I. Introduction.

The majority of the "C" series dealt with the Japanese efforts at traffic analysis of American communications circuits. There were very few messages concerning Japanese cryptanalysis.

II. Traffic Analysis.

A. Philippines. Some of the traffic analysis messages dealt with the Leyte operation and anything related to it.

1. The Japanese paid special attention to Urgent ("U") messages and their addresses. Following are some examples:
   a. "T 1943 of the 8th a submarine on the 303U circuit sent an "U" wire (using a tactical code) which we think is a wire (reporting) the sighting of our reinforcements. This wire went from Hollandia to the Leyte area air force commander, the new Guina area air force commander-in-chief (at Mak) and to Leyte." (J-1205-0).
   b. "The commander of the 7th fleet, and others, have sent "U" wire reports. These messages were transmitted to the commander of the naval unit (1st advance) in the area of Leyte from the commander of the 7th fleet. There are strong indications that the naval units reinforcing around Guina have made a rally in the 'Philippines area'. (J-1315-0).
   c. "There is a 113-group, 3 message thought to be an order, sent the 21st at 0600, addressed to the Task Force, the commander of the 7th fleet, MacArthur, and the Hollandia base (sender's name omitted). This message was relayed from the Hollandia base to air installations in the New Guinea area and to two powerful stations which are unidentified." (0901-6).

2. Miscellaneous analyses concerning the Leyte Campaign:
   a. "There appears to be just one unit in the Carolinas area and one in the Louenau or Hollandia area, which we assume is to be transport units headed for the Leyte area." (J-1605-1).
   b. "Since the 19th, there have been evidences of reinforcements being moved from New Guinea to Leyte. We have heard two naval positions of powerful commanders since the 19th, and traffic has been brisk. Incoming and outgoing wireless traffic by units which we take to be under the 7th fleet has been brisk. There is activity of units from the Palau area headed towards Leyte." (J-2750-3-6).

3. Future Operations. The Japanese were especially concerned with happenings around the 'Oriens-Uilthi area' which they call 'the central area'. There were communications phenomena which led them to believe that large-scale operations were beginning from that area.
   1. "The planes and ships of the enemy task force which attacked the Manila area on the 5th and has gradually withdrawn were detected near Uilthi on the 10th. It is almost certain that they returned to this area. The Commander of the powerful force assembling in the Uilthi area maintains frequent signal contact by means of "U" messages, with the Commander of the aforementioned task force and with the various commanders of operational forces in the 'Philippines area'." (C-831-6-1).
   2. "There has been a great deal of traffic between the commander of the Pacific Fleet, task force commander, MacArthur, the 7th fleet commander,
It seems that the urgent movement of troops into the Ulithi area is still being continued. (J 726-5)

3. "On the 12th signal activity indicating movements of ships towards the Ulithi area of the Mariana Islands by way of the Seven area of the Marshall 'archipelago becomes extremely vigorous." (J-162-5-3)

4. "It appears that the time for the rally by the troops massed at Ulithi is approaching. The task force commander in this aforementioned area seems to have completed the urgent communication relating to the next operations, with all areas." (J-789-9-C)

5. "On the 18th messages were sent from Ulithi and Saipan and there were many messages addressed to the Task Forces. It is necessary to pay attention to them as things which seem to indicate the future movements of the units concentrated in the same area." (J-1840-C)

- Attached. The Japanese study all the air communications networks, but they are now especially interested in the prediction of B-29 raids. Message J-3453-A-I sent from Rangoon to Tokyo on 26 November gives an analysis of the communications of the 20th Bomber Command. Some high points of this message are:

1. "They can be distinguished from transports by a study of air ground communications which are addressed to a number of planes every day."

2. "Reinforcement planes are indicated by the code word "C102" and planes in the main Bomber Command as "FX.""

3. "Then the B-29's move from the Calcutta bases to the bases around Chengtu for an attack against Japan, incoming and outgoing traffic, with the call sign of the B-29 bases on the American communications system, increases sharply, and the air ground communications system also shows active use. The same is true on their return."

4. "In general, before an attack, there is a restriction of traffic to Chengtu."

5. "They use the code term "G4" for air ground liaison."

III. Cryptanalysis. The messages mentioned below were intercepted between May and September 1944, but were not translated until November.

1. Messages C-360, C-676, and C-675 deal with cooperation between the Japanese and Finns in cryptanalysing Allied codes. It appears that the Finns were willing to cooperate, provided that the Japanese would give the Finns as much cryptanalytic material as they received.

2. Strips were mentioned in C-622 and C-672. The strips mentioned were O-5, 38-1, 7-1, and "Z". They appear to be strips used by the U. S. State Department at one time.

3. The "PEC code" is mentioned in C-926, a radio from Tokyo to Singapore, 3 May 1944, in which they say: "will send the PEC code after we reproduce it."

4. C-925-A-I, Tokyo to Singapore, 31 May 44, is particularly interesting. They give details of the indicator enipherment for the British Inter-service Cipher and "QM" Cipher. They also say: "we believe that the codes used by the U. S. Air Forces are not strip systems, but, rather, employ the B-209. Since we are making a full investigation of this matter, please send us all messages received at Rangoon (from the very first one)."