2. Cortina: A 26 Feb report from Major General Shimizu, the Japanese Military Attache in Italy, casts some light on the German attitude toward Fascist Italian intelligence activities. The message is garbled, but the gist seems to be as follows:

"The Chief of Military Intelligence in the Italian National Defense Ministry, Foschini [unidentified], is a person of great ability. He had completed his radio interception system, and had made an agreement to cooperate closely with us Japanese and to place intelligence at our disposal. Recently, however, he was suddenly dismissed, and that type of activity has, as a result, been curtailed.

"When I talked with Mussolini [on 29 Jan], he said that Foschini had organized a large-scale Intelligence Department, and that as a result the Germans were keeping a close watch on him. According to Foschini himself, the tremendous new Italian intelligence organization did not conform to the ideas of the head of the German Abwehr in Italy.

"An intelligence section of such size was out of proportion when compared with the small Italian Army contemplated by the Germans, and probably clashed with Germany's ideas.

"They [apparently] the Italian Fascists [are being]
watched closely. It appears that there are many things about Chief of Staff Gambara which require a certain amount of watching."

Note: On 12 March Gambara was relieved of his post as Chief of Staff "for reasons of health."