THIRD U.S. Army

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Critique

Summary.

The enemy's formation of a mobile reserve in the northern portion of the Allied front was observed by the Third Army since early October, and TUSA expected a counter-offensive, but anticipated it as a unit spoiling attack in the north, not in TUSA's zone, unless southern operations force piecemeal commitment of this force, the Sixth Panzer Army. Sharing significance with its conception of the enemy's potentialities was TUSA's receipt and reporting of intelligence data. The striking feature in this connection were the indications that TUSA's data was acquired from higher commands, and not through TUSA's intelligence resources, and that TUSA regarded it as important and reported it in great detail in its daily 0-2 Periodics.

I. Development of the Mobile Reserve Concept.

The Third Army was long concerned with the mobile reserve concept, and noted its implementation and mutations in the form of the Sixth Panzer Army during the last two months prior to the Counteroffensive. Equally, TUSA considered the northern portion of the Allied front as the attack locale, not the southern. Counteroffensive possibilities were recognized, and one was expected, in the form of a spoiling attack, in the AACHEN-DÜREN sector (northern TUSA zone), unless the southern operations forced a divisions of the northern portioned reserve and its piecemeal commitment in the south. This reserve army was location was considered as of 15 December to be between DÜSSELDORF and OPLONGE. Actual dispositions, however, were a question mark, inasmuch as eight Panzer, three Para and 3 Infantry divisions were out of contact.

A chronology of the TUSA's opinion of the enemy potentiality briefly traces the development of the mobile reserve concept:

September.

The OCHTENANSCHLAG series were formed for the last-ditch defence of the RHINE, mostly on the Western front. Panzer Brigades were identified as another version of the Kampfgruppen device, but less battleworthy.

October.

The enemy's lack of mobile reserves was illustrated by the enemy's use of the panzer shuttle system for threatened areas in connection with TUSA's AACHEN battle, TUSA's NANCY salient, and TUSA's BELFORT Gap. On 11 October, the reformation of certain
Panzer and infantry divisions suggested the constitution of a strategic mobile reserve, the initial allusion to this concept. And, on the 25th, mention was made of a possible new Panzer Army's regrouping of battered Panzer divisions by 1 December, for use in the north, to stall the Allied advance for the winter on the WEST WALL or on the RHINE.

7 Nov.
Despite a Twelfth Army Group report that a force designated as Sixth Panzer Army was regrouping on 10 October in the BIELEFELD area, and TUSA's recognition of a considerable concentration of armor in NW German, TUSA thought that the Fifth Panzer Army remained as a candidate for such regrouping.

8 Nov.
WESTPHALIA as the location of the above force was initially made on this date.

12 Nov.
The strategic reserve would not be committed until the scope and objective of the Allied main effort had been determined.

15 Nov.
The Sixth Panzer Army divisions were designated for the first time as the 1 SS, 9 SS, 12 SS, and 30 Pz Lehr Division. None of the divisions had been contacted on the TUSA's front as yet. Sixth Panzer Army was regarded as the most important reserves, with certain Para divisions also re-forming the the North as an extremely formidable infantry reserve.

19 Nov.
The TUSA's envelopment of BIELEFELD and the Allied offensive on the Western front had compelled some of the WESTPHALIA mobile reserves to be moved to positions of tactical reserve. While no Sixth Panzer Army divisions had been contacted, indications were that some had moved.

26 Nov.
The RHINE was still the highest priority in strategy of the enemy. Note was taken that despite seriousness of enemy's situation, he had only moved the Sixth Pz Army from strategic to tactical reserve without committing it, nor had he committed re-formed Para divisions, nor were there large-scale enemy reinforcements. The view was stressed that the tactical Panzer reserve was in the North which the Germans apparently regarded as the most dangerous area.

3 December.
Allied still had the initiative, and while the enemy could launch a counteroffensive, it was unlikely at that time due to emergency commitment of one Panzer and three re-formed Para divisions, the critical fuel shortage, and the lack of training of the re-formed Panzer divisions. If his high November losses continued he would be forced to commit his Panzer and Para reserves piecemeal and/or draw upon VG divisions and other theaters.
10 Dec.

TUSA referred to actual withdrawal of two Panzer divisions from contact on the Allied line, as well as continued to hold the bulk of infantry reserve out of line. The reserve enabled a possible spoiling offensive. However, since September no such critical dilemma had perplexed the enemy as that confronting him currently, briefly, whether to employ the Sixth Panzer Army on the Northern front or the Southern, or split it on both, or to bring reinforcements from the Eastern front thus sacrificing it.

13 Dec.

As of this period, the enemy's dispositions were a question mark, just as such as 18 divisions were out of tact; 8 Panzer, 3 Para, and 3 Infantry. The Sixth Panzer Army was regarded as being West of the RHINE near COLOGNE. It was expected to launch a counter-offensive in the North, unless the Allied Southern operation compelled its diversion. The locale would be in the AACHEN-DÜREN sector.

15 Dec.

The Sixth Panzer Army was considered to be between DÜSSELDORF and COLOGNE, consisting of the 31, 2, 9, 10, 12 SS and 116 Pz Divisions. The 2 Panzer and 130 Pa Lehr Divisions were thought to be in the TRIER-KOBLENZ-MITTLEK area, and the 9 Panzer and 3 Pz Grenadier Divisions in the Sixth Army and VII Corps(TUSA) areas respectively.

TUSA concluded that the battered Panzer divisions were being reformed and refitted, but available to meet serious breakthrough threats. Also, his armor was being massed in tactical reserve presumably for a large-scale counteroffensive.

Analysis:

During early September the view was expressed that the GONITZDÄMMLING series were formed for the last-ditch defense of the REICH and most then would be used to defend Germany's Western borders. (1,2, 2-9 Sep) Several new Panzer Brigades, another version of the Kampgruppe device, but less battleworth, were identified by the First and Third U.S. Armies during the week of 9-16 September. (1,2, 9-16 Sep) Desperate resistance along the REICH's Western border was the enemy's action during the period 16-23 September, and he was unable to concentrate reserves for a major concerted offensive. (1,2, 16-23 Sep) During the last week of September four Panzer divisions were reported out of contact, but a captured document indicated their conversion into Panzer Brigades. (1,2, 23-30 Sep) The periodic of 4 October noted that the 2 and 130 Panzer Divisions and a Battlegroup of 1 SS Pz Division had been reported as reorganizing; a number of other divisions in addition to nine GONITZDÄMMLING were believed forming in GERMANY, but no new SS divisions; and, by 18 October the enemy could bolster his Western defense with the equivalent of eight divisions of reserves, any or all of which could be used against the Third Army. (1,3,4 Oct) During the second week of October the First U.S. Army's AACHEN battle forced a major transfer of German armor from HOLLAND, illustrating lack of mobile reserves, and the Third Army's NAXY salient and the Seventh Army's BELGIUM Gap also demonstrated the expedient "Panzer shuttle system" between threatened areas. (1,2, 7-14 Oct.) Furthermore, while this system contained the Western front to some extent, it did
not permit reconstitution of battered Panzer divisions nor the formation of a striking force large enough to mount a major counteroffensive, instead, the armor was committed piecemeal in defense. (Ibid.) However, the 11 October Periodic stated that the 1 SS, 2 and 130 Panzer, and 348 Infantry Divisions were reported as reforming, and elements of the 2 SS and 12 SS Panzer Divisions were believed to be reforming "for the possible constitution of a strategic mobile reserve." (I,B, 11 Oct.)

The concept of constituting a powerful strategic mobile reserve began to be stressed from approximately the middle of October, and was expressed as part of the summary of significant order of battle data for the week of 15-22 October and in the Periodic of the 18th. (I,A, 15-22 Oct; I, B, 18 Oct.) The former stated that the enemy's overall attitude continued defensive, that he would continue to delay and defend to gain time for such a reserve; the latter expressed the idea that poor quality forces such as MG and Fortress Battalions were substituting for more capable units to enable organizing such a reserve by reconstituting battered Panzer divisions. The latter thought was again expressed on 25 October, adding that such a reserve had not been created in the West. (I, B, 25 Oct.) On the next day, 26 October, the Periodic of that date discussed the subject of reserves and intervention forces in a section titled, New Pz Army. (I, F, 1) According to this issuance, reports from OKWANT mentioned the possibility of a new Panzer army grouping battered NORMANDY Panzer divisions, particularly SS formations; at least five such divisions had been in the REICH since early September; deserts tended to corroborate the reports by claiming the reformation of the 12 SS and 21 Pz Division at ARNSBERG (B2712) and the 1 SS Pz Division south of it. This commentary quoted from the Twelfth Army Group that Allied penetration had been sealed off and exploitation prevented by armor switching, but an enemy armored reserve was being built up and might form a powerful striking force of battered divisions by 1 December, to be presumably used in the north of the Western Front. This reserve might "enable the enemy to achieve his major objective of stalling the Allied advance for the winter at the Rhine or the Meuse." 18

A recapitulation of the enemy's situation was expressed in two documents, the TUSA G-2 Estimate 15, on 1 November, and the G-2 Periodic of 5 November. (II; I, A, 28 Oct-4 Nov) The chief importance of the former rested in the fact that 1 November G-2 Estimate was the last Estimate issued prior to the 16 December Counteroffensive, indicating that the G-2 Estimate was not used as a frequent statement of G-2 opinions. It expressed the view that seven Panzer and three Parachute divisions were undergoing reconstruction and were in immediate reserve in the West. They could be employed for local counterattacks to contain Allied forces "or for a general counteroffensive." The 5 November Periodic observed that during the past two months the enemy had considerably rebuilt his military structure in the West. By containing the Allied advances with very poor quality forces, the enemy permitted creation of
a strategic mobile reserve of rebuilt Panzer and Para divisions, which was strategically situated for immediate employment in the North. Control over remnants of broken infantry divisions and nondescript battlegroups was obtained by reorganizing them into regularly numbered regiments and divisions.

Note is taken that a particularized location and designation of the new Panzer army reserve force had not been stated prior to early November. The only stated purpose of it was offered on 26 October on which date the opinion was expressed that the force might stall the Allied advance for the winter on the WEST WALL or the RHINE. Its location, designation, and commanders identity were ascertained during November, and its mission and potentialities we are also assessed.

The 7 November Periodic stated that the Twelfth Army Group reported a deserter claiming the Sixth German Panzer Army, commanded by Sepp DIETRICH, was regrouping on 10 October in the BREMEN (958) area. (II, B, 7 Nov) Third Army stated that there was considerable concentration of armor in WEST GERMANY, chiefly represented by reforming divisions. But, "although the regrouping of Sixth German Pz Army is possible, Fifth German Pz Army also remains a candidate.

The initial mention of WESTPHALIA as the location of this force was made by the 8 November Periodic, which estimated the enemy had 600 tanks in the WEST, 400 of them in reserve in WESTPHALIA, and these reserve forces gave "the enemy the capability of launching a large-scale counteroffensive or reinforcing with powerful tank elements against an offensive anywhere in the WEST." (II, B, 8 Nov.) The mission of this reserve was more specifically announced in a 12 November summary of the enemy's Order of Battle for 5-12 November, which opined "that the strategic reserve in WESTPHALIA will not be committed until the enemy believes he has determined the scope and objective of the Allied main effort." (II, A, 12 Nov.)

On 15 November, reference was made to a 6 November photo reconnaissance which revealed heavy loading in and nearby PADERBORN (874), which might indicate "preparation for movement from that area." (II, C, 15 Nov.) In fact, this Periodic observed: "There is considerable evidence that Sixth Pz Army, with at least 1 SS, 9 SS, 12 SS, and 130 Pz Lehr Div and possibly 2 SS Pz Div, is reorganizing in the PADERBORN area.... The area PADERBORN-BIELFELD (868)-BUSTED (897) formed the WESTPHALIA triangle is estimated to contain at least four or five reforming Pz Div and two or more Inf Divs. Including is an estimated 500 tanks of all types. There are also an estimated 55,000 to 65,000 combat troops, probably in reforming Divs of Sixth Pz Army and 1 SS Pz Corps." None of the WESTPHALIA Panzer divisions had been contacted on the Third Army front so far, however, (II, B, 15 Nov.) The five Panzer divisions of the Sixth Panzer Army in WESTPHALIA were regarded as the most important of the enemy's overall reserves, and the next most important reserves were five
uncontested Panzer divisions in the Northern sectors of the Western
front, namely the 2, 9, 116 Panzer, 10 SS Panzer, and 15 Panzer Gren-
dier Divisions. In addition to the Panzer type there was "an extremely
formidable Infantry reserve" of five Para divisions reforming also in the
NORTH numbering 2, 3, 5, 6, 7. It was uncertain whether they would be
employed only in the north by the German First Para Army or "on some
other sector of the Western Front where good Infantry is needed."

Forced dispersal of the enemy's reserve was the fundamental point
out by the 19 November Periodic (I,A, 19 Nov.) The Third Army's en-
velopment of NETZ and the Allied offensive on the Eastern front had compelled
a break up of the mobile reserves by movement from WESTBALKA to positions
of tactical reserve in the most seriously threatened Eastern sectors.
While now of the Sixth Panzer Army division had been contacted, WE statements
and TAC/R indicated some movements. The 1 SS, 2 SS, 9 SS and 13 Panzer
Divisions had moved according to indications.

Current events, their significance and the enemy reaction were
summarized in the 26 November Periodic (I,A, 26 Nov) Defense of the
RUHR still holds the highest priority in the enemy's strategy. While advanced
of armor originally intended for coordinated employment under the Sixth
Panzer Army in the North the enemy apparently did not regard his situation
as critical. Although the 4th Panzer Army was transferred from
strategic to tactical reserve, the reformed Para divisions had not been
committed nor were there large-scale infantry reinforcements, all
indicating the enemy still did not consider the situation in the West
to have reached a critical stage, either for a counterattack to avert
destruction or to counteroffensive to force the Allies back. This
analysis of the enemy stressed the point that while certain Panzer
divisions under the German Fifth Army in the North mainly facing
the Ninth U.S. Army, with an estimated 195 tanks, the more significant
fact was the tactical reserve of 400 tanks of the reformed SS Panzer
divisions, the 1 SS, 2 SS, 9 SS, and 12 SS which could launch a counter-
offensive or be employed piecemeal to contain an Allied breakthrough.
Equally important was the view that the tactical
Panzer reserve in the North, a section which the German High
Command obviously considers the most dangerous area of the Western Front.
The thought was also expressed that new Volksgrenadier divisions were
soon to be committed, thereby relieving some experienced infantry
regiments for recommitment in more active sectors.

A summary for the week of 26 November - 3 December asserted that
while the Panzer concentrations demonstrated that the RUHR and SAAR
were the main areas of threat, the large Panzer reserve in the North
marked the RUHR as the most dangerous. (I,A, 3 Dec) The Allies still
had the initiative, while the enemy could launch a counteroffensive,
"it is considered unlikely at this time, in view of the emergency commit-
ment of 150 Pz Div and three reformed Para divisions and the critical
erman fuel shortage, and the lack of training of the reformed Panzer
divisions. During the approximate last two weeks of the Allied offensive
the enemy did not appear likely to employ reinforcements
from other theaters or from the reformed VG divisions. Nevertheless,
if the enemy continued to suffer the high losses he did in November,
he will have to commit his Panzer and Para reserves piecemeal and/or draw upon the Volksgrenadier divisions and other theaters to replace the units being blasted to oblivion in the line."

During October and November the Third Army recognized the formation of the Sixth Panzer Army in WESTPHALIA by regrouping battered Panzer divisions to constitute a mobile reserve force for a counteroffensive or for piecemeal commitment in threatened areas. Despite Allied pressure, this force was still intact as of early December. It was still in the North, where the enemy considered the greatest danger to lie. In addition to this Sixth Panzer Army there were Para, Infantry, and other Panzer forces also in the North, some of which had been committed, but the mobile reserve force was yet uncommitted and was the Sixth Panzer Army. In fact, the enemy actually had used inferior forces to defend, but had not committed sizable, strong reinforcements from other theaters or from its reserves. This tendency to maintain a cohesive line without drawing heavily from armored and infantry significant reserves was significant.

During early December Third Army was impressed by the enemy action or actually withdrawing two Panzer divisions from contact on the Allied line, as well as continuing to hold the bulk of its Infantry reserve out of line. (L.A., 10 Dec.) This reserve enabled him "to mount a spoiling offensive in an effort to unbalance the Allied assault on Festung Deutchland." However, the enemy was experiencing a critical dilemma, which was described by the 6 December Periodic's section on reserves and intervention forces. (X, D, 60 Dec.) "At no time since Sept. (had) such a critical dilemma confronted the enemy. It would seem doubtful that the enemy can hold in the AACHEN area without committing Sixth Panzer Army. It also seems doubtful that he can hold the WESTWALL in South without additional reinforcements including Armor. The enemy may have to divide Sixth Panzer Army thus risking defeat both in the North and in the South. If he holds Sixth Panzer Army in the North, run a good chance of Third and Seventh US Armies reaching the RHINE this year in the area of AACHEN. Finally, to solve this problem with reinforcements from the Russian front is to invite disaster in the EAST."

Three days prior to the Counteroffensive, the TUSA G-2 Periodic of 13 December analyzed the German reserve forces potential in detail. (L.B, 13 Dec; L.G, 13 Dec) In the first place, "German reserves of Armor and Infantry in the Northern sectors of the WESTWALL Front continue to be the biggest question mark in enemy dispositions." Out of contact were the following:

- 6 Panzer Divisions: SS - 2, 6, 9, 10, 12; Pz - 2, 116, 130
- 3 Para Division: 2, 5, 8
- 3 Infantry Division: 19, 85, 233.

Even so, the Sixth Panzer Army was regarded as consisting of the 65 Panzer divisions, the 1, 2, 9, 12. They remained east of the RHINE in the vicinity of COLOGNE. Another German reserve appeared to be concentrated North of the MOSELLE, close to the First and Third Armies' boundaries.
The examination of the doctor and the nurse was performed in the presence of the patient and the information was recorded in the medical record.

The staff member present at the time of the examination was the nurse.

II. Permissible or Prohibited

The examination was performed in the presence of the patient and the information was recorded in the medical record.

Permissible action: The nurse performed the examination in the presence of the patient.

Prohibited action: The doctor performed the examination in the presence of the patient.

The examination was performed in the presence of the patient and the information was recorded in the medical record.

On the next day, if necessary, refer to the documentation.
THIRD U. S. ARMY

DOCUMENTATION

(Source: Sept. 12 Oct. 44 in L-752(1); 13-31 Oct. in L-752(2);
Nov. in L-752(3); 1-13 Dec. in L-752(4); 14-15 Dec. in
L-752(5))

A. Significant Order of Battle Facts -- Fusk 144.
This was an Annex to annex daily G-2 Periodicals, of approximately
three or four pages.

2-9 Sept. S92. 10 Sept.

"2. Germany.
Documents referred to in Par 1, indicate that nine or
ten of the '500' Divs are either inside GERMANY or missing the SIEGFRIED
Line. It would appear that the 'GERRER-GERMAN' area was formed
for the last-litch defense of the REICH, and although none of the Divs
may be used on the Eastern Front, it can be expected that the majority
of them will be used to defend GERMANY's N borders."


"2. PANZER BRIGADES.
Another phase of the operation of the total mobilization
program was uncovered during the week in the identification of several
new Panzer Brigades. These impressive sounding units are another
version of the Kampfgruppe device. From their showing in battle and
the caliber of FS taken so far, these Brigades are even less combat-
worthy than Kampfgruppe. Three of these Brigades were identified
during the week: 165 by the First US Army, 111 and 112 by the Third
US Army. A number of indications provide sound basis for the conclusion
that there is at least one more, umidentified, of these Brigades in
the Third Army zone, and others probably can be expected to show up soon."


"1. Enemy Attitude.
"a. The week demonstrated that even though the Nazi
war machine may be on its last legs, it still is capable of causing
desperate resistance. Everywhere Hitler's cohorts tenaciously contested
every foot of ground of the crust of defense that is frantically
being converson along the Western border of the Reich. The enemy's
attitude continued wholly defensive. No where was he able to concen-
trate reserves sufficient to propel a major concerted offensive. Yet
everywhere, he conducted an aggressive defense, characterized by
piecemeal and open-handed expenditure of Panzer forces in his last ditch efforts to contain the Allied advances.

"b. The enemy's operations are reminiscent of the early stages of the NORMANDY battle. In the COTENTIN Peninsula the German now and committed piecemeal all the available Panzer and Panzer Grenadier divisions in an effort to contain the Allied beachhead. Now, once more, a temporary front exists, and once again the German is expending his mobile reserves in piecemeal armor-spearheaded local counterattacks of a pure defensive nature. ..."


"1. Enemy Armor.

"a. Another significant fact regarding enemy armor was that four Panzer divisions (12, 125, 116, and 130) were reported out of contact. 21 Army Group reported contact with 9 SS and 10 SS Panzer Div and 107th and 109th Panzer Brig, and First US Army identified in contact 9 Panzer, 2 SS Panzer, 1 SS Panzer Div and 105th Panzer Brig. 109th Panzer Brig was the only new Panzer unit identified during the week. Nothing definite is known about the four unlocated Panzer divisions, but it is indicated they are reforming to reappear shortly as new Panzer Brigades. A document captured early in the week disclosed that 20 SS Panzer Div HAMBURG was to have been reconquered as a Panzer Div, 109th Panzer Div and the Allied thrust into NORMANDY apparently upset this plan. However, this was the first concrete evidence that remnants of the SS Panzer divisions are to be converted into Panzer Brigades. Thus it may be expected that the once-proud SS Panzer divisions will reappear in the reduced regular of newly organized enemy Brigades."

30 Sept.-7 Oct., f120. 8 Oct.

"1. Enemy Armor.

"a. The overall disposition of German armor on the Western Front again was the most significant CB fact of the past week. While in numbers the strength of the Panzer Schwerpunkt against Third US Army lessened somewhat, there still remained an estimated 140 tanks on this front, with some 60 more in immediate reserve. The shift of the main body of 15 Panzer Div and 113th Panzer Div to the Seventh US Army Zone, coupled with the Southward move of 21 Panzer Div and 112th Panzer Div, can be interpreted as an admission that Army Group "G" failed its attempts to wipe out the NANCY salient, and that VON RUNDSTEDT was forced to move some of his armor to meet the Allied threat to the BOLLFOERT GAP."

7-14 Oct., f127. 15 Oct.

"1. Enemy Armor.

"a. The battle for AACHEN produced the most significant enemy CB change last week. The First US Army's determined drive forced RUNDSTEDT to shift some of the armor he had concentrated in NORMANDY the week before. 9 and 116th Panzer Div and 104th Panzer Div were withdrawn from the AACHEN salient rushed to the threatened AACHEN front, where all except 9th Panzer Div have been contacted. In addition, King of 1 SS and 2 Panzer Divs also were committed in this area.
Thus, for the second time in two weeks, there has been a major reshuffling of the armor in MODEL's Army Group 'G'. This constant reshuffling of armor is a graphic illustration of the enemy's lack of a mobile reserve. This penalty of armored units has repeatedly forced embarrassing decisions upon model and his subordinate commanders. MODEL (CG of Army Group 'G') and BLASKOWITZ (CG of Army Group 'G'). MODEL, in the North, faces two main Allied threats; (1) the AACHEN breakthrough of the SIEFRIED Line; (2) the AACHEN salient in HOLLAND. BLASKOWITZ, in the South, also faces two main threats; (1) the US Army's LORRAINE salient; (2) Seventh US Army's threat to the BELFORT Gap. Since neither BLASKOWITZ or MODEL has enough armor to counter these double threats, they must resort to makeshift expedients. The result has been the development of a sort of 'Panzer shuttle system' between threatened areas. Thus, two weeks ago MODEL concentrated his armor at AACHEN, and last week he pulled these Panzer units out and rushed them to AACHEN. In BLASKOWITZ sector a similar shuttle service has been going on. Two weeks ago, his Panzer Schwarmpunkt was moved against the Third US Army's LORRAINE salient! Last week there was evident a definite shift Southward of a portion of the armor in Army Group 'G', as a result of which an estimated 80 tanks now remain on the Third US Army front as compared to over 200 on 1 Oct.

Thus this 'Panzer shuttle system' may have operated to some extent, to contain the Western front, it has not allowed EISENZAHL to recons and reconstitute any appreciable portion of his battered Panzer divisions. 130 Panzer Division is the only armored unit which still continued uncontacted. At no time has the enemy had sufficient armor out of the line to build up a striking force large enough to launch a major counteroffensive. Instead, he has been compelled to expend his Panzer in relatively small scale local counterattacks of a purely defensive nature. This has enabled the German to buy time, but only at a very high price. The cost has run into hundreds of tanks which the Wehrmacht could ill afford to lose. It is estimated that on the whole Western front, the enemy now has only an estimated 450-475 tanks.

93. Strategic Reserves.

From several sources information was received that 26 and 227 Inf Divs, from the Eastern front, are in GERMANY or Eastern FRANCE, presumably ready for early commitment in the West. Both of these units suffered heavy losses in RUSSIA and were very much in need of rest and refit. How much they received is questionable. Several incomplete reports of heavy train movements and unidentified Panzer divisions near the front may presage the appearance in the line of a new Panzer Brigade or of a battered Panzer division.

15-22 Cote F134. 22 Oct.

93. Summary.

On the basis of the above enumerated significant facts it is indicated:

93. That the enemy now considered the AACHEN area as presenting the major threat in the West, with the BELFORT sector
second and the 21 Army Group front third in importance.

b. That the overall attitude continues defensive and that he will continue to delay and defend through the West in an effort to gain the time to constitute a powerful strategic mobile reserve.

c. That the enemy's build-up of reinforcements from other fronts continued to lag due to increasing difficulties in moving units from SCANDINAVIA, equipment and other shortages for the new GOTHAFARTHUNG units and other divisions being organized in GERMANY, and to a reverse on the Eastern Front. ITALY is the only Front that offers any hope of early reinforcements for the West but so far there have been no indications of any substantial movements from ITALY.

Also, the recent Russian moves in EAST RUSSIA and sweep through HUNGARY may forebode this year's and next years' move. The Eastern situation confronts the enemy with the desperate dilemma of having to determine priority between a blazing West and a flaring East. Until the Russians' resumption of the offensive, the East received the bulk of the forces which the total mobilization program was about to squeeze out. Now the slender stock of available reserves must be split between the two fronts, with the enemy facing the nerve-racking ordeal of deciding which is the lesser threat of his early annihilation.

22-29 Oct. Fall. 29 Oct.

Summary.

On the basis of these significant facts, it is indicate d:

a. That the enemy is distributing his forces along the Eastern Front to best counter possible major Allied threats. The AACHEN (SHA) area which he considered the most advanced the previous week received no new reinforcements last week. On the other hand, the other three areas of possible major threat were bolstered. Thus, elements of 9 Ps and 15 Ps Divs were relocated to the Dutch salient, the GHENT Gap was reinforced by 269 Inf Div and the sector against the third US Army was strengthened by 361 Inf Div and a number of miscellaneous battalions.

b. That while the enemy's overall attitude continued defensive, his is further strengthening his front by bending every effort toward building a powerful strategic mobile reserve of reformed Panzer and Par divisions, which could be used for offensive operations.

c. That while possibly bringing other divisions to the West from SCANDINAVIA, the enemy's build-up from other fronts continues to lag. This is ordered due to the lull in the fighting in the West and the increased demands of the Eastern Front. Developments in SCANDINAVIA and HUNGARY are directly affecting enemy forces in ITALY and the BALKANS. Any reserves which may be swapped together in ITALY and the BALKANS are now more likely to be employed against the Russians than against the West. That leaves only SCANDINAVIA and the Reich itself to furnish new divisions for RUNDSTEDT. However, even here, Russian advances in the North may preempt any priority RUNDSTEDT may claim for reserves produced from these sources.

1. Western Front.

"c. Enemy's Regrouping, Stabilization of the Front.

"It is apparent that the enemy's attempts the past two months to rebuild his military structure in the ETO have achieved considerable headway. This is one of the most significant developments on this Front. At its roots, this factor is the basis for the successful effort to recreate a strong strategic mobile reserve of rebuilt Panzer and Panzergrenadier divisions.

"In order to effect this crucial result, the enemy deployed every conceivable type of makeshift unit to fan the West Wall and resists Allied thrusts into the Reich. Battlegroups were hastily constricted from the remnants of the broken and destroyed divisions, and the Holt, Jason, Sick, and dead were scraped up to form a series of fortress and other miscellaneous battalions. Training and Administrative divisis were rushed from their Ruhkreise (Corps) Areas in Western GHQ to assume combat missions. This operation policy played havoc with the enemy's replacement and training system, but it was the only alternate and as time showed it was an effective expedient.

"Once the Allied sweep was contained, the enemy concentrated on regaining cohesive control over the hodge-podge mass. The scores of mushroom and halter-skelter battlegroups were merged into regularly numbered regiments and divisions. The personnel of these units may not be up to the pre-D-Day standard, but at least the troops now knew the names of their commanders and their regimental and divisional assignments. In short, the enemy has succeeded in recreating a front of organized regiments, divisions, Corps, Army Groups under effective tactical control. A chaotic mob has been organized into a military force. This is an achievement and significant fact of utmost importance.

2d. Defensive Attitude.

"In an obvious attempt to disrupt the tenuous powerful Allied pressure in Western HOLLAND, the enemy launched a relatively strong counteroffensive against the south flank of the Dutch salient with 9 Panzer and 23 Panzer Grenadier Divs. However, the attack failed to achieve major proportions and did not succeed in diverting the 21 Army Group's drive to clear the approaches to ANTWERP. This attack was the first offensive of any moment undertaken by the enemy since the ineffectual Panzer drive last August to cut the Third Army's bottleneck of communications at ANVERS (T-217) and the fact is very significant as indicating the revised state of enemy resources and aggressiveness."

"...


"On the basis of the above significant facts it is indicated:

\[a\] That by the substitution of low-grade Infantry units in the line and by the use of favorable terrain, weather, and defensive
positions, to release battered Panzer and Para divisions for reforming and refitting, the enemy has developed a strategic mobile reserve, that while qualitatively deficient, quantitatively gives him the capability of launching a counter-offensive. Further, this reserve is strategically situated for immediate employment in the North, and plausibly placed (equivalent of one division within one week) relatively swiftly reinforcement of the six sectors.

b. That while the Russians are threatening NORMANDY in the N and SUDAPPER in the S, the stability of the WESTERN Front has enabled the Germans to hold reinforcement there to a minimum. Further, despite all the Nazi hush about the Volksturm and the Volksgrenadiere, indication during the week pointed to the cannibalization of the dummy 20th Army GENTLEMEN-DRUM divisions to remake destroyed divisions of earlier series, thus, demonstrating how bare the enemy's manpower cupboard basically is. As presented above, the enemy has succeeded to some extent in creating a mobile reserve but all indications are that it is the last he has in his bag.

5-12 Nov. f155. 12 Nov.

"On the basis of the above significant facts it is indicated:

1. That German Army Group "G" has committed the bulk of its available reserves to stem the Third US Army attack and that further reinforcements against their threat must come from another sector or front.

2. That the strategic reserve in WESTPHALIA will not be committed until the enemy b-1 leaves he has determined the scope and objective of the Allied main effort.

3. That while 3 new divisions appeared on the WESTERN Front during the past week, it is evident that as the final showdown approaches, the two-heat war is exerting almost equal pressure on the remaining enemy war machine both in the WEST and in the East."

12-19 Nov. f162. 19 Nov.
1. Western Front.
2a. General.

"Highlighted by the Third US Army's historic envelopment of WEST and the renewed large-scale Allied offensive along the WESTERN Front, enemy order of battle developments for the week were characterized by the following significant facts:

..."
care and efforts to build-up the Sixth F's Army as a counterrsoffensive force, the enemy once again has been compelled by the urgent pressure of developments to parcel out his reserves over a number of sector in an effort to contain penetrations before they attain breakthrough proportions. On the basis of reports so far received, it is indicated that 1 SS, 2 SS, 9 SS and 130 F's Div have been moved from WESTRALIA to positions of tactical reserve in the most seriously threatened WESTERN sectors.

**Summary.**

"On the basis of the above significant facts, it is indicated:

"a. That the enemy views the situation in the WEST as approaching a critical stage and therefore has begun to move his WESTRALIA Armor in an attempt to contain any dangerous ARMOR penetrations in the BALK or AACHEN areas.

"b. That at least two Armored divisions from SCANDINAVIA may be committed to the WEST, but that the bulk of enemy's infantry reinforcements must come from para divisions in strategic reserve or from divisions in COMPASS itself."

****

19-26 Nov. 169, 26 Nov.
"a. Eastern Front.
"b. General.

"During a week in which the Allied offensive wreaked a heavy toll on German divisions in the WEST, the outstanding significant facts were:

"(1) Collapse of enemy resistance on the 7th US Army front, forcing the emergence employment thereof 130 F's Div and a reshuffling of divisions throughout the theaters to meet the threat of the Southern sector.

"(2) The concentration of Panzer strength in the North, with the weight centered in Ninth US Army zone.

"(3) The employment of new Volksgranadier divisions in quiet sectors, thereby relieving more experienced Infantry divisions for reconnaissance in more active sectors.

**c. Panzer Concentration in North.**

"At the end of the period Bf 6 of Four Panzer type divisions were on Ninth US Army's narrow front. 9 F's and 10 SS F's Div were disposed entirely on this front, 15 F's Gren Div was divided between Ninth US Army and 3rd British Army, and 3 F's Gren Div was similarly divided between Ninth and First US Armies. These four divisions are under the control of the German Fifth Panzer Army and together have an estimated total of 185 tanks, the largest concentration of enemy armor in the WEST. However, even more important than this muster of tanks in the line, is the estimate that at least 400 tanks are in tactical reserve in this area. Thus, the four reformed SS Panzer divisons (1 SS, 2 SS, 9 SS, and 12 SS) are in readiness for coordinated employment in a counterrsoffensive, or for piecemeal commitment to contain an Allied breakthrough in this sector which the German High Command obviously considers the most dangerous area of the Western Front.

"As a result of the week's movement of German armor only 2 and 116 F's Div remain unaccounted for. F's captured by First
US Army stated that the bulk of 116 Ps Div was east of the Rhine. There were no definite reports during the week regarding 2 Ps Div.

**3. Summary.**

On the basis of the above significant facts it is indicated:

a. That the defense of the RHIN and the SAAR are the main areas of threat, but that the large Panzer reserve in the North indicates that the enemy considers the threat to the RHIN as the most dangerous.

b. The initiative still rests with the Allies. Although the enemy has the capability to launch a counteroffensive, it is considered unlikely at this time, in view of the emergency commitment of 110 Ps Div and three reformed Para divisions and the critical German fuel shortages and the lack of training of the reformed Para divisions.

c. That the enemy did not find it necessary to employ reinforcements from other theaters or from the reformed Vz divisions in Germany this week. Nevertheless, if the enemy continues to suffer
the high losses he did in November, he will have to commit his Panzer and Para reserves piecemeal and/or draw upon the Volksgrenadier divisions and other theaters to replace the units being blasted to oblivion in the line.

3-10 Dec. 1943. 10 Dec.

a. General.

"With the Allied winter offensive grinding into its second month, and the Germans losing an estimated three divisions a week, the following significant facts stood out in the ETO during the week:

"(1) Despite the drain of large losses the enemy continued to maintain a cohesive line along the entire front without drawing heavily on his Panzer reserves. During the week, the enemy actually withdrew two Panzer divisions from contact.

"(2) Although committing 719 Inf Div against the Third US Army, his only major reinforcement in the ETO during the week, the enemy continued to hold the bulk of his Infantry reserve out of the line.

b. Panzer Reserves.

Despite continued heavy losses in men and equipment, the enemy, powerful enough to maintain a well controlled defense and delay struggle along the entire front, it is significant that this defense has been conducted with a minimum of armor. By the end of the week only six Panzer type divisions (9, 11 and 21 Panzer Gren, 15, 25 and 17 SS Panzer Gren) were definitely in contact and of these divisions, two (9 Panzer and 15 Panzer Gren) were in the North against Ninth US Army and 21 Army Group, while four (11 Panzer, 21 Panzer, 25 Panzer Gren and 17 SS Panzer Gren) were in the South opposing the Third and Seventh US Armies. During the week the badly battered 130 Panzer Gren Div was withdrawn from the HVI/IV US Corps front and the equally badly beaten 10 SS Panzer Div left the Ninth US Army and 21 Army Group zone. Also, 3 Panzer Gren Div has not been contacted for several days on the First and Ninth US Army fronts and it too may have been withdrawn from the line.

"Thus, excluding 3 Panzer Gren Div, as of this date the enemy has eight Panzer divisions (130, 236, 390, 10 SS, 12 SS, 2, 116, 130) out of the line, with the strong possibility that 5 SS Panzer Div may have come to the ETO, making a total of 9 Panzer divisions in reserve. Of these units, five are in the North, available for speedy employment against First and Ninth US Armies, and at least two (2 and 130 Panzer) are disposed further South close to the First and Third US Army boundary. FW have stated that 12 SS Panzer Div also is near the Third US Army front. Overall, the initiative still rests with the Allies, but the massive armored force the enemy has built up in reserve gives him the definite capability of launching a spoiling/diversionary offensive to disrupt the Allied drive.

c. Infantry Reserves.

"With 719 Inf Div identified on the Third US Army front, three (59, 85 and 131) of the seven divisions reported moving
from BELGIUM remain uncontacted. As with Panzer, the enemy has kept his infantry reinforcement to a minimum. How effectively he has accomplished this is shown by the fact that while his losses as a result of hostile attrition has amounted to not less than five divisions in the WEST during the past two weeks, he only committed one new Volks-
grenadier division (333) from the 20-25 divisions of this type estimated forming or reforming in GERMANY. Nor has the enemy committed any In-
fantry in the WEST from other theaters. 360 Gren Div, 719 Inf Div, and 3 SS Mountain Div have been definitely reported moving from
SCANDINAVIA to GERMANY, but none has yet been contacted on the Eastern
Front.

On the basis of the above factors it would appear that unless a breakthrough occurs it is the enemy's purpose not to deploy either new Volks-
grenadier divisions or units from other theaters to meet replacement requirements in the WEST, but to await consit
instead the remaining BELGIUM (59, 85 and 331) and three Panzer (3, 5 and
8) divisions for that purpose. This will leave him free to continue to build up his Panzer and Infantry reserve to meet more desperate
commitments he may anticipate are likely to arrive in either the EAST or WEST or both in the not distant future.

Summary.

On the basis of the above enumerated significant facts it is indicated that:

a. Although the Allied offensive is destroying weekly
a number of German divisions, nevertheless the enemy has been able to
maintain a cohesive front without drawing on the bulk of his Infantry
and Armor reserves, thereby giving him the capability of mounting a
spreading offensive in an effort to achieve the
Allied success on WEST or Deutchland.

b. It would appear that there is a growing concern
on the part of the enemy as regards the mounting threat to the SAAR
and he may be forced to bolster this sector with elements of his
Infantry and Panzer reserve in an effort to block a breakthrough
that could easily prove catastrophric.

H. Overall Reserves; and Conclusions (Weekly).

Section I. Enemy Situation at End of Period of each Daily
6-2 Periodic was extended periodically, approximately once a week,
to include a sub-section II (e), which in turn contained several
paragraphs usually designated as the following: Estima of Enemy
Strength in Three US Army Zones; Overall (or Strategic) Reserves;
Third US Army Front; Overall Conclusions Week.

These paragraphs dealing with Reserves and Conclusions discussed
the enemy's potentialities, his problems and intentions. The following
extracts these two paragraphs, whichever was applicable and informative,
on a weekly basis, beginning with that of 4 October. The one of that
date served to initiate Information concerning the enemy's overall
capability, and, in particular, in respect to the formation of a reserve
force.
4 Oct.
(2) Strategic Reserves.

*a. 2 Pz, 130 Pz and a Battlegroup of 1 SS Pz Div have been reported as reforming.

*b. In addition to the nine GEHENNAH subdivisions, a number of other Waffenacht divisions are believed in process of organization in GERMANY. No reports of the formation of new SS divisions have been received.

*f. It is estimated that by 18 Oct the enemy has the capability of bolstering his defenses in the WEST with the equivalent of eight divisions, three of them mobile. Any or all of these units constitute reserves capable of employment against the Third US Army.*

11 Oct.
(2) Strategic Reserves.

*a. 1 SS 'x', 2 Pz, 130 Pz and 348 Inf Divs have been reported reforming. Contact with battlegroups of 2 SS and 12 SS Pz Divs has been reported by Ninth US Army and 21 Army Group respectively. The other Elm of these Divs are believed reforming for the possible constitution of a strategic mobile reserve.

*b. 110, 18 Oct.
(4) Conclusions.

*The continued thinning out of enemy forces on the Third US Army front has reduced the total there to an estimated equivalent of 4 Divs, a drop of 3 since 1 Oct. The situation in the AACHEN (A3843) area apparently was deemed so critical that Army Group 'G' had to reallocate 3 Pz Gren Div to Army Group 'B'. Also 553 Inf Div, the remaining Elms of 15 Pz Gren Div and 106 Pz Brig were moved 5 to the Seventh US Army zone. The identification in the Third US Army zone the last few days of three KG and Fortress Bns indicates that the enemy is employing this type of Bn units to thicken his attenuated lines on this front. This considered only a temporary improvisation to tide over more pressing commitments in other sectors, and also to enable the enemy to make another attempt to build-up a strategic mobile reserve by reconstituting batt red Panther divisions.*

(4) Overall Conclusions Week 19-26 Oct: The relative stability of the Western Front, plus the demands of the Russian front, reduced the enemy's build-up in the West to a trickle. Reinforcements identified for the most part were Fortress, KG and Grenadier Bns of low combat value but apparently deemed adequate to defend and delay while the enemy attempts to constitute a Mobile Strategic Reserve by reforming battered, but battle experienced, Pz and Panz divisions. He has never yet been able to create such a reserve in the West and is obviously fighting desperately for time to do so. The First US Army's breakthrough of the SIEGFRIED Line at AACHEN is still consider by the enemy as the most menacing of the Allied threats. In Third US Army zone, the enemy's strength remains the same as last week, equivalent to 4 divisions.
114. 1 Nov.

(a) Overall Conclusions Week 26 Oct - 2 Nov.

*The enemy's reinforcement of the Western Front continued
to lag behind his estimated capability of three new divisions a week
(only one new division, 269 Inf, appeared during the week). The enemy
continued to employ Fortresses and other low-grade miscellaneous units
to pad his 600-mile front, while intensifying his efforts to build up a
powerful strategic reserve of Panzer and Fnn divisions. In Third US
Army Zone the replacement of the depleted 11 Ps Div by the fresh 361
Inf Div raised the total of equivalent enemy divisions to 3. If 11 Ps
estimated to be in immediate reserve, is counted in the total, the enemy
strength is estimated at 5-P divisions.*

115. 6 Nov.

(a) Overall Conclusions Week 2 Nov - 9 Nov.

*Only one new enemy division appeared in the WEST during
the past week, 18 Volksgrenadier Div, actually an abridged edition
of the destroyed 18 GAF. However, it is estimated that the enemy now has
200 tanks in the WEST, 400 of them in reserve in WESTPHALIA. These
reserve Panzer forces given the enemy the capability of launching a
large-scale counteroffensive or reinforcing with powerful tank elements
against an offensive anywhere in the WEST.*

115a. 15 Nov.

F(2) Overall Reserves.

*While the Third US Army's drive forced Army Group 'G'
to unleash a newly-reformed Panzer Grenadier division and to comit
reserves available to Infantry and Panzer reserve, none of the Panzer
divisions in the W sectors or the WESTPHALIA strategic reserve have yet
been committed to Third US Army Front. However, the enemy's quick
reaction to the Third US Army's assault, coupled with reports of heavy
rail movement in the PADERBAM (82%) area indicate a capability:
of being able to commit one or more of the WESTPHALIA divisions on
Third US Army Front at any time. The commitment of these four reformed
divisions (272, 26, and 212 VG Div on First US Army Front and 4708 VG Div
on Seventh US Army Front) during the week further implement the
enemy's capability of committing new Volksgrenadier units on Third
US Army Front at any time. The pool of overall reserves available
for such reinforcements are as follows:

(a) First, and most important, are the five Panzer
divisions of the Sixth Panzer Army in WESTPHALIA. These units (L SS,
2 SS, 9 SS, 12 SS, and 130 Ps Divs) have had almost two months to rest
and refit and it is estimated that they have a total of 500 tanks,
160 per division. While the striking power of this Army may be limited
to some extent by 1 or 2 of seasoned tank crews and oil supplies, the
Sixth Panzer Army definitely has the capability of launching a
counteroffensive at any point on the Western Front at any time.

(b) The next best important reserves available to
the enemy are the five uncommitted Panzer divisions in the Northern
sectors of the Western Front which are now being held in Army or Army
Group reserve. These five units (21 z, 9 Ps, 10 SS Ps, 116 Ps, and 15 Ps
Gren Div) together with 103 Ps Divs are estimated to have 300 tanks. To
this force must be added 232 Ps Gren Div, reported reforming in
DENMARK, with an estimated 50 tanks or assault guns. If 232 Ps Gren Div
and the newly identified 25 Pz Gp Div on Third US Army Front are included, the enemy now has 16 Panzer type divisions in the WEST. Only five of these are in combat, and four of them are in Third US Army zone of advance: further implementation of the offensive capability diagnosed in Para (2) (a) above.

"(c) An extremely formidable Infantry reserve is the five Para divisions reforming in the North (2, 3, 5, 6, and 7 Para Divs). Whether these units will be employed only in the North under command of Generalfeldmarschall Student’s German First Panzer Army or on some other sector of the Western Front where good Infantry is needed remains to be seen. One thing is certain: these Para divisions have had from 6/3 weeks to refit and are now ready for commitment at any time or ground troops.

"(d) The Volksgruppen divisons, both in the WEST and in the new wave of reconstituted divisions previously destroyed, constitute a complicated problem in analysing enemy reserves...

"(e) Since the commitment 26 Oct of 269 Inf Div from STRAFF on the 1st US Army Front, the other theaters have not contributed any of their divisions to the WEST. However, they are capable of contributing at least ten divisions to this Front in the next 30 days."
undergoing reforming E of the RHINE.

"(c) The need for infantry units has become increasingly acute, so much so that the enemy apparently has been forced to commit some of his reformed Para divisions. The commitment of 6 and 7 Para Divs on 21 Army Group south and 3 Para Div on 23 Army Group front leaves only 2, 5, and 6 Para Divs still in reserve. The early appearance of one of these divisions is not unlikely.

"(d) A total of seven infantry divisions have now left HOLLAND, three of them (425, 426, 425) committed to battle. The other four (59, 55, 331, 719) are available for employment, and it is certain that one of them will appear on the Third US Army front. The enemy does not only need infantry in this sector, but reinforcements there are long overdue.

"(e) Volksgrenadier divisions undergoing formation in Germany and units from other theaters remain a potential source of enemy infantry reserves for the WEST. However, the extent to which reinforcements depend on the situation in the EAST. If that becomes pressing the flow of new units to the WEST is certain to be affected.

"(f) From SCANDINAVIA, 560 Gren Div, 710 Inf Div, and 6 SS Fountain Div have all been reported moving to the WEST. But there have been no reports of divisional movements WESTARD from the Italian theater. However, the departure of 54 Inf Div from ITALY to HUNGARY may indicate that D ALL will soon release units to the WEST.

"(g) Overall Conclusions Week 30 Nov - 7 Dec.

"(a) Defense of the WEST still dominates the enemy's strategy, but the Third US Army's threatened breakthrough of the TUSKED Line may force a shift of view. Some of the WESTERN Army reserve may be shifted South. In any event, reinforcements against Third Army are urgent and certain to appear within or East of the TUSKED Line defenses.

"(b) Apart from the Para divisions, the enemy has three major sources of infantry reserves: (1) The four still unlocated divisions out of contact in HOLLAND; (2) The estimated eleven Volksgrenadier divisions in WESTFRAK; and (3) The divisions in ITALY and SCANDINAVIA. This is the hope that the enemy has immediate at hand to draw on to meet each enemy crisis in the WEST or EAST, or both.

#156. 13 Dec.

"(a) Overall Reserves.

"(a) German reserves of Armor and Infantry in the Northern sector of the WESTERN Front continue to be the biggest question mark in enemy dispositions. There are now out of contact eight Panser divisions (1 SS, 2 SS, 2 SS, 10 SS, 12 SS, 2 SS, 116 SS, 130), three Para Divisions (2, 5, 8), and three Infantry divisions (59, 55, 331).

"(b) Indications continue that the enemy is planning an operation that would employ the four divisions of Sixth SS Panser Army (1 SS, 2 SS, 966, 12 SS) to spearhead a counteroffensive, apparently in the LAGIER_LUREN sector. These four reconstructed divisions remain W of the RHINE 4th COLOGNE (F35) despite the growing Third US Army threats of a TUSKED Line breakthrough. Further, during the week, 18 SS Ps Div was also reported out of contact, and may now be with
the other enemy armor in Vic COLOGNE (53).

(a) Another German reserve appears concentrated W of
the HOOCHER, close to the Pirex and Thirde US Army boundary, where 2 Ps
and 130 Pz Div have been reported. 130 Pz Div was recently withdrawn
from XII/XX US Ope front in a badly-named condition, while 2 Pz
Div has been out of the line for over a month and should be much more
battleworthy than 130. Both divisions are strategically situated for
rapid commitment against either the Third or First US Armies. Also,
in the past few days no contact has been reported with 3 Pz Gren Div,
but it is believed that the unit is nearby in immediate reserve.

(b) Another important source of armor reinforcement for
the WEST which cannot be ignored are Payer units fighting on the
SOUTHERN front. Reports have persisted for several weeks that 5 SS Pz,
3 Pz, and 1 Pz Division Ostendhein have come to the WEST. Further, on
12 Dec, Pirex, French, and British reported contact with 15 of 16 Pz Div in the
501/82 (674021) pocket. This will indicate that rather than commit
units of the 16 Pz Arm prematurely to delay and defend in the
North, the enemy proposed to shift Payer units from the WEST to provide
the necessary armor reinforcements for the WEST.

(c) With 719 Inf Div contacted on Third US Army front
this week, there are now only three BOLAND Infantry divisions out of
contact (39, 85, 391). 85 Inf Div may possibly have been committed on
the First US Army front as an FF from 3 Pz Legt (2 Pz Div) stated
his unit was fighting as a Komgrup under 85 Inf Div. Despite this
identification, these Payer divisions (2, 5, 6) are still considered in
reserve. It is indicated that 6 Pz Legt is fighting independently
and that it's parent organization, 2 Pz Div, is not committed
gainst First US Army. 5 Pz Div has consistently been
reported moving from BOLAND, but its exact whereabouts are unknown.

(d) Nothing new has been learned of the reported moves
of 6 SS Mount, 560 Gren, and 710 Inf Divs from SCANDINAVIA to the
WEST. Similarly in the Italian theater, although it has been definitely
established that 44 and 71 Inf Divs left for HUNGARY, there have been
no reports of moves to the WEST.

**3.** Overall Conclusions Week 7-14 Dec.

(a) It is evident from the determined horading of Sixth
SS Inf Army units that the enemy is making every effort to employ this
armor in a coordinated effort. He already is sending over backward to
avoid possible commitment. It would appear therefore that if Third and
Seventh US Armies continue to exert their breakthrough threats, 2 Pz,
116 Pz, 120 Pz, and 10 SS Inf Divs may have to be committed in the
South. However, if Third and Seventh US Armies do achieve a rapid
breakthrough of the SECTOR line, the enemy may have to forge his
offensive plans in the North and commit Sixth SS Pz Army in an effort
to avoid another WHANGDIAF (757) catastrophe.

(b) The enemy's infantry losses continue high, estimated
at a minimum of three divisions a week. It would thereafter appear that
the enemy will have to commit more units to reinforce the battle-
thinned ranks. It is believed that if no breakthrough occurs, the
6 Pz Divs will achieve this reinforcement by committing the remaining three
Payer divisions and three BOLAND divisions. However, if a rapidly
exploited Allied breakthrough does occur in the SOUTH, the enemy will
be forced to employ both Volksgendrier divisions and units from other
theaters in an attempt to avoid collapse.
C. Strategic and Tactical Intelligence: Order of Battle Notes.

OB Notes were added during the daily O-2 Periodic, containing sections titled: Tactical Intelligence; Strategic Intelligence; Personalities; Summary of Artillery Units on Third US Army Front; Enemy Identifications in ThMr US Army Zone. Informative portions of the Tactical and Strategic Intelligence Sections are extracted, dealing primarily with enemy potentialities and reserve forces.

f156. 13 Nov.

Strategic Intelligence.

"SS General 'EBPF DIETRICH (Fifth Pz Army)"

A captured search order for 17 SS Pz Gross Div, dated 30 Aug 1944, confirms DIETRICH as CC of Fifth Pz Army at that time. There had been only vague mention of his name in connection with that Army previously. More recently 'EBPF DIETRICH ' was reported possibly commanding the reforming Sixth Pz Army in Germany."

f158. Nov. 15.

Strategic Intelligence.

"Possible Activation of Sixth Pz Army."

1. Photo A no of 9 Nov, covering possible combat areas in the PADERBORN(374) area, revealed that the main PADERBORN(374) railway stations was heavily loaded, including a lot of flat cars. Four trains were present, two or which were in motion, one having double engines. Sidings near BAVARIA(375) and BAVARIA-LAGER(376) were loaded mainly with empty flat cars. This heavy activity may indicate preparation for movement from that area.

2. There is considerable evidence that Sixth Pz Army, with at least 1 SS, 9 SS, 12 SS, and 130 Pz Lehr Div and possibly 2 SS Pz Div, is reforming the PADERBORN area. One report stated a Hitler-Jugend SS Div as well as another Div are reforming in BAVARIA. This report probably refers to a Hitler Youth training organization (boys under 16). These young boys' organizations are known to have gone to SS Divs after completion of their youth training at the age of 17. At present, military training has probably received highest priority, with construction work running a close second. In all events, 12 SS Pz Div 'Hitler Jugend' is more acceptable in the PADERBORN area. 1 SS Pz Div has also been reported reforming Vic Bunke (B50) near HERTZ, in addition to the PADERBORN area. Supreme Hq stated that it is very likely that this 1 SS Pz Div are reforming in both places.

3. The area PADERBORN, BIELEFELD, WINTER (497) forming the WESTFAHIA triangle, is estimated to contain at least four or five reforming Pz Divs and two or more Inf Divs. Included is an estimated 500 tanks of all types. There are also an estimated 55,000 to 65,000 combat troops, probably in reforming Divs of Sixth Pz Army and 1 SS Pz Corps."

f171. 23 Nov.

Tactical Intelligence.

"The Shuttle System in the West."

"5. From these facts the following conclusion may be drawn:
"a. More experienced Divs may be withdrawn from relatively quiet zones to be committed against Third and Seventh US Army.

"b. Newly formed 98 Divs and reformed Divs can be expected to be deployed on the more quiet fronts."


Tactical Intelligence.

"Sixth Panzer Army.

"PF from 130 Ps Lehr Div reported that six Ps Divs had been concentrated in WESTPHALIA although they denied information concerning the other Ps Divs (further interrogations are being conducted). Merely only five Ps Divs (1, 2, 9, and 12 SS Ps Divs and 130 Ps Div) were believed reforming in WESTPHALIA under control of Sixth Panzer Army. If Ps statements are true 2 Ps Div and 5 SS Ps Div 'Viking' become logical candidates for the Fifth Ps Div remaining under Sixth Panzer Army. 2 Ps Div has been unlocated for some time. Twelfth Army Group stated that 5 SS Ps Div has not been identified for some time in the Russian front. This Div has often been rumored to be in the EAST and in GERMANY, and PF have recently stated that 5 SS Ps Div was being refitted in the same general area as 1 SS Ps Div."

§180. 7 Dec.

Strategic Intelligence.

"1. 6 SS Panzer Army.

"a. A cooperative and well informed PF stated that the Army controlling 130 Ps Lehr Div while in WESTPHALIA was designated 6 SS Ps Army. PF also stated that 1 SS Ps Corps, 9 SS Ps Div 'Bodenkreuz', and 10 SS Ps Div 'Panzerschwer' were also under control of 6 SS Ps Army. Same PF claimed he saw the designation 'SS Ps AOK VII' on a document appointing Maj (SSO) WERSCHER (an Wehrmacht officer), formerly of 130 Ps Lehr Div, as G-4 (a) of this Army early in Nov. PF also stated SS Obergruppenfuehrer (US Lt Gen) 'Beppo' DIETRICH commands 6 SS Ps Army.

"b. It has been suspected that the Panzer Army which reformed in WESTPHALIA was designated Sixth SS Ps Army. But this is the first concrete evidence of the SS designation. Logically, this title to 10 be appropriate since the Army is commanded by an SS General and includes at least four SS Panzer Divisions (1, 2, 9, and 12) and two SS Panzer Corps (I and II). Further, the fate of Nazi is bound with the success of this new Army. Just as DIETRICH the SS man, was originally HITLER's personal bodyguard, DIETRICH's SS Ps Army now attempts to guard the boy of all Nazis. Under these circumstances, it would seem logical for the Nazis to honor the new army with the elite SS titles."

"c. The following list shows Commanders, where known, of all Higher Formations in the West.

Sixth Ps Army 03 03 Oberst, und
Genoberst d. W. f. SS SEPP
DIETRICH

Oct.
186, 13 Dec.
Strategic Intelligence.

1. Sixth SS Panzer Army.

According to Twelfth Army Group 1, 2, 9 and 12 SS Panzer Divs are still located E of the ROER River under control of Sixth SS Panzer Army. It was estimated that under control of Sixth SS Panzer Army are 32,000 troops and 320 Tks presumably belonging to the above named Divs. Thus, if the men and equiment are divided equally among these four Divs, each would have an estimated strength of 8,000 troops and 80 Tks. If 130 Panzer Lehr Div is to be considered illustrative of the combat efficiency of Sixth SS Panzer Army Divs, then it appears likely that these Divs are ready to take the field again. However, it is possible that the SS Panzer Divs received preferential treatment over 130 Panzer Lehr Div and may now be better prepared for combat than 130 Panzer Lehr Div was. Gen. Kreuger's statement that a number of SS Panzer Divs will be used to prevent the Allied from progressing beyond the outposts of Frontenacht Deutschland seems acceptable. (See Para 3, Part I, Annex No. 3 to Chirn US Army G-2 Periodic Report No. 155, 13 Dec 1944). Thus, Sixth SS Panzer Army could constitute the reserve for a large-scale counterattack against the major Allied threat to the Reich.

...

6.B. --- The following is a summary reference to Gen. Kreuger:


1. Strategic Intelligence.

3. German Assault Army.

The following is extracted from the report, published by Eq. 77th US Army, of the interrogation of Capt. Hans von Breuning and Lt. Col. Willi Kaiser captured CO and C/O respectively of 553 VG Div (reliability rating B-2):

"Gen. Kreuger told Gen. Kaiser that beginning Nov 44 he attended a meeting of Div commanders of First Army in ST AVOLD, MUSSEL, where they were told by Gen von MANTEFEL that it was impossible to supply the Divs engaged on the Eastern front with fresh troops. All men that can be spared from the Navy, Luftwaffe etc. have to join VOLKSPREUDE DIVS. These Divs (whose number was not divulged) are to form an assault army (GRUPPE) under the command of SS Col gen. EWIN 'Sepp' DITRIECH. With this army equipped with new secret weapons, the German High Command hopes to drive the Allies out of FRANCE. Nevertheless, it was emphasized again the best weapon was still faith in an ultimate German victory.

Gen. Kreuger told Maj. CIBBES that between end of July and the beginning of Sept 44 he attended a special course in HINSEBETH, LOWER SILSIA. Approximately 60 Colonels and Generals attended this course. They lived in a special train parked outside the town. Gen. Kreuger was recalled after three weeks, because the then CO of 553 VG Div, Col. LINEN, was 1st in line of the charge of Jocher despite orders to the contrary of his superior officers, and Gen. Kreuger was chosen as his successor. Among other, Gen. JIBER and Gen. BRENNER addressed this special officers' course.
"The officers were told that the German High Command is planning to activate about 70 VOLKSGRENADIER Divs. Of these, 10 are to be SPRiDER ('Blocking') Divs, intended to be used for stopping the Allies short of the German borders; the remaining Divs, called STOSS ('Assault') Divs, are to be used for a single large-scale counterattack on the Western front, scheduled for the end of Dec. The main direction of this thrust is to be NETZ, CHALON-SUR-SHAFT, PARIS, and then to ards: the Channel, the clothes was told. Furthermore, 116 aircraft are being held in reserve for this assault. The figure of 27,000 was mentioned in passing as the number of aircraft available. (This figure was cited more as an example than as a fact - Ed.) The officers were also told that Admiral DOENITZ solemnly assured the Fuhrer that he would be ready to start the campaign with the new U-boat (of SHERIFF Weekly Intelligence Summary No. 37, 3 Dec.) about beginning of Jan 45.

"The German High Command hopes to achieve a large-scale breakthrough, because:

a. Allied positions in FRANCE are not constructed in depth;
b. The Allies have no reserve Divs behind the actual fighting lines;
c. The American soldier is war-weary.

"Gen EINHOHN attempted to calculate the maximum number of VOLKSGRENADIER Divs that could be organized at the present time; he was convinced that the number would not be more than 35-40.""

#187. 14 Dec.
Annex No. 3, Order of Battle Notes, Part I. The Enemy in the West. This Part consisted of extracts from the Twelfth Army Group, Weekly Intelligence Summary #15, 12 Dec., for week ending 9 Dec. 44. TONGA cited verbatim the Army Group's sections on General Summary, and the annexes on the Sixth Army Group, Panzer Army, and Panzer Lehr Divs.

#188. 15 Dec.
Strategic Intelligence.

"(1) Reorganizing Armored P. serves."

"b. Three significant indications are suggested by the above evidence:

(1) In Sixth SS Panzer Army area of the RIVER R. and N of the RHINE, between DUSSELDORF (F39) and COLOGNE (F49), 1 SS, 2 SS, 9 SS, 12 SS, 10 SS, and 116 Pz Divs appear to be reorganizing.

(2) In the area Trier (L22), KILBURN (L15), WULFISH (L35), 2 Pz and 100 Pz Lehr Divs appear to be reorganizing with 116 Pz Div reportedly slated for that area.

(3) Just out of the line and in positions of a tactical mobile reserve 9 Pz Div (9th US Army Zone) and 3 Pz Gren Div (VIII Corps VII Div Corps Zone) appear to be reorganizing.

"c. From these indications it appears that:

(1) The enemy is reorganizing and reconstituting his battered Pz Divs but at the same time is keeping them available for immediate employment in the event of a serious threat of a major breakthrough.

(2) The enemy is massing his armor in positions of tactical reserve presumably for a large-scale counteroffensive."

"..."
P. Miscellaneous extracts from the S-2 Periodic.

1. #138. 26 Oct.
   "d. RESERVES AND OTHER FORCES CAPABLE OF INTERVENTION.
   "(1) NEW PS ARMY. Reports from GERMANY mention
   possibility of the formation of a new PS Army under which will be
   grouped all the better PS Divs from NORMANDY, particularly SS formations.
   At least five of the Divs have been in the REICH since early Sept. Reports
   state that 12 SS and 21 Ps Divs tend to corroborate these
   reports. They claim 12 SS Ps Div is being reinforced at BERLIN (B2212)
   and 1 SS Ps Div in area just 5 of there. Twelfth Army Group reports,
   "The enemy has so far been able to seal off or, at least to prevent
   exploitation of each Allied penetration of the West Wall by switching
   armor from one sector to another. He is now apparently endeavoring
   to build up an area reserve and given sufficient time, say until L
   December, he could probably scrape together a powerful striking force
   of Ps Divisions. This force would be employed, presumably, in the
   northern sectors of the Western Front where allied breakthru would
   be most dangerous to the enemy both because of terrain advantages to
   Allied forces and also mobility and the proximity of vital industrial
   areas in SCHNEID." Such a reserve of armor might enable the enemy to
   achieve his major object of stalling the Allied advance for the
   winter at the West Wall or the REICH."

2. #150. 7 Nov.
   Annex I, Order of Battle Notes.
   "IX. REFORMING FAUSSE ARMY.
   "Twelfth Army Group reports a deserter had stated
   that on 10 Oct Sixth German Ps Army, commanded by Sepp DIETRICH, was
   regrouping in BIELTEND (B52) area. The regrouping Ps Army is said
   to include 2 SS, 10th SS, 11th SS and Ps Lehr Divs. Higher HQ confirmed
   that 10th SS Ps Div is still believed to be in the ARHEIM area but that
   11th SS Ps Div might have been meant instead of 10th SS Ps Div.
   "There is a considerable concentration of armor
   in RE GERMANY at present chiefly represented by reforming Divs.
   Although the regrouping of Sixth German Ps Army is possible, Fifth German
   Ps Army also remains a candidate."

3. #179. 6 Dec.
   "a. RESERVES AND OTHER FORCES CAPABLE OF INTERVENTION.
   "(2) According to Twelfth Army Group, tactical recon-
   missions indicate additional divisions in vs arrived or are on way to
   reinforce enemy line in Third and Seventh US Army areas. 2 Ps Divs
   unlocated for some time, may be a candidate. However, it will probably
   be insufficient and enemy must then decide whether to move any part or
   all of Sixth Ps Army from CHILES AREA. A. No time since Sept has such
   a critical dilemma confronted the enemy. It would seem doubtful that
   enemy can hold in the AACHEN area without committing Sixth Ps Army.
   It also seems doubtful that he can hold the WESTFALL in South without
   additional reinforcements including Armor. The enemy may have to
divide Sixth Panzer Army thus risking defeat both in the North and in the South or, if he holds Sixth Panzer Army in the North, run a good chance of Third and Seventh US Armies reaching the Rhine this year in the area of Vairet. Finally, to solve this problem with reinforcements from the Russian front is to invite disaster in the East."

E. Enemy Capabilities.

The last statement of this topic in the ENEMY CAPABILITIES section of the daily G-2 Periodicals, was in issue #186, on 13 December, as follows:

"4. Enemy Capabilities.

4a. Capabilities.

(1) The enemy is capable of defending and delaying from prepared positions an effort to block our advances and attacks on the SIEGFRIED Line.

(2) The enemy is capable of counterattacking locally with Inf and Armor, particularly against our main efforts, in an effort to contain these advances and to continue to resist our assault on the fortifications of the SIEGFRIED Line.

(3) The enemy is capable of a general withdrawal into the SIEGFRIED Line.

(4) The enemy is capable at any time of reinforcing against any section of our zone of advance with the equivalent of one Inf and/or one Panzer division.

4b. Conclusions.

Capabilities (1), (2) and (4) are favored in that order."

Periodicals #184, 14 December and #186 of the 15th referred to the issuance of the 13th for TUSA's views on the enemy capabilities.

F. Quotations from the British.

Two TUSA G-2 Periodicals cited at length from British sources."

The latest citation was contained in the Order of Battle Notes of the G-2 Periodics for 6 December, #179. It was approximately a page quotation, and the following extracts indicate the fundamental views expressed therein. Quotes are the writer's, not TUSA's.

"The 'strategic reserve' of the West, Sixth SS Panzer Army under Sepp Dietrich, has not been committed, save in the case of the Panzer Lehr Division after a long and not very profitable refit in WESTHALLA. "The enemy's aim has been to expend his infantry to stop a damaging breakthrough; to use his 'tactical reserve' to hold the infantry in line and to blunt the Allied assaults; not to use his Sixth Panzer Army until the moment is vital or favourable, more likely the former." Von Rundstedt is unlikely to risk this precious guard over the Rhine now accounting for five Panzer divisions(1, 2, 9 and 12 SS and 2) former of COLOGNE-BONN until the Allies advance over the RHINE to present a threat not to be blunted by such tactical reserves as Model has to land within his Army Group or nearby; or until the Allies offer the enemy opportunity to take them off balance so that an adroit counterstroke could put paid to future Allied
prospects for the winter. This letter is unlikely, for it demands five elements not readily to be found together: first, vital ground, there is nowhere obvious for him to go which would hurt us deeply. He
brutal drive on ANTWERP, a 'dash to the wire', as of old, is just not
within his potential. Secondly, he needs bad weather, else our air
superiority will disrupt his assembly, yet this very weather
would allow his own intent. Third, he must find us tired and unbalanced.
Fourth, he needs adequate fuel stocks not only to sustain a full-
blooded operation but also to guarantee a withdrawal in his own time
when it fails. Lastly, he needs more infantry and of better quality in
the present terrain and weather. The moral prise would be great, for
never was there greater need of a fillip, and to disrupt our winter
campaigning would be a gain worth many risks. To lose Sixth Panzer
Army in the doing of it would however be a disaster perhaps irreparable,
for the RHINE can best be defended this side, and with those five Panzer
Divs removed eight otherwise not be defended at all. It seems more
probable, then, if von Rommel continues to conduct operations unsuited,
that he will wait to assail our bridgeheads over the RHINE, then hold his
hand. As in sixty-nine."

[Of the above citation was from the 21 Army Group Intelligence Review, 3 Dec 44.]

(2) The TUSA 0-2 Periodical, p/167, 24 November, also cited British
sources in its section of that issue titled Reserves and Other Forces
Capable of Intervention.

One was a reproduction of a portion of the 21 Army Group
Intelligence Review No. 167, 21 Nov 44. The major thought expressed
was: "By the end of this year it is reckoned that perhaps as many as
twenty-three further divisions will have arrived on the Eastern
front; ... This assumes that the present priority which lies with the
West is maintained. The Eastern Front, important as it is, is still
taking second place to the defense of the Ruhr.

Some observations by the Second British Army were cited,
as being supplied from the First US Army G-2 Periodical Report p/155,
22 Nov 44."

II. C-2 Estimates.

The last TUSA C-2 Estimate issued prior to the 16 December
Counteroffensive was that of p/10, 1 November 44. No. 11 was issued
on 20 December.

[Source: After Action Report, THIRD US ARMY, 1 August 1944
- 9 May 1945, Vol. II, Staff Section Reports: p/10 C-2 Estimate, 1 Nov
44 on page 0-2, CIII; p/11, 20 Dec. on page 0-2 (XXXII.).]

The salient feature of this G-2 Estimate p/10 of 1 November 44
was the maximum-size enemy's "desperate dilemma" of deciding where to
deploy the depleted reserves he is frantically trying to amass scrape-
together to avert complete collapse before winter sets in. If he
could gain time "and secure the winter months to refurbish his combat
resources, the enemy will have the capability of prolonging the war to
costly lengths." As to the seven Panzer and three Panz Divisions
undergoing reconstruction, there were in immediate reserve in the West,
and could be used in conjunction with terrain for local counterattacks
to contain Allied forces "or for a general counteroffensive."