This internal NSA report summarizes significant intelligence developments, arranged by area of occurrence, and operational developments of general interest. The material contained herein was selected from SIGINT, collateral and press received in the NSASCC between 220700Z - 260700Z November 1963.

CURRENT SIGINT READINESS STATUS

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INTELLIGENCE DEVELOPMENTS

CUBA

1. Cuban reaction to the assassination of President KENNEDY, as revealed in COMINT, reflected a state of alarm followed by a cautious correctness. Shortly after news of the assassination reached Cuba, military units in Province, possibly near were placed on an alert; units in the Eastern Naval District were ordered to be ready to repel aggression; and instructed Cuban not to make any statements. In an unprecedented move, ordered the link to the to stay open all night. Another message requested complete data on Lyndon JOHNSON, "including his political connections, etc." The following day originated a message urging a calm objective analysis of the facts and their possible consequences, stating that both the EISENHOWER and KENNEDY administrations had been guilty of economic aggression tending to cause economic ruin and hunger among the people. Nonetheless, the official Cuban statement issued on the 23rd, expressed "deep sorrow" at the news of the "tragic death" of the President. A message of the same date reported Havana to be calm but cautious, with only a few
CUBA

isolated communist groups rejoicing. During the afternoon of the 23rd, the alert in the Eastern Naval District was partially relaxed. Elsewhere in Latin America, units were placed on an alert; and units were placed on a "first class" alert. 2/LR1 R 187-63, 230217Z; 2/LR1 R 11-63, 222120Z; 3/O R 1380-63, 231531Z, 231737Z; 2/O R 196-63, 251807Z, 2X/O R 2421-63, 241713Z; 2X/O R 478-63, 242121Z; 3/O R 1075-63, 241917Z; 2/O R 01-63, 222129Z 2X/O R 18-63, 222050Z; 2X/O R 01-63, 231927Z; 2X/O EXEMPT T 22-63, 222125Z; DIA/CIC, INDIC MESSAGE 16-63, 221928Z)

NSASCC Comment: DIA issued an IDIC message (16-63) on 22 November, urging all Indication Centers to initiate an immediate alert for possible hostile reactions to the shooting of the President. Any indication of a change in enemy posture was to be immediately passed via INDIC channels to DIA and CRITIC messages were to be used as appropriate.

2. EXEMPT

alerted a counter-revolutionary plot. The EXEMPT Chief, Chiefs at

on 23 November 1963 issued a message to the EXEMPT

at 0001 hours 24 November 1963. The EXEMPT Chiefs were instructed to "...keep a strict watch over movements in the vicinity of this Brigade and over the movements of forces of the Brigade. The surveillance will be carried out by under-cover methods. You will assume a perfect guard setup which will enable you to respond instantly in an emergency." (USM-48, 2 EXEMPT T 454-63, 250021Z; 2 EXEMPT T 455-63, 250107Z)

NSASCC Comment: As of publication there has been no SIGINT evidence that the EXEMPT