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Interview with ~~ML~~ Gen Gordon A. Blake USAF Retired
with William Gerhard ~~and~~ Jeanne Renee Jones, *
of the Cryptologic Working Group HQS National Security Agency *AFSS*
June 5/1972

The classification of this interview is TS *Onoform*
(laughter) (*Chatter*)

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Tommy OK Gentlemen you're on

Mr. G: We began in 1967 -- nobody really remembers the time. I have trouble with chronology too.
I happen to remember 1967 because this is when I got tangled up in this project--when the peace talks had begun
and everybody expected the war to end at the end of 1967.
What we have done -- we've put out a few books ~~we~~ have been collecting Lord knows how much documentation with a room
filled with documents about the size of
GB: must be massive and . . .

Mr. G: And our guidance is simply to take ~~the~~ SEA and cryptology and come up with ~~something~~
We recognized very early on, you know, the GTK incident s were one of our important subjects.
Renee has been working on it about three years - gathering documents on the subject and drafting preliminary drafts .
She has I think perhaps the best documentation that exists on the subject and we're beginning now to sound out
interviews with a few of the people that had a part of the actionwe've got Dr. Tordella on tap for later on
we hope
we are going to depend on him *for* some insight into the congressional relations. Hes the only one who has the
continuity.
The documentation, the work that we're doing *really* won't be complete unless we at
least touch base with you and *we* were hoping that we can trigger your memory. There have been a number of books
on the open market on the subject -- this is why - do we have them all here renee? Windy, the Presidents war
we have some congressional records, prints of the senate foreign relations committee sessions ~~on the subject~~

even brought the pentagon papers along -- we have one of the 4 original 1955 sets of the Pentagon Papers which we stole out of the pentagon and that too touches or covers these events.

Now we're going to try to set the stage for you if we can and renee if you want to start off by taking on about the -- some of these open books -- if you want to describe for general blake -- first of all the there are all kinds of inaccuracies, we're hoping that when we produce our work we will have a definitive study.

GEN BL it will be a good history anyway.

Mr. G be accurate at least.

NSA plays a part in all three of these books.

the establishment of a record is important -- now how that record will be used is that's another problem but we want at least to establish a record as thoroughly as we can. We're putting some honest labeling on it.

we have other business here of course, we are also working on the air war

I promise that I won't ask (laughter) I promise I won't ask you any questions about the use of SIGINT in the air war -- I'll restrain myself

GEN B. I've got a son flying a F-4 ^{his a second} tour over there so I probably have more current interest in that than in the tonkin history

Mr. G. Maybe we'll slip one in on you on the air war

GEN B that would be more personal than historical

MR G you want to start that way? We're going to try to do the talking for a while.

R taking from it from the

BREAK

R to see the raw traffic.....a massive search on - holaburd, all the records,, and as far as we know its never been found just by coincidence we talked with Dr. Beardon of the AF history office and in 67 he was asked by

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IDA, for which he worked at the time, to do a command and control study on Ton Kin.... At that time he saw all the raw traffic down in DIA it had all the operator's comments, operator chatter, pen filed in sippositions as to what the traffic might mean

In Sept of 67 Fulbright sent his first letter to DOD asking for all of the documentation on ~~the~~ Ton Kin and Dr. Beldon was told to drop his project and consequently that the last he ever saw of the raw traffic so we know at least one copy if it got down to DIA for some strange reason

If it is out in the building its not being impdiced

GEN B Of course I don't know enough about what they say and don't say except that I recall sort of a general feeling that we couldn't possibly save everything or we would have been inundated in a veryj very short period of time I recall a figure which may be innacurrate something like ⁷⁰⁰ ~~700~~ tons was digested through the digestion processes annually'

Mr. G Were a real paper mill out there probably 70-0 thousand

GEN B so I dont know that i would be inclined to make a lot of the nonavailabilty of a particular collection of raw traffic

~~Raw traffic~~ R I think the most revealing thing about the raw traffic situation is that it showed just how much of the system had been broken It was DRV naval system and we had it fairly well broken maybe partially up to the time of the tk incidents.

MR. G.

GEN B I recall it to be one of the systems we were in and out of and this become critical at one point.

R well we never had enough dept in ti to break itsuccessfully until the TK incidents and then there was such an abundance of DRV traffic passed at that time that right after the incidents we were able to break it fully

GEN B what at issue here I suppose is the credibility of the cryptanalytic portion of it and I dont/t

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recall any substantive discussion - there may have been - but I don't personally recall it at the time over the specifics of the credibility -- i have a VAGUE recollection of it - I hate to even mention it - just of a critical interpretation of a word rather than the cryptanalytic feature of it ~~in other words~~ - whether it was related to uh I don't recall the word but as it sticks in my mind very fitfully like the words now and not in English - where I may say I AM NOT GOING TO TOWN IS DIFFERENT THAN I AM NOW GOING TO TOWN

R exactly

G Translation was also part of the problem

R the mood

G the tense of the verbs

B I recall the language expert explaining the the nuances in this particular language which apparently are quite pronounced in other words its not an easy language which to be absolutely sure the translation of it is right

G at that time NSA did not have a large staff of highly qualified Vietnamese linguists

R NO they were all just starting out the main linguist had just come from school

G Renee maybe we'd better get started

B Right were getting ahead of ourselves here

go ahead and talk awhile

After the the incidents had quietened down, the sinking remained dormant for 2 years and then in July of 1967 /Ap printed an article. They had interviewed several of the men on the MADDUX. One was the main sonar and radar operator. They made several statements indicating that the 2nd attack that is the one on the 4th never happened -- In fact at one point he said that he was ordered to home in on a radar blip - this happened at night - and fire. He asked the other ship - the Turner J9y - to turn on its running light. Apparently they were homed in on the TJ

instead of a PT boat -- Well this was printed in the Arkansas Gazette Came to the attention of Senator Fulbright

and he was already having doubts about the use of the resulation to caryry forth the war anywaynf japparrntly he lept on it with all four feet

By September he was writin g a letter toSECDEF asking for all the documentation. This was kicked around throughthe Navy Dept JEC SECDEF They gave him quite a bit of the operational matter

By December they briefed himonthe SIGINT aspects and in Feb he aked Mcnamara to come talk to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and that this document I have here, -- the coffee stained, well worn document

This was February of 68 the month athat Mac was leaving office and most of what has co,e out in the open about the SIGINT aspects of TON KIN WERE revealed by Mac himself in this document. This is the UNCLAS version.

Right after that this book by Goulden His thesis is that the attack on the fourth did not happe n NO WAY

And after Goulden produced this work -- jwhich remains until today - the best one on the subject the subject was quiet again until the relase of the Pentagon Paters last year. There not too much in the PP themselvesabout hthe GTK incidents-- They tend to accept them as they were reported at the time. But ofollowing right on thiss - the New York Times e pose Antohony Austin wrote his book the Presidents War-- SHe is attacked to eh New York Times Daniel Ellsberg highly endorsed the book . Its nowt too good expect for the last ten pages.

And in that he discuss3-s our material in depth . He alleged that what we presented as SIGINT evidence of hostile intentfor the 4th whwas in fact after actions reports of the action of the 2nd. And this started a resurgence of Fulbright interest. FHe wrote the current SECDEF and asked for the ra w traffic. so that got back out to the agency almost immediately and I had to go brief jADM Gaylor on everything to do with the incidents And the SIGINT is shakey for the 4th. What SIGINT Ive been able to say -- which as I said is not raw traffic has been colected into notebooks for both the August incidents and the 18 September incident. And even o n a cursory review oof the evidence shws that it is shakey. If Fulbiright wever saw the whole thing Im sure he would be convinced it never happed

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To recap the incidents we had the first one 2 aug We had substantial SIGINT evidence that the DRV was tracking the MADDUX from the time it entered the Gulf until the incident of the 2nd. It was broad daylight. We know they came out. We have a bullet hole in the MADDUX. We have the bullet to show that they did fire. And the evidence in SIGINT which is quite good even though we weren't reading the system too well we could see what they were doing we were able to warn the ship 12 hours in advance that there might be hostile intent.

For 4 August the situation was quite different. It happened on a very dark night, no moon, no clouds, heavy atmospheric disturbances - with radar and communications and the SIGINT was very shaky. If you read it over you can see that even though it was passed during the time frame of the 4 August incident which covered about 4 hours, it does read like an after action report of the 2nd. The DRV claimed WEVE CHASED OFF THE ENEMY, WE LOST TWO BOATS. Well, they lost 2 on the 2nd. They claimed to have brought down an American a/c. Well, on the 2nd, they apparently did hit one of the American fighter a/c. It wasn't brought down but it had to recover at Da Nang instead of on the carrier because it was damaged.

This was all passed downtown and the best I can reconstruct the time sequence it hit downtown right at the time

'the critical NSC meeting was in progress when the decision to retaliate was apparatly made.

It appears as if they latched onto the rather shakey SIGINT evidence and decided to retaliate possibly because they already wanted to this just added the fuel that they needed and then it looks like we were stuck with the story because after the decision was made we had a wrap up summary wherein for the first time NSA attached the traffic to a definite attack on the fourth,. The retaliation was carried out according to what I've learned from people like Lou Grant at the agency the retaliation took every one by surprise. NSA wasn't warned that there would be a retaliation. We weren't even able to re adjust our coverage in order to see the effects of the retaliation. However we think we got everything we could possibly

We just never put out anything in that building that says SOMETHING WAS DEMONSTRATED IRREFUTABLY but the lead sentence in this report is "Herewith follows a summary of the evidence which demonstrates irrefutably that an attack did take place on the fourth. And then it lists the SIGINT evidence attached to the fourth. It strikes anybody - even without cryptologic experience - that the evidence was shaky. Also here in the wrap up of the 6th appears one scrap of SIGINT evidence quote "Khoai has met the enemy". I haven't been able to find it any other place but that wrap up of the 6th. MacNamara brought this out -- he relied on it quite heavily -- as UNIMPEACHABLE evidence that the attack took place. He also reported that POW report from 67 and a POW report from 68 wherein this Khoai was further identified as a PT boat commander in the DRV navy at the time of the incident and of the same flotilla that attacked the MADDOC but does not say that the attack actually took place. He was backed down on that also. Anthony Austin also mentioned this bit about Khoai has met the enemy and this is a point that ADM Gaylor has been particularly interested in recalling. He wants to see the war traffic himself on Khoai But there is only that one fleeting reference that went out in that rather strange summary of the 5 no 6th. Well a month later, the 18 September incident occurred. This involved two different destroyers -- MORTON and EDWARDS --

MORTON with the SIGINT detachment . It was almost a repeat performance of 4 August. It happened at night for a period of about two hours They had radar blips They never actually sighted enemy vessels they had only radar evidence and again we had a super abundance of SIGINT reflections of the DRV passing traffic but this time it was determined that the tone of all of the traffictaken cumulatively was defensive not offensive And here i have to go into an interview that Mr. Gerhard and I had with GEN CARTER because GEN CARTER was Deputy of CIA at the time and gehe sat in on the NSC meeting in September in the place of the Driector of CIA who was out of town. To the best of his recollection McNamara came to that meeting ready to go with another retaliation had the plans in hand and GEN CARTER, representing the intelligence community ,as a whole said there absolutely no evidence SIGINT or otherwise that they had hostile intent or that htthey were even out there We can't back you on this one and apparently MacNaramr abomg others were bent at that meeting were bent out of shape about this.

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and this caused an investigation a PFIAB investigation
and here I go into an interview we had with Lou Grant. The PFIAB investigation was not so much directed at WHAT
HAPPENED WITH SIGINT in August - why was it wrong in August but WHAT AHAPPEED IN SEPTEMBER
why couldn't you back us up in September. This brought out all of the facts that we had broken the system'
between August and September. We had reevaluated within the SIGINT community and found to our satisfaction
lets say that the cumulative SIGINT evidence from August that the DRV was in a defensive Mood then not in an
offensive mood for 4 August not 2 theres never b-en any question about 2 August Oh theres wquestions that it may
have been an accident that the PT boat comander went steaming out there expencting to meet an ARVN swift and
instead met a dstroyer But no that the 4 August was defensive and not offensive
and this brings me up to the point of why I wanted to speak with you What was NSA's position in this
were we forced into the position of ba king up the decision downtown did they misuse make the decision on the
fragmented evidence that we had for the fourth and then we were forced into the positon of backing it up. We did
soul searching in August in and in September and decided that we couldn't fdo it anagain for the 18 Setember incident
I think thats basically what I need to know at this point.
really
GEN B WellIm agrai thats e xactly the point on which I cant help because I don't have personal recollection
in sufficient detail to do that I can state that in the deliberations at the time notheing emerged in the laight of
we sort of bit this off now we have to back it up and the vagaries you mentioned between the August 4th example
and the September example I don't recall those differences but it does make sense that the records shows that we
were deeper in the system in September than in August and having gone through this exercise one time you are bound
to be sharper the 2nd time around I think this follows as a comon sensical arrangementbut in terms of what happened
at the time and the quality of the SIGINT evidence and the precise reporting i'm sure people like Lou Grant
patically - Lo u was always very promi nent in all these Southeast Asia SIINT matters at the time there was another
man - you haven't mentioned him - he was an Air Force LT COL - I can't recollect his name naow

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Mr G and R simultaneously: DEL LANG

GEN B DEL LANG, that's the man These were sort of the Gold Dust Twins of South East Asia SIGINT Grant and Del Grant

Everything that we seemed to be involved in - at the Director level anyway = always Lang and Grant were the cahps who were in effect down at the firing line and up on all of the detail and if their memories don't fill these gaps I certainly wouldn't do so in terms of the technical aspects of the thing. As far as the policy level WAS USIB backing up a decision I don't recall anything that would suggest that

R: Del Lang is of course the critical point in the whole thing but he doesn't want to talk about it. That's why I didn't mention him. I know that he handled the whole thing. Lou Grant was at the staff level and downtown most of the time. Del Lang was handling it out at the building and I know that from what I've heard other people say he handled the complete reinvestigation for the Fulbright affair - in a closed room -- nobody really knows what he found out in the reinvestigation. I've attempted to talk with him and he's indicated that he isn't

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GEN B Well I certainly can't help you at this juncture on a matter of that kind

(Everybody looks at once) Minly Mr. G. who says there are other aspects that we will solve in time, tend to and

Gen B A sort of general procedure that we followed ~~at that time but~~ I don't recall precisely when we followed it in this case but I have a strong hunch that we did---essentially these questions of what had the intelligence community to say about a particular involvement- whether it's this Ton Kin gulf thing or the Cuban Missile Crisis you name it. It headed up properly in the Director Central Intelligence The Head of the CIA who as you know is a two hat arrangement and he's the man who sits in with the NSC special ops group? all that sort of thing or some representative of that activity So except for formal meeting of the intelligence board or discussions back and forth our normal practice was to send the real expert We'd send the Lou Grants and the Del Langs to participate in intelligence level discussions and what the record shows in this particular case I don't recall but it wouldn't surprise me what would happen was that Grant or Lang or both would be down there at the elbow of the intelligence people

filling them in and but the decisions always remained when you get up to this level were essentially Mc Cone Carter-level decisions . Whether they were misled by the shakey nature of the August fourth incident I wouldn't know. Not by director level or by USIB level.

R: Well the entire August affair was handled in the field and the entire September affair was handled at NSA every shred was sent back here and put out by NSA examined really examined -- by us. For August you had several message -- CRITICS -- CRITIC follow ups The text on these would simply show that the DRV was tracking the MADDOX but the headliner which the field site would put on would say DRV may attack De Soto patrol and I have evidence that some people at the MACV level were concerned before the attack about the inflammatory nature of that title when the text didn't actually back it up. In September for instance to give you an example USN 27 picked up one of these similar tracking messages and sent out a CRITIC flagging it.....

Gen B USN 27 was in San Miguel wasn't it

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R Yes, They tracked it the same way DE SOTO patrol, in this case the MOROTON, may be attacked tonight. NSA reviewed it sent out an immediate message to the community cancelling the critic and the language is " all evidence shows that the DRV to be in a defensive repeat defensive vice offensive mood. I understand this was the basis for the PFIAB investigation the difference in handling of the SIGINT body of evidence between August and September The question was Was it the field who was right, or was it NSA who was right and that they really wanted to hang NSA because they hadn't been able to sue intelligence that is SIGINT as backup for another retaliation . The Pentagon Papers does bring out the fact that after the successful retaliation of August- that they were really rather eager for another excuse - the New York Times made quite a bit of that .

Gen B I don't recall any participation and conscious decision to alter procedures between August and September with relation to the particular targets involved here to those related to the Ton Kin Gulf I do recall that in the whole consideration of operations in South East Asia a number of discussion. I think some of them Milt Zaslow and people like that about the philosophy of handling those targets out there . Its a classic dilemma Its not

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peculiar to South East Asia Its the question of whether its better to put talent out at the end of the line and report directly to the field commanders delegate in fact the analysis and reporting responsibility or whether to rely on communications and concentrations of technical experts and this classic dilemma constantly recurs in the management of SIGINT and its usually resolved more or less pragmatically in particular situation-- obviously if youve got good communications and very few experts its better to centralize and apply their expertise to a number of locations in the field. If youve got a lot of experts you can afford to spread them around people who can translate and do cryptanalytic work That sort of technical expertise -- if youve got a lot of them you can afford to spread them out at several field locations and youve got poor communications then obviously you would prefer-- it would be the only practical solution - Whether this change from August to September that you point out as a fact was related to these kinds of philosophical changes perhaps even triggered by the language difficulties that may have emerged in the August incidences in translations -- whether this triggered a centralization this depending on a centralized small number of experts drawing the raw traffic.

and drawing or second guessing the analysis in some cases from field analysis second guessing field analysis I have no recollection of that kind of relationship I suppose its possible in general context of reporting We did make some communications changes which I don't know what time they came along but there was a general tendency as the Vietnam war ground on to upgrade communications more direct circuits so on so forth, not only in SIGINT but in other ways as well. Part of this sheer availability came from the Philippines to South Vietnam for example added a capacity we never had before. But a conscious decision to make this change was because of the relationship between the quality of SIGINT between September and August I don't recall that.

Mr. G: Renee Weve gone over ^{rather} very lightly the 4 August event as far as certain Pentagon figures are concerned. Perhaps Gen Blake would appreciate a few details on the agony of decision as portrayed by some of these books particularly in the case of McNamara. Of course SIGINT has turned out to be one of the lodestones for that decision.

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R: Well they tried to make it justigy. In his testimony in 1968 before Fulbright he brought the SIGINT with him and I've never been able to find in what form he showed it to him. I've tra ced it from NSA down to JCSI know he saw it down there and it wa s prepared by his intellgience and his legal staff

GEN B: This is in 67

R: This is in Feb 68, right before he left office

GEN B: That was almost three years after I left;

R:: Yes, and he gathered up what he could on 4 August and our people haand I have gone over it with a fine tooth Xxx combto try to match up what he described in that testimonyas SIGINT with what we actually have in hand out there and in places it wlooks like he's taken the critical message the possible after action report and split it into two and at other times it looks as if he's taken four and telescoped it into three. At one point he mentions nine bring telescoped into 4

GEN B: What do you mean by telescoped into 4

R: He mentiones 9 messages but when he describes the content we can only equate them with 4

GEN B: I see

R: He was backed intoa corner by one of the senators on this and he got out of it by saying Well you have to understand these things were flowing back and forthbetween stations. And we really can't find evidence out in the building that that was the case. These were fragments that were picked up.. The point is, ritht toward the end he's backed into a corner again he backs up into this what he ckeeps calling unimpeachable communications intelligencevidence and wseveral of the senators hit him with Well nothing you've shown us here today convinces us in the least that that SIGINT _they didn't call it SIGINT - communications intelligence shows that there was an incident on the fourth. It shows that they were discussing us our ships Yes. At this time they didn't doubt the that SIGINT was genuine but it didn't prove to them that there was an incident on the fourth . And finally one of the senators asked him Would you have gone ahead and retaliated without the SIGINT evidence and he said YES.

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And the senator said In other words this communications intelligence justified your decision. And he said yes. I intend to point that out in my third volume as pointing out that actually NSA for those people who criticize our effort as attaching the war to NSA that to some that takes the burden off us completely. When Johnson in his book the VANTAGE POINT passes over Ton Kin briefly he describes it much as it was described in 1964 as genuine events but at one point when he came to 4 August he mentions communications intelligence and says that they did have evidence of it and then the sentence. Our experts told us this meant - washing his hands of deciding what it meant.

GEN B: You mean nothing came after meant Well I think what we call agony by Secretary McNamara as was customary and proper in a matter of this kind. The secretary didn't pick up the phone and call me He would deal with I presume people like his own intelligence staff with Bill Carroll or with people at CIA the Director, or perhaps the Deputy Director. And he was using what I always thought - it didn't hurt my feelings any -- this I thought was proper channels -- We were the servant of the intelligence community and if they wanted to analyze the quality of our service if they wanted to call on the director they could but normally we were furnishing the real expert to participate in the discussion. They know perfectly well that the director is not a Vietnamese language expert to testify directly on the validity of breaking a secret system. You want to get into that sort of thing and measure it As to credibility, you've got to get down to the man who knows how to break that code and talk to him about a particular message and a particular circumstance As I recall our methodology was to feel that expert was the one to who should participate in the discussions -- not passing the buck to him really -- it NSA didn't have the buck We belonged to the customer really Intelligence being full of vagaries -- not only SIGINT vagaries but the credibility of direct sources and analysis of a number of things.

MR. G: Ultimately there was misinterpretation of SIGINT on the part of the customer

B: Yes, that's not to suggest that he couldn't be misled and I don't whether one could say he was in the case you're talking about here or not. The record would have to show that and discussion with the particular individuals involved. On both the customer's side and on the side of NSA by looking at a specific incident what was the intelligence

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customer told what was the SIGINT man's analysis of it Put these two down and then you can begin to develop credibility Can't develop it I would say you're a better expert on this at the moment having looked at the..... than almost anybody else.

Mr. G. I think Renee knows more about the subject than anybody else What you've said about sending the experts ~~Renee~~ for the Pfiab briefing.

R: Lou Grant and [REDACTED]

G: Understand they took down the traffic, the worksheets, and members of the PFIAB (spell out)

B: I don't even recall that PFIAB investigation. PFIAB would,,, I appeared before PFIAB on a number of matters.

O don't recall whether I appeared before them in connection with this or not. Does the record show that I did.

No, Lou said that it happened in October after all the incidents were over with and to quote him, he said they were on a witch hunt to in other words the burden was that NSA was wrong in September at that time in 1964 and there was a prepared statement -- they planned to allot 10 or 15 minutes for statement to them. JHe and [REDACTED] went

down. [REDACTED] being the actual He was the man who worked the system HThey got down there and read

GEN B

I don't recall who that was I mentioned earlier when we were talking informally I recall vaguely the criticality of translation in anything related to Vietnamese language.

G: [REDACTED] would have figured ...

R: Well anyway they got down there and read exactly two sentences out of the prepared statement and then they spent he thinks a full hour or more doing crypt problems with members of the committee actually down around a table working on the system. Apparently this ended the postmortems'

GEN B: I don't recall that postmortem at all We were often involved in this sort of thing. In addition to putting the expert down there If I would call supervisory participation or required there was usually anywhere from one to four key individuals between the director and that particular cell where something might have taken place. If you needed something besides a specific ...

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prod, his head civil service employee, you get down below that in the case of South East Asia at that time, I think in B group Milt Zaslow. You've got 3 or 4 if you want to send down a top flight individual who participates in the overall management aspects in an investigation of that kind the Director is probably one of the worst guys you could
laughters
sneered in terms of knowledge of supervision of that particular thing.

G: That's what Lou said

R: Yes

G: PFIAB does not want policy briefings

R: right

G: ..want more knowledge...

R: The idiot treatment was his exact words.

G: the traffic and the codes

B: You don't ask the chairman of the board to fix a carburetor.

G: General do you recall participating in any discussions at the Pentagon or Pfiab on the Gulf of Ton Kin incidents?

B: Nomy recollections, which I have time and again had to admit are vague as to detail were all internal in the agency itself, I don't recall any downtown so to speak I have an idea that probably the US Intelligence Board the Director, normally myself, and occasionally Lou Tordello, would represent the agency at the USIB meetings, but it was normal practice for the director to attend personally. I don't recall specific discussions there There must have been some I don't recall any And you mentioned in this document here -- this first chapter concern about what China would do and so forth and the recollection that sticks in my mind not just in this particular period but over the period of my USIB participation with respect to intelligence view of China the thing that seemed to stick out the most was concern over reconnaissance photography and the lack of it primarily because of weather. The areas in particular question - South China - characterized by long periods and a great deal of the time weather either from an overflight reconnaissance or satellite photography. And this kept cropping up repeatedly I remember Mr. Mc Cone. This was almost a pet

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subject with him. When would we get some photography Very little concern about the SIGINT indications What sticks in my mind we were of course working with [] targets and all that sort of thing but the thing that the board was fretting about the most was photography for south China. This was really the broad question What can [] do. In other words what's their posture which hopefully good intelligence can give you more difficult and I think related to this Ton Kin thing if I may say so is the question of intent. It's very well and good to analyze tracking but it's another question to say is it offensive or defensive.

G: Going back to Renee's vol. I do you recall anything on the various pressures designed to...

R: That was my next question...

B: Designed to what....

G: get North Vietnam to desist in supporting the communist activity in the south

B: No I don't recall any pressure at all that came to NSA to do anything but the best job that we could in producing SIGINT. We were largely insulated from high level discussion. I never attended a discussion above the level of the USIB

G: A question of intelligence support for some of these pressure actions.

B: Well there was considerable pressure to increase our coverage in South East Asia. I think the record will be a better testimony of that in terms of personnel Somewhere in this period while I was there I think probably it must have been before these incidents. we set up new offices in SAIGON and [] was I believe the first man in charge of it. As far as the demand for resources committed against South East Asia this was -- if you are referring to that kind of pressures -- yes there's a lot of it in terms of manpower allocations, budgets, putting in new stations, Phub Bai for example-- That pretty well built up.....

G: What I was referring to in the press is that the U.S. participated in against North Vietnam. the Laotian ops.

R: DE SOTO patrols and Laotian air ops also.

B: I recall vaguely the setting up of the DE SOTO patrol but I don't recall any pressure was designed to trigger some

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sort of reaction. It was a way of getting better SIGINT as far as we were concerned. Whether there was any other intent behind it I rather doubt. I don't think there was that Machiavelian in retrospect. It's amazing something and amusing to read operational messages long after the fact. You wonder about the intent. You have to consider the level of message who might write the message... was it DIRNSA who said this or was it somebody 4 or 5 echelons below...

B: I'm sure DIRNSA said lots of things UI never knew about.

G: Attributions to the head man always are

B: I'm sure there are many cases where you wouldn't remember where in fact you saw the message and said Yeh that makes sense depending primarily on the ability of the guy who wrote the message when your own personal knowledge the message was in fact was exactly right. I'm sure there are messages where the expert honestly believes this is a proper message persuades his supervisors which might or might not include DIRNSA that the message should be sent and a year later shown that message says that's a stupid message, I shouldn't have sent it. It turned out to be some other way. It was Monday morning quarterback backing you never lose a game.

G: Renee and I decided we were not going to ask you detailed questions.

B: I don't mind you asking them but it's obvious that

G: If you've had time to think back over your relationship to these events

B: Well I'm willing to testify that I have to these broad considerations but that's only the buildup of resources on South East Asia (garbled).

G: We've covered that fairly well in documents...

I think the record shows that better than any recollection that any recollection one wants to talk about. There are fragments of specifics that stand out if you're involved enough in them personally. Phu Bai is not in question here but just as an example of very close personal attention to particular points. I recall spending a lot of time and even making a trip to South East Asia associated with many matters, but this was one uppermost in my mind. Was Phu Bai a safe place for a SIGINT detachment that would bother me and yet the decision as to whether the answer was yes or

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willingness of the commander to say yes it can be put there and I think it can be defended and I'm willing to see to it that it is defended. These are the -----that DIRNSA has to have. to say Yes Phu Bai is a place where it can be placed. That was one that I was involved in in a very personal sense

G: It turned out to be a very successful field station.

G: Well it's long since that analysis but I think there's enough history under the bridge to indicate that those who advised me Yes it can be there were right. I can't help of course when this current offensive started when it gets down close to Hue and I hear references in the paper about the U.S. activity at Phu Bai I assume they're talking USA whatever the number is I've forgotten the number of it. Whatever is the number of it.

R: 626

G: That was the one that...626 was the one that you got established at Saigon

B: What's Phu Bai

G: USM 808 but when you were at NSA that was still called USM 626J

R: Yeah because they got a couple of bronze stars out of this Ton Kin flap. 4]4T was in the next room. They got two bronze stars

B: I don't know where the raw traffic came from. I don't expect that San Miguel and Phu Bai perhaps Monkey Mt. at Da Nang aside from the Destroyer stations probably would have furnished raw traffic for this whole exercise.

R: The destroyer didn't get anything

Mr. G: Renee and I were glimpsing the mistakes in the current literature -- this is one of them/ Various writers attribute to the ship's black box detachment the intercept.

R: Fortunately they've never caught on. But current with this thing were the [redacted] which came down on the 6th of August to Phuc Yen. USA 32 picked that up and put a critic out on it [redacted] reversed the CRITIC invalidated it - NSA invalidated [redacted] all taks at once (the [redacted] came in with the scoope

Mr. G: B you mentioned Phuc Yen in this background paper [redacted]

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But they came down to Phuc Yen later on didn't they?

R: 6th of August

G: Right after the tretaliation.

R: In fact in one of the McNamara briefings on the 5th of August when the press weas asking about the retaliation Mr. Secretary what do you think will be the Chinese reaction to these bombings and he said I think they might snd fighter a/c south to the DRV Yes I think that would be a likely reaction He knew they were coming anywasy.

B: The reason I recall that they did come to Phuc Yen - I hadn't associated it with the dates you describe here ^{in memory} ^{ve just} but I had a son flying F-4s over there at the time and as a matter of fact a little later on I think in65 as I recall he shot down one of the first MIGS and so the operational change at Phuc Yen kind of stuck in my mind The fact that ist was related to the retaliation - I didn't remember that'

Mr. G: I think in all fairness they were coming down one way or another

R: Oh Yah that might have sjpeeded it up

B: The impression I get f-om this is that they were going to Phuc Yen whenever the north felt they might be useful

R: Right. That's the whole point tin the tree volumes to me is to downplay Ton Kin even though its the tiele subject These open press people have all indieacted that that hole messstarts with Ton Kin AMD THE POINT IN my whole presentationis that it didn't,.

Gen B: I think i'll step doewn the jhall if you don't mind

INTERMISSION

B: Are you sure babout that or are you just speculating on it.

Mr. G: I found it in the testimony

B: Well I know but have you ever been called upon to testify before Congress or PFIAB or somebody like that

Well I'll tell you what happens and I'll bet you its what hapened to McNamara's case . OK I got to go see the PFIAB

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what about - well about the Dunlap spy case I remember that one with much more clarity because I was more personally involved you see than I do this Ton Kin Gulf -- That was just one more flap rapidly overtaken by someother flapso but what happens is that you get busy and do your nhomework and it wouldn't startle me a damm bit if the first time Robser McNamaragot together the SIGINT inputs to the statements he made a long time earlier was when he got ready to testify several years later He seid Hey give me the poop and so they bring in the poop and he starts looking it over and sez Hey I can hang my hat on that so don't be under any illusions that sombebody like Robert McNamara or anybody is going in from a fairly high level supervisory to testify before Congressor the PFIAB or anybody else is going to be dealing from clear cut memory of what happened at the fime He going to go back and get the record He's going to get the people in that were involved He's going to prime hisself Hje's going to learn well the things that will hslp himand he' s going to forget the things that don't help him not deliberately ubut just because jou know He can only remember fso much - don't fool with that, that doesn't have anythin g to do with what I'm trying to put across

G: He's only human

B: Thats right so-----Well I know on other occasions not having to do you know with a flap of this kind just straight old budget things you know hes goin g to present the budget of some kind He has to do some homework so he reads up on it. He talks to people gets a few things firmly in mind that can be useful and goes in and goes to work

B: Well I'm afraid I haven't helped you much Renee ~~Everyxkixkixkix~~ Every little bit I guess--

R: Every little bit yes

G: You'd be jsurpesed how many incomplete records were working on and how the person thats acquiring all these incomplete records-----remember-----

B: I suppose youve ~~gax~~ you can just lay one on top of the other like a matrix and if you bdrop a ball on top and it goes all the way through it will signify that everybody has the same hole 8 or]0 people all agree well there's a ohole there And if the ball goes all the way through to the bottom - that not bad but if the ball doesn't

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get more than 2 matrices down before somebody sez no it wasn't that way, it was some other way then you can forget it. Its a correlation I suppose between statistically suffiecient poor memores. xMinoxixxfaxixx might in fact produce a fact.

R: That's quite true.

G:Also its important to us to some extent to know what it is that you don't say .

B: I suppose it could be historically significant that to me in memorty ithis was just another flap

R: That's right

B: You know, either it wasn't all that gigantic you know as some high level conspracy to launch a retaliation certainly
at least not at my level

G: thr pressure was off for at least two years.

B: It seems to have commanded more attention in retrospect than at the time.

R: At the time...

B: ~~we had no intention~~ would be my analyses of it just as a recollection.

R: We had no intention of going into any controversey when I started this.

B: Took a long time for it to get important

R: ---after I first started.

B: I don't know when this first came to my attention as the kind of flap that you now have

In other words a key element. *in the escalation of the war I don't recal l at the time it representing that*
Maybe at the time it did represent that but but if it was it didn't stick in my mind you know that heres this
supercritical a point here at which did some guy come out with a torpedo boat with evil intent in mind or was he
just steeming up and down the coast. mI don't have the slightest recollection of the criticality of that -- looking
back at that particular time.

R: *wel that bears out my thesis that it was unimportant at the time.*

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G: Lets switch subjects. I warned you that I might try it.

Right after the flap that we have been talking about there was a great deal of attention given to a U.S. bombing program against North Vietnam.

B: In Sept you mean

That would be

R: Rolling Thunder.

G Many Many people in government thought the bombing program would begin about January 1965 Others felt that perhaps that South Vietnam was not politically or militarily strong enough at that time to resist an all out invasion from North Vietnam. They argued that the bombing program should proceed somewhat later.

B: I don't recall any participation at all in that kind of discussion

G: I'm wondering about the SIGINT programs which might have been.

B: Well I recall Rolling Thunder of course I don't remember when it started but

March 65am I going too far asked for you?

B: Doesn't have anything to do with the Ton Kin Gulf but you're trying to soak up all of South East Asia

I guess. the things I recall SIGINT wise, and this may have been just personal interest in this sort of thing was the question of warning as far as air craft crews are concerned I suppose I have to admit that having a maybe stooging? around there at the time may have sharpened my interest. I don't really think so Having been an aviator all my life I think I'm reasonably honest in saying that this sort of thing always interested me How SIGINT can be of direct support Of course it gets involved in how do you screen it You have to get back to the air operations activity somehow and let them take some action which doesn't give away your whole operation and that's fairly tricky sometimes But there was this sort of thing cooked up. I remember visiting Da Nang and places like that and sort of looking personally at the reporting procedures and how they would get word back to Well they had to go all the way back to Sai Gon for it and that struck me as -- a I suspect -- I don't recall it precisely but my guess is that that would strike me as a little cumbersome in terms of the time involved and so on

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and so forth -but thats really up to the theatre air commander - he should can't second guess him on that

TT: Did you get personally involved in any of the discussions when they were working out the air warning system?^{tp aor}

the SAM warning system: This was of course generated...

B: Not personally except keeping track of it -- knowing that we were doing it and I do recall talking to some returnees I don't remember who this was? or even where about the degree of comfort that this may have given him and he thought it was great stuff He didn't have the foggiest notion - I remember this -- how it happened you know but he said We used to get these tip offs - you know very often - but he didn't - and I just sort of chuckled to myself you know a great deal of satisfaction that the operation that I was involved with this kid up there all by himself with a fighter strapped to his butt you know I appreciated it. At DIRNSA level you kind of search for those -- something you can bite into --

TT: Well the point is that the discussion became quite hectic between PACAF and 7th Air Force and pacsectyreg and how much security we would be willing to compromise

B: I recall that -- those kinds of arguments - I don't recall in this context but I recall distinctly my penchant for risking security I usually tended to line up a little bit against our own experts Look we've put a lot of dough in this and if we can't deliver something that helps at the other end . We got to take a little risk now and then that's my general philosophy and it didn't always set well I recall that Each case was a case of its own You can't decide these policy wise How good your source is and how much cover you can put into it that has a hell of a lot to do with it Each one is separate and distinct You're subject to twin pressures the operations fellow at the other end of the line You know he wants ^{give him} a ranch in Kansas and your SIGINT expert who hasn't the foggiest notion about what it means to fly over Hai Phong or Ha Noi. He sets there you know and he's got this little scrap of evidence and he wants to make it bigger and he's desperately afraid that that will go away if it's used at all. He tends to hoard it you see It's like the spendthrift and the miser fighting with each other over operational use.

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G: Think they pretty well decided in favour of operational use.

B: Im sure we did but I don't recall the. But it was ~~an~~ an NSA decision it did = may have made it personally

I don't recollect or I may have influenced it by my preaching to people like Milt Zaslow Never had trouble with Milt on tMilt was a believer on this sort of thing In those days he was Mr. South East Asia When I sogo oup there now I still say Miltie hows our war department? Uncle Miltie Hows our war going Last time unfortunately it wasn't going to o welo He siad ther re coming in the windows

G: Thats about the size oif it

GB: There back at that same junction again and this time he 's had a lot of F-4 experience - spent 3 years of Egglound in the Tactical Air Warfare center in air to air missile weaponry so hes a real pro now/ and naturally they turned to him and asaid OK youre one of our top flight strike commanders you can gaet that damm bomb on target

and hes getting it on target but I cross my fingers of course Nsty war shame it lasted so long

G: and R agree

Guess I'd better joint M--- now if we've just reached the point of hjust reminiscing.

I know you don't want any more of that I have to read some of these books There hard to get I suppose aren't they

R: No I bought them all in the booksotre They may be sold out by now

They ujust latched on to a discrepancy - the anti war critics - and are just blowing it up

G: This is all there are...

R: !° !° Wdel Dr. Tordello stoped me in the hall the other day and said theres another letter in from Fulbright To SECDEF - and he want that raw traffic - Dr. Tordello is tstill holding out against giving it to him I agree he shouldn't see it.

B: I trust Lou's judgement in this as always but I can't get ex ited about Fulbright Ive had to shut my

adrenalin off - think he comes close to being a traitor maybe unintentionally but hes too smart for that thats 24
wahat I keep telling myself I ranted and railed on Fulbright - my wife will tell you this -- Whe'll also tell you

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I see him gone strangely silent on this the question of Sen the Senator. And that is I've decided not to waste my adrenalin on him and I'd let him have the damm traffic and let him fulminate and all that - it wouldn't worry me a damm bit. n- To hell with you I'm through worrying about you Your's a menace - you have your influcence and cause a lot of trouble but I've got no more adrenaline to waste on you

TT: He can sure keep the soup stirred thought

B: Yeah thats right. If he wouldnd up to be Secretrary of State aI'm afraid I'd say well that a sad day for America and i'd shut my adrenaline off even more laughter and garbles He leaves me cold

G: Well we want to thank you

R: Yes we do, THANK YOU

B: Appreciate the.....

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