

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

Subject: Response to Congressional Query


- 1. On 9 November 1978, G8 began a search for material to answer an inquiry by the House Assassinations Committee referred to us by NSA's Legislative Affairs Office (LAO). An individual assigned to the USAFSS intercept station in Kirknewton, Scotland (USA-55) in 1963 reportedly intercepted an message containing information relative to an assassination plot against President John F. Kennedy. He claims he intercepted this message, but was not allowed to disseminate the content. The Committee is seeking to determine if this intercept actually occurred and has asked NSA to check product and files for pertinent intercept and reporting from USA-55 during 1963.
- 2. Though it seems unlikely that such a message ever existed, the following actions have been taken in response to the House Committee request:
- a. A records check was conducted in concert with N33 (There was no material which was identified in the records index as relevant; however, there were three boxes of material dated 1963 containing unidentified material. These three boxes were opened and were found to contain the following:
- 1) Two boxes contained audio tapes with accompanying gists and logs from USASA intercept sites along the German/Czechoslovakia border (USM-42 sites). The intercept was identified as communications) dated 1961.
- 2) The other box contained between the Soviet Union and Cuba. This material was largely from the Naval Security Group Activity at and was dated in 1962.
- b. A few personnel currently at NSA had experience during 1963 with intercept policies and procedures at Kirknewton and at NSA. Several of them were questioned, and recalled that an mission did exist at Kirknewton in the 1963 time-frame, that all traffic was forwarded to NSA, and that all reporting of messages was done at NSA.
- 3. On 21 November LAO asked that we also check those records available labeled 1964, because the 1963 dated boxes contained material from 1962 rather than 1963. Further, we were asked if product for the 1963 period was available, if USA-55 material used in the product could be identified, and how much of an effort would determining this entail. We have checked the records for 1964 and find no boxes which we feel should be examined. The contents of all boxes are clearly identified and none relate to intercept, and there are none whose contents are not identified.
- 4. As noted earlier the product from intercept historically has been reported by NSA. This product is available in T14, but there is no practical way to isolate that which was derived from USA-55. It is possible to scan 1963 product and it is the T142 estimate that this would require a minimum of four weeks to scan the some 9,900 such products on file for the period from January through November 1963. G8 did not request a search of these records, pending further word from LAO.

Classified by NSA/CSSM 123-2 Review on <u>OA TAN 2009</u>



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5. At this point, G8 feels we have done all reasonable things to locate the reported intercept with negative results.



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