MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD (ATTENTION: COLONEL COLLINS)

SUBJECT: Peterson's Farewell Address

1. It is the purpose of this memorandum to explore the organic reasons for the difficulties which have beset AFSA since its establishment, and to recommend courses of action to overcome these difficulties. The total effect of the difficulties described herein has been to reduce AFSA from a strong coordinating authority with considerable directive power to a coordinating authority subject to committee debate and veto. The operational result is that AFSA is gradually losing its capacity to serve the Services, either collectively or individually.

2. The documents issued as Enclosures to J.C.S. 2010/6 have caused considerable difficulties.

   a. The format and content of the Appendix to the Enclosure to the basic J.C.S. 2010 are those of a charter. The duties, responsibilities, and limitations of the Director, AFSA, and APSAC are therein clearly and completely spelled out by the Secretary of Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

   b. The one point which was left partially unresolved by J.C.S. 2010 was the specific division of responsibility between AFSA and the Services. Paragraph 2a contains a detailed statement of the facilities, units, and personnel to be included in AFSA. Paragraph 3a(6) indicates that the individual Services will retain responsibility for such activities as are required by intra-Service or joint needs and are determined by the Joint Chiefs of Staff not to be the sole responsibility of AFSA. Specific determination of these activities should have been included in J.C.S. 2010/10 and J.C.S. 2010/11 in accordance with J.C.S. 2010 and in conjunction with statements of facilities and personnel to be made available to AFSA to perform its activities.

   c. The documents issued as Enclosures to J.C.S. 2010/6 changed AFSA from a unified organization to a joint organization, because powers were transferred to APSAC from the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Director, AFSA. J.C.S. 2010 establishes APSAC WITHIN AFSA and makes the Director, AFSA, its Chairman, with sufficient direct authority from the Joint Chiefs of Staff to enable him to organize and operate
AFSA for the benefit of the Armed Forces. J.C.S. 2010/6 interposes AFSAC between the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Director, AFSA, who is reduced to being the Executive Agent of AFSAC. Specific manipulations by which this mutation was effected are shown in Enclosure "A" herewith.

3. Certain provisions of the "Policy on Budgetary and Procurement Responsibilities for Cryptologic Activities" are causing unnecessary difficulties in developing balanced programs and plans, particularly in communication security activities. The division of responsibility makes the Services responsible for budgeting for crypto-equipments and AFSA responsible for budgeting for crypto-material to be used therewith; as long as this situation maintains, fiscal authorities completely outside the cryptologic field in any Service can disrupt the balance of cryptographic programming and produce serious inequities. Individual Service requirements assume greater importance than unified Service requirements. The inability of AFSA to influence and coordinate quantitative requirements weakens its ability to determine qualitative requirements. The inability of AFSA to influence quantities may also lead to the charge by a Service that AFSA is unable to meet the Service's requirements, and that the Service can therefore establish a COMSEC agency of its own, as the Air Force has already suggested. AFSA has been unable to take a position of control over the manner in which Service requirements can be met. The diffusion of procurement outside AFSA leads to delay, ineffectiveness, and insecurity. In this connection, the absence of centralized procurement authority in AFSA is militating against the possibility of AFSA's securing the industrial space and critical materials needed for mobilization.

4. Although the division of responsibility between AFSA and the Director, Communications-Electronics, has been clearly defined, the division has not worked out clearly in implementation. There is a serious threat to AFSA, for example, in the insistence of JCEC upon a dominant position with respect to military characteristics in communication security equipment. The responsibilities of JCEC in this field are extremely limited, but the action which they propose will remove from the Director, AFSA, the authority to establish
the plans and policies with which he is charged, will destroy the effectiveness of the AFSA Technical Committee, and may lead to the adoption of unworkable and insecure military characteristics through the action of communicators unfamiliar with security requirements. Considerable delay in coordinating reports through the Director, Communications-Electronics has also hampered action by AFSA.

5. A separate paper, attached as Enclosure "B" has been prepared exploring the possibility of creating a unified cryptologic command. Such a step, substituting an Executive Agent for AFSC, would remedy many of the difficulties pointed out in the preceding paragraphs, as the attached study shows.

6. It is realized that many of these difficulties stem basically from traditional and real variations in procedures and requirements among the three Services. It is not the purpose of this memorandum to go beyond the immediate cryptologic area in documenting the difficulties which have beset AFSA. However, it is impossible to exclude a comment regarding a basic weakness of the National cryptologic structure in the absence of firm policy determination at the highest levels. It is believed that many of the impediments resulting from this situation can be remedied by having a single Department of Defense representative on USCIB, rather than representatives of the individual military Services as at present. USCIB should be reconstituted so as to include a representative from the Department of Defense and the Department of State (with the Director, Central Intelligence as Chairman) acting in an executive capacity to the National Security Council to the extent specific authority is delegated with respect to cryptologic matters. NSCID #9 should be revised to delete the prohibition against the application of other National Security Council Intelligence Directives to cryptologic matters.

7. In view of the preceding comments, the following action appears to be necessary:

a. Secure cancellation of J.C.S. 2010/6 and promulgation of a directive to the effect that AFSA and AFSC will function as prescribed in J.C.S. 2010.

b. Secure revision of the "Policy on Budgetary and Procurement Responsibilities."
g. Eliminate JCSC domination over COMSEC matters.

h. Secure the establishment of a unified cryptologic command.

j. Reconstitute USCIB with single Department of Defense representation, with Department of State representation, and with the Director, Central Intelligence as Chairman.

A. C. PETERSON
Colonel, Artillery
Chief, APEA-12

Enclosures - 2
"A" - Sources of Power of AFSAC
"B" - Applicability of Unified Command Plan to Cryptologic Activities
1. Paragraph 1 designates AF SAC as the Agency of the Joint Chiefs of Staff charged with insuring the most effective operation of AFSA.

2. Paragraph 4 puts AF SAC under authority of Joint Chiefs of Staff.

3. Paragraphs 4a and 4c charges AF SAC with DETERMINING policies, operating plans, etc., for AFSA (referring them to Joint Chiefs of Staff only "when required").

4. Paragraph 4b charges AF SAC with coordinating and reviewing Service-operated COMINT facilities not operated by AFSA.

5. Paragraph 4f provides that AF SAC should forward to the Director (its Chairman) its decisions, for implementation.

ENCLOSURE "B"

6. Paragraph 3a directs DIR AFSA to implement, without reference to the Joint Chiefs, unanimous recommendations of AF SAC which are determined by AF SAC not to involve major changes of policy and which can be accomplished within the limitations of authorized facilities, personnel and fiscal and logistic support.

7. Paragraph 3d directs DIR AFSA to distribute his COMINT product in accordance with policies determined by AF SAC.
8. Paragraph 4a requires DIRAFSA to submit operating plans, etc. to AFSA who may or may not forward them to the Joint Chiefs of Staff (See item 6 above).

9. Paragraph 4a limits DIRAFSA's formulation and implementation of operating plans, etc. to those for AFSA.

10. Paragraph 5a(6) gives AFSA the authority to approve additional cryptologic activities to be done by the Services; no indication is given as to whether this is an exception to the paragraph cited in item 6 above.

11. Paragraph 5b says service cryptologic activities are subject to continuing review by AFSA.

12. Paragraph 11 requires DIRAFSA to submit a quarterly report to AFSA.
REPORT BY THE CHIEF, AFSA-12

to the
DEPUTY DIRECTOR, ARMED FORCES SECURITY AGENCY (AFSA-005)
on the

APPLICABILITY OF THE UNIFIED COMMAND PLAN
TO CRYPTOLOGIC ACTIVITIES

References:  
- a. J.C.S. 1259/27
- b. J.C.S. 1478/23
- c. J.C.S. 1885/6
- d. J.C.S. 2010 Series

THE PROBLEM

1. To review the Unified Command Plan (J.C.S. 1259/27) for the purpose of determining its applicability to the cryptologic activities of the Department of Defense.

FACTS BEARING ON THE PROBLEM AND DISCUSSION

2. For Facts Bearing on the Problem and Discussion, see Enclosure.

CONCLUSIONS

3. It is concluded that:

a. The Unified Command Plan is in many respects applicable to the cryptologic activities of the Department of Defense.

b. There are certain differences between the two concepts, notably:

   (1) The lack of an Executive Agent for AFSA.

   (2) The presence of a large unified operational force in AFSA Headquarters.

   (3) AFSA's lack of authority to coordinate the logistic and administrative support of its assigned intercept facilities, which may be considered as the "component forces" of AFSA.

   (4) The difficulty with which the Director, AFSA, exercises operational direction of his "component forces."

C. The following steps would be necessary to create a unified cryptologic command in accordance with the concepts of the Unified Command Plan:

   (1) The naming of an Executive Agent.
(2) The assignment to the unified cryptologic commander, as "component forces," the present unified AFSA and the entire cryptologic organizations of the Army, Navy and Air Force. Such units as were required to perform the cryptologic mission of the Services would be allocated, by the unified cryptologic commander, to the appropriate Service commanders.

d. The present status of unification of intelligence activities is such as to render very difficult the establishment of a unified cryptologic command in the immediate future.

RECOMMENDATIONS

4. It is recommended that AFSA-12 be directed to:

a. Draft a detailed plan for a unified cryptologic command,

b. Coordinate the plan with operational and fiscal elements of AFSA.

c. Present the completed plan to the Director, AFSA, for further action.
1. Appendix "A" contains a tabular presentation of the applicability of the Unified Command Plan to the cryptologic activities of the Department of Defense. The left-hand column contains pertinent quotations from the Unified Command Plan (J.C.S. 1259/27) outlining the duties and responsibilities of a unified commander; the right-hand column shows the division of these duties and responsibilities between AFSA and the Services, as outlined in the J.C.S. 2010 Series and as actually practiced.

2. AFSA is essentially a unified ORGANIZATION, not a unified COMMAND; however, the relationship of AFSA to the Joint Chiefs of Staff is comparable to that of a unified command. One of the principal differences is that a unified command has an Executive Agent, whereas AFSA has the Armed Forces Security Agency Council (AFSAC). (It should be noted that J.C.S. 2010/6, not J.C.S. 2010, interposes AFSAC between AFSA and the Joint Chiefs of Staff.) Nomination of an Executive Agent for AFSA would presumably be a formality easily accomplished. Appendix "B" quotes the Joint Chiefs of Staff "Definition of the Term and Delineation of Responsibilities of an 'Executive Agent of the Joint Chiefs of Staff'" (J.C.S. 1885/6), and suggests the effects of nomination of an Executive Agent for AFSA.

3. Although the Unified Command Plan was conceived to provide for the command of U.S. forces outside the United States, it has been adapted to the Strategic Air Command, which operates both in the United States and overseas, and it might well therefore be adapted to cryptologic activities.

4. The forces assigned to a unified command normally consist of components of two or more Services, each commanded directly by an officer of that Service. The comparable forces at AFSA's disposal are the worldwide fixed intercept facilities over which AFSA has operational direction. Exercise of this operational direction has proved difficult because of the demands of Service commanders (chiefs of the cryptologic organizations) not themselves under AFSA control that they have a hand in exercising such direction. This
anomalous situation would be corrected if AFSA were made a unified command whose component forces were the Army Security Agency (ASA), the Navy Security Group (NSG), and the Air Force Security Service (AFSS), thus making it possible to exercise unified command over all intercept facilities through an officer of the appropriate Service. This would be in consonance with paragraph 2 of J.C.S. 2010, which directs that the Headquarters, Army Security Agency, the Communications Supplementary Activity, Washington, and the comparable Air Force organization go into the initial composition of AFSA.

5. By the terms of J.C.S. 2010, certain cryptologic functions have been left under operational control of the Services. If the entire Service cryptologic headquarters and organizations were made "component forces" of a unified command, the forces to perform those functions would obviously be included therein. The unified commander would allocate specified units and facilities to the operational control of overseas Service or unified commanders for the performance of those functions reserved to the Services.

6. Each unified commander has a joint staff with appropriate members from the various components of the Services under his command in key positions of responsibility. The Director, AFSA, has such a staff, but in addition, he has a sizeable operating force similarly constituted. If AFSA became a unified command, this operating force would have to continue as at present if the full benefits of unification are to be realized. For organizational purposes, this operating force might be described as a portion of his joint staff, or as a number of subordinate unified commanders, in accordance with a provision of J.C.S. 1478/23 (Functions of the Armed Forces and the Joint Chiefs of Staff), paragraph 3 of Section III to the Annex, which states that the Joint Chiefs of Staff are "to establish unified commands in strategic areas when such unified commands are in the interest of national security, and to authorize commanders thereof to establish such subordinate unified commands as may be necessary."

7. In addition to his operational and strategic responsibilities, a unified commander has certain logistical and administrative responsibilities, including:

9. Preparing and submitting budget requests for his unified headquarters.
b. Through the separate commanders of his component forces, coordinating the logistic and administrative support of the component forces of the unified command.

c. Exercising only broad policy direction of operating details of any Service logistic support system, such support always to be provided by the appropriate Service.

d. Making recommendations for joint use of facilities, special procedures of supply, etc.

e. Reviewing requirements, and recommending priorities and programs for the component forces which will insure maximum economy of funds, supplies, facilities, and personnel and which will provide a maximum balanced program in furtherance of his joint mission, including:

(1) Comments on long-range planning for construction.

(2) Comments and recommendations on the priority and suitability of construction projects.

(3) Comments on cost estimates and budget requests.

(4) Comments on departmental allocation of funds (funding programs) following legislative action on the departmental budget requests.

(5) Comments on the adequacy or inadequacy of forces, facilities and stock levels.

(6) With Service concurrence, joint use of facilities in his command.

f. Forwarding the comments mentioned above, together with the comments of the component commanders concerned in case of non-concurrence, through his Executive Agent to the Services for their concurrence or reference to the Munitions Board. (In case of disagreement among the Services, all comments and recommendations are forwarded to the Joint Chiefs of Staff for resolution.)

8. J.C.S. 2010 does not deny the Director, AFSA, the authority to perform these functions. However, the dominant position of AFSC and the stringent provisions of the Policy on Budgetary and Procurement Responsibilities (AFSC 55/8) have made it very difficult for him to exercise any review or coordination of the overall cryptologic budget. No cryptologic planning can be put on a sound basis until the Director, AFSA, has the authority described in paragraph 7, nor can any assurance be given that the cryptologic activities of the Department of Defense are being carried out in the most effective manner.
QUOTATIONS FROM "UNIFIED COMMAND PLAN" (JCS 1259/27)

"The Joint Chiefs of Staff have prepared an overall plan for command of U.S. forces outside the continental United States. The objective is to attain a greater degree of unified command than now exists. They have reached agreement on all points."

"h. Each Commander operating directly under the Joint Chiefs of Staff will:

a. Make plans and preparations for execution of his assigned missions in event of a general emergency, and submit such plans to the Joint Chiefs of Staff for approval.

b. Coordinate his emergency plans with Commanders, operating directly under the Joint Chiefs of Staff, who, have contiguous field of responsibility and cooperate with them in the accomplishment of their assigned missions.

c. Make plans and preparations as practicable for the evacuation of U.S. Nationals in case of emergency from areas within or adjacent to his scope of command responsibilities to be implemented as directed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff."

"5. Unified command in each command will be established in accordance, so far as practicable, with Chapter 2, paragraph 12, of Joint Action of the Army and Navy, component forces consisting of Army, Navy and Air Force.

Forces assigned to a command will normally consist of two or more components and each will be commanded directly by an officer of that component."
Each unified commander will have a joint and appropriate
members from the various components of the Services under his command in
key positions of responsibility.

Commanders of component forces will communicate directly with
appropriate headquarters on matters which are not a responsibility of
unified command.

The assignment of forces and the significant changes therein
will be as determined by the Joint Chiefs of Staff."

"6. . . . . Missions and tasks of all independent commands will be
prescribed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Forces not specifically assigned by the Joint Chiefs of Staff will
remain under the operational control of the respective services.

For each command operating under missions prescribed by the Joint
Chiefs of Staff, the Chief of Staff, U.S. Army, the Chief of Naval Operations,
or the Chief of Staff, U.S. Air Force, as appropriate, will be designated to
act as the executive agent for the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

"7. In addition to their operational and strategic responsibilities, 
commanders of unified commands shall have the responsibility for coordination
of the logistic and administrative support of the component forces of their
unified command, and the provision of the maximum balanced program for
necessary military effectiveness and in furtherance of their missions.

Under wartime conditions and where critical situations make
diversion from normal logistic processes necessary the logistic authority
and responsibility of United States Commanders under the Joint Chiefs of
Staff are expanded to authorize them to utilize all facilities and supplies
all forces assigned to their commands as necessary for the accomplishment
of their missions under the currently approved war plan being implemented.
(Responsibility for logistic support to component forces in these commands
remains with the department responsible for that support.)

Under conditions short of war, scope of the logistical and adminis-
trative responsibilities exercised by the unified commanders will be consistent
with the peacetime limitations imposed by legislation, departmental regula-
tions, budgetary considerations, local conditions, and the procedures
enumerated hereinafter:

"a. Each unified commander shall prepare and submit budget
requests to the appropriate Joint Chiefs of Staff executive agent for the
operation and maintenance of his unified headquarters.
b. Each unified commander shall exercise coordination of logistical and administrative policies and procedures through the separate military commanders of their component forces.

c. The operating details of any service logistic support system will be retained and exercised by the Commanders of these services in accordance with their departmental instructions and under the broad policy direction of the unified commander.

d. Unified commanders shall make recommendations (see e below) for joint use of facilities, special procedures of supply, and any other matters they deem will lead to the effecting of economies consistent with military efficiency within their commands.

e. Unified commanders in their duties of coordination of logistic matters within their commands shall, among other things, review requirements, and recommend priorities and programs which will insure maximum economy of funds, supplies, facilities, and personnel and which will provide a maximum balanced program in furtherance of their joint missions. These shall include as appropriate and, inter alia, comments, recommendations and action in the following particulars:

1. Comments on departmental, service, and other long-range planning for construction of facilities and installations in their commands and their consonance with their strategic and operation plans.

2. Comment and recommendations on the priority and suitability of major construction projects and their consonance with their missions.

3. Comment on cost estimates and budget requests.

4. Comment on the departmental allocation of funds (funding programs) to his unified command following legislative action on the departmental budget requests.

5. Comment on the adequacy or inadequacy of forces, facilities, and stock levels.

6. With concurrence of services concerned joint use of facilities within their commands where military effectiveness, efficiency, and economy will be increased and interior or exterior administration will not be obstructed.

True within limits stated in comment on first sentence of paragraph 7.

True of AFSA Headquarters and fixed stations.

True of AFSA Headquarters. DIRAFSA might make recommendations for stations, but only within limits stated in comment on first sentence of paragraph 7.

True of AFSA Headquarters, but not of intercept facilities, except within limits stated in comment on first sentence of paragraph 7. (However, DIRAFSA has been asked to comment on Service cryptologic Public Works programs; these comments have usually been limited to facilities over which he has operational control.)
1. The comments, reviews and recommendations required of the unified commanders mentioned above, together with the comments of the component commanders concerned in cases of nonconcurrence shall be transmitted through respective executive agents for the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the services for their concurrence, or, where appropriate, for reference to Munitions Board. In case of disagreement among the services, all comments and recommendations shall be forwarded to the Joint Chiefs of Staff for resolution.

8. In cases where bases, installations, or activities under the operational control of one unified commander are assigned to another unified commander for other purposes, pertinent correspondence should be routed through both unified commanders, in order that each may be informed of conditions affecting their logistical and operational responsibilities.

9. It is not the intent of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to delineate specific geographic areas of responsibility for the carrying out of missions assigned to the commanders by the Plan........
POSSIBLE EFFECTS OF AN EXECUTIVE AGENT ON AFSA

QUOTATIONS FROM "DEFINITION OF THE TERM AND DELINEATION OF RESPONSIBILITIES OF AN EXECUTIVE AGENT OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF? (J.C.S. 1895/5)

"1. An Executive Agent of the Joint Chiefs of Staff is a member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to whom the Joint Chiefs of Staff have assigned responsibility and delegated authority, which would otherwise be exercised by them collectively, to carry out for them certain of those duties which accrue to them from the National Security Act of 1947 (as amended); from functions of the Armed Forces and the Joint Chiefs of Staff", approved by the President on 21 April 1948 (Annex to J.C.S. 1476 [23]); and from any subsequent authorizations as may be enacted or directed by competent authority."

"2. An Executive Agent may be designated to act for the Joint Chiefs of Staff in the exercise of their duties in relation to:

"a. A unified command."

"b. Certain operations, and specified commands."

"c. The development of special tactics, techniques, and equipment."

"d. The conduct of joint training."

"e. Such additional duties or elements thereof as may be assigned by competent authority in pursuance of Section 211 (b) of the National Security Act Amendments of 1949."

"3. Acting for the Joint Chiefs of Staff, an Executive Agent shall:

"a. Implement and comply with the policies and directives of the Joint Chiefs of Staff."

"b. Insure proper coordination with other commands and agencies as appropriate."

EFFECTS UPON AFSA

- Applicable to AFSA.

- Might somewhat reduce the independent authority of DIRAFSA.

- Might reduce the independent authority of DIRAFSA, but would facilitate some arrangements.
c. When required, provide the necessary administrative support for the agency for which he is the Executive Agent.

h. In the exercise of his responsibilities an Executive Agent shall:

a. Keep the Joint Chiefs of Staff informed of the major activities of the command or activity for which he is the Executive Agent.

b. Recommend to the Joint Chiefs of Staff action which they should take with regard to the command or activity for which he is the Executive Agent.

c. Except in an emergency, refer major operational decisions to the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Each emergency action of a major operational nature shall be reported promptly to the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

d. Refer to the Joint Chiefs of Staff for resolution of any matters of controversy between the Services.

In designating an Executive Agent, the Joint Chiefs of Staff shall reserve to themselves all decisions pertaining to the following:

a. The establishment of basic policies within the purview of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

b. The assignment of missions.

c. The issue of basic directives.

d. The allocation of major forces and military means.

e. Strategic guidance covering military aspects of international planning.

Probably not required by AFSA.

Not objectionable; he would probably only put cover letter on DIARFSA's Annual Report.

Would be helpful.

No difficulty.

No difficulty; might facilitate the handling of some problems.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff already operate AFSA in this manner.