I. Scope of Report.

The cover letter states that although the original intent had been to study the communications intelligence activities and the level of cryptographic sophistication of the non-English speaking countries of the world, because of the sensitivity of the information to be compiled in the cryptographic phase, the report has been limited solely to the Comint activities of foreign powers.

Comint activities have been divided into two separate fields:

1. Special intelligence efforts (considered to include the ability of a country to read the encrypted messages of another country even though the process involves methods other than cryptanalysis).

2. Traffic intelligence efforts (considered to deal with the ability of a country to locate and identify the call signs, procedures or other externals of traffic used by another country.)
CONCLUSIONS

A recapitulation of the foregoing data shows that the following nations are probably engaged in Comint activities to the extent indicated:

**LARGE SCALE:**

**MODERATE SCALE:**

**SMALL SCALE:**

**MINOR SCALE:**

EO 3.3(h)(2)
PL 86-36/50 USC 3605
V. COMMENTS

1. The report is not so comprehensive, detailed or informative as had been expected from such a study, nor do the possible sources seem to have been exhausted.

2. The study is apparently limited to post-World War II material. It would appear, however, that this limitation has impaired the information available for such countries as the World War II and pre-World War II Comint effort was strong and there is possibility of its resurgence or reactivation has actually taken place.

3. The list of names of persons engaged in Comint activity is limited and the information about each is extremely brief. Some misspellings were also noted:

4. The chart setting forth known or suspected special intelligence efforts of each nation as regards the systems of other nations as mentioned in paragraph 202 as an appendix is missing.

5. It is believed that such a study might better be undertaken by a person from AFSIA who is thoroughly versed in Comint activity rather than by a person from the Central Intelligence Agency.

6. The wording of para 204 on the Comint effort is difficult to understand. Since this is an important paragraph, the wording should be particularly clear.

EO 3.3(h)(2)
PL 86-36/50 USC 3605
"203. Considering the world-wide Comint picture it is quite evident that the majority of nations, while accomplishing a certain percentage of decryption through analysis, are following the least line of resistance and the old adage that "one crib is worth ten thousand assumptions." As a result we find that intercept coverage is essential to complement physical compromise of cryptographic material."

"204. Outstanding of the non-English speaking nations undoubtedly is the whose own security precautions and its apparent violently active Comint offensive belies its own cryptanalytic talents."

"205. The area appears to be well controlled insofar as traffic intelligence activities are concerned."

"206. In Latin America the only evidence available points to intercept activities in the"

"207. Needless to say the traffic of the United States is a major target for the Comint units of the leading powers. Those countries suspected of reading or attempting to read U.S. systems are as follows:

PL 86-36/50 USC 3605
EO 3.3(h)(2)