

471 pages

tapes 1-5

TOP SECRET//S

Declassified and approved for release by NSA on 07-14-2015 pursuant to E.O. 13526: ST80298

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1976

Tape 1, Side 1

topical subject here or whatever you want to call it. There was an absolute dearth of cryptologic material of any utility in 1930 when Friedman had started training the group that had been formed after Yardley's organization was closed down and one of the pressing jobs which had to be done was to prepare a body of material that could be used for training not only the small group which had been assembled but broadly across military intelligence and signal corps personnel, both officer and enlisted, and this lack of material was had to be overcome before any training program could be set up which would embrace more than just one small class like the unit that Friedman was bringing up by hand with his own instruction and that was the group <sup>of</sup> ~~that~~ Clark Kullback, Sinkov, Rowlett, Hurt, and the small group in the civilians in the Signal Intelligence Service. There was no training material available from the navy or (State Department or the Bureau) or any place else in the government. The few things that had been published ~~that~~ were the [Hagelin] I'm sorry it was the [Swedish writer]

DSS  
FBI

(Valaki)

(Gildan) (Gylden)  
Gylden  
Gildan.

Givierg = (?), ?

He had published a book. There was one by Gebeirs(?), Kasisky and a few of that type, totally worthless for training purposes is about all that was available. <sup>So</sup> Friedman being sort of considered the storehouse of knowledge on cryptanalysis, cryptography and cryptology was <sup>virtually</sup> the only person who could fill this gap so <sup>one of</sup> his priority objectives was the preparation of a series of books starting out with <sup>the</sup> military cryptography, Special Text No. 165 if you want to be able to identify it, which he had prepared and was ready to go to the printers by April 1930. The reason I am so precise in my recollection is that I was given about the <sup>thirteenth</sup> umpteenth copy, carbon copy, as the text which I would study when I reported for duty in April and I think I learned <sup>more</sup> ~~my~~ cryptanalysis

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 from deciphering the manuscript than I did from the text itself because it was such a poor copy and one of our jobs and Abe finally inherited this was to prepare examples for these texts. Now Friedman had four or five <sup>sessions</sup> ~~sessions~~ in mind as his approach to this problem. One of these was to divide cryptography into two parts, elementary military cryptography and advanced military cryptography and then his concept of cryptanalysis was elementary and advanced and then followed with a bunch of special texts <sup>like</sup> ~~that~~ we would find in the solution of the mechanical/electrical cryptograph, the Hebr<sup>ern</sup>~~on~~ machine, and have a bunch of technical papers which would then serve as ~~the~~ text books and calculus and group theory and other things in mathematics to people who wanted to specialize, so he began producing <sup>and</sup> of course this was not an easy job and it took several months he began producing the text which have now come out as military cryptography and I believe you'll find <sup>an</sup> elementary and advance and you'll find maybe two or three in cryptanalysis and he sort of built these up in nice neat packages which could be produced and printed you see without having to hold up the whole series until the final paper was written because there was a great deal of urgency <sup>in</sup> ~~to~~ get <sup>out</sup> ~~this~~ training program underway in the military services and also I think Friedman quite accurately <sup>recognized</sup> ~~that~~ if he didn't ~~do~~ it that it probably would never be done until some of the rest of us could be spared and he was afraid <sup>that</sup> the pressure of both producing US cryptographic materials and to produce intelligence by cryptanalysis on the messages which we'd intercepted <sup>to</sup> ~~from~~ foreign governments ~~with~~ would grow into such an important operation that none of us could be spared for it and so while he was training us he I think burned the candle at both ends producing the text <sup>at</sup> ~~at~~ least outlining and putting the words around the text and I think finally the latest ones Calimahos collaborated pretty made <sup>big</sup> ~~good~~ contributions to them because Friedman got so preoccupied with other things and probably

honestly burned out by doing these things because it's not an exciting thing to do a textbook on cryptanalysis if you've got some live material waiting for your attention. Now I believe this is a reasonable summary of what happened in the preparation of the text on cryptography and cryptanalysis and I think it lays the groundwork for us understanding to understand the so called Black Books or technical papers which were published about that time. Friedman because of the pressure producing the comprehensive work on cryptography and cryptanalysis which was a great big chore in itself, went ahead without waiting to any longer than he had to to begin publishing the technical papers and here again in tribute to Friedman's foresight <sup>he</sup> had budgeted a certain amount of money to be spent <sup>for</sup> on printing and binding <sup>and</sup> the production of technical papers on cryptology. Now as soon as he found something that would qualify for a technical paper he would get a manuscript prepared that could be sent to the Government Printing Office and he went first to the papers that he had produced. The most significant of these is the Hebr<sup>ern</sup>~~son~~ solution, the technical paper that is entitled "Analysis of the Mechanico-Electrical Cryptograph" and the reason there is a Part I to that is because that's basically his analysis of the Hebr<sup>ern machine</sup>~~son~~ which was presented to him by the navy department back in the middle 20s. Later on, Part II arose out of the second version of the Hebr<sup>ern</sup>~~son~~ machine which I believe as I recollect here without looking at the book was a result of work which was done after 1930 and we the three of us I leave Hurt out of this because he was suffering pretty badly ~~badly~~ from tuberculosis at that time and of course was burdened with the work on the Japanese. Hurt worked very little with us on the research problems and so Part II was later on published as a follow-up of a cipher machine based on the Hebr<sup>ern</sup>~~son~~ and I think <sup>that</sup> is probably the best example of <sup>an</sup> authentic pre-1930 publication. I mean the manuscript that Friedman put into publication after 1930

that we could find. Now there were certain other of these papers. The solution for the double transposition cipher and oh . . . . .

Some of the other more important technical papers that were produced as a part of the literature program and I think probably the most important that came out of the work of the three of us Kully, Sinkov and myself was the general solution of the ADFGVX cipher system. The philosophy and <sup>the</sup> concept that we discovered in dealing with the ADFGVX cipher laid the groundwork for our solution of the Japanese transposed codes, the J19 series and that group, and also gave us the first opportunity for the application of computer type; modern day computer type; attacks on cryptanalysis and I think this needs this paper; needs considerable separate treatment on its own merits because the ADFGVX cipher system, although a WWI type of system, led us into a domain of the wilderness that we might never have otherwise explored and maybe it would have been some years later than was actually the case that the application of computery to cryptanalysis would have been achieved. Others of which I felt were very good papers of the state of the art at that time was The General Solution for the Double Transposition Cipher which I believe is authored by Dr. Kullback and the permutation tables involving the featured non-transposability which is by Dr. Sinkov and statistical methods in cryptanalysis also by Kullback. These represent positive contributions, significant milestones in the development of cryptanalysis as we saw it in the early 30s and this was a very very fruitful period because for two reasons. One Friedman had really stimulated our interest in doing research, finding new techniques for solution of systems which were known and devising <sup>new systems</sup> ~~uses~~ which were an improvement and he'd build a fire under us and it got a very good response

from all of us in that field and second there was no competition so it was a very good year for young cryptanalysts to go into publication because what we had learned and we had learned lots of things that were useful but we never there was just so much work to be done we <sup>couldn't write</sup> ~~never put~~ them all down and these papers are rather thin because we were forced to put the bare bones <sup>of the</sup> information down rather than <sup>try</sup> to take some small items and expand them by elaborating on them and putting a lot of words <sup>in</sup> and so they are very pithy, they are right to the point and they are very useful I think as measures of whats accomplished in those years. Now some of the other <sup>and to end</sup> papers were published for example the report of the code compilation section of general headquarters american expeditionary forces Dec 17<sup>6</sup> - Nov 18. Since we couldn't produce enough technical papers in volume as represented by the efforts of Friedman and those of us who were in his small group to eat up the budget which had been the money which had been budget<sup>d</sup> for these things Friedman went back into the files and picked out useful historical documents and the title of the paper I mentioned represents one he'd selected. Another one, encipherment of the german diplomatic code No. 7500, money was available and this in Friedman's mind was something that ought to be documented in the history of cryptography and so he chose <sup>it</sup> ~~this~~. The Zimmerman telegram of January 16, 1917 and its cryptographic background was a paper produced by Mendelsohn and Friedman in collaboration. Mendelsohn did a tour of military duty, a couple of them, and produced this paper as part of his military assignment while he, <sup>he</sup> as a reserve officer, satisfied his requirements for active duty and its a very good paper. I think it puts into pretty good

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*Tuchman (2)*

context what Barbara ~~Cookman~~ publishes in her story of the Zimmerman telegram but I can't resist my own impulse to say what I think about it. I think that both Friedman and Mendelsohn were completely taken in by Admiral Hall and his group and the intentions of the British. I think that by golly the [British were reading the American codes and they were very nervous about ~~this~~ disclosing their cryptanalytic techniques to the US] because they didn't want to dry up this valuable source of insight into American intelligence. That is I think probably the way it happened. [The British] were so reluctant and made such a deal about revealing the fact that they read the Zimmerman telegram and I think some of the speculation in the paper by Friedman and Mendelsohn doesn't take that into account and couldn't have because at that time the Americans weren't aware of <sup>the</sup> competence how really [how good the British were in cryptanalysis.] The other papers I think can be readily identified <sup>and</sup> put in the sort of categories of useful historical docu-

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documents that is old reports which were published simply because the funds were available and we felt we had to use these funds because they might be cut back next year and we certainly anticipated that the documentation of what had been developed either as a training program or in terms of a technical papers was important to future cryptanalysis. I might mention one other paper and then I believe we've dealt enough with these and this is the paper on the solution of cryptograms produced by the IT&T cipher machine.

This was the result of a challenge by Parker Hitt of Friedman to break the machine that he had been instrumental in producing <sup>as</sup> for IT&T and it was a very straightforward attack that we applied to it and Friedman was looking ahead in this case and he could see that the automatic encipherment, the teletype signal, was going to be one of the big problems for the future of cryptography and cryptanalysis and so he was very anxious for us to write up the solution which we had achieved on the IT&T so that there would be at least some basis in the

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cryptanalytic literature for dealing with that type of a system. Both from the standpoint of cryptography, protecting our own systems, and from the standpoint of a possible attack on foreign cipher machines using the teletype stream as the basis for cipher treatment. Is that what you want?

A: Yeah.

Q: The first question I had on my list was the one that you commented briefly on there about ~~reporting~~ <sup>recorded</sup> material and the question being did you receive any recorded material during the 30s and WWII and if so what form was it in, tape, wire, dictaphone? Sir the reason that I asked this originally was that I became aware of the fact that they were using dictaphones in the WWI period, <sup>in</sup> 1919 and so forth, to record intercept and I was particularly interested in what was being used in this later period and what then was being forwarded back one way or another?

A Shall I pitch in? Yes there was some recorded material received after 1930 and during WWII but the role played by the recorded material somewhat traces the

development of the recording art in that timeframe and let me tell you some examples about some examples that I know about, This and we are now talking about intercept material. We've got to go back and realize that there was no intercept service available before the early 30s. The signal<sup>intercept</sup> intercept service in the army and I'm talking about the army now, did not begin to produce until sometime after April 1, 1930 and I would judge that as a loose recollection that the first information, the first intercept material, we got was sometime within the next three to nine months and it was the first meager takings of the second signal service company. Nathaniel Lee Baldwin, Capt Baldwin, was the officer in charge of the organization of the intercept service and they had arranged for one of these to be up at Fort Monmouth. I believe this was station one,<sup>because</sup> That was where the school was and they were going to select their operators from the cream of the communications operators. The normal telegraph operators, radio telegraph operators, in the signal corps because they had already learned<sup>the</sup> Morse code, they had learned *all* the magic of intercept, well taking the signal off the air and putting it on paper.

and so all they had to do was to learn the quirks of these special quirks of the networks that they were covering. The navy had gone much further than the signal corps in developing intercept service and I believe they had a full grown one, a very good one in being ~~by~~ 1930 but I know very little about that because we did not learn of this until sometime a couple of years later when there was the beginnings of some sort of collaboration in the intercept field that I began to observe. There may have been more before I noticed it but that's when I began to observe it. Now the first recordings that we received were from a special installation in the <sup>Presidio,</sup> ~~Psidio~~ California in the San Francisco and the reason we got these is because General <sup>Mauborgne</sup> ~~Mobern~~ later Chief Signal Officer who at that time was a colonel was the signal officer for the 9th Corps area with his headquarters in the <sup>Presidio</sup> ~~Psidio~~ and he was very anxious to begin coverage <sup>of</sup> ~~to~~ the transoceanic circuits between

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San Francisco and Tokyo to pick up Japanese diplomatic messages which was the number one priority in the SIS as our intelligence target and I believe it was about 1930 well it was a couple of years after 1930 anyhow that we began to receive in the in the signal intelligence service some undulator tapes that had been recorded by <sup>Mauborgne</sup> ~~Mobern~~ in, believe it or not, his quarters where he'd set up a radio receiver, communications receiver, and tuned it in on the commercial circuits between San Francisco and Tokyo. He knew the frequency. He'd spotted it. He had it all pretty well lined up and since they came up, these circuits came up, while he was on duty he'd also rigged up a <sup>sort of</sup> homemade do-it-yourselfer time clock on ~~this~~ <sup>the</sup> thing which essentially was, as I believe he described it, as an alarm clock with a clothespin. Somehow or other the alarm clock pulled a little piece of insulating material up between a weakened clothespin and closed the contacts and you must remember we didn't in those days have timing lights switches like we now have that you can buy for 5 bucks. It was a laboratory job to build a timer because I don't

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think the synchron<sup>ous</sup>~~is~~ (?) clock motor had been marketed at that time so it was a very primitive sort of setup that ~~Mauborgne~~ <sup>Mauborgne</sup> had but he <sup>did</sup> produce the tapes. These tapes came in in packages by registered mail with a government franking <sup>at the time</sup> and ~~we~~ were received in the signal intelligence ~~unit~~ unit. Friedman brought them in and gave them to Abe Kully and myself, and Johnny Hurt to do something with. Well they were undulator tapes in Morse code and I think this is interesting.

It really doesn't come in as part of the question but it shows the state, it shows something about our development. I was the only one who had any inkling of what a Morse code was like being a little bit of a radio buff when I was in college and before <sup>that</sup> and so I had maybe a little more knowledge of what to expect on these tapes and I was able then to take the tapes and look at the Morse signals which was inscribed on it and translate it into letters and of course there was the question of putting it down in copy so we could work on it. Well Kully and I formed a team, I would take the tape, read it vocally. Kully would take the back, take the paper

which consisted of the backs of mimeographed weather reports because we were so hard up for funds in those days in the signal corps that we couldn't buy stationery and there was some kind of commitment which required the signal corps issue every day a weather <sup>report</sup> in a certain number of copies and they had to do this to satisfy the budget requirements. At least that's what the Chief Signal Officer experts told them so when the rest of us were without paper, the meteorological section had paper and then we took their what they didn't distribute you see and used it as for <sup>our</sup> ~~our~~ paper and of course it was ideal from the standpoint of handwritten copy of the intercept. So I would read the tape and Kully would transcribe it and then Abe, we were beginning to get organized in the Japanese section at this time, Abe would you know sort it out by categories, <sup>and</sup> index it and this was the division of effort. It was this went on for two or three years until he actually had trained the intercept operators to do this transcription work in the station. Of course it was a makeshift

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Mauborgne  
kind of a thing for ~~Robert~~ to send in these tapes. Now to get down to the real meat of your question and get away from this sort of incidental experimental development which is interesting because it does demonstrate how we had to deal with the problem. In due course the intercept operators would record the signal on undulator tape because that was the way the commercial companies were recording it and it was probably the most efficient <sup>and</sup> the most prudent way of doing it because to go to some other medium, remember magnetic tape hadn't been invented, <sup>the</sup> wire recorders were most unpredictable and poor quality and poor quality control on the wire and very little was known about the theory of recording and the other fancy things like reproduction quality and fidelity. <sup>So</sup> The undulator tape was just up and down and if you got a good fat signal and it ~~was~~ <sup>went through</sup> a good strong amplifier there was no mistaking what it was unless you got a burst of static and then since the commercial companies collated their messages you could always clean up the static on the second transmission and also if it was too bad they would retransmit at a

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later date so if you kept on the circuit you could get good clean copies. They had to have clean copy because they were selling it. We had to have clean copy because we were trying to solve it. Their requirement was money and ours was maybe didn't show through as loudly and talk as firmly as money did. When we got into tape magnetic kind of tape or wire recorders some experimental work was done by the laboratories, signal corps laboratories, on wire recording and it was not at all satisfactory and at that time if you'll just look into your records I'm sure you will confirm what I'm going to say is that there was the dictaphone was pretty good for office work but for the long continued recording sessions required by the intercept operators ~~just~~ well it could be used did require special equipment, hard to obtain and did require special training which sometimes it was hard to achieve and since the undulator tape was doing such a magnificent job there was no point in going to something else until it <sup>could</sup> definitely be proved the other medium was better and we didn't achieve that latter in the timeframe up until I would say

the beginning of the war. Now *I have* ~~there~~ contact with the intercept station

at about the time the war started because there was <sup>just</sup> too much to do and there were

too few of us to work in the well the development of the old signal intelligence service we just well that's my excuse for not knowing anything about what happened

in WWII. Did I answer that question?

Yes I think very well.

*Q  
Coates*

\_\_\_\_\_ You said there was no intercept service prior

*Goodman*

to April 1, 1930. How was Yardley getting all his material?

A Pickup from cable office. That's a good point. I should have mentioned that.

You can confirm this by Yardley's book. He sort of slides over it but if you read

it carefully you will . . .

Q Do you know whether or not the MID had directed <sup>any of</sup> the ~~naval~~ signal corps people to

maintain some of the stations that were in existence earlier say the post war

period 1921, 22 *Fulton Mine* or some of the other ones. (Is

*Fulton Mine* a city or Fort Sam) Fort Sam Houston ~~was~~

They were still operating after WWI and we don't know how long they continued.

A. I don't know how to answer that but I can speculate on what might have happened

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because unless there is a threat the military services tend to go dormant, <sup>This is</sup> sort of Rowlett's rule of thumb. What can you pick up from the places you mentioned?

Fort Sam? Fort Sam was one of the stations that was planned for the signal intelligence service. It didn't take us long to discover that this was a very useless <sup>place</sup> to

have an intercept station because <sup>(1)</sup> it was right sort of in the middle of Texas which is a pretty good state and (2) for close-in listening like the Japanese military or German military what can you do down there?

Q How about Mexico?

A: Mexican? Mexico was no threat in the timeframe of 1930 to 35, If it was it was so relatively small as compared with <sup>the</sup> three major threats Japan being number one Germany being number two and Italy number three and then France possibly four.

[ Britain was not considered a threat ] for some strange reason. I don't find it

philosophically explainable that in terms of what I remember at that time and what

I learned later but [ Britain was just not considered a threat at all. ] Probably

as an outgrowth of the Alliance which <sup>was</sup> developed in WWI but [ Spain, the Spanish ]

of course was not much as a military but <sup>was</sup> useful for [ diplomatic intelligence ]

South American countries somewhere below [Spain] Cuba, of course, was of interest because of its proximity to the east coast of the US: its possibility of being taken by some foreign power in a coup like the Bay of Pigs turned out not to be so I think this kind of puts them in perspective. Now go back to my speculation about this question. It was just so futile and so little real work could be done at these intercept stations and the requirement was so disguised. The requirement was there but there was no mechanism you see to make the requirement to implement the requirement to ask that certain well you've got to give an intercept operator direction or he's no good as an intercept operator just tunes like when we do when turn our CBs on. He listens, He finds something interesting and that's where he stays but if you're going to have a thriving good production<sup>u</sup> intercept station you've got to give them a proper target and you've got to give them instructions and you've got to give them circuits and other things because the intercept station cannot thrive without direction and I don't think there was any direction and any

requirement and they just did what everybody would do under the circumstances.

<sup>just</sup>  
They <sub>^</sub> did what was necessary and let it go the rest of it go because even if there

was an impulse like

End of Tape 1, Side 1

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Tape 1, Side 2

Q  
Goodman

Was there any continuity that you can recall to intercept activities from the WWI through era to the establishment of the SIS in 1930?

A. I can speak only from 1930, April 1, 1930 on and what I bumped into quite by accident regarding what was done in the period prior <sup>to</sup> April 1 1930. The there wasn't quite a capability for intercept developed in WWI, frontline intercept. Most of this was picked up from the French and most of it was done in the field commanders domain and just like <sup>in</sup> every other major conflict where the field commander is pretty much like MacArthur was as we think about it in the Philippines where he develops his own military structure. When the need for that military structure disappears then all the components are pretty much done away with. Now since the intercept which was viable in WWI was mainly field intercept, and in the years following WWI up until 1930 there was no field requirement, You can quite naturally expect and it would be my assumption that it just dried up on the

vine because there was no need for it. But now this didn't mean that certain people within the military establishment lost their realization of the importance of an intercept capability both in terms of <sup>a</sup>the natural war and in terms of preparation for future wars. It was I think this realization coupled with the realization that there would be a need for intelligence of the type of the Zimmerman telegram, if you will, which was pretty well publicized (that lead the State Department to continue ~~the~~ Yardley's organization) and since Yardley's organization was fed by pickups from the cable offices there was no need for the conventional radio intercept operator and radio intercept station that we visualized as we looked at the problem <sup>in</sup> ~~at~~ today's dimensions. Yardley could produce intelligence from the cable copy <sup>ies, and</sup> since there was no war there was really no need to do military intercept, your [cable intercept was the diplomatic intercept] and if you could get it from the [cable companies] for almost <sup>free</sup> why waste the money and the effort and attract attention by the activity? It was good from the secrecy standpoint and all these factors tended to work against the development of a productive intercept

service in the timeframe up to 1930. Now when the Yardley's organization was dissolved in 1929 the concept of (taking the 10 grand that had been contributed by G2 to the State Department funding for Yardley's installation up in New York City well that 10 grand was used to <sup>a few</sup> hire <sup>^</sup> people, Kullback, Sinkov and myself and Hurt and Larry Clark and that just about added up to <sup>their</sup> salary because at \$2,000 <sup>for a</sup> a year <sup>per</sup> junior cryptanalyst and <sup>1440</sup> for another job you had about \$600 left over which could go into the general signal corps kitty and that came out as the dimensions <sup>of</sup> that the civilian staff of the signal intelligence service. But now since the military was going to provide the people for the intercept service, that came out of ~~or~~ a different sort of funding-manpower arrangement and there was hardly any point in developing the civilian component without mounting the intercept activity at approximately the same time because they recognized I think <sup>Mauborgnes</sup> the ~~Moberns~~ and the others who were behind this movement to develop the signal intelligence service, they realized there would be a training time lag in there.

By the time they got the cryptanalyst trained they would need the intercept

and they would need also by that time to train the intercept *and organize it*

and they visualized one each of the departments major intercept station that would

be the Philippines, the Hawaiian department and the Panama Canal department looking

down to South America. Of course Hawaii didn't look very good at any place

because the Philippines in terms of the state of the art at that time was the

primary place for intercepting communications from Japan and China and the chief

advantages of *the presidio* ~~Pedro~~ and Fort Monmouth was found in the *their availability* ~~variability~~ to pick up

transoceanic commercial circuits from New York to Europe and from San Francisco to

the east. Now in terms of the kind of information that was intercepted, military

activity was nil, *and* so they were almost limited exclusively to [picking up diplomatic

communications.] Now this wasn't true for the navy because there is always naval

activity. Ships go out. They sail the ocean? They sail around the world. The

navy always has an opportunity to intercept Japanese, German or Italian *what?* navy in

the timeframe of the 30s which you would never enjoy if you were trying to intercept military traffic and at that time you must remember also <sup>that</sup> our capabilities of the major nations still somewhat in its early stages and in some cases could not be identified as being separate from the army or navy because if I was in the U.S. Army or the U.S. Navy that land capability was so far as air was concerned was part of the army and the sea was part of the navy. I think this last is important because people lose sight of the fact that in that time period there was practically no reason <sup>^</sup> there was no Vietnam, no Korea. Nothing like that going on. We were pretty much an isolated country and we could see only what was right around us.

Q: *Coates* The second question I have here then I think you almost <sup>we</sup> ~~lead~~ <sup>lead</sup> ~~right~~ into was

is do you know of any pre-war intercept in the Philippines or China?

A: Now do you mean pre-WWII intercept?

Q: Pre-WWII. Yes.

A: Yes. The navy up ~~some~~ <sup>it</sup> sometime before 1930 and I can't put a date on this as I recollect

~~this~~ now had developed a competence for intercepting Japanese naval and other land-

based, certain other certain land-based transmissions in Asia. For example, there was

a net a Japanese net called the Far Eastern Diplomatic Net that had a base station

in Tokyo and then several outlying stations within Asia and they were covering this net completely. The operators were very good the cream of the navy communications operators and they had done enough work on the Japanese so that they understood exactly what the Japanese were doing and they copied them as good as any I can recollect having seen. Of course now I'm basing my observations on what I learned in 1933 and 34 because we didn't know about this navy activity until some years after 1930. What year I don't remember now. Now we had for example developed quite a capability for interception in the Philippines before Pearl Harbor and one of the most interesting and I think heartbreaking things that you could listen to was this recording of the last message <sup>sent</sup> [from Corregidor] because the message is from an intercept operator. That's about all they had to send back in those days.

Actually I think I might inject this reminiscence in the answer to your question.

Actually in the Philippines the intercept station was located in one of the most impregnable points in the area and when the Japs took the Philippines the intercept

station was one of the last positions that was overrun by the Japanese and the intercept operator the intercept operators were intercepting Japanese messages, field messages. It was the first time we'd seen them this close up and had been sending them in from about the time the Japs landed until the fall of Corregidor and what they were doing was taking the better intercepts which we had specified from Washington, enciphering them with the M134T1, sending them out over the radio circuits, we picked them up in San Francisco, sent them by landline to Washington where we decoded <sup>them</sup> and then we had the actual intercept messages. Now there was a considerable volume of these things coming in and they were extremely valuable because they gave us the first real sample of the Japanese military front line tactical ~~communications~~ systems and radio activity. Now as part of the human interest aspect of this thing we thought this were we putting too much of a burden on these folks so we made the query and this was the answer and I will remember this answer very vividly as long as I live - roughly - "There is very little that

we can do except it seems to us this is a positive action against the Japanese.

We are happy to do it. We would be happy if we were killed, to die doing it

because there is nothing else for us to do except surrender and we don't want to

surrender." Now this oh there were usually there was a little bit of a commentary

at the end of the transmission on what the intercept operators and the chief of

the intercept service and some of the signal corps officers thought because this-

was separate and apart from the command communications to Manila and I remember one

of the last ones <sup>fact</sup> we received talked about the imminence of the fall of the station,

what actions they were going to take to destroy the classified equipment which was

very important to us you see. We didn't want cipher devices and other things like

that and other classified equipment to fall into the hands of the Japs so we sort of

bugged the people out there and uselessly I'm sure but you do it nevertheless as a

prudent thing and they explained what they did and went into some detail about

living conditions. So we had an active and mature intercept service operating out

of the Philippines at the time the Japs struck Pearl Harbor and this had been

developed from about 1932 <sup>through</sup> ~~to~~ the years up to Pearl Harbor and it was one of the priority intercept activities of the signal intelligence service because it was the only hope we had of picking up mainland China and mainland Asia and certainly from Japan itself a military traffic because we weren't able to get it from anyplace else.

Q: I wondered to some extent about the Navy that sent their boats up the various *Contes* rivers into China - whether they were taking advantage of their close-in position to do any intercept activity?

A: I couldn't answer that except by speculation. Knowing the navy I'm sure they did and I think it was the right way to do it. I don't say that in a derogatory sense but I say it that if you're going to you have to have a pretty good idea <sup>of</sup> what each portion of the radio spectrum used by the enemy is being employed for, employed for and unfortunately ~~for the~~ <sup>in</sup> radio some of that is very close in and the timeframe of those days certainly it was indicated we'd go close in. Now these were intercepts. They were primary items of intelligence. Not secondary like we find in the, well we

had COMINT and we had RADINT. We had what the Air Force tried to do whenever they found out they could do communications intelligence and I'm talking now about ~~the~~ Butcher's fiasco. That kind of stuff is in my opinion and for what its worth in this context not worth going after because you have to do too much to it and there's to make it useful and when you have made it useful its it has to be confirmed by many other sources many of which are much better intelligence criteria than the stuff itself.

Q: Since we're talking about actual intercept activities the last question that I

*Coates*  
put on here was one concerning targetting on Russia particularly in the 30s but

also periods back during actual period of WWII. I suspect that we probably did

intercept activity against Russia and but I haven't gotten into any type of work

on it. I wondered if anyone was in fact with your group <sup>maybe</sup> working on the Russian

problem?

A: We did some work on Russian in the 30s. There was a congressional committee

investigating <sup>AMTORG</sup> ~~the AMTORG~~ activities up in New York City and they turned to the navy with a bunch of intercepts and this I guess would be 32 or 33 and asked

the navy cryptanalysts to try to decode the messages and give them to the contents,  
to the congressional committee. Lawrence S~~z~~afford and Joe Wenger, I think Joe  
Wenger was, you'll run across his name so I won't identify him or S~~z~~afford anymore  
in this context than I've done. Joe Wenger was very young in those days and  
an ensign and this is the first time I think he'd bumped into the army. S~~z~~afford  
had been known to us because he was in charge of the code section over there, so  
of material  
S~~z~~afford and Wenger brought this package ~~and~~ and saw Friedman to see if we might  
do anything with it and I think we worked, we worked pretty long on it. We broke  
into the meaning of the first groups, the indicator groups, they had a sort of a  
syllabary that told what to do with the rest of the message but we were never  
successful in breaking the messages themselves. It wasn't too much I'd say <sup>about</sup> a stack  
about two inches high which they'd filched out of the offices of the Armory

Trading Corporation and the reason they'd done this because at that time

[ we had not recognized Russia ] and I think in terms of what was done against the

[ Russians, ] remember that [ Russia's back was broken in WWI and it was a state of chaos ] to the outside world. Everything that happened in [ Russia ] was not understood. ] The communications were 'nt, didn't mean much. The American intelligence had very little concept of [ the Russian situation ] but they could see the Japanese navy and they could see the German navy and they could see the Italian navy and they could talk to the Japanese and the German and the Italian diplomats and these were the big targets and nobody ~~ever~~ <sup>had</sup> noticed [ Russia really in that simplified context. ] Now when did we [ become concerned about Russia? ] Of course when we woke up to what was happening when Hitler starting acting up in Germany then interest was developed and [ we started to put some Russian priority into effect and we required Russian messages but we didn't organize the ~~rest of the~~ <sup>Russian</sup> section because still the real fighting, the real enemy, was not Russia ] but (it was <sup>Italy</sup> Germany), Japan and Italy in that order because the order changed after Hitler had become as active but we were still working hard on Japan because we figured that Japan

would be it was inevitable I mean there was no question in our minds and the people I talked to that war with Japan was inevitable and this was clear about a year before Pearl Harbor and of course nobody <sup>knew</sup> until Pearl Harbor itself where the strike was going to be and I think we were all surprised <sup>that</sup> the Japanese had the temerity to do it the way they did. [The real realization, though, to the importance of Russia did not come until just before the end of WWII] when Japan sent a series of messages, I believe it was in May of the year, that they wanted their Ambassador in Moscow to go down and call on Stalin and get him to intercede with the Allies for an honorable <sup>peace</sup> for Japan. The only caveat over and above unconditional surrender was that the integrity of the Imperial household be maintained and when Potsdam took place and well in the first place Stalin never did see the Japanese Ambassador on this question. I think he talked to one of the his deputies in the foreign office and then when Potsdam <sup>took place</sup> and the Russians didn't mention this we knew those of us in the business [we knew who the next enemy]

was. Now another activity had taken place and I don't know whether this shows

up in the reports <sup>or</sup> of history or not so don't be surprised if you don't find it

right quick but ~~a~~ <sup>the</sup> lend-lease traffic out of the Pentagon up to Ladd Field ~~in~~ in Alaska

which then went on over to Russia through <sup>Siberian</sup> ~~separated~~ landlines. There was a link

from the Pentagon, Russian teletype installation there, which terminated in one

of the buildings over at Arlington Hall Station, A Building, and every message

that went back and forth across that line was copied, recorded, and we had a

Russian section working in B3 several months before the end of the war, and may

I tell another story because I don't think you'll find this and I don't know I

may get in trouble and you all may get in trouble in this one too but Carter Clarke

was the head of the army security agency and Carter Clarke was one of the most

dedicated men to intelligence I ever knew. He wasn't always a he never did the

conventional thing. He was a very unconventional man and he was also a man of

considerable moral courage and he would spit in your face and laugh at you. I <sup>mean</sup>

that was his temperament. Now we had organized this activity, [the Russian section,] and we were working on this Ladd Field traffic [because it was you

know sort of "for free" intercept and beautiful copy ~~as~~ about as good <sup>a</sup> as copy

as you could hope. It wasn't really intercept copy. It was communications

copy you see as opposed to the kind you pull out of the air and transcribe.

Now we had had considerable success with the German one time pads at this time.

We were read we would read everything the Japs sent in the diplomatic traffic and

we were right up on top of the Japanese military. There were two fellows up

in the White House who were very close to Mrs. Roosevelt. Shall I mention their

names? David K. Niles and Curry. Remember Lauchlin <sup>Currie?</sup> ~~Curry?~~ and for some

reason Mrs. Roosevelt got the word that we were working on Russian traffic and

G2 got the order that any work on Russian traffic was to be stopped. ] Carter

Clark<sup>e</sup> who was our boss came down to my office. He came to see me not my boss

but he came to see me and he said "Tell me what you're doing on the Russian",

and I told him and Dink Hayes was also there. Dink was pretty close to Clark<sup>e</sup> and

this was Col Hayes, Col Harold G. Hayes and Clarke turned to Hayes and said

"You haven't told me that you're doing anything on Russian, have you Dink?"

and Hayes said "No sir, I haven't" and he says "You keep on doing what you

told me." No. He says "You stop doing what you told me you were doing on Russian

and Rowlett you keep on doing what you told me you're outfits doing on Russia."

and that was the end of the conversation. Did we stop? We did not. We kept

working and we went to work harder and harder because it was pretty well established

that Mrs. Roosevelt was meddling in things she had no business to be meddling in

you see and there was a very rare opportunity for somebody in the bosom of

Arlington Hall to get this close to the White House so I remember it very dis-

tinctly and Clarke had it straight from the Secretary of War's office because he

had been called up and put on the mat for this and I'm quite sure that Curry<sup>ie</sup>

and Niles and Hiss as a group had, seeing what was happening to the Japanese and

the German and the Italian, and had presumed that we would do the same on Russia

and had taken steps on their own initiative to cool the effort. Now this is Rowlett's speculation. Did you record that? (laugh) OK. I don't think I told

you that story. You've got some more questions, sir?

Q: I have several more but I <sup>have an appointment and I'm</sup> ~~am going to have to go in a little bit.~~

A: OK lets do a raincheck.

Q: We're on tape. Do you want to read the question or do you want me to read it and (Rowlett)

then deal with it?

Q: Well how did you apply what you learned from Friedman's orange manual and from (Valzki)

open sources?

A: <sup>To</sup> Give you a smart answer. We didn't. If you mean the by the orange manual the

little booklet that Friedman <sup>had</sup> prepared I think it was published in the Levenworth series and it covered the information that he'd put together to conduct a course in cryptology at I think I don't know whether it was Levenworth up at Cape May which later became Fort Monmouth and if that's the document you mean the use its usefulness was somewhat as follows: Since it was very little instructional material available at that time; I mentioned earlier the elementary military

cryptography that Friedman gave me to read <sup>1.2)</sup> actually what happened. I came on the first of April and Friedman was hoping to have all four of us together before he started us on our formal training and since I came first, then Sinkov came about ten days later and Kully came about twenty <sup>days</sup> after the first there was a waiting period for me and <sup>then</sup> later Sinkov until Kullback came in and so he used his orange manual as a filler to keep me occupied and later to keep Abe occupied until he found out what we could do and gainfully occupy us with other activities while Kully caught up with us. Now ~~the~~ orange manual was an interesting thing because the problems in it were sort of our first introduction to cryptanalysis. To put it into perspective, when I came to Washington and Major Crawford received me in his office, Friedman wasn't there and he said "Yes, <sup>he says,</sup> "We're going to teach you to be a cryptanalyst." I asked Major Crawford, "What is a cryptanalyst?" and he said "You wait until Friedman comes and he will explain to you" and I waited and when Friedman came I asked him what a cryptanalyst was and Friedman said "Well have you

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Poe's Gold Bug

read ~~the post gold~~ book and I said "Yes" and he said "Well the man that solved

the Gold <sup>Bug</sup> ~~book~~ cipher was called a cryptanalyst and that's <sup>a</sup> ~~the~~ cryptogram that

he solved and we're going to training you to be a cryptanalyst and a cryptographer

and I nodded like I understood and I really didn't and so I was still puzzled

when he gave me this orange manual because it was titled "Elements of Cryptanalysis,"

and I ~~felt~~ <sup>thought</sup> then I would find out exactly what a cryptanalyst was but when I got

in there I was as much puzzled when I got through with it as I was when he handed

it to me and I still didn't know what a cryptanalyst was so I guess how I applied

and how Abe and Kully applied this was that Abe and I used it as a filler until

Kully caught up with us and it wasn't much use because the problems were so simple

and the concepts were so primitive that it just didn't stimulate us any way and

while we did learn a little bit about solving monoalphabets and polyalphabets

this was indeed nothing in the broader scope of well it didn't match what we were

introduced to later on to in terms of the Hebr<sup>ern</sup>~~on~~ machine and the IT&T machine and

the [Swedish cipher] machines the strips well not so much the strip as the circular

cipher device, cipher device type M94, and actually I don't think Friedman's orange

manual as you call it here was any more sophisticated than Parker Hits<sup>t</sup> book on

the solution of the Paper cipher. Now open source of material? I'll

talk a little bit about that. Again personalizing this since I was supposed to

be an expert in German when I came in, Friedman had collected a bunch of books in

foreign, by foreign writers. There was nothing written by an American that was

worth a consideration except his draft of 165 in the orange manual and Hits<sup>t</sup>

manual and so he picked out two books and gave me almost the first day I was in,

probably to find out how much German I knew and one of them was Kasiski

which was a little thin greenback book about 1/4 inch thick and 5x8 in dimensions

and another big thick hard cover book by

Andreas FIGL

Adrus : General

Thiegel?

Spiegel?

about I think cipher systems or well I forget the title of it but its Spiegel's

book on ciphers and I was supposed to read these and that was my introduction.

Now the open source of material was mainly a description of cryptography, the

cipher systems and Kasiski<sup>i</sup> in particular had a bunch of examples

of some very very unsophisticated systems, substitution, grilles, route

transpositions, things like that, more<sup>is</sup> confused the encipherer than to deny the

information to anybody with an aptitude for puzzle solving and they were

terribly written. My German wasn't very good. I could make sense out of

scientific ~~journals~~<sup>German</sup>. The vocabulary was awful. ~~The~~<sup>--</sup> words I had never bumped

into, and I finally wound up by taking examples and working out the examples

from the information that I could decipher out of the German text and then

recover<sup>ing</sup>~~ed~~ the German text sort of by intuitive cryptoanalysis and I can remember

~~it~~<sup>this</sup> distressed me so much I would, in my dreams at night in that first few weeks

which was a very stressful period of going from being to a country boy to trying

to be a city boy, I could remember seeing those pages and some of it would be in

English and then there would be a long German word and the rest would be English

and I couldn't find my dictionary. So to summarize this long reminiscence the

manual  
orange and open source of material was hardly worth anything except Friedman's

manual did introduce us to his vocabulary. Other material

Jalaki

Q: You didn't read Wheeler then? Kerckhoff's (?)

A: I don't remember. I think I may have but I don't remember and if I did it was

so much worse than Knudsen<sup>i</sup> and Thiegel? Spiegel <sup>FIGL</sup> that I probably rejected

it.

Jalaki

Q: I think probably you didn't.

Q: What was the date of orange manual? (Hank, 1923) (All present agreed)

A: Incidentally a mint copy of that is worth about \$23.

Jalaki

Q: Is that so?

(Hank)

Hey don't try to sell it. (laughter)

A: I don't think there are many of ~~them~~ <sup>them</sup> ~~those~~. ~~There's probably~~ <sup>They destroyed</sup> about 150 of them once.

I salvaged two. I've got a mint copy but I'm certainly not going to throw it

away.

(Hank) Hold on to it.

Virginia) Yeah, throw it this way if you're going to throw it away.

End of Tape 1

Tape 2, Side 1

Valaki: Q: I'd like to ask something about the green papers. You remarked something earlier about speculating what you could do and when you started working, especially on

the machine ciphers, Did you get terribly impatient with the <sup>l</sup>imitations of whatever

you were working on, the little IBM machines <sup>once</sup> ~~since you started with~~

and think ahead.

A: Oh not particularly. Cipher machines in those days were well first place of course

the thing we had to computer was one of these old Friedman compt<sup>o</sup>imeters, if you

remember that, and slide rules and these were sort of not very useful and also

not very impressive in terms of what you could use to assist you in the techniques

of cryptanalysis after we'd learned them from Friedman. <sup>however,</sup> What we did find, ~~what~~

was that by taking the cipher machine, for example the machine I call the Damm<sup>m</sup>

machine because it was invented by a Swede by the name of Damm. I forget the

number of it. I'll think of it later. What we did was to convert that to a

pencil and paper analog. We took the cryptographic principles and we worked

out how we could duplicate the machine and its cryptography and its cryptographic

process; <sup>in</sup> both enciphering and deciphering with the simpler concepts that you could

put on paper like sliding strips or in the case of the Swedish machine it would

be a fractionating square and the effect of the pin wheels and, you know, laid out

in terms of the sort of a diagram on a large sheet of crosssection paper

and once we'd achieved that, we had reduced <sup>it to</sup> ~~the~~ concepts that we could deal with

~~it~~ in terms of our cryptanalytic training and our other backgrounds, particularly

mathematical backgrounds, and what <sup>little</sup> ~~was~~ understanding we <sup>had</sup> ~~have~~ of electromechanical

devices. Now the way we dealt with the machines then was reducing <sup>them</sup> ~~essentially~~

~~the~~ <sup>to</sup> hand systems and solving <sup>them as</sup> ~~the~~ hand systems and I think I've just answered your

question in that last sentence.

Yes. I <sup>was</sup> ~~would~~ think <sup>ing</sup> ~~that~~ mostly <sup>about</sup> ~~that~~ computer applications of the machines

<sup>whether</sup> systems, ~~were there~~ ... You could see that some time in the future it would be

nice to have a very large computer or something that would dupe particular

Valaki Q:

things. Were you even thinking of generalizing the computer or building  
analogous?  
analyze?

A: Let me speak at length on that. Nobody that I knew of in the army or ~~the~~ navy except Billy Friedman had any concept of, lets use the word loosely, mechanizing the cryptanalytic process and this was only a glint in Friedman's eye and Friedman had had only very limited contact with accounting machines like Hollerith and IBM at that time in the technological state of development there were these two competing systems. Hollerith was much more static and less, well, it was very useless because you use mechanical linkages to set up your accounting process. IBM fortunately used combination relays with plug-board which gave you a much much wider range of programming potential than the simple-minded mechanical linkage system of Hollerith. Friedman had occasion to make some studies on the IBM system and he was intrigued by it but unfortunately for him at that time there was a depression on and there wasn't any money and so

he was denied any opportunity of testing the IBM against <sup>the</sup> cryptanalytic processes

and he couldn't do this commercially because of the attitude of secrecy which

surrounded our whole activity. Now keep in mind <sup>that</sup> the Secretary of State, Mr.

Stimson, had ordered the dissolution of Yardley's unit and that the people in

the Signal Corps and <sup>it</sup> G2 had actually gone to the trouble of putting our unit in

the Signal Corps because they were going to justify it in terms of being an

essential activity for our code production program <sup>for</sup> which our Chief Signal Officer

was responsible, and their justification for teaching us, training us, as cryptanalysts

was that you had to be a cryptanalyst before you could be a proper cryptographer

and if you knew the weakness <sup>as</sup> of the cryptographic systems you could therefore

produce a better system and when Friedman would start making his requests for

IBM equipment they would, he would be reminded by all those concerned and right-

fully so that we were lucky to have what we had and let's don't go making waves

until <sup>there's</sup> ~~we get some~~ more money and we're out of the depression. Fortunately to

---

sort of wind up this comment about IBM the quartermaster had an installation and Friedman found out that this was about to be closed down and so he made arrangements to use it part-time at night and we went over and actually employed these

devices for the compilation of <sup>field</sup> codes, division <sup>the</sup> codes, <sup>the</sup> training edition and we

turned out four or five <sup>codes</sup> in what normally would have, well, we did it was about a

5 or 10 to 1 ratio. We did five codes I think in less time, about half the time,

it would have taken to prepare one code and got a manuscript that was totally

acceptable by the Government Printing Office where we had <sup>our</sup> ~~the~~ codes printed

just from one operation. We had five manuscripts that, I believe it was five,

somewhere in that neighborhood. Now also at that time there was no idea, no idea,

of computery as we can look back on it and think about it today. The limited

work that had been done in England by <sup>Babbage,</sup> Babbage which is pretty well

set forth in his story of calculating machines was unknown to us. The closest

that we came to computery and I use my own term <sup>here</sup> rather than somebody else's

term is in a visit we had that was I think arranged because Kully had read about the work being done <sup>up</sup> at the University of Pennsylvania University of Pittsburgh I believe. Well it was done in Pittsburgh, but the school it was slips my mind now and we had this fellow come down and talk to us about what he had learned about these special devices that would do some of these more onerous calculations very rapidly and when he got through talking about it we were overwhelmed with the astronomical problems that he was solving and we saw very little benefit to the kind of simple-minded cryptanalytic problems we'd had. Now there were a couple of other things that might be mentioned here in terms of your question.

The navy had made a contract with Vannevar Bush and this was the scientist up at MIT to built a sort of comparator so that he could drag one cipher text against another cipher text to find whether they were in phase, that is the same key. This was an index of coincidence machine called the IC machine.

Bush

~~Bische (?)~~ once told us on one of the rare occasions that we had to talk to him

---

that he was not very well pleased with his work on this machine because it fell  
it fell far short of what he thought could be done but he never did tell us  
what he thought could be done. He just went away sort of leaving us waiting for  
him to explain further and he just never chose to so to talk down to you a  
minute there was nothing that lead us to believe that there were magic machines  
that could do the kind of things that had to be done by cryptanalysts. The  
labor saving machines <sup>to</sup> shorten the time and <sup>to</sup> achieve results satisfactory results  
in the time required for dealing with a very complex system. Nothing to lead us  
to imagine that this would be possible. As a matter of fact the information  
that we received particularly from <sup>Bush's</sup> ~~Bischo's~~ experience with the IC machine and  
what we had learned from this professor from Pittsburgh lead us to conclude quite  
the contrary. It was not until we were confronted with the J19 problem that we  
had reduced any of these things to practice. Now I'm jumping around in time here.  
Your question was directed at the early days and I guess the simplest answer to

it is that in those days we had no concept of computery. It was a glint in Friedman's eye that maybe we could be helped by ~~the~~ accounting machines, particularly IBM, not Hollith because it was so inflexible and that some day in the future we might find something that would be useful to us but we were so busy learning to be cryptanalysts and had very little skill and talents in developing computery ~~and~~ so we were lead into the investigation of <sup>like</sup> more sophisticated possibilities that might have occurred to us in computery and I think there is a good story that can be told about J19 and how it really opened the door into the application of computery and really the development and invention of computery <sup>as</sup> ~~is~~ a cryptanalytic aid and then spillover later into <sup>the</sup> public domain.

Q: Valaki  
At what point did you become acquainted with the systems of the first World War, besides the ADFGVX cipher, <sup>or</sup> even that one? The reason I mention that is because the French <sup>an enciphered</sup> ~~in a traffic~~ code which even today is pretty good for the purpose.

A: Well, there was no point in time when we became aware of these things. I guess

if you try to identify a time when we learned something about WWI systems is when Friedman took us down to the vault, 2742 Munitions Building, where Yardley's records had been stored and this was sometime in the middle of the summertime 1932 and our first job was to sort of organize these files and select from them, particularly the ADFGVX, because now here again is where Friedman had a glint in his eye that the rest of us probably weren't ready to appreciate. He thought

that ~~a~~ <sup>the</sup> special solution had been developed by <sup>Painvin</sup> ~~Panvan~~ and others, by the French cryptanalysts, was not the right proper answer of the problem. He thought

that the general solution so that you could read almost any message that was

enciphered in this ADFGVX cipher, <sup>he thought that this</sup> ~~you had to find~~ ~~it~~ was possible and so

one of our first research projects was to develop such a solution. So in

organizing these files we ran into a variety of things. Most of them very

little traffic because <sup>widely Yardley</sup> ~~you hardly~~ did not see fit to carry over beyond the

Black Chamber era some of <sup>this</sup> ~~the~~ WWI traffic but for some reason a whole mass of

all intercepts of the German ADFGVX messages had been retained and these were pretty much intact and any other systems were sort of incidental to this. They either didn't know what to do with them or they got misidentified <sup>and</sup> assigned to the German military traffic files so <sup>there</sup> ~~it~~ was very little practical real material to for us to study except ~~for~~ the ADFGVX.

Q: Valaki Does that mean that in the files there were no German dip traffic left over from the first World War?

A: No Maam. It just means that I don't remember it.

Q: Valaki Oh OK.

A: There probably was some but I don't imagine there was because Yardley's group were interested in maintaining continuity of intelligence production and not in doing research on old systems in the sense of forwarding them, promoting their cryptanalytic capability. This was for Friedman to introduce later on and for which he should receive full credit.

Q: Goodman Did you get a chance to go through the whole of Yardley holdings in the vault

\_\_\_\_\_ ?

A: Not only did we get the chance but we were required to because part of our job was to catalog and index and classify that stuff so we could sort the desirable stuff from the ADFGVX, the Japanese of course we wanted to do some review of that and then we wanted to review the other traffic, The Italian, the German, the French, the South American <sup>countries'</sup> traffic so we could develop a hard core of information on each of these hopefully in due course maybe in the next decade or so to actively and aggressively attack them and produce intelligence from them.

Q: Was it all cable traffic?

A: It was all cable well let me make a statement as correct as I can. I know that the current traffic was cable. There may have been other stuff which we would have overlooked and which time would have erased from my memory ~~but~~ I just don't remember.

Q: But the great majority of it was?

A: I remember distinctly there was a large amount of cable traffic and I can recall no other traffic other than the ADFGVX and maybe some associated miscellaneous

traffic that looked like it was radio intercept.

*Val* Q: That was left over from the first World War? Well the Yardley period.  
The ADFGVX. When did that go out? I haven't seen it <sup>seen it end</sup> ~~said~~ anywhere.

A: You haven't seen what?

Q: Its end. Because I know in 1919 for the peace conference Yardley reported back

that they were reading only two German systems and one of them was the ADFGVX.

A: And they were reading it only under favorable circumstances of having messages

with repeated

(beginnings and endings)

beginnings and endings.

Q: That was the special solution from the French wasn't it?

A: Yes the so-called ask Ambassador Childs about this.

Q: Yes, I've....

A: He'll have a good story on this and I'd like to read it if I ever get back. But

now go back and let me tell you what I remember about the ADFGVX. I believe that

when Germany lost the war that the ADFGVX died as a cipher, an active cipher. Now

the GERman forces when they re re were reconstituted may have adopted something

like the ADFGVX but it was a field cipher as I recall and it would be most unlikely

that it would be used after the end of hostilities.

*Val* Q: Well I know that it was used in December in 1918 when it was recorded in Childs

notes. They were still reading it. They were still using it to withdraw in fact there was some pretty good economic intelligence in it.

A: Well I won't fight with your date...

Valaki Q: I happened to find it you know just by chance and it sort of has puzzled me and also Yardley's report in 1919 I think it was in March or February saying this is

one of the two German ciphers we're reading. <sup>Sound peculiar</sup> ~~Rather particular~~ but I was just

wondering whether ....

A: My recollection is limited to our work with ADFGVX traffic that is reported on in the technical paper.

Valaki Q: Where did that traffic ... It just happened to be in Yardley's ...

A: No Maam. I think it was came about this way and this is sort of guessing rather than factual knowledge. I know I <sup>heard</sup> Friedman say that when he was attached

to the French <sup>idea</sup> cryptanalytic activity in Europe that what they were seeking was a

general solution to the ADFGVX, ~~That~~ that he had become convinced in his own mind

that such a thing was possible and that this could be attained through statistical

approaches but that there had not either been the opportunity or the skills

the mathematical skills available to test this out and I think it was a result of his interest and his conviction that you could have a general solution of the

ADFGVX which would be much better than <sup>Painvin's</sup> ~~Penvan's~~ solution that caused that traffic to be saved and I think he saved the select traffic, some of it <sup>of</sup> obviously was

fine traffic because this is what we worked on. We picked the day with the

greatest number of messages and we identified the ones with the odd keys and

the even keys because we developed this statistical <sup>?</sup> group and then we were able

finally to zero in on one day's traffic and break the key and for that day or for that period and then we just <sup>spread this and</sup> went ahead and did enough other days so we could prove

that it wasn't an accident, That we had <sup>it</sup> indeed achieved a general solution.

*Goodman*  
Q: The three of you got it? The general solution?

A: Yes. Abe and Kully and myself were the ones who did the work under Friedman's

general direction. well I think well the thing that came out of it,

We'd been working on double transposition. We discovered some pretty significant

new principles not earthshaking but we'd made advances in working on double trans-

position in particular. Also we had done had developed a very good understanding

of statistics and how statistics can be applied particularly in alphabet

matching and also we had realized that there was a difference in taking the

digraph for example there was a difference in the expected frequencies of

the initial letter of the digraph and the final letter and also ~~statist~~ <sup>just</sup>

attend this we had recognized the positional frequency characteristic  
of a code group, whether it be literal or numerical, could be significant in

some cases. Well for example take a simple case. Some codes would, particularly

dictionary codes, would go off maybe through 3000 and so you'd be limited to

three digits in the first position and then you would find that the frequency

of the second and the third and <sup>the</sup> fourth and fifth digit in this five-letter code

group each would have its own significant frequency characteristic. Five might

be the most frequent for the second position and some other letter~~s~~ for the third

position and so on. So you can sort of have your have your statistical penetration

<sup>o</sup>  
<sub>A</sub> base for statistical penetration laid by virtue of this fact. Well the magic

of the ADFGVX solution was that the fractionating square was devised and frequent letters all from the same column that one letter would stand out and you could find just by looking at the message. You wouldn't have to make a frequency distribution. Well taking this sort of obvious principle and refining it into mathematical, taking advantage of the mathematics we knew about in those days, we would find the tools. It was very effective in breaking into the ADFGVX messages. Now it just happened that the ADFGVX was a good vehicle for us to develop this on because the same thing, the same principles, applied later on to the Japanese system which we worked out and again to repeat myself laid the basis for the <sup>first</sup> computerization of cryptanalysis because and that's another story. I think that is about the size of it on the ADFGVX. Friedman had a glint in his eye. He used us to establish that the glint in his eye was a real inspiration and a vision and then having used the ADFGVX as a vehicle for proving that he had made the correct assumption. Later on we did expand these principles into a

broader application with even more fantastic results than ~~even~~ Friedman had

imagined when he first thought about it.

*Goodman*

Q: ~~Are~~ you suggesting <sup>et</sup> that, earlier on in your remarks on this, that Mr. Friedman

was assigned to the French.

A: That's part of his record.

G. Q: (Do you know how he obtained that position?) *was*

A: I don't think he obtained it. I think he.....

G. Q: Or decided upon it maybe would be a better.....

A: Well, it was inspired by it.

G. Q: Inspired <sup>by</sup> it.

A: That's the way I would like to say it. This was an inspiration of Friedman's.

This inspiration may have been stimulated by his conversations with ~~editors~~ <sup>others</sup> but

I think Friedman was convinced that this ought to be explored and his conviction

was so strong that he actively arranged for it to happen. I said it right, now.

I said it correctly.

G. Q: Let me ask you another question then about the business of the Yardley collection once again. This may seem redundant <sup>a</sup> but I think we ought to have it for the record. There was no intercept material traffic whatever which you recall <sup>as</sup> having come from for example army radio intercept activities in 1921 onward period.

A: I can recall nothing of that nature but I can recall volumes of cable drop

traffic.

G. Q: Cable drop traffic but nothing \_\_\_\_\_?

A: I recall nothing. This just means that my recollection, I'm tapping it, and

it means nothing more than what I've said. I didn't recognize it if it was

there. It could have been there.

Can we go back to the ADFGVX, *Mostly as* the source or the selling

point of the development of new techniques. What particular techniques can you

advise can be traced to <sup>work on</sup> the ADFGVX cipher?

A: Two major ones. One is the utilization of positional frequencies characteristics,

so that ~~XXXXXXXXXXXX~~ you can take advantage of them in your cryptanalytic attack and

that's essentially it. Of course, <sup>again</sup> depending on the system you'll have to devise

how this <sup>would</sup> ~~will~~ be applied. And second it simplifies the cryptanalytic process to

the point <sup>where</sup> it could be developed into a type of program that lead to some

of the primitive computer procedures, The adaptation for example of the IBM

machine and the publication of the GEEWHIZER which I think even by today's

standards <sup>was</sup> ~~were~~ a pretty sophisticated device and I will repeat my earlier conversations with Hank here, the thing had a memory, primitive as it was. It could

*Valaki*  
Q:

*drag...*  
 draw a.. it could do the IC task that the ~~Bishe~~ *Bush* machine was designed for. It

would give you a statistical evaluation of each one of the ~~texts~~ *tests* automatically

and finally it would discriminate and tell you which were the more likely ones.

In other words you set a level and if you got above that level, the total got

above that level, ~~it~~ when you looked at so you didn't have to look at a bunch

of ones that weren't very likely. In terms of statistics if you drew ~~a~~ *the* probability

curve it would clip off the upper end of the probability curve and reject every-

thing below the optimum positive level that you set. Finally I think it represents

an effective application of something invented by Albert Small and that was the

use of logarithm, in lieu of the absolute values or the observed values of the

statistical values which got away from the problem of multiplying and simply by

adding logs you see you got the effect of the ~~product~~ *product* of the probabilities which

I think was one of the cleverest things I ~~ever~~ *have* encountered in my whole business

in cryptanalysis. Small just came up out of the blue with that and it was

*Valaki*

beautiful. Everybody else had missed it.

*as long as you mentioned*

Q: May I ask also ~~about to mention~~ the IC about your introduction to the IC? Did

you ever see the Riverbank publication?

A: Oh yes.

Q: \_\_\_\_\_ early in the game?

A: Yes. Those are part of the fillers that Friedman gave us while Kully was getting

ready, catching up, with Abe and myself, Friedman. See I was there first so I was

the one who was always out of a job and he couldn't find enough things to do in

those first couple of months to keep me busy while Abe caught up and then Abe

and I sort of paired off and <sup>*we*</sup> ~~did~~ <sup>*some*</sup> simple things like proofreading manuscripts

for him and other things but he just didn't have enough that he could trust us

with so that we could he could keep us fully occupied and I remember hounding him

one day about I was out of anything to do so he said I will bring you something

*trivial job, make work*

in the morning and he gave me some ~~trigger Jack-nik work~~ until the day was over.

Next morning he came in with three Riverbank publications and handed one to me

and one to Abe and one to Kully and these were the ones well I think one of them

was the transposition solution <sup>route</sup> ~~there~~ ciphers. He didn't <sup>give us</sup> ~~get~~ the one on Wheatstone, ~~I preached on~~, the star ciphers, because he saving those for special examples in our later training period but the more trival ones he handed us first. One on secret inks he gave and these were make work but honestly outside of the one on the Wheatstone cipher, I think it included the star cipher too.

I'm a little hazy on this. The rest of them <sup>were</sup> ~~are~~ pretty trival and I think Friedman knew it because he was pushing so hard to get the technical papers

published.

Valaki

Q: Well what surprises me is that <sup>once</sup> ~~when~~ Friedman got the IC that he didn't sort of apply it to everything he had. You know it seems like such a terrific thing to do that I don't know why he just didn't take up traffic and try the <sup>IC</sup> ~~idea~~ on everything and then after capitus.

A: Maybe I could explain that if you will define what you mean when you say IC.

J. Q: Well I'm not quite sure what at which point after you came in which point <sup>was</sup> developed because the I.C. and the Kappa test <sup>capitus</sup> ~~test~~ <sup>which are ~~unintentional~~ ~~any~~</sup> other statistical <sup>text</sup> ~~text~~ but this is <sup>when you slide</sup> ~~applied~~ one piece of text against another piece of text and count the occurrences and then measure the number of occurrences against the expected at random. That is as for plaintext of <sup>nature</sup> ~~whether we~~ use languages.

A: Well this.... I think I can act a little more intelligently in response to your question because your definition of the IC ~~test~~<sup>test</sup> is exactly what ~~Bishe~~<sup>Bush</sup> had in mind when he developed his machine. You counted the coincidences and made a record of them and recorded the number of coincidences for each position of match if I can call it that, and then you explore<sup>d</sup> it, these totals if you will, to see which one looked like it might be the right one. Now the ~~capitus~~<sup>Kappa test</sup> turned out to be a pretty trival test because as a ~~practicing~~<sup>practicing</sup> ~~and~~ cryptanalyst you could look at them and tell better than you could figure them out. If you got into ~~the capitus~~<sup>Kappa test</sup> at all it was sort to validate your judgment after you made the inspection of the results so we we also were handicapped by something that I think became a very practical consideration in our work and that is your ~~capitus~~<sup>Kappa test</sup> has to be reduced to a sort of standard base. It was a lot of it was a problem in arithmetic you see to take messages of different length and ~~messages~~<sup>matches</sup> of different quantity<sup>ies</sup> and reduce them to all the same base because you could look

at the curve and you could tell and sort of make a mental judgment a lot easier

than the ~~capitue~~ <sup>Handwritten: K... could be</sup> could be made, so we didn't we weren't too formal <sup>Handwritten: a little bit</sup> a little bit

maybe loose in our disciplinary ~~codes~~ <sup>Handwritten: approach</sup> but actually it was just like solving a

crossword puzzle. Handwritten: Skill is worth a lot more than the mathematics

because the mathematics will give you a general idea but the real test is ~~the~~ <sup>Handwritten: does it</sup>

<sup>Handwritten: read?</sup> degree. Now we were great believers in making tests ~~to~~ <sup>Handwritten: that</sup> read, you see, and not

to satisfy the mathematical criteria that we established. Now the ~~subject~~ IC

<sup>Handwritten: is</sup> ~~the~~ test <sup>Handwritten: a</sup> was only one of the great many statistical tests. We well I think it

doesn't take too much to appreciate what you can do <sup>Handwritten: simply by siding one message</sup> ~~if you can find one that you~~

~~can~~ against the other but the real test is when you get into more sophisticated things

as <sup>Handwritten: exemplified</sup> ~~intensified~~ in Friedman's <sup>Handwritten: work</sup> ~~book~~ on the Hebron <sup>Handwritten: ern</sup> machine <sup>Handwritten: where he uses</sup> ~~so he used~~ the basic, well,

the interval test, I called it Handwritten: low because certain <sup>Handwritten: letters</sup> ~~matters~~ appeared more

frequently <sup>Handwritten: or</sup> and more likely to appear <sup>Handwritten: doubled</sup> ~~garbled~~ at different intervals, for example,

E you find more E's at 2 and 3 intervals <sup>Handwritten: well,</sup> 4 ~~about~~ maybe 3-4- and 5 interval than

you will <sup>some</sup> ~~an~~ other letter; and <sup>new</sup> that is another form of statistics. <sup>A</sup> Third form is

in what is generally well it is pretty basic to the ADFGVX test.

That's positional characteristic. And in Japanese <sup>why where</sup> you can

go to town with all sorts of frequency counts because the double

letters in Japanese like double O and double U, and since the vowels comprised

about half the text you get a terrific statistical representation. You cannot

to look at this as a simple IC test but a variety of classes of tests

that you can apply in a refined form depending on the cipher system that you

are dealing with and you sort of <sup>select</sup> ~~connect~~ that statistical test which will allow

you to penetrate to some degree the mystery <sup>that's</sup> produced by the enciphering <sup>ment</sup> process,

and I think we were more concerned <sup>with</sup> ~~in~~ developing a variety of tests than concen-

trating on how sharp we could make the IC test. <sup>What</sup> ~~Well~~ other tests were

<sup>there</sup> that could be applied to our problems and we just passed them through easier

solution.

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Valko

Q: How did you develop as was your ~~was~~ people who developed the difference for enciphered code, additive enciphered code?

A: No. We I clue, Kully may have had some ~~too~~. If any of us did it would have been Kully but I didn't realize what a difference table was until it we started collaboration with the British. Now I speak of this in terms of the pragmatic application of the difference principles, in terms of different stages and things like that. We were fully on board though as to with the statistical implications of it except we had so many beautiful machine ciphers to work on, at least in what I was conscious of. Maybe Kully would tell you different. Abe would tell you different but from where I sat it was all machines and there were so many of these and our techniques were so powerful that we didn't concern ourselves, and had no reason to concern ourselves, with the and I will sit here today and say with the trivial aspects of the difference table because the difference table is a sort of a technique, a way of doing things, its not a sophisticated

thing <sup>in</sup> itself. It's a tool. It's a shortcut. It's a sort of <sup>a</sup> golden trick that you <sup>use it</sup> employ rather than being a sophisticated approach. <sup>Now,</sup> Some of my friends who

are additive solvers will get sore at me because I put it in this context but

I think Friedman's work on the Hebr<sup>ern</sup>on machine <sup>was</sup> much much more significant than

the difference table technique. Incidentally that difference table is nothing

more than an indication of IC. It's another kind of a <sup>5</sup> text and it's

a quick way of establishing the IC. If you think about it I believe you will

believe it.

Valaki  
Q:

I see that you're thinking of it theoretically rather

than practically.

A: Both. Practically the <sup>table</sup> difference is a fine thing if you've got a bunch of

people that you don't have much time for training and who have a particular

problem with a good statistics underlying statistics, a difference table is hard

to beat. But theoretically its just one representation of the IC <sup>that is</sup> ~~It's~~ useful

to have rather than being the total answer to the problem. Difference table

will provide about, now I'm guessing <sup>and I'm</sup> ~~am~~ making an estimate, will take advantage of

about 90% of the cases, <sup>But</sup> It doesn't provide a 100% <sup>advantage and really</sup> ~~and really~~ when you get the

answer, <sup>if</sup> ~~when~~ you get the first one and it produces the answer then that's all

you need. You don't need it dredge all the way down to the bitter end.

So it's a handy tool for shortcuts.

End of Side 1, <sup>Page 2</sup>

Tape 2, Side 2

Q: We can back up to number 3 7.1.10 I asked about Yardley. If he was

mentioned, and if he was, in what light was he mentioned. I'm very curious about this,

to the ~~this~~ man himself I guess. The idea of how people actually saw him in the period,

particularly of the 30's after his book had come out and he had become somewhat of

a rogue, I guess.

A: Let me tell you what I know about Yardley. The first time I heard his name was

when ~~from~~ Friedman talked about the American Black Chamber and he reminisced a couple

~~to~~ times. One of the stories he told about Yardley was that Yardley was a guest

at Friedman's house for dinner one, one evening and Friedman, you know, was a great

one for playing up cryptology and cryptanalysis and things and he was a little

bit bugged by it in terms of present day slang. I mean he had a thing about it

and the menu for this dinner was supposed to be in cipher and before the party got

the served ~~a~~ dish, they had to figure out what it was, and Friedman's story about this

dinner was centered on Yardley's reaction because one of the items on the menu

was an indecipherable cipher cifre and cifra and they were speculating I guess

as to what this might be and Yardley spoke up and said "Well it might be hash

but no self respecting host and hostess would serve hash" and lo and behold that's

what it was, (laughter) and that's the first thing I remember about Yardley. I

didn't meet him because Yardley was a little bit of an uncertainty in terms of

what we were doing in ~~terms of~~ the SIS. He knew about Friedman and Friedman's

being a code ~~encipher~~ <sup>and cipher</sup> specialist for the Chief Signal Officer in terms of the

code compilation program and that was the reason Friedman was hired <sup>in those days</sup> not for his

cryptanalytic capability in the sense of intelligence production but for his

cryptanalytic capability in the sense of improving the codes and ciphers and

I think this <sup>an</sup> is <sup>an</sup> important distinction and it ought to be underlined if we could

underline it in the tape here. Well now, <sup>when</sup> Yardley's outfit was closed down and (the

attitude of the State Department was pretty much negative towards the continuation

of any activity like this) and the Signal Corps and G2 have nerve enough to get

DOS

DoS up and start <sup>the</sup> a new operation outside of G2 (and away from the State Department)

of course a great great envelope of secrecy was placed around it and one of the

things you didn't do was to contact people who had been associated with the old

Black Chamber activity because there might be some way of (the existence of the

new unit leading back to the State Department and Stimpson or whoever it was at

DoS that had been  
that time <sup>^</sup> responsible for Yardley's outfit being closed or taking action to

stop it over in the Signal Corps) and it's amusing I've heard <sup>the</sup> discussions <sup>that</sup> the cover

story is <sup>they're</sup> ~~their~~ just simply we're augmenting Friedman's activity <sup>in support of</sup> ~~for~~ the Signal

Corps code production program and that's why we didn't get started on intelligence

production I think until somewhat later even though we had an intercept capability

that was coming into being parallel in time to the formation of <sup>of</sup> Signal Intelligence

Service. Well what broke Yardley's back, I think there was some feeling that maybe

later on Yardley and Manly <sup>(y)</sup> and others would be called in. Well, let me introduce

something here and sort of correct a misimpression <sup>if fact</sup> I may have given. Initially <sup>i</sup>

and this is in the first few months, there was very little well I don't know of any contact with Yardley's group but before possibly within a year or a year

and a half Manley<sup>(</sup> was invited in and <sup>he</sup> came to Washington. Friedman brought him into the office and introduced him to Abe and Kully and Hurt and myself and we

met him and he was an old man and we were very impressed by him because Friedman

was obviously <sup>... him</sup> showed a great deal of reverence and then Charlie Mendelsohn,

Dr. Mendelsohn came in <sup>at</sup> He was <sup>at</sup> City College in New York and later on I think

he moved around a little bit. I <sup>believe</sup> think he died from the aftereffects of scarlet

fever. That was the diagnosis but there was great suspicion that he might

have been killed by the Germans, because of the strange circumstances associated

with him <sup>this disease</sup> being stricken with . There was some suspicion that he might, because

of the notoriety that <sup>leaked out</sup> ~~big doubt~~ about him, that the German intelligence services

<sup>may</sup> ~~might~~ have found out about him and neutralized him but I think that was pure

speculation. I think it was an old wife's sort of imaginative attitude. Now

these two gentlemen did come in and Parker Hit<sup>t</sup> came in and I was really pleased that we got the chance to meet him and he was he was really on our side, he and Mauborgne<sup>were</sup> ~~Mobern~~ was the great supporters within the Signal Corps of this concept. There was also a fellow whose name I might mention in that time frame and I'm wandering from your question but I don't think you'll get this out of me with any other question, was Col O. S. Albright who was the action officer in G2 and he was the one who drafted the G2 side of the plan for the organization of the Signal Intelligence Service and the Second Signal Service ~~Intercept~~ ~~Activity~~. Well of course Yardley was not included in this <sup>inner</sup> ~~inter~~circle of people that were knowledgeable of our existence and our plans and what the Chief Signal Officer and the Director of Intelligence expected for the unit. The next encounter with Yardley and <sup>the</sup> ~~one~~ where he <sup>forcibly</sup> ~~first~~ came to our attention was when the Black well when the series of three articles in the Saturday Evening Post for which he got a thousand bucks each which was a fabulous price in those days for an

article like that and then when the Black Chamber came out Friedman really hit the ceiling. I just could not understand then nor can I understand today why this should have rubbed Friedman as hard as it did, but he was fit to be tied and I mean literally fit to be tied and he got ahold of the book and he and Mendelsohn collaborated in making well there's an annotated copy, I think it's down in the Marshall Library. You should get that and have it photographed. You'll get a terrific appreciation, a biased one, but some appreciation of Yardley and what Yardley, I mean the impact of Yardley's book on the cryptanalytic concept and the people involved with the Signal Intelligence Service. <sup>You'll</sup> ~~You~~ get how they reacted to it in terms of the people who were directing it. Of course Abe and Kully and I were such kids at that time it didn't amount <sup>well</sup> <sub>A</sub> we thought it didn't amount to anything but you'll get Friedman's and you'll get the kind of thing that went up to the Chief Signal Officer. I believe it was Ingalls. I don't remember who the Chief Signal Officer was at that time. From that minute

on Yardley's name was <sup>mut</sup> ~~MUD~~ so far as our activity was concerned and then

although Yardley <sup>... there</sup> was some consideration given to whether or not Yardley should

be brought in because Yardley had a lot of people who admired him and thought

he was pretty terrific and I think ~~that~~ <sup>if</sup> they had chosen up on sides that they

would have voted for Yardley rather than Friedman to head this activity because

Friedman was pretty much an unknown quantity in G2 whereas Yardley was

a bit of a celebrity and one of the lights in the circle, small circle, of people

who were involved in intelligence and you must remember that the intelligence

personnel in G2 inbetween WWI and WWII were pretty <sup>pretty</sup> naive <sup>group of</sup> unsophisticated <sup>people</sup>

so Yardley, as a professional cryptanalyst, and this seems to apply to cryptanalysts

in general who had been successful and only those who had been successful, Yardley

was looked on as pretty much of a well, <sup>Mauborgne</sup> ~~Mauborgne~~ used the word magician to describe

cryptanalysis. It was a little bit of that magician aura that Yardley had inherited

in the G2 circles but he was practically unknown in the Signal Corps and since

Officer  
the Chief Signal ~~was~~ <sup>was</sup> administratively responsible his OK had to be received  
before Yardley could come into the activity and the Chief Signal Officer wasn't  
about to go against Friedman's feeling which were very anti-Yardley at that time  
and so Yardley was really just closed out.

Goodman  
Q:

Do you recall in that period, sir, whether or not anyone else in the Signal Corps  
took as strong a position as Mr. Friedman did, seemingly did, against Mr. Yardley?

A: Well Friedman's position was unique because in <sup>the</sup> ~~this~~ Signal Corps they were more  
interested in proper Signal Corps activities and most of the Signal Corps officers  
that I bumped into looked on the Signal Intelligence Service, there's one  
exception, I'll mention his name, looked on it as a sort of extracurricular  
activity which they were doing the housekeeping for and they weren't particularly  
interested in supporting or being involved in the thing. They looked on it as  
something that <sup>well</sup> possibly should go on but that's somebody else's watch and I  
don't, I won't get involved. Now also since Friedman was the high priest of  
the cult his attitude more or less was accepted by the rest of the congregation

namely the Chief Signal Officer and the others who looked on him as being the keeper of the wisdom and so Friedman's wisdom was anti-Yardley and therefore this spilled over into the Signal Corps attitude and there is a certain amount of distrust I think too present because they felt <sup>that</sup> the publication of Yardley's book was <sup>a bit of</sup> a dirty trick and one of the things that resulted from it was that both G2 and <sup>the</sup> Chief Signal Officer with G2 carrying the torch we got this law passed about the revelation of information about 330-5, is that the one Hank?

AR 330-5?

(Hank) (I don't recall)

(laughter) I used to revise and help review it and produce revisions to it

which would go down to the War Department for publication in Army Regulations

so we were the action body on keeping that regulation up to date. Yes sir.

Goodman  
Q: Did the folks at G2 react separately or in concert or were they particularly

203 startled by the publication?, after all, ....

A: There was no question that they were really really put out by this thing. I think

the people who were pro-Yardley up to the point that the book was published

turned against him. They thought this was uncalled for and while there was no law they could invoke to stop him and there was really nothing <sup>that</sup> they could invoke -- law or moral principles or anything else <sup>--</sup> because they were sort of tied because of their position and to go out and fight this book would give it more publicity so they would just confront <sup>ed</sup> ~~it~~ just like Norm Boardman every now and then is with one of these problems and they reacted a great deal like Norm Boardman reacts. They don't know what to do.

^ Nobody else would either except somebody who was brave. Now I want to mention this exception. Carter Clark <sup>e</sup> <sub>^</sub> had, I don't know, he had an insatiable curiosity about intelligence matters and he was our greatest supporter. I first met Clarke when I was doing a stint of night duty down in the War Department message center. He was I think he was a captain at that time and he was in charge of the radio station over at Fort Myers, which was the transmitter site...

Q: It was WAR, wasn't it?

A: W-A-R, ~~That was the~~ <sup>is its</sup> call letters, yes. Not war in the sense of WWI (laughter),

but I don't know why they chose WAR <sup>except</sup> ~~but~~ War Department, <sup>this is</sup> War Department top radio

station and he also was responsible for the maintenance of the message center equipment. What happened is that the antennas and transmitters were located over at WAR, Fort Myer, and then they were keyed remotely from positions in the back of <sup>the</sup> fourth wing of the Munitions Building where the message center was located and <sup>there was a</sup> ~~the~~ whole lineup of intercept not intercept but operator positions along one wall, the last portion of the wing there, and the code room was up in the front left hand corner of the third left third of the wing and that's where I was working and so Clark<sup>e</sup> would come in and he was responsible not for the code room but the support of the code room, make sure we had lights, tables, furniture, desks, typewriters and all the things that you need in a code room but he wasn't responsible for the operation of the code room. That was sort of the personal responsibility of the ~~communications~~ group and, but as one of the members of that group, on his inspection<sup>s</sup> and he would come in at the oddest hours of the night and just look <sup>ing</sup> ~~over~~ the place and see if it was running right. It

was a good thing to do. He came into the code room and introduced himself and we got to talking and he was very curious about me and my background and how

I liked the work and what I thought <sup>its</sup> ~~his~~ future would be. So we got to know each other pretty well. We ~~got to be~~ <sup>became</sup> sort of personal friends which was unusual for a young country boy and a regular Army officer because the Army officers

were <sup>or</sup> cut up themselves and they had to maintain that image and they

didn't get too palsy-walsy with civilians. <sup>But</sup> In this case Clark<sup>e</sup> and I got to know each other so we were sort of a first-name at that time and later when he

became my boss I called him Colonel. Now Clark<sup>e</sup> was intensely interested in

this thing and I think he, while he never agreed in all instances with Friedman,

he wasn't a rubber stamp, still he was a great supporter of Friedman and the

things <sup>that</sup> Friedman was trying to sell. I think Clark<sup>e</sup> knew that you didn't win

all the battles but you suffered some losses. As long as you won the war he

was happy but he could lose a skirmish and never turn a hair. He <sup>'d</sup> just go and <sub>^</sub>

start another fire some place else and if he lost that he wouldn't care he'd

~~just go and~~ start a third fire. I think a very remarkable man and totally

unappreciated. Well I set him apart because he is unique and I think he made

a wonderful contribution and helped <sup>Moubrigne</sup> ~~Modern~~ and the others, Albright, by his

support because one voice out there in the ranks sometimes will have as much

effect as, ~~well~~ will offset a distant voice from the front row, and he had a

a <sup>very good voice</sup> ~~great~~ ~~hard~~ ~~for~~ ~~it~~ and he was very vocal. He had a mastery of words and I

think he did a lot of pseudonym, nom de plume, writing forwarding. <sup>well</sup> He had a couple

of articles that I know about published in the Saturday Evening Post and he

was a good journalist. Now enough <sup>for</sup> ~~of~~ Clark<sup>e</sup> and a little bit more about Yardley.

I think I've said this before but I'll think its a good place to repeat it.

Yardley's next appearance so far as the Signal Intelligence <sup>was</sup> ~~was~~ concerned was

when Yardley was hired by the Nationalist Chinese as a code expert <sup>in</sup> ~~and~~ their

efforts to crack the Japanese <sup>military</sup> ~~field~~ ciphers. This came about directly as a

result of Yardley's publication of <sup>the</sup> American Black Chamber I'm sure because the Chinese thought if they could get this American <sup>expert</sup> ~~exploit~~ who had been so successful in the diplomatic codes working for them he might have the same degree of success on their military codes. Well Yardley didn't score a point I think in that game. He was completely whitewashed because (1) he didn't have good intercept, (2) he was so conditioned by the cable drop <sup>traffic</sup> ~~companies~~ that he have no concept of what you would expect from an intercept group and therefore it was impossible for him to organize one and (3) he had all <sup>the</sup> built-in difficulties that the Chinese have which he <sup>or</sup> ~~has~~ a western <sup>A</sup> didn't understand. The kind of things like how you get <sup>a</sup> ~~the~~ Chinese to do something he didn't quite understand. He was trusted completely by the Chinese with the intelligence that they had gleaned although they didn't trust him with the policies and political activities. He did have access to their intelligence files. The, after the Japs did what they did in China ... the Chinese suffered their heavy defeats, Yardley came out by the Burma road, he

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was one of the last last guys to get through and came back to the states and at that time Akin was in charge of the war plans and training division, General Spencer B. Akin, he was a Colonel at that time and Akin thought it would be useful if we got Yardley to prepare some brochures, technical brochures, on the information <sup>that</sup> he developed in his work on the Japanese field codes, military ciphers, so he arranged for a contract to be let. Yardley produced <sup>some</sup> ~~the~~ papers.

I was the action officer, review the papers, <sup>explain</sup> ~~bring~~ the contract to Yardley

and <sup>lay</sup> ~~later~~ the requirements out so I used to meet with him regularly, once or ~~like~~ twice a month in his apartment which is up on F Street <sup>just sort of north</sup> ~~just south~~ of the

Munitions Building and he would present what I would look at his manuscripts and

we'd discuss whether this is what we wanted or not and I'd ask him questions,

that he could you know, sort of feed him questions <sup>^</sup> answer because we wanted to get this we

wanted to get as much out of him as we could. He was never permitted into our

sanctum sanctorum but he did a couple of times come down to see <sup>Akin</sup> ~~Yardley~~ and I

think collect his money and sort of formally meet the formal requirements of the contract situation. The some of the things that disturbed me about this

relationship <sup>were</sup> ~~is~~ as follows: (1) Edna <sup>Ramsair</sup> ~~Ramaseur~~, Yardley's ~~s~~paramour,

was an employee of the Signal Intelligence Service. I'm sure we had no secrets

from Yardley (2) I often suspected that she was feeding him back information

from us which she would include in his reports. I couldn't prove this. I

discussed it with Akin and we decided well the idea here is to get as much as

we can from Yardley. This give us a measure of what he knows which in itself

is useful and probably as useful as any fabricated material that he <sup>would</sup> ~~could~~ put

in and the <sup>is</sup> feedback may stimulate him to recall things which and help us ~~to~~

answer questions which although not designed might be a more desirable situation than

without it. I love this attitude of Akin's. It was not one of anger "Kill the

son-of-a-bitch off" excuse me maam, and whoever hears this tape, but it wasn't

374 that there at all. This is an operation. We will get the ultimate out of

it and if we have to play this game to get it, let's go ahead and play the game but let's don't be fooled by it. We're still in control of the situation. And this I think is a very sophisticated attitude towards dealing with intelligence things that a lot of people never developed. But Akin had it instinctively and I think it was the proper thing to do. I was disturbed by it. I didn't like the idea of you know buying back, this is the way I put it to Akin, buying back our own dope but Akin said well we're getting more dope in return. He says dope for dope is fair trade in my book and the money is incidental.

Q: Did he have any thing of real value?

A: Well he sort of confirmed (laughter) and it took a little bit of work on our part particularly on my part because I was the action officer, he sort of confirmed what we deduced ourselves and the information he brought <sup>-- there was</sup> some of ~~the~~ new and useful but it wasn't enough to help us master the situation. It was a tough situation. Yardley, I'll use my word "illuminate" Yardley illuminated the

information that we had developed and in some degree confirmed it but this

confirmation is a sort of <sup>a moot</sup> ~~mere~~ question because did he confirm what Edna told him, assuming she did tell him, and I think she did. It would be <sup>moot</sup> ~~more~~ unnatural if she hadn't or is this freestanding information that comes from Yardley's own experience. I don't think we'll ever know and I don't think it makes any

difference because it wasn't, as time went on, the Japanese systems in war time were much much more impregnable as a massive things <sup>than</sup> ~~and~~ we <sup>had</sup> ~~id~~ imagined in those

days so it did help get us conditioned.

Goodman

Q: How did Mr. Friedman react to <sup>his</sup> renewal of the Yardley collection?

A: Why do you think I was the action officer? Did I answer the question?

(Yes sir.)

Akin sort of said if I let Friedman go up there I won't get this. I will put

the junior ~~man~~ ~~in~~ there to deal with Yardley speaking for me and Friedman was

a little bit hurt by the deal because he wanted to be out in front. I think he

enjoyed the confrontation with Yardley. He Yardley you see at one time was up

there and Friedman was here and now the roles were flipped. This I think was

Friedman's ego that was hurt rather his judgment and I think Akin very wisely avoided the confrontation between Yardley and Friedman and I don't think ~~there~~ it would have been <sup>pleasant</sup> ~~pleasant~~ because Yardley did still at that time have quite a few followers. Now let me say some bad things about Yardley. I think these are part of the sort of perspective that you want. I've said the bad thing about Edna and the possible feedback but usually when I would go up it would be about 10:30 or 11:00. Yardley loved to work late at night. He would oversleep. I'm sure Edna was living in the apartment with him. There was never any evidence of her around but I had a pretty sensitive nose and I the cosmetics that she used at the office were always present in a greater concentration in Yardley's apartment than they were around her desk. Do I need better evidence? and I'm sure Edna was there most of the time but she was never there when I was there. Yardley would usually be in a T-shirt, sleeveless T-shirt, somewhat dirty in front. He slept in it. Evidently he just slept in his T-shirt without any pajamas and

*my* nose was sensitive. He would sit down at the dinette table where he had his papers spread out. He had a desk with a typewriter on it and he looked pretty rugged pretty rough. Early morning just got out of blurry eyed sort of thing and the first thing he'd do he'd say "Can I offer you a drink, Mr. Rowlett?"

"No, thank you." <sup>You</sup> "Don't mind if I have one?" "Absolutely not. Go right ahead."

(laughter) He'd open <sup>this</sup> ~~his~~ desk drawer and pull out a bottle and he'd take a glass and he'd slosh in about two-third of a glass, tip it up. From then on he was first class and he'd do this two or three times while we were there. Sometimes he'd get a little too much before we got through and I'd just usually excuse myself. I had to get back and when would I see you again sort of and we'd make it the next day. This is what I saw about Yardley's drinking habits. Later on I think he tapered off because he got a shot in the arm when he was hired by the Canadians, he and Edna, to organize a cipher bureau up there and I don't know whether the archives show this I think I've mentioned it to you. I don't

remember reading about it but as one of the conditions for collaboration with

the UK, the US laid down the condition that Yardley would either be fired *from the job,*

Yardley would be removed from his contact with the cipher bureau, or that the

UK could not exchange any American information with the Canadians as long as

Yardley was there. The result was that the UK, who wanted a clean arena for

our collaboration, brought pressure on the Canadians to get rid of Yardley and

so Yardley was fired and I think he suspected exactly what happened. Yardley

was no fool and so he came back and hoped his services might be wanted during

the war and he was never asked and <sup>it</sup> was turned down any overtures he made. I

don't I'm not aware of any overtures but I'm sure he must have made some and

how could he help it.

*Goodman*  
Q: Who took the decision to go after Yardley in that way?

A: Well it wasn't a decision to go after Yardley. Now let me make that clear.

The decision was not to allow Yardley in but there was no malice. There was no

punishment in the context of punishment. It was not there. It was let us not

permit Yardley to be in and if he is in Canada he will be in because it is

inevitable that we will collaborate with Canada so they were simply just getting

Yardley out of the way but it, ~~wasn't~~ there was no punishment context here at all.

G. Q: Was this on security grounds or was it because they suspected his ability? <sup>ies, or....?</sup>

A: It was very simply that Yardley had broken faith with the cult when he published

the book and he might publish another one. It was that simple. They didn't look

on Yardley as a traitor. Yardley was admired but he'd done this thing and he

hadn't been forgiven for it and that's, I mean it was that simple. Now there

was nothing very complex about this and certainly we had too many other things

to do. People who were running the SIS and responsible for its activity didn't

go out on on a "get rid of Yardley campaign" <sup>where</sup> except for his activities impinged on

our activities and there they took steps to insulate it and that was the measure

of their action.

G. Q: I reckon what I'm really asking is if that sort of proposition were made to the



A: No Maam.

Q: Or just because of other reasons.

A: No Maam. If you mean was there a relationship between any reservations made in

more recent years in exchange with the Canadians and was this based on the

of  
Canadians hiring Yardley, there is no connection and I can tell you why. Any

reservations which we may have had in the timeframe that your question refers

is  
to a result of arrangements between GCHQ and NSA as to the Canadians' role and

the interpretation of these broad terms of reference were the limitation of the

Canadian, so far as our exchange is concerned. It was simply the interpretation

put by the people who gave you the instructions on these broad terms and these

may or may not have been accurately voiced. I suspect that they were practical

things and they avoided the philosophy behind the exchange and therefore they may

have sounded strange to the people who were implementing them but not necessarily

strange in terms of the concept under which the collaboration was being conducted,

so I would say positively there is no connection between any reservations that

you may have noted and which formed the basis of your question as I understand it and what the Canadians did with Yardley because once Yardley was removed from the Canadian effort and we had insured and obtained assurances from the UK GCHQ people that this was not continuing then the exchange was really open to what was agreed on between GCHQ and NSA and the Canadians sort of took what the British advised them to, really what they were told they could have. The British were a little bit more tactful about it.

Q: *Could I*  
~~Let me~~ ask you a question about the earlier period, prior to the publication of Yardley's book. In 1930-31 say as the junior cryptanalysts, yourself and Sinkov and Kullback, how did you regard Yardley as a cryptanalyst?

A: His work on the Japanese code, the work of the Black Chamber as we saw it through the archives and that was our window into it because Friedman didn't know <sup>as</sup> much *maybe* about it <sup>as</sup> we did. All he knew was the rumors and the heresy and the official understanding of it but we looked down there and we saw the raw material, we saw the worksheets, we saw the catalogs and other things and by the time we got through

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organizing that material and getting it filed properly and sorted out the ADFGVX

and the Japanese diplomatic and the other traffic we were interested in we had

a very <sup>good</sup> appreciation of the depth of cryptanalytic competence that the Yardley

organization had and they were very good at code recovery and code solution

because at that time there was very little enciphered code use<sup>d</sup> so it was a book

breaking kind of operation. Manly was a tremendous book breaker. He was a

master of languages and everything that ~~was~~ said about him I think <sup>is</sup> ~~was~~ probably

not, <sup>doesn't</sup> just give him full credit for what he could do. I think its something

short of what in my estimation Manly stature was. Mendelsohn was extremely

good. I wish Mendelsohn was on our team now. He not only was a book breaker

but <sup>an</sup> was imaginative man. He had good mathematical concepts although he was not

a mathematican<sup>I mean</sup> professional mathematican. He had a feeling for math and he

could use it as a tool but in those days there wasn't very much opportunity for <sup>the man</sup>

well for the use of mathematical disciplines as we found when we got into the

cipher machines analysis. That's where your mathematical approach really paid

*can bookbreak - its*  
off because you ~~looked for Akins~~ probable word, at least I always thought it

was because you can't ~~know~~ book break unless you know language and the reason

that language helps you is because you have a good feeling for the language

itself and you know what word is most logical there and so that's not mathematics,

that's linguistics and it's how words go end to end in the context of the language

you're dealing with. You know more about this Virginia than I do but that's

the way I look at it. I from a sort of broad cryptanalytic viewpoint I think I *???*

*probably* <sup>to</sup>  
~~am~~ pretty close right.  
^

End of Tape 2, Side 2

Tape 3, Side 1

Q: Prior to the publication of the Black Chamber was there a degree of mutual

jealousy or antipathy between Friedman and Yardley?

A: I don't think so. I don't recall any <sup>instances --</sup> ~~incidences~~ that I think there was intense

rivalry but more of the nature that you found and I'll speak of this because

personally between Abe and Kully and myself, I mean we were ambitious. We

wanted to be good in our fields and I think Yardley was a professional and

Friedman was a professional so there was a good professional relationship.

I think there was a certain amount of not jealousy if you will but I think ~~it~~ <sup>this</sup>

could have been jealousy if it had come where they were cast in tightly competitive

roles but they were never you see. Yardley had been removed at the 1930 time

and Friedman felt pretty secure because Yardley was not to be told about our

new activity because (it might lead back to <sup>the</sup> State Department and we'd be in hot

<sup>Do's</sup> water again you see and they might close <sup>out</sup> ~~up~~ the Signal Corps activity) so I think

Friedman felt pretty secure in that sense and there was no reason for him to

be anything but magnanimous toward Yardley but I think there's some evidence of sort of the professional competition that existed between them and one of the examples of that is Wheatstone cipher and the story of it. I believe this is recounted in David Kahn's CODEBREAKERS but the way I see it is a little different from David Kahn and it's something <sup>as</sup> ~~that~~ follows, that [the Wheatstone cipher had been proposed as a military field cipher by the British and had been sent over to the UK and <sup>^</sup> from the UK to the US <sup>^</sup> and that part of the US ] action on it was to have Yardley make an appreciation a cryptanalytic appreciation of the thing and make an estimate of its security and recommend whether or not it should be adopted. Well Yardley when he analyzed it spoke affirmatively and *this is good and* said, Yes, ~~that~~ we should use it. And then for some reason Friedman was brought into the act and I think this was not maybe didn't suit Yardley so in the well in what followed this situation was generated for some test messages <sup>^</sup> challenges that would be enciphered by Yardley and ~~was~~ submitted to Friedman to see if

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Friedman could break them and Friedman had made a pretty good study of the thing and felt that he knew how to solve it and I think one of the Riverbank

Publications talks about the solution of Wheatstone cipher and gives <sup>the</sup> Friedman <sup>^</sup> attack on the thing. Well he got one of the components and he found the key

word for it and he turned to Mrs. Friedman <sup>-- working on</sup> ~~for certain of~~ these test messages <sup>^</sup>

and said I'll ask you <sup>a question</sup> ~~first~~ and I'll give you a word and you give me the first word that comes across your mind and that's the answer so the component he had

discovered I believe was cipher so he said to Mrs. Friedman "cipher" and she came back with "machine". He tried the word machine for the key word for the

other components <sup>b</sup> and it worked, and now there was a little bit of a <sup>I guess of a</sup> hassle <sup>^</sup>

resulted <sup>ing</sup> from this between Friedman and Yardley because Friedman <sup>breaking</sup> ~~had broken~~ the

messages <sup>he</sup> and sort of put Yardley down. I mean Yardley's opinion then well Yardley was shown up as wrong. Friedman did break the messages and there was no contest

<sup>I think</sup> and this may have been the kind of competition between them but they had never <sup>^</sup>

come to the acromonious state which resulted from publication of Yardley's book.

It was a kind of a friendly competitive thing where both of them had a certain

stature professionally and like all professionals, mathematicians, historians,

linguists, some sort of <sup>reservation</sup> ~~regination~~ between personalities. I didn't sense any

any meanness on Friedman's part if that's part of the question. There was none

of that and I didn't know Yardley well enough at that time to know whether he

had any such feelings but I can say that when I began to work with Yardley on

this contract that I referred to earlier in no case did Yardley ever have a bad

thing to say about Friedman. As a matter of fact we both avoided Friedman the

discussion of Friedman if that means anything. Yardley <sup>never</sup> ~~did~~ <sup>ed</sup> attack Friedman and

I suppose he well I thought Yardley outside of his drinking habits and <sup>maybe</sup> his love

life with Edna was pretty normal respectable person I guess by today's standards

there wouldn't be anything wrong with what Yardley was doing but I didn't think

it was the kind of thing to do in those days so maybe I was a little biased against

him. Did I answer your question?

Q: When the Black Chamber was published, you were working on the beginnings of SIS.

Did that change your activity in any way? Did it throw a different light on it?

Did it cause you to maybe redo some things or change direction or I guess what

I'm trying to say <sup>is, this</sup> the idea that this type of thing was in the open, <sup>so to</sup> ~~sort of~~ speak,

cause the SIS any real concern or any real problem?

A: Do you mean other than Friedman's personal reaction to it?

Q: Right.

A: Yes I'm going to surprise you with what I'm going to say here. At the time that

the book was published and I'm talking about my reaction, not Kully and Abe's.

I think you're question is directed at all of us but I think I can reflect <sup>some</sup> of

theirs and mine. In the first place we didn't know what all the furor was about.

I didn't. I couldn't understand why everybody was so bothered about this thing

because this was done. The thing was closed. I was too immature in my concept

of intelligence matters to understand the future implications of it and so I was

little puzzled and amazed and I sat there watching with curiosity. Now that was my personal reaction. So far as the work was concerned it made no difference

because we were being trained and our code compilation <sup>program</sup> was in concrete. We

funded for it. We had to meet deadlines and we went ahead compiling those

damned old two part codes, great big things, doing that onerous job of proof-

reading the cross section in the heat of Washington without air conditioners

and you couldn't turn the fan on because it blew the cards away, got you all

messed up so we just sweated it out \_\_\_\_\_ . The answer? Yardley's

publication of the book at that time had no effect but now here's the thing

that's going to surprise you. I think looking back that Yardley's publication

of that book was a terrific thing for the US government and the development of

<sup>Cryptanalytic</sup>  
its competence because Yardley's book caused the Japanese to realize that their

systems were not adequate and in their efforts to improve them they went to

something like the Red machine, <sup>to</sup> the Purple machine and they went from the

untransposed codes to the transposed codes and they laid us a challenge in a  
 timeframe and in a series of operations which enabled us to meet these new more

difficult challenges in a way that we <sup>grew in</sup> ~~drew up~~ strength cryptanalytically and

<sup>-wise</sup> COMINT that we never would have <sup>attained</sup> ~~obtained~~ if the Japanese had stuck with the

old Red machine so I am so glad that Yardley published that book that I could

shout about it this morning just like I am and this is from my heart. Now look

if the Japanese had not improved their codes in the way they did (1) we would

never we would have had the intelligence but we would have never put machines

in the proper context of I mean we would have said the Red machine is no good

but you get something more complicated than that and nobody can do it but the

Purple machine <sup>so much</sup> was more complicated than the Red machine that we had to work

<sup>like 18 months</sup>  
 something <sub>^</sub> to get it and the navy turned it off. They said we can't break this.

We're going to work on naval ciphers and that was their excuse but really they

<sup>it</sup>  
 just gave <sub>^</sub> up because they didn't think it could be done. The UK did not break

the Purple machine and they had a helluva good cryptanalytic organization and their excuse was <sup>that</sup> they were busy with the Enigma but they had read the Red machine.

I don't think the Russians had read the Purple machine because if they had their attitude at the Potsdam Conference when they certainly would have read the messages between Soto and Tokyo about the peace maneauvers, ~~they~~ wanted the Japanese Ambassador in Moscow to arrange. I don't think they would have handled the situation like they did or if they did the people sitting at the conference table certainly didn't know about the <sup>crypt</sup> analytic success which seems which would amaze me to no end and so I think that Yardley's book triggered and was the critical trigger for a series of actions which lead to the full improvement~~s~~ which we achieved. Now we might have done better under the circumstances but

I think without Yardley's book it would have been much more difficult because

look how long it took us to realize <sup>that</sup> the German one time pad was not a code

system but a pad-generation problem that you could recover the system by finding

out how they generated their keys see and then by matching the key up with the intercepts and I think indirectly this laid the ground for that kind of <sup>an</sup> approach

because again I'm saying something bad about my British friends but I think

they were shocked and delighted at this movement forward, at this achievement

It was a milestone in cryptanalysis, but Yardley's book helped us. It helped

us a lot more than it hurt us.

(Could have very well been that the Japanese might have <sup>sprung</sup> ~~scrubbed~~ the Red and

the Purple on you in 1942 or 43 and then you would have been another 18 months

after that before you'd solved it like you were before. You might never have

gotten into during the war) (Hank)

That's another angle on it. I hadn't thought of that but I was thinking in the

simple terms

(It was good that you had solved both those systems in time for them at the most

critical time that you needed them) (Hank)

<sup>it</sup> and also had its feedback into our own cryptography with <sup>a the result that it improved</sup> ~~resulted improvement~~

<sup>ever</sup> it, and I don't think I've expressed myself as forcefully about Yardley's book as

I have right here but I'm convinced as I look at it today that Yardley did us a favor and he'll never get credit for it of course because the other angles are rather reprehensible but in the simple act of publishing these results he really promoted US cryptanalysis more than he could have in any other way. I think if he had been involved he couldn't have done as much for us as a result of this publication, and this is strictly fortuitous. (laughter) I can't quite figure it at all.

I'd like to add a clarifying thought to my comments about the advantages which accrued quite unintentionally from the release from Yardley's American Black Chamber although at the time it happened it looked as if a great disaster and I think I'm saying this correctly. If a great disaster had happened to the Signal Intelligence Service by the release of the information in Yardley's book as we look back today and examine this as one example I can make the judgment safely that it probably was a good thing and personally I think it

did help us but now I don't want these remarks of mine about the Black Chamber to be construed as an endorsement of the release of any other items of information whether general or specific. That it could in the long run be a good example. It could be just as bad as it could be good but you never know until 30 or 40 years have past whether it was good or bad and only if it has been released.

Goodman  
Q:

While it may sound trite, I think perhaps the proper phrase is based on its own merits."

A: I think that helps. We shouldn't use my argument that the release of Yardley's Black Chamber was a good thing that it is a good thing to release any other item whether it be big little or inbetween. One comment I'd like to make sort of out of context to the question that's been bothering me for quite a while and I don't think I've said this in terms of your history program, but some of the open publications that have appeared in the past few years have made a big deal about the difficulties that we had providing in

new and ~~conditional~~ <sup>additional</sup> copies of the Purple <sup>machine</sup> when these were required. This is a  
shere myth because (1) the machines did not have to be built under a contract by

a contractor and in fact the security requirements would never have permitted

~~it~~ <sup>them</sup> to be constructed outside the Signal Intelligence Service or the navy yard

and (2) the design that had been developed by Rosen for our analog of the Purple <sup>machine</sup> ~~A~~

was based on the procurement of standard parts from telephone companies and it

was the way these were interconnected and controlled that enabled us to dupli-

cate the function of the Purple machine and since these parts were extremely

well engineered and designed by the phone company to operate many hours without

trouble we took advantage of this and so Rosen's layout, his design, of the Purple

machine was took all these things into consideration and we <sup>--</sup>~~A~~ all we had to do

was to assemble some parts which could be fabricated and not identified as a

part of a cipher machine. For example the rotors were produced by putting

together several switches in ~~the~~ <sup>a</sup> gang and then wiring up the body contacts just

very carefully doing a wiring job. <sup>There was nothing</sup> ~~It wasn't anything~~ magic about it. We had

some jigs which enabled us to very conveniently do this. It wasn't a big job.

It was time consuming, onerous, <sup>job,</sup> requiring a lot of patience and a lot of care

but if you didn't get in a hurry you could <sup>wire</sup> ~~borrow~~ one of these things <sup>up --</sup> ~~off~~ one

<sup>could --</sup> man ~~and build it~~ in a couple of days, and we had three men from the Second Signal

Service company who were good wiremen and we bought enough of <sup>the</sup> switches. Akin

was very generous with us and he had the idea that we ought to have these things

in a great enough supply so if one of them went bad we could have another one on

hand and when we wired up enough, <sup>and I say</sup> ~~then I think~~ three or four spares of each one

of the <sup>rotors</sup> ~~others~~ was enough we put them in a safe in secure storage but we wouldn't

want anymore because we could store the basic stepping switches in open storage

you see without security requirements <sup>so</sup> ~~because~~ the critical thing in the construction

of these machines was the wiring of these banks of telephone switches. The rest

of it was a case of buying a few control switches, <sup>multi-level</sup> ~~a multiple double~~ switches,

some master relays, ah keyboards which we could get from IBM just by asking

them. They were keypunch keyboards and <sup>the</sup> ~~electromatic~~ <sup>electromatic</sup> typewriters used were

produced as part of our contract for the M134T1's and we had several of those

around and they were IBM typewriters and ~~they were~~ <sup>very</sup> reliable. Now one instance

has been overemphasized in public literature is that there weren't enough

machines to distribute to the Pacific. This is an absolute myth because we had

machines in depth, wired. All we had to do was assemble ~~them~~ and we could do

these assemblies in a matter of hours and I'm sure that we could have put a

<sup>together</sup> machine <sup>^</sup> in less than a half a day and tested it, insured that it was operating,

without a bit of trouble. So when anybody reads about the procurement difficulties,

the manufacturing difficulties for the Purple machines <sup>that</sup> <sup>^</sup> have been expressed by some

of the writers. They can be disabused, the false impressions laid by these

writers.

.....Purple machine that I think ought to be laid to rest, some of the popular <sup>writer</sup> <sup>^</sup>

and I think Winterbot<sup>ham</sup> is one of them and his, <sup>the</sup> impressions that he leaves in


the latter part of his book which deals with the Japanese war, certainly indicate

to me that he didn't know the difference between the Enigma and any other kind

a cipher

of machine. The Japanese systems were not Enigmas. They weren't even principles

following the Enigma. The Enigma machine was <sup>closer</sup> ~~closer~~ to the American machine,

the ABA or the M134T1 or the British  or the ECM than it was the Japanese

machines. Evidently the Japanese had distrusted any known type of mechanical

encipherment such as the Enigma wheel or the Hebr<sup>on</sup> <sup>an type of</sup> ~~on~~ wheel and had gone to

the concept of using a <sup>more</sup> much <sup>^</sup> complicated type of substitution maze which resulte  
d

in a, to talk about it in terms of <sup>^</sup> cryptographic things, a substitution maze

in the case of the 20 or the Purple machine or in the related cognate Japanese

navy machine could be expressed by a box of equivalents or substitutions of 20

elements, 25 elements in depth. So you have a matrix 20 x 25 which there were

25 encipherments of each of the 20 elements across the top. Now this is a lot



installation at Bletchley might have been used or a modification might have been used by the Americans for dealing with the Japanese problem and he didn't

distinguish between ~~the~~ Japanese military <sup>ciphers</sup> and diplomatic ciphers. I think

this might bother some people because since there was such a vast difference,

since there was no relationship between the cryptographic principles employed

in the Purple and navy machine<sup>s</sup> and the Japanese military systems which were

non-machines<sup>†</sup> in the main, only <sup>a</sup> small examples, Something less than a fraction,

a fraction of a percent, <sup>could be</sup> ~~that the expected~~ <sup>Japanese</sup> military machine<sup>†</sup> <sup>to be) and</sup> this would be the <sup>ed. in the Japanese</sup>

Green machine, as we identified it in those days, and we never found a case where

that was used. I think we can logically assume that the bronze goddess

was completely useless in any way against Japanese ciphers and would therefore

would not be of any benefit to <sup>the</sup> exploitation of Japanese ciphers. As I recollect ed,

and I'm pretty sure my recollection is as good as anybody's, the bronze Goddess

was <sup>an analog</sup> ~~synonymous~~ (?) of the Enigma machine in such depth that they could duplicate

action of the  
 the ~~actual~~ Enigma machine and it was the specific wiring which was employed  
 in the wheels of the Enigma machine that the bronze <sup>Godess</sup> dealt with and  
 there's no way but no way in which this could have been employed against the  
 Purple machine, against the navy machine and certainly against the type of  
 hand ciphers used by the Japanese military.

.....were transmission of intercept material and other classified information

within the United States at that time permitted the material to be mailed in

US mails with registered <sup>No problem about it.</sup> ~~registered~~ mail. <sup>Mauborgne</sup> The tapes we got from ~~Mauborgne~~ came in

<sup>registered</sup>  
 by <sup>^</sup>mail. If a Signal Corps officer was making a trip across, it usually took

longer for us to get the stuff by courier than it did by the registered mail

so it was a practical thing. To sort of back this up to go into related activity

one of the things we used to do was to send out code tables for the MI10 <sup>--</sup> code <sup>^</sup>

cipher tables for superencipher <sup>ing the</sup> <sup>^</sup> military intelligence code number 9 and later 10

which replaced 9 <sup>^</sup> and periodically, I don't remember whether it was a month or

three months we sent out a new set of tables. The rules were <sup>that</sup> within the

continental limits of the US these cipher tables could be <sup>wrapped;</sup> well, they were

SECRET. SECRET military could be wrapped, <sup>then</sup> and in one wrapper which was sealed

with wax seals and then put in an extra wrapper, both the inner and the outer

having the proper address on it, the inner one being marked with the classifi-

cation of the material contained and these were general rules which were applied

and I've sent many a cipher tables to within the U.S. under those circumstances.

Now when it went outside the US, <sup>it was</sup> you were not permitted to use registered mail

but the G2 courier system (or State Department) <sup>was used</sup> courier system, depending on which

DOS

was making the next trip, so the rules within the US which applied to the

handling of classified information included the ways that we dealt with intercept

material.

Valaki  
Q:

I wanted to ask about cryptanalysis as <sup>a</sup> the cottage industry. ~~How~~ From what I saw

of little memos here and there <sup>?</sup> <sup>...</sup> that went into <sup>it,</sup> <sup>^</sup> It seems that Friedman in the 30s

was sending out copies to different people to try to solve. Were these people  
on contract? \_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_

in the Riverbank Lab.

A: Could you describe the traffic a little better?

Q: I can't. I just have a covering memo saying we're sending you a few messages

or something like that and I don't remember what they were, specifically.

A: No Maam. We never would have sent any <sup>live</sup> ~~wild~~ traffic out that way. It <sup>could</sup> would have

~~not~~ been unheard of and I don't think Friedman would have ever done it and I

don't think he would have ever been permitted to do it if he'd wanted to. I

think there must be some misunderstanding in the context of the cover letter

as to what type of material was being enclosed and it occurs to me that there

were a great number of things that we dealt with the bulk of which was in

analyzing systems submitted for war department consideration by private citizens

throughout the country <sup>or</sup> private citizens throughout the world. We <sup>had,</sup> ~~have~~ I think

a couple by Englishmen and foreigners and Friedman used this material and the

situation to increase our cryptanalytic capability because he figured that

we took all <sup>these, quote</sup> ~~the~~ nut systems submitted by nuts there would be some pretty good

ones just by chance among them and (1) we might find a good principle and this

is one way of ~~encountering~~ <sup>them</sup> is to encourage people to send in their nut systems

and (2) he ~~wrote~~ <sup>rigged</sup> operations so that the materials submitted was prepared in

such a form that he could incorporate it in his training program and I used to

enjoy these nut systems when they'd come in because it was a great big puzzle

and we'd solve them and send back well he'd ~~rate~~ <sup>rigged</sup> it this way for example. That

we had a certain number of messages all in the same key, and then we had a certain

number of messages in different keys <sup>and the number of messages in a different key</sup> ~~was the same~~ <sup>was the same</sup> text you see using different

keys and the number of messages in the same key were different text so that he

had a sort of a cross cut on the thing and it was almost impossible for someone <sup>body</sup> ~~one~~

to invent a system with a you know proper sophistication in cryptography that

we couldn't solve <sup>just</sup> ~~by~~ more or less <sup>by</sup> inspection and I used to get a lot of fun out of doing these things. I have a feeling that the messages referred to in these cover memorandums are the solutions that we sent back to the people who submitted the systems to prove that their system was no good and I'll bet that's what it is but there never have been any <sup>live</sup> ~~large~~ COMINT type of traffic sent out on a contract basis. People would have been brought in, yes, to work on it.

Reserve officers like Captain Gerand who was a <sup>relay</sup> ~~really an~~ engineer for Bell

Telephone Company would have <sup>brought</sup> ~~Bob~~ in <sup>to help out</sup> ~~an~~ advisor and Mendelsohn <sup>on</sup> the

German problem but never would that live traffic have gone out so I must admit

that there ~~is~~ something different here. <sup>from</sup>...

<sup>The point</sup> is <sup>I</sup> <sup>is</sup> <sup>I'll</sup> fish it out ... it was  
~~Bob~~ and I remember <sup>we</sup> know where it is here and

a letter to Childs in the 30s

A: Oh! Oh! Now this could be something else. Another thing we were interested in,

and Friedman was particularly interested in this was historical examples of where

Valaki  
Q:

ciphers was used, for example, Benjamin Franklin with his <sup>own</sup> little code clerk and there's a whole body of material in the Library of Congress and there is any

number of messages <sup>from</sup> <sub>A</sub> The code system that was used by the Lost Dutchman mine

right across to the shorthand manuscripts about the <sup>beheading</sup> ~~behaving~~ of Mary Queen of

Scots and Friedman and his cohorts like Childs got a great kick out of dealing with these historical and otherwise exciting examples and I have a feeling that

that is the kind of thing that he would have sent to Childs but he would never

have sent the material to Childs and I'll bet you Childs will tell <sup>that</sup> <sub>A</sub> if he had

Childs would have sent it right back because they were just too sophisticated

in dealing with the secrecy requirements of this problem to have been so loose,

and it would have been a terrible example <sup>to</sup> <sub>A</sub> set for this rest of us anyhow. I

would lay that one aside and say there's nothing significant in this. <sup>This</sup> ~~It~~ is of

sort of incidental cryptanalytic interest, not having anything to do with the

primary mission of the SIS, I'm sure of that. That's the way I'll answer your

Valaki Q: Could I ask about setbacks in the development of the agency, and this is <sup>on</sup> two

counts. One is bureaucratic, just to put it in one pile, and the other is

technical and <sup>?</sup> ~~the first one thoroughly be professionally~~ <sup>that</sup> earlier, which is the <sup>the big question you asked</sup>

~~a big~~ milestone in the development.

A: Oh setbacks? Look it's always an uphill drag. Most of the set backs were monetary. As long as we had our salaries paid and we had problems to work on we got along. Remember there were only four or five of us. We had a nice vault which was secure. Our security problems were solved by locking the doors at night when we left. We didn't even have to put the material in the file cabinet. I remember leaving my worksheets out on the table and never having to worry about them. I just barred the windows and locked the door and went home. So there were no major security problems except keeping our mouths shut in dealing with the curious questions that <sup>friends and</sup> neighbors would ask about our occupational efforts. That was probably the biggest security problem that we had. Now

we did run short of stationery and supplies and things like that but we solved that problem by just going down to the dime store and buying five pencils for

*brought in ruled pads and*  
a nickel and I ~~probably~~ \_\_\_\_\_ old school pads because there wasn't

enough paper in the, we'd run out of funds at the end of <sup>the</sup> fiscal year. Another

problem we had was we had to take a months' leave without pay because funds <sup>ran</sup> ~~run~~

*1932 or*  
out I think ~~1933~~ and I had a wonderful time down in Southwest Virginia in the

month of May because we just closed up our apartment and went down there and

lived on the farm, lived free for a month so it didn't bother us. Our problems,

administrative problems, as reflected by my observation of what was going on

around me, I don't know what the Chief Signal Officer was involved with but

the problems within the organization there was more to do than we could get done

and it didn't make any difference <sup>if</sup> we didn't have the supplies to do this problem,

*that*  
we would work on another problem ~~but~~ we had the things to deal with and we were

<sup>so</sup>  
learning in those days, There was no urgency. We didn't have to meet deadlines

and there was no administrative inhibitions at that time. The only thing came up is we <sup>^</sup> sort of ~~had~~ been promised raises and these didn't materialize and there was a little bit of unrest among some of the members. I remember looking down at <sup>the</sup> Civil Service and I found a new job down there. It was in P2. I was <sup>a</sup> in P1 in those days and so I made some noises about it. Not in the sense of trying to get more money but in the sense of changing careers and going to a job that paid more because I didn't put it in the context that if you don't give me a raise I'll quit. I put it in the context here is this raise, I'm going to take it. Abe and Kully I think had each his own personal opportunity but none of these other jobs materialized. I guess other people got them. We didn't begin having administrative problems until the, I guess after the war we had <sup>our</sup> ~~a~~ real ones. The climate in which we operated was ~~a~~ very favorable monetary for us. We of course we didn't have money enough to get the IBM machines right off the bat but once we began reading traffic, Japanese

translations ~~thought~~ which that bought us a lot of administrative relief and

*Mauborgne*

~~Modern~~ and the other Chief Signal Officers were so proud of what we were doing

because it was getting them attention up in the office of the Secretary of War

and <sup>at</sup> presidential levels later on that <sup>if</sup> they felt we needed anything they made

sure we got it so we didn't have have much of a strive like we hear about

today and actually among us in this room I think there's more well pretty

well off. I think we got some good buildings. I think we got reasonably

good administration. I think we got reasonably good directions from the front

office. There are good ones. There are better ones <sup>and</sup> ~~than~~ there are worse ones.

I think the administration of NSA is well above average of what I've seen in

other agencies. (Well CIA I found different and here I'll be a little critical

not of NSA but of the system under which we operate with NSA members. In CIA

there is no division <sup>in</sup> of military and civilians and the life of the civilian is

much more pleasant in CIA than it is where you have the civilian of course )

*CIA*

must give in to the military requirements and military personnel in the  
installation which is military in nature like this so really we had it pretty  
good. Is that what you wanted to hear? That's the way I remember it.

End of Tape 3, Side 1

Tape 3, Side 2

Q: Somewhere about perhaps in the 40s the Civil Service Commission no longer was providing people to the register, to the cryptologic effort, and could you tell me how that came about?

A: Cause the system fell down. It was too clumsy and also the old rules the ~~old~~ bureaucratic rules as exemplified in the Civil Service Registers just didn't

work for the wartime ~~equipment~~ <sup>recruitment</sup> programs. <sup>So</sup> All the rules went out the window

and picked them and we went out <sup>^</sup> hired them and we paid them and we didn't pay too much attention

to the qualifications and we got them in tested them and then if they didn't

suit us we sent them to China.

Q: Oh are you talking about the military?

A: I'm talking about everybody. (laughter) OK we sent them to Siberia. We found another assignment for them or we just let them go or we made it so unhappy for

them. We found a lot of patriots though. Certainly made the right kind of

sounds and <sup>sound like they</sup> had the right kind of qualifications and we made a lot of mistakes

but essentially when we found a good person they would up making the proper

A trivial contribution. ~~True to~~ example, somebody in someplace got the bright idea that people who were proficient at the game of chess might make good cryptanalysts.

We had a chess player and I swear <sup>to God</sup> <sup>would</sup> he would up on the ~~Staff~~ Judge Advocate ~~Generals~~

staff and that was the China we sent him to. He wasn't worth a hoot. The

best source of people we had though was from the Signal School at Fort Monmouth

and these were military people because General Reeder who had been with us as

our boss, second commander in our War Planning and Training Division before he

was sent up to Fort Monmouth, was in charge of <sup>the</sup> Signal School so he took the IQ scores

of all the people who went through the school and he made out the top block and

he sent them to Arlington Hall Station and we got that's where we got people

like Dale Marston and Bill Bundy. <sup>Mc</sup> George Bundy was slated to come down here

except he got sidetracked to go somewhere else which is pretty well known when

you read his book, Walt Freed was a terrific man in terms of intelligence, John

Siemen was another one that I remember, Walt Jacobs whom you all know came in

a little differently but when they came through from the Signal School ~~in~~ at

Fort Monmouth, down here to [Warrenton, <sup>at the</sup> intercept station] where we phased them

in and then brought them down to Arlington Hall Station after their clearances

had been received, we knew they had to be good so, I think Art Levenson came in

that way. You just name the, Kirby came in that way, <sup>Ollie</sup> ~~Wally~~ Kirby. Now that was

the military recruitment. The others we didn't have a Bill Reeder out there in

the front line so we had to let them in droves and we had some of the strangest

things like ~~the~~ gals from North Carolina who had never worn shoes even. They'd

come to Washington and the recruiters had gone out and picked them up and Lord

there was a we had a terrible time screening these people out and I think this

was the result of throwing the old Congress Civil Service System because it was

so intolerable. We had to get closer to people quicker.

Q: How about the college recruitment program? Did you have one then?

A: We had all sorts of recruiting programs. I don't think they ever got identified

as one particular thing. If somebody knew somebody who was possibly a good

candidate for our kind of work why contact was immediately made with them.

Q: Could we go back to the late 30s at the time when people were still being

brought in from the Civil Service register as mathematicians or ... clerks?

How were the linguists brought in when it came time to start pub-

<sup>end</sup>  
lishing product.

A: In a variety of ways. They had linguists/ roles, rosters, set up by Civil Service

for the G2 (and the State Department) <sup>with</sup> language people, so there were

junior translators I suppose but there were language rosters. We ~~fed~~ <sup>?</sup> them

<sup>?</sup>  
~~back.~~ The trouble was to find people with a foreign language could be hired

because of security clearance reasons. These security clearance rules were

pretty arbitrary in those days. They weren't very well thought out. <sup>You</sup> ~~They~~

had to be sort of <sup>a</sup> second generation American if you were that then you could be

cleared. If you were first generation you might be cleared but if you weren't

born in America you couldn't be cleared. These were the broad categories.

People from bigger centers, population centers like New York, Philadelphia, and

Baltimore were looked at with little more carefully than people from ~~the~~ <sup>Rose</sup> hill,

Virginia. I didn't get formally investigated and cleared until the war was

half over. It's amusing what happened <sup>-- at</sup> a staff meeting, General Corderman

was the head of the Army Security Agency and we were talking about security

clearances and Jim Slack Col Slack who was his executive officer

made the announcement at the meeting and Corderman says, ~~said~~ "I don't want anybody

in this building who hasn't been formally cleared." and he says that's the way

it is isn't Jim and Jim says "No Sir". He said "What do you mean" He says

"Well you got a guy here at the table who isn't, hasn't been formally cleared."

Corderman looked around and said "Who is it?" He says "Frank Rowlett". Corderman

says "Frank haven't you been cleared?" You see I had come in <sup>in '30</sup> ~~early~~ and I was a

country boy from Rosehill, Virginia and everybody looked at me and said we

won't waste our time with this bird which was stupid so there were a few of us

who sort of slipped through and didn't get cleared but by the end of the war

everybody had had some sort of formal lookat and I'm amused everytime I think

about this that the consternation that was on Corderman's face until he found out who it was and then he said "Well we better clear him anyhow". That was his sort of way of getting out of the situation he had developed by his sort of pontific profession, I'm sorry, go ahead. That's about all I can give you on

that. It was chaotic.

Q: Did you ever <sup>know</sup> acknowledge <sup>Mrs. Driscoll (?)</sup> (of Driscoll) ?

A: Not very well.

Q: Quite wondering if you heard about the story of the system that possibly

she invented in Friedman's \_\_\_\_\_ and then they never spoke throughout --

... Mrs. Driscoll wouldn't speak to Friedman again.

A: May I ask a question? What was the system?

Q: I have no idea.

A: OK I'll tell you what it was then. Mrs. Driscoll was the best of the navy

cryptanalysts. She was the high priestess I guess of the cryptologic cultists

over there and when <sup>Hebern</sup> ~~Hebron~~ accepted the contract to build a cipher machine for

the navy the navy had good foresight in going after a commercially built device

because it took a little more than the sophistication of the navy yard which was

very good at building shipborne equipment but and a radio laboratory <sup>of course</sup> is very  
 good at radio but the sort of electromechanical components of <sup>a</sup> the cipher machine  
 was something that just hadn't been, there wasn't any background. There wasn't  
 any experience in that field and it took somebody that was pretty much of a  
 mechanical genius to put something like that together in those days and <sup>Hebern</sup> ~~Hebern~~  
 was that type of a guy and so he had gotten the concept of this cipher machine  
 and talked to me into giving him a contract and so he produced the first model  
 and in his discussions with the navy he met Agnes Driscoll and he  
 was so impressed with her ability and I think also a very <sup>clever</sup> ~~troubled~~ man that  
 he proselytized Mrs. Driscoll and took her on as a technical consultant in his  
 work with <sup>him</sup> ~~his~~ contract. I don't think this would be tolerated today in terms  
 of conflict of interest but in those days it made no difference. So she went  
 to work for <sup>ern</sup> ~~Hebern~~ and then they produced the device and sent it back to the  
 navy and the navy tested it and they took Mrs. Driscoll's word evidently that

it was sound cryptographically and didn't work very hard and some SOB over at the navy decided that that wasn't good enough for him so let's get the army.

I think what they were trying to do really was to get the army in on the contract more than it was to test out the device so they talked to Friedman and the Signal Corps about it. They talked to the Signal Corps and then talked to Friedman. Friedman talked them into giving him a challenge problem. I

think there were 10 messages and you can read about what Friedman did ~~with~~ <sup>to</sup>

the Hebr<sup>ern</sup>~~on~~ machine in <sup>the</sup> ~~his~~ little black book that we had in here yesterday.

Subsequently the navy decided that they wouldn't go after the Hebr<sup>ern</sup>~~on~~ machine

and got some more funds and looked elsewhere for a device. Well since the

contract was not followed through on Hebr<sup>ern</sup>~~on~~ couldn't afford to keep Aggie <sup>on his rolls</sup> so

she became jobless and she came back and went to work for the navy and I think

that is probably the thing you refer to and I think these are the substantial

circumstances whether she <sup>got mad with</sup> ~~snapped at~~ him for something else or not but this is

I think <sup>where</sup> ~~what~~ Friedman <sup>did</sup> ~~to~~ make life miserable for Mrs. Driscoll but not in the

sense of meanness or <sup>maliciousness</sup> ~~violeness~~ but in the sense of honest evaluation of the

system which was proposed for government <sup>al</sup> use and ultimately might have been

adopted <sup>by</sup> ~~for~~ the army. I think Friedman is completely clean of any malicious

act in this context and you can't blame Mrs. Driscoll because she, <sup>as</sup> ~~was~~ the

high priestess that thought the navy had a position of pre<sup>e</sup>eminence and she

couldn't have anything but hurt feelings as a result of what <sup>had</sup> ~~happened~~. Now

this is <sup>n</sup> ~~a~~ answer to your question. The part that you raised later but going

back, did I know Mrs. Driscoll? I met her a few times. After we had solved

the Red machine and had finally broken the news to the navy that we had recovered

--  
it so <sup>^</sup> ~~there was~~ always a certain amount of uncertainty about what you <sup>did</sup> ~~do~~ after

you <sup>had a major</sup> ~~have made your~~ breakthrough, you see. Who do you tell about it? Because

certainly you've got to <sup>^</sup> ~~have~~ somebody because if you <sup>'re</sup> ~~are~~ going to get the information

from the <sup>any</sup> ~~and the~~ benefit from the information you're producing the people in G2

have to know about it and then after that had been decided, <sup>and</sup> how you're going to  
 get the information over there, then you had to decide, did or did you not tell  
 the navy and how much did you tell the navy or not? Well Friedman I think was  
 absolutely right on this and I don't think he <sup>met</sup> ~~made~~ any opposition from the  
 Signal Corps although there was a great deal of discussion about the merits of  
 it under each circumstance but the idea was to have no secrets from the technical  
 people in the navy and the people in charge of the technical operation but limit  
 the cryptanalytic procedures and techniques to this group. Don't generally  
 publish them and talk about them outside the groups and this of course obtained  
 in the army <sup>so there</sup> ~~sort of~~ <sup>homologous</sup> ~~were~~ <sup>(analogous)</sup> ~~analogous~~ situations in the two services regarding the  
 release of information. I think we were more we operated with ~~more~~ greater  
 liberty in releasing things to the navy than the navy <sup>group</sup> ~~could~~ to us because there  
 were certain <sup>I think,</sup> old wounds over in the navy <sup>-- they</sup> ~~who~~ didn't trust some people in the  
 army and I think one of the things they distressed <sup>them is</sup> that Friedman had gotten

quite a bit of publicity you see. His pictures <sup>had been</sup> in the newspapers and they did the usual thing that people do when they are not certain. They said don't tell him <sup>any</sup> ~~every~~ thing. They had nothing against Friedman that was derogatory. They just didn't like the way he was doing things and they didn't understand what had happened so they they I think were cautious. But now going back to Mrs. Driscoll, after the RED machine was solved and we had talked to the navy there was much discussion between Friedman and Wenger and one of the things, Wenger wanted Aggie to come over and have the thing explained to her by the people who'd done it. That is the solution of the Red machine. So we arranged a meeting one afternoon and Mrs. Driscoll and a couple of junior navy officers who were students over there came over with her and I'll be very specific. This was some months after the initial breakthrough had taken place and we had come to the point <sup>of</sup> <sub>^</sub> where we could predict in advance the keys that were being used by the Japanese so instead of solving each days' traffic and

recovering the keys for each each periods traffic we simply went to the book and looked it up and plugged in the machine because we'd solved it for the whole year you see. That's a nice trick. I can't remember many cases where we were able to do this and so I was to explain to Mrs. Driscoll exactly how we had achieved this forecast of the keys. She came and sat down and she *didn't,*

*after saying* "Glad ~~say~~ "Nice to meet you", she just sat and she didn't say a thing and Friedman said "Well, Mr. Rowlett would you please explain to Mrs. Driscoll <sup>just</sup> how you did this." So I took my books and my worksheets and I sat down close to her and I explained and she listened and she didn't ask <sup>a</sup> ~~any~~ questions and when I got through I kinda looked at her you know waiting for her [to ask questions] and she ~~didn't~~ and I said "Well, any questions" and she shook her head. Then she said "Thank you very much" and got up and left and I never did see her anymore. I never did meet Aggie Driscoll after that. She was a quiet person <sup>?</sup>

I guess but now wait a minute. I'll take back. I did see her later because

when the consolidation took place there were several occasions when I did

talk to Mrs. Driscoll but never <sup>at</sup> that time though the world had passed her

by. She was a most unhappy person. <sup>But</sup> I don't think and this is my evaluation.

I don't think Mrs. Driscoll could keep up with the progress that had been

achieved both within the army and the other parts of the navy because I think

she just got passed by particularly when Raven and that crew

came in and of course she got along very well with Commander ~~Gipher~~ <sup>Safford</sup>. They were

old friends and then when the collaboration with the British started I think

she got left way down the technical <sup>role</sup> ~~level~~ and that's enough about Mrs. Driscoll.

Q: How old was she at that time? in the 30s?

A: (laugh) I'll I'll try to think. She must have been about 15 years older than

I. I'd say she was born about 1900, 1895.

Q: She'd gone to Riverbank.

(She had?) (VV)

(Yes)

(I didn't know that) (VV)

(That's one of the things I found out down at the Archives.) (HS)

(Did she study under Friedman?)

(I don't know who she studied under but she ... There was correspondence between

Fabyan and \_\_\_\_\_ who was head of OP20G at the time and he sent

he sent her to Riverbank. These were two guys. Also Wilson, later Admiral

Wilson, had gone through Riverbank also along with another <sup>guy which you</sup> ~~we~~ never hear of

never hear of him again) (HS)

A: Isn't that remarkable?

Q: Yes.

A: I didn't know that.

Q: And then as a matter of fact I think Fabyan's comment was that she was doing very well.

A: Well now look she was pretty good in terms of the progress of that day. She

just didn't have the background and education and the kind of things that were

needed to get in this new field of machine cipher analysis. I think she was

well over her head in the work <sup>with ern</sup> ~~of Hebrew~~

Q: Yeah, these are different things, different way different time period.

A: She was very good. <sup>Probably</sup> ~~Problem~~ in her <sup>days</sup> ~~just~~ got too much for her. One mystery.   
early and then probably just

I've been thinking about it in connection with my own thoughts about the

development of <sup>our</sup> success on the Japanese <sup>ciphers.</sup> ~~traffic.~~ When we when Friedman was

talking <sup>with</sup> Wenger and describing to him our early <sup>at</sup> attempts <sup>ing</sup> ~~to~~ solve the Red

machine, Wenger told Friedman about a navy machine but he didn't describe it

in detail and the recollection I have is that this <sup>was</sup> ~~is~~ a machine which had been

solved by Mrs. Driscoll working with some naval officer whose name I've for-

gotten right now but when Friedman began to press Wenger for the details of

how the machine operated hoping it might help us in our work on the Red machine

Wenger found a place where he stopped and he didn't go beyond the point. I have

yet to see the details of that solution. I know that it had a rotor somewhat

similar <sup>to a</sup> <sup>ern</sup> half Hebern ~~type~~ type of rotor similar to what the Purple had. Not the

Purple but the Red machine had which produced a vigenere square of one alphabet

sliding against itself either forward or backwards and it had two components. In

the navy machine I think they used the <sup>Kana.</sup> ~~code.~~ I can't remember whether it was

48 or 50 or 47 or what. I know there was a 47-point interrupter wheel on the thing which controlled the movements, advancing or well let's call it advancing the forward or backward movement of the two commutators <sup>each</sup> ~~either~~ of which provided a cryptographic substitution device for the two components which the <sup>Kana</sup> ~~code~~ alphabet was divided and structurally it was similar to the Red machine but we never got from Wenger, before the solution of the Red machine, any of the details about this and I have often wondered why he didn't level with Friedman as Friedman was leveling with him. After the solution of the Red machine had been achieved and we were more confused by the \_\_\_\_\_, Kully and I, we were the ones that read the first message in the Red machine. We were more confused by the dope that Friedman had relayed to us from Wenger than we were helped <sup>'cause</sup> ~~so~~ we wasted a lot of time. If we'd just gone ahead and looked for what we could find instead of looking for the things that Wenger had told Friedman and Friedman had tried to explain to us because I don't think Wenger

had I don't think Wenger understood what he was talking about really because he never was much much of a technical expert on these things. He could use the words but it was quite an accident if he described the thing accurately. At least that was my feeling about it, so Aggie evidently, Mrs. Driscoll, Aggie evidently had achieved the solution of this navy machine. At least it was just attributed to her, as I think back about it I just am real puzzled by the whole circumstance and about the only sensible thing I can conclude is that the navy had had a second story operation for the some how or other through <sup>espionage</sup> ~~its spinach~~ activities recovered this machine and I'm not so sure that the thing was done cryptanalytically. It's we found out we had to do in the army with the Red machine and the Purple machine and the J19 and other things.

(I think they pinched some stuff from New York) (HS)  
 Well....  
 (working in conjunction with the FBI and the New York City police department)

FBI

Well and then <sup>there was another one</sup> ~~the smuggling operation~~ of this was..... I met him after (I went

to work for CIA) <sup>and there was</sup> ~~as~~ a locksmith that used to work for navy and he was doing some

CIA

contract

work for us, training people in the art of picking locks. You recording this?

And he .....

Q: Valaki

In the early 30s we<sup>re</sup> you ever aware of the ciphers used by any of the other U.S.

agencies or is that going to put you over with the army \_\_\_\_\_ or

DS

( the navy or State Department?  
Panama Canal Department?)

A:

Q: Oh, I didn't know about that one.

A: Yeah. A little bit. ( We did not see codebooks used by the State Department.

David Salmon,

We knew from Friedman who had a very good relationship with ~~the~~ \_\_\_\_\_

DS

who was the head of the cryptographic section of State Department. I forget his

exact title but he was in charge of the compilation of State Department codes

and he relied on Friedman's advice and judgment a great deal except that he

wasn't competent to really appreciate what Friedman was telling him so there was

some knowledge of what State Department was using.) Our knowledge of naval codes

was general. We never saw or used or became involved in the systems used by

the U.S. Navy.

Q: Valaki

Excuse me. When you say the codes, do you mean ~~generetically~~ generically?

A: I mean codes, young lady. Precise sense because nobody used cipher machines in those days. They hadn't reached the state of perfection which made them reliable enough for code room use and in that regard the Japanese got a little bit ahead of us because they were out with the Red machine, using it practically before the Germans were successful in applying the Enigma to their current messages and the U.S. Navy and Army (and the State Department) and the UK all had not moved up to the point in cipher machine development where they had a machine that could be used for enciphering and deciphering messages, simple enough for a coderoom operator to use and reliable enough to do the job so the Japanese were one up on us in the practical application of the machines although the machine was cryptographically a dog. It wasn't very good as any modern cryptanalyst would tell you about the Red machine but it was pretty hot stuff to the Japanese in those days and of course the cryptanalytic capabilities of the rest of the world just hadn't reached the point where <sup>they</sup> ~~it~~ could deal with

even a simple thing like the Red machine so we were generally acquainted with what they were using but we didn't have the codebooks in hand. We knew how they worked but we didn't know the details. We knew the general <sup>concept.</sup> ~~contents.~~

There was no reason <sup>really</sup> for us in our capacity as cryptanalysts and sort of developing a cryptography of the war department because we were at that time compiling the codes and I mean literally codes, the war department staff codes, the war department confidential code, the MI10s and the division field codes and the army field codes which were on the code production program. We were busy with that and we didn't have time to sort of go into other areas.

*... were the codes.*

*Q: Valaki*

So the rest of the world ~~was a code?~~ Now from your perspective now which

country would you say <sup>was</sup> ~~is~~ the most sophisticated after Japan. Apparently Japan was then was the most sophisticated and led the world in ... machines.

A: No Maam. Japan was not the most sophisticated and I would say somewhere down about the middle of the pile. I believe the people who <sup>had</sup> ~~have~~ probably the best

sense of cryptographic security in those days and I'm including the U.S. <sup>[</sup> State

*DOS*

Department and the army and the navy <sup>in this</sup> ~~and the~~ comparison. I'm not excluding, <sup>US</sup>.

I think the British had the best concept of cryptographic security. Now let

me explain that a little bit. People like John Tiltman and Travis and the

graduates of OB40, Admiral Hall's outfit, had been involved in the preparation

British of <sup>naval</sup> [and diplomatic] and military ciphers and John Tiltman as you well know

is has been an expert in this field for many years. They used <sup>good</sup> ~~two~~ sized code-

books with additives or superenciphered with something similar to.... the

<sup>principiz</sup> additive ~~prints~~ were applied in their own ways, and they had also a realization

of the amount of work which would be involved in the breaking of the system so ~~that~~

they didn't overload the system and thereby destroy its security by misuse or

overuse and they had <sup>the</sup> proper concept of for key <sup>change</sup> ~~chain~~ <sup>?</sup> states and other things.

Now they maybe their security wasn't the best in the world but they sure had

the greatest sophistication in dealing with ciphers because it was a combination

of practicable ciphers. The pragmatic, pragmatic aspects as well as theoretic.

45

145A  
TWICE

Now these I know about and I can say in the ones that I understood that the British in my opinion were at the top. I don't know what the Russians were using but from what I have learned since I think the British were well above the Russians in sophistication. The well just an aside for a minute one of the I believe it was an ex-Russian national who had been adopted by GCHQ was really the fellow that introduced the concept of the one time pad. I forget his name but somehow or other the name Federlein (?) comes to the front.

I don't know whether that was his name or not. I do know that the Russians knew about the one time pads and so did the Germans. They called it the Wuburn W U B B U R N but the generic term applied to short additive which later on extended to a bigger additive. Now the Germans were pretty sophisticated as we found out from World War II systems. The military field systems were <sup>just</sup> about the same as the ADFGVX used with more sophistication and taking into account useage time factors, amount of usage and how much traffic might be sent.

Probably better than the German sophistication in WWI but the grading was sort of narrow. There's not much difference between the WWII sophistication and the Germans so far as the field ciphers were concerned, military field ciphers and WWI. I think the same is probably true of the navy, German navy, so far as codes were concerned, but when we get in the active situation of WWII we find that the greatest evidence of German sophistication <sup>was</sup> ~~is~~ their use of the ENIGMA. Now the German Enigma was a very reliable device mechanically. Its greatest fault <sup>was</sup> ~~is~~ the fact that <sup>it</sup> ~~you~~ used a "lark" <sup>RP</sup> bank and you had to read the <sup>lamps</sup> ~~blanks~~ and record the message whereas the Japanese Red machine ~~was~~ had a printer attachment so it automatically printed the text. In that sense the Germans were a little bit behind the Japanese in their practical exemplification of their cipher devices. The security of the German Enigma though was greater than the the Red, much greater, and its usage, the Enigma usage, was much more secure than the Japanese usage of the Purple machine and the navy machine. The Japanese didn't quite

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understand the usage ~~mode~~<sup>load</sup> factor, how much traffic you can send and they didn't

allow for that as much as the Germans did in their change of keys. Also the

number of wheels and the <sup>in</sup>variability of the digmawheels ~~for~~ added security factors

which the Japanese Purple machine and its related navy machine didn't provide.

French, Spanish, Italian somewhere down below the British and the German.

French I think were not as well, they were about on an equal with the U.S.

The difference between the French and the US the Americans yak more and send

more traffic and send more traffic and as a result the use factor weakened our

codes. Also our physical security in the understanding of how to deal with

the physical security of codes was pretty immature on the side of the Americans

and I'm sure anybody who wanted to copy (an American code book State Department

type could.) I know definitely from many sources of information many - I'm

talking about, I can think of four different sources of information now that

confirms the compromise of the strip cipher <sup>as</sup> used by the State Department) and so

I would say our sophistication falls we had some doggone good ideas on the

drawing board as we used our codes and I'm talking about now the State

*D.S.* Department which was very poor in its physical security and whose codes books

were antediluvian in date, navy which hadn't yet found the cipher machine it

wanted but the amount of traffic the navy sent was far below the use factor

which created a weakness in the system <sup>that it enabled it</sup> ~~unable~~ to be solved by cryptanalysis.

I don't know what about physical security measures used by the navy but I never

found any evidence that a navy cipher had been violated <sup>-- that is, a) or</sup> ~~in its ship to~~ shore

installation. I don't know about naval attaches. I don't know whether they

had much traffic or not. U.S. military ciphers I know were violated. I know ~~that~~

the Fellers codebook was stolen by the Italians. I mean the codebook involving

the Fellers incident that I've talked about earlier was stolen by the Italians.

I found this out after the war. Circumstances are good TV script. The strip

cipher was also violated and I know the Japanese got the details of the strip

cipher from Defense who had traded cryptographic information with the Germans

and the Italians and <sup>w<sup>2</sup></sup> received <sup>the</sup> strip cipher as part of that and we used to when

we were reading the Japanese military attache cipher we'd concentrate on the

traffic from [Finland] because in that traffic the military [attache] would send

the recoveries that the [Finns] had made of the American strip systems back.

Had to send them by radio you see encoded and we intercepted them and <sup>I</sup> might

explain <sup>there was no</sup> ~~it was done~~ surface, <sup>sea or</sup> ~~see our~~ other communication, possible between

[Finland and Japan] at that time because so very exposed <sup>?</sup> to them and submarine

warfare situation was such that they couldn't have vessels traveling between

Europe and Japan so they were forced to go on the radio circuits in code messages

and send this intelligence information. We were reading it cold and Captain

Jim Molk who was in our CSEC organization, I used to call him up and ask him

to come over and he'd go down and look at the partial recoveries in the Japanese

*DoS* military attache system then (go to the State Department and) go through their

vaults until he matched up the recoveries with the actual strips that were in use and then bring back the set of strips and we'd crib them into the

<sup>recover</sup>  
military attache messages and ~~were published~~ more MA key. The fact that they

<sup>encribbing cribbed</sup>  
were ~~encrypt~~, we ~~eluded~~ in our own (laughter)  
<sup>dumb old crib</sup>  
(The same ~~doggone~~ film) (VV)

I mean this is a fantastic story. Nobody would believe it and I'm sure that the

only reason you believe it is because you think I'm a truthful man but we did

that. But it's fantastic that such a thing was possible I think in the time-

<sup>II</sup>  
frame of sophistication of ~~WWK~~ cryptography so I would say while we had ideas

on the drawing board our sophistication from the standpoint of what we were doing

was deplorable yes deplorable. Friedman knew this. We knew this, Abe, Kully

<sup>Mauborgne</sup>  
and I. ~~Mobern~~ knew it. Akin knew it and we were working awfully hard to change

the situation but the massive nature of the war department, the time lag for

procurement and funding and other things in <sup>the</sup> ~~manufacture~~ of a modern device,

the state of the art just wasn't there and of course we didn't have <sup>the</sup> ~~a~~ crash

capabilities for protection ~~and~~ <sup>that</sup> it suddenly came into being with the outbreak of the war.

H5 Q: Can I ask you a question on the Enigma while we're still here?

A: Yes Sir.

Q: We have some documentation that shows that between 1923 and 26 reports came back to Friedman about the usage of the German commercial Enigma and Friedman put in an order for two of them and due to one thing or another he didn't get ~~them~~ <sup>two</sup>.

~~He didn't get the two,~~ <sup>he</sup> finally got one in 1930. Do you recall any working

on any any <sup>on</sup> ~~of~~ the commercial Enigma?

A: I sure do. After we'd finished the work on the [Swedish] machine, the strip

cipher device and other things and had gone through the repeated Friedman's

exercise with considerable help from him on the Hebr<sup>ern</sup>~~on~~ machine he gave us the

Enigma to study. We did not have a bunch of problems <sup>in</sup> with it. We had the

machine and the machine itself <sup>to study</sup> and I think what Friedman wanted to do was to

set up a problem similar to the one that he had used in proving the challenge that

the navy ~~was~~ gave him. He wanted a similar kind of a problem for us to work

on but we had already been in training so long <sup>and</sup> I think he kind <sup>of</sup> ~~a~~ felt that

maybe until we had some actual usage of this commercial Enigma which we hadn't

encountered at that point in time <sup>many of</sup> ~~into~~ the intercepts <sup>that</sup> it would be better to

study <sup>it</sup> ~~a~~ and not waste our time in a simulated problem which could be anything

but real, so while it might have helped us ~~to~~ understand the Enigma he just

never did get around to giving us an assignment involving messages enciphered

by this commercial Enigma and I I think he was right because I don't think <sup>it would</sup> ~~would~~

have done as much good, probably wasted a lot of time. I don't think we'd <sup>have</sup> ~~learned~~ <sup>a</sup>

anything we didn't learn later on anyhow.

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.....that is mishandled through some mistake and through some failure of the rules and <sup>the</sup> regulations that apply to it and there is a bit of a mess to clean up and everybody goes around and reexamines the old rules and makes the new set of rules. Now this ~~step~~ doesn't mean that the new set of rules are any better, it just means that they are different and <sup>that</sup> they are based on that situation which resulted in a mistake. Now I have seen any number of cases where the decision to improve the ways and means of handling information has been taken and actually we had to go back to the old rule? (1) Because the new rules corrected most unusual and rare set of circumstances and (2) that the people who were dealing with these things had a hard time understanding the new rules and changing their practices so it was better to limp along with the old rules which maybe wouldn't satisfy all the special circumstances <sup>but</sup> which were designed to satisfy most of the circumstances <sup>a</sup> then it was to introduce new

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rules which took care of all the exigencies that might arise and this has

happened many many times in some of these fancy systems that we put into

effect in the cold war situation in Berlin I think where you had the crash

messages going from the source to everybody in Washington without any possibility

of them being analyzed by mature intelligence officers created more confusion

than they created good situations.

Probably the best example of what I'm talking about is found <sup>in the</sup> scurrying around

Washington which took place looking for that <sup>winds</sup> ~~Winns~~ message. Actually there was

no need for the <sup>Winds</sup> ~~Winns~~ message. It didn't mean a thing if they <sup>id</sup> ~~sent~~ <sup>it</sup>. I don't

think they sent it. Stafford said he saw it but he never could prove it. I

looked for it. I never saw it. I think I would have seen it if it had been

there because I knew what I was looking for. Friedman looked awful hard for

it but he was a little bit remote from the situation and he couldn't find it

and Col <sup>d</sup> Saptler and Bob <sup>SchuckRAFT</sup> Shucraft and all of us helped each other and we

scurried all around looking for that thing and we never did find <sup>it</sup> and later on

when the T<sup>I</sup>ACOM team went to Japan, Erskine and his folks discussed this with the Japanese and I believe their report substantially indicates that the military didn't trust the diplomatic Japanese diplomatic corps enough to tell them that the strike was being made so the diplomatic corps was never alerted to the point of where they could have sent the Win<sup>d</sup> message which would have meant what everybody thought it meant. Now as a result of that a lot of soul searching was done in the ~~middle~~<sup>in</sup> military circles of Washington including the Army and the Navy and probably up at the White House where they felt this pain probably as much as anybody else and certain<sup>rules</sup> for handling the magic summary and other material which was being distributed at that time were put into effect. These were much well they were designed to make better distribution but nobody could have anticipated the Win<sup>d</sup> message and what would have well what resulted from the fact that ~~the~~ we didn't receive the message but it was presumed that we had received it and the action<sup>that</sup> was taken was based on the probability that

there would be <sup>an critical</sup> ~~other~~ message like that and while this probability seemed high at the time actually the normal system seemed to work quite adequately without this special gimmicks that were introduced to take care of the potential second <sup>d</sup> Winns type of message.

Q: Now your question is specifically what good would thorough research and analysis of the commercial Enigma would have benefited us in terms of dealing with German military and naval <sup>and</sup> air traffic as exemplified by German usage of the Enigma machine under wartime circumstances?

A: And the answer is we would have been aware of the general principles underlying the usages of the three services, air, land and sea in Germany but practically each service in Germany, the Air Force had one set of wheels and one system of rules for using the Enigma and it was a different Enigma from that which was used by which was exemplified by the commercial model we received. The main difference is that the military Enigma had a plugboard between the endplate and the keyboard so that you could change your connections between the keyboard

and the enciphering component as a part of <sup>the</sup> period key change and in some cases this <sup>will</sup> change several times a day, something like every six hours or so.

Now our study of the commercial Enigma if we'd gone into deep research probably would have been a waste of time when we got around to dealing with the actual

Enigmas used in the let's say by the German army because it was something less

than the machine used by the German Army and the simple principles that we

could have used for solving the commercial Enigma would have been much less

powerful than would have been required to produce the answers with the military

type of Enigma. Now as I recollect and I believe I'm correct in this, the

German navy had one more wheel in their basket than the German Air Force and

the German Army and consequently their machine would have been more difficult

to deal with the German Navy machine <sup>that is</sup> would have been more difficult to deal

with so I think in looking back that the commercial Enigma gave us an understanding

of the underlying principle which is <sup>employed</sup> important namely rotors with the umkervaltz

~~with~~<sup>it</sup> the reflector and then the double use of the rotors because the input and output endplates were identical and it was the electrical wiring that enabled the double use of the wheel to be achieved in the Enigma and this didn't happen in the American version of the 134 series, the SIGCOM and the ECM, because we used the one way circuit. The British ~~type X~~ <sup>Type</sup> did use the reflector, the unkervaltz principle and used Enigma circuitry.

Q: They were all three of a family though weren't they?

A: Yes, they were indeed of a family. The difference between the Enigma and the

Heb<sup>ern</sup>~~ern~~ which <sup>is</sup> of the two general classes, the Heb<sup>ern</sup>~~ern~~ used a reversing switch so that it in effect <sup>when you</sup> went from the decipher mode into the encipher <sup>or</sup> vice versa you simply in effect turned, reversed the current <sup>to</sup> ~~through~~ the wheels. Now this is fine and electrically it has certain advantages because the resistance path through the wheels is shortened. Now when you send it down, the current down, <sup>at least</sup> through the wheels around through the reflector and back then you've got <sup>at least</sup> twice the resistance and since its a very <sup>a</sup> variable thing and will vary with each

contact in the wheel in the endplate or the separator plates if they used separator plates between the wheel and the adjacent wheel but you get a factor in there which is pretty unpredictable and then with use the resistance becomes so great the machine doesn't function properly. This is probably the reason the Germans didn't have a printing mechanism on theirs because in the Enigma principle the current went  $\wedge$  through the circuit but through the wheels and returned from a reversing plate at the end and the connection between the keyboard and the lamp bank which was the recording component of the Enigma machine was <sup>e</sup> affected by a sort of double kind of single <sup>-pole</sup> ~~pull~~ double-throw switch. The key in this type was a single <sup>-pole</sup> ~~pull~~ double-throw switch <sup>and</sup> so when you depressed the key to send the current through it was impossible for that light or <sup>the</sup> ~~that~~ indicator associated with <sup>the</sup> ~~that~~ key to be used because the circuit came out always at some other place.

Now that's another distinction between the Hebr<sup>ern</sup>~~on~~ type circuit because in the Hebr<sup>ern</sup>~~on~~ type circuit a letter can represent itself. A plaintext letter can

represent itself in cipher text but in the Enigma circuit the plaintext letter

can never be represented by the same character. Going back and a little bit

more on the printing principle, it could be that the Germans tried printers.

They had pictures of solenoid operated typewriters but I think the circuitry

of the Enigma the resistance factor that I talked about earlier was they

didn't resolve it. Now the British very interestingly had a printing mechanism

on the Type X but the way they got around this resistance factor was principle

that the Bell Telephone used in its relays and it had double <sup>double</sup> contacts,

<sup>bifurcation</sup>  
~~modification~~ and they had double wires going through the Enigma

wheels and double <sup>string of</sup> ~~spring~~ contacts so if the one failed the other one might

carry the current through so it reduced the probability of a bad circuit or

resistance contact by about oh by a reasonable factor something like 4 instead

of 2 or 1.

Q: Were we able to read the British Type X?

A: There wasn't any point on working on it, was there?

Q: No, I'm just curious. The reason I asked that is <sup>all</sup> these three were of the

family. It must say something about US cryptanalysts. That they broke the German system but the Germans never broke us, or was the difference that great?

A: The German cryptanalysts were handicapped because they were too competitive.

I think if you look in the history, the TICOM history, you'll find there was something like 7 or 8 different organizations all doing the cryptanalytic work on allied traffic. The trouble with these organizations is they were so anxious to get attention, the little bit of mail, the intelligence that they

all skimmed the cream off and they did the easy ones and nobody, none of them, were ever able to concentrate on the more important and more secure systems

and bringing them under control. I don't think they could have with the

sophistication in cryptanalysis and <sup>with</sup> the capability the computer capability

that is available to the Germans I think the security <sup>factor</sup> of the ABA or the ECM

would have been ~~far beyond~~ <sup>far beyond</sup> their capabilities if they had all been together

in one wad and worked on nothing else because the recovery of the wiring of

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<sup>e</sup> Irratically step set of wheels is quite a complex problem that can be attested

to by people over in CSEC and some of the other sections of prod or some of the

sections in Prod. I don't think the Germans could <sup>have</sup> ~~copied~~ with this. I don't

think they could have read the British Type X. I never saw any evidence that

they did. I never saw any evidence that they had captured information about

the Type X and if they had I'm sure that they would have done something about

the Enigma because the British sophistication <sup>in</sup> of the use of the cipher machines

~~is~~ was pretty high for those days.

Q: Your question is is there any significance in the fact that the three major

powers the ones with the greatest degree of sophistication in cryptography,

is there any significance in the fact that they used rotor type machines and

I'd say grossly the answer is yes and in detail here is what happened:

A: The first concept of an commutator <sup>like</sup> ~~look~~ an electrical substitution of letters

of <sup>the</sup> plaintext by letters of cipher text using circuits came from a Swede whose

name was Vernoy and who invented this concept along about the turn

of the century sometime in the early 1900. His idea was not a wheel but it was

sliding strip <sup>of</sup> contacts, <sup>ly</sup> equal spaced contacts, which <sup>slid</sup> ~~fit~~ between two sort of end

plates and these contacts were interconnected in a sort of <sup>a</sup> haphazard <sup>or random</sup> way so that

as you slide this stick of contacts and of course there had to be 26 wires and

52 inputs and 52 outputs <sup>to</sup> ~~provide~~ <sup>e</sup> for the all 26 could be enciphered at one

time so you effected a new substitution simply by pushing your stick with the

contacts further down the groove. This was the first concept. Now that was

later turned into a wheel because you could by making <sup>the</sup> ~~a~~ circular arrangement

of the 26 contacts then you didn't have to have the 52 contacts for the end plates

and also you could put the wheels in cascade and from this very simple idea

of the Swede Mr. <sup>Arvid Damm?</sup> Vanoy, <sup>ern</sup> ~~Hebron~~ in America and Dr. Scherbius

who <sup>was</sup> ~~was~~ also known as <sup>KoRN</sup> Willie Kohn I believe its <sup>KoRN</sup> WILLI KOHN, The name of the

man to whom the patents <sup>down</sup> the patents office were issued, took this concept

and out of it came two different slightly different machines both using the

wheel. In the German version, the Dr. Scherbius version, I believe his name is spelled SCHERBIUS, The Enigma principle was used where you had the endplate with the set of 26 single <sup>-pole</sup> ~~pull~~ double-throw switches in <sup>the</sup> ~~the~~ keyboard and the <sup>lamp</sup> ~~the~~ bank together with the reflecting plate so that you <sup>sent</sup> ~~set~~ the circuit the substitution circuit through and it came back so you got a <sup>sort of</sup> double use of each wheel. With the Enigma version of this wafer-like commutator wheel if you will device. Now the Hebr<sup>ern</sup>~~on~~ idea was instead of the double <sup>-pole</sup> ~~pull~~ double-throw arrangement in the reversing plate he used a simple gang switch ~~which with~~ 26 contacts 26 circuits from the, well, the 26 contacts into the first endplate went through and came out another 26 contacts and then to <sup>an</sup> ~~an~~ indicating device like <sup>a lamp</sup> ~~the~~ ~~bank~~ or a bunch of solenoids operating typewriter keyboards. Now the enciphering and deciphering mode in the Hebr<sup>ern</sup>~~on~~ device had to be satisfied by a multiple switch which would in effect deal with the 26 circuits in and out in such a way that the endplates that the wheels were reversed. I

mean the circuits through the wheels were the paths through the wheels ~~were~~ was

reversed so it just really flipped the indicating device and the contacts

which you fed the enciphering contacts and the reading contacts. You ~~switched~~ <sup>flipped</sup>

them from one end of the wheelbank to the other and that's the difference

between the Hebr<sup>ern</sup>~~on~~ and the Enigma roughly. Now we in America like <sup>to</sup> ~~to~~ reversing

switch principle rather than the Enigma type because most of the work had been

based on Hebr<sup>ern's</sup>~~on~~'s development of a cipher machine under <sup>the</sup> ~~a~~ navy contract we spoke

about earlier and of course that concept ~~is~~ carried on and the Enigma itself is

not too well understood and I think one of the things that instinctively turned

the Americans against it was the fact that the Enigma did give a little bit of

a clue as to what the plaintext was because a letter couldn't encipher itself so

both the electrical characteristics and the lower resistance <sup>thru</sup> ~~to~~ the wheels coupled

with the fact that there was this non-PERMISSIVE encipherment, that <sup>is</sup> ~~is~~ the letter

couldn't represent itself, lead the Americans to prefer the Hebr<sup>ern</sup>~~on~~ type of circuit.

Now why did these three of course the British, it seems to me like they picked up the Enigma circuit and they didn't weren't exposed to the Hebr<sup>ern</sup>~~on~~ as much as the Americans were because of the navy contract and Friedman's analysis of ~~it~~ the navy device. They weren't aware of that and they weren't conditioned <sup>K</sup>psychologically for this kind of approach so the Enigma looked pretty good to them and so they just went ahead and tried to <sup>m</sup>prove it mechanically and electrically and produce the Type X machine. Now the common strain that runs through these is this invention <sup>of</sup> ~~that~~ the Swedes <sup>which</sup> later on turned into a wheel, the commutator concept, and the state of the art kind of <sup>led</sup> ~~lead~~ to a situation like Newton and Leibnitz and the invention of calculus. It was time for this to happen and the state of the art had <sup>led</sup> ~~lead~~ the people who needed good cryptography to use ~~that~~ <sup>which</sup> seemed to be the best thing to them and that was the cipher wheel because the cipher wheel was much better than anything else that we saw. The Damm machine used a keyboard and an indicator device with the

~~electrical circuit~~ electrical circuitry and the mechanical control and that was very poor. I think we were projected into the Hebr<sup>ern</sup>~~on~~ type well the use of the wheel type cipher machine because there <sup>just</sup> wasn't anything else available and I'm sure that's exactly what happened with the Germans and the British.

Talking about the security aspect of American systems, a little personal story

about General <sup>Neuborgne</sup> ~~Nebern~~ I think you all might find interesting and ought to be

somewhere put down in the history if you get an opportunity. I think its

significant that when we revealed to <sup>Neuborgne</sup> ~~Nebern~~ the fact that we had been successful

and we were able to produce translations, decodes and translations, of the

Japanese Purple system after the 18 months <sup>del</sup> we'd been working on it and I spell

this out because I want to set the context here correctly for what I'm going to

say, I think it's significant when he saw this and was amazed that we <sup>had</sup> finally

achieved this after 18 months work that his first thought was well now can

somebody do this same thing to our system, which we are about to put into effect





basically a fallacy. There is no such thing and that good administration demands that you find the fellow who has the skill required by the problem and in modern cryptography and cryptanalysis the field is so broad that you'll not find any man who is master of all the branches of it. Now you'll find specialists

in a variety of fields because it <sup>has grown</sup> ~~had been~~ so big and so broad and this would be contrary to what happened maybe in the early years when Friedman certainly

was <sup>the</sup> a machine expert as we came into the early 30's and he knew more about cipher machines, <sup>their use,</sup> ~~their~~ application and weaknesses than anybody else. But now, there are

many more types of ciphers machines and there are many more people who <sup>have introduced</sup> ~~been able~~

~~to review it and~~ <sup>and</sup> so you can pick and choose <sup>for your specialists in</sup> ~~with respect to~~ any given aspect

of this thing and I don't think you <sup>need to worry</sup> ~~know too~~ much about the pyramid effect

                     because if there was such a pyramid its the organizational

administrative structure that was being reflected and not the skills of the

<sup>who are</sup> people involved and I would presume if you'll sort of ease your rules that you

could say the guy that's been hanging around the longest and had the most

<sup>ought to be your</sup>  
experience ~~under~~ the senior man and I can think of no better candidate for this

than Bill Lutwiniak who is also been involved in a lot of things but I ~~find it~~ <sup>am inclined to</sup>

think that you could also go down to Research and Development organi-

zation and find people both in the intercept and the cryptanalytic-computer <sup>fields</sup> who

could qualify as being very senior, very senior cryptologists even though they

might not <sup>wear</sup> ~~have~~ the tag of a cryptographer or cryptanalyst but walk out with the

emblem of an engineer on them. Now I guess what I'm saying is that your

the guys who are up <sup>close to</sup> ~~at~~ the top are the ones who <sup>have</sup> had the greatest exposure to a

variety of problems and <sup>who</sup> ~~have~~ done well in more of them than some of their collab-

orators.

we help the NATO countries ~~help~~ improve their systems so they don't spill our secrets,

that there hasn't been that <sup>much</sup> ~~type~~ of a change in <sup>new</sup> the systems. Just to a certain extent

but not that much (Rowlett chuckling in background) <sup>we</sup> and still can read ~~without~~

Q:  
Valaki

without any help on what led to systems they've made

themselves and this is true just about for a lot of them - but anyhow -

and I just wonder if you can explain it and also that despite ~~there is~~ \_\_\_\_\_

all kinds of skills and all kinds of information that has appeared in the paper

and you would think that anybody could just rush home immediately

and change the systems and throw out the old ciphers and get

a new bunch, or something and relatively speaking nothing has happened.

Either that or we managed amazingly to be there to meet them when they come in  
to pick up the machine or whatever.

Really  
A: (laughter by Rowlett) Virginia do you expect me to give an intelligent answer

don't understand either.  
to something I I don't understand it. You know we're always scared to death

if we improve <sup>a nations</sup> if we expose a nations cipher <sup>foreign nation</sup> they will <sup>better cipher to a</sup> replace <sup>the ones that we can</sup>

by this  
read ~~xxxxxx~~ new version but some how or other just like seed falling on

unfertile ground. It don't take root and it don't <sup>grow</sup> and I can't understand it.

I never could understand it. and I've come to the conclusion that John Tiltman's <sup>maybe</sup>

remark is probably is more german

I'll repeat  
to this situation than anything else and ~~it is repeated~~ for it here for the sake of

bringing us up to date \_\_\_\_\_ that <sup>when</sup> ~~in~~ cryptographic systems security

questioned ~~that~~  
is/~~special~~ and the people that are usually turned to are the experts ~~in the~~ who

devised this system \_\_\_\_\_ and their <sup>that</sup> motivated by ~~the~~ <sup>sort of 2</sup> impulses which

add up <sup>thrust</sup> ~~and don't think~~ and the first is that they because ~~it would back down~~ of their background,

their training, and their understanding of the situation think this is a good

system and it's the best they could produce which they did in all honesty,

and therefore they don't understand why it isn't good and second ~~you know~~ even if they

question  
~~just~~ \_\_\_\_\_ ~~to~~ the system or if they <sup>felt</sup> ~~said~~ it was insecure, <sup>or</sup> had

their own doubts about it <sup>they</sup> ~~it~~ would be most reluctant to admit their failure

because it <sup>could</sup> ~~destroy~~ the <sup>in</sup> professional standing and so you will find I think a

sort of reluctance sort of a natural human trait in the cryptographic masters

of foreign nations to adopt <sup>new</sup> ~~these~~ systems because they are afraid it will

destroy the <sup>in</sup> professional standing or they don't understand enough about the

weaknesses of the system that they've endorsed to be  
 suspicious of it. ( I think this is the case of David ~~Bowman~~ <sup>Edwin</sup> in the  
 State Department around 1930.) He just, one, had such a limited understanding  
 of cryptology <sup>because</sup> ~~from the~~ <sup>sense</sup> that to be a good cryptographer you've got to  
 know both sides of the coin that is what makes a good system and what makes a  
~~great~~ <sup>to produce</sup> system and how to join the two a proper cipher. I don't think  
 his depth in that <sup>was</sup> ~~is~~ respect <sup>is</sup> very great ~~that~~ and, second, he just couldn't afford ~~that~~ to change the  
 system because <sup>it</sup> ~~he~~ would have admitted that he had made an <sup>(error)?</sup> error decision that

was wrong

Valaki

Q: Giving a lot of information low - level information on cryptanalysis  
 to some of the people in third party intercept third party practice. I was  
 just wondering what do you think it would do to the cryptanalytic ~~expertise~~ expertise  
 in the country in those countries. Are we giving them a leg up that we shouldn't  
 be giving them?

A: I don't know, don't really know because <sup>is</sup> the world is a real <sup>complex</sup> situation we have

now and there <sup>sc</sup>certainly are two parts. I don't think we should go too far

in the release of information but if we're going to use these people we <sup>got</sup> have

to tell them enough about the problem so that we can take advantage of their

geographical location and their skills because our manpower requirements <sup>can</sup> just

never be met if we try to do this all ourself. We learned this years ago.

One of the reasons we went <sup>[</sup>into third party arrangements was to multiply our

intercept capabilities for that very precious geography which we don't enjoy.

Now part of the price we pay is for selected third party nations that we can

trust and look like long term friendly people. It's to share information with

them but we got very carefully to screen that information and release it in such

a way <sup>→ that</sup> well for example if we're reading the traffic of the country we're

collaborating with we certainly don't want to dry that up. Well now you just

can't have your cake and eat it so you <sup>got</sup> have to make the choice between whether

you deny yourself intelligence about that country <sup>]</sup> or help get them to help <sup>to you</sup>

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*the kind of job that*  
 to do ~~you~~ you need to have done, and each case has to be decided on its own  
 merits. I think we're getting way over our heads here if I try to go further  
 than that ~~to~~ <sup>in</sup> answer <sup>ing</sup> your question because you got to examine each one on a  
 its own merits and I've had to be involved in several of these examinations  
 and it gets to be a very complicated problem and the one complicating factor  
 that I'll sort of drag <sup>out</sup> as something to be on the watch for <sup>---</sup> that the intelligence  
 analyst, the people in the intelligence game whose bread and butter is derived  
 from the intelligence produced through NSA's activities on that country are  
 going to be deadset against cutting off that flow of information and usually  
 they are the ones who cast the deciding vote and it this isn't necessary <sup>ily</sup> the  
 whether ~~is that~~ <sup>deciding</sup> ~~to place~~ where the vote should be cast and that is my word of caution.

Valaki

Q: Why did Friedman select mathematicians settle on mathematicians rather than any  
 other batch of people?

A: That was for the selection of the first group and the fallout of the Yardley

~~that~~  
funds and if I can talk about the \$10,000 was available to the Signal Corps for

hiring junior cryptanalysts. Well I think the answer to that is fairly obvious

~~it while it~~  
to me because I saw ~~what~~ was happening. Friedman had just was still in the

still was just very soon after Friedman had been so successful against the

~~ern~~  
Heb~~ron~~ machine and solved the challenge that the navy had produced. Now if

you'll look at that writeup you will find that the key to Friedman's success

was basically a statistical~~s~~ advantage that he had developed. Now he was

convinced from that experience working with against the Heb~~ron~~ <sup>ern</sup> machine that

mathematicians who could understand statistical things and statistical principles

~~and laws~~  
~~as well~~ might turn out to be better cryptanalysts for that kind of a problem, mainly a  
machine problem, ~~or~~

related machine problems than people who didn't have the background. He was

simply taking advantage of their schooling and their training in college, ~~or~~ wherever

they may have been trained to forward their preparation for their cryptanalytic

training. I think it was that simple. Now most of us who followed on after

<sup>ed</sup>Friedman sort of observed that yes this was a pretty good thing that he did because he was looking for somebody who had statistical training as part of his background and <sup>that</sup> since it worked for Friedman it ought to work for us and then pretty soon we kind of lost sight of the fact that Friedman had a very pragmatic basis for this conclusion and we sort of generalized it maybe too freely and <sup>that</sup> said "Oh yes we will deal with mathematicians and look for mathematicians first" but I go back in my mind and I can think of a Greek scholar who turned out to be one of our most <sup>brilliant</sup> cryptanalysts and I can think of some mathematicians that I wished to God I'd never seen.

Q:  
Valaki

<sup>what</sup> Who has given us the impetus to improve our systems from the outside and to  
conduct (?) our own self-examination. Did the defection of M&M also spur us on to look at our systems again?

A: Probably not. There may have been a little impulse in that direction but the M&M didn't have much contact with our own crypto systems. They were more or less

involved <sup>in</sup> with the Prod aspects of the thing. I think there <sup>was</sup> ~~were~~ some overtones

of the CSEC operation there. We looked into it but I don't remember at the time

that we looked into that we found <sup>exposure</sup> exposure to our current systems was anything

to worry about and anyhow sort of as a background to this one of the concepts

we had in mind when we laid out our cryptosystems was that they could survive

~~that~~, such a circumstance so I think all that needed to be done was to ~~know~~ <sup>note with</sup>

<sup>interest that</sup> ~~within us whether~~ Martin & Mitchell had been exposed to certain CSEC things and

to make sure that these had been appropriately changed <sup>either</sup> due to the timeframe

in which they'd been exposed or because they were now now in the state of

defection and then I think there was some effort made to look at what might

have been <sup>but</sup> compromised in CSEC ~~and~~ I think my recollection is that we came to

the conclusion there wasn't anything there that was earthshaking, distressing

or course, <sup>but</sup> there were many more important distressing things associated with

the Martin & Mitchell defection than what they carried over in CSEC. I think

we were mainly concerned about the effect it would have on other nations.

I know we sat waiting for the other shoe to fall for a long time and I don't

recall much effect that we observed. I think if it had been anything real

startling it would have surfaced but it was more or less business as usual in

terms of the coderooms of other nations. <sup>Now</sup> Our impetus to improve systems is

not a reaction to something that happens in real time. It's more an instinct

of preservation and its been built up during the years going back to some of

the things I've referred like the Fellers incident, the 228, we have learned

some lessons that have been so deeply impressed on us by circumstances

of the historical situation in which we found ourselves that we have subconsciously

assumed a certain instinctive reaction that we <sup>per</sup>form when we prepare ~~an initial~~ <sup>and issue a</sup>

system. Now as I saw it from my experience in where I sat in the last few

years we had a good strong instinct in regard to the construction of the system.

How long we let it stay in effect, the physical security surrounding it which

we had very little control over <sup>but</sup> we could lay down certain rules you see and have inspectors <sup>to</sup> go out and look about the installations and see what whether they were being conducted in accordance with the best practices and most important to sort of keep track of how much a system was ~~being~~ used so that it didn't get overloaded and thereby result in a compromise of some sort because it hadn't been used properly - it had been used too much. Now these are sort of SOP I think in making your cryptographic decisions. Some of the things that I bumped into that hadn't fallen into our instinctive apparatus

kind of

were the more modern sophisticated <sup>u</sup> things like spurious radiation and stuff

like that if it means anything to you and these had to be taken into account,

[ I think particularly <sup>in</sup> Moscow and usually though when we sent a system to be used where it might be compromised lets say <sup>in</sup> a communist nation or something like that we made sure that this was a special use system and that it wasn't universally used so that the traffic lets say from London to Washington if you

can imagine that oversimplified situation could not be compromised if the Moscow  
to Washington link had been physically penetrated by the Russians, a second  
story job had been done on that.

Tape 4, Side 2

Your question about the special advantages of the Madam X the relay type of

Bombe over the mechanical type of Bombe which the British and the navy employed,

The U.S. Army uniquely employing the relay type which we called the Madam X

and other Bombes being more or less the navy being updated version of the

British mechanical Bombe. Well the Arlington Hall Madam X type of Bombe had

an advantage over the navy and the British type of Bombe in that it was

particularly useful for finding the setting of wheels in a message in which

the indicator was unknown and one of the messages dealing with the Battle of

the Bulge which contained the key information had lost its indicator and the

crux of the message as I recall and this is probably an oversimplified

and maybe too well recollected circumstance but one one part of the message

which revealed the point the whole point of the Battle of the Bulge ~~was~~ in as

well as the geographical location was intercepted but could not be decoded by

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*the* Bletchley Park outfit because they didn't have the indicator. Well it was not recognized in the watch office at that time that this message was of such importance so it got so ~~shredded~~ <sup>scrambled</sup> up and transmitted to Arlington Hall where we ran the dud-bust operation on the unknown messages because there were quite a few of them and when it was broken and sent back it was the particular message that the intelligence analysts had been looking for which was a missing part evidently and they were looking for ~~an~~ <sup>the</sup> answer to it and when it came why then the whole picture of the Battle of the Bulge began to emerge as it could be deduced from the Enigma traffic but at that time it was too late to anticipate the what the Germans were up to so the Battle of the Bulge was already under way and the golden opportunity was missed because the indicator had been missed by an intercept operator and we sort in retrospect having looked at the advantage of the Arlington Hall dud-buster as I like to call Madam X now as opposed to a Bombe, we learned through the rest of the war that we could make a better use

---

of the dud-buster aspects of Madam X <sup>a</sup> then to use it as a straight Bombe and we

concentrated on it from that point on out so that we were able to provide <sup>I think</sup> a

very valuable adjunct to the British Bronze Goddess operation ~~in~~ that

Winterbot <sup>ham</sup> ~~son~~ brags about. Now this is I'm generalizing. I haven't thought

enough about it to give the details but this I remember. I know we talked

about we just if they had just got that sooner we may have saved a tremendous

amount ~~of~~ of lives. It's a scary business we're in, particularly in wartime

because you know that just little shade of difference in judgment can mean a

difference between losing a battle and winning a battle.

Q: Did the British know that our analog was much more sophisticated than theirs?

A: Are you recording? Did you get that question? I would like to change your

question a little bit. The British realized the peculiar advantages <sup>which</sup> the

<sup>type of</sup> Madam X construction afforded in terms of the dud-buster aspect for example but

our Bombe was not as fast as the British. I mean we could run a three wheel

Enigma setup as effectively as the British could and dredge it out but it would

take us longer<sup>^</sup> the relay operation was slower than the mechanical operation.

I think it was I don't remember the factors but <sup>there</sup> it was an appreciable advantage

in time that the mechanical Bombe had over the relay operated and we had

gone to the trouble<sup>or</sup> at least the engineers and the telephone people who had

put the Madam X together had gone to the trouble of selecting the relays and

sort of speeding up their operation and <sup>they operated them</sup> ~~operating~~ much faster than they normally

would operate in terms of telephone requirement because we wanted to shorten the

running time as much as we could but there <sup>was</sup> ~~is~~ a limit as to how much you could

speed these things up and Sam Williams who was one of Bell's greatest relay

experts lived <sup>with</sup> ~~at~~ that installation until it had served its usefulness. He

just kept right on top of it. Actually I don't think we were justified as I

look back in time to make a judgment. I don't think we were justified in

building the Madam X because it certainly wasn't <sup>as efficient</sup> ~~sufficient~~ as a mechanical

Bombe. I think the navy made a wiser decision but sometimes it is better to

be stupid than smart because we would have lost the advantage of the dud-buster

and I think it was worthwhile to have a dudbuster even though it cost a good

million bucks and it would have more than paid for itself if we'd if circum-

stances <sup>had</sup> permitted us to fill in this gap in the Battle of the Bulge message.

I mean and there may have been other cases which well you notice the Battle of

the Bulge because you lost, you pay attention to it but there may have been ten

or fifteen other cases where the dud-buster advantage would be as significant

as that message which we lost.

Q: <sup>Certainly</sup> ~~So it~~ would have been advantageous had the British had that advantage on their system.

A: And had we realized it sooner, but you see it was mechanically impossible

because the nature of the to do this kind of a thing the way the British

machine was designed and the way in which <sup>all</sup> you always had to have a good probable

word to crib before you could line up the message. Well now the dud-buster

aspect of Madam X didn't require crib. It used other things. I don't ~~imagine~~

*remember*

now just what they were, <sup>but</sup> Dale Marston could tell you. Leo Rosen. Matter of

fact out of this concept that the  Madam X Rosen designed and put together a

beautiful cryptanalytic device which was mainly relays which was in effect <sup>it was</sup> a

<sup>Hagelin</sup> dud-buster for the ~~Hamlet~~ system so he could locate the Hagelin wheels, just

run the thing and it gave <sup>you</sup> a statistical index. A sort of IC and this is what

we used whenever we came to <sup>the</sup> a point of reading the messages about the Japanese

surrender. This device was useful in reading one of the legs of the information

travel order. To clarify this last point a little bit the surrender message

was since the Japanese couldn't communicate with us directly they had to send the  
surrender

the what we call the surrender message that is their announcement they were

ready to negotiate an unconditional surrender to some mutual party like the Swiss.

The Swiss in fact are the ones they selected so the message went from Tokyo to

Berne. The Japanese Ambassador in Berne and <sup>then</sup> it was decoded there, taken over

to the Swiss foreign officer and then sent from Switzerland, Berne, to the Swiss

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who delivered it  
 Ambassador in Washington and then to the U.S. authorities. I've told you this

story, haven't I?

(Not in that detail)

Well this <sup>is</sup> interesting historically. Well here is what happened. In we knew the

message was coming because we'd been reading the traffic but we hadn't seen

the message so we ~~sent out~~ <sup>set up</sup> a special intercept services. In San Francisco we

had

~~XXXXXX~~ a landline into one of the wings at Arlington Hall <sup>Station</sup> and when that message

came over the air we had a good copy. I don't I think it was San Francisco but  
 anyhow from an intercept station we had a line running to Arlington Hall Station

and I think it was San Francisco. It may have been Monmouth or some other place

or it may have been Fort Hunt, but there the message was being typed out on the

teletype. We were all set up for it so when the message got on the air and its

of course it  
 first transmission <sup>was</sup> to get to Berne and I think it had to take two steps maybe

somewhere in the Indies, the East Indies and then on over to Berne before it could

be received because <sup>f</sup> the radio transmission situation at that time, <sup>atmospheric</sup> ~~kind of scare~~

conditions, so we knew when that message went on the air and we also knew from

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the pilot messages <sup>that</sup> it was going to be in the Japanese code that they used for

such things which we called LA, <sup>code</sup> for L.A. LA is a diagraph <sup>that identified the</sup> ~~for their own private~~

code. Now there was a young girl down here in Virginia or West Virginia

somewhere who <sup>had</sup> worked on that code and loved to work on it and she had memorized

the code and we put her at a table right next to the teletype and when the <sup>t</sup>

message came in this young lady looked at ~~it~~ it and wrote down the plaintext

just as almost in the realtime it was being typed out and then it was one of

<sup>Reischauer's</sup>  
Ed Rishour's boys who was on the telephone calling over to G2 talking into a

talking to a stenographer who was producing a typed copy on that end you know

from what he had read to her on the phone so that when before the message was

received for by the first jaw the information was in the hands of G2. Now

this is really really fast operation. We didn't do this for every message

but we did it for the surrender message and of course the President was vitally

interested in this thing and word got to him as quick as they got a clean copy

from right there but we were a little distressed because there were some garbles

that came in I mean it wasn't a full transmission so they had to when the

message got down to Berne <sup>and</sup> the Japanese received it <sup>and</sup> ~~in~~ <sup>d</sup> decode <sup>it</sup> which was not in

the same time frame. I mean it was a long time. The message got there. They

had to ask for a retransmission and then we had to wait until the message was

delivered to the Swiss foreign office by the Japanese <sup>amb...</sup> messenger boy, ~~for~~ the

Ambassador, and then they had to decide what to do with it, encode it and send

it to Washington. Well we intercepted that message and we broke, <sup>[</sup> we were

reading <sup>the</sup> Swiss code at that time, <sup>ed</sup> so we check <sup>ed</sup> the message being sent through

the Swiss diplomatic system against <sup>]</sup> the Japanese version that ~~was~~ <sup>we had</sup> intercepted

out of Tokyo and let that word get over to G2 and confirm the transmission.

Well this of course started long after lunch and went on until well close to

dinner time because it takes time to do all these things except from our

standpoint we were right there <sup>the minute it</sup> ~~we~~ got on the air from Tokyo. That's all we

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wanted.

(Could have told the Swiss not to bother.) (laughter) (We already have it, thank

you).

This would have been wonderful. That reminds me of something <sup>that</sup> happened.

Of course to wind up the thing it was along about 6:30 <sup>or</sup> ~~7:00~~ <sup>o'clock</sup> when we got the

you know that <sup>it</sup> had <sup>been</sup> ~~in order to~~ deliver to the Swiss Embassy here in Washington and then

<sup>sort of</sup> those of us who had been <sup>^</sup>worried about this thing, I went home because I

wanted to see what was going to happen on the radio, you see. I wanted to

get away from that place. I knew the war was over and so I went on home and

sat there, <sup>and</sup> didn't go to dinner. My wife said "Why don't you come on and eat?"

I said "I'm tired. I want to listen to the radio a while."

"Well, I'm going to take the kids and we'll eat."

And I sat there you know just anxious as all get out waiting for that radio

report to come through telling us what was happening officially and it finally

came through and now I could say to my wife "Did you hear that radio report?"

(laughter) There is a little bit of a sort of a incidental situation. B4 was

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the Japanese translator who and some how or other the word got out in B4 this

message came through in English if the IA I think it was English anyhow it came

through. Well now every God damn translator in B4 began ~~honking~~ <sup>hunkering</sup> and hovering

over that little girl who was doing the best she could to decode this message

and I walked down. I had sense enough to stay away from the place. I mean I

didn't want to bother her. She was down there doing her ~~best~~ <sup>business</sup>. All I could do

<sup>to</sup> help her and the best way I could help her was to leave her alone and when

I saw this gang coming down there I just put on my Colonel's bars or whatever

you wear when you're a Colonel and I told to get the hell out of there, ~~they~~

were going to break the floor through and leave her alone. And then I got

scared and I went down to see Dink Hayes who was running the \_\_\_\_\_

and I said "Look now you know this is more excitement than we've had for years

What are <sup>we</sup> ~~you~~ going to do about it?" and he goes "Well" we better do

<sup>We</sup> something. What can we do?" and I said "Just go and remind them". and he said  
^

-x 16 193

"Well you better get out there and remind them, Frank." He says "I'll do some and you do the others" so we got to Kully and the three of us went around and announced to people "Yes, we've received the surrender message and yes, the war was over but for God's sake don't go home and brag about it. Go home business as usual. Please don't give away these secrets because we don't know how valuable it could be for us to continue this information and just go home and be surprised like everybody else when you <sup>get</sup> ~~hear~~ the news over the radio.

And I think that was wise. I think <sup>we were</sup> ~~he was~~ very thoughtful in doing that. Big moments in your life? <sup>of course,</sup> ~~That's~~ the biggest moment when Hank GRAFF called me on the telephone and said "Colonel, cut it." That was a wonderful thing. I'm sorry I'm wandering off.

Q: *Goodman* That's all right. The L.A. code goes back quite a ways doesn't it? You all had done some work on that from Yardley's stuff.

A: Well what had happened is they used a version of the L.A. code in Yardley's time and then they evidently updated it. It was a utility code. It wasn't

a secrecy code.

Goodman

Q: You <sup>told</sup> ~~were telling~~ me once before that the L.A. code was one of the first things you all had looked at in the vault.

A: Yeah that was a little bit about that if you'd like. What happened is Kully and

<sup>was doing</sup>  
Hurt see I was compiling the codes and Abe I think he was doing correspondence

courses and so Kully got fingered to work with Hurt in getting this make the

first move into the Japanese stuff. They picked out some messages and Kully

would decode them <sup>you see</sup> and then he'd hand the decodes to Hurt who would look at them

and Hurt had a batch of traffic in the L.A. indicator and it didn't quite make

sense but he kept saying "This almost reads. It's just <sup>it's just</sup> beyond me. I can't

make sense out of it." and then finally his cryptanalytic training came to the

front and he began to change groups and I can remember it was a real exciting

time because Hurt got so excited himself that it was contagious and he ~~said~~ <sup>says</sup>

"Look they changed the code." and Kully said "They couldn't have changed the

code." and Hurt <sup>he says</sup> says "It almost reads and if I make this an RU instead of an

? N

MU he says it makes a good word. So he and Kully pretty soon ~~it~~ solved, worked

out the variations that had been introduced by the Japanese cryptographers. Oh

it took them I think a day to clean up the thing. It wasn't too much of a job

and this was very useful because it encouraged us to dig deeper into the traffic

because we felt like the changes that had been made weren't going to be so

significant that we couldn't bridge the gap from what Yardley had done to what

we wanted to do and that's in fact what happened.

Q:  
Valaki

How did you start working on traffic. Did you have big tables and sort it out

in piles? Did you take a little bit at a time and look at it and wonder what

to do? Did you know how to cope with quantities of traffic because there were

little exercise books you know in a little book all the systems are the

kind that <sup>can</sup> really solve one at a time or taking two at a time. They don't really

require massive material <sup>and</sup> organizing massive material to get into them so you

were confronted with quite another situation. How did you manage?

~~How did you manage?~~

9-196

A: <sup>let me</sup> Well ~~I can~~ tell you what we did and you can produce the answer to your question.

As I recollect we we had sort of two phases to this. One <sup>was</sup> ~~is~~ to look over the material that Yardley's group had been working with and which was down in the vault so we started out with that. Sort of in the same time frame but separately

we had the current material which was coming in in dribbles. We didn't have any cable intercept at that time, <sup>it was Second</sup> mostly ~~See~~ Sig [Second Signal Company] produced

material, <sup>and</sup> We'd been looking over this current stuff that come in <sup>of course</sup> ~~because~~ we

sorted out the Japanese and everything else and <sup>we</sup> ~~put~~ the Japanese in one pile.

We could do this very easily because it was either addressed to Kochi or

GAIMUDAIJIN  
~~Guy Nu~~ <sup>Duy</sup> Jen and signed with the Ambassador's name Kochi Washington

GAIMUDAIJIN  
~~Guy Nu~~ <sup>Duy</sup> Jen Tokyo and that was easy. Most of it was numerical traffic

as I recollect in the Japanese diplomatic stuff. So we had a big \_\_\_\_\_

of the navy we had a <sup>half a</sup> ~~big~~ file drawer of stuff. It wasn't too much. See there

Q: wasn't much interest.

Q: This is the current stuff you mean?

A: Yes this was the current stuff. This latter and Abe and I were pretty much

200-197

spare timing this batch while Kully and Johnny were dealing with the Yardley material. And some of it well the two general categories that I remember now that come to my mind as I look back were those that were divided evenly into five letter groups consistently in five letter groups and those that had groups of varying length, ~~that go~~ anywhere from usually 8, 15 or 20 letters. And then there was a batch of Japanese plaintext and these were the three piles we sorted into. The stuff with varying group lengths we put over in <sup>a</sup> ~~the~~ pile and said we'll look at that later because it doesn't look like any of <sup>the things</sup> ~~^~~ we found in Yardley's place and then let's <sup>then</sup> ~~s~~ see if any of this current material matches, can be worked with the Yardley's systems and so that's when we began to try the old code charts ~~recovered~~ by Yardley against these messages. That's what Kully and Hurt was doing with the current stuff because there was no point in working any longer on the Yardley stuff because most of it had already been <sup>^</sup> ~~^~~ coded and processed. It was just a familization <sup>ari</sup> thing with that but ~~to~~ test the codes



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ability as a Japanese translator allowed him to make the translations immediately of the contents of the message. Of course the LA code at that time and later on as we ascertained was being used for administrative matters which were pretty trivial so far as the information and intelligence was concerned and so there was no world shaking translations produced from this simple code breakthrough. Now after we had been able then to subtract the <sup>quote</sup> LA code from the other systems we began then to subdivide the remaining traffic into categories based on the external characteristics of the message which now became meaningful to us because as we looked at the LA decodes we could understand something about the way they numbered messages, the format, the plain language and we looked for the same <sup>kind of</sup> things that Yardley <sup>had</sup> discovered when his group was decoding these messages and then of course we pretty soon packaged up the replacement systems which was carrying the better information that Yardley had been able to produce such as that ~~was~~ for the naval conference held in Washington. They had

evidently changed their codes and this would not of course be surprising

to you or <sup>was it</sup> surprising to us, so we had then had identified what we were going

to work on as our first problem, one of these unsolved messages, and then we

tried to put them together, packages or sections of them together which would

insure that we were working on one system and not a multitude of systems and

we'd look for repetitions and simple evidence like that and pretty soon we

began to build up a body of traffic that we felt was homogeneous, one system,

and later on we were able to break into this. Of course it wasn't the sort of

"identify it today and read it tomorrow". It took us several weeks of poking

around trying to find out what was the best system. We couldn't couldn't proceed

like Yardley's group had done with their indexing because he and his people had

organized their a group working on Japanese into clerks and translators and

codebreakers and we were clerks and translators and codebreakers all in one with

only one very proficient translator and that was Hurt and we had to devise some

203 201

way <sup>of</sup> ~~to~~ making our catalogs for the bookbreaking operation because it was unenciphered code so that we could achieve the end that Yardley's catalogers had achieved, <sup>namely</sup> ~~mainly~~ the location of the group, groups in front, groups in back, and then work out the numbers and dates and more frequent Japanese language groups and this was pretty slow process. A lot of cut and try and finally we developed a technique, <sup>and</sup> <sub>^</sub> we began following it and we began to get results. Now

I think I answered all your questions.

End of Tape 4, Side 2

Tape 5, Side 1

Q: Do you recall any contact that you had with with Fabyan and Riverbank in the  
 Goodman  
 30 's?

A: I can't recall any contact with Fabyan. I rather suspect I met him once but  
 I wouldn't swear to it. The role of secrecy which we had to satisfy in respect  
 with our purpose, ~~with~~ <sup>namely</sup> eventually to become the cryptologic organization of the  
 Signal Corp or <sup>the</sup> War Department and the proper fear that any exposure of our  
 activity might <sup>cause it to</sup> ~~of course~~ be killed off. I think precluded Fabyan's being  
 introduced <sup>to us</sup> because ~~I think~~ he would have immediately identified this and he  
 was notoriously a man who liked to make noises and I doubt I really doubt that  
 we met him but I may have, but it was a long time ago and if I did it was  
 probably <sup>in</sup> 1930 and not later so I'd say there was no contact with Fabyan and if  
 there was any contact it was sort of incidental and would have been handled in  
 a very reserve <sup>d</sup> manner.  
 ^

H.S.  
Q: In the 19 in the 1920's with Yardley in New York doing cryptanalysis what was the Signal Corp doing in the 20's and specifically what was Mr. Friedman doing in the 20's?

DoS  
A: Yardley in his effort, the one up in New York city, was aimed at the production of intelligence in support of <sup>the</sup> G2 well ( the State Department requirements and incidentally in support of G2 because State Department was funding Yardley's organization with a sort of token contribution of I think it was 10 grand, <sup>that</sup> G2 provided, the War Department code program I mean the program of cryptography <sup>now</sup> as opposed to cryptanalysis or COMINT in our present day nomenclature, <sup>that</sup> Yardley was doing, the COMSEC activity was in the War Department and it was divided into two packages as and I think ~~that~~ I'm reasonably correct on this, the Chief Signal Officer was responsible for the design, the compilation and supervising the use of codes, with <sup>the use</sup> ~~the~~ supervising, <sup>moot</sup> being a very ~~mute~~ question because it was an area for conflict between the Adjutant General and the Chief Signal Officer and the Adjutant General was responsible for the <sup>publication</sup>. Now in the sense

that the Signal Corps would prepare the manuscripts and the AGO (Adjutant General's Office) would do the publication. The AGO also did the storing and distribution, mail room operation that we used to look on the Adjutant General as Post Master of the Army and a very limited concept of their duties. And also the operation of the coderooms and preparation of the message for transmission by the Signal Corps circuits or other means, Signal Corps within the military establishment, other means if they were outside of the military establishments for example to the military attache in London or some other foreign country, the cable would be filed on <sup>a</sup> ~~the~~ commercial circuit but any message from the War Department message center to any <sup>of</sup> ~~of~~ the <sup>Corps</sup> ~~core~~ areas of the three departments would be turned over to the Signal Corps where they would go on the War Department net and then there were certain variations to this rule but messages might be sent by the Chief Signal Officer on landlines, Western Union, to points within the U.S. There was a kind of well it was probably designed

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based on the a previous concept of the roles of the Chief Signal Officer and  
the Adjutant General in terms of the formal ideas <sup>at</sup> that time but when you've  
got it down to the practical concept there was a certain amount of overlapping  
and particularly ~~of~~ this concept of the Chief Signal Officer making sure that  
the codes were properly used but had become a pretty acron<sup>i</sup>omious subject and  
laid the groundwork I think for what happened about the time ~~that~~ we came in  
and that was getting all these responsibilities of the Chief Signal Officer  
including moving the message center and the code storage and distribution program  
from the AG to the Chief Signal Officer. Now I think I might elaborate on that  
a little bit, probably deviating from your question, but I think its important  
to note this. When the decision was taken to form the group, ~~of~~ the SIS, there  
was still the concern about an official ~~edit~~ <sup>edict</sup> from higher <sup>than</sup> ~~in~~ the War Department  
causing it to <sup>have to</sup> be stopped. Now they had to justify the existence of this group  
by and its emergence at that time by <sup>a</sup> ~~the~~ change in the organizational structure

and also the Chief Signal Officer stimulated by Friedman who was aware of the insecurity of our systems was much concerned that and G2 particularly was much concerned that better attention should be given to the <sup>code book</sup> ~~program~~ practices and the use of the systems and with the physical security <sup>measures</sup> ~~major~~s should be improved.

So everything was for putting it <sup>under</sup> ~~on~~ the Chief Signal Officer and there was nothing that the Adjutant General's office could produce except that we'd been doing it for a long time and we think we're perfect and nobody believed that latter statement because they weren't perfect. The people who were sophisticated enough to know were distressed. Col. Albright. He had no words of praise for the Adjutant General's way of doing the thing. I heard him say one time <sup>that it</sup> ~~there~~ was a change that was long overdue and <sup>that</sup> ~~the~~ country would suffer would have suffered tremendously had the change not taken place so there that is sort of the rationale behind it. Now did I answer the rest of the question?

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Q: Uh, how about then from 1921 to 1929 Mr. Friedman was in code construction,  
H.S. compilation.....

A: Yes. I'll give you a little detail on that. I believe that part of his career

is pretty well set forth in David Kahn's book but initially Friedman was hired

as a sort of consultant by the Chief Signal Officer for his expertise on

codes and ciphers. <sup>I think</sup> He had made a reputation for himself up at Riverbank ~~with~~ <sup>by his</sup>

work on the Wheatstone and the Star cipher which was the forerunner of the M94

and I believe that he had done the Vernam <sup>a</sup> system for the AT&T cipher while he

was up at Riverbank and this was so far ahead of anything else that anybody

within the U.S. government had done. <sup>that</sup> The Chief Signal Officer had <sup>got</sup> ~~let~~ Friedman to

come done <sup>wasn't</sup> and he wasn't under Civil Service, it was sort of <sup>an exempted position</sup> ~~excepted service~~

that Friedman <sup>held</sup> ~~had~~ and they gave him a <sup>some</sup> ~~sort of~~ office space and secretarial and

clerical assistance and Friedman then laid out the code program for the Chief

Signal Officer and it was not until sometime after 1930 that Friedman ~~was~~ ever <sup>was</sup>

able to move from this exempted position status on to Civil Service roles you see.

So he was technically an employee of the Chief Signal Officer but organizationally

he was somewhat of a consultant I would imagine. Organizational<sup>ly</sup> in terms of  
^

an administrative concept. Now there was nobody else of that stature in the War

Department so Friedman was pretty much of a one-man operation with one fellow who

was a perfect typist and some secretarial help. Finally, <sup>about</sup> ~~by~~<sub>^</sub> the time we got there

Friedman had a <sup>y</sup> fulltime secretarial~~ist~~ <sup>had</sup> but he <sup>^</sup> lost the clerk who was a veteran and

I think his upper limit was being able to do an accurate job of typing whether the

word was spelled correctly or not he could type it accurately so Friedman didn't

have much help really. All he was doing was on his own and he had no facilities

in support of him except well he had the vault where things <sup>c</sup> would be stored which

was sort of donated by G2. He had access to the message center and things like

that but because of his position he could go over and study what was being done in

the Adjutant General's group that we're dealing with the code production, <sup>well, with</sup> the Adjutant  
^

General's cryptographic responsibilities and because of where he was he <sup>had</sup>

DWS
 developed contact~~s~~ <sup>with</sup> ~~at~~ (the State Department) and contact~~s~~ with the Navy although

the navy was pretty pretty hard nosed about letting anybody outside of a navy

officer get into <sup>spec</sup> code room especially selected personnel assigned Hearts

so I doubt if Friedman's access to the navy <sup>group</sup> ~~room~~ was as free as it should have

been really and I think he had a little better relations with Salman than he did

with the navy group because Salman felt very insecure, at least that was my

estimate when I met him <sup>of</sup> ~~about~~ what he was doing in his position, <sup>but</sup> he was just

overwhelmed by the organizational difficulties that confronted him and his own

lack of sophistication in cryptologic matters. One of the things which I observed

with a great deal of interest was sometime in 1930 we made <sup>the</sup> ~~a~~ physical move of the

DWS
 coderoom from the Adjutant General's building, (the old State) <sup>and Navy</sup> ~~and~~ War <sup>^</sup> Building which

is now up there next to the White House in Washington, down to the Munitions

Building and put it in the corner room in the last third of the wing just across

<sup>from</sup>
~~in~~ the radio operator's position so that the message center was colocated with

the transmission facility. Some rooms had been selected that could be locked, sealed off with a little bit of an entrance area so that people who brought in the ~~mail~~ and picked up the ~~messages~~ <sup>mail</sup> didn't get into the coderoom and <sup>see</sup> what was happening so the coderoom activity was really sealed off and conducted behind closed doors with a little bit of a front office type of arrangement for messages to be ~~dropped and picked up~~ <sup>picked up</sup> and administrative and other matters to be handled <sup>dropped for the</sup> without interference with the coderoom. The coderoom operation itself was pretty simple. It involved the use of the war department telegraph code and the military intelligence code and that's all I remember right now. The none of the messages were encoded. None were enciphered. They were all encoded in this tremendous code and if the message was to the military attache' or in the military attache' system it was I mean all the military war department <sup>network</sup> messages were encoded in the war department telegraph code, the great big code that we used for everything. But a message to a military attache' was encoded in a separate system which I believe at

center  
 the time the message<sup>center</sup> was brought over was MI, military intelligence code, ~~MI~~<sup>MI9</sup>  
 and these messages were always enciphered with a set of encipher tables, 10 tables.  
 Tables 1 and 2 were the reciprocal of each other, tables 3 and 4 likewise, 5 and  
 6, 7-8, 9-10 and so you really had five tables in encipher<sup>ing</sup> and deciphering versions.  
 This was looked on by the Adjutant General as the ultimate in security and if you  
 had to send a message that was really sensitive if there ~~really~~ was such a  
 message in those days it would have gone in the MI10 code if people on the other  
 end had the code. If they didn't it would have gone in the War Department  
 Telegraph Code.

Q: *Goodman* Did the Adjutant General prepare the Military Intelligence Codes or were they  
 being done in-house by \_\_\_\_\_? (2,2)

A: That gives me a question to clarify what I said earlier. The manuscript for  
 the military intelligence No. 10 code would have been prepared by the Chief  
 Signal Officer and the manuscript would have been turned over to the Adjutant

General and from there on it would have been <sup>an</sup> ~~the~~ Adjutant General's responsibility to have the code printed, to store and account for the code, that is to keep it in safe conditions and when it was issued to determine who got the code and if they did in fact receive it and to get <sup>the</sup> <sub>A</sub> periodic reports that the code was in hand and non-compromised. At least that was the affidavit that was required from the holder of the code and to recall and destroy the code you see when it was superseded by the next edition. I believe that the military intelligence code, of cipher tables that I described, the 10 tables, substitution tables, which super-enciphered the code groups prepared in MI9 was prepared in G2 by <sup>the</sup> <sub>A</sub> special section under Friedman's supervision because even at that time G2 wanted to keep its own hand in its own business and I think this grew out of some of the practices that had been developed in WWI so these tables were of course turned over to the AG after they were mimeographed and they were <sup>not</sup> <sub>A</sub> printed and the word is multigraphed and this has a special connotation because in that timeframe there was a

reproducing device with which consisted of a drum with a lot of slots in it and

a supply of <sup>type slugs</sup> ~~tab stops~~ with typewriter face and you composed your whatever you

were going to reproduce on this multigraph device just like you would set type

and run it through <sup>it</sup> ~~press~~ except the type <sup>was</sup> ~~is~~ set ~~up~~ on this drum with a lot of

grooves in it and G2 was responsible for the setting <sup>of</sup> ~~of~~ the type and the running

off of the tables and I think from then on the Adjutant General took over and

handled <sup>them,</sup> ~~it~~, distributed <sup>them,</sup> ~~it~~, counted <sup>them</sup> ~~it~~ and stored them as necessary and of course

there were tables <sup>which</sup> ~~that~~ were used for a given period of time. I think there was

three months and then they had a bunch of emergency tables in case one got lost

or compromised they could <sup>declare the</sup> ~~prepare~~ a table out of date and <sup>introduce</sup> ~~produce~~ the emergency

table and it was up to <sup>G2</sup> ~~the AG~~ and <sup>the AG</sup> ~~to~~ get cracking and produce another one and

get it out to the field. I don't remember whether it was one or two emergencies

~~but~~ I think one of the things we introduced was two emergencies so in case the

emergency was lost we had a backup. Now when the coderoom came over only two

cryptographers came with ~~him~~<sup>it.</sup> These were Benjamin Smith who was just about ready

to retire and a Mr. Williams who ~~was~~<sup>was</sup> also about ready to retire and this was the

carryover of expertise <sup>and practice</sup> from the Adjutant General's office. These two men I got

to know ~~pretty~~<sup>very</sup> well because I ~~got to~~<sup>at</sup> work in the coderoom for two reasons.

(1) As part of our training, our indoctrination, Friedman and the others who were with him thought it was a good idea to have us get some coderoom actual coderoom

practice and of course this was a little bit well here's what happened. Mr.

Williams wanted to go on leave for a month. It was a long way <sup>east</sup> to the Mid West

where he lived and he had for years been taking his summer leave in one slug and

spend <sup>it</sup> with his family. He was either a bachelor or widow <sup>er</sup> and he ~~would~~<sup>went to</sup> see his old

family and <sup>he</sup> spend <sup>take this</sup> his 3 or 4 weeks <sup>of</sup> annual leave out there and since this was his

he just had to go this summer last year <sup>^</sup> because he was preparing for retirement and had to make the arrangements

for where he was going to live because he was tired of Washington. The town was

too big, too busy in 1930 for him to tolerate it so he wanted to get back to

quiet and peace of the Midwest and I got fingered to take his place.

He was doing the night shift. We had day shift, night shift, no swing shift

because there wasn't enough people or enough business to require this so you

were going <sup>around</sup> in about 4:30-5:00<sup>o'clock,</sup>, overlap the day shift, find out what had to be

carried on and then work until the slate was clean, take the messages across the

hall, give them to the chief radio operator who would then take each one of the

packages that you laid out, the one for the Philippines department, Hawaii and

the core<sup>ps</sup> areas and pass them out to the respective operators just like you know

a waitress would serve your meal after you've put your order in for it. That

was the coderoom operation. All the messages had to be typed in regular form ,

standard form, put on the special preprinted pieces of paper which then would

be filed and you always kept a carbon, two, <sup>I think</sup> one or two carbons, it doesn't make

any difference but there was a message center record of these things. It was

pretty business like, <sup>and</sup> pretty efficient. Now it was a wonderful thing <sup>I think</sup> looking

ahead <sup>that</sup> This shift took place because again this helped condition us in our  
concept for the role of monitoring our own systems and see <sup>whether</sup> ~~where~~ they were  
used properly and I think the experience we got from watching the traffic  
pass and actually working in the coderoom, <sup>because</sup> Abe and Kully and I all did this  
except my ability to type <sup>sort of</sup> meant that I got called more frequently for coderoom  
duty than Abe and Kully because they were very good at decoding you see  
because they'd decode the message and pass it over for somebody else for typing  
on the day shift but since neither could type and you were required to type and  
since there was only one guy on at night obviously I got the night shift and I  
enjoyed that because I got to learn a great deal about the kind of people that  
are responsible for the transmission <sup>at</sup> ~~at~~ the radio end of the thing which most  
cryptanalysts never come in contact with today and I also got acquainted with  
the difficulties they encountered, ~~with~~ the kind of problems they had in  
receiving messages and also their special skills and how to take advantage of them.

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And this was extremely <sup>useful</sup> background training because you couldn't get that anywhere else. You never could have got it at Signal School or anywhere else because there it was in real time and you were living with it, and you could begin to sense the weaknesses in the system by observing it in terms of your own specialized training as a cryptanalyst. Now I elaborate on this because I want to emphasize *that* there was no capability for this kind of examination of the use of coderoom practices and radio practices in the earlier years before we actually got involved in participating in <sup>the</sup> coderoom, while it was under the Adjutant General <sup>a</sup> <sub>^</sub> agis, and I think this in a large measure accounts for the sad state of well the non-existence <sup>e</sup> of cryptographic security in the 20's and early 30's, the early 30's because you just don't change practices of this nature overnight so it took us about 3 or 4 years to get the coderoom situation cleaned up and as <sup>a</sup> <sub>^</sub> part of this we had to get some new codes compiled and new cipher tables, <sup>a</sup> <sub>^</sub> variety of things like that. One example of the benefit of this is when we put in some of our new

codes, war department staff codes, war department confidential code, which were

the two Smith ones that went in. The War Department Staff code

would never be used without encipherment and a system was formulated for that.

I won't go into details but I will go into <sup>the</sup> details of the system that was used

for the War Department Confidential Code. Friedman was a great believer in

transposition systems and he thought transposed code would be pretty good. He

thought this would be a good place to try it out, so we prepared and issued

transposition keys to be used for enciphering messages in War Department

Confidential Codes and based on our coderoom experience and how it was used and <sup>by</sup>

going down into the coderoom and looking at the traffic that was prepared, by

this time enough enlisted personnel, <sup>s</sup>ergeants and corporals had been ~~detained~~ <sup>obtained</sup>

to do the work that Mr. Smith and Mr. Williams had been doing. By our examination

of the traffic coming in and going out it became evident to us that the War

Department Confidential Code enciphering system that we had proposed would not

stand up and so I remember getting sort of in an argument with Friedman about this and a challenge resulted in which we took a days' traffic to see if we could solve it and so help me we did and this I think was the first example of where our group, <sup>the</sup> ~~our~~ little group under Friedman, showed (1) the validity of the contention that the Signal Officer ought to be responsible for the review and coderoom practices as well as the compilation, well the actual supervision of the coderoom. I don't mean ~~the~~ review because he still had that. The actual supervision of the coderoom and the application of the cryptographic system just showed the wisdom of bringing that over and putting it close to him because well actually the system fell apart of its own weight because we sent indicators <sup>in the clear</sup> ~~to Heffere~~ which were bonafide code groups and the enciphered text of course was made up of code groups from the same garble table. Well with the indicators in the clear from the code vocabulary you could reconstruct the garble table and then you could determine the limitations placed on each one of the positional elements

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in the five letter code group, so we'd go back to the principles of the ADFGVX

and the ADFGVX research we were doing was coincident in time with this thing

and it just fell apart. Now this I think is worth noting historically because

it shows that the concept that Mauborgne and Hitt, <sup>and</sup> Friedman and Albright and

the others who had been strong supporters of the Signal Intelligence Service

coming into being, it showed they were right and encouraged them to go on and

of course it was a big feather in our hats. Friedman <sup>felt</sup> ~~was~~ a little bit disturbed

about it because he had proposed the system and then his outfit comes in and

destroys it but he went up and very honestly faced up to it and he says "Look

look at what happened. Look at how this group that we have started training

straightened us out here you see. I've proposed this system and they destroyed

it. This is wonderful, sort of." and he took that kind of a pitch which I think

should be noted. He wasn't resentful. He was non-plussed. He was distressed

like I was with the 228 but he faced up to it and said this has got to be

changed and we took it out. Crawford was the officer in charge of the War Plans and Training Group in April of 1930.

*Goodman*

Q: That was David M. Crawford?

A: Major David M. Crawford. He was about five feet eight, yeah. You got it?

About five feet eight, blue eyes, sandy hair, athletic built, athletic build, wore rimless glasses, little bit nearsighted I think and very intense in his conversation and most gracious in his attitude toward young country boys who'd come in to learn to be junior cryptanalysts. He made sure that everybody that came into the office was introduced and with the proper manners, requirements had been satisfied and <sup>that there was</sup> peace and harmony <sup>with</sup> in the office. He was a very outgoing tremendous personality and loved to talk. He was always talking about something. He loved to try out ideas on other people, other people to get their reaction to them and sometimes he would take an adversary position even though he didn't believe in the question to stimulate the other person <sup>to</sup> and argue with him, and <sup>it</sup> he was very good. I remember one case where he and Friedman got in a big argument

over the difference in meaning between adhere and cohere and so Crawford proposed

<sup>the</sup> Friedman <sup>and</sup> ~~that~~ he go poll Abraham Sinkov, Solomon Kullback and Frank Rowlett

to see what was the true meaning of this word (laughter) and we simply confused

them because each one of us had a different concept of what cohere.... Mine I

knew what a coherer was in a radio sense you know. It was a radio detector and

the old radio detector was initially called <sup>a</sup> ~~the~~ coherer because the substance

they used to rectify the radio signal would act would physically pull itself

together when the signal was applied so they called it a coherer you see. Well

Abe and Kully looked on it as <sup>the</sup> ~~a~~ adhere type of principle where cohere you know

two things came together and stuck together and Crawford was trying to get the

finest distinction. I'm elaborating on this because it shows the type of mind

that we had in the Chief Signal Officers staff at that time and he had a tremendous

range of interest, things which not only were meaning of words type but things

related with the military profession and he was an avid reader and he liked to

speculate on world events and things like that and it was really an education to have David Crawford around. He was a first class Signal Corps officer. He was well respected by all up and down the the line and finally became a general and I think in charge of the transatlantic well some of the European communications because he was involved in the SIGSALLY program that is the master voice encipherment system used between the US and across the Atlantic with one installation in London used by Churchill in conversations with the President and there was another used by the War Department I believe in North Africa after the space had been cleared out of the Germans and they had a base in North Africa. And he was involved in that from the standpoint of the Signal Corps management of it and very capably got it installed. <sup>And</sup> He's the one that told me this story once that they'd gone up to see Mr. Roosevelt to see whether ~~he~~ Roosevelt needed an extension up in the White House or just where he did want it. ~~to~~ *when they* presented this to Roosevelt and he said "Well now where is Churchill going to

have his?" and they told him that Churchill was going to have it, right next to his quarters in the underground which was down in the underground in London you see. They'd taken part of the underground and put the Churchill's headquarters and the battle part of the government down there at least those that had to remain in London and then Roosevelt sort of wanted to know can this my end of the thing be put over in the Pentagon? and they said well we can put it right here in the White House if you want it Mr. President, and he said "No, I'd like it in the Pentagon." And they said "Well would it be more convenient for you to have it here?" and he said "Yes it would be. Churchill would be calling me at all odd hours at night and I wouldn't get a good nights sleep but if he knows I have to drive over to the Pentagon to answer it he won't bother me as much." (laughter)

He told me this story. I think this is a little bit of a personality sketch of David Crawford that might be useful for people to keep in mind when they think that somebody had to be Friedman's boss in those days and I haven't seen Crawford's

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

name mentioned as much as it ought to be mentioned. It's important to note that he was there at the point of transition and was most helpful to me as an individual because he was a gracious, ~~and~~ friendly man and I admired him and his granddaughter works in the Agency today. I can give you her name when I get back to Rose Hill if you want it. Might be interesting to talk to her about him.

(Very much so)

Now there are other personalities post 1930 I can talk about but these right now

I can't think of any more. What I'm referring to is <sup>C</sup> Korderman was one, <sup>Bicher</sup> ~~Beecher~~ was another, Harold Hayes <sup>is</sup> ~~was~~ another, Mark <sup>Rhoads</sup> ~~Rhodes~~ <sup>is</sup> ~~was~~ another, Capt Nathaniel Lee Baldwin who was the first man to send a radio signal out of China. He was over during WWI and assigned to the Russian forces in Siberia. He was a very very proficient Chinese language man and he <sup>that</sup> ~~was~~ the man ~~who~~ introduced me to the Chinese character dictionary. I'd never been able to figure out how you would look up a Chinese character if you had a dictionary of Chinese characters and he showed me

how and it was a wonderful revelation to me because it's an amazing thing and a lot of people are curious about that even to this day. And in addition there was a whole variety and you'd have to go down through the roster followed on after these folks, Capt King, Henry O. P. King, William O. Reeder and more. This is a good question. I'm glad you asked it because I think I'm going to fill a gap.

Q: Could you give us <sup>any</sup> ~~any~~ recollections of <sup>significant</sup> any cryptanalytic successes other than the ones we've already talked about previously?

A: Well I've talked at length about what's been done on the Purple and the Red and the Japanese diplomatic systems, J19, the transposed code. We had some mention of Tiltman's success in breaking into the Japanese military attache' cipher where he made the initial penetration once we determined what the system was and we set up a unit to collaborate with the UK and we recovered that and that's the one which we found out (the State Department strip system had been violated) and that was very significant from an intelligence standpoint and we also found <sup>out</sup> a great deal

DoS

about the capabilities of the cryptanalytic organization which we were pitted against, Japanese participation. While it was not a clear crystal clear picture at least it gave us some idea that this kind of thing was going on and a measure of their competence because we didn't quite understand how they'd broken into the strip system and so we gave them credit <sup>maybe</sup> for more than they deserve but that's a little bit different story. I think the main just to review these for a minute and add on some that I haven't already talked a little bit about, Certainly the work done on the Japanese military systems is a chapter a full chapter unto itself and should be people like Kully should be talked about to fill in that gap. I think it would be presumptuous if I tried to talk about the work there. I'd mentioned the GEE in other context and that I think was a terrific cryptanalytic achievement. The principle <sup>al</sup> aspect of it being that we recovered and we learned by experience that we could go behind the use of the system and figure out how the key had been generated. The closest we'd come to

this before<sup>was</sup> in the case of the Japanese system we had predicted the Red keys for months in advance and also we found out that the Purple keys could be predicted so we were going back into solving the code compilation problems rather than the use and as a result of solving the what was happening in the code compilation area we were able more or less automatically<sup>to</sup> routinely to produce decodes of messages because we had generated the same materials in effect that the code compilers Japan in terms of the Red and Purple reuse keys and in terms of the GEE we had provided ourselves with those materials you see so all we had to do was to supply them. I think this was a degree of sophistication that had never been reached. I think we reached it before the British did really and I would say this is one of advances we made over them. The now since we're talking about systems and not techniques we were able to recover the German Floradora that was sort of the second the one time pad was the most secret German code and then the Floradora was to the most secret code like our War Department Confidential code was to our War

Department Secret code. It was sort of regular use and it used the same it used a book of additives. It was a two time additive rather than a one additive sort of. That was a significant piece of work done by Kully and his group. We had been under such pressure to get on with the German and Japanese and Italian that we had not gone deeply enough into the other countries for me to claim that we had made any significant progress outside of the three. The Italian code was pretty straight forward. I don't think there was any, unfortunately for Abe, I don't think there was any real extraordinary challenge in the Italian systems. They were somewhat behind the Germans and the Japanese and of course Kully was extremely fortunate in finding that kind of a challenge in the German problem and of course the main thing about the Japanese is that since they used machines and since the Japanese language <sup>was</sup> ~~is~~ a very fabled one from <sup>the</sup> ~~the~~ cryptanalytic standpoint because of the real remarkable statistical aspect and since the cryptography used by the Japanese sort of progressed step by step at a time instead of taking great leaps

why we sort of lifted the calf when we got up in the morning and when it got to be a full grown bull like in the transposed code we were still able to lift it. We sort of developed our strength along with their advancement and I think these kind of things are the significant ones to mention. I could have overlooked some because its been a long time since I thought about these but now in addition to systems we worked <sup>on</sup> there were three other milestones I think might be examined.

One was Friedman's conviction that we should automate both cryptography and cryptanalysis and the automation in cryptography took the form <sup>of improved</sup> to include cipher machines and the automation in cryptanalysis initially took the form of procuring the IBM equipment, the accounting equipment which he deemed <sup>superior</sup> to Hollerath because it was more flexible and that I think was a tremendous <sup>step</sup> forward which we achieved under Friedman's direction and then the next step was where we modified the accounting equipment to do special purpose things . . . . .

*End of Slide 1*

Tape 5, Side 2

Well, <sup>just</sup> ~~lets~~ go back <sup>^</sup> a little bit. I think the next big step was the development the

modification of the accounting equipment to do special problems like we found in

the Geewhizer <sup>z</sup> ~~^~~ and the great advantage that accrued from this development in terms

of keeping up to date with the Japanese transposed codes and then this set the

stage for some further progress and also for making some mistakes because I

think the navy's cryptanalytic equipment program, the old IC machine exemplified

by the <sup>B</sup> ~~B~~ <sup>bush</sup> variety plus the optical devices the navy had under contract

from the Eastman Kodak Company were aimed at doing the same kind of things but

the trouble with them is they were designed to deal with trivial problems like

matching <sup>alphabets and things</sup> ~~alphabets~~ <sup>^</sup> which no longer were being used in enough quantity to make ~~it~~ them

significant because the type of fractionation system which we had learned to deal

with in terms of the ADFGVX was greatly similar to the type of transposition system

used by the Japanese in their transposed code systems and so we opened up a whole

new domain <sup>as a result of</sup> ~~which resulted in~~ the Japanese going to the transposed codes. If they <sup>d</sup>

stayed on their simpler charts their security would have been about just as good.

We wouldn't have had to work so hard of course nor would we have developed the

strength the cryptanalytic strength that we developed <sup>from</sup> ~~in~~ their introduction to

these new systems. They just simply paced us up the ladder. That's what they

did by their efforts to improve their cryptography and I think we could learn a

lesson from that even with our own systems today and forever and any country

could learn a lesson from that. I think it's the principle that we need to be

aware of as well again its lifting the calf <sup>when it's a</sup> small creature and then if you keep

lifting it and stay <sup>up</sup> with it no matter how big it gets you can still lift it if

you develop the strength <sup>( ? )</sup> of the code. It's that principle. Now beyond that a

lot of things happened more or less well let's see what they are. The improvement

in cipher machines while we may want to separate it out from the cryptanalytic

work really was based on cryptanalysis because we could not have achieved the

security that we attained for ~~the~~ US communications, Army and Navy, and joint

without this thorough grounding in cryptanalytic techniques which enabled us to determine what were bad principles and what were good principles and so we could sort out and determine that this type of a machine was a good one. Now we had again some bad experiences like the 228 story that I told but we grew on that, so even our disasters could be turned to advantage. Probably the biggest step forward in cryptography at least from my viewpoint <sup>hat</sup> we achieved was our realization that we had to go to the one-time tape principle which again gives you the total security

*that* you require and that had one weakness which we were distressed by until somebody

If you came up with a simple answer. Use the same tape twice the message is <sup>vulnerable,</sup> ~~laudable~~

so I think Rosen invented the tape splitter. Once the tape went through the head

the key tape went through the head it was destroyed. Well this distressed the

code clerks and <sup>the</sup> communicators because they wanted well it meant <sup>hat</sup> if there was a

break on the other end you had to use <sup>a new</sup> ~~another~~ key tape and they didn't want to do

that. That was inefficient. You had to have another transmission. You couldn't

go back and use the old transmission. Well we just decided that yes we will spend that effort and we destroyed the tape after it went through the tape head and

that's the only way you could avoid the <sup>depth,</sup> ~~death~~, and once we crossed that psycholog-

ical accepted that concept psychologically, <sup>that</sup> there could be no reuse of the tape *1/2*

I think we were in total security, and the only thing to our dis....well which we

had to worry about then was the physical security and later on <sup>u</sup> spurious radiation

which we didn't know about in those days. Now during the war a lot of good things

were done. I think the SIGSALLY was <sup>it</sup> sort of a milestone. I don't believe it was

the greatest thing that came down the pike, <sup>but it was certainly</sup> ~~A~~ new mode in cryptography because

here we were taking the voice signal and enciphering it and ~~I~~ believe SIGSALLY was

<sup>added a</sup> good system and incidentally just about well within the last few months I noted

that the patents <sup>have</sup> ~~had~~ been issued on the basic principles underlying the SIGSALLY

which you might want to look into for your archives. This was in a news release.

I think it was in the Sunday paper somewhere where <sup>they</sup> ~~it~~ talked about inventions and



could save our cryptanalysts a lot <sup>of</sup> effort and I think some of the messages particularly in the South American countries and Spain, Portugal got a great benefit from this section because the diplomats here in America would encode press reports and if we could find the newspaper clipping that they were reporting on then the codebreaker had an exact text to work from and his job was greatly simplified, <sup>so</sup> We were able to multiply then our codebreaker's talents in this particular instance by using a bunch of other skills to support him without these skills having to be trained in the depth that the codebreaker had to be trained so we were dodging the training program that we would have had to employ had we gone ahead and tried to recover the text of the message by brute force but to have the crib in front <sup>of us</sup> was a very useful exercise and I don't believe in any of our discussions <sup>here</sup> that I've had with you I have mentioned the importance of this collateral information <sup>to you (?)</sup> [bit] and while it isn't technical in nature <sup>it</sup> ~~is~~ certainly was a valuable thing from the standpoint of speeding up our production <sup>of</sup> information

in achieving the solution of <sup>difficult</sup> the systems which otherwise might not have been <sup>attained</sup> obtained.

H.S. Q: Could you describe the relationship that <sup>COMINT</sup> Captain Hastings from, the British Colony rep in the U.S., had with the SIS?

A: Yes. I can tell you something about it. This was Capt Eddie Hastings who was on the directorate level at GCHQ and very close to Travis. He came over I think the purpose of his first visit was to take a look at the American activities the Army and <sup>the</sup> Navy in particular and maybe the FBI. I don't know whether he got involved in with the FBI or not but sometime after Dennison, <sup>t</sup> who was the first of the British COMINT types to come over, Hastings came over and went almost through the same course that <sup>t</sup> Dennison had gone through. He spent more time I believe with the navy unit, <sup>the</sup> OP20 G group than he did with the SIS but that probably was because as I recollect he was a captain in the British navy at one time but we showed him roughly what we had showed <sup>t</sup> Dennison and I probably, <sup>maybe</sup> a little bit more because Dennison <sup>t</sup> was pretty tired and a bit of a sick man when he came over and I don't

think he personally enjoyed these liaison trips because he felt uncomfortable and

<sup>the ....</sup>  
distrusted. He was a very friendly guy by nature but he just wasn't cut out to

be to do that kind of a job. [Eddie<sup>by</sup> Eddie Hastings] however was a lot more out-

going than [Dennison<sup>t</sup>] and consequently I think got a little better reception

particularly since we'd found [Dennison<sup>t</sup>] was not a menace but a friend and <sup>then</sup> we

opened the doors at least more cordially, whether they were opened wide or not

for [Hastings]. These are general impressions I can recall of his trip over. He

was played quite a role in terms of the policy actions developed in GCHQ and

probably had as much to say about the liaison arrangements as anybody <sup>else</sup> on the staff

and I'm sure his <sup>the</sup> purpose of his visit was to make an assessment of the

two U.S. units <sup>have to</sup> that they were going to collaborate with and this assessment included

the COMSEC aspects as well as the SIGINT aspects. I think his role was more of

an advisor to Travis and <sup>to</sup> the London SIGINT board or whatever the ~~London~~ board was

at that time because he was a lot less responsive to technical explanations than

than ~~Dennison~~ who was a damn good, a very skilled technician. ~~Hastings~~ was not.

He was more of an administrative <sup>man</sup>. At least this is my impression of him and if

he was a good technical man he certainly concealed it very well. He was we

found <sup>in</sup> him a man easy to deal <sup>with.</sup> Reasonable. When there were points of differences ~~that~~

<sup>came up</sup>

<sup>and</sup> one of the biggest points of differences which I think probably disturbed

the British but which they made no noises about was the U.S. absolute refusal to

reveal anything about a U.S. crypto system. ~~We~~ just that line was drawn for us

that you will not give any information to the British about these things including

our machine cipher. ~~xxxxxx~~

Q: Who made that decision?

A: I don't know whether it was made at the Secretary of War level or not but I know

that both the Chief Signal Officer and the Director of G2 were in complete accord on

this and well for what its worth I thought it was a very prudent decision. I just

didn't feel like that it was called upon us to expose our own crypto techniques

because well just bluntly some of us knew we were going to win the war and we

knew that the British had a good cryptanalytic organization and we knew that if we did win the war they would be on the winning side too and we were inclined to believe that the collaboration might <sup>just</sup> continue after the war and therefore why give them a leg up on entering American communications because at that time we didn't see anything else on the drawing board to replace the systems we were using. We had just reached about the maximum that we could visualize at that time in terms of the state of the art, ~~in~~ efficiency, and we thought well we'll be

using rotor machines, that'll be the big thrust for American cryptography and why tell them some of the more intimate details of it. Now this endured <sup>till</sup> almost the

end of the war. I think it was an accidental exposure of an ~~ABA~~ <sup>ABA</sup> to the British.

Of all the people it was John Tiltman and I think John was very honest about it.

He came and <sup>at</sup> I recollect this if it was John Tiltman he did come and say that he

had seen this and he wasn't supposed to but he wanted us to know about it ,

*Displaying (?)*

*Plain* good personal faith and good GCHQ faith with the Americans

~~TOP SECRET~~

and of course there wasn't anything else except ~~except~~ <sup>to accept I believe it was</sup> it, ~~was~~ John Tiltman that

came and told I believe he told Friedman and me about it. I'm a little hazy on

who the individual was but I know he was a Britisher. On the other hand the British

and Eddie <sup>probably</sup> probably had something to do with this decision, quite freely exposed us

to crypto systems they were using and I rather suspect at the time hoped that we

would relent and reciprocate but we never did and there was one instance though--

~~that~~ I've got to remins<sup>i</sup>ce a little bit about here because its a personal thing.

When I went over the first time the Travis you know told them to show me what I

needed to see and among the things that I was shown <sup>I</sup> was known as being very deeply

involved in COMSEC at the time. As a matter of fact I represented the Signal Corps

on some of the COMSEC discussions that we had in terms of joint combined communi-

cations and how we would meet the combined communications requirements and so I

was recognized as being sort of a COMSEC type. Well the British at that time had

under development an automatic teletype enciphering device and I got shown this

quite by accident, and I found it extremely interesting because it was the only thing that I had seen in the UK that seemed to me like was up to the state of the art. It was a beautiful job and there was no damage done really because it was only a matter of <sup>or</sup> few weeks until they ~~began~~ <sup>were going</sup> to expose it to us anyhow because they wanted to use this device for enciphering COMINT material. It was fast.

I think Winterbotham <sup>and</sup> ~~in~~ his outfit needed something faster than motorcycles.

Travis's remark when he found out about it was "Well why did you have to show it to Rowlett? You couldn't have picked a worse guy if you wanted to keep it a secret" because that was my field (you see in those days). Been worse if it had been

shown to Rosen of course. Now Eddie Hastings continued to be involved in the

policy aspects of our collaboration, both sides, COMSEC and COMINT, probably until

the end of the war <sup>plus</sup> and <sub>n</sub> this happened as we got closer and closer in collaboration

with the British. The policy <sup>lines</sup> <sub>n</sub> were pretty well laid and most of the interchange

was done on the what we always called the technical level if that has any meaning

but there was face eyeball to eyeball technical exchange and that was where most

of my interests ~~lay~~ so I didn't see too much of [Eddie] except at international

conferences, things like that because he sort of moved out of the picture and I

think he was <sup>handling</sup> ~~many~~ other things for Travis because he had come into this as a sort of special assignment quite possibly.

It might be interesting if I remin<sup>i</sup>sced a little bit about my understanding of

how advances were made in cryptology and compare in this discussion the SIGINT

world or the COMINT<sup>world</sup> or the cryptanalytic world with the COMSEC or the cryptographic

world. The I'll have to do this a little bit haphazardly I think because we<sup>ve</sup> got

to jump <sup>from</sup> one to the other and keep the timeframe moving along because this was

a bit like a rail fence. The center of gravity shifted from one side of the

timeline to the other<sup>side</sup> so we'll go into the COMSEC maybe and then into cryptanalysis

but I think the and I will start with 1930. The advance at that time the big advance

was in the field of COMSEC. This is the thing I noted because on the drawing *board*

was Friedman's idea of the M134 and contracts were being let to have this device constructed and it was to be tested out by issuance to the three overseas departments. *By the time it was* had just a few devices built. COMSEC records

can tell you ~~just~~ how many. Now this device and I am going back a little bit,

this device resulted from the work Friedman did on the Hebr<sup>ern</sup>~~on~~ machine which is covered in the technical paper which describes his attack, successful attack, on

the on that machine. Now in this device <sup>4.5</sup> ~~is~~ incorporated the defenses against the

weaknesses which Friedman had discovered in the Hebr<sup>ern</sup>~~on~~ machine. It was basically

a Hebr<sup>ern</sup>~~on~~ device, <sup>a</sup> five-wheel device, and the reason there <sup>were</sup> ~~was~~ five wheels in it is

because there were five holes in the teletype tape and the idea was to issue ten

wheels and they were reversible wheels so in effect you got ten basic wheels and

ten other possibilities so it gave you something factorial ten to factorial twenty

in terms of the wheel selection for a given day's traffic. That was quite a

numerical advantage. The way Friedman had arranged these wheels was to avoid the

sort of simple minded and most fortuitous case of a wheel ~~slipping~~<sup>stepping</sup> against an  
endplate continuously one by one because it was this kind of a an arrangement of  
the selection of that wheel the moving wheel the constantly moving wheel of course  
in the Hebr~~on~~<sup>ern</sup> it was a meter-like motion against an endplate was the thing that  
enabled the statistical evidence to emerge from ~~the~~<sup>the</sup> cipher text and you could determine  
this by making the right kind of frequency count so Friedman recognized this and  
he destroyed that attribute because ~~this~~<sup>his</sup> tape caused the wheel to move erratically  
even though it moved only a step at a time you didn't know when it was going to  
move and that was important and that was enough to smear the statistics in the  
small amount of traffic or counts that you could make from from the traffic intercept  
that was ~~essentially~~<sup>potentially</sup> available so these are the kinds of things that Friedman  
overcame when he began to build his generation of the M134 and we called it T1.  
Now keep in mind that this ~~is~~<sup>was</sup> on the drawing board. Now when we got to work we'd  
go over on the other side of the fence, ~~||~~<sup>||</sup> because we examined we repeated Friedman's

exercise on the Hebr<sup>ern</sup>~~on~~ and then we went into other machines like the Swedish machine, the Damm machine. I believe that's a B211 isn't it? Number just comes to mind right now and we found out a little bit more about that. We as I mentioned earlier had looked at the Enigma the commercial Enigma that Friedman had bought and we looked at a bunch of other things the Kryha is one of them. The strip well the cylindrical cipher device, Type M94, that was more or less an exercise in repeating what Friedman had already done because he had been very successful in obtaining the solution ~~to~~ that and so we began to build up a feeling for machines and how to deal with them and then this set the stage for the real advance and that was when the Hebr<sup>ern</sup>~~on~~ Mark II was developed and the navy sent it over <sup>for</sup> to us to the same kind of a challenge. Friedman had except the machine was so much better we had to have more traffic so that the amount of material we had to work with was greater. I think the conditions were not as difficult as they were in the case of Friedman, because they gave us <sup>the</sup> wheels. What we had to do was identify the wheel

settings because <sup>by</sup> ~~at~~ that time we became aware that mature security consideration was that the enemy would capture the machine with the wheels and the problem was reading <sup>the</sup> back traffic. <sup>^</sup> If you could remedy the situation by issuing new wheels and using the same machine but you couldn't do anything about the traffic that had already been transmitted and intercepted so we postulated that the wheels would be known and I think this was the main difference between our work on the first Hebr<sup>ern</sup>~~on~~ and then <sup>its</sup> ~~this~~ successor. The successor was also designed to avoid the constantly moving wheel being located next to the wrong endplate because I don't remember whether it was plaintext or cipher endplate right now. I could think about it and decide considering what the logic of the attack but the there was no wheel next to an endplate that moved constantly. The constant moving wheel I think there were two wheels which moved constantly and then the other three moved erratically and that was a much better keying principle than we found in the previous model. Now at that point in time I think we advanced a little bit in our cryptanalysis.

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should  
be  
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It may not look so to people who are dealing with the more sophisticated machines today but in those days that little step <sup>was</sup> ~~is~~ measurable because I think we were getting closer to the practical considerations that had to be applied in assessing our own cryptographic security but I think the next step forward and this gave us more confidence than anything else because <sup>sure</sup> ~~we~~ were applying what we had learned to ~~the~~ machines, about machines, to live traffic to produce intelligence and after we got started on the Japanese we finally isolated out the ~~Red~~ <sup>Red</sup> traffic and we got to work on that and when we saw the Red machine, that was a big step forward on the cryptanalytic side because it took the I mean we felt confidence as a result of this because <sup>we</sup> ~~it~~ had been successful and because we'd gone through the veil [cf] secrecy that <sup>the</sup> communications, cryptography that had wrapped up the Japanese message we'd penetrated that, and brought out the underlying device, actually reconstructed it, based on what we had learned in our previous work and what Friedman had taught

us and we just went in and solved the machine without a knowledge of its mechanics or how it operated and we needed that at that point in time because we sort of felt like we had grown up. We can now start drinking and smoking you see with impunity we were grown up cryptanalysts and that was a big step forward. Of course I'm condensing a lot of work into <sup>just</sup> one little package and just pointing at the milestone but it just took a lot of climbing for us to get to that level and then we began to <sup>fold</sup> ~~pull~~ back some of these concepts into our cryptographic world and I think I mentioned this morning <sup>the</sup> transposition encipherment of the War Department Confidential code and how we proved that the this was not a secure system based on our examination of actual materials which had been transmitted and that gave us also confidence because we felt if we could take War Department traffic which we had not, which had <sup>been</sup> honestly prepared in the coderoom and transmitted, this was the real stuff, and we could break it then we were still pretty good you see and I think this is an example of where the product well our cryptanalytic skills caused

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us to move forward in, not the development of new systems but in the rejection of systems <sup>for use</sup> ~~were used~~ within the War Department communications structure and that's just as important as finding new ones. ~~Of course~~ if you reject them all of course you've got to find a new one but if you got a whole bunch and you're using a bad one the sooner you discover and reject it the better is your security and in that context this <sup>is</sup> a step forward. I think the effect was more psychological on us and the Chief Signal Officer and the people in G2 who knew about this than it was a material one but again when we are in the business of using codes and ciphers the psychological element seems to dominate and override the technical considerations because people will continue to use bad systems simply because they don't realize that they are bad or they refuse to admit that they are bad and we of course found out that it was better to admit that they were bad then to continue to use them for whatever reason and that hadn't been recognized by us before and may sound real stupid and foolish as I talk about it but it meant a lot to me

because I was there. I had the attitude. I became converted. I became a Christian

and so I worshipped at a different altar from then on and in that sense it was a

real thing <sup>to</sup> ~~for~~ me. Now probably the next step forward was in the development of

sort of <sup>well!</sup> it was the Friedman's model of the M134 used the tape for the for the

keying element, the motor key that set the wheels forward, to put it in crypto-

graphic terms. Well this is the thing that <sup>distressed</sup> ~~troubled~~ me because I was making the

tapes and it became clear <sup>I think</sup> to all of us who were involved in this thing and of

course somewhat of a disappointment to Friedman because he had hoped that he had

solved the problem but when he found out that we were having all sorts of <sup>trouble</sup> ~~problems~~

with the tape production that was an essential part of <sup>the</sup> use of the M34T1 we had to

devise other techniques for advancing the wheels and that's when we used we we

discovered and accepted the rotor principle as being the generating mechanism or

means for advancing the cipher maze wheel and I think this ~~is~~ <sup>was</sup> probably <sup>the</sup> most

significant step forward in COMSEC at that time because for these reasons. The

navy since we had destroyed their faith in all the Hebr<sup>ern</sup>~~on~~ machines, were seeking a device, <sup>a</sup>mechanical electromechanical device, that would satisfy their fleet requirements and their ship-to-shore and shore-to-shore station requirements.

They didn't have anything <sup>that</sup> to suit them. They had a lot of things on the drawing

board <sup>but</sup> ~~that~~ <sup>at</sup> ~~there~~ just wasn't anything that was good enough for them and they were

dissatisfied with what they had and they were still looking for the ultimate so

there was a hunger on their part. On our part in the army we had the same

requirements that Friedman was trying to satisfy with his M134T1 but we had

rejected the M134T1 because of the tape construction problem and we had to go to

this other means of key generation which was simple and much more desirable

because it avoided storage and issue of a lot of keys and you could have a small

package with same ten wheels you see generat<sup>ed</sup>~~ing~~ both the key and performed

enciphering maze so your keying was simplified and your distribution of materials

was simplified, certainly the physical security problem of storage, <sup>there</sup> <sup>as</sup> <sup>much</sup> <sup>as</sup> <sup>volume</sup>

and about all you had was the maintenance manual and a key list and instruction book and a set of wheels and that was it. Now in the old tape method or additive method you had to have enough additives or tape to satisfy the volume requirements which would be generated on that circuit, well more than enough to satisfy them because you took the optimum and then had a cushion <sup>that</sup> ~~which~~ you chose. Well the two requirements then meant <sup>that</sup> something had to be done and as a result the army and navy joined together. The navy took the quote million dollars unquote quote no year funds unquote they had for cipher machine development that somebody once said Franklin D. Roosevelt had gotten for them when he was Secretary of the Navy and I believe that's true but it needs to be verified. They had the money, and now I'm going to brag, we had the ideas and so we provided them with the ideas, they provided the money, we let a contract, the first contract was navy and the second contract was army, the follow-on contract was army and so the M134, I think it was T3 or T4

ABA  
the ~~ABA~~ or the ECM, lets change our nomenclature now, started to come into being.

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Now I'm talking about this like it was just a matter of a few days but it wasn't.

It was more like several years. Just an observation on this <sup>letter</sup> ~~other~~ point. You

know it was a tremendously fortunate thing that the army and navy both joined

together in the development of the cipher machine in those years because imagine

if the navy had gone ahead with one of their versions and suppose they'd <sup>b</sup> bought a

<sup>or</sup> ~~and~~ modified and improved Hebr<sup>ern</sup> type of machine for naval use and suppose that

the army likewise had gone ahead and developed the M134T4 or <sup>ABA</sup> ~~ABDA~~ then we would

have had two unique machines for use, one in each service. The this would have

been allright in peacetime but <sup>if you can</sup> imagine a wartime situation where joint communications

are certainly required then it would have meant that one service would have had to

accept the other's equipment and that the other service would have had to provide

the equipment and then you could have three systems and the same message might

go in an army system, a navy system and then <sup>the</sup> ~~a~~ joint system and this is crypto-

graphically unsound but fortunately the joining together and using the same device

and the way the machine developed you could achieve new keying or separate keying simply by reordering the wheels or setting out a new set of wheels. The same chassis could be used and all you had was a box of wheels and the keying instruction to effect well you needed three of those. One for the service, the army, one for the navy and then one for joint. Now later on when we got in with the British and this ~~is~~ sort of an incidental advantage of the type of system that we were lucky enough to have was that the type X machine could be simulated

using a special set of wheels <sup>on</sup> ~~in~~ the <sup>ABA</sup> ~~ABBA~~ chassis \_\_\_\_\_

pretty simple. As I recollect one of the solutions which we discussed was instead of having an endplate we just had a reverse set of wheels but anyhow we could use

<sup>ABA</sup> the ~~ABBA~~ chassis and Type X wheels and we didn't have to provide the British

with ~~ABBA~~ <sup>ABA</sup>s, our device, because the ~~ABBA~~ <sup>ABA</sup> chassis and the special wheels we wired

up with the special motion provided a better machine than the Type X itself so

it was a needed improvement on the mechanical version, <sup>the</sup> electromechanical version  
^

of the Type X which the British were struggling along with. Incidentally I've seen some of those in operation and I of course I was conditioned to by American technology and the British cipher machine technology at that time was different, they looked like they were clumsy things to me and not very well engineered but they were reliable and they did get the British through the war. Now the luck was that when Pearl Harbor was hit these <sup>ABAs</sup>~~ABBAs~~ were just coming <sup>off</sup> the assembly line up at IT&T and the first ones which were intended for the ships in the fleet were just ready to be being packaged and sent to Washington. Well you know what happened to the fleet and you know that at that time the army started mobilizing and we needed cipher machines in a hurry so what we did instead of putting the first machines and sending them over to the navy as was our plan, had the war not started, a decision was taken to give the divisions, this is when we used the division level an army communications center <sup>in</sup> at the War Department Headquarters center, the first machines that came off the assembly line and all <sup>we</sup>~~they~~ had to do to modify those machines for army use was

for somebody to take a little bit of a nice cold chisel and a hammer and go down

and knock the nameplates off the <sup>Navy</sup> ECM, the nameplates off, which is a little metal

or plastic thing and the other guy would come back and revved ~~it~~ on the

army nameplates and then instead of the army waiting for the next batch the navy

the next batch of course with the revved up production requirement the navy

was quite willing to take the second batch. Now this was just sheer luck because

we went into the war with a good cipher and we I think found out later on that

it <sup>was</sup> not ever violated <sup>or</sup> ~~or~~ compromised by cryptanalytic purposes. I think the one

that was lost at the Remagen bridgehead gave us a lot of worry but

they found that thing intact. I think it was a pretty lucky thing and I do

believe <sup>this</sup> ~~it~~ was kind of a wonderful corner of the rail fence that I've described

here in terms of the advancement of American cryptography. Now mind you this ~~is~~ <sup>took</sup>

about six or seven years so you can't identify it as a particular piece in time

but it's sort of spread over the years and it involves a lot of things that went

on before.

Q:  
H.S.

the same outgrowth ~~of~~ the 134Q1 except for a different rotor

mechanism.

A; Well we can look on them as generations.

(Right)

End of Tape 5, Side 2

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comparison of advances or really consolidation of advances in the two fields

of  
The one <sup>^</sup> the most significant things that happened was ~~that~~ Friedman's first

efforts to mechanize the business of cryptanalysis. He was aware but not too

familiar with the nature and operation of ~~Hollerath~~ <sup>the Hollerith</sup> system and the IBM system. He

assessed the things accurately. The two initially because of the greater

flexibility of the IBM and he set himself out a course of action aimed at pro-

curring these devices for our to assist us in our cryptanalytic work. He also

had visions that they would be extremely useful in our code compilation program

and since he learned enough about them to establish how they could be used in the

code compilation problem he was very persuasive and finally managed to get a

small unit made available to us so we could do some testing of it. ~~Actually~~ this

<sup>the</sup>  
unit ~~their~~ first efforts were not on machines that were in our area but they

were in other areas and I remember working at nights with equipment that had been

~~SECRET~~

by other  
rented. Well Quartermaster Corps was one and we used to get permission to use  
this equipment on the swing shift when it was sitting idle for our testing  
purposes and so we worked both day and night in those days preparing the  
materials ~~for~~ <sup>in the</sup> daytime and then go in for several hours in the evening, use the  
machines and then come back and sort of make an estimate of what we had achieved  
the night before and ~~work~~ <sup>lay out</sup> our program for the next few days and carry on until  
we <sup>had</sup> completed our assessment program of their advantages and actually tested them  
on the problems, live problems that we had solved and the first thing I think we  
did worthy of mention was we punched a set of cards with the code vocabulary ~~with~~, the  
plaintext vocabulary for a 10,000 group code known as the Division Field Code, and  
the first one we produced <sup>is was</sup> ~~in~~ the training edition. We did this because it had to  
be done outside ~~of~~ the area, <sup>the</sup> controlled area, the vault area <sup>that</sup> we were working in  
and we thought for security purposes we'd go ahead and get the vocabulary punched  
out and then run off the first version and see what we had to do to produce

~~TOP SECRET~~

others. Well this was a terrific thing that happened because once the cards for the plaintext vocabulary, ~~or~~ the 10,000 cards, had been prepared we had a deck of cards and all we had to do then was to get the code groups somehow or other punched on these cards in a random <sup>way</sup> ~~way~~ and or to say more simply scramble the cards, punch the codegroups on them and then <sup>re</sup> sort the cards. You <sup>can</sup> get one version and if you sort it on the plain language it's the encode version, if you sort it on the codegroup it's the decode version. Well I have a suspicion that we scrambled the plain language groups without numbering them to start with and so when we we had put the codegroups on in logical alphabetical order we also had numerical equivalents associated with these literal groups and we ran off then well the process <sup>was</sup> ~~is~~ this. Let me just go step by step. First thing you did was to get a manuscript of the 10,000 plaintext meanings that you wanted to include in the code. The next thing you did is you punched a card for each one of these. The third thing you did was to assign these meanings to your code vocabulary in

~~TOP SECRET~~

some haphazard random <sup>or</sup> otherwise unpredictable order and I think the precise word here is unpredictable because it might be non-random and non-haphazard but the idea was to confuse the cryptanalyst so I think the proper word is unpredictable fashion. Use the <sup>5</sup>value cards through a sorting process to prepare the two versions then forget the codegroups element on the card, rearrange the cards in a logical order and well in a useful order, they don't have to be alphabetical but get the cards set up in such a way that you can control the next step which is the punching of a new series of codegroups on the plain language cards and then through the process of sorting and printing you could produce version, edition No. 2 of the code and then repeat the second process for as many times as the area on the card will permit you and then you can use the same deck of cards for producing several codes and when you run out of space then you wire up the plain language equivalents and reproduce them on another set of cards and if you're *real* smart you will have done this before you messed up the cards with any other

~~TOP SECRET~~

extraneous information on it and I remember what we did essentially was to put together the plaintext vocabulary, then we scrambled it, and put <sup>ack on (?)</sup> on the codegroups in order and then we had to resort on the plain text and since these groups, the plaintext equivalent, sometimes had several I think we set an upper limit <sup>of</sup> somewhere in the 20's maybe 25 as the longest phrase we could put on there. We had to sort over 25 columns and we wondered how stupid we could be after we got involved in that but it was too late to do anything about it because all we had to <sup>do write</sup> number these 10,000 serially in alphabetical order and then you could make five sources instead of 25 well it was really more than 25 because <sup>a</sup> numerical sort is a one run and an alphabetical sort is a two run so 25 times 2 as opposed to 5 times 1 is quite a time factor. Well the little pitfalls like that. I mention <sup>it</sup> that because we were so happy to have these things we sometimes didn't sit down and contemplate just exact <sup>by step</sup> <sub>^</sub> step <sub>^</sub> what we wanted to do. I don't know whether this is too bad or not because we certainly learned a lot of hard ways to do easy things (laughter)

~~TOP SECRET~~

*by* this somewhat thoughtless approach. Well the first code came off and that was a surprise but the real payoff came when edition 2, 3 and 4 came out because it was very little clerical effort. It was purely a mechanical machine operation and printing the sections with the IBM tabulator and the question was can the printing office use this IBM run as a manuscript and when we found out *that* they could the code production problem suddenly took new and less <sup>awesome and</sup> frightening dimensions because a lot of the things we were doing were so time consuming because they had to be done by hand, the machine was doing automatically for us, and we still didn't get away from the final check, cross-check you see, to make that *in* sure <sup>in</sup> somebody <sup>^</sup> manipulating the cards didn't slip or the group was misrepresented.

The final crosssec... crosscheck, encode against the decode, still was necessary and we didn't solve that for quite a while. I don't think we ever satisfactorily solved it because we went on to other things and we got out of *the* code production problem. So the Friedman's adoption, the realization of his dream of mechanizing

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part of the cryptographic cryptologic activity, was proved almost immediately or within a short time period once we got the machines, and the demonstration was so persuasive that he had no trouble in getting the funds for his own installation and we had a very modest one. We had I think two punches, one sorter, one reproducer and one tabulator and as I recollect<sup>--</sup> this may be borne<sup>^</sup> out by some of the documentation<sup>--</sup> that we were forced to order the cheapest printer but IBM didn't have one of the cheaper ones so they provided us with one of the more up to date ones. A simple printer wouldn't do all the things we needed but when Friedman wanted a bigger one I have a feeling that IBM was just doing a good bit of company PR so they gave us <sup>the</sup> a big one because they figured ~~that~~ <sup>that</sup> later on<sup>^</sup> we would buy more and they didn't want to prejudice their rental proposition to us by giving us one that wouldn't be adequate so I think they very cleverly gave us <sup>the</sup> a big one in lieu of <sup>the</sup> a small <sup>er</sup> one. I use big and small in terms of plugboard counters <sup>were</sup> that contained in the machine and some of the

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

refinements that they had built <sup>to</sup> in the newest model so we got the newest model printer for our installation. Well now this opened up <sup>2</sup> new training program, to get a little bit personal here for us, because there was nobody around. We didn't have any clerical force to operate the machine so guess who got the job. Abe, Kully and Rowlett, and Larry Clark came in and then Sammy Snyder came in later on and he sort of specialized in the use of these machines but all three of us got a pretty good indoctrination in the use. We could <sup>wire</sup> ~~work~~ plugboards. We could even use, I could use, the keypunch and I did and I often punched up my own text, made the cards, ran them through and had the whole deal just like a present day computer programmer will run his his whole project. I mention my experience <sup>with it</sup> ~~as~~ because I think it was typical of all three of us. Now what about the use of these machines in cryptanalytic endeavors. I've talked I think enough about what we did in the code production program and I just might add that when it came to developing cipher tables and key tables and things like that the

~~TOP SECRET~~

IBM machine could be utilized in lieu of the hand methods we were using so we got away from a lot of the drudgery that had been bogging us down in our code production program as soon as the machines <sup>came in</sup> Now the lets talk a little bit about ~~the~~ cryptanalytic use of the machines. Probably the first big problem we used them on and I there may have been others but I do remember this one and let me put it this way, when we got <sup>to work</sup> ~~the words~~ on the Red machine, when we <sup>'d</sup> isolated out that batch of traffic and started a full blast attack on it we had our IBM installation and it was freed from its code production program to do whatever was necessary in the analysis of the Red machine and we of course were <sup>kind of</sup> stumbling around and fumbling in the dark because we didn't really <sup>at that time</sup> appreciate the capability <sup>ies</sup> of the machines so it was a learning process for us and I think the work on the Red system where we had to do certain frequency counts and other things to satisfy our statistical problem, helped us <sup>in</sup> appreciate <sup>of</sup> what these machines could do. Now it actually boiled down to this kind of a situation.

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I want to hurry up and put it in this context that while the machines were useful

in working on, <sup>in</sup> our recovery of the Japanese Red machines we <sup>would</sup> still have done

<sup>without them,</sup> it <sub>^</sub>so they weren't critical, they were only useful and it wouldn't be fair to

say if we hadn't had the accounting machines that we wouldn't have read the

Red machine. We would have and we could have read it sooner than we did if

we had time to work on it and this was even before the accounting machines were

available. Now I think <sup>the</sup> ~~that~~ accounting machines the next significant well probably

the first significant contribution the accounting machines made in cryptanalysis

was in the work Abe and Kully were doing on the Italian and the German systems

because this well let me describe something. The catalogs that Yardley described

in the Black Chamber that his people were putting together for the recovery of

the Japanese codes before 1930 could easily be produced by processing the cards

through an appropriate program in the accounting machines so the number <sup>of</sup> personnel

which would was required to work on the Italian and the German problem was cut

back because we had the machines available to do this for us, and there we found *out*

that the machines on those two problems the machines were vital I think and as

I said they weren't vital for the Red machine but they were vital in the code

recovery program and the key recovery program that were involved in the German

and Italian work and that is where we found, we proved <sup>that</sup> the machines were indeed

valuable for cryptanalytic processing<sup>es.</sup>. Going back to the Japanese problem which

I know more about than I do the other two and I feel easier talking about it.

Each time we had a code change in the Japanese of course the machines were

invaluable because it did the cataloging work for us and since the Japanese codes

were less involved and had a fewer number of groups to recover we didn't take

long and it wasn't nearly ~~so~~ the drudgery and didn't require the tremendous cata-

loging process that the bigger codes in the Italian and German section required

and so we usually interrupted the other work enough to provide us with catalogs

for the Japanese codes. These were very short interruptions because it didn't

take too long to recover the Japanese codes. The greatest use though of the IBM

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equipment we found in the Japanese section was in the preparation of the frequency data and the work sheets in the Purple machine solution. This, we standardized our format and so you could go from one indicator to another indicator and not have to make an adjustment and your statistical data was all pretty well organized and I would say that the accounting equipment was critical<sup>thing</sup> in the solution of the Purple machine even though it was useful in the Red we couldn't have done the Purple without the or if we had it would have been more like 36 months instead of 18 months so by now you can see we're dedicated to the accounting machines as a cryptanalytic tool but now we're ahead of the computer stage. The most dramatic thing I can recall in that time frame is when we were confronted by this Japanese transposed code system. Now the Japs had been using a sort of<sup>a</sup> primitive transposition system for special messages. The office chief eyes only<sup>type</sup> but this was a sort of seven element transposition so we usually deciphered it by writing the groups out, five or seven or whatever the key link was and then simply

reordering them without even putting them in a matrix. They were so short.

*But*

Well now when they put in this J19 concept, that type of code where they used

<sup>a</sup>  
~~the~~ key 15 to 25 elements in length the matrix with the certain of the upper

lines crossed out and applied the transposition key in the conventional trans-

posed position type operation, the problem got to be extremely difficult and

the Japanese group of course was confronted with the recovery of these keys

in <sup>a</sup>~~the~~ proper timeframe. We found, we developed, a hand method for doing this *that*

was I think very clever and very useful and ~~quite~~ very good but what we were

doing <sup>it</sup>, was taking a small force available, this was Albert Small and Bob <sup>e</sup> Firner,

myself and Mary Joe Dunning and <sup>Gene Grotjan?</sup> ~~Jean Grotjan~~, later <sup>Gene</sup> ~~Jean~~ Feinstein, and

a few others whose names I, whose faces I can see but whose names I can't remember

right now. We had ten or twelve people working full time on trying to recover

these keys and the recovery-to-use ratio was about one out of six so we were

falling back five feet every time we climbed up one. We weren't getting out of

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

that hole going in that direction. So what happened as I recall Friedman was not too deeply involved with us. I think he was having some some his health wasn't too good so he was not <sup>being</sup> ~~really~~ as deeply involved for health reasons in our activity as he wanted to be so we were confronted with the problem of devising some better way of recovering these keys because we certainly weren't going to completely satisfy, we weren't going to achieve, the total exploitation of the traffic that we had trained G2 to expect because we had been doing it before and that distressed us and distressed G2 more than that and distressed the Chief Signal Officer so we were all unhappy and since there was nobody around that knew more about this problem than <sup>e</sup> Firner, Small and Sammy Snyder and myself we decided we'd put our own work on it and just let the folks we'd trained <sup>to</sup> do it mechanically.

I mean the junior, the cryptologists, cryptographic clerk type, go ahead and do what they can and help them when they ran into a snarl and we would devote all our cryptanalytic skills to devising a new way of recovering the keys. I'm

dragging this out a little bit because I'm trying to show that we had to have a motive for doing this before we would undertake the research and the motive was the necessity for recovering these <sup>keys</sup> in a shorter timeframe and we didn't have enough people to do it and we couldn't expect to get enough people in and trained in time to do any good so we had to go to something new and much more efficient with the result that we began to explore what we could do in (1) improving the statistical tests that we needed to make to do the column matching to get the key recovery to see if we could adapt <sup>the</sup> or any way use <sup>this</sup> ~~the~~ accounting equipment to facilitate this operation and (3) to discover other techniques and advantages in our statistical activity which would sharpen up the key recovery operation. Well in this in this endeavor I think the team Small, <sup>FERNER</sup> Furner, Snyder and Rowlett sort of again formed a composite where we each put in our own, our own specialities. I mean it wasn't one person dominated. It was where four people joined together. Sammy was, Sammy Snyder was very good for going down to

~~HANDLE VIA COMINT CHANNELS ONLY~~

the machine room and producing a very, <sup>a</sup> most reliable IBM treatment of whatever data you gave him <sup>to</sup> ~~for~~ process. Small was sort of he he lived with the machines and he sort of was the new idea man to develop new programs using the machines and FURNER was just a doggone good <sup>said</sup> cryptanalyst and mathematician and he could take Small's sort of brilliant glimpses and reduce <sup>them</sup> ~~well~~ not reduce <sup>them</sup> ~~but~~ convert them because he enhanced them, he didn't reduce he enhanced these into practical applications and he made them real. He'd sort out the sort of glint in Small's eye and he would come out with reality and I guess my role was more that I encouraged and I helped and I had a certain ability with my hands. I could produce things, so among the four of us I think we had a pretty team there. Well without going into <sup>the</sup> ~~into~~ details of how this was achieved the four of us contrived a program which we thought <sup>could</sup> ~~be~~ satisfied by the machines but the missing thing was someway of converting the text into a special presentation machine. We had to have something more than the IBM machine is what I'm saying before we could

do this. Well where do you find this thing because in the first place you don't go and bring in a bunch of engineers and tell them you working on Japanese codes because we'd have to tell them that and the second we weren't quite ready for this because we didn't know really what we wanted and the third we probably knew <sup>as</sup>

<sup>much</sup> about the theory, ~~and~~ the wiring and the logic necessary to produce some kind <sup>of a mechanism</sup> as

anybody <sup>else</sup> in the world, certainly more than anybody <sup>else</sup> that we knew about so we kind

of ganged up and figured out what kind of operation had to be satisfied and we

took advantage of the spare parts box for the Purple machine which had been

built at that time and we devised a sort of commutator-like device which was

essentially a <sup>well a</sup> half-Hebron <sup>ern</sup> wheel like we used in the Red machine which we had

the parts to build <sup>that,</sup> ~~at~~ but the logic behind it was essentially different and I

remember taking these parts home over the weekend and wiring them up while my

wife was in the hospital giving birth to our second child. I was babysitting

the young fellow. Now I mention this very personal thing because these are the

---

people who did that. I mean we had to do them sort of under <sup>those</sup> ~~the~~ circumstances.

I'm sure Small sat at home and burned up ream and ream of paper trying to figure <sup>out</sup>

the right kind of way of presenting the data to the machine that, the accounting

machines, and I'm sure <sup>u</sup>Farner spent similar time and I'm sure Sammy did because

it was a sort of 24<sup>-</sup> it was a preoccupation with this thing and once we got the

thing working and tried it out and it did do what we hoped to achieve we refined

the our very primitive thing after naming it the Geewhizer<sup>z</sup> and put it to work.

Now this I think this is a very exciting thing <sup>that</sup> I was involved in and I get a

because  
little emotional as I think about it <sup>^</sup> we could see the frontier move. We

climbed up on top of the mountain. This was Alexander <sup>s</sup>Spotwood and

his boy looking over the <sup>(391)</sup>confluence, and we got up there and we didn't

stop like Spotswood did. We didn't announce that we'd open up the west. We

went down and we saw what we had uncovered you see. Now another exciting thing

about this, <sup>and</sup> I'm really spreading this out too much but I've got to say this ~~and~~ to

get it out of my systems sort of, was that the navy also was working on this problem and when they they had been watching with interest our experimentation but (1) they didn't have equipment dedicated to cryptanalysis which we had and (2) their cryptanalysts hadn't been pushed as close to the accounting machine application as we had and so they sort of looked and wondered why we were doing this because they didn't really didn't understand and while they hoped we would be successful they didn't really believe we would be. This was sort of the attitude that I think they had and I'm not saying this in a derogatory way, it's just the way it was in those days. Well when we began they really got religion <sup>when</sup> ~~and~~ we began to recovering keys at about four times the rate they could and we were recovering keys that they actually could not achieve by their own techniques and then they came over and wanted to know how we were doing it and could they have a Geewhizer<sup>z</sup> sort of. Now I'm oversimplifying this because it went over a period of about two weeks but I think this endeavor on our part

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encouraged the navy to make a greater use of IBM equipment and to undertake with new vigor an enhancement of their cryptanalytic equipment program. This is the IC machine, that I mentioned earlier that Bush had put together for them.

I think it <sup>led</sup> ~~lead~~ them into this optical system <sup>r</sup> <sub>A</sub> contact that they got into with Eastman Kodak and set the stage for a lot of navy talent to be directed into the cryptanalytic mechanization area and so this and I'm bragging, and I don't care

if I am, this lucky result of ours in terms of Geewhizer <sup>z</sup> I think ~~was~~ <sup>put</sup> the whole context of cryptanalysis in a brand new light. It could be mechanized and

mechanized successfully, and that great advantage could accrue from devising programs and special equipment <sup>to do</sup> ~~through~~ these cryptanalytic processes that sometimes had been considered impossible because of the manpower and time requirements.

H<sup>S</sup> Q: What date are they? Right there.

A: Look up J19. I could tell you but I'd have to think and I don't feel like it.

Q: Must be 40, 41?

A: It was after the Purple. It was about a year and a half before Pearl Harbor.

(Oh, okay)

A: Who's got the Geewhizer<sup>z</sup> paper \_\_\_\_\_?

Valak Q:

We got it \_\_\_\_\_

\_\_\_\_\_. You might like to see it.

A: I would. I'm real curious about that. Now is this what you want Henry? I'm

rambling a lot.

Q: Yes, That's fine.

A: We rambled a lot in those days and I guess maybe...

HS

Q: Well this was the only thing I was trying I was trying to put it in a date

somewhere. I knew it wasn't after 41. It had to been before the 18 months

in the Purple went from what 39 to 40 so it was somewhere in there.

A: When you're ready I'll start recording again.

(small talk chatter)

QX I think a few more comments are <sup>germane</sup> ~~germain~~ to this development of this Geewhizer<sup>z</sup>

because it sort of indicates just where we were with reference to the rest of

the cryptanalytic parties we were associated with. I talked a little bit about

the navy. What about the British? Well finally when we started to collaborating

with the British I think they found this Geewhizer<sup>z</sup> a most amazing thing because

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\_\_\_\_\_

we were doing things you see that they had hoped to be able to do but they hadn't as <sup>yet</sup> mechanized with all the wonderful research and development that they had done on the Bombe, ~~but~~ still that was a different kind of a cryptanalytic operation and the Geewhizer<sup>z</sup> just opened up a whole new approach and I got to brag about Small a little bit here because his idea of using logarithms which, a logarithmic equipment for the statistical element was a terrific thing because instead of having to multiply the probabilities which were involved in our computation done by the equipment and which would have been impossible with the accounting equipment, Small's proposal to use the logarithmic method<sup>?</sup> <sub>^</sub> that you <sup>meant</sup> could add because the true probabilities are measured by the product of the prospective probabilities and not its a product relationship and not an additive so we we <sup>he</sup> devised tables which converted the well I'll call it the absolute as opposed to the logarithm expression. He devised tables where we could make a probability measure of these things and instead of using converting<sup>them</sup> <sub>^</sub> back these

tables I mean converting them back to the absolute phase these tables were adjusted so that we could go directly to the logarithmic value and of course its a pretty obvious thing after its done but before somebody invents it you its quite another thing so Small was able to do this. Now a little bit about what other people did. When Verkuyl, the Dutchman, came after the war, <sup>had</sup> started, we found out from him that he and his units had <sup>solved</sup> ~~seen~~ some of these transposed Japanese diplomatic messages but they were using the very primitive methods that we had developed and both the army and the navy were following when the system was first introduced and I know I was a little bit put out by this if I can <sup>again</sup> be ~~expressed~~ <sup>general</sup> because I had to accept Verkuyl in my section against my better judgment and my logic at that time was not sharp enough to envision that Peterson's <sup>e</sup> defection to the Dutch that later on occurred but it was simply a <sup>protective</sup> ~~detective~~ instinct that I was following sort of based on lets don't tell the Brits about our own cryptosystems and I just didn't see telling this Dutch officer

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about our techniques for the solution of the Japanese transposed codes because  
 what we had was so far ahead of what he had and you can imagine how anxious I  
 was to learn what he knew about this so I could make the measure. The judgment  
 obviously was that we were that we had something that they never could have  
 achieved. My instinct was protective and Friedman joined <sup>me</sup> in this and the Chief  
 Signal Officer thought this is the way it should be done <sup>but</sup> ~~and~~ G2 ~~had~~ turned him  
 down and said we've got him. We promised him. Our relations with the Dutch,  
 diplomatic, <sup>all</sup> ~~and~~ such <sup>that</sup> ~~and~~ if we don't use him, if we reject him <sup>that</sup> ~~we~~ may antagonize  
 and otherwise <sup>may</sup> ~~make~~ generate problems elsewhere. Well of course G2 was a little  
 bit in the drivers seat so we had to accept him. I wish to the Lord ~~that~~ I had  
 I don't think the Peterson <sup>e</sup> thing did as much damage as everybody thought it did  
 but still it could have done that damage and I wish that our first instincts and  
 impulses Friedman and I presented had been accepted and acted favorably on. The  
 French knew about the Japanese system, I learned later but never did break into

it. This was Col. Black and his people. I don't think anybody else anywhere in the world had achieved that particular degree of sophistication in that particular type of statistical approach and so I believe there is one of the significant milestones ~~of~~ both in the production of intelligence and in laying the groundwork for the development of further specialized devices used either in conjunction with the accounting machine equipment or in sort of in total concept of <sup>the</sup> specialized machine like the Dodbuster associated with Madam X, with the Bombe operation, but without this first entry I don't think and the timing of it I don't think we would have been able to do some of the things, computer of a computer type that we later on achieved. Now I think some other we now cross over to the COMSEC again because we are getting up pretty close to where the war is about to happen. We haven't had Pearl Harbor yet and the Army Communication Service had determined that they were going to use teletype or rapid communications and of course you couldn't use it in ~~the~~ clear so we had to -- we started work on the some concept of enciphering teletype but before the war

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<sup>equipment</sup>  
 happened this sort of fell in abeyance and the ~~equivalent~~ was not on the  
 drawing board even when the war started but within a few months after the  
 war started the requirement became a very real <sup>one</sup> and Stoner just laid it flat  
 on the SIS. Stoner was the head of, General Stoner was the head of Army  
 Communications Service, ACS is the acronym, and that covers a lot of evils as  
 well as ACS and the Signal Corps. He just laid the requirements <sup>right</sup> on Friedman  
 personally to <sup>produce</sup> ~~do~~ something so we this is when the SIGCOM first came into being  
 and I think I've told you the story of how it got issued out and we had to  
 recall it from use and replace it with something else which turned out to be  
 the one time tape concept, the SIGTOT. But this was after WWII had started and  
 we were actually sending troops and equipment over to North Africa and I think  
 our capability ~~was~~ for using the one time tape principle which was sort of a  
<sup>old</sup>  
 reversion to what Friedman wanted to do with the <sup>ML34T1</sup> if you'll remember  
 because we had to generate key tape. But not a reversion to a something that was

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impractical because the state of the art technology had advanced and produced equipment much more reliable <sup>lv</sup> ~~than~~ the timeframe of 1942 then it had a decade earlier, 1932 and 33, so we were able to generate the key tapes and do this in a mathematically secure way. In other words, the requirement here is something that's unpredictable. Now it doesn't have to be random, probably its better if it isn't random because if you try to do random set up a randomizing machine ~~it~~ you got to satisfy a lot of mathematical requirements. In the cryptanalytic world its you just want the thing to be unpredictable. You don't care how its produced. It could be produced by design or by random or whatever as long as the guy doesn't know what's coming up next you got to be happy so we had key generators in great quantities to generate this unpredictable key stream which then was fed into the code production program and produced the tapes used by SIGTOT. Now I think you may be a little <sup>bit</sup> surprised at the next thing that comes <sub>^</sub> out but you see this key generation factory leads us right into the concept

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which we discovered when the German one time pads system was broken because  
in our analysis of the SIGTOT principle we asked ourselves can somebody figure  
out how we generated these keys and take advantage <sup>pick,</sup> if they get one key from  
a booboo where the tape is used twice for two different texts they can obviously  
recover the tape. Well now how much of that would they have to have before they  
can figure out how the tape was put together and predict the tape.

End of Tape 6, Side 1

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ape 6, Side 2

Well now I don't think this concept of examining the key as we did with SIGTOT was as significant thing in as I may make it in what I'm going to say about it in the context I'm going to speak. When we got ~~the word from~~ <sup>to work on</sup> the German one time key but here's sort of what happened, and I'll point out where they come together and show that we were psychologically ready for this kind of a thing at ~~a~~ <sup>the</sup> time when we needed to be. The simple background behind the German one time key operation was that the Germans sent some pads, <sup>ed their</sup> distributor pads, and I believe the circumstances were as follows: There was a high level German foreign office individual whose name <sup>slips</sup> ~~escapes~~ me for the minute but he came to Washington and he was going to visit several German foreign office installations on his trip and as part of his luggage <sup>in</sup> he was acting as a courier for the code production people in the foreign office <sup>in</sup> and he had the pads that were going to be distributed both to Washington and <sup>in</sup> other places in the Western Hemisphere, <sup>When</sup> ~~and~~ he got to San Francisco

*or maybe*  
and he got on a boat I believe ~~and~~ he was headed for San Francisco anyhow I

know he passed through the Panama Canal and when he got to the Canal [the FBI

was standing there waiting for him and asked him for his diplomatic credentials.

*Will*. He had failed to ~~secure~~ *procure* these before entering the canal and the FBI, discovering

this, immediately took over his luggage and held it because he didn't have the

credentials. He raised hell about it. He the Germans got livid and made a lot

*FBI* of noises and you know tried to stop this but the FBI *just stood (?)* ~~said~~ stolidly you don't

have the credentials therefore we have to do it this way, We're sorry. And

*they* so <sup>^</sup>held it overnight and photograph it and then of course it didn't make any

*whether* differences ~~if~~ they violated it or not. They hoped they'd get by with it but

they didn't care because they assumed *that* because they'd held it overnight the Germans

wouldn't use it anyhow so they just photographed it. Next day when his credentials

were validated and received they very graciously turned it *all* back over to him. Now *the*

copies of those photographs wound up in Kully's German outfit and then we had *the*

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reorganization where the Kully personally got involved <sup>with</sup> ~~in~~ the military thing

but we kept a small group. Kully took all of his old Floradora people and this

was the proper thing to do and put them over on the Japanese military because

the Japanese military was of the same stripe as the <sup>p</sup> ~~additive~~ <sup>well, it was</sup> applied to numerical

code and his people were trained in the IBM techniques and everything was set

up to make an examination so the Floradora was a damn good staging ground for

our <sup>--for our B-2</sup> G2 <sup>in</sup> operation to work on the Japanese military and ~~for~~ that we were fortunate.

And we were damn lucky to have Kully and Frank Lewis and the others who had been

conditioned <sup>for</sup> ~~to~~ this kind of a problem ready to assign to ~~do~~ it. Well

we were so intrigued with these additive pads that had been recovered that we

kept a small effort <sup>going on it, them.</sup> I think there were three people, Tom Wagner and a couple of

gals, and it took several months before they found the clues for the breakthrough

which was needed for us to look into the the possibility of these being generated

by some kind of a machine. <sup>well,</sup> Had we not had this key generated <sup>or for the</sup> ~~at~~ SIGTOT we probably

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wouldn't have been able to visualize <sup>an</sup> ~~the~~ installation dedicated to the generation of one time pads but you look at it and you say "Oh, they must have done something like we did with the one time key tapes. They must have had some kind of a device."

Well what happened once that ~~the~~ that ~~the~~ Wagner and his group had discovered this attribute and they just weren't sophisticated enough or advanced enough in

ing their cryptanalytic understand<sup>ing</sup> to know what this meant. That I got into the

position of doing a PI on them, <sup>I mean</sup> ~~see~~ performing the operation which PI is designed

to do. I had a small group of technicians. Now <sup>e</sup> Farner and Small who had been

so well, deeply involved in the Japanese thing of course had to be multiplied

skill several times and their ~~scale~~ spread out over a great ~~area~~ many people ~~and~~

and with them as a cadre and some other individuals like Dan Dribben, Walter

Freed and John Seaman, and I believe Dale Marston was closely associated with

this group, these formed <sup>a</sup> sort of a <sup>task</sup> ~~test~~ group concept that would go down and

help each one of the sections by finding out what the cryptanalytic problem <sup>is</sup> and

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making recommendations to the cryptanalysts on the job as what to do, come back

and tell me what kind of ~~a~~ priority since I was chief of B3, what kind of a

priority <sup>was</sup> ~~was~~ put on the machine requirements you see and sort of act as a

<sup>and</sup> technical liaison ~~in~~ fertilizer if you will for ideas, <sup>to</sup> help stimulate people

to find out weaknesses in our training structure <sup>and</sup> so we could remedy those, to

find out what other kind of training was needed so we could get that and they

were <sup>just</sup> again it was a team concept and they were mature enough people, fine enough

people so <sup>that</sup> they respected the sensibility <sup>ies</sup> of the people they were working with and

thereby <sup>were</sup> ~~would~~ completely accept <sup>ed.</sup> ~~that~~ <sup>gone in a</sup> if they had <sup>gone in a</sup> high handed manner and put the

people down, <sup>to</sup> ~~if you~~ use a modern day expression, I think they wouldn't have been

successful but they very skillfully developed the right public relations set-up

and people <sup>wanted</sup> ~~would~~ they'd come and actually sit outside waiting for an opportunity

to talk ~~to~~ with this group, and this group was immediately put on <sup>to</sup> the German

problem <sup>to</sup> ~~and tried~~ to find out what had been done by the Germans which caused

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these phenomenon<sup>i</sup> to appear in the text. Well I think it might be useful to

mention that instead of bringing the problem down to the technical staff, the

technical staff <sup>in a</sup> ~~and the~~ body went down and became members of the problem, became members of the section and were assigned to it. This was a psychological gimmick

but in effect the problem was removed from the section because it was just too

much for the competence<sup>of the people</sup> there, but <sup>we</sup> left it for psychological reasons and we were

able to <sup>give it</sup> ~~get~~ the support and everything that <sup>it(?)</sup> we needed. Well once the phenomenon<sup>o</sup>

was explained and the concept that there was some kind of a generator there and

the necessary statistical and other analytic runs from the IBM unit were provided

the problem just fell apart. I mean it was an amazing thing. everyday you could

see significant progress and finally when the device was actually recovered it

was just sort of like recovering the wiring of the Purple machine or the wiring

of a bunch of wheels in an Enigma or something like that. I mean it was became

a real cryptanalytic success story and all of it was against the background of our

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concept which we'd employed in our COMSEC and I think this is what you want an example of. Where <sup>?</sup> ~~our~~ COMSEC concept lead to some promotion of the cryptanalytic aspect. Had we not developed this thing on our own in terms of the COMSEC key generator we might have never recognized that the Germans had indeed had some kind of device which was fabricating this key and I think while we might have found out the phenomenon and learned to exploit it I think and probably in due course would have realized that this was a key generation thing, we wouldn't have gone into it with the concept that it was a key generation problem so this is one of the rare cases where some contribution has been made to cryptanalysis by the COMSEC requirements. The statement that will probably be quite adequate to enable us to generate the other pads that had been produced by this German machine which the Germans never suspected we would be able to reproduce because you know it was sort of a step beyond the [actual <sup>?</sup> accession] of the pads. They thought that if we got the pads that we'd be stumped and we'd never find out how they were

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generated. Well there we we fooled them. We did. Now in the domain of key that we had it was the total domain that could be produced by this machine. Whether or not we reproduced it all I think is beside the point. We could have. The idea was to know it was there and penetrate it and find those portion of key which would decode the messages that we intercepted. Now the Germans had another practice. Instead of making a total scramble of these pages, evidently and I almost I think this is about the way they did it, as I remember we reconstructed it, that the machine would run and it would produce <sup>the</sup> sheets in a normal order of succession so you got <sup>them in</sup> a proper order as they appeared as they were produced by the generator. The Germans evidently distributed these in piles on a table. They didn't have too many piles. Sometimes they'd have seven piles, sometimes nine piles, <sup>and</sup> so on and so forth. Then what they would go do is to, and the pad sheets came off <sup>of</sup> this sort of printing press affair that was producing <sup>them.</sup> They would just go and drop each page into a pile and walk around the <sup>16</sup> table and then when they got

to the first pile they would go on. Sometimes they would skip a pile. Sometimes they wouldn't skip a pile and so there wasn't a total <sup>smearing</sup> ~~smearing~~ of the order of pads. Once you found part of the key, once you got close to the key by finding a ~~pad~~ pad, a sheet in one of these pads, then you could sort of, you didn't have to look so far. You <sup>d</sup> just look at a few places for the next key because you'd have to go around the table again sort of and so you knew the next <sup>one</sup> ~~one~~ was just a little bit further on and so you just did a little skip jump and you'd find maybe pile one had been put in some pads that had been used between Berlin and Tokyo and pile two would have been used between Berlin and Buenos Aires but you knew that by the second message from Berlin to Tokyo what the Berlin-Tokyo pad I mean message number one if you used it to identify what pad was used you knew that message number two would be about seven or eight pages further down <sup>the</sup> ~~the~~ <sup>22/11</sup> stream produced by the key generator even though it was the second page. Once you began to find these little niceties the problem of search was refined a point

where it wasn't nearly as big a task. GEE report has all these fine things in it in a much more accurate presentation than I can reproduce here from my memory but these are the high spots and the general concepts that we operated under and my recollection is not going to be as good about this as would be some of the Japanese problems where I was personally involved in the work ~~but~~ <sup>because</sup> I was sort of remotely related to this. My job was to make sure we got the skills there and <sup>the</sup> support <sup>for</sup> this. The British also participated once we got <sup>it</sup> <sup>ten</sup> into this thing. They were really delighted. I mean it was just as much fun to them as it was to us because we divided up the pie and they went ahead with it. Really <sup>there</sup> ~~it~~ was no need for them too, but I think they had a bit of the same impulse as we. They had to keep their techniques and their talents sharpened up.

Q: This concept eventually stops doesn't it? I mean learning from one, applying to  
 HS the other, <sup>and</sup> vice versa, after the war, <sup>the</sup> creation of NSA and the huge expansion of everything it becomes more difficult to work or to learn like you all did.

A: It shouldn't and I'll tell you why. I think one we used to have a [Pl in Prod]

when I was here earlier. This I think <sup>was</sup> ~~is~~ the Raven <sup>group</sup> ~~crew~~ wasn't it and the idea

behind that was to take your people with greatest gifts and spread them over

the place. Well now and I'll be very blunt with what I'm going to say. The

success of that concept is <sup>a</sup> ~~the~~ function of the <sup>personalities</sup> ~~personnel~~ involved in it. <sup>e</sup> ~~F~~arner

and Small and that group I <sup>have</sup> ~~had~~ mentioned were ideal personalities for this kind of a

thing because not only did they go out and help people but when something new

like this pad problem came up they brought it back and spread the word, the

kind of a gospel, around in other places where this <sup>kind of a</sup> problem might be encountered and I

want to assure you that we looked over all the key that we had to see if we

couldn't figure out how these were generated and I think with some luck. Problems

escape me right now. I remember one but <sup>4</sup> I can't remember more than one I ought <sup>n</sup>

to mention <sup>to be</sup> This key generation principle was recognized and we looked for other

places where we might be clever enough to recover the key generation of the

system. I don't think we were ever found another case where it was so startling and satisfying as in the case of the GEE and I can't help but feel like that's one of the one of the most well maybe it wasn't significant technically but it was sure a very satisfying development to be able <sup>to</sup> announce that you had <sup>solved</sup> ~~found~~ the one time key.

Q: I should think that the people who are being put into or choose to go into the career of cryptanalysis or in a career of COMSEC should be trained in the other one as well and much more than some one week introductory course in the other discipline.

A: Your ideal, you didn't ask this question but I'll watch it, <sup>?</sup> <sup>The</sup> ~~your~~ ideal type for your COMSEC operation is the guy who has mastered every known cryptanalytic technique that can be applied and has <sup>had</sup> the deepest possible experience in it.

Now he is the guy that can probably do more to insure your total cryptographic security. That is he tests, he can <sup>-- to</sup> <sup>it,</sup> simplify <sup>^</sup> He can flash the principles of, the cryptographic principles, involved in a system against his experience and make an

A

evaluation and determine what actual tests should be made of the use of these things. That is how you would attack the traffic if you wanted to prove whether or not it could be read better than some guy who is dryly been trained in COMSEC because I think everything I've said here in this, the last, well, in this discussion, shows that you've got to keep people on top of both sets, both sides of <sup>the</sup> ~~the~~ field of cryptology if you're going to advance your COMSEC to the ultimate and <sup>that</sup> sometimes the COMSEC pushes the SIGINT ahead a little bit. I think its not as apt to give it the impetus, that is the flow <sup>from</sup> ~~to~~ the COMSEC advance the SIGINT is not going to be as noticeable as the what your cryptanalytic or SIGINT pack does to the COMSEC field. I I'm not surprised and I'm not unhappy that that's the case. It's just a law of nature.

..... the cryptologic center of the US government and that was our <sup>dream.</sup> ~~^~~ that we had to pay is that we had a military Director which rotated among the three services and what you find I think is only <sup>a</sup> natural result. Now I'm not trying to

~~SECRET~~

run down Pat Carter and <sup>you</sup> ~~the~~ present boss and others but it would be impossible to achieve the kind of thing you're talking about unless you had one dedicated almost omnipotent and omniscient guy to head the agency. Now I think if I ran the agency one of the things that I would require right quick is I'd require each one of my major outfits to be qualified in both COMINT and COMSEC <sup>and</sup> with some intelligence training and some business management. If they weren't a good COMSECer they couldn't be head of PROD and if they weren't a good COMINTER they couldn't be head of COMSEC because I would want that <sup>that</sup> guy to think <sup>the</sup> the head of COMSEC, to think like a COMINTER because he needs that, for his counterintelligence attitude makes him the most proficient protector of of the information that he's responsible for securing. I said that exactly right. Now on the other hand I think the COMSECer and now <sup>of course</sup> I want these to be <sup>just</sup> almost twins, both of them well trained, but the COMSEC requirements in a COMINT type of a thing is got to be one that recognizes techniques which identify weaknesses in the COMSEC things that

we're using so that we can reject them just as I told you about some of the things we rejected. Now this is the ideal. We're, you and I, aren't going to live that long friend (laughter).

(I might recognize that)

No, but I think what we're saying is essential <sup>ly the</sup> same thing. I'm looking at it

from one side of the heap, you're looking at it from another side of the heap and we can both think of a half dozen actual examples which would prove our point.

You say why do we tolerate this? I don't know why. I have no answer to that,

except I think we're a <sup>bureau</sup> ~~beaura~~cratic organization and you just don't change

government and this is one thing that's going to <sup>whup</sup> ~~hurt~~ Jimmy Carter if he gets

whupped because he's going out here and swear to God that he is going to change

the government and most of us, particularly those of us who were raised in the

government, know he ain't going to do that. And I think the country at large

knows he's not going to do that. If Jimmy Carter says that he's going to lose.

I wish he could but I don't think he knows what to change really and I'd just as

soon we we didn't have somebody changing that didn't know what he was doing as I'd just as soon put up with what we got. (laughter) Now I'm not saying I'm against Jimmy Carter but this is what scares me about Jimmy Carter when he opens his mouth. Maybe I don't hear what he's saying and that could be a problem in semantics.

End of Tape 6, side 2

~~TOP SECRET~~

Tape 7, Side 1

associated with the Arlington Hall operation and was he kept apprised of the technical situation on sort of a day to day basis? Did you get that? and the answer is Clarke<sup>e</sup> was right on top of it. Not only was he on top of it because <sup>the</sup> of ~~a~~ chain of command but he had personal links like his friendship with certain of us particularly myself and also as our collaboration with the British developed ~~but~~ he had his own force over in GCHQ under the requirement for getting the end product<sup>t</sup> and he carefully selected the individuals<sup>y</sup> who were assigned to GCHQ with an idea that they would keep him currently informed of any kind of ~~a~~ development<sup>s</sup>, technical, political or otherwise over there, and he had a mania for staying on top of all angles of the problem. Now Clarke<sup>e</sup> I think we might stop here and explain a little bit about Clarke's role in respect to Arlington Hall Station at that time. We had a sort of <sup>a</sup> Siamese twin situation over in G2. There was the Director who was in an overall sense responsible for the intelligence activities

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and then there was the siamese twin concept which was Al McCormick of Chicago newspaper fame and Carter Clarke who was a dedicated Signal Corps officer and a born intelligence officer. <sup>direct</sup> He he didn't need to be trained. He was by instinct an intelligence officer and Clarke I think was one of the motivators to get ASA out of the Munitions Building complex and keep them away from the Pentagon and put them in Arlington Hall Station. He insisted that we ought to buy the school over there and turn it into the cryptanalytic organization of the Army. Well cryptologic organization is the proper term because, <sup>while</sup> ~~well~~ obviously he was greatly interested in intelligence, He was also a counterintelligence man and automatically embraced the COMSEC as being an important well he felt as some of us old timers do that the first priority is good COMSEC and then COMINT comes after you've satisfied your 100% requirement for total cryptographic security, <sup>if</sup> you can have a 100% total. Now Clarke did stay on top of the technical things. He would get the reports. He would read them and he would call in some of his friends like myself

and I've done this many times to interpret these and what does this mean sort of Frank? and I would try to tell him and he would understand. He was very able in his comprehension of the technical aspects. He I don't think he could have broken the mono alphabet but he knew what it meant to break the monoalphabet.

Q:  
HS

Could ~~you~~<sup>you</sup> ask a follow-up question? In negotiations with the British <sup>them,</sup> in terms of collaboration, Carter Clarke was fully aware of all the technical developments that had taken place in cryptanalysis?

A:

Yes Sir, unequivocally and the reason <sup>he</sup> was because he wanted to know what we might lose if we <sup>he</sup> he was a suspicious type of an individual and I think <sup>he</sup> was the one that put in concrete the concept <sup>stet</sup> [not to release to the British our US cryptographic principles that I mentioned earlier.] And I think I told you ~~xxxxxx~~ that Carter Clarke instructed me to get and he used sort of Carter Clarke language to get off of whatever it was I was sitting on and get over there and get all that stuff back and get people working on it so they could understand it in ~~the~~ and apply it when we won the war. That he didn't want to miss this opportunity

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of taking every advantage of the British' long years that OB40 and other places. He wanted to get that as <sup>a</sup> part of the trade but he wanted to make sure that we knew what to do with it. He

didn't want a bunch of photographs and carbon copies in the file cabinet. He wanted a live operating [Middle East] organization.

He wanted every country in [South America.] He wanted a little

<sup>that was</sup> section ~~of us~~ working on that traffic because he said there will

be no German and no Japanese and no Italian traffic to work on.

What you are going to have to do is have jobs for all these people and you better train them now and not wait until after the war is over because they'll get discouraged and go home and he says you've

got something here to challenge your good people and anyhow we

got to have a cryptanalytic organization that's competent and <sup>deal</sup> deal

with any traffic that we might want to intercept so let's get it

now while the getting is good and I don't know anybody in that

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timeframe that was so dedicated to this principle of the perpetuation of the effort which had been built up and which had been so valuable during the war and as I look back at some of these discussions which followed well the discussions at the beginning of the war right after Pearl Harbor and I'll compare the Army and Navy now and Carter Clarke was over at the Army and there was no Carter Clarke at the Navy. There was the Redmond boys. Two Admiral Redmonds. One of them was directly in charge of the Navy outfit that was responsible for working on the Japanese and German, the naval ciphers. Their idea was that they would concentrate exclusively on the Naval intercept and they did and I can remember distinctly the group working on the Japanese diplomatic, the Navy group working on the Japanese diplomatic, who came over to see me one day and said what can we do with our files. We've been

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ordered to get rid of them and we don't think they ought to be destroyed and they will be lost if we leave them here. What do you think should be done with them? And I said you bring the materials. I'll get the file cabinets, and just bring them over here. I'll find a place for them and so next day here came a whole bunch of sailors, each one with a two wheel truck and a file cabinet on it, coming across from the Navy building, into the elevator, up to the third floor and there <sup>was</sup> ~~were~~ about oh a great number of file cabinets that I had to put in the area outside, the hallway outside of my office, which was a secure area and they sat there almost without being moved until we found a place over at B Building ~~over~~ at Arlington Hall for them. Now the Navy attitude was "Let's concentrate particularly on the wartime situation." Clarke's attitude was "Let's concentrate on the wartime situation but let's take something and dedicate it to the concept that we

will win this war and we want to have a viable cryptanalytic-COMSEC organization after the war is over and we got to have intelligence. If you're ever going to produce intelligence <sup>you</sup> ~~we~~ get it from a system that's used under wartime stress because people tend to make mistakes and this is the time to exploit it so let's don't put all our eggs in the military basket. Let's keep these diplomatic problems moving along and it was well worth while because we got a lot of good information, wartime information out of this effort. I think this is worth noting and I do believe that Carter Clarke should be given credit for being the most, well the word that I want to use here is hard to find but he should be given credit for having the proper kind of foresight and to be willing to risk the probability that his judgment <sup>may</sup> ~~might~~ have been bad in not putting all the effort on the military problems as the <sup>Redman</sup> ~~Redman~~ philosophy was, but he was willing to take the gamble for the future effort and I'm sure glad he did because when the war was over it was wonderful to have problems that people could be assigned to after they cleaned <sup>up</sup> ~~the~~ the documentation

of the Japanese and the German effort and it gave us a chance to pick out the ones we wanted to keep. That's when the Kirbys and the Buffhams and the Marstons....

We twisted their arms to stay on and if you look back in the people who <sup>have</sup> ~~are~~ really promoted ~~at~~ NSA you'll find that this group supplemented by others like Herb Conley, Jack Connelly and just great numbers that I could name if I wanted to take the time. These, that's how we got those people. We had something for them to do s you see and if we hadn't had a challenge for them I'm sure they would have gone away so I just can't give too much credit to Carter Clarke. I think that it was terrific what he did.

I think ~~Don't~~ maybe people might be puzzled by in some measure by the difference between

the Army philosophy and the Navy philosophy because here <sup>'ve</sup> ~~I~~ really outlined this in

the in describing Clarke's attitude where he was willing to gamble for the perpetuation

of the activity against the <sup>Redman</sup> ~~Redman~~ concept that we go all out. Now there was probably

a reason for that and I would rationalize it as follows. We started out with a

civilian, Billy Friedman, and I think G2 recognized, Col Albright and the Chief  
Signal Officer and the Director of Intelligence, Military Intelligence, recognized  
that it would be a very difficult <sup>thing</sup> to get Army officers to dedicate their careers to  
cryptographic and <sup>crypt</sup>analytic matters and they had seen much closer than the Navy had  
what could be produced by a civilian organization because the Army was a party to  
the Yardley Black Chamber and the Navy was not and it may be that the Army was  
conditioned by their understanding of how Yardley, civilian type group, might operate  
in the military establishment. Now the Navy didn't have that experience and therefore  
had no insight into it but the Navy had a philosophy that these secret <sup>matters</sup> had to be  
dealt with by commissioned personnel and that you could employ non-commissioned  
personnel but that the decision <sup>that</sup> of the more critical things could be handled only  
by an officer. I am not sure where that philosophy arose but I have encountered it  
many times. Now there was a great deal of that in the Army because I know <sup>that</sup> I was  
excluded from many discussions simply because I was a civilian but the officers

would come back and tell me what was said because I was a civilian in a position of trust and I had to know about it otherwise I couldn't function. Now I think <sup>maybe</sup> these two things, one the exposure of G2 and the Chief Signal Officers <sup>representatives</sup> to the Yardley concept where they could appreciate how civilians could be employed as the long term continuity thread in the organization and that coupled with the concept in the Navy of having officers only deal with highly classified matter lead the Navy into use Navy personnel, uniform <sup>ed</sup> personnel if you will, whether cryptanalytic organization supplanted only by civilian linguists in the early days because now Mrs. Driscoll was <sup>of course</sup> over there but I think these few exceptions, Woodruff, Driscoll and <sup>C</sup> Kate. <sup>C</sup> Kate, is Driscoll was cryptanalytic type, <sup>C</sup> Kate, Woodruff, and some of the others were civilians were translators but that's because the Japanese language was so difficult that the Navy officers couldn't learn it well enough in the short time they could devote to it. Now Kramer was the top Japanese linguist over in the Navy but I have no feeling for how competent he was in Japanese. I don't think he was near as good as Johnny Hurt

---

or Paul Cade<sup>t</sup> or the Erskine, Hugh Erskine over at the Army. He was better though  
 than Joe ~~Shere~~<sup>Sherr</sup> and Merrit Booth and the Army officers who had studied in Japan but  
 Shearer (?)

I don't think he was as skilled in the language as the civilians so the Navy I

think because there was no other way of getting them had to go to civilians for  
 certain skills. The Army though was dedicated to the idea that the civilians could  
 continue in the business without any interruption by rotation<sup>al</sup> of assignments and I

think that is the substantial difference between the Army and Navy organization and

I think if somebody makes the judgment that we were able to accomplish more in the

Army than maybe the Navy had and I assure you nobody in the Navy would agree with

that, that you might attribute the reason to what I just said. Did I deal with it?

(That's exactly right).

....~~part of~~<sup>product</sup> which I observed in the Army and Navy and I'm going to contrast a little

bit with the way ~~common~~<sup>COMINT</sup> end product is handled today. In terms of the diplomatic

translations which were made and I'm talking now in the time frame just before Pearl

Harbor, maybe 18 months before the Pearl Harbor strike. The function of G2 and the Navy officers was simply to carry the translations up to the President or the Secretary of War or the Secretary of Navy and let them read for themselves what was being produced. Now this was fine because well for example the Japanese officer in the State Department, Japanese desk in the State Department, was currently talking with the Ambassador and he was very anxious to know the precise words that had been sent back to Tokyo about his conversation. He didn't want that to be strained through somebody else's brain. He wanted to drink it from the cup himself. Now ~~that~~ <sup>the</sup> President got that kind of an attitude too and he wanted to have that cup <sup>at</sup> ~~to~~ his own lips. He didn't want to have it digested for him by somebody else so now you see the pressure, the attitudes of the recipients was I want the word of God and give me nothing less. Now the same thing was true, <sup>I think,</sup> <sup>in</sup> the Navy because the commander wanted the decode. He wanted to make his own judgment about the the information contained in the translation. He didn't want Kramer to act in his capacity of making this judgment. Now I think this conditioned us to a way of handling information, the

end product that's entirely inconceivable today. I think we can imagine giving Mr. Ford an occasional translation but to have Mr. Ford confronted with something like <sup>the</sup> ~~a~~ magic summary of years ago I think would be totally unacceptable so there's been a difference. One, also keep in mind there was no other intelligence worth mentioning in the pre-Pearl Harbor days because Americans just weren't good intelligence, had no feelings of intelligence. I think it was a sheer accident that the COMINT thing developed like it did because if you probably ask G2 officer in those days what would be a good intelligence organization he would give you an answer ~~but that~~ you had to have some kind of a field organization. [You would not have the national concept of intelligence as now exemplified by the CIA in the post war philosophy <sup>ies</sup> ~~that was~~ <sup>which have</sup> developed.] I think it would have been pretty pedestrian and pretty low and I think <sup>our</sup> ~~a~~ great luck in dealing with the Japanese <sup>systems</sup> in the sense that we were able to exploit them gave ~~them~~ <sup>a</sup> reason for this concept of national intelligence to grow up well in advance of the war and that's been the president's (?)... of course was

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looking at the translations. It I would say it would be hard to conceive today of one of our sections over in PROD having a direct line up to the White House and thats what we had in the Japanese section over at Arlington Hall Station and I thought that's what the Navy had. That useful?

I think a related consideration <sup>fire</sup> to what I <sup>ve</sup> just said is worthy of noting that I've heard some of my good friends in <sup>our</sup> ~~their~~ <sup>state of</sup> bull sessions about intelligence and

its growth. I <sup>ve</sup> <sub>^</sub> heard them and I agree with this, because I've assisted them in their

thinking, that we suffered in our intelligence development because of the great success

we had in the COMINT business. <sup>T</sup> That the people in the War Department and the Navy

department, were so amazed at the type of information being produced, the security

with which it was produced and the practical avoidance of all the nasty business

of running a spy organization, they <sup>have</sup> ~~had~~ concluded, and I would agree with them, that

our success in COMINT inhibited the development of the cognate intelligence activities

which we now are getting blamed for running in this government. In other words we

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had no spy rings in G2. Navy had done a little clandestine work but the Army's capability for clandestine work was zilch, nil. It wasn't. The Navy clandestine work though worried us. I know one of the things that bothered us considerably about right after we'd had found out what the J19 type of system was the Navy had burglarized a Japanese foreign office installation in the US and produced the photographs of the system and ~~their~~ <sup>the</sup> first question that I had to answer G2 and the Chief Signal Officer when they found out about this - Did they break into a place that held the Purple and Red machine and if they did we'll have, we'll have them on the mat for it because we don't want those to be violated. Fortunately the breakin was not at a cipher machine installation but I got strict instructions to go there and tell those folks in the Navy not to do this unless they got Army concurrence and our folks were right because you see being able to do it cryptanalytically we didn't want to lose the cryptanalytic advantage ~~of~~ <sup>by</sup> having them change ~~the~~ <sup>their</sup> system and what Mauborgne and the others were afraid of is that the Navy or whoever was violating, breaking in, would leave traces of that would make the Japanese change their system

and they might do, put in another machine that's more complicated than the Purple  
and then it would take 36 months rather 18 <sup>or</sup> ~~and~~ maybe never before we got the answer  
and so they were very nervous about this. Also when you're intercepting a message  
it's you leave no trace but if you crack a safe you might, so if you can read the  
message by cryptanalysis the enemy has, and you keep your activity and your success  
secure<sup>d</sup>, properly secured, the quote enemy unquote has no capability for making a judgment,  
whether he has no evidence, that you're reading his message and this was a bothersome  
thing. [ I still have that kind of a feeling even though I worked over CIA I think  
its better if you can read by cryptanalysis than to steal it. ) Now I don't want that  
to get out to the press because they give another... I'm not against stealing it  
either if I need to.  
Not answering promptly as I'm having to think about and try to recall what happened.  
I met McCormick about that time frame but there were a lot of things going on and  
most of all I was converted from the civilian to military. I was come in as a  
Second Lieutenant and when most people looked at anybody in uniform they didn't look

at who it was they looked at what was on his shoulder and you know a guy going around with a Second Lieutenant's insignia is not going to be listened to and not to be called in to discussion to somebody going around with a pair of eagles on his shoulder so I did meet, I did meet McCormick. I could sketch a picture of him because I was much interested in him for other reasons but Carter Clarke is the one that did most of the contact with McCormick. I think Carter Clarke was dissatisfied with Minkler and I don't think he admired Bullock either because they knew each other very well and I don't know whether it was Clarke that put the skids under Minkler or whether McCormick or whether Minkler just didn't have it and he just went out because he was really a frustrated man.

In this context I think we ought to, except we didn't record that story about Minkler did we?

(No)

Well Let's do it because its on top of my head and I think I think the question

is roughly this - What could I say this morning about the circumstances of the

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14 part message which has been discussed so much and which really is the key to the COMINT which was obtained in reference to Pearl Harbor?

Here's what happened. The I think it was on Wednesday which would be the 3rd of

December we got a message from Tokyo to Washington which instructed Washington to

destroy their codes. We called it the code destruction message. It's in the file

of translations <sup>that are</sup> or attached to the Pearl Harbor report and essentially it said

destroy all <sup>the</sup> systems except one machine system and make sure it's working good because

we got an important message we're going to send in it. Now this message was picked

up by Col Sattler who was a Signal Corps officer and very able man and it excited

him ~~to~~ no end because he came, he just almost ran from his office when he got the

message and he just banged through the doors and I was the first breathing body he

could find down in the SIS and so he came in and <sup>he</sup> says "What does this mean?" and

I just looked at the message and I said "I don't know. I just got it but it looks

to me like they're either going to change the codes or <sup>there's</sup> something real critical

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happening and they <sup>ve</sup> ~~had~~ never sent a message like this because they usually changed  
the code and then sent the message. And he says "This is a different one <sup>then,</sup> ~~isn't it?"~~  
and I said "Yes sir. We just <sup>never</sup> ~~haven't~~ seen anything like <sup>that</sup> ~~it~~". Well he says  
~~Well he says~~ no government is going to destroy its codes unless its going to war. <sup>go to</sup>  
He said this is an indication of war.  
He said something terrible is going to happen. He said I got to get this down to  
G2 and the Chief of Staff. So he turned around and ran. I mean this was Wednesday  
afternoon I think. Well there was a lot of flurrying around and of course the  
President got interested. I don't think the President or the War Department or the  
Navy Department any of them looked at this message like Sattler did because it was  
that was all Sattler needed and if you'll read the Pearl Harbor report you'll find  
that he got kicked around a little bit because he was so anxious to get a message  
out to the Hawaiian department and Philippine department and I think that's all the  
motivation Sattler required. Now I think because the people in G2 and <sup>N</sup> ~~O&I~~ didn't  
know what to expect I think they were waiting for the Japs to tell them and the only

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way the Japs could tell them was ~~to~~ be by sending a message telling the Ambassador  
or <sup>to</sup> send ~~the~~ message, a circular message, out on the on the Japanese diplomatic network  
throughout the world. Now I'm not talking about the Far Eastern diplomatic network  
but <sup>to</sup> send out a circular message to all Japanese ambassadors. They had this practice  
and followed it pretty frequently. Most of the people then were anxious to read  
every message from Tokyo to Washington. Then we got another message I think. I  
don't remember <sup>the date</sup> of this. It probably was, well the real message that got everybody on  
the alert was <sup>a</sup> ~~the~~ message that came through Saturday morning. This was called the  
Pilot Message. It says we're sending the 14 part message. Now in that sense the  
Japs told us what to expect and since everybody was waiting for the Japs to tell  
them they were anxious to see what the Japs were going to tell them, say, and so the  
the 14 part message was a big target. We had closed up at noon on Saturday because  
we'd been working too much overtime and the Civil Service regulations require that

we ~~be~~ given credit for any overtime hours we spent and so a decision was made from

somewhere up in front, probably from Minkler's office, that we wouldn't have any more

overtime and everybody would be sent home whether the work was done or not so we

were actually sent home. Schuckraft<sup>k</sup> and I locked up the office, turned off the

switches for the cipher machines and did those things that the security check<sup>er</sup> always

did. I left last because I was I was boss so the boss always gets off the shift last ~~at~~

~~so~~ even if you're working in the Signal Corps. We left together and then we got

called in about 2 o'clock and I came right back and we got the force going because

what had happened, the translation of the pilot message had just been sent over as the

last piece of paper well sent over promptly but the timing was that it was in the

last batch of translations that we<sup>re</sup> carried over from the signal office to ~~the Chief~~

of G2 so the G2 desk which didn't have this overtime problem that the Signal Corps

had did what was natural. They came and said Signal Corps have you got this message

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and then the Signal Corps says we're closed down. We don't know. They said well you better get them in here and get <sup>a-</sup><sub>^</sub> cracking to <sup>c</sup><sub>^</sub> Minkler and that's when we got called you see. So we came back and went to work and of course <sup>Schurraft</sup><sub>^</sub> <sup>e</sup><sub>^</sub> Shurraft and I we were anxious to get the 14 parter because that's why we were called back really. To find that 14 part message. Now to get down to what was done with that message. The Japanese came on I think it was later on in the day about supper time when we began to get information that, about the message, but it was around the wee smallies of the morning after midnight that we had everything except the last part and so we just sat there waiting and waiting and waiting and the 14th part of the message came in about well sometime after breakfast and of course we cranked it out right fast. Well what happened <sup>it</sup><sub>^</sub> was this delay of the Japs in sending the 14th part that caused the hangup in delivery of the information to Marshall and to the President

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and to others because both G2 and O<sup>N</sup>I didn't want to take an incomplete message, *an*  
incomplete translation, up to that level and so they took the decision they would  
wait until <sup>*the message*</sup> ~~it~~ was complete before they delivered it. This was I don't think too  
bad a decision because as I recollect the message, and I read it very carefully, *and*  
~~There~~ there was no translation involved because the message was in English. The first 13  
parts was simply a resume of all that had been discussed between the Japanese and the  
US authorities and really really didn't make any difference because they knew it  
anyhow. The puzzle was why were they recapitulating it and then when you got down  
to the 14th part I think the best thing to do is to read it because it says  
essentially the Japanese government cannot tolerate the US attitudes and actions  
and therefore ~~we~~ will do as <sup>*it*</sup> ~~we~~ sees fit in these circumstances which is about as  
tight as the declaration of war <sup>*got.*</sup> ~~and God~~. Now there were some other messages that  
bothered us and that was the instructions as to when and how to deliver the message

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to the US and if you look back you can see that the time<sup>of</sup> Pearl Harbor is identified but there's nothing to identify the place of Pearl Harbor and of course 7:30 Honolulu

time is <sup>1 o'clock</sup> ~~8:00~~ Washington time I believe and that's the connection that was observed,

noted. I think some people talked about what might be happening but nobody ever

dreamt that the Japs would bomb Pearl Harbor. They just didn't think in those terms,

To go back a little bit and discuss the results of throwing these lines into opera-

tion. I was calling Monmouth and <sup>Schukraft</sup> Shu<sup>k</sup>craft was calling San Francisco. I couldn't

raise Monmouth. I kept ringing the bell on the teletype trying to get them up,

never did get an answer. <sup>Schukraft</sup> Shu<sup>k</sup>craft though got quite a quick response from <sup>the Presidio</sup> Psidio

and the first thing that came through is <sup>we're</sup> "You're not suppose to use this line.

What are you doing on the other end?" and he said this to <sup>Schukraft</sup> Shu<sup>k</sup>craft. "Now I want to

get this line in operation. Where is the, who is in charge?" <sup>S</sup>argeant Martin is in

charge and he says "Get ~~at~~ Martin on the teletype. I want to talk to him." So he

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told Martin what he wanted when Martin finally got there. I don't know where Martin

was. It took about fifteen or twenty minutes and Martin said "I'm sorry, *but*

intercept, he was talking to the intercept station now, not ~~at Presidio~~ <sup>to the Presidio</sup> but at the

intercept station right down where the receivers were. This was just off to the side

of them, just like over there in the corner and the Martin said "We don't have any

copies we ~~could~~ <sup>can</sup> teletype to you because we sent all our ~~teletype~~ copies down to the

*Presidio*

~~Presidio~~ mail room to be mailed to you. And *Schuckraft* says go get them and put them on

this line and these are the ones we want. And he did this in the clear. We didn't

fool <sup>in</sup> *ward* in ciphers no with that because we didn't have time. We found out later that

it wasn't that the non-comm in charge up at Monmouth intercept station hadn't been

told exactly what to expect from this teletype thing but he'd been instructed not to

use it until he had been he was given the word officially and when the thing started

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banging over there he got up and pulled the plug to keep it from bothering him.

Did you get that?

Q: So the 14 parter really came in, was in that batch they'd sent to the mail room at ~~the~~

*Presidio*

~~Psidio?~~

A: Put it back on. No the 14 parter was I think we got a copy from Hunt, Fort Hunt, and the Navy had a copy. We got it from all over because the Japs bounce it through and of course all these intercept stations and then Hunt and the naval<sup>y</sup> intercept stations were looking for it and so as quick as it got on the air we picked it up and so it was really foolish about the lines to San Francisco and Monmouth except we started using them immediately and from then on they never did close. I don't I don't think those teletypes stopped until we moved over to Arlington Hall Station. We put in some more but the copy of the 14th part was decoded promptly as soon as it was intercepted. It was only a matter of getting it through the cipher machine and into

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hard copy.

Q: Was the communications from Fort Hunt, the line from Fort Hunt, as efficient as the

*the Presidio?*  
one from ~~Psidio?~~

A: We didn't have a line from Fort Hunt.

Q: How did you get your intercepts from Fort Hunt?

*Schuckraft*

A: ~~Shuck~~<sup>k</sup>raft took his personal car and went down and picked them up and the ~~S~~<sup>r</sup>argeant

down there called him ~~when~~ <sup>that</sup> he had a ~~batch~~ <sup>batch</sup> of intercepts.

Q: My question is, If the line to ~~Psidio~~ <sup>the Presidio</sup> had been in effect say from December 1 or

at least before December 6 would you then have gotten any of ~~the~~ <sup>those</sup> 14 parts quicker

than you did?

A: Yes Sir. We would have gotten them just as they came off the air. They would have

come right in on that teletype line and we could have decoded them immediately and

we wouldn't have had to scurry around between us and the Navy to make sure we were

finding them and that we had the word out to the intercept station and ~~Shuck~~<sup>k</sup>raft

wouldn't have had to go get in the car and sort of look over their intercept operators

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shoulders hoping he would find it. Martin and his group <sup>out the President</sup> at ~~Psidio~~ were the best  
 in the Army and I think if and I'm sure those 14 parters, some of them, were in there.

We can check this by going through the files but I'm sure we got them from every-  
 body, from every intercept station, because these were good signals and everybody  
 was listening and what would have happened is, as the Japanese diplomatic intercepts  
 were collected by the operators, the intercept operators' copy would have gone over  
 the teletype and they would have used the teletype to make a record copy and it  
 would have been delivered in real time into this, into the Purple room, where the  
 teletype <sup>was</sup> ~~is~~ installed so we all we'd have to do is to strip it off the teletype,  
~~and~~ go over and check the indicator and put the starting point on it and run it  
 through the cipher machine. I believe we'd already recovered the key for the <sup>--</sup> there  
 was no delay in recovering the key for that day.

Q: Do you recall approximately the time, the average time, it took from the time of

<sup>at Fort Hunt</sup>  
 intercept ~~before it went~~ to the time that you received it.

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A: There were it was a very <sup>easy</sup> relationship. When Shucraft<sup>k</sup> maintained very close liaison with the Fort Hunt group and he had told the operators what to look for and the kind of things we were interested in so Shucraft would call up on the telephone and double talk <sup>with the</sup> ~~those~~ <sup>back then</sup> people and if they had any thing Shucraft<sup>k</sup> thought we ought to have he'd get in his car and go down there and pick it up. If they didn't have it he wouldn't go. It was that simple.

Q: Can you give us a time, a rough time, for the whole operation? From the time they would intercept it until you had it in your hands?

A: If they intercepted one that they thought Shucraft<sup>k</sup> wanted they would call him up and this is on the assumption it was an identifiable item. Shucraft<sup>k</sup> would drop everything, get in his car and the time lag was what it took Shucraft<sup>k</sup> for driving time and .....

End of Tape 7, Side 1

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Tape 7, Side 2

The question is what do I remember about the <sup>attitude</sup> ~~objective~~ of people in the Signal

Intelligence Service toward the work, <sup>whether</sup> whether we were dedicated to the technical

aspects or whether we were dedicated to the product, intelligence. Well <sup>I think</sup> ~~since~~ this

varies a little bit with the personalities <sup>and</sup> ~~then~~ maybe I should take each one of

<sup>us</sup> ~~them~~ separately and express how we felt. I <sup>think</sup> ~~get~~ the, we could lump all the military,

the officers who were involved in this, <sup>into</sup> under one category. They were certainly

end product oriented and they wanted to get as much end product as we could produce

but a few of them realized, and the few of them included Akin and Mauborgne specifically,

realized that the way you got end product was ~~to~~ make an investment in developing

<sup>technical</sup> your capability and so they were willing to abide by Friedman's judgment as to

whether or not he should put all his effort on <sup>the</sup> this production of end product or

divert some of it to cryptanalytic research and of course we had the cryptographic

problem too and they left pretty much the disposition of the personnel <sup>group</sup> to Friedman

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*people*

so far as the technical work was concerned. Well obviously the G2 <sup>people</sup> cared very little about the technical progress. They I think grossly realized we needed to have good cryptanalysts but they were anxious to have this cryptanalytic effort put on the production of end product <sup>and</sup> so they get a little petulant if they found out that somebody had been transferred from the Japanese section to some place <sup>else</sup> and I assure you I used this to my advantage. Now then I think the important thing to talk about is the attitudes of those of us and I'll I'll I'll deal with four, Friedman, Sinkov, Kullback and myself who were the senior cryptanalysts at that time in the Army. We had some other people who later on well who at that time <sup>I think</sup> <sup>e</sup> <sup>1</sup> <sup>2</sup> <sup>3</sup> <sup>4</sup> <sup>5</sup> <sup>6</sup> <sup>7</sup> <sup>8</sup> <sup>9</sup> <sup>10</sup> <sup>11</sup> <sup>12</sup> <sup>13</sup> <sup>14</sup> <sup>15</sup> <sup>16</sup> <sup>17</sup> <sup>18</sup> <sup>19</sup> <sup>20</sup> <sup>21</sup> <sup>22</sup> <sup>23</sup> <sup>24</sup> <sup>25</sup> <sup>26</sup> <sup>27</sup> <sup>28</sup> <sup>29</sup> <sup>30</sup> <sup>31</sup> <sup>32</sup> <sup>33</sup> <sup>34</sup> <sup>35</sup> <sup>36</sup> <sup>37</sup> <sup>38</sup> <sup>39</sup> <sup>40</sup> <sup>41</sup> <sup>42</sup> <sup>43</sup> <sup>44</sup> <sup>45</sup> <sup>46</sup> <sup>47</sup> <sup>48</sup> <sup>49</sup> <sup>50</sup> <sup>51</sup> <sup>52</sup> <sup>53</sup> <sup>54</sup> <sup>55</sup> <sup>56</sup> <sup>57</sup> <sup>58</sup> <sup>59</sup> <sup>60</sup> <sup>61</sup> <sup>62</sup> <sup>63</sup> <sup>64</sup> <sup>65</sup> 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you will <sup>because</sup> we still had the code making problems to solve. He realized it was a good way of achieving his resources and so he had proper appreciation of this aspect of it but his instinct was to find a solution and his goal was a general solution to almost any problem <sup>so</sup> that you could just crank it into a sort of assembly line program and the answer would come out on the other end if you didn't have to do any deep intuitive analysis or anything. You just knew precisely in advance every step that had to be followed and out would come the answer and he liked to devise these kind of programs and once he had satisfied himself that that kind of a situation had developed he was then ready and anxious to go on to some new problem and I think Friedman was unique in that regard because I don't think anybody over at the Navy had that kind of motivation and I think it was a wonderful thing for the government that Friedman had this. I mentioned it not in the sense of complaint about Friedman but in admiration of him because he had enough other people beating him over the

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head to get the end product out so somebody had to stand up for the technical advancement and he did that ably. Abe, Dr. Sinkov, I think was closer to Friedman in his attitude toward the problems. He realized too the importance of the end product but he just loved the Italian problem and he could get so steeped in it <sup>but</sup> he didn't want to be bothered with anybody else. Now I think Kully was a little closer to Abe and Friedman than I was because both, remember, both Abe and Kully were needed sort of intellectual stimulations. They were both PhD's in mathematics pretty soon after they came and so they liked the research aspect of it, I think, because they were conditioned to it by the fact they had gone on in mathematics as far as they had. <sup>but</sup> Kully was a lot more pragmatic, I think, than Abe or Friedman and somewhat closer to me because I looked on cryptanalysis, I wasn't. I enjoyed it. I thought it was a tremendous occupation to be in but somehow or other I had an instinctive desire to find out what people were talking about. I was curious. I was nosy and there was more of that in me I think than in the other three. Now I admired what

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Friedman did. I like to do this same kind of a thing but I also realized that you  
couldn't put the problem aside, <sup>and</sup> I think I introduced one thing that maybe the  
other three didn't have if I can talk about myself. I think my attitude was now  
I've got this program. Can I improve it? Can I make it more efficient? and I  
would work very hard you see at trying to make find an easier way of solving a  
problem, <sup>and I was</sup> always looking for the golden solution and I think I had this motivation  
which probably Friedman also had but didn't seem to be as prominent in Friedman's  
discussions and his actions as mine did to me and that's probably because I was  
closer to me than I was to Friedman. <sup>He'd tried (?)</sup> ~~He felt~~ other judgements and I felt this  
personally but I can remember many cases where Friedman was real pleased to let me  
go ahead with the operation of the Japanese sections when things were pretty well  
under control because that gave him a chance to do the other things that he liked  
to do, <sup>namely</sup> ~~mainly~~ improve our cryptographic systems, find new devices, speculate about  
improvements in the applications <sup>our</sup> of IBM and all sorts of avenues into a broader  
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domain of cryptanalysis. Of course as I sit here today I can't help but think of how strange this may sound in terms of the present concept of intelligence because we have really complicated the situation because we formalized it into intelligence requirements, and intercept requirements and mission objectives and all the fancy words that you bump into <sup>in</sup> ~~on~~ staff papers but nonetheless it the process boils down simply to the technical skills and actions which are required to reduce the intercepted traffic <sup>to</sup> some basic <sup>intelligence</sup> form, translation I think is a good example of what I'm talking about, and the dedication to that segment of the operation <sup>as</sup> ~~is~~ contrasted with the quote consumer impulse unquote which we find in the intelligence agency. <sup>is,</sup> The people who receive the information then the final consumer <sup>is who</sup> is the man, and I would say <sup>that</sup> Kissinger is a pretty good example of this, Kissinger and his hungers for information and I'm sure Kissinger doesn't have any idea of what's involved in the earlier steps <sup>--</sup> ~~of~~ interception, processing, solution of the system and its translation. I think he would be familiar with that thing closest to him

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namely the people who evaluate the information and digest it for him. I think he would understand that but I think he would have very little patience with a man that said well the end product, the end goal here is the solution of the system not the information we're going to give you Mr. Secretary, and in those days you see of course the whole thing was telescoped into very short path because G2 was just over <sup>there</sup> ~~at~~ and there were only a few people we talked to. We could clearly see the cryptanalytic organization, <sup>int</sup> how it was working and then we were immediately close to the intercept operation and there was no competition, no strong competition for intercept time. Our biggest competition was for machine time because the geographical location of our intercept station<sup>s</sup> took care of the requirements, intercept requirements, problem. They listened to what they could hear and that's what they sent in.

Q: In through the 20's but from then on it gets very very hazy.

A: Well I might tell you what I remember about the 1930's on up until we got involved in the war and I think the during the war and post war story about and lets call it the cable traffic here for an easy handle. It <sup>is</sup> ~~was~~ pretty well documented. I doubt

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though if <sup>the</sup> intercept of the early 30s has been treatly adequately in any historical records and so I will just tell you what I remember. Now lets talk about the state of the intercept in 1930, sometime in the early or late spring April-May 1930 time frame. The Second Signal Service was just being put together and so the amount of intercept which we received from them was just the result of sort of accidental, an accidental thing which maybe one of the officers or one of the operators had produced because he was practicing and I think we got a lot of that type of material but it wasn't much use. In the first place we didn't know what to do with it. We were still too young in our training program to be ready to deal with that kind of material and second it was <sup>poorly</sup> ~~pretty~~ organized because the Second Signal Service hadn't set down the rules and <sup>the</sup> ~~the~~ format for proper preparation of intercept which is vital I think to being able to use the material efficiently because it's got to be pretty well sorted out and identified before it gets, before you can even decide which is

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items are going to be transmitted because a lot of it is crud and you don't want to waste your time with it so we find that the Second Signal Service, the great <sup>of</sup> hope ~~for~~ the Signal Intelligence Service for intercept in the future, was just now coming into being and was in the preproduction <sup>state,</sup> ~~stage~~. Yardley, to go back and sort of cover up that side of, uncover that side of the picture, Yardley was relying mainly on cable drops and I think that's pretty well told in his book the Black Chamber and I think that's pretty accurate. I don't think he says so in so many words but somebody who understands the business can certainly see this and on my own recollection I can remember a lot of cable drop traffic obviously picked up <sup>from</sup> cable offices in ~~this~~ <sup>New York and</sup> country, which ones I don't know but I would guess ~~in~~ Washington because the nature of the traffic. I can remember a lot of that but I remember very little if any intercept except the World War I traffic like the ADFGVX material <sup>that</sup> ~~which~~ I talked about earlier and that obviously was from the field intercept

stations that had been provided for support of intelligence in WWI. Now since we

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in the SIS were not actively engaged in COMINT production we didn't need any traffic at that time so probably the security of the operation was such that it seemed like we would be prematurely rocking the boat if we went out or G2 went out and tried to begin to collect cable traffic because there was no point. <sup>text</sup> It would have cost us more in terms of security than we would have gained in terms of advantage, and now there is one other sort of area interest that I think I should mention. The US Navy had and I learned this later. I didn't know it until about 34 or 35 or certainly not before 1932. The US Navy had developed a very effective intercept service and had been covering the Far Eastern circuits particularly the Japanese Far Eastern diplomatic net which was a special net set up with headquarters in Tokyo and several points throughout Asia I believe. I think there were four major stations in it. That's my recollection and I caution anybody to quote me but I remember four stations. This could be wrong but there were certainly a headquarters

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and some stations in Asia, Manchuria and the parts of Asia that the Japanese were occupying in those days and this was I think some of the best intercept copy I saw until we got the Signal Service organized and were using mechanical aids such as undulator tapes <sup>for</sup> ~~that were~~ recording the signal and then we could always go back to the tapes and check it. The Navy intercept copy was almost a hundred percent perfect.

I know it was a Navy intercept copy we worked on when Kully and I broke out the first Red machine traffic. It was a Navy intercept, Far East net. It was December and I believe it was December 1930 was the date of the message. Now of course we didn't have access to this Navy material but I mention it to round out the picture.

Well a couple of things should be noted in connection with the Second Signal Service and its <sup>intercept</sup> efforts. One of the things that the Signal Intelligence Service was responsible for grew out of the WWI concept of, I will call it a SIGINT organization, because the secret inks in WWI had been a great source of intelligence and in the

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concept of the Signal Intelligence Service <sup>of the</sup> ~~in~~ 1930s it was envisioned that there should be a secret inks laboratory attached to the Signal Intelligence Service and be a part of it and Friedman had was a very good friend of John McGrail who at that time was a captain and a professor of chemistry at one of the eastern universities. I dont remember which one and John came down a couple of times on active duty. John McGrail one of the things he did on his active duty trip was to design and layout <sup>a</sup> ~~the~~ laboratory for secret inks treatment. One purpose of it was, one, to have a laboratory in being so that we could train people in secret inks and believe it or not I took a course under John McGrail in secret inks, manipulation and flap and seal work and other things which I found great, <sup>right</sup> interesting because I had a chemistry major in college and of course I was pretty well conditioned for this and I thought it was great stuff. Now as a part of this secret inks laboratory John had set up facilities for microdot and that required a dark <sup>room</sup>

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and in a corner of the dark room we had developing facilities for 35mm film and a 35mm enlarger and so sometime on in the 30s and I cant put the date on this but I assure you it would be about somewhere between the date of the solution of the Red machine and the Purple machine when G2 began to find out that we could in fact process and exploit the Japanese diplomatic intercept so rapidly that they began to figure on ways of cutting down the time of receipt of the material because that was now the bottleneck and arrangements were made with the local cable office here in Washington for one of the officers to go up and photograph the selected traffic and bring the film down where it would be developed in this little secret ink laboratory and now it was really part of the intercept service because we were so busy with other things we lost interest <sup>really</sup> in secret ink and we were using this facility as a way of getting prints of the messages and that had been <sup>filed (?)</sup> filed up in Washington. Now this pickup

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had to be done in the early morning hours. I believe I'm correct in this recollection that the, some fellow came in very early in the morning and got the messages in a little package at the RCA office or whichever cable office it was in Washington. Then one of the officers, and Earl Cook did most of this, would go up go into this little room where he had a camera that could be set up with some lights, photograph the messages, put the film in his pocket, lock the camera back up in whatever compartment he ~~sof~~ stored it in, come on down and either he or one of us or a <sup>e</sup>sargeant would run the film through, develop it and make the prints, and this, just sort of <sup>to</sup> interject something that's historically out of place and chronologically out of place but so it doesn't get lost, we found it extremely interesting and sometimes valuable, I can't think of anywhere it was of <sup>inestimable</sup> \_\_\_\_\_ value but it did enable us to learn a lot of things about coderoom practices and in fact some of the messages from, that he had brought down, the photographs showed clearly that that well the

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Scandinavians I believe certainly were using Hagelin cryptograph that produced a

printed tape and they simply paste the tape up on their message blank and that was

a very good confirmation that they were using Hagelin you see, and other times,

particularly in J19 domain we'd find a code clerk would make a mistake and he would

copy the wrong column and then type the message up and check it back from the message

and he'd scratch out the column and write in the correct text so on occasion when

you found a message that had been editorially corrected by the code room producing it

and that the copy date [correctly<sup>?</sup>] been filed you could pick up a little clue as to,

would help you in your exploitation thing. I dont think any of these, for example J19

transposed code corrections, we ever got the key out of but I think we I can remember

maybe you were on this but I know F<sup>e</sup>arner and Small and I, ~~and~~ Sammy, When we got one

of these we would just see how much help this <sup>would</sup> ~~could~~ give us if we hadn't recovered

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the key and I think our conclusion was this <sup>w</sup> could be a very good clue and if <sup>we</sup> ~~it~~ had

this material before we <sup>had</sup> understood the system as well as we did it might have been  
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the difference between breaking into it early or not breaking into it at all. --

Just these little clues <sup>from</sup> looking at the original messages. Now as the interest in

intercept and the further development of intercept capabilities sort of lagged until

we got actually engaged in the COMINT business and G2 became interested in our

end product and began to put the pressure on us for faster servicing of them for

particular messages. As a practical example of the kind of thing they were interested

in was any message dealing between Tokyo and Berlin and Rome in which dealt with the

negotiations of this tripartite type pact called the Axis Pact and the key to this

their interest was to discover the precise wording of the secret codicil<sup>s</sup> which had

been drafted for this tripartite pact <sup>and</sup> ~~in~~ which had never appeared in the press or the

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public domain. I think we had <sup>the text</sup> from open sources of the basic pact but the secret  
codicil<sup>e</sup> to it was never revealed in the open press and that was their primary interest  
so you see they were anxious to get this dope as quick as they could and this  
stimulated G2 who placed the requirement on us with the result that the Chief Signal  
Officer and the head of the War Plans and Training Division, which was responsible  
for both the activities, the SIS and the Second Sig, keeping in mind the SIS was a  
cryptanalytic organization and the Second Sig was the intercept organization. Since  
the War Plans and Training Division was responsible for both of these then they dealt  
with the requirements for more rapid services<sup>ing</sup> and this I think gave us <sup>an</sup> ~~more~~ impetus,  
the impetus we needed to have, to get on with the intercept. Now the nice thing about  
the cable drop traffic is that it was clean, it was useful, it was perfect copy,  
it wasn't garbled by being incorrectly transmitted, typed in the code<sup>'''</sup> in the  
communications office and of course you avoided the garble of the intercept process

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which no matter how good your intercept operations<sup>ors</sup> are there's bound to be some small percentage of errors<sup>s</sup> introduced and I would say that's roughly the picture unless Sammy can add something that I've overlooked.

Q: Let me ask a follow up question to that. In the period<sup>from</sup> 1934<sup>and</sup> with the passage of the

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Federal Communications Act and the actual beginning of hostilities for World War II

was there any thought that you know of given<sup>in either</sup> ~~of~~ the SIS or G2 as to the legality<sup>is</sup> of

using the cable traffic?

A: Yes we gave considerable thought to it. We knew it was illegal and therefore we

better keep quiet about it.

Q: You knew it was?

A: Yes Sir. There was no doubt in our minds<sup>but</sup> what this was illegal. You want to ask

a question or you want me...

Q: Well what we were wondering about is that with the Section 605 of the Federal

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Communications Act of 1934 it spells it out very clearly that interception of foreign

communications was prohibited. Of course that goes by the boards during wartime so

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the question was when, as the SIS was using these cable, the cable traffic, from 30 or 31 through 41, beginning of the war, and then from 45 onward, what were the legality the consideration, the legal consideration involved in this?

A: Well if I may answer that in terms of what I recollect and sort of the rationale that I remember as I remember it if you will go back to your law you will find that there is a whole string of things, words end to end, starts out with the interception and winds up with "the publication thereof" so we figured this was the envelope that we hid behind. We figured that as long as we didn't let it be openly published that we were still legal if we intercepted and if we cryptanalyzed and if we translated and ~~if we use~~<sup>d</sup> it within government circles in an unpublished form, that we we sort of had a little bit of an island to stand on. And that was just about the attitude that we employed. Essentially we recognized ~~this~~<sup>its</sup> potential illegality and we knew if it ever

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got to court that we would be condemned and even some of us might be tried as individuals. We were told that by G2 and our bosses that "Look you must remember, and I guess you'll remember this Sammy, but I was told just like I was about ~~patents~~, <sup>patents,</sup> there's a caveat that you were given about any invention you made would be the governments you see but that came on later on but there were certain things, ~~patents~~ <sup>patents</sup> was one and the other was the legality and the need for secrecy. We were told that the law was unfair, that this was being done in the national interest and if we had any qualms about it we better get out because if ~~they~~ <sup>if</sup> ever came to ~~issue~~ <sup>issue</sup> the law, the legal aspects might be against ~~you~~ <sup>us</sup> so in that sense I was aware that what we were doing had, could be illegal and I was satisfied in my own estimate of it that it was but I didn't care because I felt so strongly that what we were doing was a proper <sup>thing</sup> for the US government and I certainly knew that we had to have the codes because I could

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not see, for example the UK which was notoriously <sup>it</sup> successful nation in codebreaking.

I couldn't see the British pulling back for some legal consideration if they felt

they could get a diplomatic advantage from reading and breaking an American code so

this was the context in which most of us approached it and maybe we sort of developed,

mutually developed, this attitude and fell into it because it gave us <sup>a</sup> comfortable

if I had feeling but I think <sup>^</sup> to do it over again baldfaced I would go and run the risk and in

those days <sup>it</sup> was in <sup>deed</sup> much less than it is today that <sup>the thing</sup> ~~it~~ would be exposed because then

you were dealing with people that you knew were honorable. The people in the business

were honorable people. They weren't <sup>ei'</sup> siezed by some of these things like Ellsberg

was <sup>ei</sup> siezed with. There just weren't enough of them around so that the probability

of an Ellsberg being in our group was great enough for it to actually happen. Now we

did have a few people that we were nervous about but as I look back there was no call

for nervousness . Its just that they they talked that way rather than believe<sup>d</sup> that way,

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and I think today as I look at it I would not feel as easy about my chances of going through that kind of an operation without being caught at it as it was in those days. It was almost <sup>100%</sup> foolproof in those days. Now its something less than that because I would be afraid that some of my contemporaries might turn out to be an Ellsberg and that would bother me considerably for what its worth.

Q: The cable companies were certainly agreeable to cooperating, were they not?  
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A: They indeed were and I tell you I found this. That there were certain people within the cable companies. Now I wasn't involved in this directly so this is second hand and hear say. Some of the people in the cable companies felt like they were doing a national service and were proud to be involved in this thing because they had enough understanding and had been briefed appropriately by our G2 representative and we of course did this at <sup>the</sup> higher level when the stage was set for us to pick up this cable traffic they had ~~complete~~ <sup>confidence</sup> enough in the war department people to trust

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that it was indeed something in the national interest and was not going to be used for,

as implied by Mrs. Abzug and others, that this is for persecution of the individuals.

They they they weren't that stupid, these officials, but they did take pains to ~~make~~

sure <sup>that</sup> whatever arrangements <sup>was</sup> ~~were~~ set up well enough organized that the actions could

be kept secret and not be leaked to the press. We were awful nervous about people

from the press. We just avoided them wherever possible, not for that reason but for

the whole basic concept of keeping quiet the SIS activity. I think the Navy is just

as bad. I don't recall <sup>whether</sup> the Navy did any, had any arrangements, picking up the traffic

because and I think the reason <sup>was this,</sup> ~~is~~ that the Army got in there a little bit early on

the deal and the Navy and the Army both felt <sup>if</sup> that the Navy <sup>tried</sup> ~~would try~~ to go in and do

the same kind of thing that then this might be too much for <sup>the</sup> communication companies

and might be too much to have too much, make too much of a, make too many waves and

therefore be discovered.

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Q: What was the situation at the end of the war? Did you go back, <sup>did you</sup> continue on after the war using cable traffic?

A: Let's put this on tape. Now this is a nervous <sup>but</sup> but I'm going to tell you what I recollect. I don't think its going to be any worse than <sup>what's</sup> in the records already.'

At the end of the war we could visualize a couple of things. One, the certain setbacks were in fact inevitable in our intercept capability. We had hoped to have a

[world-wide intercept capability] but we didn't know whether that would endure or not

because in <sup>the</sup> a few months after the war people just couldn't get home quick enough

and later on, just to throw in a little bit of a personal observation, when they got

back home and after they had been there for a while it didn't look so good so they

were anxious to get back into the service. So in that little period when there was

a great outflow of people from the intelligence area and I can remember General

C Korderman giving a speech out on the campus at Arlington Hall Station

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He got everybody out there and made a speech to them and in essence what he said was we'd like for you to stay but here's your hat, what's your hurry. I mean he just encouraged people to hurry up and get back home because he was he had been told by the Chief Signal Officer and the people in the Pentagon that we had<sup>to</sup> demobilized rapidly and look General <sup>C</sup>Kordermann you got a lot of people out there at Arlington Hall Station. The sooner you get back to nothing out there the happier we'll be with you and your administration and <sup>C</sup>Kordermann was out there trying to effect that rapid dissolution of the outfit which was absolutely contrary to the Carter Clarke philosophy and that was "let's keep the better ones". I don't know what discussions <sup>C</sup>Clarke and <sup>C</sup>Kordermann had but I do remember <sup>C</sup>Kordermann was mentioned a couple of times by Clarke in his conversations with me and I quote "Why the hell is Red so anxious to get rid of the people?" unquote but there was that. I mean <sup>we</sup> he could see that maybe we could go too far in the dismemberment of the activity and we laid on a plan which

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I think got called Shamrock at some time and the object of Shamrock was to continue

these practices which <sup>had been</sup> ~~were~~ developed under wartime conditions and considerations

with communications companies because if we broke them off and then <sup>go,</sup> had to go start  
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them again you see <sup>that</sup> ~~it~~ would be just like building the world all over again and we

thought as long as these were in being and we could continue them to keep people

happy this would be fine and I do know that the efforts expended for the continuation

of these things turned out to be considerable and involved people at the highest level.

People from the upper levels of the government. The Secretary of Defense, the Secretary

of War's office. Actually went up and talked to the heads of the communications

companies which <sup>we</sup> ~~wanted~~ to provide us with this stuff and the arrangements were laid  
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out on that level and it was <sup>set up</sup> ~~sent out~~ so that the detail pickup arrangements, that is,

who would deliver what traffic to whom and the rules and regulations surrounding

the way it should be handled were set up at the lower level but the sanctions and

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the agreement <sup>in</sup> ~~and~~ principle was negotiated at the highest level, in the country in the Secretary of War's office. I'm sure that must be documented somewhere around Washington. I don't know whether those documents would be here because this would be done between G2, under G2 auspices, rather than the Director of well rather than the Chief Army Security Agency or Chief Signal Officer. Now this Shamrock operation was considered valuable for these considerations. One, it was a cheap way of getting intercept, realcheap. It was a fast way of getting intercept. It was a secure way of getting intercept because the waves you generated by <sup>it's</sup> somewhat clandestine arrangements <sup>were</sup> ~~was~~ a lot less than you might expect to be generated by having an intercept station deal with the stuff. That was one consideration. The second consideration was <sup>this</sup> ~~the~~ attribute of the traffic. You were looking at the copy which had been filed by the coderoom, prepared in the coderoom and sometimes the nature of the system~~s~~ shows through in this and the two things I mentioned are beautiful examples of the kind of

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information you can pick up. What was the printer like? Was it a hand system?

I think you could make a good guess at it. <sup>or was it</sup> ~~Always~~ a machine system and most ~~of the~~  
machines were designed to print on the <sup>page</sup> ~~page~~ and you could by <sup>examining</sup> ~~determining~~ the type  
and the external characteristics of the message you could learn a lot about the  
system and you might get some wonderful clues about it because they scratch out an  
indicator and replace or, as they did with the J19, they would alter one of the columns  
and that was directly and accurately reflect the length of the column, the length of  
the key and some other implications and so it was this technical consideration that  
was important and I think in my mind almost enough to continue <sup>it</sup> ~~not~~ for the timely  
receipt and economical receipt <sup>of the</sup> ~~intercept~~. Then there was a third consideration that  
it had been a very nervous thing to get these companies involved in this activity  
earlier and we felt if they ever pulled away from it that we might not be able to  
recruit them to assist us so these were the three considerations. One, efficiency and

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economy, cheapness and speed of intercept. The technical plums that you might

examine the glean from a photograph of the traffic and this was particularly so in the Washington

area because that's where the Embassies were and then finally we didn't want to have

to invent the wheel all over again with some later generation of communications

company.

Q: I think it's important to reiterate the location as to the decision to do that, was

upper level of the government rather than the agency looking at the traffic.

A: The agency generated a requirement and before the operation could be conducted

it had to be sanctioned in the upper levels of the government and the nature of the

thing was such that some of the negotiations had to be conducted by that level. That

was the Gordon Gray level if you want a particular... Gordon Gray being an Assistant

Secretary I believe of War at that time. Later on he was Assistant Secretary of Defense.

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.....regard to what Jim Slack, I'll identify as the secrecy oath where an individual who when he accepts <sup>it</sup> the position signed an oath of secrecy. I don't remember the precise time of that. I know I didn't sign a secrecy oath and I wasn't cleared until about the middle of the war and the reason I wasn't cleared <sup>is about why</sup> ~~was~~ because obviously I had been in the business since 1930 and was one of the original three or four. Do you remember signing the secrecy oath Sammy?

(*Not on the beginning*)

Now when the war came on I think <sup>C</sup> Korderman and Jim Slack, Col Slack, <sup>his</sup> ~~was~~ the Executive Officer, got a <sup>new</sup> ~~notice~~ about this and at that time <sup>C</sup> Korderman issued an order that all people who had access to COMINT and particularly <sup>to</sup> <sub>A</sub> COMSEC materials would have to have some kind of a background examination. I remember that's about the first time I ever heard the term background examination and I wondered what it was and I wondered what <sup>C</sup> Korderman meant and so did ~~the men and so did~~ Jim Slack but they kind of figured out something that should be done and that was to look to see if there was

record and derogatory information in their files and look over their Civil Service application and maybe write a few people. We always had three people <sup>you know</sup> that we used as references and they would write to ~~the~~ references and from them they would pick out one or two and, one of two names, of I mean this was sort of the second generation that if I gave three references they would write to one of the references and say could you please list some intimate acquaintances of this individual and then they would pick out one or two of the individuals who were, had been recommended, by the fellow I had used as a referral and they would check with them to see if there was any derogatory information. Well this patently is not much of a way of doing a background investigation but I guess it was better than nothing. I don't <sup>know</sup> whether it was worth what it cost or not. Well that was sort of the first step and then later on when we got more and more sophisticated and got into compartmented problems and particularly after the war they got to be lot more fussy <sup>just it</sup> and I think the ultimate in this

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requirement was the use of polygraph. I don't know that we had even envisioned this

~~secret~~  
after the war but now there is another set of circumstances in the war. It was

I think the basic reason for requiring the secrecy oath when you signed it, was to

~~people from spilling~~  
keep their guts out after the war was over because everybody was remembering the

effects of the Yardley book and they didn't want people to go out and tell all about

their wartime experiences because they were <sup>afraid</sup> something might spill through that

would be classified, and so I think it was just to inhibit people from making noises

about what they had been involved in and that's <sup>about</sup> all it amounted to. Now really there

was not too much reason for security investigations during the war because it was a

<sup>I think,</sup>  
rate thing, to find somebody who wasn't totally dedicated to winning the war and

certainly the Japanese would be identified by color. I mean there was a race element

there which people now say ignore it now if you want to, <sup>but</sup> there are times when you

don't ignore the difference in people's skin, the color, and that was a deterrent.

The German was a little more complicated question but somehow or other we got through

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without any bad luck. Of course though when the war was over and we began to, I say

we, I mean the nation now not just the SIGINT types and we as a nation and those of

us who were in the intelligence business and subjected to the considerations of

security requirements, <sup>when</sup> ~~and~~ we began to find out what the <sup>Communist</sup> intelligence service ]

were doing why then I think we got real scared. I guess this was a sort of [Joe

McCarthy] concept of it and I think <sup>there</sup> ~~it~~ was something we needed to be worried about,

because most of the country had looked [on ~~the~~ Russia as an ally] and it wasn't until

[the Potsdam Conference had taken place that we began to realize that the new peace

we were in was a cold war with Russia.] I think that's the first inkling we had and

then we began to tighten up, <sup>but</sup> as I recollect, on our security requirements ~~and~~ I would

say and I could be wrong in this, but the oath of secrecy came in about war time, and

I think we were all required to sign it. Do you recall anything different Sammy?

I don't remember signing this oath until.. I don't think I had to sign it because I was in uniform. See, people in uniform are a cut above people who are not in uniform in the military establishment. ~~They think~~ I don't know, they are born out of different <sup>members</sup> ~~rooms~~ or something. Something happens to them. At the end of the war the <sup>--</sup> under mobilization, those of us who were soldiers for the duration were given the opportunity of continuing in uniform or reverting to civilian status and I'll talk about my own situation and I believe that's your question.

At the end of the war when I got out of ~~the~~ uniform I was undecided whether I wanted to continue in the SIS work or not, and when I talked to Col. Hayes about this, our big problem, my big problem, was not the grade that they offered me but whether I wanted to continue in this work or not because I was tired. It had been a long war and we had been working, all of us, not just me but everybody, had been working such long hours and under such pressure that we we just wanted relief from it and I think I had had a couple of offers outside. One was with a new computer company that was being

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organized and the <sup>monetary</sup> ~~military~~ offer was <sup>enough,</sup> ~~not the~~ substantial, and of course my natural inclination was to go back to the mountains and rest a while and that's sort of what I was dreaming about. I just didn't want to be bothered with computers and other things so I had a little bit of a personal problem and finally I think when it came down <sup>that</sup> ~~and~~ Hayes said Well I sort of got to know about this and I said I'll give you an answer over the weekend, so I went home and thought about it very carefully and I'll record my own feeling about it because it may be of interest to somebody. I was vividly aware of what was happening because people were getting out and going away. I was vividly aware <sup>that</sup> the government had invested a lot of training, a lot of money in me, and that I represented some kind of an asset that would be hard to replace. I mean I probably was a little bit egotistical about this but <sup>frankly</sup> ~~frankly~~ this would be the kind of an argument that I would make about myself. So I was worth something and I was a little bit unique because of this long training. Also at that time and

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I thought this was important, and this may be a little bit self-serving but I was had considerable influence. I had made a name for myself and I was listened to when I spoke and I was believed because I sort of as somebody who had been living this thing for a long time was looked on as a sort of person who understood the business and whose judgment could be trusted and that was part of the contribution I might make. Now this may sound very egotistical but I'm just trying to tell it like it was. <sup>well</sup> So these were the things that persuaded me that I ought to take this job and I still didn't know what the salary was going to be at that time, so Monday morning when I went to see Hayes to give him my answer, Yes I'm going to continue, then I found <sup>out</sup> what I was going to be paid, which really surprised me because I wasn't expecting this much so this was sort of why I continued in ~~the~~ <sup>the</sup> business. Now I'm glad I stayed on for this for two reasons. One the battle for consolidation, <sup>whether</sup> we had three services or one NSA came up and I think I was helpful in bringing about the NSA concept. I

shudder to think if we had three competing services right now, <sup>the same</sup> I don't know whether the problems would be covered or not. At least in NSA you can put your finger on NSA if <sup>it</sup> the problem slips out from under. If you've got three services and I know as sure as I'm sitting here and with all due respect to the officers <sup>in the</sup> that populate these services there is going to be a great business of buck-passing and some of the important problems would vanish just like they did with the in the German SIGINT structure <sup>during</sup> in WWII. The Germans had a great number of SIGINT operations. They all went around, skimed <sup>the</sup> the cream off. They did the easy stuff and left the real gems, they never really uncovered them. They never really made an honest-to-God attempt on the American high level traffic, The SIGABA, I don't think <sup>they</sup> ever made a proper attack on the lesser SIGCOM traffic and the Argentin traffic. They had some success, yes, but they were all so busy doing the easy ones <sup>that</sup> they never got down to the hard. Well that's exactly what I think <sup>we</sup> would have <sup>had</sup> happened without the

consolidation and I think it would have been a terrible situation for the country.

I don't think we would have had the secure crypto<sup>system</sup> because there would be three experts around you know, each one pulling out his own and I think that would have been terrible so I'm kind of glad <sup>that</sup> I stayed on but the reason I mention this is I just about

committed suicide in my NSA career because I was such a vocal proponent of this

consolidation because although the Army and the Navy initially, the Air Force and

Navy, I'm sorry, although the Army initially wanted consolidation that actively

impact of the consolidation itself had taken place some of my friends over in the Army

had told me that they wished they had never had any part of this and this of course

was exactly what was found in the Navy and Air Force. Well then I ran into trouble

with Canine sort of and he moved me from the SIGINT end of the business where I was

real comfortable and happy and he just sort of kicked me around I thought. He sent

me over to the COMSEC side of the business. Well I was doing more good for the COMSEC I thought by being over in the SIGINT end than I could in COMSEC and anyhow I was working for a guy who didn't know as much about it as I did and that was

*CSA* intolerable [so I was lucky enough to get a job over in CIA.] This was about, just right after the consolidation took place and you could see why I mention the two things in the same breath because I was having a terrible personal time over there *at* NSA. Canine didn't like me. I I didn't move fast enough to suit him and I think he sensed I didn't have much respect for the way he was running the business because I was pretty outspoken, and of course my friends in the Navy were damned glad to get rid of me because I had made so much trouble for them for <sup>10</sup> ~~all~~ these many years that

*CSA* it was a happy decision for all. [Then when I went over to CIA,] and am I making this too personal, <sup>I think,</sup> Hank <sub>A</sub>, I found a different world. First place I was sitting pretty

much at the top of the heap and I was great deal in the position that J. Edgar Hoover found himself. You know you become consolidated because you hadn't been moved out and I knew how to maneuver and stay on top of that heap without too much effort but when the heap crumbled down I had to get back and start scratching again and show that I had some merit on my own. (This is exactly what happened to me when I went to CIA because cryptanalysts, I mean Dulles put it flatly, we're not going into competition with NSA. We're not going into competition with Canine and his people. We've got CIA enough to do in CIA and we're not going to fragmentize our efforts by going over there and starting a cryptanalytic organization, COMINT organization, which <sup>and</sup> this is for the record, which I think a lot of people including Canine thought Dulles was about to do. In my conversation both with Smith and <sup>with</sup> Dulles it was clear they had no intentions whatsoever but they did need something over there which I could provide and that's ]

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{ somebody with expertise so <sup>the</sup> they thought they were getting good advice because most  
of the people at CIA had not come from the technical end of the business. They didn't  
quite understand ~~the~~ what was required in terms of <sup>a</sup> ~~the~~ cryptanalytic organization and  
what was important to pick up and how much, how deeply, they should go in the liaison  
with the on these third party deals and this was kind of my role over there and but  
I had to learn how to be a CIA type. I took their training course<sup>r</sup>. I tailed people  
around through Georgetown, ~~for~~ one example. I went to isolation. I got pretty good  
indoctrination, you know, a quickie course really but it was a lot of fun and really  
very tiring because here I was well I've gone up in years, see, starting a brand new  
job and I had enough personal pride to want to earn my money rather than just go there  
and take that job because I well it was just the way I was put together. We had a lot  
of fun over there. Some of the things that at least I had a lot of fun, I think made  
some contributions because one of the mysteries <sup>to</sup> ~~in~~ the SIGINT business was what kind of ]

traffic was going on the [landlines, the Soviet landlines] and we were able to <sup>mount</sup> ~~knock~~

this [Kings] operation which I think was a pretty good one. It lasted <sup>for</sup>

almost a year, [11 months, 11 days and 11 hours] is what I remember, and then George

Blake finally got through to the [Russians, <sup>that</sup> we had this tap.] He was the one who blew

it, I'm sure. George Blake was aware of it but for some reason the [Russians didn't

react <sup>rapidly</sup> to this] and that's the kind of thing I did over there which in itself is just

another domain of the SIGINT as we see it today except I would go on record right now

as saying that [clandestine collection should be something that] NSA should avoid like

sin. First place the kind of people that NSA would use in the collection ~~would~~ have

to be trained in [clandestine attitudes] and I don't see that in any of the services

nor did I ever see that it in the services. Rarely you'll find a man who is instinctively

[a clandestine] operator and you can employ him but your average intercept operator is

just, he looks <sup>practically</sup> ~~just~~ like an intercept operator, he talks like him and he ratchetjaws

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the whole story out if he gets somebody <sup>he</sup> he can ratchetjaw with, so I would say NSA had

<sup>better</sup>  
~~would~~ be well advised to let all the [clandestine activity] to be done by CIA and I

guess maybe I wouldn't have to argue too much now because look at what happened to

the Bureau when it got out into the clandestine business and got caught so it <sup>'s</sup> just

<sup>CIA</sup> as well to let somebody else front for you. Why did I come back to NSA [from CIA?]

Well first place Sammy had an idea that well <sup>he</sup> you had to have a new Deputy Director

and Billy Friedman had retired and Sammy had an idea that it would be a good thing

to get some ~~of the~~ old timers in the business, back in the business, and I think also

Sammy rather suspected that his life would be a little easier, not that he mistrusted

me but if for his [task?] that he could show that [any possible competition from CIA in

<sup>CIA</sup> the business of SIGINT was removed] and he felt that by my coming back to NSA I could

bring two things. One, alleviate some of the feeling [that CIA might get involved <sup>in the,</sup> ~~with~~

<sup>CIA</sup> compete with NSA and] two, I think Sammy got to know me well enough in both in terms

of the [Regal] operation which required a lot of coordination and I talked to Sammy as Chief of Air Intelligence, made the arrangements you know, ~~Sanford~~<sup>Sanford</sup> briefed him on the [Regal] and told him so there was quite a long period of relationship between and he felt like maybe my experience [in CIA] would be useful as well as the fact I had been in the business a long time and at one time had a reputation so I think this sort of convinced him it was a good thing to come back.

Q: Who was this?

A: General Sanford. Sammy Sanford. Well he offered me the job of, that I took as Special Assistant and I was very happy to come back because I loved <sup>the</sup> to work. I loved the organization. It was a fun place to work so I came back. I don't remember the date but that was the job and that was the circumstance, and I think <sup>this</sup> will be interesting. I'm ~~not~~ really making this more of a personal story than answering the simple questions chronology. Wes Reynolds, who was the Director of Security, came up to me

and he said "Frank, he says, we would like you to take a polygraph when you come back to NSA", and he was very apologetic about the thing and I reminded him that I had one

*and [it]*  
CIA [over at CIA] hadn't bothered me. Why was he bothered about this? He says, Well we

CIA could actually accept you based <sup>your</sup> on CIA polygraph but we would like to have it said

that you, even an oldtimer in the business, when you came in to take this job,

took the polygraph and we'd like to be able to point that <sup>people in</sup> ~~even~~ senior positions <sup>have</sup> had

no objections to this, and I said well this is fine with me so I took the polygraph

and quite honestly everytime I get on that polygraph I get nervous and well now with

respect to the training program for our second generation cryptanalysts I guess we

better delineate the second generation. I can think of several generations and I'd

like to define the first generation, setting Friedman aside for a minute, but Abe, Kully,

Larry Clark, <sup>there were</sup> Johnny Hurt and myself, ~~the~~ five of us. Obviously Friedman trained us

and we had a long training program and this was a combination of on the job training

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*the combination*

and classroom and personal research. A self taught training I mean ~~the~~ combination

of those things. Self-taught in the sense that the three of us, I'll leave Hurt

out because he was more of a linguist than we were and we were less of a linguist

than he was, so you [<sup>?</sup>mix and match] natural cleavage and Abe and Kully and I after

receiving from Friedman what he could tell us began to teach each other, ~~and we~~ *I, mean we*

self taught the group as a team. Kully and I worked <sup>long</sup> together on the Japanese while

Abe was in Panama. I'm sure we learned from each other. I learned from Kully. I

hope he learned from me so there was that kind of training. Now when the second

generation, the next group came along and I'd like to identify these as the Albert

(GENEVIEVE M. GROTSJAN) later "Gene" Feinstein)

Smalls, the Bob <sup>e</sup>Farners, [Jean Feinstein, ~~Robert~~ Jean Grochen,] Mary Jo Dunning, Leo

I think

Rosen<sup>A</sup> That's about the bracket. That's the next generation you see. The first

group's the children, Friedman being the grandfather and us coming <sup>in</sup> ~~in~~ the lineage

behind him. Their training was a combination of two things. They were ~~aware of~~ *well*

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trained. I think much better trained than the average cryptanalyst today, <sup>because about</sup> ~~now~~ half

<sup>in</sup> the time they took the courses that Friedman had given us and they worked together

in teams except for Rosen whose was kind of unique in that he came in at a time when

<sup>if you will</sup> nobody else was coming in and so he did all these by himself but he didn't have to

go through the drudgery the rest of us did because he was just out there but he was

a real good guy, sharp <sup>as a tack</sup> ~~and fast~~ so he assimilated this cryptanalytic lore with great

facilities <sup>y</sup> but the others who weren't Rosens and I don't say this in a derogatory sense

about them because they weren't graduates of MIT. I mean some of them didn't even

have their college degrees. They did it more pedestrian way and half the time they

were working and I remember that a lot of their training, a lot of their <sup>pr</sup>actical

training, on the job type of training that was conducted, <sup>was</sup> to enable them to understand

the operation we expected them to perform. For example in some of our work on the

Red machine we used the newer recruits to do some of the clerical work and we would

explain to them what we wanted them to do and we would also take the trouble to explain to them what we were looking for and why we were doing it and what the implication was, <sup>feeling that</sup> ~~for doing it~~ and I think rightly so that this would motivate them to do a better job and take a lot of the drudgery out of it and it was drudgery because it was all hand methods so it was this close working relation between us, the first generation and the second generation and coupled with their self study course, self study work on the courses that we had taken, and I can remember also acting as instructor at times for a pair of people as they went through the courses and that's how that training was done and then let's take another sort of generation except a different <sup>P</sup> ~~strike~~ and these were the officers who were selected. The Baldwins, the Rhoads, Bickers, <sup>C</sup> Rhodes, the Beechers, the ~~Vorderman's~~ and others and these were brought in in twos and they sort of paralleled the work that we did, and Friedman had developed this

*with*  
 because <sup>Hurt,</sup> the four of us, Sinkov, Kullback and Rowlett, came in we formed two teams.

Abe and Kully worked together and Johnny Hurt and I worked together and we sort of, we had a good healthy competition you see to make... We oh the spirit of competition was tremendous. It was friendly competition but I never encountered anything like this in college. There there were four of us, two teams, and we could see what the

*It really drove us.*  
 others were doing and it drove us. <sup>^</sup> Now this concept of training was followed by

Friedman and I think it was a very good one because you <sup>didn't</sup> ~~do~~ have one instructor. You you see.

didn't have anything formalized but anybody that knew the answers to the questions could be called on to explain it and sometimes what Abe would tell them and what Kully would tell them and what Rowlett would tell them would make a better answer than if

*didn't*  
~~each~~ one of us individually had told them so I think they probably had a better

environment for their training as the second generation <sup>a</sup> ~~then~~ we had as the first

generation. From then on I think <sup>other</sup> ~~every~~ generations came in, except as we got closer

to the war <sup>people</sup> came in faster and it became clear to us in our development of these new people that some of the things that were included in the first course were useless, redundant, and that newer material ought to be <sup>produced</sup> ~~used~~ and one of the things that came in was the inclusion of <sup>some</sup> statistical courses that Friedman <sup>had not</sup> ~~and~~ produced but Kully, Kully <sup>made</sup> ~~made~~ out and I think he wrote his more ambitious works based on <sup>the</sup> requirements for text for this. I think he wrote some statistics maybe <sup>there</sup> ~~it~~ was a couple of books that he prepared on cryptanalytic, for cryptanalytic training purposes, Statistics and Cryptanalysis I believe was the title of it or something like that and as a specific example of what I'm talking about here, when we were reading that Red machine and we had it cold you see we kind of coasted it. We predicted the keys and <sup>there</sup> ~~it~~ wasn't much of a cryptanalytic problem so <sup>our main</sup> ~~little~~ cryptanalysis was done in terms of ~~well~~ <sup>There</sup> recovering the codes. ~~It~~ was a regular change of codes and putting indicators to message where the indicator was garbled. We couldn't read it otherwise, you know this

a little bit of a cryptanalytic technique involved in clearing<sup>n</sup> up an indicator and  
in support of the COMSEC program<sup>to</sup>, test on our COMSEC systems, and ~~finding~~<sup>finding</sup> possible keys,  
~~and let's~~<sup>you know, to</sup> test out the use of rotor machines and other things, so we got spread out a  
little bit there and that in itself is very good training. The type of on-the-job  
training in a related field, but when we had, we were just real happy about the Red  
machine and our work on the Japanese codes and then we began to get some messages  
through the intercept<sup>s</sup> talking about the<sup>b</sup> cipher expert that was going around from  
embassy to embassy that held a Purple machine and there was a clear indication that  
the new machine was about to be introduced and of course as a matter of prudence we  
wanted to be ready for it so we took a look at the ~~sort~~<sup>kind</sup> of things that we might expect  
the Japs to do and<sup>so</sup> we picked the group that we hoped would be able to work on ~~it~~  
this new machine that came in, identified them as individuals as then looked across  
the spectrum of systems that might possibly be adopted by the Japanese and started

training the individuals who were designated to work on the Purple in the specifics of machines or types of cryptographic principles that might be used. Of course we didn't know at that time. <sup>g</sup> We had no traffic to test it on but we thought it wouldn't hurt if we let them direct their training in this direction and one of the things we did was to make sure they got these courses in statistics and tabulation, <sup>of</sup> cryptanalytic data right down to its evaluation. The kind of thing you talked about in your ~~essays~~ <sup>Kappa test,</sup> <sup>^</sup> The IC kind of thing, and we, I think this was very useful because it was useful for two reasons. It certainly helped to round out, <sup>some of</sup> the junior cryptanalysts. Now I'm down beyond the Rosens and the Feinsteins and the Smalls and the <sup>FEENEY and Jim into</sup> Furners, <sup>^</sup> all just before the Dale Marstons and the Chittendens and that group. Well there were also certain other training, I've spoken here about the Japanese but Abe <sup>in</sup> ~~and~~ the preparation of his staff for the Italian problem and Kully for the German problem of course had to broaden the <sup>base of</sup> ~~basic~~ <sup>^</sup> training to include how you deal with additive

systems, how you determine what kind of a code and bookbreaking, which was pretty trivial in the Japanese section because we had Johnny Hurt and there wasn't any use of anybody competing with Johnny and we had the language officers so we didn't worry too much about bookbreaking <sup>on</sup> ~~in~~ the Japanese group. We worried about language, language characteristics <sup>orthographical</sup> (~~topographical~~) considerations if I may put a fancy term on it and the statistical implications of that ~~but~~ <sup>^</sup> it was pretty important to us. Now when the, when the when we called in the reservists, the ROTC people, this is the Dale Marston group we had enough work for them to be engaged in so that most that they got was on the job training and we had some formal courses that we put together and they were inflicted, was inflicted with upon them and this was very good but things were then <sup>if</sup> moving so fast I, I'm really surprised ~~that~~ they got anything except an opportunity to do some selfstudying in their spare time of which they had very little but I know that well I can talk about Dale. Dale worked in the Purple room and I know

Dale got instructions from all of us, mainly from the people who were <sup>running</sup> recovering the machine and recovering the keys on a day to day basis, how to do the key recovery and of course Dale Marston being who he was and as clever as he was he was just right where he belonged, so <sup>of</sup> He was a great deal like Rosen. He grew into the ~~the~~ problem.

Some of the ~~the~~ others, Tom Chittenden <sup>of this</sup> got involved in the COMSEC operation and arrived at their position through other arrangements but again most of the training was on the job from that time on out.

Q: ~~I think~~ we know that Safford was sending out correspondence courses in cryptanalysis

to fellows <sup>that</sup> ~~to~~ be trained that were still in the service plus courses to students in colleges, correspondence courses devised by Friedman. Did you have the same practice in the SIS of sending correspondence courses out to colleges or to anybody else and if so were they successful?

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~HANDLE WITH EXTREME CARE~~

A: Yes We we did quite a bit of that. One, I've mentioned special text 165 & 166 and  
strangely enough it just slipped my mind here in the last <sup>discussion</sup> ~~session~~ we had and I  
think the reason it slipped my mind, I'll give you the evaluation of it first. This  
is fine stuff if you want <sup>to</sup> reserve officer credits but you didn't learn much  
cryptanalysis from it and I <sup>put it</sup> pretty low down on the ladder in our training operation.  
~~You ask~~ <sup>if</sup> it gave people a ~~good~~ vocabulary. They knew what a code was and a cipher  
but they sure didn't learn how to break codes and ciphers from these training courses.  
Now they were wonderful things and they set the stage for the on the job training  
later on that was conducted, and I now remember clearly that we, these were the first  
on the job, well you <sup>went</sup> ~~worked~~ through 165 and <sup>what</sup> part of 166 was prepared at that time and  
then we went on to these special problems so this was the primer level. Now <sup>it was</sup> ~~as~~ a matter  
of classification of these things. You couldn't put too much in them because you  
sent them through the mail and we could just imagine them falling in the hands of the

~~HANDLE~~

Germans and all sorts of things like that so they were kept pretty sanitary and I think this militated against their usefulness. I found it a lot easier <sup>though</sup> to talk to somebody <sup>that</sup> who had taken 165 and 166 when he came on the job than somebody who hadn't.

I mean it prepared them to receive training. That was the thrust of these courses but so far as making them, giving them skills, no it didn't. And to whom did we give them? At that time we wanted to use them as a screening. <sup>Any</sup> ~~Every~~ body who wanted to

take these things we were glad to let them take them whether it was Army or Navy or whichever because we could tell from the courses they took and how well they did in these courses whether or not they might be a good choice to be hired and

this way I think some of the people we hired through <sup>turned</sup> out to be first class cryptanalysts because it was a very straightforward and definitive way of taking <sup>the</sup> ~~a~~ measure of the individual and how well he might fit into our requirements.

Q: Do you know that Frank Raven had taken this?

A: Yes. I know that Frank Raven was one of the first guys I trained in the Navy and

in order to recover Purple key. That's when we met. He and a couple of others

instead of coming over to our place we went over there, ~~and~~ <sup>where</sup> we met. I was impressed

with Frank. I thought he was terrific because he was one of the sharpest of the Navy

students. ~~Burton~~ <sup>rather</sup> ~~hood~~ was another one. ~~Burton~~ <sup>rather</sup> ~~hood~~ was very good. A fellow named

Ely(?) <sup>that</sup> ~~was~~ <sup>we</sup> good too and one one Navy officer, Brown, called him Brownie. He

was regular Navy but he was assigned about that time and Fabyan, who went with ~~us~~ <sup>Pres</sup>

Currier and Abe and Rosen on this junket they made to Britain. They came in about

that time but the Navy didn't have much much formal training material and

the courses were ~~very~~ <sup>for</sup> good ~~but~~ that very low very basic primer type of thing but you

could do 65 and 66 exercises until you got black in the face and you still wouldn't

be able to recover Purple or Red key or detransposed a code or strip an additive or


that kind of a thing. That was specialized training.

H5 Q: At what point did you senior cryptanalysts, not stop teaching because I realize you probably continue, but was there a formal school created to train cryptanalysts?

A: Yes there was a formal school but we never did stop. I think even when I left just before retirement, <sup>quite</sup> I was still doing a little bit of, I was involved in the educational program <sup>of</sup> obviously as Commandant of the school, and where I left, I mean my performance there I'll not make any mention of but we did when you get to be a senior individual and if you have any imple<sup>nt</sup>se as a teacher you'll go back and practice a little bit I think <sup>well</sup> and Abe and Kully and I all had teaching backgrounds and I think they responded more <sup>to me</sup> definitely than I did <sup>if I can</sup> ~~to get and~~ limit the quote senior individuals you mean old timers suits me better for the three.

H5 Q: But there was a point where you couldn't keep up with the influx of personnel could you?

A: Absolutely not and so we had to multiply our talents by, and the best way of doing this, was to set the stage so that people, since we were busy with other things and



since we were in real short supply the way we multiply <sup>100</sup> ourselves and set up training devices. One of the things we had was the training <sup>bank</sup> ~~bank~~ where the correspondence courses that we were talking about were handled.

End of Tape <sup>8</sup> /, Side 1



Tape <sup>8</sup> 7, Side 2

Alright you ask a question and I'll try to answer it

Q: I <sup>1</sup> ~~was~~ just asking <sup>you</sup> whether <sup>stat</sup> [Fort Monmouth and Hunt] were any good, and then you can just repeat what you just said.

A: You mean [Vint Hill Farms]. <sup>stat</sup>

Q: [Oh Vint Hill]. <sup>stat</sup> Yeah

A: Well about the training that was conducted up at Fort Monmouth and Vint Hill Farms.

This I think was trivial. First place, the security considerations limited the kind

of training we could conduct down there and so <sup>down</sup> the most primitive training and the

most primitive kind of things <sup>that</sup> we could do. This also applied <sup>up at</sup> to Monmouth but one of

the most useful things that came out of this, We could put courses in down there

that helped <sup>us</sup> <sup>^</sup> to determine whether the students that took the courses might actually

had the aptitudes that we were looking for so it was sort of an aptitude screening

operation rather than a conditioning operation and I would validate it and say it was

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~~SECRET~~

worth while just for that reason if for no other. But now after the guy was cleared for a different thing, we used to run, I'm jumping around in time now, but this is a good example. In the B3 organization which was known as the general cryptanalytic branch and which was responsible for everything except the Japanese military systems we found that it was absolutely essential to take the people who had come out of the Monmouth and Vint Hill school, these were the enlisted men. Incidentally some pretty good names came through there and ~~these were~~ the people who were being hired as civilians brought in for language skills and others because <sup>the</sup> ~~the~~ language skills had to be conditioned and we found even though they might not be good cryptanalysts it was worthwhile to run them through the school so at least they got the feel for what they were doing and learned the language and the bookbreaking, I don't think <sup>you can have</sup> ~~we had~~ a formal course for bookbreaking. You just describe the situation and then put on a practical demonstration. It's just like painting. Nobody can train somebody to be

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

artist. What you do is sort of tell them how to do it and then they go ahead and they become an artist themselves. Well now bookbreaking in that sense is an art and I think a very very honorable art because the skill of a bookbreaker is a combination of several skills. Virginia you can check me on this. First its how well you know the language and second how good you are to come to logical conclusions and third is a matter of patience. Well now the theoretical, the statistics and the other knowledge that are required for this, are minimal. I mean its, <sup>the</sup> ~~a~~ real basis of book-breaking is the language. I don't know how you can say it otherwise and of course there are a lot of things you can do to simplify bookbreaking as I look at it from a cryptanalytic standpoint and that's the proper catalogues, <sup>and</sup> ~~the~~ proper techniques, <sup>and</sup> ~~the~~ proper worksheets and things like that, <sup>but</sup> The real brains of it is the application of your knowledge of the language to the situation that's, that statistical would cover from the catalogues to produce the answers to the book. Now there was a lot of bookbreaking required in the old B3 outfit because many of the South American and

Near Eastern countries had big books to recover. Now when you get into the more machine type of thing then the problem is no longer as simple as it is <sup>with</sup> ~~for~~ book-breaking and when you get into additive recovery its more complicated so you had to build on some extra training which we tried to produce. Now at that point you can ~~try~~ <sup>begin</sup> to make ~~the~~ <sup>a</sup> division in the kind of training at least in my concept that you conduct. The people who are going to work on additive type systems, its a good idea to give them some machine training but you've got to let them know what a difference table is like, how ~~an~~ indicator solutions, I mean ~~are~~ <sup>its</sup> awfully important in my my book to understand message numbering systems and other things because they can give you good clues to the messages and ~~also~~ <sup>usually</sup> important is how to use your collateral information facilities. And this you can make into quite a pyramid of activity and you don't want to dilute that type of skills with having people subjected to mathematical statistics in courses like that because that'll go and turn them off with good language people.

Lots of good linguists just don't have the aptitude in mathematics and you <sup>can</sup> scare them right out of the building if you forced them to take a course in statistics. They would patiently submit to it I'm sure but they wouldn't be happy and it wouldn't do them much good so you see <sup>you</sup> begin to direct <sup>their</sup> training then but most of the people who <sup>worked</sup> on machine problems needed a lot more conditioning particularly in statistics and in mechanisms and the cryptographic exemplifications of the mechanical things. What you look for, how you deal with it and that was a broader base <sup>than</sup> the language which they carried with them when they came ~~speaking of the French section.~~

[ People in the French section <sup>were</sup>

~~was~~ always selected because they were proficient in French so we didn't have to train

them in that. It was just introduce them to <sup>the</sup> how to use their language capability to

produce the answers. Now I don't mean to run down bookbreaking or anything like that

but I'm trying to put it in perspective as I saw it. Now when <sup>you</sup> get over here to

these people who were going to be trained in machines there were two purposes for

that. One is because by that time, I'm talking about into the war, we were aware of

the Enigma <sup>see</sup> and we were aware of the use of the Hagelin <sup>had</sup> and we ~~got~~ a lot of

requirements for real good cryptanalysts in machine systems to, in the verification

of <sup>the security</sup> our own systems, and we didn't have really much of a need for people skilled in

the Japanese machine because that was already satisfied because of the experience

we had gone through but we needed <sup>to</sup> change then so we began to conduct special classes.

Dan Dribben was one of the best training officers I ever had in my organization.

He was good. Dan was a sharp cryptanalyst and he was a good teacher and he loved to

train people and Dan Dribben just about <sup>a</sup> ran the school for us but he was a member of

the technical staff you see so he didn't get over here and cover his head up with

sack cloth or something. In his training program he was out there and he was looking

for requirements and he, as the training officer of the technical group, identified

the requirements and came back and nobody got in his way when he tried to satisfy them

and I think this was a wonderful thing that we enabled Dan to be involved in because

right now we tend to formalize these things too much and we lose sight really of what the training requirements are. But now in that sense since we were small and since there were a lot of things that had to be done and since the time was short and since the instructor staff <sup>was</sup> ~~was~~ burdened with other things we took a lot of short cuts but luckily we didnt make too many mistakes. Have I answered your question now?

Q: How do you train a cryptanalyst now?

A: How do you train a cryptanalyst now? I don't know. I haven't trained one in so long I've ....

V.V. (I'll tell you sometime, I've trained two analysts -- cryptanalytic interns .... ) 135

I would think maybe you might might once have sent him to Calimohos's school.

V.V. (That's at the end (look the box?) That's at the end  
*Don't want to say*  
 170 the last five or eight years.  
Rough but the end of their training when they've had sufficient ....

Tape 9, Side 1

Q: Question is what do I remember about the early work on the Japanese military and was there any interference between the work on the Japanese diplomatic and the work on the Japanese military <sup>which</sup> ~~that~~ might have resulted in a delay in <sup>to</sup> our entry into the Japanese military systems, and I think this is a very good question that probably hasn't been dealt with anywhere else.

A: <sup>To</sup> Quickly dispose of the Japanese Purple. Just about the time the war broke out we were adequately covering it. The intercept of the Japanese diplomatic messages could be done within the U.S., <sup>and</sup> ~~the~~ ones we were interested in, and therefore did not interfere with the interception of Japanese military which had to be conducted as close in as possible, <sup>and from</sup> ~~in~~ the Philippines so in that sense there was really no conflict. Oh there might have been a trivial thing where we assigned an operator to one instead of the other but this was a management thing but they did not stand up and confront

each other. We were doing as well as we could with each so there was no intercept problems, resulting from the possible conflict between the two. The big problem in

the Japanese military is we just didn't have enough intercept stations close in to

pick up the traffic <sup>in the quantity</sup> ~~uniformity~~ that was needed at that time. Now so far as the processing and exploitation was concerned Purple was dead cold. We had it covered.

We were predicting the keys and we were collaborating with the Navy and then split

the load between us and the Navy and so most of the Purple people, the <sup>e</sup>Farners and

the Smalls, <sup>the</sup> ~~and~~ others, the Sammy Snyders, were being used in support of other problems

such as <sup>our</sup> COMSEC operation and sort of managing and doing the difficult keys, The ones,

well, recovering some Purple keys under certain circumstances could be pretty difficult.

<sup>Normally it</sup>  
~~None that~~ was a very easy thing but a few things would come up like the use of a

station chiefs code which was then enciphered by the Purple and the average key

~~TOP SECRET~~

reco<sup>u</sup>perer in the Purple wouldn't know what to do with these messages so ~~F~~<sup>u</sup>rn<sup>e</sup>r and Small and the rest of us who had been involved in the recovery of Purple would be called in to deal with these problems. Fortunately these were not numerous so we had a dedicated group on the Purple, split between the Army and Navy and these were ~~still~~ <sup>skilled</sup> specialists ~~that~~ <sup>and</sup> could, well, some of their skills could have been used in the Japanese military, they weren't really needed because Kully who was put in charge of the Japanese military had been given a staff of people specially, sort of trained for this kind of problem because Japanese military problem was in the <sup>early</sup> ~~diagnostic~~ stage. Now it took some time for Kully and the folks to begin to take the measure of the problem to determine ~~the effect of~~ <sup>exactly</sup> what was used and how to attack it because all they had was a bunch of intercepts and no continuity, ~~Maximum continuity~~ no sample Japanese systems and here Yardley's reports were not much good. He mentioned a few systems but

and I'm talking about <sup>now</sup> special reports that Yardley put together in a contact with the Chief Signal Officer after he had returned from his duty in China and I'm not talking about the Black Chamber reports. I think that's important because these are two different points in time and so we, well, Yardley's information was about as good as we had and it wasn't good. It was trifling, trivial or whatever term you want to put on it and we probably Kully would have done just as well if he hadn't had it really I think because <sup>we'd(?)</sup> ~~we~~ spent some time confirming what Yardley had reported and we puzzled about it and we had to answer a lot of questions because the Chief Signal Officer wanted to know how good is this thing. Didn't Yardley tell you how to do this? Why can't you do it? <sup>part of</sup> So but and so it was more of a bother than it was a help but now keep in mind that the Japanese military system was very well designed. [ It was an enciphered code. A sort of additive <sup>en</sup> ciphered code. I believe initially it used normal arithmetic and then they got into a sort of crypto substitution where instead of ]

using the normal device of addition they had mixed, mixed numerical sequences sort of  
 like a mixed alphabet problem versus the vigenere square with normal alphabets because  
 the normal additive just to overexplain this thing, the normal additive is nothing  
 but a vigenere square using <sup>the</sup> ten digits pushed in <sup>a</sup> forward or backward mode depending  
 on whether its an additive or subtractive and the Japanese did <sup>a</sup> little bit  
more to that. ~~They~~ They scrambled the sequences and they used the  
vigenere principle so <sup>that</sup> your recollection of the tricks that you'd learned about two  
 plus two equaling four when we were in kindergarten couldn't be applied so you had to  
 look up two and two <sup>in a</sup> ~~and the~~ matrix and find out the what the equivalent was. Now this  
 was a pretty I'm talking <sup>now</sup> about cryptographically, I don't recall how the Japs did it,  
 but the cryptographic effect of this non-normal arithmetic <sup>is</sup> <sup>just</sup> was what I described. Now  
<sup>a</sup> this makes problem of different dimension of difficulty when you do something like that  
<sup>a</sup> because ~~instead~~ of the normal additive thing because, oh a lot of things. You can set up

your accounting machines to do normal arithmetic<sup>e</sup> and then you have to make a very

special arrangement to get them to go into the ~~un~~<sup>non</sup>normal mode so the problem was not

one an easy<sup>^</sup> and the breakthrough was based on <sup>a</sup> lot of examination of material, diagnostic

which inspired work<sup>^</sup> if you've got some <sup>^</sup> people around can be very short but if the problem

is difficult and the people who are working on it just haven't had the opportunity or

you haven't been fortunate<sup>enough</sup> to cap an inspiration that makes the golden guess you've just

got to dredge it out. You've got to accumulate enough traffic, sort of oddball

messages, bust and all this other tricks of the trade ~~something~~ to give you kind

of clear indication of just what you're up against and it took some time to establish

and accumulate enough traffic. The Japs were pretty clever. They didn't change,

didn't hold their keys in use for a long time. They changed them frequently so about

the time you get a handhold in one period the it would slip away from <sup>you</sup> ~~them~~ and you'd

be trying to corner another greased pig of a second period. So it was not an easy

~~TOP SECRET~~

problem and was not one which could be done overnight. Now the Purple system which  
in retrospect is a lot less cumbersome to solve. Remember <sup>it took</sup> ~~just~~ 18 months and we had

the background of the Red machine and we had to accumulate enough data and determine

exactly how the key system worked for each one of the periods then reduce them to a

<sup>sort of</sup> simple base since the system so carefully defined <sup>and</sup> diagnosed as the Purple was, having

required 18 months to get it under control, you can I would say that the Japanese

military problem was much greater magnitude and I think Kully's group, the B2 group <sup>which</sup>

<sup>was</sup> sort of the early outgrowth of the organizational structure, the idea <sup>here being</sup> ~~to~~ let's isolate

the military problem, let's put all the power that we can bring to bear on it, every

skill that's needed, let's give it priority. I think that came into being pretty

well just around Pearl Harbor and we began to realize it of course when the Japs hit

at Pearl Harbor. ~~XXXXXXXXXXXX~~ Well there was no question but what these were

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

the rules that you applied <sup>to</sup> for the SIS and you put all, you didn't deny the military<sup>?</sup> problem anything that it needed. Now I remember this latter pretty pretty vividly

because I was in B3 and I had certain requirements that I hope I was able to be a

good neighbor to Kully and didn't deny <sup>him</sup> anything we had. We really we really <sup>tried</sup> try to

<sup>In the past,</sup> support this. ~~It was across~~ the SIS support to the B2 problem that <sup>that</sup> was the rule of

the day. Now I think as we get deeper into the war we find certain other aspects to

the military ~~problem~~ that I recall and really the one to talk to about this is

Dr. Kullback but I remember this. The GCHQ people early on let it become clear that they

were so busy dealing with the German problem that they could not afford any resources <sup>or</sup>

divert <sup>any</sup> ~~to~~ resources to the Japanese military problem but simply turned that over to

the folks down at Brisbane and here again we find <sup>that</sup> great emphasis was placed <sup>in the</sup> ~~on~~ support

of Brisbane. Akin had gone down there as Chief Signal Officer and he said he wasn't

ignorant of what was needed and he certainly knew how to get it and if there had been

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any reluctance in Washington to give the Brisbane group any support <sup>that</sup> Akin would have

known how to defeat it. An example of this is early on Dr. Sinkov was assigned and

he went down to Brisbane and between Brisbane and Washington I think the bulk of the

<sup>important</sup>  
work was done on the military problem.

Q: Did you support Brisbane in terms of additional research?

A: We tried <sup>to give</sup> Brisbane anything that we could as I recollect. I 'm not aware of the details

because there was a lot of exchange between B2 the Japanese military. We there was

one thing we learned early on in the war and it was a good lesson. You should have no

interferring channels or echelons between in in your liaison between technical units.

In other words B2 dealt directly. Abe and Kully communicated directly with each other.

It was no overview in terms of the supervision of the officer in charge of NSA but

Kully and Abe had complete latitude in what they exchanged. Of course they the head

of ASA needed to know what was going on and he got appropriately briefed by Kully and

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I'm sure Akin had ~~alms~~<sup>at</sup> daily conversations with Sinkov but the rapport was so good

that a lot of this material didn't have to be documented. There was no delay like

formal reports <sup>and</sup> or stuff like that. We usually did the job and then when we got around

to it we'd write up the report <sup>on it</sup> and now inevitably there will be little differences of

opinions which if not watched can get out of control. I can remember some cases where

it looked like there was going to be a difference but these were usually resolved

without acro<sup>i</sup>mony and appropriately and it was more a result of the distance and also

we couldn't very well have people <sup>shuffling</sup> coming back and forth between Brisbane and Washington

which I think probably would have been an advantage that might have accrued. <sup>It was a little?</sup> [It's so ]

different between the <sup>navy</sup> unit working on the Bombe and <sup>our</sup> work~~er~~ on Madam X over at

Arlington Hall Station because we have people going back and forth between Washington

and Britain pretty frequently and this personal insight into the problems on both sides

in discussions eyeball to eyeball, sort of enabled us to get along. I can remember

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I can't remember any difference between the technical <sup>technical in</sup> outfits and Arlington Hall Station and GCHQ. The closest we can to it I think was in the work on the military attache system. John Tiltman broke it sometime after the start of the war. He got the entry into the military attache system which was a very important stream of traffic and ~~the~~, looking back at the fact that the British had said these words about the Japanese military and this is the military attache - that we cannot divert people from the Enigma problem to work <sup>on</sup> ~~along~~ the Japanese military. When we got down to the military attache problem which had been broken by Tiltman at Bletchley then there was a bit of sorting out of whether or not the work would be done over in GCHQ or Washington so we were anxious and willing and of course under the Clarke philosophy of what to do about problems why I had no choice but to set up a unit to work on it and so in working out the details of how we would divide the effort which can be a

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very complicated problem. I mean do you work on odd days and even days like that stupid arrangement that the Army and Navy made about the Purple or do you take the front end of the book and the last end of the book or do you do it by indicator.

We had to work out some reasonable way of splitting the effort out ~~and~~ <sup>but</sup> we did and in this case I think the biggest advantage well the greatest thing, the greatest help we had was surefire and rapid communications carrying the technical information. We had special system set up between us and GCHQ which could carry all the technical information and then there was another little bit of the same sort of thing when we got into the GEE problem because the UK was just as interested in that German one time pad, both for cryptanalytic advancement and for <sup>the</sup> intelligence that could be produced so we had to make a similar division in the effort there but these are trivial things and I don't want to leave the impression <sup>here</sup> to the listener that there was any big problem there. It was a matter of the practical resolution, the

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determination that the <sup>best</sup> easier way of doing something had to be done and of course our national prerogatives had to be satisfied. Clarke's requirement that we become *involved* in every problem, big, little, old or young was a thing that I had to keep in mind and I think there was a similar attitude <sup>on the part of</sup> to GCHQ and I think a very reasonable thing because nobody at that time and I think its important that people today keep what I'm about to say in mind, In terms of WWII we didn't know whether <sup>there</sup> ~~it~~ would be continuous <sup>ed</sup> ~~ed~~ *collaboration* ~~operation~~ between the US and Britain in the cryptologic field. Most of us expected that the collaboration would end with cessation of hostilities you know kind of break off and then just disappear like... Like it did in WWI, the collaboration <sup>between</sup> ~~with~~ the French and the US and of course we never did get deeply into OB40 but there was a little collaboration. We expected that kind of a principle to apply at the end of WWII. ] Fortunately it didn't but now people today I'm sure get the feeling that there

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has always been this collaboration. It's just like it was in the Bible. There was always God, there was always a church but we were pagans in those days and honestly I I I did a lot of thinking about the wisdom of going too deeply into collaboration with the British and for what its worth I'll try to drag out the three points that were most significant in making the determination to go ahead. First was the geography for intercept purposes. We could see ourselves being pulled back to the continent you see and we remembered vividly the difficulties we had in collecting Japanese military and so I think this is a good point. *E* This would promote which would make us want to collaborate with the British because they had a capability *es* for doing intercept in many points of the world. You sort of think of the British empire and how it would sort of delineated in those days and it gives you a pretty good intercept picture. The second thing is we had learned to admire the British technical competence. We found *they,* *we* figured that together we could do much better technically

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than we could separately and we allowed for the difference in national objectives

because we went on the assumption that the British organization would be in support

of ~~the~~ UK requirements and ours would have to be in support of US requirements but

again the technical collaboration would be important because the emphasis would be

found in terms of exploitation and intercept. The intercept based on <sup>your intelligence</sup> requirements

and you exploit the traffic to satisfy the same requirements so we didn't see too

much conflict in that regard because both of us would have needed the basic traffic

to break into the system and that's what we wanted and then the third point which

is ~~an~~ <sup>the</sup> obvious and simple one that together we could do much better than we could

separate and it might be a good thing over the years but the thing that really drove

it home and made the decision clear was the attitude of the Russians at Potsdam when

it became clear that the war, the world tension wasn't over. The Russians were the

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[ natural target, intelligence target from that point out. When that became clear then

I think any doubts about the need for us to continue our collaboration with the British

were removed. ] Now I may have wandered around here speaking the obvious but I think

my recollection of the attitude of the discussions is ~~mostly~~ <sup>grossly</sup> accurate. The details

might vary but this was the sense of the discussion and I also think that it was a

good thing that we made that decision.

Q: Could you give us your recollections in the whole <sup>time</sup> period beginning from the 1930s  
H.S.  
April 1930 through your association with, your relationship with Mr. Friedman and  
your evaluation.

A: Well this would not be very subjective. I'm reluctant to do this but in the sense  
<sup>putting down</sup>  
of how Rowlett feels and in the sense that other people, unfortunately Friedman can't,  
and that's basically my reluctance to do this but I'll do it, because I think it might  
be useful provided that whoever listens to what I say remembers that this is entirely

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is  
subjective and may not correct but just what I saw. Well I'll just go back to the  
^  
first time I met Friedman. I was impressed with him and as he went on as our teacher  
the greater admiration developed as time went on for what Friedman could accomplish  
and we looked on whatever Friedman said as sort of <sup>as</sup> being the word of God and that you  
didn't argue with it and he enjoyed this because Friedman liked to be liked and he  
liked to be admired and I think he'd had a little bit more of this than people like  
to see in other people but I believe he it wasn't any worse in Friedman than it was  
<sup>any of</sup>  
in the rest of us except he may have let it show through a bit more than others. He  
wasn't, he didn't run out of the ~~limelight~~. He sort of loitered while it was pointed <sup>ing</sup>  
in his direction and I don't hold this against him. I think I would do the same thing  
and do do the same thing when the opportunity is presented. I guess what happened  
is that Friedman got more opportunities than maybe a lot of other people so they got  
a little bit jealous <sup>of</sup> with the frequency with which he got the limelight. Friedman

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was proud and he did have some <sup>vanity</sup> ~~advantages~~ and I think what I just said is the part of that vanity but he also when he deliberated about a thing <sup>he could be</sup> ~~he was~~ fair about it but he had to deliberate. He had to think about it. I think his immediate personal reaction <sup>is</sup> ~~was~~ now this is Dr. Headshrinker Rowlett <sup>talking</sup> and I got no business being this <sup>of sub (?)</sup> ~~subjective~~ but I'll go ahead and do it. I think Friedman's first thought was the one that usually show <sup>ed</sup> through and then if he had to back off and think about it he would ~~just~~ assume an entirely different attitude and it was essentially fair. I mean of course it was sort of like in a business deal. You looked out for yourself. Billy looked out for himself but I don't think <sup>Billy</sup> ~~he~~ was dishonest. I don't think he would intentionally steal and I can't find any place where Billy in my knowledge of him and I knew him a long time that after this deliberation that he had done that Billy was essentially dishonest. Now I know that he was a very thoughtful man and he was a good planner. He could look ahead and he could set up situations which are

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favorable to him but don't we all. I mean that's how you live in the jungle so in

that sense this is not a derogatory remark I'm making about Friedman but he was a

good business man so far as his own interests <sup>354</sup> ~~were~~ concerned. Now I think I <sup>ve</sup> <sub>^</sub> put a

pretty good background. My relations with Friedman were pretty direct and personal

and calculated because some some personality conflict between them because very simple

reason that I had 10 days seniority on Kully and 20 days on Abe and in the military

view this was enough to make me the senior of the three whether I had, whether I

~~merited~~ <sup>merited</sup> it, whether I had earned it personally or not, <sup>but</sup> so it was an automatic thing

rather than something you had to go out and compete <sup>for</sup>. Well this bothered Friedman a

little bit because he wanted us all to be on a par and he didn't like for the automatic

selection to be made and about the only thing automatic that Friedman liked was

drawing straws where everybody had an equal chance and I think this was fair. Many

times I would step back, now I'm being subjective about Frank Rowlett but this is

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what I found to be the best way of dealing with it instead of demanding my rights based on this microscopic difference of 10 days I found that the thing I ~~could~~ do was to go ahead and accept the straw drawing which I think was right because well you do like <sup>your</sup> a personal advantage but you don't want, you don't want to lose your integrity in seeking it so in this sense there was always the feeling that I had to be very careful because I might lose something because my experiences by losing this little advantage I had I was always on the short end of the stick you see and my lightning rods went up a little bit faster and so I watched Friedman and the things he did a little bit more closely than would this have not had happened. But I don't know to this day I don't know which one of us would have been selected if it had been true competition but the simple fact is I did have <sup>that</sup> a slight edge and this bugged Friedman throughout because there were certain times when he honestly felt that Abe or Kully ought to be chosen to deal with the problem but I was chosen by Akin and

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others because they were in the habit of doing ~~that~~ <sup>this</sup>. I think Friedman felt a little nervous about this. Now let me say a few things about how Friedman dealt with the advancement of the technical situation for which he was responsible. I think Friedman had more vision, that is good vision about the future of the cryptologic effort in the US than anybody else in that time frame. I think Friedman became impatient with us, his students, and I think he became more impatient with the bureaucracy that he had <sup>to</sup> battle as he looked toward achievement of these goals. Not ~~as~~ <sup>up</sup> but because he had great support in terms of the Chief Signal Officer and G2 but I think he did become ~~was~~ impatient with trying to fight the bureaucratic influences which inhibited the prompt response to his requirements or the cryptologic requirements as he saw them and I think this <sup>I mean</sup> this made him feel, <sup>^</sup> he sensed this and he resented it and he reacted to it and I believe at times this, <sup>probably the</sup> impatience is <sup>^</sup> a better word, he became really impatient with it, <sup>this</sup> ~~his~~ impatience would show through and cause him to try to devise

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ways and means of getting around the obstructions that he recognized were in his way.

If I recall when I get down to talking about some of the cipher machine developments

I'll give an example of this but now this is the kind of image that I remember of

Friedman and I can also remember sort of the transition from the point where Friedman

was the last word in cryptology to where the people he had trained who had come behind

him began to become recognized for their own actions. Friedman's overall reaction

to this was very good but I think he loved to be the father and to carry the the

ultimate an expertise image and I think maybe he did react a little bit personally

to the emergence of a group of people and the fact that this had now become a team

organization rather than a one man and I don't use this in a derogatory sense. The

situation where one person would grandstand which was quite tolerable when Friedman

was there by himself but now that the team should get the credit and Friedman worked

very hard to insure that the team got the credit but I think he kind of felt a little

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~~HANDLE WITH CARE~~

*you know*  
bit of lonesomeness that he couldn't at times take full credit for some of these  
wonderful things that were done but let me add right quick he was as fair as he could  
be about it so there's no element of unfairness here but sort of his personal reaction  
of I wish I could take full credit for that but I can't really take it so I'll give  
it where it belongs. I mean I said it right and I wish I could have taken full credit *fa*  
but since I didn't <sup>*do it*</sup> I can't and I'll put the credit where it belongs. I think I have  
put Friedman's personality reaction to the upsurge of technical competence in a  
nice fairly spoken package in those few words and I 'm glad I said them because that *ed*  
the way it looks <sup>*ed*</sup> to me. Now one of the problems Friedman had and now I'm talking  
about Friedman's personality is that he did have a well he did have to have medical  
attention. This came on and I think it's been erroneously presented by David Kahn  
for example and some of the <sup>*other*</sup> writers but Kahn's the one I remember. Actually what  
happened is that there was a combination of things. I don't know whether there was

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anything in Friedman's personal family life that impinged on this. He never talked about his family. We knew Mrs. Friedman but his family problems never he never brought to the office and I wasn't aware of any but there were certain other things. One, the requirements for cipher systems, cryptography, US requirements Friedman bore the brunt of that. The and the pressure was considerable for these reasons. That the Chief Signal Officer and the War Department recognized the requirement for the best possible type of system for US usage. They had imagined that they had this requirement satisfied with the M134T1 but when Friedman had to expose one, of the difficulties of that we had encountered in the simple matter of technical production of tapes and two, that there was a different, alternate idea that ought to be adopted I think he was rebuffed considerably on the upper level and now let me tell the story I promised to earlier. The reason the ABBA was developed was because it was evident particularly to those of us who were involved in the day to day production of <sup>the</sup> key tape material

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that it wasn't a viable system because one, the job of making the tapes was too great, two, the amount, the sheer bulk of material that had to be stored in each each coderoom where the machine was held was pretty great. It wasn't intolerable but still it was a problem so your physical security problem was pretty great and three, that the material the key tapes were intended to be used over and over again and the flimsy tape that we had to prepare got ~~to~~ torn up after a couple of uses so it was in effect a one time tape system not by design but simply because it worked out that way. The tapes just wouldn't last that long. Maybe a two or three time tape. With care you could get five or six encipherments out of a tape so we had gone to a very thick, <sup>hard</sup> parchment type of tape and it had a little bit of some kind of abrasive in it like <sup>phonetic</sup> [pulajarets] 54.

or what have you and the the punches which cut the holes in the tape got dull and they would just make indentations in it and one indentation is enough to destroy the usefulness of the tape because then its different from the other tapes. The wheel

doesn't move at the right time and the message becomes <sup>in</sup> undecipherable and there's not much you can do about it unless you're a cryptanalyst and then it becomes two or three weeks before you could produce the text so the material just simply wouldn't stand up under usage so I think once Friedman accepted this <sup>that</sup> ~~and~~ he went out and went <sup>3-</sup> gun<sub>^</sub> ho to achieve, to throw out the M134T1 and replace it with something better using a different principle with the key generator which is essentially what the AB~~SA~~ was so when he went up to the Chief Signal Officer and presented this alternate solution and requested support, monies, he got a shock and I remember how dejected he looked when he came back. He knew that there was something, a few thousand <sup>dollars,</sup> something like <sup>or some trivial amount like that,</sup> 2500 dollars <sup>^</sup> set aside for ~~development~~ <sup>research and</sup> in the code production program and that this could be expended up at the Signal Corps laboratory up at Fort Monmouth. Well when he went up to request that some work be undertaken to do, to prove the new key generator principle and they said "No. We don't have any money" and he said sort of "Well what

about that budget, the \$2500 or whatever sum it was" and they said "Well we don't have that" and his question was "Well what happened to it" and they didn't, evidently couldn't

give a clear answer and after a little research and investigation they found out that

the money had been turned over to the laboratories and that George Graham, Chief

Graham  
Engineer, up there, I believe it was George Graham the last name was Graham had used

it in the development of a field cipher device and that nobody in Washington knew

about it. The Signal Corps Laboratory had undertaken this on their own. Well this

was a real slap in the face to Friedman because he thought he had a ~~xxx~~ pretty good

relationship. He would regularly go up to Fort Monmouth and have discussions with

[<sup>?</sup>Graham] and when he found out this job had been undertaken and his money, the SIS

research and development money, had been used for it he was fit to be tied. I mean

he was officially ~~ground~~ <sup>browned</sup> off and he was personally hurt by this kind of <sup>u</sup> thing and I

think that it was a dirty trick that they played on him. He was very dejected about

this. It took him several several days to recover from it and the net result was that finally Friedman was sent up to look at this device to insure you know that it was a pretty good thing. Well when he went back and said I don't think much of this device he was told well look there's just no money in this budget and next years budget, its a tight time Billy. I don't think we can afford to go into this new system, this new type of key generator system, and by this time Friedman was dedicated to the replacement of the M134T1. His own brainchild now. He had to reject you see and had to promote something that wasn't entirely his own and I think Friedman should be admired for the way he conducted himself under these circumstances because this could be damaging you know under some circumstances from a professional standpoint. But fortunately the people up at the Chief Signal Officer took the attitude that it was a result of Friedman's development of the SIS and this was an SIS product rather than just being a Friedman product so I don't think he was denied any of the personal

credit that he should have deserved for it and that is the truth, the true situation,

as I saw it from where I sat being involved in it and then we, since I was working very

*with Friedman*  
closely on this improvement of the M134T1, I got a pretty good insight *into* <sup>personally</sup> how he felt

about it but it didn't deter us from going ahead and doing the groundwork and examination

of the principle and working out the logic of the machine.

End of Tape 9, Side 1

Tape 9, Side 2

of course this shock of finding <sup>that</sup> we had no funds <sup>to</sup> ~~for~~ developing ~~ing~~ this idea which now, by  
now had seized well particularly Friedman and myself because we were the prime movers  
of this modification of the M134T1, ~~it~~ was a great disappointment and fortunately  
within a few weeks after the word had come that there were no funds some representatives  
from the Navy came over in one of their infrequent but most important discussions, the  
technical problems particularly of cryptography that occurred in those days between  
the Army and Navy, it became clear from what the Navy representative said (1) they  
were dissatisfied with the prospects <sup>for</sup> ~~of~~ developing <sup>a</sup> ~~the~~ cipher machine in terms of the  
devices or the ideas or the logic of the machines which they were examining and were  
committed to and they felt like <sup>that</sup> ~~they~~ had go into into something entirely different to  
achieve the requirements, to meet the requirements, that the Navy had set for itself,

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so that they had nothing on the drawing board that satisfied them and they were looking

for new ideas. That's the sum and substance of it and <sup>second,</sup> (2) that they could immediately

embark

~~work~~ on a program because they had plenty of funds and I don't know how true this is

but I will tell you like it sounded to me at the time. They had something like a

million bucks of no-year money that Mr. Roosevelt, that's Franklin D., as I think one

of the Undersecretaries of the Navy <sup>had</sup> procured for them and if they didn't use the money

this year it could be carried over to, several years you see. It didn't have to be

accounted for and turned back in in terms of a one year deal. Well now these two

things (1) the Navy was looking for ideas (2) they had the money and were <sup>ready and</sup> willing

and ready to go if they had a good idea really excited Friedman and I think I think

we had some discussion about it. Friedman was intrigued by it and I was a good

sounding board to knock it off of so his feeling was <sup>that,</sup> "What an opportunity." <sup>is</sup> If the

Army doesn't have the funds they have the need but the Navy has the funds and if we

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could just some how or other get the Navy to test this thing out we'd be ahead," and

so he decided to take it up with the Chief Signal Officer and see if the Chief Signal

Officer was willing <sup>on</sup> ~~This was~~ <sup>(1)</sup> sort of a proposition: <sup>^</sup> We don't have the funds Mr.

Chief Signal Officer (2) we have a good idea (3) it needs to be tested (4) We the

technical people think its much better than anything else we've seen before. We

think that this is the best that's ever been produced and we'd like to have it

available <sup>for</sup> ~~over~~ at the Signal Corps. Ergo, your permission to take this up with the

Navy and to encourage them to test it out is requested and when it was presented to

the Chief Signal Officer under those terms affirmative permission was given and

Friedman was allowed to present these ideas to the Navy on the premise that if the

Navy wanted to carry on with the project and use it <sup>in</sup> ~~with~~ their own cipher machines,

the Navy cipher machines, that the Chief Signal Officer would present no objections

but that the Chief Signal Officer would want access to all the results and the benefits

of the Navy research and this was, seemed to be a very fair prospect. Well now I'm

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going to be a little <sup>bit</sup> personal in the words that follow because I was involved in this thing as the co-inventor of it and I think my personal reactions may be useful from a historical standpoint. <sup>o</sup> Whether or not they are indeed subjective, <sup>so</sup> ~~though~~ I'll not apologize for that. I'll just go ahead and be subjective. Well when Friedman got this permission from the Chief Signal Officer, he came back and told me about it and I was delighted because I thought it was a good idea and so Friedman made arrangements then to set up a meeting and brought over well I think he first disclosed it to Admiral Wenger, who was at that time Commander. I was not present at the disclosure because Friedman and Wenger always had these sort of private meetings and they discussed a lot of things and I think this was probably a good thing on Friedman's part because the Navy was very reluctant to talk about sensitive things outside of a selected few people and Friedman already had the entree, developed this rapport with Wenger and for

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Abe or Kully or me or all of us to be involved in those very very private discussions would have inhibited the exchange of information, certainly the flow from the Navy to the Army, and so I think this was right and proper and it was in one of those, Friedman set up one of those meetings, <sup>and</sup> revealed, I'd prepared the drawings and everything else to make sure he had the right kind of a package in front of him so he could put it forward in the best <sup>light</sup> ~~side~~ in the simplest terms. So he gave this to Wenger, presented it to him, and then after the meeting he came in and told me Wenger's reaction. He said Wenger was amazed because the concept is so new and different Wenger wanted to take it back and further discuss it over at the Navy and that we'd be hearing from him in due course. Well we waited sort of. I waited anxiously and I think Friedman did and every chance I got to see him we talked about this and wondered what the Navy was going to do with it because we were really sold on it. It was a damn good idea we thought and it must have been, otherwise things that

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happened to it wouldn't have. Then several days later Friedman got a call from Wenger

that he wanted to bring over a group of navy officers from other parts of the Navy

and have some more discussions about this in Friedman's office. Well Friedman told

me about this and <sup>that</sup> it was going to come up and of course I was very anxious and I

of material helped Friedman get his package together for this meeting so Friedman goes out and

has to answer a lot of questions. <sup>He rebriefs them</sup> ~~we briefed him~~ fully on this device and answers ~~to~~

a lot of questions and <sup>there was</sup> considerable excitement evidently, <sup>because as</sup> Friedman reported to me

They were very serious about it. after the meeting that they had a lot of questions. <sup>They</sup> ~~apparently~~ had no words of

praise but he could tell <sup>from</sup> ~~by~~ their reaction they were really excited. They just couldn't

bury that and he sort of implied that he didn't think ~~that~~ Wenger had really understood

what he was explaining to Wenger <sup>and that</sup> ~~but~~ now he had had a good opportunity to make a proper

presentation because some of the people there were much more familiar with electro-

mechanical matters than Wenger obviously was so we were real excited. We were waiting

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momentarily to get <sup>the</sup> ~~our~~ great big check saying that look your article has been accepted.

You're going to get full credit for this. It's a wonderful thing. <sup>We're</sup> ~~you're~~ going to

have a best seller sort of. (laughter) But then a week went on, two weeks went on,

not a word from the Navy and by this time I began to push Friedman <sup>a little bit;</sup> ~~and~~ I said "Look

why don't you call Wenger up and get a report on this <sup>meeting?"</sup> ~~and~~ and he was most reluctant,

not that... I don't know why he was. He just didn't want to demean himself <sup>to</sup> showing

any curiosity. I think he was a very proud man and finally I think it got the better

of him and so he made a date with Wenger and put the question to Wenger. Well what

do you folks think about it? Well I <sup>don't, I</sup> ~~wasn't~~ there so I don't know what transpired

but the report <sup>that</sup> Friedman gave to me was ~~he~~ didn't think the Navy understood it

because the consensus which Wenger reported as a result of the briefing Friedman

had given the second, the second briefing to Wenger and others not ~~just to~~ Wenger alone

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said he didn't think they fully understood the principle because they ~~didn't think~~ <sup>said</sup> it

would<sup>n't</sup> work. It was impractical. Well this was sort of a second order disappointment.

Friedman wasn't nearly as disappointed with this rejection of the idea as he was with his original presentation to the Chief Signal Officer and so we, I was disappointed too.

We just went on. We had a lot of other things to do so we didn't cry in our beer

too long about this. Now I think its important to note with regard to Friedman and

his role here that he was able to start out that which was best and find ways and means

of getting it adopted even by finding ways of getting around the pretty flat budget

limitation in the Signal Corps because he took advantage of the opportunity presented

by the Navy's funds to get this idea promoted and as you look back <sup>from</sup> ~~in~~ history it was

a wonderful thing that happened. Well things went on for some time without any

reaction from the Navy and among other things Major William O. Reeder joined the

War Plans and Training Division and Friedman went on a junket overseas to install the

M134T1s and while he <sup>was</sup> ~~was away, this is~~ I think while we were working on the, it was I

think we were beginning to <sup>attack</sup> tap the Purple machine. The Purple machine had come into use and we were working very closely with the Navy technical group on trying to get into the Purple machine. Now I bring in the Purple machine here ~~now~~ because this was <sup>now,</sup> several weeks several months, after Friedman had reported to me that the Navy had rejected the idea. Ham Wright and I were sitting at my desk over in the Munitions Building looking at, sort of reviewing, what we had cryptanalytically developed about the logic of the Purple machine and the cryptanalytic attacks that we might mount on it and Ham was sitting there and we were discussing the possible types of machines that might be used and Ham <sup>says,</sup> made the remark. He ~~said~~ "By golly Frank he says this might, they might have invented the kind of principles that we are using in our new Navy machine. And I said "Well it might" and you know principles come up. And I said "I didn't know you had a new Navy machine and he says "Oh yeah, I'll tell you about it." So help me ~~and~~ this is the truth now. Ham ~~sat~~ sat down there and he developed the logic that,

of the system that Friedman had revealed to Wenger and the other Navy people and

clearly indicated that the key generator <sup>that</sup> was being involved in this Navy machine

was exactly the one that we wanted to have involved in the Army machine that we'd

been denied the opportunity to develop because the funds weren't available. Well

I didn't let on <sup>to</sup> ~~about~~ Hamph and so I ~~started~~ <sup>sort of</sup> to ask <sup>ed</sup> him, ~~I said~~ <sup>well,</sup> "Where did you get these

ideas?" <sup>sort of</sup> and he said "Well Wenger got them somewhere." you see and I said "Well what

is the status of it?" and he says "Well we're having one built." He says "It'll be

down here and I'll see if I can't arrange for you to look at it." and this, well I

sort of sat there and kept my cool think<sub>ing</sub> about this because I wondered my goodness

what's going on here sort of. I know where Wenger got the idea but why didn't the

Navy tell Friedman about it? Well as soon as Hamph left I go out and seek out Major

Reeder who is a very easy guy to talk to and I ask him if I can close the door and

he says "Yes" and I closed the door and I told him what happened and I went back and I said "Now it seems to me that this is exactly the information that Friedman had given Wenger several months ago before you were here and <sup>that</sup> the Navy had told us <sup>that</sup> they weren't going to do anything about it". and he says "Well what do you think about it Frank" sort of and I said "I think its a damn good thing. I'm glad they've done it". He says "Well I'd hoped you'd feel that way about it". He said "I was talking to the Navy people a couple of weeks ago and they have invited us to send you and Friedman and Sinkov and Kullback over to look at the pilot model of their new cipher machine in which had been adopted the principles that Friedman ~~had~~ revealed to Wenger and this is part of their reciprocation for the use of these ideas" and he said "The only reason that we hadn't gone over earlier is that Friedman's out of the country and they wanted to wait until he comes back." Well I tell this as an interesting episode but it sort of

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shows how the Army and Navy were collaborating <sup>in those days</sup> and really the barriers between the two so far as the exchange of both technical and tightly held operational information is concerned. Well later on we went over and looked at the thing and it was a joy to and delight to see what a magnificent job the Navy had done on this. The pilot model was not perfect but it was so much better than any cipher machine that had ever been built yet that I just couldn't keep my hands off <sup>of</sup> it. I got the opportunity to sit down to encipher and decipher a message and the doggone thing worked and I watched those wheels go round with great glee and enjoyment and so did Friedman. Abe and Kully, poor fellows, they got elbowed out because they hadn't been as close to this thing as Friedman and I had and we just took over. We couldn't leave our toy alone and ~~with~~ the consensus of all four of us, Friedman, Abe, Kully and myself, was that this was a terrific thing. That we had a cipher machine here now that could answer better than anything else certainly and probably better than any other nation could produce

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to answer the requirements for rapid encipherment that from Army level on up. We weren't thinking about this in terms of division because <sup>of</sup> a lot of considerations but this was from Army right on up to overseas commands <sup>to</sup> headquarters, coderooms, provide <sup>a</sup> the US, both the Army and Navy, and we were thinking not just Army and the government because we were thinking about [ the State Department too, <sup>could</sup> ~~to~~ provide us with a terrific cipher machine device. ] Well needless to say Friedman was elated by this and I think felt that he had, that this was a great step forward, ~~that~~ he was personally involved in both from the technical and managerial standpoint and I think he got a lot of personal satisfaction out of this thing and I sit here and attest that Friedman ought to get, because I think it was sort of that there is no measure of how much credit Friedman should get for this, <sup>an</sup> he overcame

obstacle  
two obstacles, the technical <sup>an</sup> and the management obstacle to achieve this, the introduction of this real good principle. Now in todays view this may not amount to

much but in the view of 1938, 39 and 40 this was a terrific advance and I think the WWII experiences bore out the fact that we did have an invulnerable system.

As a part of the follow-on and now that we had seen the importance of <sup>the</sup> cryptographic idea, Friedman approached me and said we've got to make sure now that this is properly patented and someday we'll have to sort out our contribution and so I went to work

writing up, drafting the, or updating the drafts for patent application that we had

put in <sup>you see</sup> to make sure <sup>that</sup> the concepts, all the concepts, were appropriately covered and the

particular one adopted by the Navy was effectively ~~portrayed~~ because when you get to

the patent you don't want to find yourself in the ~~loophole~~ of having the practical

device looking different <sup>from</sup> ~~than~~ what the patent application claimed. So that was the

first thrust. Then question of, sort of division of credit, came up on this. Friedman

<sup>sort of</sup> I thought that we ought to do this pretty soon. I was most reluctant to do it because

how do you sort out a thing like that. Finally we hammered out a paper which we both

agreed on and signed and we used this sort of as a basis for future <sup>then</sup> ~~options~~ actions.

I think its interesting, and now again this is subjective, that all the things, <sup>you see</sup> ~~the~~ three  
of us got <sup>monetary</sup> ~~military~~ <sup>the</sup> awards from Congress for what we had done. It was Friedman first  
followed by Safford and then myself. As I look at it the only thing, the big reason  
for this, was the work done in communications, cryptography, so I think that Friedman's  
application for this Congressional award, had it not included the AB~~A~~, would have been  
most difficult. It would have been a very difficult <sup>job</sup> <sub>^</sub> for him to receive it but I think  
with ~~that~~ <sup>the AB~~A~~</sup> in there it was pretty much assured. <sup>Now</sup> <sub>^</sub> Friedman broke the way. Then Safford  
put in an application and if you look at the papers that Safford had submitted the  
thing that I identify <sup>in</sup> ~~with~~ my knowledge, <sup>very</sup> ~~my~~ personal knowledge, of the things <sup>which</sup> ~~that~~ were  
presented by Safford, <sup>was again</sup> <sub>^</sub> the one of significance <sub>^</sub> the ECM, and of course we called it  
the AB~~A~~ and the Navy called it the ECM so then having these two awards presented  
one to Safford and one to Friedman it would have been kind of stupid for me not to  
put in for my hundred grand because I was as deeply involved in the AB~~A~~ as they were,  
so I think sort of as an aside it was the work on the AB~~A~~/ECM that enabled three of

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us out of the cryptanalytic organizations <sup>of</sup> ~~in~~ the Army and Navy to to get monetary recognition for <sup>our</sup> ~~a~~ contributions and I throw that in for what its worth. Actually in my case the thing that bothered me is <sup>that</sup> the newspapers twisted the thing around and said that this is for the work on the Japanese codes. Somehow or other that ~~thing~~ came out but thats the for the birds (chuckle). It was strictly on the merits of the cryptographic contribution <sup>that</sup> these awards were made. The COMINT side of it never came into question and the press is in error in that sense. Now I think going into such detail into the development of the ~~ABBA~~ principle ~~and~~ how that worked out I've gotten away from the main stream of thought <sup>here</sup> but I do believe ~~that~~ this example was significant of the kind of role that Friedman ~~played~~ in his capacity as head of the technical effort in the Signal Intelligence Service. Now of course we've overlapped in time. Other things were involved while we were working on the <sup>is</sup> ~~ABBA~~/ECM because this didn't happen overnight. It took several months <sup>for it</sup> to come about. Now Friedman of

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course continued as the head of the organization, its Director, and that's a good word for it. He was the Director of the technical effort, cryptologic effort, and that embraces both cryptanalytics and cryptography in the SIS and he was aware of the management problems and dealt with them but most of the administrative problems were dealt with by Akin and Reeder and others who were in the office of <sup>the</sup> War Plans and Training Division because their concept was to keep Friedman as free of these administrative duties as they could so <sup>that</sup> he could bring his talents, his rare talents, to bear on the technical advancement of <sup>the</sup> ~~this~~ activity. <sup>well</sup> Friedman, when he came back from this trip abroad <sup>/</sup> distributing the devices to the overseas commands, the M134T1, when he came back he had a little catching up to do and of course we were involved with this business of getting the ECM, once the Navy had produced the pilot model, then we had to go to make sure that this satisfied the Army requirements and would be suitable for the

Army because early on we envisioned a contract for the same chassis and the same wheels but the wiring of the wheels would be different. We wanted the same chassis and the same instrumentation between the Army and Navy because then the contract problems would be greatly simplified and the cryptographic difference could be insured because of the design of the wheels and the critical thing was the wiring of the wheels

if there, so we had differently wired wheels we could send out in sets, we could still use the same chassis and the same instrumentation throughout. Probably the major difference was the power supply because in the Navy usage the shore stations and larger naval, what's the word, vessels had plenty of power on them but for Army use and Army headquarters in particular there might not be the 120<sup>volts</sup> DC which I believe <sup>the equipment</sup> Navy was designed for, and we had to use <sup>maybe</sup> a ~~Navy~~ local generator or in <sup>an</sup> emergency situation run the thing off <sup>a</sup> jeep power supply or a truck power supply so we had to provide for <sup>the 24-</sup> ~~120~~ volt <sup>an</sup> operation which was permitted by certain vehicles' electrical system and there were

differences like that, ~~and~~ The Navy had a thing about, one which to Friedman, Abe, Kully

and me seemed a trivial <sup>crypte</sup> graphic thing. They wanted to incorporate some means of

shifting the ~~wiring~~ wiring manually which, well, shifting the wiring between the key generator

and the rotor, stepping mechanisms, and we finally argued that this was trivial and we'd

go ahead and accept the Navy version of it because the Navy was putting emphasis on

simplicity of operation and we were putting emphasis on <sup>using</sup> ~~use of~~ the best cryptography

but the difference between the two was so trivial we finally decided that we would ~~be~~ not

make a <sup>n</sup> argument about this. The job done by the Navy was so good, <sup>though,</sup> there was very little <sub>^</sub>

we could contribute to it except ~~to~~ check it out for its cryptographic, make sure the

best principles were used and <sup>that some</sup> ~~some~~ dangerous <sup>principle might</sup> ~~some dangerous~~ <sup>exemp</sup> ~~lication~~ of the

principle, might not be involved or incorporated in the device when it was manufactured

by the contractor, which was IT&T, so essentially we accepted the Navy device and it

took a lot of work to get this done and it interfered very little with the work done

by the Purple section because we had <sup>e</sup>Furner and Small and the other group carrying on and we had the Navy people still working on it at that time and also we, it was a lot of <sup>just</sup> routine spade work that had to be accomplished before we could get down and make the big pitch, <sup>to</sup> make the big attack, break through. I guess at that time the thing that was bothering everybody ~~the~~ most was not our work on cryptography but the fact that we had not yet solved the Purple. This was about six <sup>or</sup> ~~of~~ seven months after the, Friedman got back and G2 was beginning to get rest<sup>ive</sup>~~ed~~ and want, wanted badly, to read the text of the messages in the Purple because the use of the Purple system was, it carried the important traffic between Washington and Tokyo, London, Rome, Berlin. These four capitals. Of course <sup>er</sup> Moscow was important, but these four capitals were high <sup>er</sup> ~~priority~~ and these were, there were seven or eight. I think there was Ankara. Distribution was Washington, Tokyo, <sup>--</sup> Tokyo, Washington, Rome, Berlin, London, Paris, Ankara, Moscow, Warsaw. I think that's, there may have been one more, but this see G2 couldn't get this traffic

because it was on the Purple and so they wanted this traffic and they said get on with it. So the Chief Signal Officer called Billy in and said drop everything and concentrate on this Purple. Give it everything you need but you Billy, you senior cryptanalysts, go down there and solve the Purple you see. Well Friedman I think tried to explain <sup>that</sup> he wasn't, he, solely, was contributing everything he could. He had a good team working for him. They said anyhow Billy drop it. I think this bothered Friedman. I don't think it helped his health much, <sup>and</sup> It put a lot of psychological pressure on him in addition to what he already was experiencing, namely he felt a deep responsibility to get this thing on and he was satisfied in his own mind that he was doing just right about it, making the proper division between his work with the Purple because he was staying right on top of everything we were doing and we were insuring that Friedman was kept up to date on it so there was nothing missing and <sup>filed</sup> (Rosen) and <sup>filed</sup> (Small) and <sup>e</sup> Farner and myself probably, well, we were were a good team and he knew this

and I think he felt ~~that~~ (1) we might be resentful if he came in and sort of the  
implication that we weren't doing a good job and (2) that there <sup>was really</sup> ~~wasn't~~ nothing that

he could contribute that he wasn't already contributing but there he was sitting in

<sup>the</sup>  
A vacuum with the Chief Signal Officer pounding on him to get this answer out and

there wasn't a damn thing he could do but sit there and suffer. Now I think that's

exactly the situation that <sup>Billy</sup> ~~that~~ was in and I think if there is any truth in Kahn's

book about his statement that Friedman had a nervous breakdown as a result of his

Purple assignment that <sup>t</sup> ~~is~~ was an unnecessary and artificial pressures that were

brought on Friedman by this simple act of saying put full time on it <sup>&</sup> That caused

Friedman's health to degenerate. Now Friedman was pretty tired <sup>you see</sup> and we'd been working

awful hard and he was, he was a little bit older than the rest of us and I don't think

this helped his health <sup>any</sup> at all and I think it was a most unfortunate thing that happened.

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Now this, the importance of the Purple and the crying need to get translations of messages between Tokyo and these major capitals of the world, <sup>having</sup> ~~happened to~~ <sup>d</sup> caused Friedman to be assigned full time to drop all other activities and spend full time, <sup>that's the</sup> ~~this is a~~ better way of putting it, on the solution of the Purple I think had a pretty heavy impact on Friedman because he knew everything that could be done was being done. It was a matter of collecting more information and more material but he had to take certain actions in response to this new situation, <sup>him</sup> ~~he was~~ spending full time on the ~~problem~~, and one of the things he did was to call, in support of the technical effort, all the skills that could be mustered out of the Signal Intelligence. Abe and Kully came in and spent, each left their responsibilities, Abe for the Italian and Kully for the German, and came in and reviewed what had been done. Friedman called in some people from outside. The one I remember distinctly was a reserve officer who was a relay engineer for Bell Telephone Companies up in New York City. His name was Juran, J U R A N,

and he came in for two weeks and I stayed with him for this whole period of two weeks going over what we had learned about the Purple and what we had imagined <sup>about it,</sup> ~~our~~ diagnosis of it is a better way of putting it, and to make sure that he was briefed within the two weeks he had available to us for his active duty assignment as a reserve officer, that he was made <sup>as</sup> completely aware as possible of what our problem was, and I might just dispose of the Juran experience as follows <sup>that</sup> about the last two or three days he began to express <sup>some</sup> ~~judgments~~ <sup>[?]</sup> ~~since~~ the first five or six days of his period was one of intense interest in what we were doing and strong motivation to make sure he understood it because he was impressed by the assignment. To be called in to put his skills you see in support of something was fantastic, ~~It was something~~ he had never dreamt about. An attack on <sup>sophisticated</sup> ~~the~~ cipher machine used at the highest echelons of

J apanese diplomatic establishment and thats quite a mouthful of awesome words and he was impressed by it. He wanted to find the magic solution to the thing. He wanted to be able to point to something that could be looked on as a contribution to this definitely important piece of work. But I can remember the last two or three days he was beginning to formulate in his mind what he was going to tell the Chief Signal Officer because the Chief Signal Officer wanted to talk to him. He was known. He had a good personal reputation. He wanted to talk to him personally and get <sup>his</sup> an evaluation of this so he sat down and told me what he was going to tell the Chief Signal Officer and he said this. That there was nothing that he or any of his compatriots could contribute to this problem. That we had done a most magnificent job and had gone so far, <sup>far</sup> beyond any measure that could be expected of us and that what we should do was to continue and probably be left alone because he deplored that he had interrupted our work for the two weeks and had to go away without making any contribution. Now he sort o

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hurried up and added "Now this doesn't mean <sup>that</sup> you shouldn't call on us if you think that we can make a contribution if there is any possibility that we can make a contribution but taking into account the security of the problem as well as what has been done here in the Signal Intelligence Service you're better off to go ahead on your own until you need us and that was a sort of <sup>a</sup> different attitude I found because most people would want to go away leaving the impression that they had helped us a lot but he went up and said very negatively "I haven't done a thing except interrupt." and this of course helped Friedman, <sup>J</sup>Juran's recommendation, because it reinforced what Friedman had told the Chief Signal Officer, that we had pulled all stops on this and that, and I think this eased Friedman's personal <sup>tension</sup> ~~attention~~ and apprehension somewhat because it was now bugging him. ~~and~~ he was getting tired and you could see the effects of this added pressure because now he had to <sup>bear</sup> ~~bare~~ the full responsibility for the thing and he

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could <sup>nt</sup> shift it off on any of the rest of us nor could we share it with him which we would have gladly done but this was Friedman's nature. He took it all on his own shoulders. Now also sort of to relieve the pressure on Friedman and I think I'm describing the pressure on Friedman more than I am the technical situation but I think this is sort of what you want. Abe and Kully and the others who had been assigned to the problem had come in and reported that they didn't see that there was anything that could be done that hadn't, that we weren't doing you see. They sort of said look we've reviewed this thing. We've reviewed it critically and everything is being done.

There is nothing we can contribute and <sup>then</sup> they said, "Please let us go back and work on our own problems a little bit because we're getting behind there you see and so this added to the the getting back to proper attitude. I think it was a little unnatural to put all that pressure on Friedman. Fortunately **FERNER** <sup>(Sext)</sup> (Small, Rosen) and I who really were bearing the brunt of the work, it ~~really~~ didn't bother us. For some reason I guess



we were pretty well satisfied. We didn't know what else to do and if somebody had come in and solved it we'd been glad because, so there was no tension between Friedman and us because the Chief Signal Officer had put the pressure on him. Maybe I'm overemphasizing the sort of personal reactions here but <sup>I,</sup> these exist today I'm sure and they have a lot of influence on what's done and how the answer is achieved and ~~that~~ <sup>they</sup> can't be ignored. In due course I think the problem <sup>developed,</sup> oh one of the other things that happened in this timeframe and I think sort of in some way affected Friedman's attitude <sup>is</sup> that the Navy had withdrawn both in act and interest in trying to solve the Purple. They I think sort of reached the conclusion that there was nothing in it for them since it was going to eat up a lot of people it was kind of an impossible situation to solve the problem and they had the pressures of working on the navy systems in front of them.....

End of Tape 9, Side 2

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Tape 10, Side 1

Now of course it took several weeks sort of for Friedman<sup>to</sup> work himself out of this  
^  
position that had been thrust upon him and this came about not only because Juran's  
reports and Kully and Abe's attitudes and Friedman's own reporting to the Chief Signal  
Officer but other things came in and had to be dealt with particularly in the COMSEC  
field <sup>and</sup> so we began to getting back to a more normal less <sup>and will less</sup> disturbing situation for  
was(?)  
Friedman because this wasn't a bad deal that he got I think in terms of getting this  
special assignment. The other things that came up were in terms of satisfying intercept  
requirements. We had a lot of problems in regard to the lower echelon~~s~~ systems that  
had to be resolved and then there was <sup>the</sup> a continuing problem <sup>of</sup> with insuring that the  
cryptographic program which had been established for budgetary and other reasons was  
being satisfied and to update the requirements for cryptographic systems and Friedman,

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this is this is some thing <sup>that</sup> he loved and had worked with effectively, and so as the situation developed to the point <sup>of where</sup> ~~that~~ we could go on with our research, <sup>5</sup> with Friedman sort of playing in and out of it I think the tension on him was relaxed. Of course ultimately when <sup>the</sup> system was broken. I think the release of tension, Friedman still felt some of it but when the system was broken and the fact established that we could read the messages I think it was only then that he <sup>could</sup> ~~was~~ totally relaxed ~~from~~ from this requirement because the outside people who were aware of our effort then were satisfied that the solution had been achieved and that everything that could be done of course had been done <sup>or</sup> ~~and~~ that everything that needed to be done had been done because we were reading the messages so the pressure let up at that point in time and Friedman relaxed a bit and I think that <sup>5</sup> when he was able to, well, start back up hill and regain some of his his, well, get out of this more dejected state into a less dejected state because

there was a state of dejection that became evident to some of us at that time. Probably

the next thing of significance that occurred which which I think Friedman might have felt

*some problems*  
 I was in terms of <sup>the</sup> development of <sup>the</sup> mechanization of the, of the solution of the Japanese  
<sub>the</sub>

transposed code. Fortunately for all of us, the the magnitude of the problem was not

recognized outside of the technical sections. It was a very awesome aspect to

recover each day several transpositions keys and not only the keys themselves but the

underlying codes without a knowledge of either. Early on in this introduction of the

transposed code the Navy had made some photographs of the code and the system and had

given us copies of them and they, well, both Friedman and the Navy had the same conclusion,

that this was practically impossible. We might have limited success but we never could

exploit it you see and the system was just that overwhelming in nature and Friedman

made a judgment and I think expressed himself that this was the case and then later on

when the SIS was able to develop the GEEWHIZER<sup>Z</sup> in a mechanization of this I think  
<sub>A</sub>

Friedman may have felt a little personal some of his personal reputation ~~may have~~ <sup>had</sup> suffered because of the earlier stand he took but I don't think this should have bothered him because he should have regaled himself in the fact that he had set the stage for the emergence of this approach and if he hadn't (1) had the vision and foresight to get the people acquainted with the principles which ~~had been~~ <sup>could be</sup> applied in this case and (2) had gone <sup>a</sup> way out on a limb to get the IBM equipment which was an essential part of the solution on board, and I think Abe receives more credit than those of us who were more deeply involved in the particular development that resulted,

<sup>and</sup> I'll identify it here as the GEEWHIZER approach, the GEEWHIZER being the cover name <sup>the</sup> or short title or handy title of a device that was ~~was~~ constructed to be used in conjunction with an IBM tabulator and by the use of this combination of things together with certain things introduced by <sup>Short</sup> (Small) like the use of the logarithm instead of the the absolute frequency and some of <sup>FERNER'S</sup> Furner's concept, mathematical, and contributions made by

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others of us which finally culminated in the production of both a program and a primitive mechanization of cryptanalysis. I think it was that incident and I think probably the thing that bothered Friedman most though was the outbreak of the war. The imminence of the outbreak of the war was beginning to bear down on him and I think the records will show here that a team was selected to go to visit GCHQ. Dennison<sup>4</sup> had been over to see us and we had been, the SIS and the Navy group, had been invited to send each two representatives so Akin had selected Friedman as senior man together with I believe<sup>Sect</sup> (Rosen) was selected early on because everybody had great respect for what<sup>Sect</sup> (Rosen) could bring back with his engineering background as well as his own<sup>personal</sup> sharpness.

He was, he was really on top of this so we thought that would be the best deal and then Friedman went into uniform and I think the act<sup>of</sup> ~~on~~ going into the uniform had a serious traumatic<sup>dramatic</sup> effect on him. I don't think he was too disturbed about going to London

*I think this,*  
because<sup>of</sup> he would have been right out, he would have been doing exactly what he liked

~~HANDLE~~

once he got over there but I think just going into uniform shook him up so he had to take a breather ~~away~~ from the activity and get away from it and get some help, ~~some~~ medical help, and from then on I think Friedman's career was overtaken by the pressure of the war. Things were <sup>just</sup> happening too fast. Friedman could never keep up with them and so he finally paced himself until where he acted more in the capacity of an advisor instead of being involved in the administration and he, in this capacity he got involved in several things. One of them was the development of the 228, the SIGCOM, and I also got involved in that and worked with him and I found that he was beginning to realize that he was going to have to turn over the reins to the rest of us <sup>because</sup> he just couldn't stand the pace. The requirements were just too great for him and he began to relax in his attitude <sup>except</sup> somewhat, he would feel pretty badly at times. He'd, I don't like

to use the term fits of depression but that might pretty well describe it because I think he wanted to produce more. He wanted to give more than he was able to give and I think that bothered <sup>him</sup> and I think he reacted to it and finally he was put in a position of senior consultant and of course in a way was insulated from some of the greater pressures, organizational pressures and wartime pressures, and he pretty soon accepted this but it was only an overt acceptance I think. I think from then on Friedman had a pretty traumatic existence. Fortunately though, the officers in charge of the Army Security Agency knew Friedman and his reputation of what he had contributed and they didn't make life any more unpleasant for him than the situation <sup>?</sup> [was.] They were aware that this was bothering Friedman. They tried to help him and they tried to do it in such a way that it didn't look like charity but every now and then it would show through and I'm sure it bugged Friedman. But he continued <sup>in</sup> so far as his interest <sup>^</sup> in the activity was concerned. He was just as intensely interested. He was always

~~\_\_\_\_\_~~  
~~\_\_\_\_\_~~

intensely interested. There was never any diminishing of his interest in the thing.

It <sup>was</sup> just that he didn't have the ~~the~~ physical stamina to respond and to do all the things ~~th~~

he thought he ought to be doing, and I think I've accurately described what was wrong

with Friedman, that he thought he ought to be doing more than was required of him

and since he couldn't provide this I think he felt like he was being deficient

and he downgraded himself and he really shouldn't have because I think anybody who

had done as much as Friedman could have sat back on their laurels at that time, but

he just <sup>absolutely</sup> refused to do it. Now I've said this very well and I think its right and its

just about the way it was. I've left out the details but this is my impression and

to just <sup>sort of</sup> quote it a little bit, I think Friedman felt that he should do more than

he was able to accomplish and it was the difference, his incapability of doing all

that he thought he ought to be doing that bothered him.

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I might describe some of the organization implications which resulted and which had a bearing on Friedman and his contribution which conversely Friedman had a bearing on

and it was this. We've now gone from <sup>about</sup> 1938 <sup>right the</sup> into a period shortly after the war had

started, and my last few sentences were directed <sup>at</sup> ~~towards~~ Friedman and his role during

the war. But that period of transition <sup>I think</sup> needs a little attention in these remarks and

<sup>I think</sup> ~~may~~ we find it here. In the first place with the advent of Bullock, Col. Frank

Bullock and Col. \_\_\_\_\_, who had no real experience in cryptology

before their assignment. They were a straight first class signal <sup>corps</sup> officers but not

aware, as aware, of the Signal Intelligence activities as Akin and Reeder and Mauborgne

were. I mean we had a new climate now. A new attitude. A new, bosses came in and also

with the burgeoning awareness that the war was imminent and with the influx of a great

many more officers in the Chief Signal Officer and <sup>the</sup> calling in the reservists some of the

rather happy environment that we had enjoyed was suddenly lost and this became a

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bothersome thing and one of the things that I can remember ~~and~~ distinctly that I think would have had a bearing on Friedman's feelings about it. It certainly had a bearing on mine was that the senior officer, language officer, who was assigned who was put in charge of the Japanese, well, <sup>he</sup> was put in charge of the signal intelligence activities <sup>--that's</sup> ~~was~~ Harold Dowd, and then other officers who had been assigned to the Japanese, other sections, assumed the responsibilities for them. The senior language officer in the Japanese section was Capt Svenson and he replaced, ~~I mean~~ just overnight there was an order issued that said Svenson is responsible for the Japanese section. Rowlett is his technical assistant you see and this <sup>was</sup> ~~is~~ sort of the way Friedman was treated. Well it didn't bug me because I'll say it because I believe it. Svenson was known as the "Charging Swede" and I think was the football hero up at West Point when he was there. He still was a football hero as far as I was concerned but he didn't know anything about the technical end of the business. I'd, I'd make ~~the~~ peace with him

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other than just making peace with him;  
but I ignored him <sup>^</sup> because nobody listened to him. I issued the orders and if he didn't like them he'd come and argue with me because he couldn't argue with the fellow who was doing it. I usually was able to out talk him and I'd even make trades with him, you know, to change priorities and things like that. <sup>if</sup> <sup>^</sup> He wanted to do something and he knew he couldn't do it unless I helped him. I'm really describing how I solved my problem. I don't know how Friedman solved his. I don't think he ever solved it but I accepted Svenson and <sup>just</sup> <sup>^</sup> I sat down and outfigured the bastard. That's exactly what I did because that was the only way of getting on with it and maybe I was smart or maybe I was stupid but there was that kind of a thing that we had to deal with and Svenson <sup>is</sup> ~~was~~ the one that drove us out of the Munitions Building on the 6<sup>th</sup> of December after we had information about the pilot messages because he was applying Minckler's instructions about the overtime and that was a terrible thing to ~~have~~ happen to us

because I think it would have bothered <sup>me</sup> ~~my~~ more if I hadn't sort of accepted it. You know this is a necessary evil and how do you get around it. I just wasn't overwhelmed by it at all. Now it was that kind of a thing that we had to accept and adjust to in our transformation from the earlier, well, the earlier kind of saturated technical attitude until we got in this pseudo-administrative mishmash that nobody understood and most of us who had any concept of the true mission of the SIS, most of us just ignored it. I think I said enough about that didn't I?

Comments about some other things that happened. I think I might better make a comment about some other things that \_\_\_\_\_ . I've been talking now in terms of just <sup>the</sup> a few people, the old timers but one of the other problems <sup>that</sup> we all had to solve was how to deal with the increase in personnel requirements. Fortunately we didn't have to go out and recruit. There was a large body of skilled people on tap. These were the ROTC people that <sup>of</sup> which Dale Marston is a good representative and Tom Chittenden,

*They* came in as a body and were assigned to positions of, well, Charlie Heiser (?)

was another one that I remember. They were assigned to positions within the Signal

Intelligence Service. At that time we began making the division between those who

would be dedicated to the COMINT side and those who would be dedicated to COMSEC

because it became pretty evident to almost everybody that (1) war was imminent

(2) whether war was imminent or not there was going to be a greater effort at mobiliza-

tion and (3) that we had to have a cadre. Had to expand our cadre of knowledgeable

people if the <sup>full</sup> mobilization took effect so this problem had to be solved in that time

I think  
frame and this probably was behind the concept of putting the, of sort of removing the

responsibilities from the civilian workforce and turning it over to the military.

Then there was another thing <sup>that's</sup> ~~the~~ that most of us in key positions were reservists and

so we would eventually be called to active duty and there was that, that overtone that

had to be considered. Of course Abe and <sup>Stet</sup> (Rosen) had already gone into uniform to make

the trip to London and they were the ~~first~~ and I think some of the, I didn't get into

uniform until <sup>some time</sup> after Pearl Harbor. I was still a civilian and I guess I always <sup>was</sup> a

civilian because I never got to be an officer. I was a very poor officer. I wasn't

trained. I didn't have the dedication <sup>to</sup> of the military code and principles that you

get if you have some sort of formal training. All we did <sup>was,</sup> I think Kully was a great

deal like I was. We just wanted to get on with the job and it was easier to do it in

uniform than out of it. It didn't really make any difference and I think rank

was something that was held pretty <sup>sacred</sup> ~~secretly~~ at one time but I can remember Walt Jacobs

and Dan Dribben as <sup>s</sup>ergeants bossing majors and captains around. Not, not ordering them

but directing them. They were the essential directors of the activity. It was great

bit of topsyturvyness in the military structure within the SIS and this instead of,

well, it just created uncertainties and oddities rather than generating obstructions.

End of Tape 10, Side 1

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THE END