of the... from the point of intercept right on. What really happened was when I was put in charge of that group... that target in 1961 I had the knowledge from the big target that allowed me to go in there, and in a year's time – I could some day sit down and document what all we did – but I had been able to automate and speed up the process unbelievably to the point that I put all of my cryptanalytic processes on the computers. I had the product going out directly from my office to the customers, and I let nobody stop me. One night I had an item that I thought Adlai Stevenson should have at the UN, and the State Department people wouldn't agree to pass it, and I argued with them, and they said, well, if you want to take on that responsibility, you do it. We're not... we can't do it. And I did. I called New York and got him out of bed. And he sent up congratulations to the agency. He got out of bed [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] Some of that didn't get me as far as I might have gone (2-3G), because I didn't... I did what I felt was right, and I really didn't care about the politics at any time. Anyway, that's a good question you asked me about the Cuban crisis. Just as I felt as though I'd spent my life getting ready to be able to help the agency through that crisis, I vowed that I would spend the rest of my career on lessons learned during that crisis and what I could do. And by then... the year before that I had had with those target... intelligence targets I had and the experience I had working and finding my way through trying to get product to the user before it became history caused me to vow that I was going to spend the rest of my career as nearly as I could doing something about working closer with the user and tailoring what we were doing more to them, and so in '66 I was first told there would be a "B" Group and I'd be the Chief of "B" Group and then what happened, I turned around and I was told I was going to go on staff level – something called P2 – which I did. And I was there from '66 to '73, I believe it was, when I became Chief of "B." We'll talk a little about that later. But in that job what I did was I closed ranks with our users all over town. I put NSA representatives... I went down-town and I talked... I put NSA representatives side-saddled with our users not only in the big agencies but in the small ones. I mean, even things like Treasury and places like that where they have requirements that were even harder to understand.

**Frahm:** Basically everybody who had requirements got a "rep."

**Moody:** I put people... and I helped organize the White House Situation Room in the White House and the communications that went with it. I'd personally train what became the second director of the White House "Sit" Room. I

worked... (cut off)

**Frahm:** Which one was that, McManis?

**Moody:** McManis, yes. He was a protégé of mine.

**Frahm:** (B% And also) John (B% "Mc") that he knew you. He was down there as was (2G).

**Moody:** Yeah, he was one of my people that I put down there. And I worked with all the different agencies and set out to get our product on-line on something called the SOLIS system which I sponsored. So you see, I've sponsored systems all the way from intercept through every analytic process and up to, through, and including putting the final product where it belonged.

**Frahm:** Yeah, SOLIS was... (cut off)

**Moody:** SIGINT On-Line Information System. It was the, you know,... at the time I retired we were still having... we were just really getting it going. It was slow, it was hard. I had a hard... none of these things were easy. I mean, it was... I was fighting a long, hard, up-hill battle even including working closer with the... I wrote in the days that the Cuban Crisis was moving... had us circling down on it, I wrote the first SIGINT report that was ever published, and I spent months begging to publish it. I won't go into that with you. It's since (XB).

**Frahm:** I think you have talked about... (cut off)

**Moody:** I think I mentioned it in that more classified interview.

**Frahm:** Yes, you did. How did you convince people to let you put "reps," say, in the White House or some of these places that seemed like they would be hard to get somebody in the door?

**Moody:** I talked to various people and sometimes created requests (B% that way)... as I said, I wasn't always the most popular girl on the block, because there were people who thought we shouldn't do that. There were some strong feelings, and I guess Frank Raven was the most famous as the one who thought we should stay in our own backroom with our worksheets and never venture out and then... you know, we should just do those fun things for the fun of doing it. And we had big arguments about that, and he never really came around on that. But it was fun, you know, when I was playing with my worksheets and didn't know any better, but then the more I got to realize what we were there for and what we were supposed to do, the more I became interested in doing that. Let's see, where else (B% have I been). Anyway, then after we had the... I was on the committee with Hermann and we made recommendations, and there again Hermann and I were not too popular for what we were advocating. But in the meantime, in my organization which was P2 and then "V," I had... we had developed the first generation of the operations center which we called the Command Center and then gone with the Worldwide Operations Center, and Dick Lord was the chief of it and worked in my organization. So we made a lot of progress in that respect.

**Frahm:** Now, was P2 and "V" the same thing under different names?

**Moody:** P2 was not as strong an organization. "V" then became a group chief and had... and they turned... NSA always threw some rags and tags and things, you know, they put some funny things in organizations together. Let's see, they put the Central Reference in P2. I don't remember now whether it was in "V." But it didn't matter. I had the overall responsibility. In both of those jobs I had requirements and priorities. What I did primarily was to try to work and get out and beat the bushes with the users and tell them, you know, they needed to understand each other and the requirements and priorities and know what the trade-offs were to get the most timely items first in line and so forth. I had quality control for reporting, and I had the Director's daily briefing and so forth. Had briefers... and we had those daily briefs. We didn't even have a daily report. Right after the... during the Cuban crisis I started sending highlights to the Director each day, and he would pedal them downtown. He went down to the White House and so forth. Right after that Buffham, and Zaslow and I wrote a memo and sent through Kirby to the Director and Deputy Director saying that we wanted to publish a Daily Summary of the highlights of what came out, and that was the first SIGSUM. And so what happened was that we then... I picked up the responsibility for that publication when I... when P2 was established and continued to have it in "V." And that was a very successful thing.

**Frahm:** Yeah, I think... I'm sure it's still around. You see the SIGINT Digest electronically now. Everything is electronic now.

**Moody:** Anyway, I had a lot of fun, but I took a big beating too.

**Frahm:** I bet doing different things like (1-2G).

**Moody:** You wanted to... we didn't go into the role models and mentors, did we?

**Frahm:** No, not yet. So "V" was your last office.

**Moody:** Yeah.

**Frahm:** What made you decide to retire? Just the time was right, or... ?

**Moody:** Ah, a combination of things. I had given the agency all I had... myself. I really worked day and night all those years. I was in the most interesting, I think, jobs in the agency, but I had had little time to spend with my family – my mother, and father, and husband – and my husband became ill in '74, and my mother and father were getting on in age and had problems, and I felt the need to spend some time with them. I also... actually I've never said this to anyone before, but I will say I had been passed over for promotion and some of things I was doing, although I think I had pretty good leverage, I felt that I could have... I could get out quicker if I'd had more... you know, if I had not been passed over. There were a lot of people who I knew couldn't hold a candle to what I knew about the business were doing all right. I mean, I'd be hard pressed... I can give you a long list of names that I'd be hard pressed to tell you what contribution they made who would get promoted and I didn't. Now, I think the reason that I didn't is probably because, as I



told you before, I always did what I felt was right, whether it was politic or not, and so I wouldn't change that. That had something to do with it. But I had this personal thing. The other thing was I had also thought that everyone ought to quit while they're ahead instead of hanging around until they... I remember saying to General Allen – who pleaded with me not to go – that I would not come back and dabble in management. So I told him I felt that whatever... that I will have had whatever influence I could have had in the agency, and he commented to me, which was very nice, that the... it had been... the influence I've had had been considerable. I really felt terrible about telling him of all Directors, because I had such a good working relationship with him, but, you know, I'm still glad I left when I did. And Ann Caracristi still tells me I should not have done it. She didn't want me to go then. And I guess if I had stayed on there would have been probably some promotions. I don't think I ever would have had any more satisfaction out of what I was able to do, so I had a wonderful career, a great career. And I had no doubt that I did make a big contribution.

**Frahm:** Obviously.

**Moody:** So, as far as mentors go and did I mentor anybody? Yes, I did. Lot's of people. There used to be a... I used to hear around the building that there was something called the "moody boys." That was someone who kind of resented the fact that I was able to have these real dynamic people working for me, and there were some "moody girls" too. I wasn't... a lot of the women that I sponsored and helped had pretty much moved up to like the -15 level, but because they wouldn't get in management they didn't... you know. (B% Carrie Berry) was a great... to go into the agency and make a big contribution, and she was a wonderful person as well as a good cryptanalyst and just a tower of strength. When I moved into that V1 job, she was one of my right-hand people.

**Frahm:** Did she come in during the Second World War like you did?

**Moody:** Yes, she was there in the war, too.

**Frahm:** What did she work on in the war? Was she a German with you, or was she Japanese?

**Moody:** Ah, I believe she was Japanese in the war, too. I didn't meet her until after the war. And when I met her she was on the Soviet problem, and then I moved her around into the Serbo area. Alice Sachakliaan, as I mentioned. There were people like (B% Luce Lee) who was a great teacher of cryptanalysis, and I used to give her the job of teaching our young servicemen, and she also ran our machine room that I had all those equipments in. And (B% Andre Ferguson), she was a great "cryppie."

**Frahm:** Was Martha (B% Chen) a cryppie?

**Moody:** Yes, she was. She never worked with me.

**Frahm:** Marie (B% Meyer), did you know her?

**Moody:** Yes, I knew Marie. She was very good.

**Frahm:** Is she from the Soviet... I recently got e-mail. She went to the University of Chicago, so I just sent them an e-mail, and I wouldn't want to play scrabble with that lady. The list of languages she had studied from Sanskrit, Greek, and Latin to Navajo and everything in between, I assume she was a Russian linguist for most of the time.

**Moody:** Yes. I knew... some of those people I worked with were from the University of Chicago, and I've always had a really healthy respect for that institution because of some of the tremendous people. I worked with a couple of Egyptologists during World War II. Dr. Hughes and a Dr. Liz (B% Stephanski). She was an Egyptologist, and she was an atheist. You know, always announced that she was an atheist, and I had never really met anybody who claimed to be an atheist at that point in my life.

**Frahm:** How about Mary Jo (B% Dunning)?

**Moody:** Mary Jo was a good person. I never really worked directly with her, but she was good.

**Frahm:** Where was she?

**Moody:** Ah, I believe Mary Jo was on the Jap problem during the war.

**Frahm:** And after?

**Moody:** Ah, probably, I believe... now I can't be sure of this, she was not where I was, but she might have been in the old ALLO area before I got there in '61. I didn't know a lot of those people until I went in there in '61.

**Frahm:** Somebody else that I stumbled across... we have a (1G) history of AFSA, and it was interesting to look at the very high-ranking people in that original organization. The only woman in Operations who was high was Dr. Ward. One of the women who was very high-ranking was an Ethel (B% Fish) in Personnel. Did you know her at all? Because you've said in some of your classes you had (1-2B).

**Moody:** Wasn't she a friend of Ward's?

**Frahm:** I don't know. She might have been.

**Moody:** Mrs. Fish. Oh, yeah. She was in Personnel, right? Yeah, she had a son that worked for me. (TR Note: talking to herself here:) What was his name?... Ethel Fish... I just knew she was sort of high-ranking in Personnel, but I never really knew much about her, but I did know Dr. Ward. When I knew Dr. Ward... and I got to know her very well and respect her highly. When I really knew her and worked with her very closely was when she was in that agency staff position with Cecil Corry, and, you know, she was just a tremendous person, a very bright lady. My first knowledge of Dr. Ward was during the war when she was at the agency, but I did not know what she did. All I knew was there were a lot of... she had been the Dean of Women at Bryn Mawr and a lot of my friends were Bryn Mawr girls who had come to work there, and they were scared to death of her. They would actually turn around and, you know, some of them wouldn't meet her in the... I mean,

they just held her in such awe that, you know, it was... but, you know... I don't know what it is like in colleges now days, but I know I kind of had the same attitude toward the dean of women where I went to school. Anyway, when I got to know her she was such a down-to-earth person, and very good, very... and also such a modest person. I used to do a lot of writing for Dr. Ward's signature even though I was in Operations when she was on the agency staff. I would just send her a draft. She'd tell me, here's what I have to answer, and I'd send her a draft. But Dr. Ward would never change a word in my draft without calling me, and I was just giving her a draft because she was... you know, and so many people in the agency weren't that smart, you know. I mean, she knew that I knew the technicalities of the problem, and she was so wonderful about it, and she would call, and sometimes I would laugh at her, and I'd say, "Oh, you shouldn't worry about me (1G). You know you could go ahead with that." But she was just tremendous to work with. She also had a great sense of humor. But one of the first things that I remember about Dr. Ward – and you may have heard this story; if you have just stop me – but back way in the old days we used to... for some reason, Civil Service would have us complete a Form 52 which was like an application for employment. Over and over we'd have to fill these old forms out, and we all hated it. And there was one question on there: Are you an habitual partaker of alcoholic beverages? Well, Dr. Ward was approached by Mel Klein, as the story went. In fact, I know it's true because he... Mel told me that, and he said... do you know who Mel Klein was?

**Frahm:** Vaguely.

**Moody:** He was Chief of Personnel. He was a very powerful personnel chief back in those days. He said, "Julia, you checked 'yes'!" You know, "You checked off this 'yes.'" And he said, "You can't... you know that's not true. You're not a..." She said, "Well, I am!" And he said, "Oh, come on." And she said, "No, the first thing I do when I get out of this place and go home every day is have a martini, and that is a habit. And so I am an habitual partaker of alcoholic beverages, and I don't care who knows!" And in those days that was a... you know, that was quite something. But I guess they were looking for alcoholics, I don't know, but they had some funny ways of wording (1-2G).

**Frahm:** I have understood by the few people left at the agency who knew her and remember her that she had extremely high standards for what went out.

**Moody:** Oh, she did, very high standards. You know, she certainly always would do... she did a great job, and I always felt that Julia should have been promoted. I just don't think that she was treated fairly, and I don't know why.

**Frahm:** I haven't heard that. That's interesting, because William Friedman... and we found this in Friedman's folder. I'm not saying he's the only one that did this, but '53, '54, and '55 he had lists that had been saved of basically who ranked starting with whatever the top grade was, and one year it was a -16, and then another year it was an -18, and right down listing everybody – which has been great to look at because it's fun to see who was the -12's and who were the -15's. And at this particular time, in '55, she and Polly

Budenbach were the -15's; then there was Martha (B% Shen [Shin?]), and then there was you and Ann Caracristi. And you and Ann Caracristi and Polly Budenbach kind of continued up, and she and Martha Shen sort of dropped from sight.

**Moody:** Probably age had something to do with it at that time.

**Frahm:** Yeah. She was a lot older than all three of the others. I don't know how old Martha Shen is. She was somebody that I literally just stumbled across and was surprised to find her up there in the -14's and -15's when there were only five of you who had reached that... I didn't know how to ask Polly Budenbach this, and she was so modest she didn't say. Why was she a -15? Why was she the highest ranking woman in the agency in the mid fifties?

**Moody:** I don't know. First of all, I guess you have to remember she was older than we... than I and Annie. Ah, I don't know. (TR Note: recorder shut off here briefly.)

**Frahm:** So, say that again. You knew her?

**Moody:** But I knew Aggie through school. She sat in a room. Had a... like a little private room at the head of the wing that I worked in, and every once in a while I would just stop in and talk with her. But, you know, nothing of any consequence. At this point she received help in and out, but I do remember a lot of people who had known her over the years would drop by. People who would be... you know, a lot of Navy people who would be back on TDY, so they'd drop in and say hello to her.

**Frahm:** What was she working on then?

**Moody:** I don't know. I don't think much of anything. I think they just took her some worksheets, and she just kind of... you know, just probably nothing that made any difference. As I said, mostly my contact wasn't... was social. I just felt, you know, that she kind of liked to have somebody drop in and say hello, and every once in a while I'd do that, and I'd (2-3G). But I knew who she was.

**Frahm:** During your career did you feel that you had to... I don't know how... in the questions I sent you we used "speed bumps." Was there anything you had to do because you were a woman that the men didn't have to? Were there any hurdles you had to go through, anything... ?

**Moody:** I think I had to work a lot harder than they did. There were speed bumps, but what I... you know, I decided that I was going to try to be an equal as far as the work went, and I always felt... and I told this to women in the agency over the years: If you want to be treated equally, you've got to act equally. So don't expect to be a clinging vine and be treated equally too.

**Frahm:** You said you couldn't get in the War College. Was there anything else that was... ?

**Moody:** That's right. Oh, I know there were times. I never... well, I never had a

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period, you know, away from the Agency. The most time I was ever away from the Agency was one time I took three weeks leave. And I did go on TDY sometimes.

**Frahm:** Like where?

**Moody:** Well, primarily because of the targets that I worked in the European area. And England, I went to England many times because I worked very closely with those people over the years. I knew a lot of people at GCHQ. And I did get later on nominated for... one time the job in England at the Embassy. I was asked at least. And the one in [ ] but it was not at a time when I could arrange it as far as my personal and private life, so that didn't amount to anything. I am sure that there were times when there were things that I was not included in because I was a woman. I always kind of think maybe I should have played golf. My husband thought I should have played, but I do think that a woman coming up in my days certainly had to work very hard, although I think one break that people like Ann, and Polly, and I had was that during the war when they had to depend on us the people that we were working for, you know, recognized ability. I also think – and always have – that the caliber of people that we had in the agency had something to do with the fact that women were more accepted. I think the brighter and better educated our men are the more willing they are to accept women of ability.

**Frahm:** (B% I have to change... wait a second.) (TR note: recorder shut off here.) Okay, we're back. So, your husband thought you ought to play golf!

**Moody:** Oh, yeah. He wanted me to play golf particularly after we retired. He was a very good golf player, and I just felt like I'd be holding him back. Somehow I just didn't do it.

**Frahm:** Was he supportive of all the hours and all the work you did?

**Moody:** He was very supportive of me and my career, which was wonderful.

**Frahm:** Did he work around here? I mean, obviously... did he worked in D.C.?

**Moody:** He was an airline... yeah, he worked for Eastern Airlines at National Airport.

**Frahm:** He was a pilot?

**Moody:** Management. Airlines executive. He was a protégé of Eddie Rickenbacher.

**Frahm:** Really!

**Moody:** Yeah. Rickenbacher put him on the board (B% when he was a young... )

**Frahm:** So, you knew Rickenbacher. Did you ever meet him?

**Moody:** Yes.

**Frahm:** What changes did you have to make to adapt to work in an all-male environment?

**Moody:** I don't really remember any. First of all, I never... you know, my father and my grandfather and my uncle... the way I was brought up in... , I never knew that women had to worry about things like that. They always made me feel that I could conquer the world if I wanted to. So... and I guess I was just too

stubborn to make any... I don't remember even thinking about it, to tell you the truth. Later on I think that the higher up I got the more aware I was of some of the things you had to combat, but I didn't make any changes in my life style. I remember General Canine inviting me to... he was having stag parties, and I was the first woman invited to one of his stag parties. And all the guys... they thought that was something, you know, that I got an invitation from him to a stag party. And I believe it was in honor of Sir Eric Jones who was the GCHQ Director and was a friend of mine. I may be wrong about that, but I do remember going to what amounted to stag parties a lot of times, but this was called a stag party. And I remember the guys feeding me with a spoon. You know, they made a big fuss over me at this stag party. It was fun! That stood out a little bit. But I went to many, and particularly when I'd go to England the people I'd be working with there were mostly always all male, and there would be parties (2G). But I always found it a rather pleasant experience. Nothing that bothered me. Sometimes I – but almost never – was shocked at some of the language earlier on, but that was never really a problem.

**Frahm:** Were you ever discouraged from taking a job? Was there anything you ever wanted to do but... ?

**Moody:** Yeah. It turned out that just about every five years they'd just kind of bundle me up and put me in a... gave me a whole bunch of new challenges. I kind of liked that. But it... so I think it's all tied together (B% if you looked at it.)

**Frahm:** The next question... it's funny because these are rather stark questions that I have asked a variety of women who... a variety of generations, and the sexual harassment question comes up because that's been the big thing at work the past four or five years.

**Moody:** It has?

**Frahm:** They march us into the Friedman Auditorium and everybody has to go sit through this film on sexual harassment. Was that something that ever came up or anything like that when you were there?

**Moody:** I never had much of a problem. I guess people in my generation kind of thought that most people made their problems, although I ran into a few times... and I know there were times when that was... it was there. The... we had... well, let me say this. We had one Director that is the one that I have the least respect for who had these young ladies in a group. I never could figure out what they were supposed to do at the agency level, and he went around joking and calling it the "paint and body shop." Did you ever hear of that?

**Frahm:** No.

**Moody:** One day I was in the ladies room just outside the Director's office, and three of those young ladies were in the ladies room crying, and I asked them what's wrong? And they said... they started telling me how he had been talking to them. They were crying because of remarks he had made to them. Until this day I wish I had done something, you know, but I didn't. It just

appeared to me that I had all I could handle because I was not devoid of his... in one case Oliver Kirby had asked me to go on a trip and had sent out a message including all the places I was to visit. And after hours this Director sent a message out and told the commanders... he sent instructions ahead of my visit saying I was not to visit the commands. And apparently he thought that it was inappropriate for a woman to visit the commands. The interesting thing is that the people in the commands were friends of mine, and several of them called and came to see me. It was best not to make any noise about that, but that did happen. That was the most outstanding example I know. This was shortly before Mr. Kirby left the Agency. But anyway, that particular Director... most anybody can guess who he is, or who he was – he's not alive any more. I had a case of another... where the... another high-ranking military officer tried to persuade General Blake to remove me from my job in the days that the Cuban crisis was coming down, and I know exactly what happened. I don't know what you do with this or whether I should be telling you this or not. (TR Note: recorder shut off here briefly.)

**Frahm:** Still on. What did Dr. Ward die of? She was sick for a while. She... (cut off)

**Moody:** I don't really know.

**Frahm:** Because she was sick... (cut off)

**Moody:** When did she die? Maybe that would explain why.

**Frahm:** Sixty-one, sixty-two. Because she seemed to not have left the Agency. She left in March or April and died in June or July, and the NSA Newsletter said nothing about the cause, but it sounded like she died in place as opposed to having gotten sick, you know, retired suddenly and then died. It sounded like she just... (cut off)

**Moody:** I don't know. See '61, '62 I was so busy I couldn't keep up with my own. I didn't even get to go home a lot of days, and so... (cut off)

**Frahm:** Yeah, that was a horrible time for you to be aware of that, so... no, it was... (cut off)

**Moody:** Just a lot of things got passed to me, and I was really... day and night really... (cut off)

**Frahm:** Yeah, it could have been cancer or something. How prevalent do you think the sexual harassment was at that, ah,... do you think there was... ? (cut off)

**Moody:** I don't know. I never heard much about it, but then I think a lot of people might have accepted whatever happened. I just don't know. But I know one time one of my bosses told me that... I was up at IBM at the research lab. I had... I enjoyed a very good working relationship with IBM over the years, and I was at their research lab and one of my superiors told me that another one was looking for me, and he told me mine was up at IBM at the research lab, and he made a remark again about, you know, what does a little girl know about computers. But, you know, there wasn't anybody that ever mistreated me that I knew of, but it was kind of funny. But I stayed in touch

with IBM and was briefed on their "way out" technology. You talk about secret! They were really secret about that. And I remember when I first heard about the chip memories, and what we'd be able to do with it, and I was just absolutely in awe. But anyway, I know there was... you know, it was always there, but I never made any... but I must say I never had to fight anybody off with my hands or anything like that.

**Frahm:** Do you think NSA is in general good and fair to women employees?

**Moody:** I think NSA has always been ahead of just about any other organization I ever had any knowledge of. But as far as accepting women or any other minorities for what their abilities were, a lot better than other places. I don't... and I think a lot of that was because of the... on account of our origin and the background, and, you know, most of our founding fathers, if you want to call them that, have been pretty well educated people primarily from the colleges and universities where I think we benefited from the mentality of our workforce.

**Frahm:** You alluded to this before. Do you think the war had anything to do with NSA and its acceptance of women, because... ?(cut off)

**Moody:** Oh yes, I think so. The fact that, you know, there was a dependence there, and I think women had a chance to show... the war affected every walk of life, everybody in this world – World War II did, you know, really. It affected the family as a unit. Many families, you know, they grew up for generations and lived in the same area forever, and then when the war came along... mostly that didn't happen. My brothers and sisters were scattered all over. There have been times when we've been all over the world one way or another, and that couldn't have happened before World War II. Everything... it changed a lot of things, and I think that's one of them.

**Frahm:** Did you know anything about the Renata Predmore episode where she sued the Agency about a lack of a promotion?

**Moody:** I've heard of it, but I don't really know anything about it. I've just heard about it.

**Frahm:** Do you think the Agency has made any significant improvements, any changes? Was there any conscious thing to bring women forward during their career?

**Moody:** Well, I think it... the Agency obviously accepted women more so than other agencies, and I think that should have been clear to women. And that's, as I say, why so many times I told them to... women in the Agency, you know, you've got to act equal if you want to be treated equal. And I think some women were, and still are, reluctant to get out and join the march. On the other hand, I also think the movements with any groups caused some setbacks too. I think any, you know, waving the flags, and marching, and chanting kind of efforts hurt some people as well as opened doors.

**Frahm:** Interesting you should say that. One of the women who just retired who came in in the early sixties – late fifties, early sixties, I guess – said that the



civil rights movement, she felt, hurt women at the agency more than it helped, because she felt that beforehand when it came to being selected for a job, she didn't stand out in a positive way because she was a woman. Do you think there is any truth in that?

**Moody:** Well, I think the tendency at a quota that sometimes has been... you know, I think in the case of the integration of Blacks as well as women that the tendency that we'd better have a woman, we'd better have a Black, may at times have caused something less than the best qualified person to be picked, and to that extent I think sometimes that does (1-2G). On the other hand, if we didn't have these movements some of this, I suppose, wouldn't have gotten done. So, I think it's par for the course.

**Frahm:** We have talked about a lot of various women who you have known and touched. Jennifer over at the museum and I are going to be updating, improving, expanding the wall where we talk about great women of the agency and expanding it into cryptology, because a lot of her research has been, surprisingly, about women code breakers during World War I and the Civil War. She's actually turned up a couple. Who that you know – beyond, of course, like Dr. Ward, and you, and Ann Caracristi, and Polly Budenbach – who else should we include do you think?

**Moody:** Well, do you have a level that you go to? Does it make a... ?(cut off)

**Frahm:** No, it really doesn't. One of the people, for example, we're considering including is Marie Meyer. She made significant contributions to VENONA. According to what Meredith Gardner says, she made the first book breaking successes, and she also was the first person at the Agency to be awarded the Meritorious Service Civilian Award. So we just are mainly looking for significant as opposed to high-ranking – very often they end up being both, but not necessarily. Elizebeth Friedman is another good example. She never was at the Agency as far as anybody can tell, except visiting.

**Moody:** Well, I've known (B% then) several that I just thought were... I don't know... whether you... I think Carrie Berry stands out. I nominated Carrie for the job in Cheltenham. She even told me that she was convinced that no woman would ever be selected for that job. She just did not... I said, "Now, all you've got to do is just... listen to me. I mean, do you or don't you, or will you or won't you accept if you get the job, and you let me worry about (1G)." Well, she got the job, and she went over, and she was a horrendous success. Not only that, but she was just the hostess of, you know, of the decade. I guess one of the greatest hostesses ever.

**Frahm:** Was she the first woman to ever hold a job like that? Now, what job was that?

**Moody:** It's that job in England which is like the... you know, we had a rep in London – SUSLO – and this was the USLO job in... (cut off)

**Frahm:** Okay.

**Moody:** Yeah. And I nominated her for it after... she replaced Bob Stewart, I believe.

Bob was one of my great (1G). I don't know if you knew Bob or ever (B% have) (1-2G).

**Frahm:** No. When was this roughly?

**Moody:** Oh, she must have gone over there probably in the sixties. She would have replaced him sometime in the sixties. And she certainly stood out as a cryptanalyst.

**Frahm:** Yeah, her name keeps... she's mentioned and mentioned by several people. Mrs. Budenbach mentioned Jane (B% Brulla/Bruleck).

**Moody:** Yeah. I think Jane was good. Then, ah, let's say I think Alice Kiotian Sachakliaan, who became a 15, was a tremendous combination of... she knows all kinds of languages. She could just absorb a language. I have called her in when I've had a document in a language we had no capability in the agency, and she would say, give me a few days and I'll come back with a translation. I remember having lunch with her during the Vietnam War, and I said, "What are you doing these days?" and she said, "Oh, I'm in a... I've just signed up for a class in Vietnamese." She said, "I'm going to be bored to death in that class with all those young kids." I said, "Now, wait a minute! You may... you have to run (2-3G)." The next time I saw her I said, "How are you doing?" She said, "Well, I remember going in my language class, but you're right. I've had to really work (1G)."

**Frahm:** I'm amazed by some of these people and the languages they can absorb.

**Moody:** Well, I think (2-3G) covered.

**Frahm:** I think that we've covered about everything. Is there anything else you want to talk about?

**Moody:** No, I don't think so. Unless there's... you know... you don't have anything. (B% I think I'm) running down.

**Frahm:** Okay.

**[END OF INTERVIEW]**