SECOND ENDORSEMENT ON DIC, HAYSECGRUDET 467, NOVEMBER 4TH SER 0003 OF 23 August 1964

FROM: Officer in Charge, U.S. Naval Security Group Activity
TO: Chief of Naval Operations (OP-34E)
VIA: Commander Task Force 72
       Commander Seventh Fleet
       Commander in Chief Pacific Fleet

1. Forwarded, concurring, in basic letter.

2. The value of a Naval Security Group Detachment in a Direct Support role is believed to have been proven beyond question during the voyage of the HACDOX. Based upon the success of the team in this role feel that all future DESOTO patrol Security Group Tactics should emphasize the direct support intercept and analysis mission with unique SIGINT collection as a secondary task. During instances of duplicative intercept and cryptanalysis by both field sites and USS 4571, the pertinent decoded messages were in the hands of the Commanding Officer thirty minutes to one hour prior to receipt of the same information on the CRI broadcasts. This fact strongly argues in favor of the acceptance of the recommendation in paragraph 6.D of the basic letter.

3. Concur in recommendations paragraph 6.C.

4. Paragraph 6.E. in order to utilize present size communications type shell to fuller intercept/collection extent (i.e. "spy positions") if a larger van is considered unfeasible, suggest that the CRI broadcast position be taken out of van and installed in perhaps radio room by HAYSECGRUDET personnel at all times. Above suggestion would allow accommodation of the number of positions desired in basic letter and permit utilization of present-sized van.

5. Paragraph 6.D. Concur that tech details should be provided embarked HAYSECGRUDET as a matter of course at end of spot reports. Format could read:

Thom Klar

Horam Klar
FIRST ENDORSEMENT ON 01 AUG 1964

From: Commanding Officer, USS HADDOX (DD 731)
To: Chief of Naval Operations (FF-84-)
VIA: Officer in Charge, U.S. Naval Security Group Activity
Commander, Task Force 72
Commander, Seventh Fleet
Commander in Chief, U.S. Pacific Fleet

1. Forwarded, concurring with the contents and recommendations in the basic letter.

2. The results of this patrol prove beyond any doubt the value of the Naval Security Group Detachment to the DESOTO Patrol. In addition to its usual missions, the Security Group Detachment provided operational intelligence which may have saved the HADDOX from serious damage. Because of the time between scheduled fuel replenishments and the length of the patrol, it was necessary for the HADDOX to plan the "credits" at five knots in order to complete the patrol without additional fueling. The five ship group with which we were contacted on the night of 1 August with a planned CPA to Long Hai and Hon Be of about four miles, through concentrations of the NQ guns, made the HADDOX particularly vulnerable to the firepower type of attack indicated in paragraph 2.f. of the basic letter. Information provided by the Security Group Detachment permitted the HADDOX to take precautionary measures against this type of attack. Also the information provided by the Security Group gave the HADDOX the first indication that the DRV reaction to the patrol was hostile.

3. The Security Group Detachment provided information which indicated that a torpedo attack was imminent on 2 August. This warning permitted the HADDOX to position itself advantageously prior to the attack. In addition, the Security Group Detachment provided information which indicated that the DRV planned to attack the HADDOX and TURNER JOY on the night of 4 August.

4. The efficiency, reliability, dedication, and cooperation of the U.S. Naval Security Group Detachment, under LT General Moore, were outstanding at all times and in keeping with the highest traditions of the Naval Service.

HERBERT L. DAGLER, JR.

23 August 1964
TOP SECRET DINAR

TOP SECRET DINAR

FROM: Officer in Charge, USN 467 November
TO: Chief of Naval Operations (OP-66)
VIA: Commanding Officer, USS NADROX (DP 731)
Commander, Task Force 72
Commander, Seventh Fleet
Commander in Chief, U.S. Pacific Fleet

SUBJ: July-August 1964 DESOTO Patrol

FILET OPERATIONS REPORT

Ref: (A) USN 720 223002 of July 1964 (DESOTO 1964-10-02-64 TO 1964-10-05)

Encl: (1) Gazetteer
(2) Chronology of DESOTO Operations Against Selected Targets

1. ACKNOWLEDGE.

A. USN 467 NADROX was a DESOTO FLAT FOX [X] in USS NADROX (DP 731) during the period 22 July to 22 August 1964. A mission of the deployment was: (1) To PLK (PLANNED LAUNCH) on July 22 and (2) Conduct DESE"O'TO" PATROL DURING THIS PERIOD.

B. The ship departed Kure (by 26 July) and joined the patrol in the Gulf of Tonkin on 26 July at a position on 13-46T 107-16E. The ship proceeded along the proposed track to 15-47T 107-51E where it was attacked by three 522 MTR armed torpedoes at 08-55T on 2 August. The patrol resumed along a revised track (between 15-47T 105-04E and 17-15T 107-20E) on 3 August with PN-102 C. TURBEE JAY (DD 331) in company. The two ships were again attacked by an unidentified flotilla of AVG motor torpedo boats on the night of 4 August in the vicinity of 15-17T 107-33E. The patrol was officially concluded on 6 August, but the ship arrived in Subic Bay on 23 August following thirteen days of operations as an element of Task Force 72.

C. The ten most-wanted of the following:

LT DEWELL D. NOBLE
ATCHISON, DONALD S.
BAIN, JACK C.

623-463/1615, USN
53-49 04, CT 3, USN
279 93 80, CT 3, USN
TOP SECRET

DINAR

[Image]

GURBETTE, Harvey H.
ZIMBELMANN, Lyle (ENS)
MITCHELL, Dennis E. 9
DOUGLASS, Charles H.
LINTON, Thomas L.
O'ROURKE, Richard J.
DELANEY, Samuel H. 8
PROUTY, David A.
COLTON, Victor J.
ALLAIRE, Matthew B.
GAUGER, Thomas A.
KORAB, Arthur B., II
SARTORI, James H.

CYS, U.S.N. Communications
CTE, U.S.N. Communications
CTE, U.S.N. Vietnamese G/A
CYS, U.S.N. Vietnamese T/A
CYS, U.S.N. Manual Horse
CYS, U.S.N. Manual Horse
CYS, U.S.N. Manual Horse
CAL, U.S.N. Manual Horse
CAL, U.S.N. Manual Horse
CAL, U.S.N. Manual Horse

- TRANSFERRED TO USS YUCONBERGA (CA-14) ON 11 NOV, FOR FURTHER TRANSFER BY COD TO CUBI POINT TO RELIEVE PERSONNEL EXCURSIONS AT PARENT COMMAND.

D. This report is a summary of operations carried out by USS 467 November, and is submitted in accordance with reference (a).

2. HIGHLIGHTS OF OPERATIONS:

A. During the early morning hours of 31 July the USS NADDOX, while enroute to the Gulf of Tonkin from Huelva, passed within 42 miles of Hainan Island. This was the closest point of approach to Chinese territory during the patrol. Communications rate serving the communications and observation posts in the area were intensified to detect any reflection of the NADDOX. No information was received, and it is believed that the NADDOX was undetected until she reached the JSO area.

B. On 31 July the NADDOX operated in the vicinity of 17-05N 107-18E. Although what appeared to be a radar track was visually identified on Isle Du Zigue, no tracking that could be associated with the ship's movements was noted on the AN/SPQ-14 radar. However, beginning at 0136Z on 1 August, a tracking station located at Vou Dinh Son began passing sightings reflecting the presence of the NADDOX. Tracking by various stations continued throughout the time the NADDOX was in the Gulf of Tonkin, and was especially heavy between 1 and 4 August.

Saturation plotting of reverse azimuth and range enabled the detachment to make the following tentative locations:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>LOCATION</th>
<th>COORDINATE</th>
<th>41 GROUP</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Vou Dinh Son</td>
<td>17-56N 103-25E</td>
<td>0424</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vou Dinh</td>
<td>18-40N 105-40E</td>
<td>0424</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hoa Khoi</td>
<td>16-48N 105-47E</td>
<td>0423, 0424</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thanh Hoa-Area</td>
<td>19-48N 105-57E</td>
<td>9224</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ron Ne</td>
<td>19-23N 105-55E</td>
<td>9224</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ron En</td>
<td>18-18N 105-09E</td>
<td>9224</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

A definite pattern appeared in the 41 group of the messages, probably...
REPRESENTING THE STATION NUMBER OF THE STATION SENDING THE SIGHTING.  
THE ONLY ABNORMALITY APPEARED IN THE TRAFFIC FROM HON BOU, WHICH WAS  
NOTED USING TWO DIFFERENT AI GROUPS. ON 1 AUGUST VINH WAS NOTED  
RECOGNIZING SIGHTINGS FROM HON BOU (USING AI GROUP 6.C6) IN ADDITION TO  
SENDING SIGHTINGS FROM THE VINH SITE. LATER, HON BOU WAS NOTED  
SENDING SIGHTINGS DIRECTLY TO HAIPHONG (USING AI GROUP 0424). THE  
EXACT STATUS OF THE STATION AT HON BOU THEREFORE COULD NOT BE RESOLVED.  
IT WAS ALSO SUSPECTED THE HON BOU WAS POSSIBLY USING RADIO-TELEPHONE  
COMMUNICATIONS TO PASS SIGHTINGS TO VINH. (A CONSIDERABLE AMOUNT OF  
VIETNAMESE VOICE TRAFFIC WAS INTERCEPTED ON 12560 KCS DURING THE  
PERIOD VINH WAS NOTED RELAYING SIGHTINGS FROM HON BOU.)

C. RANGES OF UP TO 73 MILES WERE NOTED IN THE TRACKING MESSAGES,  
BUT THE NORMAL RANGE WAS CONSIDERABLY SHORTER. IN GENERAL, THE TRACKING  
APPEARED TO BE RELATIVELY ACCURATE AND APPARENTLY BASED ON BOTH  
VISUAL AND RADAR SIGHTINGS. IT WAS NOT POSSIBLE TO DETERMINE THE TYPE  
of RADAR BEING USED BY THE TRACKING STATIONS AS THE SHIP WAS UNABLE TO  
DETERMINE SIGNALS UNDER 550 KCS.]

D. AVAILABLE SIGINT EVIDENCE INDICATES THAT THE HAADOX (AND LATER  
THE C. TURNER JOY) WERE SHADOWED BY BRV NAVAL VESSELS ALMOST CONTINUOUSLY  
WHILE OPERATING IN THE GULF OF TONKIN. SHATOV CLASS FGN'S WERE USED  
ALMOST EXCLUSIVELY IN THIS ACTIVITY. THERE IS VARIOUS EVIDENCE THAT THIS  
ACTIVITY MAY HAVE BEGUN AS EARLY AS THE NIGHT OF 31 JULY. AT 1553 Z A  
MESSAGE PASSED BETWEEN TWO UNIDENTIFIED STATIONS REVEALED THAT VESSEL  
723 (UNIDENTIFIED AS TO TYPE) WAS GOING OUT TO OPERATE. THE STATION  
RECEIVING THE MESSAGE WAS INFORMED TO COMMUNICATE WITH THE VESSEL. THERE  
is NO ELINT OR FURTHER SIGINT EVIDENCE TO CONFIRM THAT 723 ACTUALLY  
SHADOWED THE HAADOX. ON 2 AUGUST, VESSELS, T377 (SHATOV CLASS FGN),  
T146 (SHATOV CLASS FGN), AND T142 (SHATOV CLASS FGN) WERE ENGAGED IN  
SHADOW ACTIVITY (SEE SUBPARAGRAPH F. BELOW). ON 3 AUGUST "SKINHEAD"  
RADAR CONTACTS WERE NOTED AT 0520 Z AND 1320 Z. AT THE LATTER TIME THE  
HAADOX HELD A RADAR CONTACT THAT WAS APPARENTLY PARALLELING THE COURSE  
OF THE DESOTO SHIPS. MESSAGES INTERCEPTED BY USN 27 INDICATE THAT T142  
WAS THE VESSEL INVOLVED DURING AT LEAST PART OF THE DAY. IT IS INTERESTING  
TO NOTE THAT BEGINNING AT 1200 Z 2 HOURS AND 9 MINUTES OF PROBABLE  
BRV VOICE TRAFFIC WAS INTERCEPTED ON 13160 KCS (SEE PARAGRAPH 3.B BELOW).  
AT 1439 Z BEN THUY ORDERED VESSEL T379 (SHATOV CLASS FGN) TO GO TO HON  
BOU, BUT TO STAY CLOSE TO THE COASTLINE EROUTE. AT 1550 Z THE VESSEL  
REPORTED ITS ARRIVAL AT HON BOU AND ADDED THAT THE SITUATION AT SEA  
WAS PEACEFUL. ON BOTH 4 AND 5 AUGUST THE SHIP AGAIN HELD "SKINHEAD"  
RADAR CONTACTS, INDICATING FURTHER SHADOWING BY SHATOV CLASS FGN'S.  
COINT INDICATES THAT T142 WAS INVOLVED IN BOTH DATES. ON 6 AUGUST THE  
DESOTO PATROL WAS TEMPORARILY SUSPENDED AND THE SHIPS REMAINED OUTSIDE  
THE GULF OF TONKIN. ON 7 AUGUST THE HAADOX AND C. TURNER JOY HELD A  
"SKINHEAD" RADAR CONTACT. AT 0909 Z AN UNIDENTIFIED BRV NAVAL VESSEL  
BEGAN PASSING SIGHTINGS ON TWO ENEMY SHIPS (IDENTIFIED AS LIGHT  
CRUISERS). AT 0403 Z THE VESSEL REPORTED THREE SHIPS AND TWO ENEMY PLANES  
AND SAID, "I AM FOLLOWING." (AT THIS TIME THE USS SAMUEL E. ROSE HAD  
TEMPORARILY JOINED THE DESOTO SHIPS FOR TRANSFER OF MATERIALS RELATING TO  
THE 2 AND 4 AUGUST ATTACKS BY BRV NAVAL VESSELS.) SHADOW ACTIVITY WAS
AGIN HOKED ON 8 AUGUST WHEN THE S. TURNER JOY HELD A "SKINHEAD" RADAR CONTACT BETWEEN O916Z AND 0105Z. THERE IS NO EVIDENCE AVAILABLE TO IDENTIFY THE UNIT INVOLVED, BUT IT WAS PROBABLY A SWATCH "R" OR FBN. AT 0314Z THE FINAL ACTIVITY THAT COULD BE RELATED TO THE SHOULDERING OF THE DESOTO PATROL WAS NOTED WHEN A MESSAGE WAS INTERCEPTED THAT STATED AN UNIDENTIFIED VESSEL WOULD MAKE A PATROL FROM PORT VIANI TO VIANI THAT NIGHT AND RETURN THE FOLLOWING DAY. AT THE TIME OF INTERCEPT THE DESOTO SHIPS WERE IN THE VICINITY OF 17-05N 107-16E, AND SHORTLY THEREAFTER CONCLUDED THE PATROL AND LEFT THE GULF OF TURKIN.


F. ON 2 AUGUST A HEAVY FLOW OF TRAFFIC WAS NOTED ON DRV NAVAL NETS. VESSEL 1377 CONTINUED ACTIVE AND AT 0315Z PASSED A SIGHTING THAT STATED, "AT 0800 TARGET THREE NAUTICAL MILES EAST OF HON HE." AT 0400Z THE HADDON VISUALLY SIGHTED THREE PROBABLY F-1 CLASS MOTOR TORPEDO BOATS AND TWO POSSIBLE SWATCH CLASS FBN'S. A MESSAGE FROM TI46 INTERCEPTED AT 0637Z CONTAINED A SIGHTING OF THE "ENEMY SHIP". IT ALSO INDICATED THAT 135 WAS IN THE VICINITY OF HON HE. TWO OTHER MESSAGES FROM TI46 TO HAI PHONG DURING THE NEXT HALF HOUR CONTAINED FURTHER INFORMATION CONCERNING THE COURSE, SPEED, AND MANEUVERS OF THE HADDON. THEY ALSO STATED THAT THE "DIRECTORATE" HAD COMMAND THE 135 AND CONTAINED INFORMATION CONCERNING THE TACTICS BEING EMPLOYED BY THE DRV VESSELS, INCLUDING THE INTENTION OF LAUNCHING TORPEDOES. A MESSAGE FROM TI42 TO PORT WALLUT INTERCEPTED BY USN 4141 STATED, "RECEIVED ORDERS. TI46, TI42 DID (ONE GROUP UNREADABLE) USE HIGH SPEED TO GO TOGETHER WITH (ENEMY FOLLOWING TO LAUNCH TORPEDOES.) THE HADDON WAS ATTACKED BY THREE DRV MOTOR TORPEDO BOATS AT 0508Z. SUBHIT LATER INDICATED THAT THERE WERE 1333, 1336, AND 1339. 1339 WAS SUNK AND THE OTHER TWO VESSELS DAMAGED. 1336 VERY HEAVILY.

6. IN A MESSAGE INTERCEPTED AT 022412Z HAI PHONG INSTRUCTED TI46 TO
REPORT THE POSITION OF T135, T142, AND T146, TO SEND ONE VESSEL TO ASSIST "COMRADE GIANG'S SHIP," HAVE ONE VESSEL REMAIN TO ASSIST BOATS OF 135 AS TO THE NECESSITIES OF LIFE, AND TO ORGANIZE DEFENSES AT THE ANCHORAGE. T146 WAS FURTHER ORDERED TO MAINTAIN CONSTANT COMMUNICATIONS WITH HEADQUARTERS AND NOT TO GO ANY PLACE WITHOUT ORDERS FROM HEADQUARTERS.

II. ON 4 AUGUST INFORMATION RECEIVED FROM USN 4147 AND USS 626J INDICATED A POSSIBLE ATTACK ON THE KESOTO SHIPS BY DRV NAVAL VESSELS THAT NIGHT.

I. FOLLOWING THE ATTACK BY CARRIER-BASED PLANES ON DRV NAVAL VESSELS AND INSTALLATIONS ON 5 AUGUST, DRV OFFICIALS APPEARED TO BE QUITE CONCERNED OVER THE SAFETY OF BOTH NAVAL AND MERCHANT VESSELS, AND TOOK ACTION TO LESSEN THE DANGER FROM ATTACKS OF ANY NATURE. AT CS13142 A MESSAGE FROM HAI PHONG TO ALL SHIPS ON A FISHING FLEET COMMUNICATIONS NETWORK STATED, "SITUATION INTRICATE TONIGHT; TEMPORARILY STAY AT (UNREADABLE PROBABLE PLACE NAME). ABSOLUTELY CANNOT NEGLECT THESE ORDERS (WHICH ARE) EFFECTIVE UNTIL NEW ORDERS ARRIVE." A BADLY GARBLED MESSAGE INTERCEPTED LATER THAT DAY TO AN UNIDENTIFIED NAVAL VESSEL ORDERED IT TO HIRE FISHERMEN AND TO GO INTO SHORE AND KOMBINE THE PEOPLE'S ARMY. IT ALSO DEALT WITH THE ASSIGNING OF VESSELS FOR ASSURANCE. VESSELS 495 AND 497 (UNIDENTIFIED AS TO TYPE) WERE MENTIONED SPECIFICALLY. AT 1828Z HAI PHONG INSTRUCTED VESSEL T142 TO "RETURN TO THE COAST IMMEDIATELY. SEARCH FOR A PLACE TO HIDE FROM PLANES BEFORE MORNING. REPORT YOUR POSITION AND ATTEND TO COMMUNICATIONS WITH HEADQUARTERS. THE HIDE AREAS THAT THE ENEMY CANNOT ENTER ARE: A. 20-51-29N 107-04E, B. 20-53-20N 107-04E, C. 20-51-25N 105-09E, D. 20-53-25N 107-09E." AT 072032Z A MESSAGE FROM HAI PHONG REVEALED THAT, "THE FISHERMEN REQUEST OUR SHIPS TO MEET THEM AND GUARD THEM." A PROBABLE DISPERAL PLAN WAS REVEALED WHEN IT CONTINUED, "ON 8 AUGUST THREE VESSELS ENTER (ONE GROUP UNREADABLE), TWO VESSELS GO INTO HAI PHONG, THREE SHIPS LEAVE THE RIVER NORTH BETWEEN THEM."

J. AT CS15482 PORT HALLUT INFORMED AN UNIDENTIFIED VESSEL THAT, "FROM NOW ON WE WILL PRODUCE OUR INSIGNIA AS FOLLOWS: A YELLOW STAR; A RED BACKGROUND WITH A CIRCLE WITH A YELLOW EDGE. THERE WILL BE TWO RED LINES PASSING THROUGH THE YELLOW EDGE. THIS INSIGNIA WILL BE ON THE FUSELAGE, THE BELLY, THE WING, AND BEHIND THE TAIL OF THE PLANE. WHEN YOU OBSERVE AIRPLANES WITH THIS INSIGNIA ON IT, IT IS OUR PLANE. YOU MUST WAIT UNTIL YOU CAN DISTINGUISH IT."

K. AT 032122Z HAI PHONG INSTRUCTED VESSEL T120 (SUAHOU CLASS PGM) TO TOW TWO OF 135'S BOATS BACK IMMEDIATELY. (THESE WERE LATER IDENTIFIED AS T333 AND T336). THE VESSELS DAMAGED IN THE 2 AUGUST ATTACK ON THE HADDOX.) IT ALSO REVEALED THAT THE SALVAGE TUG BACH DANG WAS TOWING T132 (SUAHOU CLASS PGM) AND THAT FURTHER DISCUSSIONS WOULD BE HELD CONCERNING THE TWO VESSELS THAT WERE SUNK (PROBABLY DURING THE AIR STRIKES OF 5 AUGUST.)

L. BETWEEN 6 AND 8 AUGUST SEVERAL PROPAGANDA TYPE MESSAGES WERE INTERCEPTED ON DRV NAVAL NETS. A MESSAGE FROM PORT HALLUT INTERCEPTED AT CS1615Z CLAIMED THAT ON 2 AUGUST, "HE CHASED OFF THE AMERICAN WARSHIP".

TOP SECRET DINAR
AND THAT ON 5 AUGUST FIVE ENEMY PLANES WERE SHOT DOWN AND THREE DAMAGED, AND ONE AMERICAN PILOT CAPTURED ALIVE. A MESSAGE INTERCEPTED AT 071720Z STATED, "WISH YOU VICTORY; IT IS THE BEGINNING OF THE FEELING OF HOSTILITY; PUSH STRONGLY THE DECISION (ONE GROUP UNREADABLE) ENEMY AND CARRY OUT EACH MISSION." OTHER MESSAGES DEALT WITH ALERT CONDITIONS AT BASES AND THE AWARDING OF MEDALS ON 8 AUGUST.

N. A MESSAGE INTERCEPTED AT 052205Z FROM FORT HALLUT TO AN UNIDENTIFIED STATION REVEALED THAT THE BODY OF ONE AMERICAN PILOT HAD BEEN PULLED OUT OF THE WATER ALONG THE COAST.

3. QUANTITY AND QUALITY OF INTERCEPT:

A. A TOTAL OF 135 HOURS AND 14 MINUTES OF MANUAL HORSE TRAFFIC WAS INTERCEPTED. THIS INCLUDED 96 HOURS AND 41 MINUTES OF DVR NAVAL TRAFFIC AND 17 HOURS AND 27 MINUTES OF [BLANK] NAVAL TRAFFIC. SIGNALS WERE GOOD TO EXCELLENT DURING THE PATROL, EXCEPT WHEN THE TRANSMITTERS OF THE HADDON SHUT OFF.

B. A TOTAL OF 7 HOURS AND 49 MINUTES OF PROBABLE DVR RADIO-TELEPHONE TRAFFIC WAS INTERCEPTED. INCLUDED IN THIS WAS 7 HOURS AND 25 MINUTES OF POSSIBLE NAVAL TRAFFIC INTERCEPTED ON 129.0E AND 131.0E HCS. THE GREAT MAJORITY OF THIS TRAFFIC WAS INTERCEPTED WHILE IN THE VICINITY OF 19-00N 103-53W. HOWEVER, ON 3 AUGUST STRONG SIGNALS WERE INTERCEPTED ON 131.0E HCS WHILE OPERATING APPROXIMATELY SEVENTY-FIVE MILES FROM THE DVR COAST. WHETHER THIS WAS THE RESULT OF DVR NAVAL VESSELS KNOWN TO BE SHADOWING THE HADDON, OR DUE TO ATMOSPHERIC CONDITIONS IS NOT KNOWN. DURING THE SAME PERIOD, THE SHIP'S RADAR SEARCH RADAR WAS TRACKING CONTACTS AT UNUSUALLY LONG DISTANCES BECAUSE OF BUCING. SPECIAL EFFORTS WERE MADE DURING BOTH ATTA CKS BY DVR NAVAL VESSELS TO ISOLATE THE ATTACKING VESSELS IN VOICE COMMUNICATIONS. HOWEVER, ON BOTH OCCASIONS ALL FREQUENCIES BETWEEN 100 AND 200 HCS WERE BLOCKED BY THE SHIP AND SUPPORTING AIRCRAFT.

C. ON 5 AUGUST, 36 MINUTES OF UNIDENTIFIED RADIO-TELEPHONE TRAFFIC WAS INTERCEPTED. SIGNALS WERE FAIR TO GOOD DURING THE PERIOD OF THE INTERCEPT, BUT BECAUSE OF THE DISTANCE OF THE SHIP FROM THE COAST IT IS BELIEVED THE INTERCEPT WAS DUE TO ATMOSPHERIC CONDITIONS.

D. A SUMMARY OF ELINT INTERCEPT WILL BE INCLUDED IN THE DESOTO REPORT SUBMITTED BY USS HADDON.

4. DIRECT SUPPORT (ELENT) PROVIDED USS HADDON:

A. WHILE ENROUTE TO THE GULF OF YOMIN ON 30 JULY, AND AT OTHER TIMES DURING THE PATROL WHEN THE HADDON WAS OPERATING NEAR TERRITORY, AIR DEFENSE NETS (EITHER MANUAL HORSE OR VOICE AS CAPABILITIES PERMITTED) WERE MONITORED TO PROVIDE EARLY WARNING SUPPORT TO THE COMMANDING OFFICER. ON 30 JULY NINE RAIDS, CONSISTING OF AT LEAST TWELVE PROBABLE
However, no reaction to the DESETO ship was noted at any time on these nets.

B. The information concerning shadow activity and the impending attacks by DRV naval vessels contained in paragraph 2 above was passed to the Commanding Officer, USS MADDOX and Commanding Destroyer Division 192 immediately after decoding or receipt over the GRI broadcast. In addition, a daily meeting of all COMINT cleared officers was held to discuss significant events of the previous day.

C. The detachment's two ELINT personnel were assigned directly to the operations officer of the MADDOX to assist in the Combat Information Center. They provided advice and instruction to aid the ship's company ECM operators in the collection and evaluation of electronic intelligence, and also stood normal ECM watches.

5. Performance of Equipment:

A. The performance of all intercept equipment was excellent throughout the patrol. The ship's long wire antenna was used for high frequency intercept and the GR broadcast. It gave excellent results, as did the VHF antennas installed on the van.

B. The performance of the KHR-37 and all associated equipment was outstanding. The only problem encountered with this system occurred following the second attack by DRV motor torpedo boats when jarring caused by the firing of the ship's guns necessitated minor adjustments to the KHR-37 and the bohine frequency shift converter.

C. On 7 August one of the van's air conditioners broke and could not be repaired aboard ship due to the lack of spare parts. A "Red Devil" blower was obtained from the ship, and although the temperature in the van rose slightly, the detachment was able to continue full operations without ill effects to either equipment or personnel.

D. In addition to needed air conditioning repairs, the van, after almost six weeks of solid patrol time, is in need of a general overhaul.

6. Comments and Recommendations:

A. Excellent cooperation was received from personnel of the USS MADDOX in all respects. The ship made every effort to insure the successful completion of the detachment's mission and to provide comfortable living and working spaces for the detachment. The only difficulty encountered was the blocking of intercept at times by the ship's transmitters (see paragraph 3 above), and this was held to a minimum by sending routine traffic when it would least interfere with productive intercept by the detachment.
B. The support provided to the detachment by the COMINT stations tasked with DESOTO support was excellent throughout the patrol. Especially outstanding was the support provided by USN 27 and USN 4147/USN 6254 when the patrol was being subjected to enemy attack between 2 and 4 August. The only recommendation for improvement would be to include brief technical details with the information provided so that the detachment could concentrate its efforts on those cases which appear to be most productive at any particular time.

C. One of the outstanding features of this Patrol was the proof (if any was required) of the value and reliability of the GR1 broadcast. At the beginning of the patrol there was some apprehension that it would not be possible to copy the GR1 broadcast while in the Gulf of Tonkin. However, these fears proved to be groundless. After some difficulty in finding a satisfactory night frequency the first two nights after leaving Keelung, the broadcast was copied with a circuit availability of almost 90 per cent for the remainder of the patrol. (Circuit availability for the entire patrol was 82.5 per cent.) Use of the ADDHIS back-up system was not required. The value of on-line communications to the successful completion of this DESOTO patrol cannot be overemphasized.

D. It is believed that this was one of the first DESOTO patrols to have personnel assigned whose primary function was analysis of intercepted traffic. This proved to be extremely valuable. Even though much of the information was received from other sources later, in several instances highly significant information was passed to the Commanding Officer much earlier than would have been possible without trained analysts aboard. It is recommended that future DESOTO patrol teams include two analysts who are thoroughly familiar with the primary target of the patrol.

E. The communications van provided an excellent working space for the detachment's operations, and placing the van between the stacks did not appear to hamper operations in any respect. However, the present van is hardly adequate in size for even an emergency patrol, and when emergency conditions prevail (as they did on much of the present patrol), it becomes inadequate. It is recommended that a larger van be procured for future patrols, and that the installation provide for a minimum of four (preferably five) intercept positions, one communications position, and adequate space for processing and analysis. The number of positions used for manual Morse and radio-telephone collection could be varied from patrol to patrol, depending on the target country's communications.

Copy to:
CHO (GP-946/554) (Advance)
CHO (GP-9227) (Advance)
CONNAFJAPAN
DHIESA (3 copies C11, G22, D26)
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Latitude</th>
<th>Longitude</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ben Thuy</td>
<td>16-39N</td>
<td>105-42E</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hai Phong</td>
<td>20-52N</td>
<td>106-41E</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hon En</td>
<td>18-18E</td>
<td>106-09E</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hon Me</td>
<td>19-22E</td>
<td>105-56E</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hon Ne</td>
<td>15-54N</td>
<td>108-01E</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hon Ng</td>
<td>16-46N</td>
<td>106-47E</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Isle Du Tigre</td>
<td>17-16N</td>
<td>107-20E</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Port Gianh</td>
<td>17-42N</td>
<td>106-29E</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Port Hallet</td>
<td>21-13N</td>
<td>107-34E</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thanh Hoa</td>
<td>20-00N</td>
<td>105-30E</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vinh</td>
<td>18-40N</td>
<td>105-40E</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vinh Son</td>
<td>17-56E</td>
<td>126-21E</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>