

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Mr. Friedman
FROM : R. Adm. Wengly
SUBJECT:

DATE: 16 Apr 52

These papers may serve to clear up some misunderstandings that have arisen about the origin of 2010/6 and certain parts thereof.



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24 Jan 52

MEMORANDUM FOR GENERAL CANINE

SUBJECT: AFSAC

1. In considering the troubles that appear to beset AFSAC, much has been made over the alteration of the original concept of AFSAC which resulted from JCS 2010/6. It is alleged that whereas AFSAC (or rather its predecessor, AFGIAC) was originally established as purely an advisory body, JCS 2010/6 established it as a controlling authority over AFSAC. In view of the interest which the Brownell Committee appears to be taking in AFSAC and USCIB, I believe it may be advisable to clarify some of the misunderstanding that has arisen.

2. As stated in J.C.S. 2010/6, the present charter of AFSAC was prepared by the members of AFSAC "pursuant to the directive by the Secretary of Defense in the Appendix to JCS 2010." After a review of the original statement of the status and functions of AFSAC, as set forth in the latter document, it was concluded that:

- a. The anomalous position of AFSAC as an advisory council to the JCS within AFSAC should be clarified, and
- b. It was essential to create a more workable mechanism than JCS 2010 provided.

3. In creating AFSAC as a joint or unified organization, the Secretary of Defense had not designated an Executive Agent as in the case of other unified operations or activities. Moreover, the establishing directive did not provide an alternative means of delegating with respect to matters under jurisdiction of the JCS, any authority to make decisions, even on minor matters, nor any authority to implement such decisions, as was normally vested in an Executive Agent. In order to prevent the Director from being hamstrung by these omissions, it was concluded that arrangements should be made so that everything requiring authoritative decision at a level above DIRAFSA would not have to be referred to the JCS. The solution arrived at merely provided that when there was unanimous agreement in AFSAC on matters other than those of major policy the Director would be authorized to implement the agreement without reference to the JCS. This was considered to be reasonable since the Director normally had to obtain the implementing support from the Services, and the members of AFSAC were the individuals who would normally advise their respective Chiefs on such questions. In effect, this arrangement would merely permit obtaining consent for the necessary support at a subordinate level, thereby facilitating action. This concept is written into para 3a. of Enclosure "B" to JCS 2010/6.

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4. In connection with the foregoing, several provisions of the original directive were maintained for the Director's protection:

- a. He retained procedural decision on matters involving AFSAC;
- b. He remained Chairman of AFSAC with a vote which could not be overridden;
- c. He continued to have direct access to the JCS.

By virtue of these safeguards, it did not appear that the authority of DIRAFSA would be essentially affected. On the contrary, changes made were such as to improve his ability to exercise that authority.

J. N. WENGER
Rear Admiral, U. S. Navy
Deputy Director, Armed Forces Security Agency

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