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BROWNELL COMMITTEE REPORT

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DOCID: 3201737

Date: 3 Jan 79

Subject: "Brownell Report"

To: D4/AHA Tony Nables

Tony,

This document (an extra which Elwood had in his file) is historically very important; to it may be attributed the establishment of NSA.

It was Harry Truman who directed the SECDEF and SECSTATE to initiate a study to find out what was wrong with the operation of AFSA. They, jointly, commissioned the Brownell Committee to make the study, and this was the result.

It makes for very easy and interesting reading.

It has not been downgraded (27 years old).

In a recently study I had reason to dig into this report in order to prepare my response for DIR. So, old as it is, it is still a useful document.

While I, or some other staffer may have need to refer to this document, I think that properly there should be a copy on file not only with Elwood's references, but in the AH A file, and Hank should have one also.

This is for accessioning into your "burgeoning" collection.

D.C. WIGGLESWORTH
Chief, N33

Encl:
Brownell Report, 13 Jun 1952

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BROWNELL REPORT

JUNE 1917
—
13 JUNE 1952

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Report

to the

SECRETARY OF STATE

and the

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

By a special committee appointed pursuant to letter of 28 December 1951

Copy for: The Director of Armed Forces Security Agency

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~~TOP SECRET~~
~~SECURITY INFORMATION~~

10086-2

REPORT

to the

SECRETARY OF STATE

and the

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

By a special committee appointed
pursuant to letter of 28 December 1951 from
the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defense

~~THIS DOCUMENT CONTAINS CODE WORD MATERIAL~~

George A. Brownell, Chairman
Charles E. Bohlen
John Magruder, Brig. Gen., USA, (Ret.)
William H. Jackson

COMMITTEE

~~TOP SECRET~~
~~SECURITY INFORMATION~~

13 June 1952

Dear Sirs:

In your letter to the undersigned dated 28 December 1951,* you advised that the President had directed you, assisted by the Director of Central Intelligence, to have the communications intelligence activities of the Government surveyed, with the view of recommending any corrective measures that might be required to insure the most secure and effective conduct of such activities. In your letter you appointed the undersigned as a Committee to make a survey and submit to you proposed recommendations for your consideration on two general subjects, which may be summarized as follows:

(a) The needs of each governmental department and agency for the production of departmental intelligence, and of the Director of Central Intelligence for the production of national intelligence.

(b) The allocation of responsibilities and authorities respecting communications intelligence activities that should be made to insure that such needs are satisfied most effectively, giving due regard to the requirements of security. In this connection the Committee was directed to give consideration to the extent to which responsibility for, and authority over, the interception and processing of communications intelligence information, or any other aspect of such activities, may

* see Exhibit A to this Report.

and should be assigned for performance as a service of common concern, and to which department or agency such assignment should be made.

Since its appointment the Committee has held hearings on 14 days at which it has had formal interviews with 43 witnesses.* In addition to the formal interviews, individual members of the Committee and of its Staff have had a large number of informal conferences with certain of the witnesses and other individuals active in the field of communications intelligence, and the Committee has had the benefit of a number of special memoranda prepared for it. Finally, the Committee has had extensive executive sessions. Our conclusions and recommendations are contained in the final Report submitted herewith.

It was necessary for the Committee, before attempting to arrive at its conclusions, to assemble and become familiar with a mass of information and data pertaining to the history of communications intelligence in the United States, the past and present forms of organization of the units engaged in that activity, and the manner in which the present organizations are operating. Having assembled this material, and finding it to be important background for our conclusions, we have felt that it should be summarized in the Report so that you may have before you the same information in evaluating our recommendations. This will, we hope, explain and justify the length of the first four parts of the Report. Part I is devoted to the history of the national communications intelligence effort from its beginning to the present time; it is believed

* see Exhibit B to this Report.

that this is the first time that any such broad historical statement has been attempted. Part II is a summary of the Committee's findings as to the importance of communications intelligence to the Government in the past as well as at the present time. Part III contains a description of the manner in which our communications intelligence activities are now organized, with particular reference to the statutory authority and the various directives of the National Security Council, the Secretary of Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff which bear on that subject. Part IV is an outline of the manner in which these activities are now actually being conducted, with a rough estimate of their present cost.

Part V contains the Committee's conclusions and recommendations on the two subjects set forth in your letter of 28 December 1951. In addition, we have ventured to add our comments on certain ancillary and miscellaneous issues raised by various witnesses in the course of our survey. We have not, however, attempted to extend the survey to include other subjects not assigned to us in your directive, and we have in particular not attempted to make any evaluation of the efficiency or economy of the expenditure of funds used in the overall communications intelligence effort, as this subject is not only outside your directive but completely beyond the capability of the Committee and its limited staff.

It is hoped that the Report will accomplish two purposes. The first is to acquaint the National Security Council and other interested officials with

the manner in which our communications intelligence machinery is organized and is operating, the scope and importance of its activities, and the organizational and other problems with which it is now confronted. The second is to convey to the same individuals the recommendations of the Committee, based on its evaluation of the testimony presented to it, for improving the organization and its present product.

In summary and greatly condensed form our major findings and recommendations are:

(a) Communications intelligence (COMINT) is of vital importance to the National Defense. In the last War its value to the Armed Services was incalculable. In times such as the present, the information which it produces is needed in almost equal degree by both the Services and certain of the civilian agencies.

(b)(1)
(b)(3)-50 USC 403
(b)(3)-18 USC 798
(b)(3)-P.L. 86-36

(b) [redacted] The added difficulty of the problem under attack places a greater premium than ever on the quantity and quality of the physical and intellectual resources available, and on the efficiency and clarity of the organization charged with the task. While much has recently been done to provide adequate physical resources for the job, the Committee is convinced that the present organization of our COMINT

activities seriously impedes the efficiency of the operation, and prevents us from attracting and retaining as much top quality scientific and management manpower as this country ought to be investing in so important a field. It is highly significant to the Committee that the return of many of the best wartime COMINT brains to more attractive civilian pursuits

(b)(1)
(b)(3)-50 USC 403
(b)(3)-18 USC 798
(b)(3)-P.L. 86-36

(c) In place of the two COMINT organizations (Army and Navy) that existed during the War, we now have four -- a unit in each of the three Armed Services, and a combined organization called the Armed Forces Security Agency (AFSA) located in Washington and under the Joint Chiefs of Staff. AFSA has no authority over the Service units, which in turn are independent of each other. For all practical purposes AFSA is controlled by AFSAC, a committee of the Joint Chiefs of Staff consisting of representatives of the three Services. The arrangement is a compromise, produced in 1949 when there was danger of the establishment of three complete Service organizations, each paralleling the other. It is not well suited in this intensely specialized field to the elimination of duplications and to the concentration of available resources and funds on the intensely difficult problems that exist and in fact it did not prevent the Air Force

from establishing a third complete and virtually autonomous organization which will soon be larger than the Army, Navy or AFSA units and is still growing. In addition, it results for all practical purposes in tri-service military control of our entire COMINT effort, for the U. S. Communications Intelligence Board (on which the State Department, the Central Intelligence Agency and the Federal Bureau of Investigation, as well as the three Services, are represented) has inadequate authority and has become an ineffective organization. The COMINT effort of the Government today has too many of the aspects of a loose combination of the previous military organizations and too few of a true unification of the COMINT activities and interests of all the interested departments and agencies.

(d) For the foregoing reasons, and for others set forth in our Report, the Committee believes and recommends that a point has now been reached which makes it essential to carry further the 1949 reorganization. We believe that a more effective centralization of certain of the COMINT activities, brought about by a strengthening of AFSA itself and an increase in its authority over the Service COMINT units, will increase its effectiveness and correct deficiencies which have become apparent since 1949. We also believe that a greater degree of policy control over AFSA's operations should be vested in an interdepartmental board on which the

interested civilian agencies have adequate and effective representation.

Our recommendations on the subject of organization logically fall into three categories: (1) the organization below the AFSA level; (2) the organization within AFSA itself; and (3) the organization above the AFSA level.

(e) As to the first, the Committee recommends that AFSA should be made the keystone of the COMINT organization. Its mission should be defined by Presidential Memorandum, which should state that its function is to provide effective unified organization and control of the COMINT activities of the Government, and to provide for integrated operational policies and procedures pertaining thereto. This responsibility should not, however, affect the responsibility and authority of the other agencies and departments (including the military services) in respect of the evaluation and dissemination of the COMINT product received by each of them from AFSA, and their synthesis of that product with information available to them from other sources. To the extent feasible and in consonance with the aims of maximum overall efficiency, economy and effectiveness, the Director should centralize or consolidate the performance of COMINT functions for which he is responsible. Although the Memorandum should make it clear that the Director has the authority to control all collection and processing of COMINT, it should also

provide that he shall have due regard for the close support requirements of the Services, and that where necessary for close support of combat forces, operational control of COMINT activities ~~are~~ is to be delegated by the Director to the appropriate Service COMINT units.

(f) Within AFSA itself, the Director should serve for a longer term than the two-year rotational term provided for at present. He must be a man of the highest competence. Although qualified witnesses have recommended to the Committee that he be a civilian, we believe that, on balance, the position should be held for the first term of at least four years by a career military officer on active or reactivated duty status, and that he should enjoy at least 3-star rank while he occupies the office. He should have a civilian deputy; and in other respects (particularly in the field of research) the development of civilian careers should be encouraged to a much greater extent than at present. If, as things develop, it should later appear that a civilian could better qualify for the position of Director, we recommend that no sense of tradition or vested military interest be allowed to stand in the way of his appointment.

(g) As to the organization above the AFSA level, the above-mentioned Presidential Memorandum should designate the Department of Defense as the executive agent of the Government (under a Special Committee of the National Security Council --- consisting of the Secretary of Defense

and the Secretary of State, and the President, as circumstances may require,) to manage for the six interested departments and agencies the production, security and distribution of communications intelligence, and to manufacture, safeguard and distribute the nation's own cryptographic systems. We are advised that there is precedent for this type of organization in the existing structure of the Atomic Energy Commission.

We recommend the abolition of AFSAC and of USCIB as presently constituted. We believe that as a successor to USCIB there should be a new COMINT Board consisting of (1) a representative of the Secretary of Defense, (2) a representative of the Secretary of State, (3) the Director of Central Intelligence, (4) the Chairman of the Joint Intelligence Committee, (5) a representative of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and (6) the Director of the Armed Forces Security Agency. The Director of Central Intelligence should be the chairman of this COMINT Board.

It should be the duty of the Board to advise and make recommendations to the Secretary of Defense, in accordance with the procedure outlined below, with respect to any matter relating to communications intelligence which falls within the jurisdiction of the Director of AFSA:

(a) The Director of AFSA should be required to make reports from time to time to the COMINT Board, either orally or in writing as the

Board may request, and should bring to the attention of the Board, either in such reports or otherwise, any new major policies or programs in advance of their adoption by him. In addition, he should be required to furnish to the COMINT Board such information as the Board may request with respect to the operations of AFSA.

(b) The Board should reach its decisions by a majority of not less than four members. Each member of the Board shall be entitled to one vote.

(c) In the event that the Board votes and reaches a decision, any dissenting member of the Board shall have the right of appeal from such decision within 7 days to the above mentioned Special Committee of the NSC. In the event that the Board votes but fails to reach a majority decision, any member of the Board shall have a similar right of appeal to the Special Committee. In either event the Special Committee shall review the matter and its determination thereon shall be final.

(d) If any matter is voted on by the Board but (1) no decision is reached and any member files an appeal, or (2) a decision is reached in which the representative of the Secretary of Defense does not concur and such representative files an appeal, no action shall be taken with respect to the subject matter until the appeal is decided, provided that if the Secretary of Defense determines, after consultation with the

Secretary of State, that the subject matter presents a problem of an emergency nature and requires immediate action, his decision shall govern pending the result of the appeal. In such emergency situation the appeal may be taken directly to the President.

(e) Recommendations of the Board adopted in accordance with the foregoing procedure shall be binding on the Secretary of Defense. Except on matters which have been voted on by the Board, the Director of AFSA shall discharge his responsibilities in accordance with his own judgment, subject to the direction of the Secretary of Defense.

The Committee realizes that the above machinery is more complicated than one would desire, although it is less involved than the present arrangements for the determination and control of AFSA policies. The complication appears unavoidable because of two controlling but somewhat conflicting factors: (1) all of the interested Services and agencies must have a voice in determining AFSA policy and giving it guidance, and (2) at the same time, in order to strengthen AFSA and make it a viable organization, it is necessary that for administrative purposes it be placed under a single government department.

In addition to the duties of the Board relating to AFSA, it should also be the duty of the Board: (1) to coordinate the communications intelligence activities of all departments and agencies authorized by the President to participate

therein; (2) to initiate, to formulate policies concerning and to supervise all arrangements with foreign governments in the field of communications intelligence; and (3) to consider and make recommendations concerning policies relating to communications intelligence of the common interest to the departments and agencies, including security standards and practices. Any recommendation of the Board with respect to these matters (as distinct from those falling within the jurisdiction of AFSA) should be binding on all departments and agencies of the Government if it is adopted by the unanimous vote of the members of the Board. Recommendations approved by a majority, but not all, of the members of the Board should be transmitted by it to the Special Committee for such action as the Special Committee may see fit to take.

As we have indicated above, Part V of the Report contains a substantial elaboration of the above recommendations, as well as comments on certain ancillary and related subjects which we believe appropriate for consideration by the new COMINT Board.

The Committee has been assisted by an able staff consisting of Messrs. Benjamin R. Shute, Lloyd N. Cutler, Harmon Duncombe and Grant C. Manson, all of whom have had previous experience with the subject. We take this opportunity of expressing our grateful appreciation for their valuable assistance. We also wish to record our thanks for the unrestricted cooperation which we received during the course of our survey from each of the Service departments

and the other departments and agencies involved, and particularly from the individual members thereof who either appeared before us as witnesses or who otherwise assisted us in furnishing information and other material.

If after examining our Report you find that there are any parts which call for further discussion, the members of the Committee will be glad to meet with you at any time at your convenience.

Respectfully submitted,

/s/ George A. Kennedy
Chairman

/s/ Richard M. Helms

/s/ Robert Amory, Jr.

/s/ R. H. Ostrander

The Honorable
The Secretary of State
Department of State
Washington 25, D. C.

The Honorable
The Secretary of Defense
Department of Defense
Washington 25, D. C.

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REPORT TO SECRETARY OF STATE

and

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

by

COMMITTEE APPOINTED BY LETTER OF
28 December 1951

TO SURVEY
COMMUNICATIONS INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
OF THE GOVERNMENT

~~THIS DOCUMENT CONTAINS CODE WORD MATERIAL~~

~~This document contains information within the meaning of Public Law 513 - 81st Congress. It is to be seen only by US PERSONNEL especially indoctrinated and authorized to receive Special Intelligence information. The security of this document must be maintained in accordance with SPECIAL INTELLIGENCE SECURITY REGULATIONS. No action may be taken by any person on the Special Intelligence presented herein, regardless of any advantage which may be gained, unless such action is first approved by the Director of Central Intelligence.~~

PART I

A BRIEF HISTORY OF COMMUNICATIONS INTELLIGENCE IN THE UNITED STATES

~~THIS DOCUMENT CONTAINS CODE WORD MATERIAL~~

Before 1917 United States activity in the field of communications intelligence was sporadic, and there is little record of it.* For all practical purposes the history of American cryptanalysis begins with our entry into World War I. At that time codes and ciphers, even those used to carry the most sensitive information, were naive by current standards. They were hand-constructed and hand applied cipher systems usually overlying double-entry code books, the attack upon which required skills and patience but not the elaborate electronic and tabulating devices of today. Consequently, the codes which this Government "cracked" from 1917 to 1919 were handled by a small group of lexicographers, mathematicians, and people who had acquired some background in what was then the hobby of cipher construction.

The War Department set up the first organized cryptanalytic office in June 1917 under Mr. H. O. Yardley, an ex-State Department telegrapher who had taken some interest in cryptography, or cipher construction. His office at first consisted of three people. It grew rapidly, was subdivided into functional sections, and at the conclusion of the War had a table of organization

* The phrase "communications intelligence", abbreviated for the sake of convenience and by common usage to "COMINT", means intelligence produced by the study of foreign communications, including breaking, reading and evaluating enciphered communications. The breaking of ciphers is called "cryptanalysis." The construction of ciphers is called "cryptography." The entire field, including both cryptanalysis and cryptography is called "cryptology."

of some 150 persons with an annual budget of $100,000. Its security regulations were primitive. Ciphers were broken and code values were recovered entirely by hand process. The volume of traffic handled by the group was nevertheless respectable, and the results of its work on the military, diplomatic and economic fronts ~~was~~ were important enough to impress both the General Staff and G-2. But its budget for fiscal year 1921 ran into opposition, and during the next decade was gradually cut to $25,000.

During most of the 1920's what was left of the effort appeared to be of interest primarily to the State Department. The group's capacity and output dwindled to a small daily "bulletin" of diplomatic traffic, and its curtailed support came largely from State Department appropriations. Yardley remained on - the office was removed to New York for "security reasons", and the whole endeavor entered into the era which, as the result of subsequent notorious publicity, has been dubbed the "State Department's Black Chamber." No research was carried on; there were no training activities, no intercept, no direction-finding studies. The personnel had fallen to six.

There was another factor, aside from relaxed pressure, which contributed to this stagnation. The entire concept of "reading other people's mail" was not only unfamiliar but actually distasteful to the American people and its Government. The coup-de-grace to the State Department activity came in 1929, a few weeks after Mr. Stimson became Secretary of State. Current copies of the

"Black Chamber" bulletins, containing some translations of Japanese diplomatic messages of significance, had been placed upon his desk. Mr. Stimson was astonished. When he was told how the material had been obtained, he disbanded the Yardley office forthwith. Yardley's reaction was to set about writing his memoirs, which eventually appeared in 1931 under the title "The American Black Chamber," and which destroyed by unprincipled exposure most of the gains that the early effort had made.

The records and physical possessions of the New York office fell by default to the Signal Corps of the Army, which had been giving minor support to the effort. At a later date it was decided to reconstitute and continue the work under Army auspices. In light of the fact that Yardley's memoirs had caused such a furore and had thrown the entire concept of cryptanalysis and cryptanalysts into such disrepute (embarrassing this Government not only vis-a-vis those countries whose mail we had read, but also vis-a-vis the British, who had given us some small assistance in doing so), it was surprising that anything at all was salvaged.

The period from 1931 to 1935 was one of revival. The first job was to reassemble former personnel and enlist new recruits; a training program with instructional literature was organized, and it is noteworthy that for the first time a complete cryptographic program (the construction of our own ciphers) was envisaged. There was still no intercept service, as we understand it today, but

raw material was clandestinely obtained through "backdoor" arrangements. The secrecy surrounding the work, in the backwash of shock following the Stimson ultimatum, precluded showing the results of the effort to anybody but the Chief Signal Officer -- even G-2 was proscribed. In those depression years funds were extremely difficult to get, especially in view of the nervous secrecy engendered by the Yardley disclosures. Perhaps the greatest triumph of the Army cryptanalytic group at this time of stringency and uncertainty was the establishment under the Signal Intelligence Service of a training school for officers, which grew from a student body of one in 1931 to about a dozen ten years later.

This renewed interest in cryptology was not confined to the Army. The Navy had for many years conducted its own cryptographic bureau under the Code and Signal Section of the Office of Naval Communications, but this office had concerned itself solely with the manufacture and distribution of the Navy's own codes. A "pinch" of a photostatic copy of the main Japanese Naval codebook in 1921 had given the first rudimentary impetus to a Naval counterpart of the Army's cryptanalytic endeavor, and the codebook was exploited for some time by a "Research Desk" within the Code and Signal Section established in 1924. A secret fund buried in the budget of the Director of Naval Intelligence was made available for the work. Although this fund was turned back in 1931 by some fiscal official of the Navy Department who may have been influenced

by the Yardley revelations, the work somehow went on, for the Navy began in the 30's to build in earnest a cryptanalytic organization equal to and in some respects more far-flung than the Army's. Its task was ready-made, for the Japanese Naval Code was formally changed in 1930 and this time had to be recovered the hard way, for no "pinch" was feasible. Also, for the first time, the codebook's values were enciphered by a more complex system. This made the problem much more difficult and foreshadowed the sophisticated ciphers which confronted the Navy in World War II. Another milestone in the art of codebreaking was the adoption by the Navy of tabulating machinery to help in the attack.

The Navy's cryptanalytic group, like the Army's, first came into being under the aegis of the communications division. The Director of Naval Intelligence conceded the practical advantages of conducting under the Director of Naval Communications an effort which was related to communications in general. Accordingly, the DNI agreed to the arrangement in return for an assurance that resultant intelligence, which the DNI could get from no other source, would always be available to him, and that his requirements would be considered in the direction of the effort. That arrangement remains in effect today. (The Army subsequently reversed its position and transferred its activities from the Signal Corps to G-2). The Naval cryptanalytic organization was built around a central bureau in Washington with several forward

echelons in the Pacific area, a forerunner of the eventual world networks which modern American cryptanalysis demands. The main purpose of the Navy's program was coverage of the movements and development of the Japanese Navy, and the effort was marked by successful attacks upon the communications surrounding its great periodic maneuvers. During the '30's, success built upon success in this coverage, each bringing in its train strengthened conviction on the part of the Naval High Command of the indispensability of COMINT, with resultant increases in allotment of funds and personnel. By 1938 the Naval cryptanalytic group was in a flourishing state, and had branched out into full-fledged intercept and such latter-day concepts of the art as traffic-analysis and high-frequency direction-finding. A secondary central unit in Hawaii had been established, and the tradition had developed of allowing officers to specialize in the field of cryptanalysis, although they remained nominally "communications officers."

In this early period of the '20's and '30's, the most glowing success in the American cryptanalytic field, subsequently highly publicized, was the breaking of the main Japanese Diplomatic Codes, so that practically every message of the Japanese Foreign Office was being read.

With the growth of the Army and Navy communication intelligence activities, the need for a definite division of effort between them became apparent. In October 1931, the Director of Naval Communications took action

to allocate responsibilities in order "to preclude duplication of effort, to keep down to a minimum the expenditures for radio intelligence activities, and to build up a policy of whole-hearted cooperation between the radio intelligence activities of the Army and Navy." As a starting point he proposed that the Navy be assigned responsibility for activities relating to naval affairs of maritime nations and to diplomatic affairs of certain major naval powers, and that the Army be assigned responsibility for activities relating to military affairs and to diplomatic affairs of nations other than those assigned to the Navy. In addition, he recommended that there be free exchange of information and material between the Army and Navy radio intelligence organizations. After periodic attempts to arrive at an acceptable division of responsibility along the foregoing lines, a joint working-level committee finally agreed in 1933 to the Navy's proposal, but it was eventually discarded at a higher level.

Between the outbreak of World War II and the entry of the United States into hostilities, the volume of diplomatic and attache traffic, primarily Japanese, available for decoding and translating was considerable, and neither the Navy nor the Army group could individually bear the burden. Efforts were then resumed to effect a mutually agreeable allocation of work. In 1940 collaboration between the Navy and Army resulted in the breaking of the now famous "Purple" code, the chief communications medium used by the Japanese diplomatic network prior to and at the time of the Pearl Harbor attack.

Although this and other cryptanalytic successes had been brought about through pooled effort, the inevitable rivalry between the Services had arisen. Much of the work on military ciphers was jealously guarded by whichever Service felt it had the primary interest, and the problem of what to do with the voluminous diplomatic traffic remained unsolved.

The method of processing and disseminating the diplomatic messages that were read was both duplicative and unseemly. For example, in the Japanese diplomatic traffic each organization had all the available intercepts and in some cases all the means for breaking into them - whenever an important message was read, each Service would immediately rush to the White House a copy of the translation, in an effort to impress the Chief Executive. After considerable discussion, the responsible authorities eventually agreed that the only acceptable and workable solution was for the Services to alternate daily in reading the traffic, and for the Navy to disseminate results to the President, and the Army to the State Department. This "odd-and-even day" arrangement for processing traffic was a strange one, but it seemed practical for the reason that the traffic could be readily sorted according to the cryptographic date. The arrangement remained in effect until the middle of 1942. (Curiously enough, it was discovered after the War that precisely the same basis for division of effort was employed among the German cryptanalytic organizations, and for the same reason.)

American COMINT activity in the years 1938-41 responded to the stimulus of the second World War; the foreknowledge of our almost certain participation in it intensified the effort and made budgetary and logistical support comparatively easy to get. Just before and after the attack on Pearl Harbor, it was clearly realized that COMINT's immediate target was tactical military traffic. The job was at hand and its potentials were enormous. Since the country's first actual military engagements were oriented towards the Pacific, the first cryptanalytic task was the problem of Japanese naval ciphers. So great was the challenge and so great the volume of traffic that the Navy at once decided that the only possible solution was total specialization. By a hastily concluded "gentlemen's agreement", the Naval COMINT group transferred to the Army its entire interest and capacity in all cryptanalytic fields other than naval and related ciphers. The idea was that the Army would accept stewardship of the Navy's excess cryptanalytic cargo, would exploit it to the best of their ability during the War, and would return it, presumably enriched, when the War was over.

With expanded facilities now available, the Army turned a large part of its effort to the increasing demand for diplomatic, political and economic COMINT pending the time when it would become more fully occupied with enemy military traffic. It came about that the Army's personnel accretion was largely civilian, while the Navy's was largely military. Henceforth, the

Naval endeavor was commanded by officers with a communications background; those in charge on the Army side were generally civilians with appropriate technical training gained in private or academic pursuits. This unpremeditated differentiation in staffing was to become an important element in the problem of post-war unification later described.

The two cryptanalytic units were housed at the time of Pearl Harbor in wings of the Old Navy Department and of the Munitions Building, where working conditions were poor and where adequate security was almost impossible. In November, 1942, and February, 1943, respectively, the Army unit and the Navy unit removed to private grounds in suburban Washington -- the Army took over the former girls' school in Arlington County, Virginia, known as "Arlington Hall", and the Navy took over the former girls' school on Nebraska Ave., N. W., known as "Mt. Vernon Seminary." Between the two was several miles of distance and the Potomac River, which it was believed at the height of the inter-service rivalry in 1944, would never be bridged for cryptanalytic intercourse.

From the period of the disruption of Yardley's group in 1929 down to the early days of World War II, the civilian consumers of COMINT (primarily the Department of State) were serviced by the Army on the basis of its own best judgment of what they needed. The actual mechanics of such servicing consisted of the simple device of sending officers from the Army to interested and cleared individuals. Where a briefing on the basis of current COMINT results

was to be conducted, it was entirely oral and the officer-courier left behind no code-word material of any sort. Until after World War II, the State Department had no separate "functional" intelligence office of its own and no secure arrangement whereby COMINT could be kept for study or reference. Essentially, this method of servicing the State Department with COMINT remained in effect throughout World War II.

It soon became apparent that, with the enormous expansion of the COMINT production, a corresponding increase in the over-all intelligence-consuming ability of the Services was required in order to cope with the flow of communications intelligence other than that which was strictly tactical or strategic. For this reason, both the Army and the Navy developed "special intelligence" organizations. Because of the importance of the non-military traffic which the Army was processing, the Army's special intelligence group (Special Branch, G-2) in due course became the larger. The Navy's special intelligence-consuming interest was small because its main target, cryptanalytic attack on enemy naval tactical ciphers, brought results which were evaluated and acted upon largely by the Navy's forward units in theaters of war. For this and other reasons, Special Branch, G-2, eventually assumed an importance within G-2 equal to or even greater than that of the parent organization. At the end of 1944, G-2, having at that time an extremely shrewd and energetic attitude toward COMINT in general, acquired control of the Army cryptanalytic effort

from the Signal Corps, thus differentiating the organizational status of COMINT in the Army from that of the Navy, where COMINT has remained under the control of the Director of Naval Communications.*

Some reference has already been made to the rivalries and jealousies that developed during this period, despite the "gentlemen's agreement." They persisted to a degree that became disturbing to responsible officials in both Services. One illustration appears in the history of our wartime relations with the British COMINT organization, known in those years as the Government Code and Cipher School. Cooperation with "G.C.&C.S." was essential to us for the solution of the Atlantic naval problem, and our knowledge of the Pacific naval problem was, in turn, of great importance to the British. The cooperation was accomplished by stationing parties of U. S. Navy and Army cryptanalysts and liaison agents at G.C.&C.S. headquarters at Bletchley Park in England, and corresponding British parties at the COMINT headquarters in Washington. From the beginning there was no friction between each British and American group, but also from the beginning rivalry and suspicion between the American groups in England was so open as to constitute a detriment to the effort. Those who served at the American outpost at Bletchley returned well aware of the distressing effects of separatism.

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* The accomplishments of Special Branch, G-2, in World War II are a direct testimony to two factors relevant to the COMINT problem today: (i) the prime importance of top-flight personnel in leadership and at the working level; and (ii) the incalculable advantage of top-side civilian and military support for the COMINT effort.

It is only fair to say, however, that because of complications arising during the '30's from the interest of other agencies than the Army and Navy, in the cryptanalytic field, some corrective measures were adopted. In July 1942, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, in order to conserve the COMINT resources available for the prosecution of the war and to promote security and efficiency, recommended to the President that cryptanalytic activities be limited to the Army, Navy and the Federal Bureau of Investigation. Following a Presidential directive to this effect, a standing committee was established for coordinating the work, and agreements were made between the Army and Navy defining spheres of responsibility. As the War progressed the need for even closer relationship became apparent and, in May 1944, an informal Army-Navy coordinating committee (ANCICC) was established at the Navy's suggestion to improve collaboration and to deal with a variety of operating problems.

Until the War was nearly over ANCICC continued to struggle with the problem. Just before V-E Day, correspondence between the Commander-in-Chief of the Navy and the Chief of Staff of the Army set in train a series of meetings which, with acknowledgment of the need for broader cryptanalytic coordination as the agenda, resulted in the establishment of the Army-Navy Communications Intelligence Board (ANCIB), the first high-level COMINT board. It began operating in March, 1945, on which occasion it absorbed ANCICC and reconstituted it as the Board's working committee. The

foundation of ANCIB was a somewhat grudging act. A ground-swell had begun to gather among Army specialists, particularly a small group of converts to the centralized, British type of COMINT organization. While equally zealous converts existed on the Navy side, their proselyting activities were hampered by the conviction of the then COMINCH and the then Director of Naval Communications that the Navy must never surrender any part of its control of naval COMINT. It was made known that "political" issues and forces were involved: i.e., the old conflict between the Navy and the Army in the communications field had moved up a notch and had become confused with other matters of bitter disagreement between the two Services. COMINCH realized, however, that some observance of the idea of COMINT collaboration was demanded, and decided upon a limited tactical offensive. Accordingly, ANCIB was urged into being for the purpose of "extending and improving the existing arrangements* for collaboration and coordination as might be possible in connection with all matters of joint interest," although this resolve was watered down by the presentation of a memorandum from COMINCH stating that the Navy considered it "inadvisable to effect any actual consolidation of the physical, technical facilities" of the Navy and Army COMINT activities.

Meanwhile, a new functional intelligence division had been set up in the Department of State with a Special Projects Staff to service the Department

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* RICC, and also ANCRAD (Army-Navy Communications Research and Development).

with COMINT. This radical departure meant that the Department would henceforward be independent of G-2 as a consumer of COMINT and that by the same token it would become a claimant to status within the COMINT family equal to that of the old-line members, Army and Navy. In December, 1945, ANCIB admitted the Department of State to membership and changed its name accordingly to STANCIB (State-Army-Navy Communications Intelligence Board) and the name of its subcommittee to STANCICC. In March, 1946, the wartime Anglo-American COMINT partnership was formalized at a conference in Washington which produced the present "BRUSA Agreement." The Department of State took full part in those deliberations.

In the first half of 1946 there were further developments. An early draft of the new BRUSA Agreement was referred to the Federal Bureau of Investigation, which had had for years a marginal interest in COMINT. The Bureau expressed a desire to become more actively associated with the regular COMINT group, a trend which STANCIB members welcomed and approved. Also in 1946, the President directed the establishment of the Central Intelligence Group, forerunner of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), and it was at once recognized that this Group had a natural claim to intelligence from the COMINT source and a place in the coordinating mechanism. In June, 1946, after these new members of STANCIB had been installed, the Board voted to call itself USCIB, the United States Communications Intelligence Board, (its present name), and its working committee became USCICC.

Through 1946, ANCIB-STANCIB-USCIB had no formal charter other than the original Presidential mandate given to the Army and Navy to work out and exploit the COMINT liaison with the British. Early in 1947 the State Department representation in USCICC pointed out that not only were the latter-day members without legal footing in the COMINT association but also that the association was attempting, from necessity but without adequate authority, to impose COMINT security regulations and limitations upon the entire Executive Branch. The result of the ensuing discussions was the present USCIB charter, known as NSCID No. 9, promulgated by the National Security Council as an intelligence directive through the special channel of the Central Intelligence Agency.* This directive (more fully discussed in Part III of this Report) provided for the establishment of USCIB "to effect the authoritative coordination of communications intelligence activities of the Government and to advise the Director of Central Intelligence in those matters in the field of communications intelligence for which he is responsible." It gave membership to the Services, State, CIA and FBI, required unanimity for decisions, with reference to the National Security Council in the event of disagreement, and directed all departments and agencies represented on or subordinate to the National Security Council (and any others designated by the President) to implement the Board's decisions and policies. However, it left "the internal

* NSCID No. 9 in its present form is attached as Exhibit C.

administration and operation of communications intelligence activities to the member departments or agencies."

The next development of the COMINT structure was the direct result of the organization within the National Defense Establishment in 1947 of a separate Air Force, which promptly took steps to develop its own unit for the intercepting and processing of foreign radio communications of special application to its mission, thereby further complicating an already complex problem and intensifying existing frictions in the COMINT field. Shortly after it came into being, the Air Force was accorded full representation in the USCIB structure, bringing the total membership to six departments and agencies, where it stands today.

The immediate post-war period was one of adjustment and in a sense retrenchment of the COMINT effort. In August, 1945, its business shrank from the swollen proportions of wartime to the normal peacetime volume, largely political rather than military in character. Although everyone was now alert to the need for cryptanalytic continuity, and although every effort was made to avoid the disruption of the COMINT endeavor which had followed World War I, certain drastic cut-backs in personnel and funds took place. The COMINT structure became suddenly top-heavy in management, geared to high-speed production but with a scarcity of raw materials and labor, and with six stockholders where it had once, in the days of its greatest productivity, had two. A sense of frustration and anticlimax was felt by all those who remained in

the business. An ebbing of morale, which later became one of the most serious issues in the COMINT problem, set in very soon after V-J Day.

It was in this atmosphere that the Navy approached the Army with a view to re-examining the "gentlemen's agreement" and repossessing its share of diplomatic and political traffic. Practically speaking the Navy COMINT unit was out of business by 1946, but it had a plant, trained personnel, "career" officers, and a vital stake in cryptanalytic continuity which could not be kept going on imaginary problems. Live traffic, as had been foreseen in 1942, was of the essence. The Navy's effort to reenter the diplomatic field was strongly resisted by the Army, which had in the intervening years developed a sense of ownership in place of the trusteeship that was originally intended. It was considered absurd at Arlington Hall that a shift of pieces of the diplomatic and economic problem, for the processing of which effective machinery existed, should be seriously proposed merely for the purpose of "giving the Navy something to do." The Navy, on the other hand, could not afford to commit cryptanalytic suicide for the sake of keeping the peace. A compromise transfer program was eventually adopted and dragged out its painful course for many months.

At this juncture a new category of traffic for cryptanalytic exploitation, that of the USSR and its satellites, revitalized the COMINT effort.

(b)(1)
(b)(3)-18 USC 798
(b)(3)-50 USC 403
(b)(3)-P.L. 86-36

(b)(1)
(b)(3)-50 USC 403
(b)(3)-18 USC 798
(b)(3)-P.L. 86-36

At least, however, the experience had injected into the effort a badly-needed sense of fresh purpose and incentive, and it had provided a new basis upon which to build subsequent plans for fuller collaboration within the American COMINT structure.

The emergence of the Air Force as a potent factor in the COMINT story has been mentioned. It brought into sharper focus the question of duplication

* See Part IV, pp. 105-107

versus amalgamation. After passage of the National Security Act of 1947, there were not two but three vested military interests actively engaged in collecting, processing, evaluating and disseminating communications intelligence. Roughly, the position among the Services was this: the Army, with its large civilian component, the most inclusive commitment, and the greatest experience with the non-military aspects of the COMINT complex, was generally in favor of some sort of consolidation of the effort; the Navy, only too well aware of the indispensable importance of COMINT to the success of naval war, and reluctant to share an effective COMINT organization that had become integrated with its operating forces, stood behind its top command to a man in the refusal to surrender COMINT sovereignty; the Air Force, stimulated by its new freedom, asked only to be left alone to develop its Brooks Field and other COMINT outposts.

In August, 1948, the Secretary of Defense created a board under the chairmanship of Rear Admiral Earl E. Stone, then Director of Naval Communications, to study the COMINT situation within the Defense Establishment and to recommend some final solution. The Stone Board was composed of representatives of all military interests in the COMINT family. In December it submitted a split paper to the Secretary of Defense. The Navy and the Air Force both opposed consolidation, while the Army advocated placing responsibility for all COMINT tasks, other than the performance of intercept and

decentralized field processing, within a single organization. After reading the paper the Secretary called in General McNarney to assist in resolving the dilemma by directive, since the more democratic method had failed to produce a workable conclusion. General McNarney adopted a plan which in part required a merger but in part left the three Services the right to maintain their own separate COMINT organizations, and in due course this type of organization was ordered into effect by Mr. Johnson. Supplementary directives, which go beyond the scope of the Secretarial directive, were later issued by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The resulting and existing structure is described in Part III of this Report.

PART II

THE VALUE OF COMMUNICATIONS INTELLIGENCE

~~THIS DOCUMENT CONTAINS CODE WORD MATERIAL~~

Before considering the present COMINT organization, it is appropriate to appraise the value of COMINT in the recent past and at the present time as a measure of the scale of effort that COMINT deserves, and of what might be expected if the conduct of our COMINT activities could be substantially improved.

In World War II COMINT may well have been our best paying investment. Its cost cannot be accurately computed, but an informed guess would be perhaps a half billion dollars annually at the outside. Admiral Nimitz rated its value in the Pacific as equivalent to another whole fleet; General Handy is reported to have said that it shortened the War in Europe by at least a year.

In the Pacific, COMINT located the Japanese fleet enroute to the Coral Sea and again enroute to Midway in 1942, enabling us to mass the carriers for the battles which are generally regarded as the turning point of the War against Japan.* In 1942 COMINT also told us of the critical Japanese decision not to join the Axis war on Soviet Russia. In 1944, it helped us to pick the soft spots for our island advance, often showing where the Japanese expected us to attack and where their troops were massed.

* The official narrative of the Joint Combat Intelligence Center, Pacific Ocean Areas, includes the following comment on this engagement: "The factors that vitally affected the battle of Midway were many and complex, but it is undoubtedly true that without radio intelligence it would have been impossible to have achieved the concentration of forces and the tactical surprise that made the victory possible."

Throughout the War, COMINT supplied a day-to-day check on the results of our submarine and air campaign against Japanese merchant shipping. It gave us detailed knowledge of how many ships Japan had, where they were, and when they were lost; armed with this intelligence, we planned and executed the remarkably efficient and effective submarine, direct air and aerial mining campaign of 1944-45. The Strategic Bombing Survey mission which checked on Japanese shipping losses after the surrender discovered that COMINT's knowledge of the size and location of the Japanese merchant fleet on V-J Day had been more exact than the records of the Japanese Ministry of Merchant Marine.

Finally, COMINT provided us with our only reliable measure of how fast the Japanese were losing their will to resist. Our leaders had a thorough and immediate record of the peace feelers which the Japanese asked Ambassador Sato in Moscow to send to us through the Russians, and of the explanations to him of how decisions were being reached and on what points further concessions would be made. (Some of these feelers were not passed on promptly by the Russians, and our only knowledge of them came from COMINT). Throughout 1945, from Manila through Okinawa and Hiroshima to V-J Day itself, we were in possession of Japan's instructions to her principal negotiator, often before the Japanese code clerks in Moscow could put the message

on the desk of Ambassador Sato, the intended recipient.*

In Europe we were not as successful with German diplomatic systems, but the Allied achievements on high level German military traffic were even more spectacular. Before the War began the Poles had developed, with the help of some wiring diagrams, an analytical solution of the German Enigma machine. This knowledge reached the British, who worked out a brilliant method of rapid recovery based on the work of the Poles. The principal public credit for winning the Battle of Britain has gone to radar and the "so few" to whom so many owed so much. But much credit is also due to another British "few" who rapidly deciphered the high level combat traffic of the Luftwaffe, and guided the airborne "few" to the defense of the right place at the right time. This secret is still shared within the Allied COMINT community.

Before Pearl Harbor, our own Japanese COMINT contributed to the Allied effort in Europe by giving advance warning of the German decision to attack Russia. General Oshima, Japan's Ambassador in Berlin, was a veritable mine of information to more governments than his own, as he faithfully communicated to Tokyo what was confided to him by the German leaders. After Pearl Harbor, we joined and greatly assisted the British work on German military

* COMINT intercepted, decoded, translated and delivered some of these messages to U.S. consumers while the Japanese code clerks in Moscow were struggling with garbles and asking Tokyo for repeats.

traffic, and equally profitable results soon followed. Once we had built enough escort vessels, they were guided by COMINT to the U-boats which habitually and carefully reported their positions each night to the German Admiralty. COMINT also intercepted German reports to its submarines on our convoy movements, and our Naval orders to the convoys were changed accordingly. (This was represented to the Committee as another well-kept COMINT secret, and perhaps one of the most sensitive -- aptly reinforced by results of post-war investigations of captured German documents showing that the Nazis continued to blame their high U-boat losses on some hypothecated Allied invention for direction-finding the source of U-boat emissions. The Committee, however, found much of the story of our COMINT-based anti-U-boat campaign spread out in detail in the May, 1952, edition of "The Reader's Digest", a publication with a circulation of 15,000,000. The Committee could not avoid some speculation as to the nature of other "well-kept COMINT secrets" that were confided to it in camera.)

In the war on land, COMINT did even better. It read Rommel's intentions in Africa so well that the Desert Fox guessed the truth; he confided his suspicions to Berlin, only to be told by the German High Command that such things were not possible. On the Eastern Front COMINT coverage of German military traffic, while spotty, was sufficient to provide a unique perspective as to where the truth lay between rival communiques. It furnished occasional daily battle

reports on the progress of various offensives and counter-offensives by Soviet and German forces, and most important, order of battle and tactical intelligence of a quantity and quality which enabled Special Branch in G-2 in 1944-45 to evaluate the course of the conflict correctly. COMINT also helped to trace the transfer of German forces between the Eastern and Western Fronts and to and from the South. Amid a welter of contradictory collateral reports and claims, COMINT showed clearly in German communications that it was Tito's partisans, but almost never the Mihailovic forces, who were fighting Germans in 1943 and 1944.

Before D-Day in France, COMINT furnished several of Von Rundstedt's periodic appraisals of the situation for the High Command, showing where he thought the main attack would come, as well as some of Berlin's replies ignoring Von Rundstedt's good advice, presumably in favor of Hitler intuition. COMINT also contributed Ambassador Oshima's detailed reports to Tokyo on his pre-invasion tour of the Channel defenses, which led, the Committee has been told, to basic revisions in our landing plans. After the assault was launched, COMINT supplied a large quantity of battle reports and battle orders on every level from the OKW itself down to the various divisions. Throughout the campaign in France and Germany, our estimates of enemy troop strengths, locations and intentions were based more on COMINT than on any other source. COMINT was also the principal source of the information used to select

strategic and tactical bombing targets behind German lines; and it helped us to identify the testing of advanced weapons (such as improved torpedoes and guided airborne missiles) in time to get our scientists started on suitable counter-measures, thus greatly reducing the ultimate tactical effectiveness of the enemy's new developments.

Of course COMINT was not always a perfect mirror of enemy intentions. We did not intercept all important enemy messages, and we could not always decrypt the messages we heard. Even when we did intercept and could read, our COMINT producers sometimes failed to turn out the messages in time to be useful. Several significant Japanese messages that could well have made the difference in forewarning us of an impending surprise attack on Pearl Harbor were intercepted from November 24, 1941 through December 6, 1941, and might have been but were not in fact available to the COMINT consumers until after December 7. At times, the failure to make effective use of COMINT capabilities was chargeable to those who "consumed" COMINT and formed intelligence conclusions from it. The Japanese messages disclosing Japan's decision not to attack Russia in 1942 were viewed with reserve by our military planners at the time; those with the responsibility had already formed the opposite opinion and rejected the strong COMINT evidence presented by G-2 on the ground that it might have been a deliberate Japanese attempt to deceive us with false messages. Faulty appreciation of COMINT

led to the absurdity of assuming that the Japanese knew we were reading their highest diplomatic code and yet were continuing to use it throughout the world.

Perhaps the most striking tribute to COMINT's value in World War II is the remarkable letter written by General Marshall to Governor Dewey on September 25, 1944, at the height of the Presidential election campaign. This letter was written without the knowledge of President Roosevelt or Secretary Stimson -- "without the knowledge of any other person except Admiral King (who concurs)." The unprecedented nature of this step by a professional soldier reflects the vital importance General Marshall attached to protecting the security of COMINT sources. The letter is attached as Exhibit D to this Report. The question of Administration bungling at Pearl Harbor was a key campaign issue. In the letter, General Marshall urged Governor Dewey against taking any steps in the campaign that might disclose or force the disclosure of our ability to read the Japanese codes. This plea is supported by a detailed recital of specific examples of COMINT's value in the conduct of the War on both fronts, and of the tragic consequences if the Japanese were warned to change their codes.

COMINT's value today is more difficult to measure. In time of peace - even what we now call peace - day to day knowledge of specific enemy strength and specific enemy intentions is still of the greatest importance, but COMINT

in these fields cannot be of the same spectacular service as COMINT in time of war. Of course, COMINT could do nothing more valuable than to forewarn of a Soviet surprise attack on the free world, but its capabilities on this point remain to be fully tested. COMINT failed to warn us of the attack on South Korea for a variety of reasons on which we comment later.

Another problem for COMINT in time of peace is the relative security of communications in a peaceful world.

(b)(1)
(b)(3)-50 USC 403
(b)(3)-18 USC 798
(b)(3)-P.L. 86-36

Military forces remain at their bases, where they often are able to communicate on interior land lines, and cannot be heard. There is less pressure on the communications network; the operators make fewer mistakes, and COMINT has a much harder time decrypting what there is to hear. As a result, the intelligence consumers also have much greater difficulty in fitting together into a coherent story the scattered bits and pieces they receive from the COMINT producers.

Nevertheless, the witnesses before our Committee have been unanimous in testifying that COMINT ranks as our most important single source of intelligence today. The attached charts (Exhibits E and F) show the estimates of the intelligence agencies as to how much COMINT contributes to our overall

intelligence as compared to other sources, first for all countries other than the USSR, (designated "ALLO"), and then for the USSR. For ALLO countries, including the Soviet satellites, these agencies estimate that COMINT supplies from 30 to 50% of our military, political and economic intelligence, as well as minor portions of our scientific and atomic energy intelligence. For the USSR, COMINT is said to contribute 70% or better of our military and economic intelligence, substantial parts of our political and scientific intelligence, and practically all of our atomic energy intelligence, such as it is. In submitting these charts, the Committee stresses that they have been furnished to it as estimates only, and any accurate percentage allocation is obviously impossible. Also the fact that in some fields a high percentage of our total information comes from COMINT must carry the qualification that the total information in that field may be very small. Nevertheless, the charts serve to indicate in a general way the importance which the using agencies ascribe to COMINT sources.

COMINT has had some brilliant moments since World War II, notably on [redacted] and on North Korean military traffic after the attack in June 1950. [redacted]

[redacted]

(b)(1)
(b)(3)-P.L. 86-36
(b)(3)-50 USC 403
(b)(3)-18 USC 798

(b)(1)
(b)(3)-50 USC 403
(b)(3)-18 USC 798
(b)(3)-P.L. 86-36

Even these limited and largely low-level sources provide much valuable intelligence. The COMINT consumers have given the following recent examples:

(a)

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(b)(3)-50 USC 403
(b)(3)-18 USC 798
(b)(3)-P.L. 86-36

(b)

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(b)(1)
(b)(3)-50 USC 403
(b)(3)-18 USC 798
(b)(3)-P.L. 86-36

(c) (b)(1)

can usually be gathered in peacetime from a variety of open sources, such as traveling businessmen and tourists, American engineers and technicians engaged in particular foreign assignments, technical magazines, railroad timetables, and similar data. But in the case of the Soviet Union these sources are now virtually non-available.

(b)(1)
(b)(3)-50 USC 403
(b)(3)-18 USC 798
(b)(3)-P.L. 86-36

(d)

(b)(1)
(b)(3)-50 USC 403
(b)(3)-18 USC 798
(b)(3)-P.L. 86-36

[redacted] Intelligence conclusions based on such material contain ample margins of error; unless processed carefully, they can become ultimate assumptions piled on a number of preceding assumptions.

[redacted]

(b)(1)
(b)(3)-50 USC 403
(b)(3)-18 USC 798
(b)(3)-P.L. 86-36

Mistakes can be and often are made on any of these points, particularly by analysts who lack a background of long COMINT experience. In battle, the mistakes can often be corrected by collateral evidence such as ground contact,

* [redacted]

air reconnaissance and prisoners. [redacted]

[redacted]

(b)(1)
(b)(3)-18 USC 798
(b)(3)-50 USC 403
(b)(3)-P.L. 86-36

Whether the margin of error is small or large today, it is apt to increase geometrically as time passes, until something more solid than [redacted] and similar methods comes along as a check on our mounting accumulation of assumptions. [redacted]

[redacted]

(b)(1)
(b)(3)-18 USC 798
(b)(3)-50 USC 403
(b)(3)-P.L. 86-36

(b)(1)
(b)(3)-50 USC 403
(b)(3)-18 USC 798
(b)(3)-P.L. 86-36

But a steady and patient watch over these sources can produce three results of enormous value upon the approach of general war.

a.

b.

(b)(1)
(b)(3)-50 USC 403
(b)(3)-18 USC 798
(b)(3)-P.L. 86-36

c.

COMINT was mined from a rich ore in World War II. Today, the ore being processed is of far lower grade. Large volumes of materials are being handled, and the refining process is complicated in the extreme. Costs of operation are high. New veins of ore need to be unearthed, and the costs of exploration are also high. If the new veins are to be opened up, part of the

present operation may have to be sacrificed. Whether richer ore will be discovered, and whether the operation can keep in the black meanwhile, depend primarily on the skill and efficiency of the management.

PART III

THE PRESENT ORGANIZATION OF UNITED STATES COMINT ACTIVITES

~~THIS DOCUMENT CONTAINS CODE WORD MATERIAL~~

The present organization of U. S. COMINT activities includes four principal producing agencies, six principal consuming agencies and two principal coordinating bodies. All of the four principal COMINT producing agencies are within the Department of Defense. These agencies, and their positions within the Department, are as follows:

1. Within the Army, the Army Security Agency (ASA), the commanding officer of which is responsible to the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, who is the principal intelligence staff officer of the Chief of Staff, U. S. Army.

2. Within the Navy Department, the Naval Security Group, the chief of which is responsible to the Director of Naval Communications, who in turn is responsible to the Chief of Naval Operations.

3. Within the Department of the Air Force, the Air Forces Security Services (AFSS), the commanding officer of which is responsible to the Chief of Staff, USAF.

4. Within the Defense Department, the Armed Forces Security Agency (AFSA), the commanding officer of which is directly responsible to the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

(b)(1)
(b)(3)-18 USC 798
(b)(3)-50 USC 403
(b)(3)-P.L. 86-36

(b)(1)
(b)(3)-50 USC 403
(b)(3)-18 USC 798
(b)(3)-P.L. 86-36

The six principal COMINT consuming agencies are the Military Intelligence Division of the Army, the Office of Naval Intelligence within the Navy, the Air Force Intelligence Division, the Office of Research and Intelligence of the State Department, the Central Intelligence Agency, and the Federal Bureau of Investigation. All of these agencies receive COMINT material from the COMINT producing agencies and themselves collate and evaluate such material. The customers of these six intelligence producing agencies receive their product, which in some cases consists of or contains COMINT and in other cases has been prepared against the background of COMINT.

The two principal COMINT coordinating bodies are the United States Communications Intelligence Board (USCIB) and the Armed Forces Security Agency Council (AFSAC). From the point of view of organizational position within the Executive Branch of the Government, USCIB is the highest U. S. COMINT body. As indicated in Part I, USCIB was the outgrowth of a long historical development in the coordination of COMINT activities and now exists under National Security Council Intelligence Directive No. 9, issued on July 1, 1948 (in its present form attached as Exhibit C). That directive establishes

the Board, to be composed of "not to exceed" two members each from the Departments of State, the Army, the Navy, the Air Force, the Central Intelligence Agency, and the Federal Bureau of Investigation. (FBI was added in March, 1950). The Board may act only unanimously; when it fails to reach a decision, it is required to refer the matter to the National Security Council, provided that if unanimity is not reached among the military departments of the Department of Defense, the Board shall first present the problem to the Secretary of Defense.

The functions of the Board are stated in paragraph 1 of the Directive as follows:

(1) "to effect the authoritative coordination of Communications Intelligence activities of the Government" and,

(2) "to advise the Director of Central Intelligence in those matters in the field of Communications Intelligence for which he is responsible."

This is weak and unsatisfactory language. With respect to the first function, the word "coordinate" ordinarily means to bring into common action or harmonize, but the preceding word "authoritative" appears to indicate some greater power. Yet the requirement of unanimity precludes any greater power. With respect to the second function, although the Board is charged with the duty of advising the Director of Central Intelligence in those matters in the field of communications intelligence "for which he is responsible" there is no statement

as to what are the matters in that field for which he is responsible, and paragraph 6 of the Directive expressly provides that all other orders, directives, policies or recommendations of the Executive Branch relating to intelligence shall be inapplicable to communications intelligence. Accordingly, the second function can at the most mean that the Board is to advise the Director of Central intelligence on those COMINT matters concerning which he in turn is responsible under the National Security Act for advising and making recommendations to the National Security Council. [redacted]

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In the final analysis, therefore, the only functions given to the Board are to attempt to coordinate, with unanimous agreement, the communications intelligence activities of the member agencies. Even these functions are limited by paragraph 10 of the Directive which provides that the Board "shall leave the internal administration and operation of Communications Intelligence activities to the member departments or agencies." This limitation seems designed to insure that in the field of actual production of COMINT (i.e., interception, decoding, translating and preparation of COMINT reports), the Board shall not have even the coordinating and advisory functions set forth in paragraph 1 of the Directive. Thus, the proposed move of AFSA to Fort Knox, Kentucky was apparently considered by the military a question solely for decision by the

Department of Defense and beyond the province of USCIB.

The Board has twelve members. Each military service is represented by its chief intelligence officer and by the chief of its COMINT producing agency, the Central Intelligence Agency by its Director and an Assistant Director, the State Department by the Special Assistant for Intelligence and his principal COMINT assistant, and the Federal Bureau of Investigation by two representatives of the Director. The Director of AFSA is not a member of the Board, but acts as its "Coordinator," or executive agent. The chairmanship is rotated annually. The Board holds regular monthly meetings and interim meetings when requested by any member. At its meetings there are usually present, in addition to the thirteen Board members or persons acting for them, twenty or more other representatives of the member agencies, so that the total attendance is between thirty and forty persons. The Board as such has no office, staff or secretariat, and AFSA provides secretarial service. In addition to the Board itself, an aggregate of thirty representatives of the member agencies are members of the three standing committees described below, each of which meets at least once a month, but none of which has any staff or secretariat of its own.

Other than for liaison purposes abroad, the entire USCIB organization apparently provides no personnel, either member or staff or secretariat, whose sole or primary duty is to consider or act upon COMINT matters from the national point of view, and it appears that all of the members of USCIB and its committees

as well as its "Coordinator," are persons holding full time positions of heavy responsibility in their respective organizations.

The Board has issued eight directives, which deal only with its own organization and COMINT security standards. It has three standing committees, one for "intelligence," one for "security," one for "collateral information," and an ad hoc "technical" committee appointed for a particular current problem. Since the issuance of NSCID No. 9, the Board has held approximately sixty meetings. A review of the minutes of those meetings indicates that its activities have been confined principally to matters relating to relations with Great Britain, Canada and other nations in the COMINT field, general security problems and to a limited extent the coordination of evaluation and dissemination of COMINT intelligence. No matters have been referred to the National Security Council for failure to reach unanimity.

Thus, the actual operation of USCIB confirms the very limited scope of its function as prescribed by its charter and interpreted by its members. USCIB and its subcommittees undoubtedly perform valuable and necessary coordinating functions in limited fields, but it is evident that USCIB does not have or exercise any power comparable with its position at a high level in the organization of the Executive Branch. It has been made clear to the Committee by a number of witnesses that , except perhaps in the field of COMINT arrangements with other governments, USCIB as presently conceived and functioning is an ineffective

and inefficient body.

AFSA was established by Secretary of Defense Johnson, by a memorandum dated 20 May 1949 and a Directive (JCS 2010) attached as Exhibit H, which placed AFSA "under the direction and control of the Joint Chiefs of Staff." Its stated purpose was "to provide for the placing under one authority the conduct of communications intelligence and communications security activities . . . within the National Military Establishment, except those which are to be conducted individually by the Departments of the Army, Navy and Air Force." The Directive enumerates 15 specific functions of the Director, Armed Forces Security Agency, of which the most significant for present purposes appear to be (1) "operational control of all AFSA facilities, units and military personnel; and operational and administrative control of all AFSA civilian personnel," (2) production of COMINT and conduct of all operations necessary to such production, "except those operations which . . . are to be conducted individually by the Army, Navy or Air Force" and (3) accounting for, and preparation, production, storage and distribution of all crypto-material for the Armed Forces.

Under the Directive, AFSA consists of such facilities, units and military and civilian personnel, including the headquarters, Army Security Agency, the Communications Supplementary Activity (of the Navy), and any comparable organizations of the Air Force, and "such other facilities, units and personnel as the Joint Chiefs of Staff may determine as necessary to fulfill the functions herein assigned."

Thus, as far as COMINT is concerned, the functions of AFSA are defined, not affirmatively, but in terms of what is not performed by the Army, Navy and Air Force. The Directive affirmatively assigns six missions to the Army, Navy and Air Force, including (1) assigning facilities and personnel to AFSA, (2) providing "fixed intercept installations" to be "manned and administered" by the Services but to be "operationally directed" by AFSA, (3) providing "mobile intercept facilities" for the Services, to be "manned, administered, and operationally controlled" by the individual Services but which "may also be used to perform special missions for AFSA," (4) providing communications facilities required by AFSA and (5) to "continue to be responsible for all such cryptologic activities as are required by intra-service or joint needs . . . and are determined by the Joint Chiefs of Staff not to be the sole responsibility of AFSA."

The Directive also created the Armed Forces Security Agency Council (AFSAC) (with ten members, all of whom are military officers within the Department of Defense). The Directive gave AFSAC certain duties to make recommendations to the Joint Chiefs of Staff in respect of COMINT and to "determine and coordinate joint cryptologic military requirements." Under the Directive itself, AFSAC is given no actual control over AFSA or the Director of AFSA, except for the determination of requirements.

In July 1949, AFSAC submitted to the Joint Chiefs of Staff two further detailed directives with respect to the functions of AFSA, AFSAC, and the

Director of AFSA, stating that they were submitted "pursuant to the directive by the Secretary of Defense in the appendix to JCS 2010, to prepare for approval by the Joint Chiefs of Staff -- (1) a draft charter for the Armed Forces Communications Intelligence Advisory Council (AFCIAC); and (2) a draft directive to the Director, Armed Forces Security Agency (AFSA)." While it is not readily apparent why such documents were prepared for the Joint Chiefs of Staff except perhaps the necessity to amplify the directive of the Secretary of Defense, the results unquestionably altered the arrangements set forth in that directive, specifically with respect to the authority of the Director of AFSA vis-a-vis the Service agencies and AFSAC.

The draft charter for AFSA and the draft directive to the Director of AFSA were approved by the Joint Chiefs of Staff on 1 September 1949. The charter for AFSAC designates that body as "the agency of the Joint Chiefs of Staff charged with insuring the most effective operation" of AFSA and gives AFSAC the functions to "determine policies, operating plans and doctrines" for AFSA in its production of COMINT; to "coordinate and review" the Service-operated COMINT facilities; to recommend to the Joint Chiefs of Staff the facilities, personnel, and fiscal and logistic support to be provided by the Services to AFSA on the basis of requirements determined by the Director of AFSA; and to forward to the Director of AFSA "for implementation, without reference to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, its unanimous decisions on matters which it determines not to involve

changes in major policies . . . " It will be seen that for all practical purposes the directive made AFSAC (which is nothing except a committee made up of the three Services) the boss of AFSA, which in turn is completely dependent upon the three Service organizations for all its communications and practically all of its collection of COMINT. The pattern was not unification under a single control, but rather a combination of limited functions under the three-headed control of the combining agencies.

The directive of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Director, AFSA, complements the charter of AFSAC by providing that the Director of AFSA will implement, without reference to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, unanimous recommendations of AFSAC which are determined by AFSAC not to involve changes in major policies. The directive further provides that all AFSA COMINT activities of unique or principal interest to any one service will, insofar as practicable, be carried out under the immediate direction of AFSA personnel of the Service concerned, and that AFSA will provide for a full-time Deputy Director from each Service. The directive further restates the responsibilities of the Director, AFSA, and of the Services at great length, with repeated emphasis upon the position of AFSAC.

Under the above directives the COMINT functions of AFSA are defined only in terms of what the Services are not to do, and the COMINT functions of the Services, other than intercept, are not defined but left to the Joint Chiefs of Staff to determine. As more fully explained in Part IV of this Report, the Joint Chiefs

of Staff have not made any clear-cut or definitive determination, and the actual division of responsibilities has been and continues to be reached through negotiations among the various Service organizations and AFSA.

AFSAC consists of the Director of AFSA as permanent chairman, the two USCIB members from each of the Services, and one additional member from each Service, or a total membership of ten. Attendance at meetings usually approximates 30 persons. It has two standing committees, one of which coordinates technical COMINT matters among the member agencies and the other of which coordinates the intelligence requirements of the Military Services for COMINT. Like USCIB it has no staff or secretariat of its own, and all of its members have full time military positions of heavy responsibility in their respective organizations.

A review of the minutes of the thirty-five meetings of AFSAC from its organization in July, 1949 until the end of 1951 indicates that its activities fall into three principal categories: the logistic support for AFSA, the relations and divisions of responsibility between AFSA and the three Service COMINT organizations, and a variety of matters involving communications security and COMINT production problems of a technical nature. The activities of AFSAC thus are of a different scope and nature than the activities of USCIB.

The negotiations among the Services and AFSA with respect to the division of responsibilities among the three Service COMINT producing agencies

and AFSA involve the basic issue of degree of central control by AFSA versus operational autonomy of the individual Service organizations and relate to three principal matters: (1) intercept, (2) processing of intercepted traffic (i.e., cryptanalysis, traffic analysis, decoding, translation), and (3) the relations among the Services and AFSA in theaters of operations. The present division of responsibility with respect to each of these fields is the result of protracted negotiations over the period of more than two and a half years since AFSA was established. Such negotiations have absorbed a substantial portion of the time and energies of the principal officials of the four producing agencies.

These and other aspects of the actual working out in practice of the USCIB Charter (NSCID No. 9) and the AFSA Charters (JCS 2010 and 2010/6) are described in the succeeding Part IV of this Report.

PART IV

HOW THE PRESENT ORGANIZATION OPERATES

~~THIS DOCUMENT CONTAINS CODE WORD MATERIAL~~

In Part III, we have outlined the communications intelligence organization as it was created by the USCIB Charter and JCS 2010. That outline is in part a skeleton; a useful picture of the flesh and blood organization requires a statement as to how its normal daily operations are being conducted. Only by following the "production-line" of COMINT down to the delivery of the finished product can we learn how this paper organization has functioned in fact, and understand the organizational and operating problems.

In this Part IV, we attempt to show how the COMINT organization created by the USCIB Charter and JCS 2010 actually operates in the fields of intercept, priorities, processing, dissemination to consumer agencies and use in creating intelligence, cryptography, and security.

Size and Cost

The Committee has felt that it would be helpful to those reading this Report to have a rough estimate of the amount that the Government is spending annually in the production of communications intelligence. However, we have found that it is impossible to give any completely accurate figures. This results from the fact that great masses of the personnel involved belong to the three Services, and that a large amount of the work and effort which goes into the production of communications intelligence is the product of Service personnel and equipment which are also engaged in other duties and functions.

The Committee has, however, obtained from AFSA and other sources certain estimates and data which it believes are sufficiently informative to merit reproduction here, even though some of them may be only little better than informed guesses. A breakdown of this material by major categories appears on the following pages. Many of the expense figures are necessarily only estimates of the proper allocation of various indirect support costs, such as military pay and maintenance and the very considerable cost of passing raw COMINT traffic through our military communications networks. The Committee emphasizes that it has not attempted to make anything resembling a cost accounting analysis. It believes that the summary given furnishes a reasonable approximation of the amount that we are spending to acquire and process communications intelligence. The summary does not include any estimate of the amounts expended by the various departments and agencies in analyzing, utilizing and distributing the intelligence summaries which are based in whole or in part on COMINT.

Intercept

Under the 1949 directive of the Secretary of Defense referred to above (JCS 2010), each of the Services is responsible for providing intercept facilities for its own use and to serve AFSA. The only criterion provided in the directive for the allocation of intercept facilities between the Service organizations and AFSA is that "fixed intercept installations will be manned

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ESTIMATED ANNUAL MANPOWER AND EXPENDITURES FOR COMMUNICATIONS INTELLIGENCE, 1952

(all figures are rounded)

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MANPOWER

Agency	Military	Civilian	Total
AFSA	[redacted]	5,400	[redacted]
ASA		[redacted]	
NSG			
AFSS			

NOTE: By the end of fiscal year 1954, this total is scheduled to increase by more than 20,000 with the Air Force Security Service alone scheduled to rise from 9,600 to 21,000 men.

EXPENDITURES

1. Direct Armed Forces Security Agency Expenses -

Personnel	-	[redacted]
Supplies & materials	-	
Equipment	-	
Miscellaneous	-	
Total		

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2. Direct Army Security Agency Expenses -

Personnel	-	[redacted]
Facilities (intercept stations)	-	
Miscellaneous	-	
Total		

3. Direct Naval Security Group Expenses -

Personnel	-	[redacted]
Equipment	-	
Facilities	-	
Total		

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4. Direct Air Force Security Service Expenses

Personnel -
Equipment -
Facilities -
Total

5. Military upkeep -
(quarters, subsistence, etc.)

6. Communications -
(estimated at approximately commercial rates)

7. Miscellaneous -
(security clearances, depreciation on equipment, and other unallocated indirect costs)

GRAND TOTAL -

and administered by the Service providing them" but will be "operationally directed" by AFSA, and that "mobile intercept facilities" required by the respective Services will be "manned, administered and operationally controlled" by the individual Service but "may also be used to perform special missions for AFSA as requested by the Director thereof."

The subsequent directive of the Joint Chiefs of Staff establishing AFSA did not further define the responsibilities for intercept, but merely stated, "Intercept - as indicated in JCS 2010." The first relevant Joint Chiefs of Staff directive (JCS 2010/10, dated 25 October 1949), stated that "operational control" of [redacted] Army and [redacted] Navy fixed intercept stations should be vested in the Director of AFSA. The accompanying papers emphasized that this was an "initial" allocation of units "engaged primarily in support of the functions of AFSA," but did not state the functions of AFSA except by reference to the previous directives, which had not defined the functions of AFSA.

The theory of JCS 2010 seems to have been that "fixed" intercept facilities are most suitable for performance of AFSA's undefined mission and that "mobile" facilities are most suitable for the performance of the undefined Service missions. It appears, however, that in most cases the actual physical nature of an intercept facility as being "fixed" or "mobile" has little relation to the adaptability of that facility to perform missions for AFSA or for a Service. The test set up in the directive is also impractical because

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of the difficulty of determining whether any given intercept facilities are in fact fixed or mobile. For example, the Air Force designates all of its intercept facilities as "mobile" although, we are informed, many of such facilities are as physically fixed in location as facilities of the Army and Navy which are designated by them as fixed.

As of April 10, 1952, the three Services had in operation an aggregate of [redacted] intercept positions*, of which [redacted] were to some extent under the operational control of AFSA. The Army's intercept facilities included [redacted] fixed intercept stations at locations throughout the world having a total of [redacted] positions, and [redacted] intercept units (called Radio Reconnaissance Companies) having a total of [redacted] positions. The Navy had [redacted] fixed intercept stations with [redacted] positions, plus [redacted] mobile units with [redacted] positions. The Air Force had [redacted] Radio Squadrons Mobile and other intercept units with an aggregate of [redacted] positions. As of that date, [redacted] positions at the [redacted] fixed intercept stations of the Army and Navy (including all of the Army positions) were under the operational direction of AFSA. [redacted] fixed positions were under Navy control for direction finding, pursuant to JCS 2010/10 (see para 3); in addition, [redacted] intercept positions of the Army were assigned to perform missions directed by AFSA, and [redacted] the positions of the Air Force were

* [redacted]

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assigned to the operational direction of AFSA pursuant to an agreement between AFSA and the Air Force Security Service (AFSS) entered into on November 16, 1951, providing that AFSA and AFSS "will each have exclusive task assignments on 50% of all AFSS intercept positions." However, under the agreement AFSA may now assign "non-Air missions" to a maximum of two positions. The agreement provides that this maximum will be increased by mutual agreement as the total number of Air Force positions increase. It should be noted that all arrangements between AFSA and any of the Service COMINT organizations in the allocation of positions not designated by the Service as "fixed" have had to be effected by negotiated "agreements." An important aspect of the process of operating through long and painful negotiations is that, should a negotiated arrangement prove wrong or unworkable, or should circumstances change, further negotiations are required to annul it and then to make a fresh start.

Each of the Services is now carrying forward a program of expansion of its intercept facilities under authorization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS 2010/46, dated 6 November 1951), pursuant to which the Army is authorized to increase its positions to [redacted] the Navy to [redacted] and the Air Force to [redacted] for a total of [redacted] positions.

Within each Service, all intercept facilities have been kept subject to the command of the Service COMINT organization, rather than being assigned

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to theater or tactical commands. The Army Security Agency (ASA) has two principal overseas headquarters, ASA, Europe, and ASA, Pacific, each of which commands all fixed and mobile intercept facilities of the Army within its geographic area but has working relations with the theater commander to supply his local COMINT needs. All of the Navy intercept facilities are under the direct command of the Washington headquarters of the Naval Security Group. Air Force intercept facilities are under the direct command of the Brooks Field, Texas, headquarters of the Air Force Security Service and its subordinate Security Groups.

No intercept facilities are "assigned" to AFSA for "command," but each Service has worked out with AFSA an agreement as to how the command function of that Service over its intercept facilities shall be reconciled with "operational direction" by AFSA. Extensive negotiations have been held between AFSA and the respective Services as to whether AFSA's operational direction of Service intercept facilities will be exercised through general intercept requirements transmitted to the headquarters of the Service organization, or through detailed assignments so transmitted, or by directions sent by AFSA, either in its name or the name of the Service COMINT commander, directly to the intercept station. It would serve no useful purpose in this Report to detail the negotiations on this matter and its present status, but the great amount of time absorbed by and significance attached to such arrangements are noted as a commentary upon the present COMINT organization.

It should be helpful, at this stage, to illustrate how the exemption of particular Service intercept facilities from AFSA's "operational direction" has affected the employment of our total intercept capabilities. In the several months preceding the invasion of Korea in June, 1950, the U. S. had some intercept positions so situated as to be capable of intercepting North Korean traffic. Of these positions, AFSA had "operational direction" of the remainder being directed by the Army and Air Force. AFSA had many other demands for the limited facilities available to it, and assigned only of the positions to search for and intercept North Korean traffic. In large part because only positions were assigned to the task, AFSA was no Korean traffic whatever at the time of the invasion in June, 1950. With the benefit of hindsight, it is now clear that it would have been wiser to assign more of the available positions to Korean traffic. If AFSA had had the positions under its operational direction, it might still have decided for what seemed to be good reasons in the Spring of 1950 that were sufficient to cover North Korea. But AFSA never had the opportunity to decide how many positions it would put on Korea out of AFSA had only positions under its control.

After the invasion in June 1950, both AFSA and the Services rapidly assigned a considerable number of intercept positions to North Korean traffic. Some North Korean encrypted and plain text messages were intercepted

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in July, and by September the monthly total had risen to [redacted] But despite an impressive increase in total effort, the division of "operational direction" among the Services and AFSA led to a number of wasteful and inefficient practices. The Army (ASAPAC) and Air Force (AFSS) units in the theater duplicated much of their intercept effort on Soviet and [redacted] traffic in the combat areas, with neither unit accomplishing complete coverage or analysis on either problem. Despite the urgent recommendations of an AFSA team (which visited the theater at the invitation of General MacArthur's headquarters) that ASAPAC and AFSS divide and coordinate their efforts by agreement, the duplication continued for an additional year until ASAPAC voluntarily discontinued its own efforts on both problems in March of 1952. Similarly, AFSA recommended in the Spring of 1951 that the direction finding (D/F) facilities and activities of the three Services in the Far East be placed under common control to obtain results on Chinese Communist traffic that were urgently needed and could not be achieved with the limited facilities possessed by any one Service. The Committee is advised that this single and obvious step was not adopted until this Spring, more than a year after the original recommendation was made. And today, despite a substantial increase in the number of intercept positions in the Western Pacific, the proportion under AFSA operational direction has actually declined, from [redacted] out of [redacted] in June 1950 to [redacted] out of [redacted] on May 1, 1952.

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The Joint Chiefs of Staff's recent authorization for an increase of intercept facilities to [redacted] positions makes no provision as to whether such facilities shall be fixed or mobile or shall be subject to AFSA or Service operational direction. The Committee is informed that, in negotiations among AFSA and the Services leading to such authorization, the understanding was reached by at least some of the negotiators that a certain number of the total authorized positions would be deemed to be reserved to the Services for the "direct support of combat commanders" and that the remainder would be deemed available for AFSA requirements. However, the JCS authorization contains nothing which prescribes this allocation, and it appears difficult if not impossible to make any allocation on the basis of what is and what is not in "direct support of combat commanders." Accordingly, under the present directives, the future allocation of intercept facilities as between AFSA and the Service organizations appears to depend upon what portion of such facilities shall be fixed or mobile in the case of the Army and the Navy and what portion shall be allocated to AFSA by voluntary agreement in the case of the Air Force. Also it appears that the manner of exercise of operational direction by AFSA of such facilities as may be at its disposal will probably continue to be the subject of dispute and protracted negotiations.

The foregoing detailed description of the intercept situation illustrates one of the complex problems which occupies an inordinate amount of the time

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and energy of the COMINT organizations. An effectively controlled COMINT organization would permit complete flexibility in the use of intercept facilities, having in mind at any time the available traffic, the intelligence requirements of military and civilian consumers, the nature of the processing required, the need for speed in a given situation, the ability to identify targets, and other pertinent factors. These various factors may change rapidly, particularly in time of war, and the desired flexibility cannot be achieved by application of the present arbitrary standards of allocation or through "negotiations" among separate COMINT organizations.

Priorities

Although throughout the COMINT process the interrelationship of producers and users is continuous, the consumers first enter at the point where they make their COMINT needs known to the producers -- a periodic act of instruction known as the "determination of priorities."

It is obviously impossible, as well as impractical, to intercept, analyze and disseminate to all interested agencies each of the hundreds of thousands of radio messages traveling daily through the air and theoretically available for study. It is necessary, therefore, that machinery exist for determining the particular channels for particular subjects to which attention is to be primarily directed. Two committees meet monthly to address themselves to the question of determining the national COMINT

requirements for any given period.

First, the USCIB Intelligence Committee has formal responsibility for USCIB COMINT priorities. The Intelligence Committee has representatives from all member departments and agencies of USCIB: i.e., ONI, G-2, A-2, State, CIA and FBI, with the chairmanship rotating among these representatives. Voting is done on chart-like forms divided by countries, and under each country there is a list of topics previously drafted and agreed upon by the Committee from time to time. The interests in these topics are expressed in terms of the numerals 1 through 5, with 5 the highest. The results of this preferential voting are forwarded directly to DIRAFSA (the Director of the Armed Forces Security Agency). There is appended as Exhibit H a characteristic sample of USCIB intelligence requirements for the month of 15 January to 14 February 1952. It will be seen that these requirements are broadly-phrased, subject-matter interests of the USCIB intelligence consumers, which do not attempt to pinpoint the type of information desired either by nationality of traffic or by links or frequencies. We believe that in most cases these priorities are so broadly expressed as to be of little value to AFSA.

The weaknesses of this method of expressing consumer priorities are well illustrated by the USCIB Priority Lists furnished to AFSA during the seven months' period December 1949 - June 1950, immediately preceding the

invasion of South Korea. As shown below, the various intelligence agencies were becoming increasingly concerned during this period about the possibility of a Soviet move against South Korea, and yet this concern was never directly communicated to AFSA through the mechanism of the USCIB Intelligence Requirements Lists:

(a) Early in 1950 the intelligence agencies had formed an informal Watch Committee under the sponsorship of CIA (this Committee was the predecessor of the present official interagency Watch Committee presided over by G-2). The Committee had 10 members, 2 each from Army, Navy, Air Force, State and CIA. The Committee operated at the COMINT level; 3 of the 10 members had their offices in the consumer beachheads at AFSA which are described below.

(b) The Watch Committee did not deal with COMINT exclusively, but examined evidence from all sources so as to select and identify every available means of warning that might indicate a Soviet move against the non-Soviet world. The Committee's minutes for its meeting of April 12, 1950 record only six items of evidence on Soviet intentions. The sixth item was the following collateral report:

> "A report relayed by CinCFE stated that the North Korean Peoples' Army will invade South Korea in

June of 1950. Representatives of the Department of the Army undertook to ask for further information on this subject."

(c) This particular report is not mentioned again in the minutes until the meeting held July 31, 1950, five weeks after the invasion, when the Department of the Army stated that the report "had emanated from an Air Force source whose reports were not given much reliability by the Air Force." But meanwhile, Korea had continued to hold the attention of the Watch Committee, along with a number of other areas the Committee regarded as sensitive. In the minutes of the meeting held on June 14, 1950, the following appears:

> "A list of sensitive areas for consideration by the Watch Committee as potential sources of conflict with the USSR was presented by the Chairman (a CIA man). These areas, arranged in the Chairman's estimate of the order of their explosiveness in the near future (six months to one year) are: Indo-China, Berlin and West Germany, Iran, Yugoslavia, South Korea, the Philippines and Japan. Members of the Watch Committee were asked to present alternative lists or rearrangements of this list at the next meeting, 28 June 1950." /The invasion occurred on the 25th, and subsequent minutes do not indicate that the alternative lists were ever prepared./

The above quoted minutes of the Watch Committee indicate that the consumer agencies had South Korea on their minds, and that at least the CIA representative regarded South Korea as the 5th most potential source of conflict with the USSR throughout the entire world. But this degree of concern over Korea was never specifically indicated

in the USCIB Intelligence Priorities List.

(d) The table on the following page shows the number of priority requests by consumer agencies for traffic relating to particular areas of the world during the period December 1949 - June 1950. (During these 7 months, 9 separate lists of intelligence requirements were submitted by the USCIB members). On the highest priority list (List A), Korea is mentioned only once out of 124 separate specific priority items, and ranks 12th and last in frequency of mention among the areas of the world. On the 2nd priority list (List B), Korea is mentioned only 5 times out of 277 separate items, and ranks 15th of 18 areas in frequency of mention. On the 3rd priority list (List C), Korea is mentioned once out of 90 separate items, and is tied for 13th and last place in frequency of mention. As a comparative measure of the importance evidently assigned to coverage of traffic on Korea by the intelligence agencies, Latin America, while never mentioned in List A, received 15 mentions on List B and 25 mentions on List C during the same period.

(e) The above evidence suggests the possibility that the USCIB Intelligence Requirements Lists do not accurately reflect the views of the intelligence agencies themselves as to comparative priorities, and it is not surprising that the Lists are of such little assistance to AFSA.

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FREQUENCIES OF USCIB CONSUMER REQUESTS FOR TRAFFIC ON KOREA AS SHOWN BY USCIB INTELLIGENCE REQUIREMENTS LISTS (December 1949 - June 1950)

List A includes those individual subjects considered to be of greatest concern to U. S. policy or security.

List B includes those individual subjects considered to be of high importance.

List C includes those individual subjects considered to be of considerable interest but of less immediate concern.

Under each List is shown the number of priority requests by consumer agencies for traffic relating to each area during the period December 1949 - June 1950:

List A

1.	USSR	26
2.	China	23
3.	[redacted]	16
4.	Satellites	13
5.	[redacted]	10
6.	World Wide	7
6.	[redacted]	7
8.	[redacted]	6
9.	[redacted]	5
10.	[redacted]	5
10.	[redacted]	5
12.	Korea	1

List B

1.	China	31
2.	[redacted]	29
3.	Satellites	24
4.	[redacted]	21
5.	[redacted]	19
6.	[redacted]	18
7.	[redacted]	17
8.	[redacted]	16
9.	[redacted]	15
10.	[redacted]	14
11.	USSR	13
12.	[redacted]	9
13.	[redacted]	8
13.	[redacted]	8
15.	Korea	5
15.	World Wide	5
17.	[redacted]	3
18.	[redacted]	2

List C

1.	Latin America	25
2.	[redacted]	15
3.	[redacted]	11
4.	[redacted]	8
4.	[redacted]	8
6.	[redacted]	6
7.	[redacted]	4
8.	China	2
8.	Satellites	2
8.	[redacted]	2
8.	[redacted]	2
8.	[redacted]	2
13.	Korea	1
13.	[redacted]	1
13.	USSR	1

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Since the intelligence agencies themselves failed to communicate to AFSA the extent of their growing interest in the Korean problem, it is small wonder that AFSA was so poorly prepared to handle Korean traffic when the invasion occurred on June 25, 1950.

AFSA's own dissatisfaction with the USCIB Intelligence Requirements Lists, illustrated by the Korean episode described above, led the Director of AFSA to protest to AFSAC on August 18, 1950 that he was in a position of having to direct the intercept and processing efforts of AFSA without formal integrated guidance from the Services as to their intelligence requirements. On October 2, 1950, AFSAC agreed to establish a special Intelligence Requirements Committee consisting of members of ONI, G-2, A-2 and AFSA. Since the creation of this Committee, it has assumed the responsibility for making intelligence priority recommendations as to military traffic, and the USCIB Intelligence Committee has confined itself primarily to non-military traffic.

The part of the total "COMINT pie" available to the USCIB Intelligence Committee for the expression of its priorities is what is known as "Joint." It is primarily non-military traffic in which, however, the intelligence divisions of the Service components of USCIB have an interest. For this reason, they participate in the expression of USCIB priorities. The part of the pie dealt with by the AFSAC Intelligence Committee is composed entirely of military traffic in which in the main the civilian components of USCIB have

only a secondary interest, other than to be kept advised of the highlights of the resulting intelligence.

When the recommendations of the two intelligence committees reach DIRAFSA, they are acted upon by the Intercept Priorities Board (IPB), of AFSA-02 (the processing center of AFSA). As in the case of the intelligence committees, IPB meets monthly. Its voting members are the heads of the branches of AFSA-02; its chairman is always the Chief of AFSA-02. The civilian components of USCIB have no voting members in IPB but have the right to station observers at its meetings and customarily do so.

The IPB, in turn, has about ten SIPG's (Special Intercept Priorities Groups) set up within the various branches of AFSA-02. In advance of the monthly meeting of IPB, the SIPG's prepare and submit their own recommendations based upon the interests and needs of the processing units. As in the case of the IPB, the civilian agencies participate in the SIPG's through non-voting observers.

On the basis of the priority recommendations received from the two intelligence committees and the various SIPG's, IPB lays out the actual intercept plan for the coming month. At this time the total COMINT intercept capabilities necessarily exercise a limiting influence. It will be remembered that AFSA has operational control over only [redacted] (b)(1) presently existing intercept positions. Accordingly IPB is in fact able to apply the priorities

recommendations received from the consuming agencies only in laying out the intercept plan for approximately two-thirds of the available intercept positions. The remaining intercept positions follow the priorities laid down for them by the three military Services.

It will thus be seen that each of the three military Services has absolute control over priorities for its own reserved intercept facilities, and that it is also authorized to make recommendations to AFSA as to priorities for the intercept facilities under AFSA control. Within AFSA the military Services have an effective voice, if not absolute control, over the actual intercept plan laid out by the IPB for the AFSA control stations, through military personnel assigned to AFSA who happen to serve as members of IPB.

The civilian consumer agencies are therefore at a substantial disadvantage in determining intercept priorities. With respect to the one-third of the total intercept capability reserved by the three military Services, the civilian agencies have no right even to make priority recommendations. With respect to the "Joint" (but not the military) portion of the remaining two-thirds of the intercept more or less controlled by AFSA, the civilian agencies are permitted to make priority recommendations, in conjunction with the Services, but, since they do not assign personnel to serve under AFSA command (as the military Services do), they do not sit on the AFSA Board (IPB) which considers the various recommendations and which makes the decisions.

It is a natural consequence of this arrangement that, in the opinion of the civilian agencies, an Intercept Priorities Board composed wholly of employees of the Department of Defense tends to place undue emphasis on priority recommendations made by the military Services, as compared to those made by the civilian consumers. Thus the State Department representatives have advised this Committee that of the [redacted] intercept positions at the disposal of AFSA in June 1950, only [redacted] positions or [redacted] were devoted to non-military traffic, while of the [redacted] positions available to AFSA in April 1952, only [redacted] positions or [redacted] were devoted to non-military traffic. Against a 100% increase in the number of intercept positions available to AFSA, both the percentage and the absolute number of positions devoted to non-military traffic have declined sharply. These figures, moreover, leave entirely out of consideration the [redacted] intercept positions reserved for and operated by the military Services, rather than AFSA.

Once the actual priorities for a given month are set in terms of substantive requirements, it is necessary to translate them into the "professional" terms required by intercept station practices. The basic implement for instructions to stations is the "case book", which contains a list of all known radio circuits, and of which every intercept station has a copy. [redacted]

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The interpretation of the COMINT substantive requirements for the benefit of intercept operators is done by AFSA-28, the Intercept Division of the Collection Group of AFSA. As a result of this translation into professional terms, given intercept stations are told to listen to certain case-book numbers. In each case, three auxiliary case-book numbers must be assigned along with that number which is preferred, because of ionospheric and other technical complications which may make it necessary for the intercept station to use some leeway and judgment in picking up the required traffic.

Processing

After the raw material is intercepted, it is returned to AFSA and to the decrypting units of the three Services according to current instructions, which vary with the type of traffic.

a. Processing as between the Service units and AFSA

The allocation of responsibility for processing traffic as between the Service units and AFSA has proved as controversial and difficult as the parallel problem of intercept already mentioned. The 1949 directive of the Secretary of Defense provided no criterion for allocation of responsibility for processing. The directive of the JCS to AFSA states that the Services shall be responsible for processing "as needed for intercept control and

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combat intelligence," but that "Exploitation by each Service applies only to material of operational interest to that Service" and "will not entail undesirable duplication." The "initial composition" of AFSA prescribed by JCS 2010/10 placed under the direction of AFSA portions of the Army and Navy processing organizations, but did not limit the right of the Services to engage in processing with any retained or new personnel.

At present neither the Army or the Navy maintains any processing unit in the continental United States, but the Air Force maintains a processing unit at Brooks Field, Texas, and all three Services maintain processing units outside the United States, the Army at [redacted] and [redacted] the Navy at [redacted] and the Air Force at [redacted] and [redacted]

It is clear that some decryption must always be done in the field processing centers, because of the time element, because of special direct support requirements for certain military operations, and because any effort to concentrate all processing at AFSA would produce such overcrowding of telecommunications circuits as to be unworkable. The processing at the Service centers consists mostly of decryption of [redacted] systems on which no further cryptanalysis is required; there is, however, a certain amount of

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cryptanalysis that is necessarily carried on. For instance, even low-level systems will from time to time be changed, requiring a cryptanalytic attack to put them back into readable condition in a matter of hours if the volume of traffic is heavy. [redacted] (Navy) and [redacted] (Army) do some medium-grade cryptanalysis as a result of the Korean War, which necessitated medium-grade COMINT being available on the quickest basis to commanders in the Korean Theater. But despite agreement on this general principle, AFSA and the Services have had a good deal of difficulty reaching an understanding as to where the line of processing responsibility should be drawn between them and between the Services themselves.

As between AFSA and the Air Force, the debate continued for more than two years. Eventually, the division of responsibility for processing was set forth in a so-called "reporting agreement" dated December 13, 1951 and accepted by AFSA on February 8, 1952, which contemplates three levels of processing, first at the point of intercept, second at the theater level and third by AFSA and AFSS. Although the wording of this agreement is in some respects ambiguous and its actual application has not yet been tested, the principle of allocation appears to be that processing which can be accomplished effectively within twenty-four hours after intercept shall be done at

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the point of intercept within the theater, that further processing which can be done within forty-eight hours shall be done at the theater level, and that all other processing shall normally be done within the continental United States, with AFSA performing the COMINT processing and AFSS performing certain reporting and "unique technical support" functions, the exact nature of which is not entirely clear. This agreement thus appears to reflect to some extent a recognition that the processing of intercepted traffic shall be accomplished at the most forward locations at which the desired speed can be achieved and shall otherwise be performed by AFSA rather than a Service organization.

As between AFSA and the Army and the Navy, no written agreement exists as to the allocation of processing responsibility. Neither the Army nor the Navy has at any time since the organization of AFSA undertaken to establish processing units within the United States, but the Army has on various occasions strongly asserted its right to do so. The division of processing responsibility between AFSA and the Army and the Navy field processing units has, we understand, involved less controversy than the relations with the Air Force, and has been reached through frequent liaison and close cooperation.*

* For example, Navy processing at [redacted] is currently under the operational direction of AFSA.

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In general, the Army and the Navy field units have performed such processing as can be done with speed and efficiency within the theater to provide information for the theater commander on the basis of technical assistance provided by AFSA.

As in the case of intercept, however, there has been a certain amount of duplication of processing effort between the military Services themselves, best illustrated by the previously mentioned duplication of effort between the Army and Air Force units in the Pacific in processing Russian and [redacted] traffic, with the result that neither unit was able to accomplish complete analysis on either problem. An AFSA team was invited to study this problem and concluded that a much greater degree of success could be achieved on both Russian and [redacted] traffic if the Army and Air Force units would divide and coordinate their efforts by agreement. Despite such a recommendation by AFSA in the Spring of 1951, duplication continued until March, 1952, when the Army unit voluntarily abandoned the entire field to the Air Force.

As in the case of intercept, the general principle has been followed in processing that each Service organization is concerned primarily with the traffic of the same Service of the "enemy" nation. The soundness of this fundamental premise depends upon the particular

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nature of the "enemy" traffic and also upon the organization of our own military forces for operations. Although no serious difficulty appears to have arisen to date, it may be questioned whether enemy military traffic can always be divided effectively on the basis of three Service organizations, whether for the purpose of intercept, or for the processing purposes of traffic analysis and cryptanalysis. Also, under our own present concept of unified commands in theaters of operations, the premise that any U. S. military Service has a peculiar command responsibility for deriving COMINT from the traffic of its "enemy" counterpart Service appears of doubtful validity.

Considerations such as these have led to extensive negotiations among the Services components of AFSA with a view to the establishment of a so-called "global COMINT organization." In general, it has been the position of AFSA in such negotiations that COMINT activities require coordination within any theater similar to the coordination within the continental United States through AFSA. In general again, the Services have opposed any such concept as inconsistent with normal command relationships and with the responsibility of each Service to provide combat intelligence for its own operations. The only tangible outcome to date of the extensive negotiations with regard to the so-called "global COMINT organization" has been the

establishment of a unit in the Far East called AFSA Field Activity, Far East, to which a small advance complement of personnel has been assigned to date. The principal functions of AFSA Field Activity, Far East, is to assist the Director of AFSA to coordinate United States cryptologic activities in the Far East area, coordinate United States activities in the area with those of any collaborating foreign power, and provide technical support to service COMINT activities within the area. Each of the three Service COMINT organizations, however, continues to maintain its own COMINT organization within the theater.

Although the Services have tended to oppose the establishment of any AFSA field activity as being inconsistent with normal command relationships, we understand that each Service has utilized a vertical command organization for its own COMINT activities, regardless of the fact that such organization likewise appears inconsistent with normal command relationships in theaters of operation and results in the presence in each theater of two or three separate COMINT agencies reporting directly to their respective Service COMINT organizations in the continental United States.

b. Processing within AFSA

AFSA eventually receives, either by telecommunication or

by pouch according to urgency, one copy at least of every item of raw traffic intercepted anywhere. While the Services and AFSA are often in disagreement as to the division of processing responsibilities, there is considerable team-work in the matter of sending raw traffic around. Service communications networks are currently handling AFSA's raw traffic requirements in the following proportion: Army 44%, Navy 38%, and Air Force 18%. These are largely the same networks upon which the Services must rely not only for the passing of their own COMINT traffic but also for their overall communications of a general nature. Since raw traffic must be enciphered in privacy systems before being put on the air for return to COMINT centers, the extra load is even more burdensome. Upon receipt at AFSA, new traffic is sorted first by country of origin, then according to certain traffic-analysis requirements, and lastly by cryptographic system under the heading of the country of origin. If readable, the traffic then goes directly to decrypting sections; if unreadable, it is further sorted according to the general type of encipherment, whether by machine or hand, and is passed to the appropriate cryptanalytic units.

Simultaneously with the cryptanalytic or decoding techniques which are applied, other copies of the traffic are being subjected to

the process of traffic analysis. [redacted] Theoretically, completely readable traffic can be turned into the form of a finished translation very quickly, since there are no real difficulties involved in handling it. However, there are long delays, sometimes up to ten days, encountered in translation, and much effort is dissipated through processing messages that either have no substantive value to any consumer or that have lost it through being robbed of their timeliness. A recent AFSA report estimates that fully half of the messages translated meet no specific intelligence requirement whatever of the consumer agencies.

Non-readable traffic these days consists mostly of Russian and satellite systems, with [redacted] traffic as an important second category. The cryptanalytic attack upon non-readable traffic relies heavily upon electronic devices and tabulating machines in collaboration with AFSA's best human brains. [redacted] Satellite traffic, [redacted]

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Despite cybernetics, however, our attack on Russian [redacted] since the early [redacted] of 1947 and 1948. Granted, the problem is extremely difficult in view of the fact that the various systems under attack are undoubtedly based upon [redacted] but some cryptanalytic experts not presently on duty at AFSA have advised the Committee that, in their opinion, the attack is timid, parsimonious, and too bound by the remembrance of past accomplishment to make the fresh and untrammeled start that is demanded.

Naturally, until the time when the more [redacted] How to divide AFSA's resources between such speculative research and current production is a problem that is more perplexing in the COMINT field than is the comparable issue so frequently found in private industry. To add to the difficulty, AFSA's manpower potential has suffered through loss of many of its best cryptanalysts. It is estimated that there remain only ten or fifteen top-flight

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mathematicians and technicians to provide the necessary guidance and incentive, as compared to three or four times that number during World War II. Low pay and "too many military bosses" are the reasons usually cited for this distressing attrition. AFSA, as a military organization, is operated largely with military officers as heads of its various departments and units, and with the rotation policy now employed at least by the Army and Air Force, the officers in charge often appear greatly inferior in skill and experience to the civilian professionals under their command. Day-to-day operating frustrations and the difficulty of advancement under these conditions are cited by a number of our better World War II cryptanalysts as primary factors in AFSA's inability to retain the best men, while the Government pay scale and the problems involved in original security clearances have seriously impeded AFSA's efforts to recruit and train qualified young replacements.

It should be recognized that many of these baffling personnel problems exist despite AFSA's management, and not because of it. AFSA was not spared the general budget restrictions prevalent throughout the military establishment from the date of AFSA's creation through June, 1950. Perhaps because of AFSA's role as the first "combined" functional military operation not directly under the

control of a single military Service, it began existence by adopting the principle of awarding proper billets to the officers of all three Services, too often at the expense of a deserving civilian professional better qualified for a particular task. The present Director of AFSA is well aware of this problem, and has taken a number of significant steps in the direction of higher pay and greater responsibility for his civilian professionals.

So much for the processing of enciphered traffic, readable and unreadable, which is that aspect of AFSA's assignment that engages popular imagination (unfortunately stimulated by too frequent publicity) under the heading of "decoding."

At the other extreme is the bulky flow of plain text, which is at present the best completely readable product which AFSA has to offer in the field of Russian COMINT, excepting those elements of order-of-battle intelligence, [redacted] Russian traffic. Plain text is unenciphered traffic sent in vast volumes throughout the eastern and more primitive half of the USSR and containing, among other things, much of the urgent but presumably less sensitive business of the Soviet [redacted] Since the [redacted], under the Soviet system, embrace every conceivable activity of official life, these plain text messages when studied

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in bulk, are sometimes very revealing, at least when compared to the appalling lack of information available from other sources within the Soviet Union.

The problem in handling plain text is two-fold: first, it is a question of reducing the volume to workable proportions; and second, it is a problem of translating "in the gross", so to speak. Of the [redacted] messages intercepted per month, a preliminary sort accomplished by rapid scanning reduces the total by about 80%. This act of wholesale rejection is intended to eliminate unimportant personal messages which make up so large a proportion of the traffic carried by the plain text circuits. However, it is arbitrarily accomplished by selecting for retention only those messages that contain certain predetermined words, of which there is a glossary of about 1300. Such scanning as this is sheer drudgery. It is performed by low-grade personnel with little or no knowledge of the language, or, indeed, of what ultimate purpose their work serves, who are trained to recognize merely as patterns the appearance of these words wherever they may occur in the message, and then by reflex to file the message in the corresponding bin. So far, no other more humane or less haphazard method of reducing the millions of bits of paper to usable and workable proportions has been developed.

Of the remainder thus produced, expert linguists in eleven separate reading panels make the second sort, reducing the bulk again by some

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20-25%, and cross-filing the retained material in about ninety general categories. It is these readers who also select those individual texts which are translated verbatim and disseminated to consumers, a final distillation of less than 1% of the original [redacted] However, nothing that results from the second sort is destroyed, and these messages are available for further study or for subsequent translation as required. Just as an example of the actual totals handled, in the month of March, 1952, the first grand total of intercepts was [redacted] The first sort reduced the total to [redacted] and the second to [redacted] We have not been able to obtain the ultimate number of these [redacted] texts which were finally translated and disseminated to the consumers, but applying the general average made available to us it was substantially less than [redacted] The remainder of the [redacted] messages would not be destroyed but, as above indicated, would be retained and filed.

Valuable as Russian plain text is, the physical plant and the staff required to produce it are enormous when compared to the problem of handling encrypted traffic. At the same time, plain text is classed as orthodox communications intelligence and is given the same security treatment. It may well be that this common grouping is seriously impeding the progress of both our cryptanalytic program and the most efficient utilization of plain text as well. The argument can be made, as it has for several years past in U. S. COMINT circles, that plain text should be down-graded to TOP SECRET

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or at least segregated from cryptanalytic COMINT material under a separate code word of equally high classification, thus insulating the knowledge of our cryptanalytic activities from the large number of intelligence analysts required to work exclusively on plain text.

Before we turn to the final steps of the actual dissemination to consumers of the COMINT product and the use they make of it, something should be said of the so-called "beachheads" at AFSA. These are groups of intelligence analysts and liaison personnel stationed at AFSA by the six consumers: ONI, G-2, AFSS, State, CIA and the FBI. While varying considerably from consumer to consumer, the main purpose of the beachheads is to study communications intelligence in its unpublished state both for the sake of speed and for reduction where possible of the quantity of finished COMINT to be disseminated. The beachheads also serve as a valuable device whereby consumers and users of COMINT can keep abreast of each other and understand more completely the requirements on one hand and the capabilities on the other. The beachhead principle is not entirely without its opponents, however. The beachheads are physically within the AFSA compound; they have full access to all levels of the AFSA operation; yet they are not under AFSA control. It has been suggested with much force that beachhead personnel should be, for the sake of efficient management, under the operational control of AFSA production chiefs, even though they continue, as now, to influence AFSA's effort

in the direction which individual customers desire.

Dissemination and Use of Processed Traffic

To complete the picture of how the present COMINT organization operates we next come to the arrangements for disseminating processed traffic to the intelligence consumers, and the methods employed by the consumers in producing intelligence from this traffic. Any reorganization of our COMINT efforts should be based on an understanding of how the processed traffic is supplied to the intelligence agencies and used by them. A knowledge of the methods of the intelligence agencies is also an essential element in considering the adequacy of present COMINT security procedures, discussed at a later point in this Part IV, and the merits of the "CONSIDO" debate.*

It will be recalled that the six consumer agencies each have sovereign powers over the internal administration and operation of their COMINT activities, recognized and confirmed by paragraph 10 of the USCIB charter. The methods and habits of the six consumer agencies in evaluating the bulk COMINT that they receive and in disseminating the resultant intelligence are thus allowed to vary considerably, and they do. Some of the differences stem from basic divergencies in the intelligence requirements of particular agencies, but whatever the reasons, the differences exist, and it is therefore necessary

* See the Committee's observations on the CONSIDO problem, attached hereto as Exhibit I.

to describe the procedure of each agency in turn, although a few generalizations apply to all three of the military intelligence Services as a group.

Military Intelligence

The three military Services use the COMINT product as a major source of "tactical" order-of-battle and operational intelligence about the [redacted] and Korean forces in the field, and as the principal source of "strategic" intelligence on USSR order-of-battle and military intentions. Each Service concentrates on its opposite enemy number, but keeps abreast of developments in all branches of the enemy forces under study. The COMINT needed for tactical purposes is largely intercepted and processed by the Service intercept facilities in the combat theater, and immediate tactical intelligence is produced by the Service intelligence unit stationed there. Both the theater-processed traffic and any resultant intelligence estimates are returned by each Service in the theater to its own headquarters in the United States (as well as to AFSA). On arrival here, these estimates are used by the Service intelligence units to brief military and civilian officials on tactical developments in the theater, as well as to produce additional intelligence (primarily order-of-battle) which is of interest to the theater commanders and is transmitted back to them.

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The COMINT needed for strategic intelligence on Soviet order-of-battle and Soviet intentions is processed mainly in the United States, either at AFSA or at the Air Force unit at Brooks Field, and the resulting product is turned into useful intelligence by the Service chief of intelligence or units under his command. Again, each Service concentrates primarily on its Soviet opposite number.

In Washington, the three Services follow substantially the same procedures, with minor variations. Each of the three maintains a beachhead at AFSA not only to perform liaison functions, but also to produce intelligence from the bulk traffic delivered by AFSA. Each maintains its intelligence analysts at AFSA and prepares intelligence summaries there, thus avoiding the security risk involved in delivering bulk traffic outside the physical confines of AFSA's production center at Arlington Hall Station.*

The Army and Air Force units at AFSA prepare only working intelligence papers which are edited, published and distributed among their top Washington commanders by the parent G-2 or A-2 staffs in the Pentagon. G-2 in the Pentagon then cables important items to the Army field commands throughout the world, while in the Air Force

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* The Navy, however, sends a full set of AFSA's "take" to CINCPAC at Hawaii, where a separate intelligence staff maintains a complete and permanent message file for Pacific naval operations.

this role is performed by the AFSS Command at Brooks Field in Texas, to which the Air Force beachhead at AFSA has recently been subordinated.* The Navy Director of Intelligence, on the other hand, has delegated full COMINT responsibility to the ONI party (Y-1) at AFSA. Y-1 not only prepares intelligence summaries from COMINT, but also edits and publishes the weekly Navy Special Intelligence Brief and other reports, and services Navy commands throughout the world with cables, COMINT summaries and urgent operational flashes as occasion requires. Army G-2 has also authorized its AFSA beachhead to originate cables to the theater whenever the beachhead develops operational intelligence on the Korean campaign.

The production of intelligence at the AFSA beachhead serves military needs in a number of ways. It is obviously the fastest method of developing operational intelligence and getting it back to the theater, in the frequent cases where hours and minutes count. The tricky nature of order-of-battle intelligence and of tactical military intelligence (particularly when, as in Korea, we rely mainly on traffic analysis and [redacted] places an enormous premium on close working cooperation between the intelligence analysts,

* AFSS, in turn, is subordinate to the Chief of Staff rather than the Assistant Chief of Staff, A-2.

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traffic analysts, and cryptanalysts. Each type of specialist can and often does save the other from critical mistakes. Working jointly, they are far more effective than when they work separately. If the intelligence analysts remained at a physically separate location, joint work of this sort would be far less effective. Another important advantage of the "beachhead" arrangement is that it not only facilitates cooperation between the Service groups and AFSA but has greatly improved cooperation among the Service groups themselves. Finally, the physical concentration at AFSA, reducing as it does the shipment and storage of raw traffic throughout the city, undoubtedly contributes to the security of the COMINT source. Partly because of this concentration, the Services are also able to hold down the number of intelligence personnel cleared for COMINT. Each Service manages with an AFSA beachhead of 100 or less, and with no more than about 300 to 400 cleared intelligence-producing personnel on duty with each Service in the Washington area. Only a small percentage of the Service intelligence staffs in Washington are cleared for COMINT (except that in fields such as Soviet order-of-battle, where COMINT is virtually the only source, the entire group must necessarily be cleared to do effective work).

State Department Intelligence

The State Department does not carry on any part of its intelligence-producing function at AFSA, and limits its beachhead to liaison duties. The processed traffic moves in bulk (in up to eight copies, depending on the class of material involved) to the Department's Special Projects Staff (SPS), located across the street from the Department's main building. Here a small staff of less than 40, with the longest continuous COMINT experience possessed by the intelligence producers of any agency except the Navy, further clarifies and develops the processed material for intelligence use. Items of general interest are edited and published in the daily Diplomatic Summary, circulated to a limited number of top Department officials and to the other principal COMINT consumers in the Government, including the President. Messages of limited interest are personally delivered to the Department officer concerned by the SPS area intelligence specialist, who explains any COMINT features of the item that require caution or elaboration, remains while the officer reads, and then brings the item back to the protected area. Some 100-odd Department officers are served in this way, weekly or oftener as required. Urgent items, such as [redacted] are delivered to SPS and passed on immediately by SPS to the proper

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Department officer. Important items are also cabled via Army channels to a few Embassies abroad [redacted] where adequate safeguards exist.

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Central Intelligence Agency

The Central Intelligence Agency likewise conducts the production of intelligence in its own buildings, situated, like the State Department, at a considerable distance from Arlington Hall. CIA is the [redacted] and the most prolific producer of intelligence reports based on this source. It requires delivery from AFSA of as many as ten or fifteen copies of most types of traffic. [redacted] and it turns out by far the largest number of intelligence reports, of all security classifications, of any governmental intelligence agency. The Committee has not attempted to evaluate the efficacy of the exploitation methods used by CIA or any of the other consumers.

The CIA has a number of special responsibilities which COMINT helps it to discharge: it produces "national intelligence" based on material prepared by the specialized or functional intelligence agencies; it briefs the President on "national intelligence" of both current and long-range nature; it is the major producer of economic and scientific intelligence about the Soviet Union; [redacted]

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Alerting Top Officials

Something should be said of the existing machinery whereby COMINT messages of crucial importance are immediately furnished to topmost officials

of the Executive Branch. The Pearl Harbor investigation shed a hard and relentless light on the necessity for such machinery, and for keeping it in perfect working order. At present, there are several ways whereby urgent COMINT items can be carried to officials of Cabinet rank and, through them or directly, to the White House, but the primary channel is that which is at the disposal of the Director of Central Intelligence. He has, by statutory right, access to the President, but also, on the other hand, he has by virtue of his specialized intelligence responsibilities a place at the production echelon in the intelligence councils per se. He is therefore in a position to pick up an urgent COMINT item from source, judge its importance, and to hand it without intermediary to the Chief Executive. The other COMINT consumers have, of course, eventual access to the White House through their respective Secretaries.

Careful arrangements exist within the CIA for the notification at any hour of the twenty-four of the Director and his Assistant for Current Intelligence in the event that a COMINT item of high priority has been received. The

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[redacted]

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There is, of course, always the possibility that some significant message will be fatally missed or delayed because of the large volume of material handled. But, granted this fundamental weakness in the COMINT alerting mechanism (in which characteristic it is no different from any other) there is the more disturbing fact that the COMINT mechanism suffers from indecisiveness. Because it [redacted]

The DCI's channel, described above, is the best one, and seems to have been evolved partly in a spirit of cooperation inasmuch as the other intelligence chiefs can participate in its operation; but, as is so often the case in

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(b)(3)-50 USC 403
(b)(3)-18 USC 798
(b)(3)-P.L. 86-36

interdepartmental arrangements, its efficiency is mitigated by that unyielding sense of sovereignty which characterizes each department and agency, and which consciously provides loopholes for drawing off the strength of such arrangements. The method of alerting the highest authorities concerning crucial COMINT items is one which, above all others, should be free of all possible evasion and duplication; but it is not. It is suggested that an early act of any revitalized COMINT Board that may result from this present inquiry would advisedly be a review of the existing machinery with the purpose of evolving a single, unchallenged alerting technique that would place responsibility squarely upon one authority for notification of the President, the Chief of Staff, the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense, and his three services Secretaries.

Cryptography

There is another aspect of the present communications intelligence organization which has not been hitherto mentioned in this part of the Report, namely, cryptographic activities. These are confined to the construction, the checking, and the distribution of the Nation's own code and cipher systems. While cryptography is of itself an advanced, complicated, and important science, it has not been beset by rivalry and strife to nearly the same degree as has the cryptanalytic effort; for this reason, the cryptographic picture is a relatively serene one. The inevitable relationship between cryptography and cryptanalysis

(for the combination of which two activities the special all-embracing synthetic word "cryptology" has been coined) has long been recognized. The security and the efficiency of our own ciphers are to a large extent revealed by the insecurity of the ciphers of other governments. Any insufficiencies or breaches in our own cryptographic systems might well become known first through cryptanalytic activities, and the testing of our own systems, which is carried on continuously, is so closely related in nature to the basic principles of cryptanalysis per se as to make it advisable that cryptographers have access at all times to cryptanalysts and the results of their work.

When AFSA was created, the cryptographic activities of both Army and Navy were transferred by the Services to AFSA. At the time, the Air Force had no independent cryptographic unit of its own, and no such unit has since been created. The State Department and other government agencies had already adopted the practice of relying upon the Military Services for cryptographic service and they have continued to rely upon AFSA. As a result, true unification and centralization of this Government's cryptographic activities was achieved by the creation of AFSA. So far as the Committee has been able to determine, our cryptographic activities have been performed efficiently by AFSA without significant jurisdictional conflict, and without any of the various unfortunate consequences which the Services have often predicted would follow from a unification of other phases of our COMINT operations.

Security

The consideration of the cryptographic aspect of cryptologic activities brings into focus the numerous problems of security which plague and are inherent in the COMINT world by its very nature. The delicacy of COMINT as a source of intelligence, and also, inversely, the reason for its unique value, is the ability of the target to deny the source to us as soon as its accessibility to us is suspected. There is at all times a balance to be maintained between the security of the source, which is vital if communications intelligence is to continue, and the application of COMINT as an instrument of national action vis-a-vis the target nations, without which COMINT would cease to have any useful meaning.

Two principles of COMINT security have grown up and become basic, namely: (1) the principle of the "need-to-know", whereby it is decided whether or not a prospective recipient has the right of access to a given category of COMINT; and (2) the compartmentation principle, whereby those whose need-to-know has been established are kept from developing any knowledge of other aspects of communications intelligence which lie beyond the province of their special responsibility or activity. The purpose of compartmentation is primarily to localize the dangers and effects of compromise. The maintenance of this balance lies at the very root of the COMINT security problem. It becomes particularly difficult as the size of the COMINT

world increases. COMINT security was relatively simple in the days when the total number of people with established need-to-know amounted to no more than 200 or 300; but, with the growth of importance of COMINT as a source of national intelligence and with the increasing complexity of the cryptanalytic effort whereby COMINT is produced, that number has grown from the few hundreds to some 40,000, (including the consumer agencies). And in spite of the two principles mentioned above, it must be taken for granted that indoctrination, even though dissemination be compartmentalized and restricted to the narrowest scope, involves full knowledge of the existence of the communications intelligence endeavor and peripheral knowledge of the general means and techniques of its production. Thus, it can be seen that people engaged in the COMINT effort, whether their positions within that effort be humble or exalted, are all by definition possessed with information of a most sensitive nature. This necessitates, in turn, that every member of the COMINT world be screened before indoctrination and be periodically scrutinized thereafter. Enormous problems of investigation and clearance are unavoidably brought into play as the result of this aspect of COMINT security.

At present, COMINT security is the sovereign province of each COMINT agency, so far as concerns that agency's own practices and personnel. There is a USCIB Security Committee at which the sovereign agencies meet and negotiate agreement on general security standards, but the application of

these standards within each agency is for the agency itself to determine. Even the original clearance of COMINT personnel is handled by different investigators in each agency, and the FBI, which for a time carried a large share of the general burden, has recently ceased screening AFSA's own personnel, because of the pressure of other duties. As a result, one of the most sensitive agencies of the Government, AFSA, has lost the services of our most professional screening organization.

Among the unfortunate results of the sovereignty enjoyed by each COMINT agency over its own security affairs is the tendency of each COMINT agency to suspect and criticize the security practices prevailing in other agencies, without being able to learn the true facts or do anything about them. The Committee has been struck by the frequency with which representatives of particular COMINT agencies have pointed to poor security practices in other COMINT agencies, practically on a round-robin or pot and kettle basis. AFSA worries over the security practices of the consumer agencies, the consumer agencies worry about AFSA and about each other; yet so far as the Committee has been able to determine, no COMINT agency, and no individual in the COMINT world, has sufficient information about security practices outside his own immediate field of COMINT activity to form a sound opinion one way or the other.

A good example of this weakness of the present system is the reaction

of the various COMINT agencies [redacted] before AFSA was created, but relating to security practices which the creation of AFSA did not disturb. [redacted]

(b)(1)
(b)(3)-50 USC 403
(b)(3)-18 USC 798
(b)(3)-P.L. 86-36

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(b)(3)-P.L. 86-36

It also seems worth noting that the USCIB Board considered the problem [redacted] and made the following recommendations:

"(c) The following counter measures are required:

(1) [redacted]

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(b)(3)-50 USC 403
(b)(3)-18 USC 798
(b)(3)-P.L. 86-36

(2) A thorough review of present dissemination lists and dissemination practices, by each of the consumer agencies with a view to insuring that:

a. The "need to know" principle is rigidly adhered to.

b. That the producing agencies are required to furnish only those COMINT items which the application of the "need-to-know" principle reveals are actually required by a consumer agency.

c. Only the minimum number of copies of individual COMINT items essential to the accomplishment of the dissemination program be requested from the producing agencies, and

d. Proper measures for handling, custody and stowage are being practiced.

So far as the Committee has been able to learn, very little has been done by USCIB to carry out these recommendations. The general tenor of the testimony before the Committee was that, in the opinion of each witness, security practices in his own agency are excellent but that security practices in other branches of the U. S. COMINT effort are poor, with no observation of any improvement [redacted] The Committee is unable to express an opinion on the accuracy of these statements, but it is convinced that under our present

form of COMINT organization, no one COMINT official has acquired, or has the authority or ability to acquire, sufficient information about actual security practices in all agencies to reach any sound conclusions on this subject.

PART V

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

~~THIS DOCUMENT CONTAINS CODE WORD MATERIAL~~

The first four parts of this Report do not purport to be a complete summary of all of the evidence presented to the Committee, or of the numerous and varying opinions which have been received from the witnesses listed in Exhibit B and from other individuals with whom members of the Committee and its staff have held informal discussions. On the other hand, they are more extensive than would have been necessary if the Committee had limited its report to specific replies to the two main questions submitted to it. In order to put itself in a position to answer these questions, however, it was essential for the Committee to acquire the background information which these four parts contain, and it was decided that, since the material had been collected, it might be equally helpful to the officials to whom the Report is addressed to have this same background.

Our conclusions are necessarily matters of opinion and judgment, based on the evidence we have received. They have been arrived at unanimously. In addition to those submitted in response to the two main questions raised in our directive, we have added certain others of an ancillary nature on three or four other subjects necessarily encountered in the course of our survey. We have not, however, attempted to extend the survey to include consideration of the efficiency of the expenditure of funds used in the overall COMINT effort, nor to evaluate the methods or machinery used by the various departments and agencies in utilizing the COMINT information currently being made

available to them, as these subjects are completely outside our terms of reference.

The Importance of Communications Intelligence

In our directive of 28 December 1951 we were asked first to consider "the legitimate Communications Intelligence needs of each governmental department and agency for the production of departmental intelligence, and of the Director of Central Intelligence for the production of national intelligence." Our reply to this question is in large part contained in the material set forth in Part II and in pages 89-102 of Part IV. The Committee can advise without qualification that communications intelligence has been in the past, and still is, of vital importance to the Government. There was a tendency on the part of certain witnesses from the three Services to emphasize that its primary importance is "military", and that the primary justification for our great COMINT effort should be to furnish the three Services with intelligence which is necessary in connection with the conduct of a war and in preparing to meet attack if a war starts. When one considers the fact that in the past most of the spectacular examples of its success have been directly connected with our military effort, this view is not surprising. On the other hand, there is no question in the Committee's mind that at this stage of our country's history communications intelligence is also of primary importance to the successful operations of certain of the civilian agencies particularly the State Department, the Central Intelligence Agency and the Federal

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Bureau of Investigation. These civilian agencies today play a vital part in the national security of the United States, and it is apparent to us that COMINT has an essential part in our entire effort to protect that security and not only in that large part of the effort which is the direct responsibility of the Military Services. This principle should govern our COMINT organization to a greater extent in the future than it has in the past.

Information obtained through COMINT is of importance in a number of ways, but it is not too much of an oversimplification to divide its importance into two main categories. The first of these relates to the direct support of our military units in the field through communications intelligence pertaining to order-of-battle, movements of the enemy, enemy plans and intentions, and so forth. The second includes the longer-range military information, and intelligence relating to diplomatic, political, economic and scientific matters. While the two interlock, the former is unquestionably of primary importance to the Services and is indispensable to them. The latter is of importance to the Services and the civilian agencies alike. The two-fold characteristic of the finished product is the source of one of the difficulties in the organization of a central communications intelligence effort. The difficulty is compounded by the fact that, although it is possible to separate to the extent indicated the use of the finished product, it is not at all possible to segregate to an equal extent the functions of collecting and processing the material which is the

source of the information. Some information in the first category can be obtained directly at a forward intercept station. Other such information, very probably of even greater importance, can be obtained only by compiling at AFSA itself all the bits and pieces derived from all COMINT sources, and by using the complicated cryptanalytic machinery located at AFSA. This is but one of the factors that leads us to the conclusion that COMINT is a national responsibility (as distinct from the responsibility of any particular Service, department or agency) and that as a consequence the activity must be so managed and organized as to exploit all available intelligence resources in the participating departments and agencies in order to obtain the optimum results for each and for the Government as a whole.

Our conclusions as to the importance of the COMINT effort are not weakened by the fact

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(b)(3)-18 USC 798
(b)(3)-P.L. 86-36

If an active and

efficient COMINT organization is maintained, it may at any moment reward us with more satisfactory results.

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(b)(3)-P.L. 86-36

Because our enemies are today much better informed, perhaps because of our own disclosures, of the importance of communications intelligence to this Government, we may never see a return of the great successes and victories attributable to COMINT during the course of World War II. Nevertheless, the art is one which will be of such importance to the defense of our country in the foreseeable future that we must maintain our efforts aggressively and efficiently so that (1) we may employ this source of intelligence during the present critical period and (2) we will have in existence a skilled organization that can furnish the communications intelligence that will be of even greater importance in the event of a general war.

The Organization of Communications Intelligence Activities

The second of the two general subjects which our Committee was requested to survey relates to the organization of the Government's communications intelligence activities. This organizational problem has been by far the most difficult part of the Committee's assignment.

The 1949 reorganization and the creation of AFSA was a compromise. It did not bring into one organization all of the functions which at the time were being performed separately by the Army and the Navy and which the Air Force was beginning to put into operation for itself. The two previous COMINT organizations were each vertically organized, each largely self-sufficient, and each relied on "coordination" and "liaison" for reduction of duplication. Since 1949 we have had four COMINT organizations; besides AFSA itself, each of the three Services has its own, ASA (Army), CSA (Navy), AFSS (Air Force). As explained in Parts III and IV of this Report, each of these three is independent, each is subject to the command control of its particular Service and performs certain functions for that Service, and each collects COMINT traffic and furnishes it to AFSA, receiving in return finished material from AFSA. Each of the Service units processes certain categories of the material which it collects, and distributes the results both downward to its own field commands and upward to AFSA. AFSA is dependent on the Service units for all of its direct interception of COMINT [redacted] and on Service communications agencies for all of its communication channels. However, none of the three Service units is subject to AFSA control, except for the intercept positions placed under AFSA's "operational direction" by negotiated agreements, and AFSA has no power to compel elimination of duplication between them, or to

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restrain them from engaging in activities that could better be centralized in AFSA itself, or to observe interception priorities established by AFSA.

Stated as baldly as this, it may appear that the creation of AFSA was a step backward. As a practical matter, however, it was preferable to the only two alternatives that were considered at the time.

The first of these would have been the creation or continuance of a complete COMINT organization for each of the three Services, and conceivably a fourth to serve the civilian agencies. Obviously this would have been ridiculous duplication, and undesirable for many reasons in addition to the extravagant expense that would have been involved. Although at the time such separate setups were urged by the Navy and the Air Force, the Committee has been told that today none of the Services or agencies would recommend this plan.

The second alternative would have been to concentrate in AFSA all COMINT activities, top to bottom, of all the Services and civilian agencies. This in general is the plan that has been utilized successfully by the British Government for a number of years. Ninety-five percent of the intercept capability of the British effort is under the control of ~~General~~ Communications Headquarters (GCHQ), which heads up to the Foreign Office. GCHQ does not follow the policy of disseminating its total product in bulk to all of its consumers, but processes the raw material and distributes a relatively finished

COMINT product in accordance with its general knowledge of the needs of the given consumer and the detailed advice of liaison officers from the consuming agencies. The personnel engaged in the entire effort, even at the intercept stations in the field, are for the most part civilian. The British Services have long accepted and cooperated with this type of organization, which in their case has apparently proved successful.*

Centralization to this extent would not be practical in the case of the United States at this time. As has been explained at length in earlier parts of this Report, our organizations for COMINT in the field are [redacted] manned and operated by the three Service COMINT units. In addition, the essential communications networks are integral parts of the military organizations. While as indicated below we believe that AFSA should be given authority to determine the scope of the activity of these Service units, and to control them in certain other respects, we would not go so far as to recommend that they be incorporated organizationally into AFSA itself.

Although we feel that the organization created in 1949 was preferable to these alternatives, we have concluded, on the basis of all the testimony presented

* The Committee obtained helpful and interesting testimony from the leading British expert in the COMINT field, Sir Edward Travis (Director, Government Communications Headquarters), who made a special trip to the United States in response to the Committee's invitation, and also from General Kenneth Strong (Director, Joint Intelligence Bureau).

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to us, that the experience of the past two years has demonstrated that the 1949 reorganization should be regarded as a first step, and that a point has now been reached which makes it essential to carry it further. We believe that a more effective centralization of certain of the COMINT activities, brought about by a strengthening of AFSA itself and an increase in its authority over the Service COMINT units, will increase its effectiveness and correct deficiencies which have become apparent since 1949. Before turning to the organizational changes that we wish to suggest, it is appropriate to enumerate certain of the reasons which prompt them.

1. The COMINT effort of the Government today has too many of the aspects of a loose combination of the previous military organizations and too few of a true unification of the COMINT activities of all the interested departments and agencies. This is easily understood when one considers the historical development, but does not justify the continuation of the present setup. It is not well suited in this intensely specialized field to the elimination of duplications, the intense concentration of available funds and the flexible assignment of resources to the solution of a problem that must be treated as a whole. AFSA must be the keystone. The success or failure of the national effort depends on AFSA's strength or weakness. And today its success is of vital importance to every department and agency

participating in the national defense.

2. In theory the Joint Chiefs of Staff exercise direction over AFSA. In practice this direction is taken over almost entirely by their agency AFSAC, which is an interservice committee acting under the rule of unanimity. Its members devote much of their time in frustrating detail to safeguarding individual Service autonomies. The Director of AFSA is obliged to spend much of his energy on cajolery, negotiation and compromise in an atmosphere of interservice competition. He has no degree of control, except by making use of such techniques, over the three COMINT units operated by the Services. In fact, he is <u>under</u> the control of the three Service units, through their representation on AFSAC. His only appeal is to the same three Services sitting as the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

3. These difficulties have not been corrected by USCIB. As shown in some detail in Part III of this Report, its charter powers are vague and its jurisdiction is limited, and it has itself no authority to exercise policy direction or control. Despite this, the Committee feels that, if USCIB had from its inception been more aggressive and alert, it could have made its weight felt in bringing about needed reforms.

4. Inside AFSA itself the organization reflects the comments made above. By direction of the Joint Chiefs the Director has a two-year term,

and the position is rotated among the Services. He is required to have a deputy from each Service. There is inadequate attention to the development of career officers and inadequate opportunity for that advancement of civilians which is necessary to the building up of a strong and permanent civilian staff. The increasing complexity of the task before AFSA demands the continuity which will result if more of its key personnel are career experts.

5. The evidence shows that as a result of all these factors, AFSA has had a high turnover of personnel, has lost too many valuable men, and its general morale has been low. Presumably these are among the conditions that prompted the appointment of this Committee. The Committee found no evidence that they are due to the lack of effort of the present Director or of his predecessor. The major difficulties stem from the current organizational structure. Lack of success in certain important fields is undoubtedly due in part to the extreme difficulty of the problems that exist today as compared with those of World War II, but qualified witnesses have convinced the Committee that there is sufficient hope of their eventual solution to justify a major effort to correct the situation we have described. This effort will not be effective without a further reorganization of the COMINT structure.

Our recommendations on the subject of organization logically fall into three categories: (1) the organization below the AFSA level; (2) the organization within AFSA itself; and (3) the organization above the AFSA level.

Recommendations as to changes in the organization below the AFSA level.

The Committee suspects that the present ASA, CSA and AFSS have grown to greater proportions, and have assumed more autonomous functions, than was intended by Secretary Johnson's 1949 directive which created AFSA. It is hard to avoid the conclusion that the three Services, instead of exerting themselves to the greatest extent possible to bring about a maximum unification of COMINT activities in a strong AFSA, have put their emphasis on developing their own COMINT units at least to the limit permitted by the Secretary's directive and have relegated a minimum of functions of common concern to an AFSA organization that for all practical purposes was kept subject to their joint control. We believe that in order best to exploit the available resources in all departments and agencies, to obtain the proper coordination of the three Service units into the national COMINT structure, and to insure the elimination of unnecessary duplication, it is essential that AFSA be given a substantial degree of authority over those three organizations. At present the Director can theoretically exercise control by obtaining action through the Joint Chiefs of Staff, which in practice means persuading AFSAC -- really the three Services themselves -- to take the action he desires. This is not effective.

With very few exceptions, all of the witnesses who appeared before the Committee agreed that the authority and power of the Director of AFSA should be increased. This was true whether the particular individual came from one of the Services, or one of the interested civilian agencies, or AFSA itself. The only difference bore on the extent to which this increase should go.

We recommend that the mission of AFSA should be defined by Presidential Memorandum (referred to more specifically below), which should state that its function is to provide effective unified organization and control of the COMINT activities of the Government conducted against foreign governments, as these activities are defined in Public Law 513, and to provide for integrated operational policies and procedures pertaining thereto. This memorandum should provide that, subject to the top policy control described below, the Director of AFSA is responsible for accomplishing the mission of AFSA, and that for this purpose all COMINT collection and technical processing resources of the United States are placed under his operational control and technical control. This authority should not, however, affect the responsibility of other agencies and departments in respect of the evaluation and dissemination of the COMINT product received by each of them from AFSA, and their synthesis of that product with information available to them from other sources.

To the extent feasible and in consonance with the aims of maximum overall efficiency, economy, and effectiveness, the Director should centralize or

consolidate the performance of COMINT functions for which he is responsible. Although the Presidential Memorandum should make it clear that the Director has the authority to control all collection and processing of COMINT, it should also provide that where necessary for close support of forces in the field, operational control of COMINT activities necessary for such support are to be delegated by the Director, during such periods and for such tasks as are determined by him, to the appropriate unit.

There should be direct access and direct communication between the Director and any Government COMINT activity. The Director should be authorized to obtain such information and materials pertaining thereto as may be required by him.

The memorandum should further provide that the Director shall exercise such administrative control over COMINT activities as he finds essential to the effective performance of his mission. Otherwise, administrative control of personnel and facilities will remain with the departments and agencies providing them.

If the authority of AFSA and its Director is expanded in the manner above recommended, we will still have other units besides AFSA engaged in COMINT collecting and processing activities, but only to the extent that the Director determines that such separate operations should, in the overall national interest, be separately conducted. We appreciate that this will involve drawing a line between the powers to be employed by any one of the Services or a

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field commander and the functional director in Washington. However, the problem is by no means a new one in the Armed Services, and it has been solved in other fields, although any such solution necessarily involves sincere and intelligent cooperation between the commanders involved.

Recommendations as to organization within AFSA itself.

The Committee received much testimony from both military and civilian sources very critical of the situation that exists today within the AFSA organization. This criticism was directed against the present organizational structure of AFSA and not against the capability or efficiency of any individual occupying a responsible position.

At present the directorship of AFSA is rotated among the Services, each incumbent holding the position for two years. There was not a single individual whom the Committee questioned on this point who did not express the opinion that this term was too short. Recommendations varied from three years to an indefinite or "career" period. Everyone agreed that under the present setup it took a year for the Director to get his feet under him and that he really only became well trained to perform his difficult task shortly before his term of office expired. The Committee recommends strongly that AFSA should be administered by a director with a substantially longer term of office.

The witnesses differed in their opinion as to whether the director should

be an officer or a civilian. These differences by no means followed the status of the particular witnesses; one of our senior generals stated flatly that he should be a civilian, and some other officers said that they did not think it made great difference whether he was a civilian or not. The majority, both military and civilian, expressed the strong view that, rightly or wrongly, a civilian would have a harder road, and greater difficulties to overcome, unless by chance he was a retired officer with good military experience behind him. This question would of course depend in any particular case on the particular personality involved. The primary qualification which should determine the selection of the director is competence, and the thoroughly competent individual may be found in any field of endeavor. Nevertheless, on balance, the Committee feels that initially the position should be held by a career military officer on active or reactivated duty status, enjoying at least three-star rank during the period of his incumbency. He should be appointed preferably for a term of 6 years, but not less than 4 years. If, as things develop, it should ultimately appear that a civilian could better qualify for the position, it is strongly recommended that no sense of tradition or vested military interest be allowed to stand in the way of his appointment. If the director is an officer, he should have as his deputy a career civilian. The Director should be designated by the President on the nomination of the Secretary of Defense.

Below the directorate level, senior positions should be filled by individuals, whether officer or civilian, who have a career interest in the field of

communications intelligence. We do not believe that these positions should be limited to civilians, because we are impressed by the testimony given by many witnesses as to the importance of familiarizing the Service organizations in the field with AFSA organization and operations by rotating officers from AFSA into field positions and then back again. Also, the long experience of several Navy officers is one of the great assets of the activity today. On the other hand, it would be a major mistake to limit the senior positions to officers, because it is of the greatest importance to encourage civilians to make careers in the COMINT field by clear demonstration that senior positions will be available to them if their talents merit promotions.

We have been disturbed by the testimony as to the high rate of turnover among AFSA employees. This has been a tremendous handicap to the building up of an efficient organization, as well as a serious hazard from the point of view of security. One cause, emphasized by informed witnesses, appears to be that many of the civilian employees believe that no matter how long they work nor how expert they become, the top positions in the divisions will generally be filled by officer personnel of less experience and training than they. Another factor during the past year was undoubtedly the decision (subsequently cancelled) to move the entire AFSA establishment to Fort Knox.

To produce COMINT material requires as high a professional skill as any other applied science, and perhaps cryptanalysis and intelligence based

on cryptanalysis require longer training and experience than most other scientific fields. The COMINT agencies today are in poor position to compete for the people they need. They cannot offer comparable salaries; they cannot give the tangible rewards of public service such as the recognition of the community; they cannot offer the opportunity to acquire a skill usable in private life. We are not only not attracting capable young people in the numbers that are needed, but we are losing many that we have had in the past. Apparently there are only ten or fifteen top flight cryptanalysts left at Arlington Hall out of the much larger number who were in the COMINT effort during the War. In this connection, none of the so-called super-grades has been allocated to AFSA. Only under the present Director was application for such grades made; it is understood that the pending application is stalled today because all authorized super-grades have been allocated elsewhere in the Government.

The Committee cannot venture to prescribe methods of solving these personnel problems, except to emphasize what has been said as

to the importance of making careers in the Agency attractive and to recommend that a study should be made as to the desirability of increasing salaries paid to the key individuals. On the military side, a corresponding study should be initiated on the question of extending to the Army and to the Air Force the policy now in force in the Navy of making communications intelligence a career assignment, and of recognizing its importance by promotions to general or flag rank for those who achieve success in the field.

The Committee also adopts the recommendation made to it by SCAG (the Scientific Communications Advisory Group referred to more fully below) that the Director should have a civilian chief technical assistant who would have under him all research and development in the cryptanalytic field.

This research work requires the employment of expert career men to an even greater extent than other AFSA departments.

The Director should provide for increased participation by representatives of each of the agencies eligible to receive COMINT in those offices of AFSA where priorities of intercept and cryptanalysis are finally determined.

Recommendations as to organization above the AFSA level

The changes that should be made in the organization above the AFSA level present the single most difficult question that the Committee has encountered. As has been explained in detail, AFSA is now under the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The Joint Chiefs as a body pay little direct attention to the organization and leave its supervision almost entirely to their agent, AFSAC. Control of AFSA is thus under three bosses (the three Services represented in AFSAC), whose principal energies and loyalties are elsewhere, and to make matters worse, three bosses who must act by unanimous agreement.

The Committee believes that this situation is highly undesirable and that it is responsible for many of the handicaps under which AFSA is now operating. It also means that AFSA has been, for all practical purposes subject only to military control and policy guidance. It is true that USCIB exists, and that on it there are representatives of the State Department, CIA, and the FBI, as well as of the three Services. However, USCIB's actual powers, as pointed

out in Part III of this Report, are exceedingly limited.

We are more concerned over the fact that the present top level control of AFSA is in a three-headed group, each member of which often has in mind the interests of his own Service, than by the fact that the group is military. Although it is our opinion that the 1949 experiment whereby AFSA was placed under the Joint Chiefs of Staff should be terminated, we would not adopt the plan urged on us by some witnesses that, following the British precedent, it should be placed directly under a civilian agency, such as the Central Intelligence Agency. We reach this conclusion not so much on the theory that the COMINT product is more important to the Services than to the civilian agencies as because (1) the Services are practically the sole collectors and transmitters of the raw intercepted material, and (2) the product is used to so important an extent in combat activities in time of war as to dictate the desirability of preserving lines of command through established defense channels. We have received no convincing evidence that it is necessary to put AFSA outside the Defense establishment in order to assure that the needs of civilian agencies are properly taken care of.

If there were a Chief of Staff of the armed forces of the United States, the Committee might well have recommended placing AFSA under his jurisdiction. But there is no such position. We also explored the possibility of putting AFSA directly under the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, but

after discussion with the present incumbent of that office, we have been convinced that the arrangement would not be workable.

We have concluded that the problem should be resolved by the issuance of a Presidential memorandum designating the Department of Defense as the executive agent of the Government for the production and dissemination of COMINT for the benefit of the Services and the civilian agencies and departments and for the production, security and distribution of our own codes and cipher systems. This memorandum should further provide that the Department of Defense as such executive agent will be directly under and responsible to a Special Committee of the National Security Council for COMINT, which Special Committee should consist of the Secretary of Defense and the Secretary of State, and the President as circumstances may require.* The memorandum should instruct this Special Committee to prepare and issue implementing directives setting forth: (1) the terms of reference for the Secretary of Defense which will provide that the Director of AFSA shall report directly to him and which will define the mission of AFSA and the specific responsibilities of the Director of AFSA as outlined in the preceding subsections of this Part V, and (2) a charter for a reorganized USCIB (to which reorganized Board we hereafter refer for convenience as the COMINT Board) replacing NSCID No. 9,

* We are informed that in connection with matters pertaining to atomic energy, the National Security Council operates through a similar Special Committee consisting only of those members of the NSC who have primary interest in that particular subject. It would seem that this precedent can be satisfactorily followed in this case.

reconstituting the Board as a body acting for and under the Special Committee, and prescribing the Board's composition, general functions and responsibilities in the COMINT field. This will involve the abolition of AFSAC.

The following principles should apply to the jurisdiction of the COMINT Board as so reconstituted:

a. The COMINT Board shall be composed of the Director of Central Intelligence, who shall be the Chairman of the Board, a representative of the Secretary of Defense, a representative of the Secretary of State, the Director of the Armed Forces Security Agency, the Chairman of the Joint Intelligence Committee of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and a representative of the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation.

b. The Board shall have a staff headed by a full time civilian executive secretary designated by a majority of the Board.

c. It shall be the duty of the Board to advise and make recommendations to the Secretary of Defense in accordance with the following procedure with respect to any matter relating to communications intelligence which falls within the jurisdiction of the Director of AFSA:

(1) The Director of AFSA shall make reports from time to time to the Board, either orally or in writing as the Board may request, and shall bring to the attention of the Board, either in

such reports or otherwise, any new major policies or programs in advance of their adoption by him. In addition, he shall furnish to the Board such information as the Board may request with respect to the operations of AFSA.

(2) The Board shall reach its decisions by a majority of not less than four members. Each member of the Board shall be entitled to one vote.

(3) In the event that the Board votes and reaches a decision, any dissenting member of the Board may appeal from such decision within 7 days to the Special Committee. In the event that the Board votes but fails to reach a majority decision, any member of the Board may also appeal within 7 days to the Special Committee. In either event the Special Committee shall review the matter and its determination thereon shall be final.

(4) If any matter is voted on by the Board but (a) no decision is reached and any member files an appeal, or (b) a decision is reached in which the representative of the Secretary of Defense does not concur and the representative of the Secretary of Defense files an appeal, no action shall be taken with respect to the subject matter until the appeal is decided, provided that, if the Secretary of Defense determines, after consultation with the Secretary of

State, that the subject matter presents a problem of an emergency nature and requires immediate action, his decision shall govern pending the result of the appeal. In such an emergency situation the appeal may be taken directly to the President.

(5) Recommendations of the Board adopted in accordance with the foregoing procedure shall be binding on the Secretary of Defense. Except on matters which have been voted on by the Board, the Director of AFSA shall discharge his responsibilities in accordance with his own judgment subject to the direction of the Secretary of Defense.

e. It shall also be the duty of the Board as to matters not falling within the jurisdiction of AFSA: (1) to coordinate the communications intelligence activities of all departments and agencies authorized by Presidential Memorandum to participate therein; (2) to initiate, to formulate policies concerning, and to supervise all arrangements with foreign governments in the field of communications intelligence; and (3) to consider and make recommendations concerning policies relating to communications intelligence of common interest to the departments and agencies including security standards and practices, and, for this purpose, to investigate and study the standards and practices of such departments and agencies in utilizing and protecting COMINT information. Any recommendation of the Board with respect to the matters described in this paragraph e. shall be binding on all departments or agencies of the Government if it is adopted by the unanimous vote of the members of the

Board. Recommendations approved by a majority, but not all, of the members of the Board shall be transmitted by it to the Special Committee for such action as the Special Committee may see fit to take.

While it is believed that the above proposal is less complicated than the structure which now exists above AFSA, it is realized that it is more involved than one would desire. However, some complication is made necessary by two controlling but somewhat conflicting factors: (1) all of the interested Services and agencies should have a voice in determining AFSA policies and giving it guidance, and (2) in order to strengthen AFSA and make it a viable organization, it is necessary that for administrative purposes it be placed under a single Government department. The somewhat involved machinery for appeals to the Special Committee has been dictated as a result of our strong belief that the unanimity rule which now hampers USCIB should be eliminated for the new COMINT Board in matters pertaining to AFSA. We are

hopeful that this machinery will seldom be used, and that its mere existence will stimulate harmonious action. Of course, no machinery will work satisfactorily unless the several Services, departments and agencies bend every effort to cooperate in the common cause. It is imperative that lack of such cooperation be never allowed to weaken or dissipate our COMINT activities.

The Committee has ventured to prepare a draft Presidential Memorandum (annexed as Exhibit K) designed to carry into effect the major organizational changes which are recommended above. Although the preparation of such a memorandum is a technical matter and doubtless involves problems with which the Committee is not familiar, we submit the draft partly because it will further clarify the Committee's recommendations and partly because it may be of assistance, if you approve those recommendations, in putting them into effect. We point out, however, that the memorandum does not cover all of the recommendations contained in this Report.

The foregoing conclusions and recommendations are the Committee's reply to the specific questions included in our Directive. In the course of our survey, we have encountered a number of ancillary issues raised by various witnesses in addition to those discussed above. Examination of those additional issues has been relevant to the conclusions and recommendations, but we believe that their proper solution should be left for the revised COMINT Board. Brief discussions of three or four of them at this point, however, may serve to further support and illustrate the necessity for the reorganization recommended above, and record for the benefit of the new COMINT command the results of our investigation of those problems which should be of early concern in the work of the new organization.

The Security of Communications Intelligence

The current security measures and problems in the COMINT field have been discussed in Part IV. Suffice it to record here several basic principles and conclusions. The success of our COMINT effort has varied in the past, and will undoubtedly vary in the future, in direct proportion to the effectiveness of the security measures taken to protect it. During World War II our great successes were possible only because our enemies had little if any knowledge of what we were doing or the degree of our accomplishments. Our successes are smaller and fewer today, despite great advances in the art of cryptanalysis, partly because these security measures have been on occasion

intentionally abandoned (as in the case of the Pearl Harbor investigation) or not adequately protected.

We must assume that the Soviet Government is fully aware of the fact that we are striving to break its codes and read its messages. We have from time to time in the past made no secret of the fact that we have been active in this field, and furthermore, the 40,000-odd individuals (including the consumer agencies) engaged in the COMINT effort from all walks of life, and the high rate of turnover, creates a serious security risk. But this does not mean that security precautions can be eliminated; constant coordinated effort must be made to improve security. To be sure, we cannot keep from other governments the knowledge that we are in the business of trying to read their mail. We can, however, keep from them the extent of our effort and the success that we are having at any particular time. If by chance we should be so successful as to break some new code, there must be in existence effectively working security measures which will reduce to an absolute minimum the possibility that that fact will be disclosed.

At present each of the three Services and three civilian agencies making use of communications intelligence, and the Armed Forces Security Agency itself, individually handles security matters pertaining to its own personnel. Each agency is supposed to follow general rules laid down by the USCIB Security Committee, but each agency is free to apply these general rules to

concrete cases as it sees fit, without any supervision or checkup whatever. The Committee has not attempted to make a survey of the precautions which each of these groups is taking, and even if it were able to do so, it would not feel qualified to express an opinion as to their sufficiency. It does appear to us that the number of individuals "cleared" for the use of communications intelligence (as distinct from its collection and processing) is too large.

A second problem called to our attention has been the too widespread distribution of the AFSA product, in terms both of needless circulation of useless messages and of unnecessary multiplication of required copies of each message. This difficulty at least in part is inherent in the present system of intelligence processing outside the control of AFSA, which is commented on below.

While the Committee cannot attempt to lay down rules on the subject of security, it believes that the entire subject merits careful study and action by a central organization such as the new COMINT Board.

The Cryptanalytic Effort

We have seen that at the present time AFSA's efforts in certain important parts of the cryptanalytic field have not been crowned with success, to say the least. The subject is so sensitive that, if the Secretary of State and

the Secretary of Defense wish more detailed information on it, we would prefer to arrange to furnish it to them orally. However, we would submit in this Report our observations as to some of the possible causes.

The Committee had the benefit of an extensive conference with top cryptanalysts in AFSA and also with seven of the members of the Scientific Communications Advisory Group (SCAG). This latter group has been appointed by the Director of AFSA from among the leading civilian industrial experts in the field of the development and construction of the intensely complicated machinery which is today the backbone of the cryptanalytic effort. (The names and titles of these individuals appear in the list of witnesses annexed as Exhibit B). The Committee has also studied and discussed with the senior cryptanalytic consultant to the Director of AFSA a recent report made by SCAG to the Director on this subject. It is the opinion of the experts that there is reasonable hope of greater success, provided a greater and more efficient effort is made. This means the employment of a larger number of highly skilled personnel, and the expenditure of additional funds for machines. It also would require the development within AFSA, under civilian direction, of a strong research and development group.

Greater civilianization, according to SCAG, is absolutely necessary in that branch of AFSA which is charged with the conduct of technical research. Many scientists and mathematicians in recent years have felt the appeal of

the importance and mystery of the COMINT effort, only to draw away upon developing closer contact because they have felt it impossible or frustrating (whether rightly or wrongly makes little difference) to work within the military hierarchy. It is SCAG's contention that AFSA has, because of difficulties in contract relations and errors of judgment, so injured its reputation in scientific circles as to make both companies and individuals somewhat wary of doing business with it. The contention is based upon an alleged lack of rapport between the military and the civilian, particularly in the field of abstract science and its appurtenances. There is probably much to be said on both sides, but civilianization of COMINT's more abstruse technical activities would probably do much to provide a remedy.

In such a highly technical field the Committee can do no more than record these responsible opinions furnished to it. It is entirely possible that the results of a better organized effort will be negative, but if they were only in part successful, they would produce information of much greater importance than we are now obtaining through the expenditure of much larger amounts on the more orthodox sources.

There was some evidence that the day-in and day-out demands for COMINT information which we can now obtain have been so great as to compel the AFSA authorities to turn their energies in that direction, and to deter them from assigning more personnel to the longer-range cryptanalytical problems which

at best will not pay dividends for some time. The division of labor between these two fields, will, of course, always be a matter of judgment, and there could be no more important subject for continuing consideration by a top level group such as the COMINT Board which we have recommended.

The Size and Expense of the COMINT Effort

The Committee has furnished in the body of its Report a rough estimate of the number of individuals employed in our overall COMINT effort (approximately 32,500) and the overall expense (approximately [redacted] These figures do not include the manpower and expenses of the consumer agencies. As indicated in Part IV, these figures, particularly the dollar cost, are necessarily very general estimates because of the difficulty of making accurate determinations with respect to those engaged in the field. AFSA itself employs approximately 7500 people, and its estimated direct cost runs at present at about [redacted] leaving aside AFSA's share of indirect costs such as communications charges.

The Committee was in no way equipped and made no attempt to consider whether any part of this expenditure could be reduced without materially affecting the product, and in fact this subject fell completely outside our Directive. However, we have been impressed by the fact that the sums involved

[redacted]

(b)(1)
(b)(3)-50 USC 403
(b)(3)-18 USC 798
(b)(3)-P.L. 86-36

are very large, and that because of security factors they are necessarily not subject to any of the checks and balances that operate as effective controls in other Government departments and agencies, or to the restraining influence of Congressional investigations or public opinion. We must look to AFSA itself and to the three Services to insure that all expenditures are handled on as an efficient and an economical basis as is possible. This is a further compelling reason for insuring that AFSA management be stable, strong and highly responsible, and that there be a COMINT Board which has sufficient authority and ability to exercise a strong guiding hand in major policy matters.

/s/ [illegible] Chairman

/s/ [illegible]

/s/ [illegible]

/s/ [illegible]

EXHIBITS

~~THIS DOCUMENT CONTAINS CODE WORD MATERIAL~~

TS #62899

28 December 1951

Dear Sirs:

The President on December 13, 1951, directed the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defense, assisted by the Director of Central Intelligence, to have the Communications Intelligence activities of the Government surveyed, with the view of recommending any corrective measures that may be required to insure the most secure and effective conduct of such activities.

You are hereby appointed as a Committee to make a survey as hereinafter described and submit to the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defense proposed recommendations for their consideration.

In order to assist us in carrying out the directive of the President, it is desired that your Committee consider the following:

a. The legitimate Communications Intelligence needs of each governmental department and agency for the production of departmental intelligence, and of the Director of Central Intelligence for the production of national intelligence. Your Committee's consideration of such needs shall not be narrowly interpreted and shall include, without limitation, any and all aspects of the interception, transmission processing and production of useable Communications Intelligence information.

b. The allocation of responsibilities and authorities respecting Communications Intelligence activities that should be made to insure that such needs are satisfied most effectively, giving due regard to the requirements of security. Your Committee's consideration of this question shall include, without limitation, the extent to which responsibility for, and authority over, the interception and processing of Communications Intelligence information, or any other aspect of such activities, may and should be assigned for performance as a service of common concern, and to which department or agency such assignment should be made.

Your Committee may establish such methods of procedure, consistent with existing Communications Intelligence security regulations, as it may deem fit. Your Committee is authorized to employ such staff as it may require, and you may apply to the Director of Central Intelligence for the clearance and indoctrination of such persons not presently cleared and indoctrinated for Special Intelligence as may be required to assist your Committee.

Your Committee is hereby authorized to request all departments and agencies conducting Communications Intelligence activities for the Government to make available to your Committee and its staff any and all persons and papers from which information relevant to the above-described survey can be obtained.

/s/ Robert A. Lovett
Robert A. Lovett
Secretary of Defense

/s/ Dean G. Acheson
Dean G. Acheson
Secretary of State

Mr. George Brownell
Mr. Charles Bohlen
Brig. General John Magruder, Retired
Mr. William H. Jackson

LIST OF PERSONS INTERVIEWED BY BROWNELL COMMITTEE AND DATES INTERVIEWED

Andrews, James D., Chief, Policy and Liaison Staff, Office of Current Intelligence, Central Intelligence Agency, 18 January 1952

Armstrong, W. Park, Jr., Special Assistant, Intelligence, Department of State, 5 January and 11 April 1952

Becker, Loftus, Deputy Director (Intelligence), Central Intelligence Agency, 9 February 1952

Belmont, Alan H., Assistant Director of the Domestic Intelligence Division, Federal Bureau of Investigation, 16 February 1952

Bernier, Colonel Donald, Operations Officer, Army Security Agency, 16 February 1952

Bolling, Major General Alexander R., Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, U. S. Army, 2 February 1952

Bradley, General of the Army Omar N., Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 11 April 1952

Cabell, Major General Charles P., USAF, Director, The Joint Staff, 24 January 1952

Canine, Major General Ralph J., Director, Armed Forces Security Agency, 5 January and 22 February 1952

Chadwell, Dr. H. Marshall, Assistant Director for Scientific Intelligence, Central Intelligence Agency, 18 January 1952

Clark, Ralph L., Deputy Assistant Director for Scientific Intelligence, Central Intelligence Agency, 18 January 1952

Clarke, Brigadier General Carter W., Osaka, Japan, formerly Chief of Army Security Agency, and Deputy G-2, U. S. Army 8 March 1952

Collins, Charles P., Senior Staff Officer, Office of Current Intelligence, Central Intelligence Agency, 18 January 1952

Davitt, Colonel William J., USAF, 24 January 1952

Donchez, S. J., Chief, Special Support Division, Office of Current Intelligence, Central Intelligence Agency, 2 February 1952

Douglass, Kingman, Assistant Director for Current Intelligence, Central Intelligence Agency, 11 January and 18 January 1952

Duff, Major General Robinson E., Chief of Army Security Agency, 16 February 1952

Engstrom, Howard T., Engineering Research Associates, (The Special Communications Advisory Group), 8 February 1952

Friedman, Wm. F., Consultant to the Director of the Armed Forces Security Agency, 22 February and 4 April 1952

Goulett, Captain W. B., USN, Acting Director of Naval Communications, 24 January 1952

Holtwick, Captain J. S., Jr., USN, Office of Operations, AFSA-02, 11 January 1952

Howard, John H., Burroughs Adding Machine Co., (The Special Communications Advisory Group) 8 February 1952 (SCAG)

Johnson, Rear Admiral Felix L., USN, Director of Naval Intelligence, 24 January 1952

Johnson, Colonel Hugh, Chief of Staff, Army Security Agency, 16 February 1952

Keay, Victor P., Chief of the Liaison Section, Federal Bureau of Investigation, 16 February 1952

Leva, Marx, formerly Assistant Secretary of Defense for Legal and Legislative Affairs, 29 February 1952

Lynn, Brigadier General Roy H., Commanding General of Air Force Security Service, 15 February 1952

Mason, Captain Redfield, USN, formerly head of AFSA-02, 4 April 1952

McMahan, Knight, Chief, Intelligence Staff, Office of Current Intelligence, Central Intelligence Agency, 18 January 1952

McNarney, General Joseph T., Office of the Secretary of Defense, 24 January 1952

McPherson, John C., International Business Machines, (The Special Communications Advisory Group) 8 February 1952

Millikan, Dr. Max, Assistant Director for Research and Reports, Central Intelligence Agency, 18 January 1952

Packard, R. F., Special Projects Staff, Department of State, 5 January and 11 April 1952

Polyzoides, T. A., Special Projects Staff, Department of State, 5 January and 11 April 1952

Potter, Ralph K., Bell Telephone Laboratories, (The Special Communications Advisory Group) 8 February 1952

Robertson, H. P., Weapons Systems Evaluation Group, (The Special Communications Advisory Group) 8 February 1952

Rowlett, Frank B., formerly Technical Director of the Armed Forces Security Agency, AFSA-02, 9 February and 15 February 1952

Samford, Major General John A., Director of Intelligence, U. S. Air Force, 9 February 1952

Smith, General Walter B., U. S. Army, Director of Central Intelligence, 2 February 1952

Speakman, Edwin A., Research and Development Board, (The Special Communications Advisory Group) 8 February 1952

Travis, Sir Edward, K.C.M.G., Director of the British Communications Intelligence effort, (~~General~~ GPO/T Communications Hqs.) 4 April 1952

Weckerling, Brigadier General John, Deputy Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, U. S. Army, 2 February 1952

Wenger, Rear Admiral J. N., USN, Deputy Director of the Armed Forces Security Agency, 8 March 1952

(Prepared 14 April 1952)

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Commission (p. 1)

[illegible] Chairman

[illegible] E. [illegible] State

[illegible] Secretary of Defense

[illegible] USA (Ret.)

[illegible]

Commission Staff (p. 12)

[illegible]

[illegible] N. [illegible]

[illegible] D[illegible]

[illegible] C. [illegible]

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL INTELLIGENCE DIRECTIVE NO. 9

COMMUNICATIONS INTELLIGENCE

Pursuant to the provisions of Section 101 and Section 102 of the National Security Act of 1947, as amended, the National Security Council hereby authorizes and directs that:

1. There is hereby established under the National Security Council the United States Communications Intelligence Board (hereinafter referred to as the "Board") to effect the authoritative coordination of Communications Intelligence activities of the Government and to advise the Director of Central Intelligence in those matters in the field of Communications Intelligence for which he is responsible.

2. The Board will be composed of not to exceed two members from each of the following departments or agencies: The Departments of State, the Army, the Navy, and the Air Force, and the Central Intelligence Agency, and the Federal Bureau of Investigation. Only those departments or agencies designated by the President are authorized to engage in Communications Intelligence activities.

3. The Board members will be vested with authority to represent their respective departments or agencies in the field of Communications Intelligence and each member department or agency will be represented at each meeting by at least one member, or alternate, with the necessary powers to act.

4. Decisions of the Board will be based on the principle of unanimity, which shall be a prerequisite for matters within the purview of the Board, except that the Chairman shall be elected by majority vote. When decision cannot be reached, the Board will promptly refer the matter for resolution to the National Security Council; provided that, when unanimity is not obtained among the military department heads of the Department of Defense, the Board shall present the problem to the Secretary of Defense before presenting it to the National Security Council.

5. Decisions and policies promulgated by the Board within the scope of its jurisdiction shall be applicable to all departments and agencies represented on or subordinate to the National Security Council and any others designated by the President, and shall be implemented by those departments and agencies of which action is required.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

6. The special nature of Communications Intelligence activities requires that they be treated in all respects as being outside the framework of other or general intelligence activities. Orders, directives, policies, or recommendations of any authority of the Executive Branch relating to the collection, production, security, handling, dissemination, or utilization of intelligence, and/or classified material, shall not be applicable to Communications Intelligence activities, unless specifically so stated and issued by competent departmental or agency authority represented on the Board.

7. The Board shall act for the National Security Council to insure proper and full implementation of Council directives by issuing such supplementary directives as may be required. Such implementing directives in which the Board concurs unanimously shall be issued to and implemented by the member departments and agencies. When disagreement arises in the Board upon such directive, the proposed directive, together with statement of non-concurrence, shall be forwarded to the National Security Council for decision as provided in paragraph 4.

8. Other National Security Council Intelligence Directives to the Director of Central Intelligence and related implementing directives issued by the Director of Central Intelligence shall be construed as non-applicable to Communications Intelligence activities under the authority of paragraph 6 above, unless the National Security Council has made its directive specifically applicable to Communications Intelligence.

9. The Board will perform such functions as may be required to accomplish its objective set forth in paragraph 1 above, and in the exercise of responsibilities and authority delegated to it by the National Security Council in this directive.

10. The Board shall leave the internal administration and operation of Communications Intelligence activities to the member departments or agencies.

11. All currently effective decisions, policies, and operating arrangements of the Board and its predecessors, the Army-Navy Communications Intelligence Board, and the State-Army-Navy Communications Intelligence Board, as previously constituted, which are not in conflict with this directive, will remain in full force and effect unless changed by subsequent decisions of the Board.

12. Definitions. For purposes of this directive the following definitions apply:

a. "Foreign communications" include all telecommunications and related materials (except Foreign Press and Propaganda Broadcasts) of the government

and/or their nationals or of any military, air, or naval force, faction, party, department, agency, or bureau of a foreign country, or of any person or persons acting or purporting to act therefor; they shall include all other telecommunications and related material of, to, and from a foreign country which may contain information of military, political, scientific or economic value.

b. "Communications Intelligence" is intelligence produced by the study of foreign communications. Intelligence based in whole or in part on Communications Intelligence sources shall be considered Communications Intelligence as pertains to the authority and responsibility of the United States Communications Intelligence Board.

c. "Communications Intelligence Activities" comprise all processes involved in the collection, for intelligence purposes, of foreign communications, the production of information from such communications, the dissemination of that information, and the control of the protection of that information and the security of its sources.

~~TOP SECRET~~
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~~SECURITY INFORMATION~~

~~TOP SECRET~~ (FOR MR. DEWEY'S EYES ONLY)

25 September, 1944

My Dear Governor:

I am writing you without the knowledge of any other person except Admiral King (who concurs) because we are approaching a grave dilemma in the political reactions of Congress regarding Pearl Harbor.

What I have to tell you below is of such a highly secret nature that I feel compelled to ask you either to accept it on the basis of your not communicating its contents to any other person and returning this letter or not reading any further and returning the letter to the bearer.

I should have preferred to talk to you in person but I could not devise a method that would not be subject to press and radio reactions as to why the Chief of Staff of the Army would be seeking an interview with you at this particular moment. Therefore, I have turned to the method of this letter, to be delivered by hand to you by Col. Carter Clarke who has charge of the most secret documents of the War and Navy Departments.

In brief, the military dilemma resulting from Congressional political battles of the political campaign is this:

The most vital evidence in the Pearl Harbor matter consists of our intercepts of the Japanese diplomatic communications. Over a period of years our cryptograph people analyzed the character of the machine the Japanese are using for encoding their diplomatic messages. Based on this, a corresponding machine was built by us which deciphers their messages.

Therefore, we possessed a wealth of information regarding their moves in the Pacific which in turn was furnished the State Department--rather than, as is popularly supposed, the State Department providing us with the information-- but which unfortunately made no reference whatever to intentions toward Hawaii until the last message before Dec. 7, which did not reach our hands until the following day, Dec. 8.

Now the point to the present dilemma is that we have gone ahead with this business of deciphering their codes until we possess other codes, German as well as Japanese, but our main basis of information regarding Hitler's intentions in Europe is obtained from Baron Oshima's messages from Berlin reporting his interviews with Hitler and other officials to the Japanese Government. These are still in the codes involved in the Pearl Harbor events.

To explain further the critical nature of this set-up which would be wiped out almost in an instant if the least suspicion were aroused regarding it, the Battle of the Coral Sea was based in deciphered messages and therefore our few ships were in the right place at the right time. Further, we were able to concentrate on our limited forces to meet their advances on Midway when otherwise we almost certainly would have been some 3,000 miles out of place.

~~TOP SECRET~~
~~SECURITY INFORMATION~~

We had full information of the strength of their forces in that advance and also of the smaller force directed against the Aleutians which finally landed troops on Attu and Kiska.

Operations in the Pacific are largely guided by the information we obtain of Japanese deployments. We know their strength in various garrisons, the rations and other stores continuing available to them, and what is of vast importance, we check their fleet movements and the movements of their convoys.

The heavy losses reported from time to time which they sustain by reason of our submarine action largely results from the fact that we know the sailing dates and the routes of their convoys and can notify our submarines to lie in wait at the proper point.

The current raids by Admiral Halsey's carrier forces on Japanese shipping in Manila Bay and elsewhere were largely based in timing on the known movements of Japanese convoys, two of which were caught, as anticipated, in his destructive attacks.

You will understand from the foregoing the utter tragic consequences if the present political debates regarding Pearl Harbor disclose to the enemy, German or Jap, any suspicion of the vital sources of information we now possess.

The Roberts' report on Pearl Harbor had to have withdrawn from it all reference to this highly secret matter, therefore in portions it necessarily appeared incomplete. The same reason which dictated that course is even more important today because our sources have been greatly elaborated.

As a further example of the delicacy of the situation, some of Donovan's people (the OSS), without telling us, instituted a secret search of the Japanese Embassy offices in Portugal. As a result the entire military attache Japanese code all over the world was changed, and though this occurred over a year ago, we have not yet been able to break the new code and have thus lost this invaluable source of information, particularly regarding the European situation.

A recent speech in Congress by Representative Harness would clearly suggest to the Japanese that we have been reading their codes, though Mr. Harness and the American public would probably not draw any such conclusion.

The conduct of General Eisenhower's campaign and of all operations in the Pacific are closely related in conception and timing to the information we secretly

obtain through these intercepted codes. They contribute greatly to the victory and tremendously to the savings of American lives, both in the conduct of current operations and in looking toward the early termination of the war.

I am presenting this matter to you, for your secret information, in the hope that you will see your way clear to avoid the tragic results with which we are now threatened in the present political campaign. I might add that the recent action of Congress in requiring Army and Navy investigations for action before certain dates has compelled me to bring back the corps commander, General Gerow, whose troops are fighting at Trier, to testify here while the Germans are counter-attacking his forces there. This, however, is a very minor matter compared to the loss of our code information.

Please return this letter by bearer. I will hold it in my secret file subject to your reference should you so desire.

Faithfully yours,

G. C. MARSHALL

1 October 1951

(b)(1)
(b)(3)-50 USC 403
(b)(3)-18 USC 798
(b)(3)-18 USC 798

(b)(1)
(b)(3)-50 USC 403
(b)(3)-18 USC 798
(b)(3)-P.L. 86-36

CITATION FOR 1ST RADIO SQUADRON, MOBILE FOR AWARD OF MERITORIOUS UNIT COMMENDATION IN DEPARTMENT OF AIR FORCE GENERAL ORDER 64 OF 11 OCTOBER 1951

During the period 26 November 1950 through 18 July 1951, the 1st Radio Squadron, Mobile, has made outstanding contributions to all services of United Nations Forces engaged in the Korean conflict. Among the continuous contributions provided over the period cited are the detailed disposition of enemy ground units and the exact locations of various enemy headquarters, the routes and schedules of enemy supply trains, together with their daylight hiding places and the nature of their loads, the proposed flight plans of enemy air reconnaissance including numbers and types of aircraft involved and times of take-off, the specific locations of fuel storage dumps under construction and those currently operational, the enemy's own evaluation of UN bomb damage to his airfields, bridges, supply dumps and other installations, and detailed reports of their state of repair, the enemy's plans of attack on all sectors of the front, the enemy air capabilities, intentions and plans of attack, and a Yoke service to the UN Tactical Air Controller which gives the Controller a running and instantaneous account of MIG-15 operations, including take-offs, numbers of aircraft involved, altitudes, headings, locations, and often what specific UN flights are the targets of the enemy aircraft. In addition, the 1st Radio Squadron, Mobile, is breaking complex enemy weather codes and furnishing theater and 5th Air Force weather service with over [redacted] enemy weather messages a month on an immediate basis, providing Chinese and Russian weather from the South China Sea to the Kamchatka Peninsula not obtainable from any other source which has been an invaluable prerequisite of successful air operations in Korea. The above-mentioned contributions were all performed in addition to the 1st Radio Squadron, Mobile's routine mission of determining the working of the Chinese and Russian air signal communications networks, the location and determination of airfield facilities and navigational aids, and the strength, disposition and state of readiness of Chinese and Russian navigational and tactical air units.

Specific accomplishments, considered of extraordinary value to the mission of UN Forces in Korea and in at least two cases to the vital interests of the United States, were the advance notification to UN Forces that the enemy was aware of UN plans to attack Anju and Chinampo, as well as his plans to counter the projected attacks, the advance warning of the enemy's intent to bomb American troops on hill 872 near Tuk Son, a complete inventory of the Chun Chon main depot, the location of the enemy Combined Headquarters at Mukden and movement of his Air Defense Headquarters to Peking, advance warning of the exact times and intentions of the enemy air attack on Sinmido Island on 19 June 1951 which resulted in severe reverses for the enemy, the provision of advance information of enemy troop dispositions, strength, times and places of intended attacks

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during the 14 December to 20 December 1950 evacuation of the Ham Hung beachhead, the first positive indication that the nationality of the MIG-15 pilots was Russian, thus fulfilling the top priority intelligence requirement of USAF at the time and answering a question of the highest international import, and, finally, the breaking of the

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The contributions of the 1st Radio Squadron, Mobile, in direct support of the UN combat effort in Korea have furnished the UN Forces and the Government of the United States with tactical and strategic intelligence, of incalculable value to the success of the UN mission and to the security of the United States, and have thereby reflected great credit on the unit and the Air Forces of the United States.

C O P Y

24 May 1949

A P P E N D I X

DIRECTIVE

ARMED FORCES SECURITY AGENCY (AFSA)

Pursuant to the authority vested in me by the National Security Act of 1947 (Public Law 253, 80th Congress), and in the interest of greater efficiency and economy, there is hereby established within the National Military Establishment, under the direction and control of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, a unified cryptologic organization to be known as the Armed Forces Security Agency (hereinafter referred to as "AFSA") which shall have the purpose, composition, authority and responsibilities hereinafter described.

1. Purpose

The Armed Forces Security Agency is established in order to provide for the placing under one authority the conduct of communication intelligence and communication security activities (hereinafter referred to as cryptologic activities) within the National Military Establishment, except those which are to be conducted individually by the Departments of the Army, Navy, and Air Force.

2. Composition

a. The AFSA shall consist of such facilities, units and military and civilian personnel of the armed forces which are or may be used for, or engaged in communication intelligence or communication security activities, including the Headquarters, Army Security Agency (ASA), Arlington, Virginia, the Communications Supplementary Activity (CSAW), Washington, and any comparable organizations of the Air Force, and such other facilities, units and personnel as the Joint Chiefs of Staff may

determine as necessary to fulfill the functions herein assigned.

b. A Flag or General Officer of the Army, Navy or Air Force will be appointed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, subject to the approval of the Secretary of Defense, as Director of the AFSA. His normal tour of duty shall be two years. The directorship shall be rotated among the Services.

c. An Armed Forces Communications Intelligence Advisory Council (AFCIAC) shall be established within the Armed Forces Security Agency. The Council shall consist of the Director of the Armed Forces Security Agency, who shall be chairman thereof, the Army, Navy, and Air Force members of the United States Communications Intelligence Board, and not to exceed one additional member from each of the services to be nominated by the respective Department Secretaries.

3. Responsibilities and Functions

a. Subject to the authority and direction of the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Chiefs of Staff will exercise direction, authority and control over the Armed Forces Security Agency.

b. The Armed Forces Communications Intelligence Advisory Council will:

(1) Recommend to the Joint Chiefs of Staff policies, operating plans, and doctrines for the production of communications intelligence which will insure the provision of:

(a) Authentic information for planners and policy makers within the National Military Establishment and other Governmental Agencies having membership on the United States Communication Intelligence Board; to apprise them of the realities of the international situation, war-making capabilities, vulnerabilities and intentions of foreign countries, and to eliminate the element of surprise from an act of aggression by another country.

(b) The unique information essential to the several services for the successful prosecution of war and vital to a shortening of the period of hostilities.

(2) Recommend to the Joint Chiefs of Staff policies, operating plans, and doctrines for communication security activities.

(3) Recommend to the Joint Chiefs of Staff the facilities, personnel, and fiscal and logistic support to be provided by the services to AFSA; such recommendations to be based on requirements as determined by the Director, AFSA.

(4) Determine and coordinate joint cryptologic military requirements.

(5) When unanimity cannot be reached substantive matters shall be referred to the Joint Chiefs of Staff for resolution, procedural matters shall be determined by the chairman.

(4) Formulation of policies for: (i) transmission security and communications cover and deception; (ii) cryptographic security; (iii) physical security of cryptologic material; (iiii) cryptologic countermeasures.

(5) Evaluation of violations of cryptologic security; determination of extent of compromise; and remedial action through appropriate channels.

(6) Investigation of the means employed for clandestine communications; and preparation, detection, and processing of secret inks, microphotographs, and open codes and ciphers.

(7) Liaison with appropriate departments and agencies, for the purpose of coordinating cryptologic equipment and procedures.

(8) Preparation, for review and approval by the Research and Development Board, of coordinated programs for research and development of cryptologic equipment under the cognizance of AFSA and, when approved, action to implement these programs.

(9) Preparation, for review and approval by the Munitions Board, of coordinated programs, including industrial mobilization planning, for the procurement of cryptologic equipment under the cognizance of AFSA and, when approved, action to implement those programs.

(10) Preparation of technical publications pertaining to subjects peculiar to AFSA.

(11) Preparation of technical training programs and establishment of training standards for AFSA personnel; provision of certain specialized training of personnel to meet the respective needs of the Army, Navy and Air Force.

(12) Establishment for units of the Armed Forces of a basis of issue of special items of crypto-equipment for which provision is not made in standard distribution lists.

(13) Technical supervision of all communication security activities of the armed forces.

(14) Provision of technical support to the Army, Navy, and Air Force in their conduct of cryptologic activities.

(15) Preparation of budgetary and other fiscal requirements of AFSA, coordination of such requirements with the participating services, and the presentation of such requirements to the Joint Chiefs of Staff through the AFCIAC. Such requirements for AFSA as may be approved by the Joint Chiefs of Staff will be included in the recommendation made by the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Secretary of Defense on budgetary matters.

d. The Departments of Army, Navy, and Air Force will:

(1) Take necessary action to facilitate the efficient and economical operation of AFSA, such action to include assignment of personnel and furnishing of facilities, equipment, and fiscal and logistic support. The respective

Secretaries are hereby authorized to issue such orders as may be necessary to effectuate the purposes of this directive.

(2) Provide fixed intercept installations as authorized by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Such installations will be manned and administered by the service providing them, but will be operationally directed by AFSA.

(3) Provide mobile intercept facilities required by the Army, Navy and Air Force respectively, which will be manned, administered, and operationally controlled by the individual service. They may also be used to perform special missions for AFSA as requested by the Director thereof.

(4) Provide communication facilities required by AFSA for joint use. The crypto-material utilized in such facilities will be furnished by AFSA and will be operated and maintained by the individual service.

(5) Normally assign military personnel to AFSA for a period of not less than thirty months, reserving the right to add, withdraw, or substitute personnel, within limitations of authorized personnel strength of AFSA, and subject to agreement by the Director, AFSA. In accordance with existing law, the administration of military personnel of the Army, Navy, and Air Force assigned to AFSA will be a responsibility of the Army, Navy, and Air Force, respectively.

(6) Continue to be responsible for all such cryptologic activities as are required by intra-service or joint needs (e.g., communication intelligence processing, intercept, research and development, training, etc.) and are determined by the Joint Chiefs of Staff not to be the sole responsibility of AFSA. They will at all times keep the Director, AFSA, fully informed concerning all such activities.

(7) Not undertake or continue cryptologic activities which are determined by the Joint Chiefs of Staff to be the sole responsibility of AFSA.

4. Implementation

a. The consolidation of those parts of several service agencies which will constitute the AFSA will be effected under the direction and control of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, with the minimum loss of continuing of operations. It shall be initiated not later than 1 July 1949 and completed not later than 1 January 1950. When the consolidation has been completed the Joint Chiefs of Staff will so inform the Secretary of Defense.

/s/ Louis Johnson

EXHIBIT I

The "CONSIDO" Problem

At the same time that the central AFSA was created, one very active school of thought believed that there should be an "intelligence" counterpart of AFSA charged with evaluation and dissemination of the COMINT product as opposed to mere collection and processing. It proposed the erection of an agency to be known as the "Consolidated Special Information Dissemination Office" (i.e., "CONSIDO") which would be composed of analysts of the various COMINT consuming agencies, reporting to a chief of CONSIDO, and which would have absolute control over those further aspects of the COMINT effort. The proposal, although worked out and presented in detail by its proponents, was abortive, but the germ of the idea is still very much alive today and is actively advocated, in modified form, by a considerable group of qualified COMINT officials.

The concept of entrusting to a centralized office the job of editing and interpreting communications intelligence has good precedent in the practices of the British COMINT effort. Since 1920, in which year the present GCHQ was organized under the Foreign Office, the British have combined in one compound and under one head both the production and the utilization of COMINT, and it has apparently worked out very well through the ensuing years. There is, however, an important difference between the British practice and the CONSIDO

scheme as it was originally put forth: the British merge both aspects of their effort, while CONSIDO was built on the principle that it be independent, vertical, and alongside the new and (presumably) consolidated processing plant with no gangways between other than a suitable pipeline for passing the undigested material from one to the other. The head of CONSIDO was to be a czar in his own right, from whose decisions there was almost no appeal. It was this that killed the plan, for consumers of COMINT, and especially the civilian consumers, would not listen to any scheme that robbed them of their sovereignty in the use to which they put their share of the product, or the assignments which they cared to give to their COMINT analysts, or the persons in their own establishments whom they considered eligible for COMINT clearance.

If CONSIDO had made its first appearance free of this element, its history might have been different. There are certain definite and undeniable advantages in the idea of centralized evaluation of the COMINT product. First, it has security advantages: it provides the means for a better control and more limited distribution of the product without necessarily impairing its usefulness -- it would drastically cut back, for example, the current practice of a monthly printing of some two million sheets of code-word paper to gratify the "minimum" demands of the customers. Second, it would result in a finished COMINT product into which all pertinent collateral is intermixed

from central collateral files to which all consuming agencies continuously and freely contribute, thus giving to each consumer the full advantage of national resources.

It is now conceded that any revival of the CONSIDO proposal would automatically entail one major change: CONSIDO would become a function of, and not a rival to, AFSA itself. It would not be a separate organization. It might thus bring in its train advantages other than those outlined in the preceding paragraph, such as resolution of the present dilemma surrounding the production of plain text, or the shortcomings of the compromise "beachhead" plan. The Committee believes that the proposal has sufficient merit to justify a recommendation that it be carefully reviewed by the new COMINT organization with the purpose of arriving at a decision either to dispose of it finally or to implement it in whatever form seems best in light of the experience of three years of operation that have intervened since it was first put forth.

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~~TOP SECRET SUEDE~~

SC 02067

15 March 1952

TO : USCIB Coordinator

SUBJECT: Current Intelligence Requirements List No. 21
(Effective 15 March - 14 April 1952)

1. The attached list has been prepared by the Intelligence Committee, USCIB, on the basis of statements of interest supplied by the recipients of communications intelligence information, as a guide for the procurement and processing of pertinent readable traffic in the joint field.

2. The list is arranged by geographical areas or countries, with items divided into three priority categories. All items with the same priority designation should be regarded as of equal importance and no significance should be attached to the order in which the major areas or the individual items in each priority category are listed.

a. Priority category A includes those individual subjects considered to be of greatest concern to US policy or security. It is requested that high priority be assigned to the procurement, processing and forwarding of pertinent material considered to be of significance.

b. Priority category B includes those individual subjects considered to be of high importance. It is requested that, to the extent possible, expeditious handling be accorded pertinent material considered to be of significance.

c. Priority category C includes those subjects considered to be of considerable interest but of lesser immediate concern.

3. This list is not designed to include all subjects of concern or interest to the intelligence agencies, nor does the position of a subject in priority category A or C preclude high priority handling of a pertinent item considered of especial significance. In the final analysis, the judgment of the processing agencies is relied upon for appropriate treatment of individual items pertinent to any subject, whether listed or not.

istribution:

Horace D. Neely, for

HORACE D. NEELY, Col., USAF
Chairman
USCIB Intelligence Committee

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CURRENT
INTELLIGENCE REQUIREMENTS

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EXHIBIT K

MEMORANDUM FOR: The Secretary of State and
The Secretary of Defense

The communications intelligence (COMINT) activities of the United States are a national responsibility. They must be so organized and managed as to exploit to the maximum the available resources in all participating agencies and to satisfy the legitimate intelligence requirements of all such agencies.

I therefore designate the Department of Defense as executive agent of the Government, for the production and dissemination of COMINT and the production and security of our own code and cipher systems.

I further designate the Secretaries of Defense and State as a Special Committee of the National Security Council for COMINT, to establish policies governing the above-mentioned activities, and to keep me advised of such policies through the Executive Secretary of the National Security Council.

I direct this Special Committee to prepare and issue directives which shall include the provisions set forth below and such other provisions as the Special Committee may determine to be necessary:

1. A directive to the United States Communications Intelligence Board (USCIB). This directive would replace the National Security Council Intelligence Directive No. 9, and should prescribe USCIB's new composition, responsibilities and procedures in the COMINT

field. This directive shall include the following provisions:

a. USCIB shall be reconstituted as a body acting for and under the Special Committee, and shall operate in accordance with the provisions of the new directive.

b. The Board shall be composed of the Director of Central Intelligence, who shall be the Chairman of the Board, a representative of the Secretary of Defense, a representative of the Secretary of State, the Director of the Armed Forces Security Agency, the Chairman of the Joint Intelligence Committee of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and a representative of the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation.

c. The Board shall have a staff headed by a civilian executive secretary designated by a majority of the full Board.

d. It shall be the duty of the Board to advise and make recommendations to the Secretary of Defense, in accordance with the following procedure, with respect to any matter relating to communications intelligence which falls within the jurisdiction of the Director of AFSA:

(1) The Director of AFSA shall make reports from time to time to the Board, either orally or in writing as the Board may request, and shall bring to the attention of the Board either in such reports or otherwise any new major policies or programs in advance of their adoption by him. In addition, he shall furnish

to the Board such information as the Board may request with respect to the operations of AFSA.

(2) The Board shall reach its decisions by a majority of not less than four members. Each member of the Board shall be entitled to one vote.

(3) In the event that the Board votes and reaches a decision, any dissenting member of the Board may appeal from such decision within 7 days to the Special Committee. In the event that the Board votes but fails to reach a majority decision, any member of the Board may also appeal within 7 days to the Special Committee. In either event the Special Committee shall review the matter, and its determination thereon shall be final.

(4) Appeals by the Director of AFSA and the Chairman of the Joint Intelligence Committee shall only be filed with the approval of the Secretary of Defense.

(5) If any matter is voted on by the Board but (a) no decision is reached and any member files an appeal, or (b) a decision is reached in which the representative of the Secretary of Defense does not concur and the representative of the Secretary of Defense files an appeal, no action shall be taken with respect to the subject matter until the appeal is decided, provided that if the Secretary of

Defense determines, after consultation with the Secretary of State, that the subject matter presents a problem of an emergency nature and requires immediate action his decision shall govern pending the result of the appeal. In such an emergency situation the appeal may be taken directly to the President.

(6) Recommendations of the Board adopted in accordance with the foregoing procedure shall be binding on the Secretary of Defense. Except on matters which have been voted on by the Board, the Director of AFSA shall discharge his responsibilities in accordance with his own judgment, subject to the direction of the Secretary of Defense.

e. It shall also be the duty of the Board as to matters not falling within the jurisdiction of AFSA:

(1) to coordinate the communications intelligence activities of all departments and agencies authorized by Presidential Memorandum to participate therein;

(2) to initiate, to formulate policies concerning, and to supervise all arrangements with foreign governments in the field of communications intelligence; and

(3) to consider and make recommendations concerning policies relating to communications intelligence of common interest to the

departments and agencies, including security standards and practices, and, for this purpose, to investigate and study the standards and practices of such departments and agencies in utilizing and protecting COMINT information.

Any recommendation of the Board with respect to the matters described in this para. e. shall be binding on all departments or agencies of the Government if it is adopted by the unanimous vote of the members of the Board. Recommendations approved by a majority, but not all, of the members of the Board shall be transmitted by it to the Special Committee for such action as the Special Committee may see fit to take.

f. The Board will meet monthly, or oftener at the call of the Chairman or any member, and shall determine its own procedures.

2. A directive to the Secretary of Defense. This directive shall include the following provisions:

a. The mission of AFSA shall be to provide an effective, unified organization and control of the communications intelligence (COMINT) activities of the U. S. conducted against foreign governments, to provide for integrated operational policies and procedures pertaining thereto, and to produce and protect this Government's codes and ciphers. As used in this para. 2 the term "communications intelligence" or

"COMINT" shall be construed to mean all procedures and methods used in the interception of communications and the obtaining of information from such communications by other than the intended recipients,* but shall exclude the evaluation and dissemination of such information, and its synthesis with information from other sources.

b. AFSA shall be administered by a director designated by the President, on the nomination of the Secretary of Defense, who shall serve for a minimum term of four years and who shall be eligible for reappointment. The director shall initially be a career military officer on active or reactivated duty status, and shall enjoy at least three-star rank during the period of his incumbency. He shall be under the direct authority of the Secretary of Defense.

c. Under the Secretary of Defense and in accordance with approved policies of USCIB the Director of AFSA shall be responsible for accomplishing the mission of AFSA. For this purpose all COMINT resources of the United States are placed under his operational control and technical control. Specific responsibilities of the Director of AFSA shall include the following:

(1) Formulating necessary operational plans and policies for the conduct of the U. S. COMINT activities.

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* See Public Law 513 - 81st Congress 1950.

(2) Conducting COMINT activities, including research and development, as required to meet the needs of the departments and agencies which are authorized to receive the products of COMINT. (This responsibility does not contravene the responsibilities of the departments and agencies in respect to the evaluation and dissemination of such products, and their synthesis with information from other sources.)

(3) Determining, and submitting to appropriate authorities, requirements for logistic support for the conduct of COMINT activities, together with specific recommendations as to what each of the responsible departments and agencies of the Government should supply.

(4) Within AFSA's field of authorized operations, prescribing requisite security regulations covering operating practices, transmission, handling and distribution of communications intelligence within the AFSA system; and exercising the necessary monitoring and supervisory control, including inspections if necessary, to ensure compliance with the regulations.

(5) Conducting all liaison on COMINT matters with foreign governmental communications intelligence agencies.

d. To the extent he deems feasible and in consonance with the aims of maximum overall efficiency, economy, and effectiveness,

the Director shall centralize or consolidate the performance of COMINT functions for which he is responsible. However, he shall have due regard for the close support requirements of the departments and agencies being served. Where necessary for close support, operational control of COMINT activities may be delegated by the Director, during such periods and for such tasks as are determined by him, to commanders of the forces supported or to other appropriate authorities.

e. There shall be direct access and direct communication between the Director and any elements of Service COMINT agencies or civilian agencies on COMINT matters. The Director is authorized to obtain such information and intelligence material from these agencies as may be required by him.

f. The Director shall exercise such administrative control over COMINT activities as he deems necessary to the effective performance of his mission. Otherwise, administrative control of personnel and facilities will remain with the departments and agencies providing them.

g. The Director shall make provision for participation by representatives of each of the departments and agencies eligible to receive COMINT in those offices of AFSA where priorities of intercept and

and processing are finally planned.

h. The Director shall have a civilian deputy whose primary responsibility shall be to ensure the mobilization and effective employment of the best available human and scientific resources in the field of cryptanalytical research and development.