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D R A F T~~SECRET~~USCIB DIRECTIVE NUMBER 12 (CIBD #12)

(Approved by USCIB on 6 - APR 1954 )

CONDUCT OF OVERT COMINT LIAISONWITHFOREIGN GOVERNMENTAL ACTIVITIESI. PURPOSE

1. The policy set forth herein is intended to provide a basis for the orderly conduct by the member Departments and Agencies of USCIB of overt COMINT liaison with foreign governmental activities.

II SCOPE

1. This directive will apply to overt COMINT liaison with governmental activities of the United Kingdom, Canada and Australia.

III DEFINITIONS

1. Foreign Governmental Activity - any official organ of a foreign government.

2. Governmental Communications Intelligence Agency - any governmental activity engaged primarily in the collection and processing of foreign communications for intelligence purposes.

3. COMINT Board - an official, governmental board or other council charged with the formulation of policy governing COMINT activities.

IV. GENERAL POLICY

1. The Board and each of its members have legitimate need for overt COMINT liaison in the foreign countries included within the scope of this directive.

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2. There will be no unilateral activity concerning communications intelligence in foreign countries. The general liaison policy governing the activities of all persons dealing with communications intelligence in foreign countries will be determined by USCIB.

3. To each foreign country included within the scope of this directive there shall be appointed a Senior U.S. Liaison Officer (hereinafter called the SUSLO) who shall be appointed by the Director, NSA with the approval of USCIB and who shall be accountable to the Director, NSA, for the fulfillment of his responsibilities.

4. In addition to whatever other credentials may be provided to him, the SUSLO shall be accredited from USCIB to the foreign COMINT Board having cognizance over COMINT policy in the country concerned. The SUSLO shall be responsible in the country of his accreditation for all U.S.-Foreign COMINT liaison falling under the jurisdiction of USCIB and the foreign COMINT Board to which such SUSLO is accredited as well as that liaison which concerns their respective governmental COMINT agencies.

5. All matters pertaining to the cooperation of the U.S. and the foreign COMINT activities concerned shall be conducted initially through the SUSLO, in accordance with the policy of USCIB, regardless of the echelon or organization within which such matters originate.

6. The channel through which members of USCIB express their requirements for the services of the SUSLO is through the Executive Secretary to the Director, NSA, except in the case of requirements

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originating with the Director, NSA, or elements of COMINT Agencies under his operational or technical control. In cases involving visits to foreign governmental COMINT Agencies, USCIB members will express their requirements directly to the Director, NSA.

7. The SUSLO and his facilities are under command of the Director, NSA. Therefore all matters referred to the SUSLO on behalf of the Board or any of its members will be handled through the command channels provided by the Director, NSA.

8. With regard to USCIB members other than NSA, there will be no extension of existing arrangements for liaison involving the dissemination of COMINT to foreign governmental activities without prior notification to the Board of such intent; nor may any member Department or Agency of USCIB refer to or provide the COMINT product of another such member Department or Agency to any foreign governmental activity without prior approval of the originating member Department or Agency.

9. In assigning responsibilities to SUSLOs, the Director, NSA will include for each (as appropriate) the following specific duties and responsibilities:

- a. To arrange for USCIB members to obtain freely such communications intelligence as may be required by them where such collection and exchange involves no conflict with USCIB policy.

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- b. To establish liaison channels as necessary for representatives of USCIB members abroad on temporary assignment.
- c. After liaison has been established in accordance with USCIB policy, to assist if required and within his capabilities, in facilitating direct contact between working groups on a continuing basis.
- d. In so far as practicable to inform U.S. citizens dealing with Communications Intelligence in the country to which he is accredited of the policy of USCIB with regard to their COMINT liaison activities.

10. With regard to U.S. citizens who are representatives of international commands such as SACEUR or SACLANT the initial contacts involving COMINT dealings with foreign governmental COMINT agencies will be arranged through the SUSLO who will thereafter be concerned only to the extent that his assistance may be required.

11. As the SUSLOs may be required at any time to vouch for the COMINT credentials of U.S. citizens serving in international commands, the USCIB member Department or Agency serving as executive or administrative agent for such command will keep SUSLOs advised via the Executive Secretary of the names and titles of those COMINT cleared U.S. citizens serving in international commands.

12. The Executive Secretary will make sure that the Director, National Security Agency is kept informed of the policy of USCIB on

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liaison matters and will in addition make suitable arrangements with the Director, National Security Agency to convey the requirements of USCIB and its members to the various SUSLOs in accordance with the policy set forth above.

13. The Director, National Security Agency and other members concerned will take appropriate action to make sure that the Executive Secretary is generally informed of the conduct of liaison on COMINT matters with foreign governmental activities. USCIB members will furnish the Executive Secretary with information copies of correspondence with the Director, National Security Agency arranging visits of U.S. personnel to foreign governmental COMINT Agencies.