FIRST U. S. ARMY.

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FIRST U. S. ARMY

STРАФФИ

This was the senior UNITED STATES Army in the European Theater, having assumed command on the army level in October 1943, and was the D-Day army on 6 June 1944. It continued its NORMANDY invasion operations throughout June and July, executing a beachhead breakout during the latter month called Operation OSHIMA, then exploited the achievement during August and early September, pursuing the enemy through northern France and Belgium, to the Belgium-GERMANY border, where the FUSA was situated on 13 September. This arrival on the enemy's WEST WALL — the BRECHTEN Line, inaugurated the Battle of Germany, which continued until interrupted by the enemy's Ardennes Counteroffensive on 16 December.

Resurgence of the Northern Locals Concept.

On 29 September, FUSA ordered a coordinated attack for about 1 October to reach the RHINE and to capture KÜN and BORN. This offensive operation in the north continued until 16 December, whereas the southern part was relatively inactive and defensive. During late October the enemy counterattack on the northern ALLIED front against the Second British Army in the KIEL, Holland area, he obtained a bridgehead over the KASS in the VERMONT-VENLO area. The broad area of VERMONT-GEILHENKIRCHEN was attractive to the enemy, FUSA believed, because of the Allied weakness at that point. This British force was north of the Ninth U.S. Army, which, in turn, was adjacent to the First U.S. Army. An expected continuation and expansion of the German attack during the first half of November did not materialize, which FUSA interpreted as a lost opportunity for a spoiling attack. The First Army launched its own ICE雕 offensive on 16 November. Enemy resistance in the NORTHERN Forest and SCHIN winter areas halted the FUSA attack, but it was renewed on 13 December by the V and VII Corps, in conjunction with the Ninth U.S. Army.

This attack on the northern FUSA front was progressing generally on the BRECHTEN Line, when on 16 December, the enemy launched a large-scale counteroffensive against the FUSA's southern zone, occupied by the VIII Corps, which had been relatively inactive and defending. The attack occurred approximately at the juncture of the G and VIII Corps and southward.

FUSA's own operations were conducted in the north, and a further emphasis upon this northern locals consisted of the fact that FUSA consider the enemy potentialities as pertaining to the north. FUSA believed the enemy's strategy was based upon counterattacks rather than a planned offensive opened on his initiative, and FUSA expected a counterattacking on the northern front. This northern locals counterattack concept was introduced on 31 October, in that FUSA designated the VERMONT-GEILHENKIRCHEN area as the probable locals. Then, on 10 December
PUSA considered that the attack area could be generally east to north between the ROER and the EIST Rivers, and south to north, from approximately CLEMMER-KORN-ALM-HEID. It would occur after the ROER had been cleared by major Allied forces.

Especially, PUSA believed there was a strong build-up of reserve forces in the north, between the TEE and the EIST, and generally ranged south to north on the approximately line of ARNHEM-M-SCHENAART-SCHENAART-HEID-HEID. These troops were dispersed in terms and villages close to training points. The enemy was regarded as possessing a reserve force, identified as the Sixth坦r Army, which had considered to be key to enemy's counterattack strategy, but, despite the enemy's desire to retain it as a unit, Allied pressure might force its piecemeal withdrawal. As of 10 December, this army was believed to be located between the ROER and NEUSER, the northern boundary probably running from NEUSER along the ROER to NUERG.

Pursuant more, air reconnaissance indicated that the northern portion of the FUSA front, the X and VII Corps, south to north, was the locale of enemy activity during the several weeks preceding the counteroffensive. Their defenses had been improved west of the ROER, particularly north of M.I.A., with considerable movement in the VII Corps area between the 15th and 23rd had been taking place.

Another demonstration of FUSA's dominating consideration of the north in the locales of a counterattack consisted in the First Army's evaluation of the assault's gravity on 26 December. The mentioned geographical locations were in the north. FUSA reported in its 26-27 periodic on the day that the German attack was an all-out one, that the enemy was attacking all on this offensive, and that the current activity was a drive through FUSA's rear areas and seizure of bridgework over the NEUSER River. If the attack appeared to be slowing down, one enlisted man, 250TH INF, NEUSER, said that the capture of Nuwere had sufficed as the Christmas present for Hitler. FUSA had planned that an attack was planned whose success would be a gift to the Father. ACHER was mentioned by them.

Note is taken that on this first day of the assault, the First Army's actions in the Corps operations, the Periodic, did not point out the purpose of the attack. Instead, FUSA considered the Sixth坦r Army, as the key to the enemy's counterattack strategy, perhaps FUSA was undeceived as to the intent of the attack, because, as the Periodic pointed out, this reserve force was not committed on the 16th. FUSA did not indicate if it thought the operation was independent, was on the enemy's initiative, or was a reaction to the First Army's current offensive.

MISINTERPRETATION OF SCANTY LOCALS:

Street is laid upon the points that since arrival upon the LINDELL Line on 13 September, (1) FUSA's operations had been
offensive in the north, and (2) it expected enemy counterattacks in the northern sector. Equally significant, (1) FUSA's southern zone was quiet and defensive during this period, until the 15th, (2) the 16 December Counteroffensive was launched in this sector, not in the northern areas where FUSA anticipated an attack.

FUSA's attitude towards its southern sector, occupied by the VIII Corps, was negative. FUSA recognized some buildup and activity in this sector, but misinterpreted the enemy's intentions for its use. This southern sector's mission was a contributory one, according the last pre-Counteroffensive G-2 Estimate, that of 10 December. It stated: "During the past week there has been a definite pattern for the reasoning of newly formed divisions in the comparatively quiet sector opposite VIII Corps prior to their dispatch to more active fronts." Other G-2 statements, in the daily G-2 Target Reports, discussion of enemy activity, confirmed this conception. As of 5 December it was thought that the past week's reinforcement in the BULAGEN-BYTMIR area confirmed the view of the JUGENDS Line on the ESTERH in being lightly held and that first troops are arriving for reserve or relief." However, FUSA indicated on the 15th that it actually was aware of the strength in the TBAR-FRAN sector. Three to his four divisions with armor and some bridging equipment had moving in since 20 November, but bad weather had "prevented observation" of large movements into or out of this sector" for as long as four consecutive days.

**Influence and Forwarding of Data.**

FUSA received official issuance, e.g., daily G-2 Periodics and Intelligence Summaries, from subordinate centers, adjacent armies and their corps, the British Second Army, and Twelfth Army Group with its slight acquisitions from SHAEF. There was no indication as to the particular influence exerted by these issuances, if any.

The First Army's receipt and reaction to certain data was of interest. Three VIII Corps divisions had acquired four data which appeared to be attack signs during 12-15 December, namely, an acceleration of enemy traffic, a general situation about an enemy build-up in the general BURGEN-BYZMIR area, and a Peshlaki claim of an impending attack for about 17-20 December. While FUSA received reports on this data, usually through the Corps G-2 Periodics, there was no expression that FUSA undertook proactive measures as a reaction. In fact, FUSA did not seem to be impressed by the data, partly at least, because it already possessed virtually identical evidence, and these VIII Corps data were merely additional.

Intelligence data was to restrain by FUSA through its G-2 Periodics and the very frequent G-2 Estimates. The Estimate was the medium of expression of the FUSA opinions on enemy capabilities.
FIRST U. S. ARMY

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CRITIQUE

1. Preoccupation with Northern Operations Towards KOLN.

When the First Army reached the SICKLED Line in September, it
described its projected operations for the immediate future which
were to reach the KOLN and to capture KOLN and EILM. This drive
had reached the ROPERS River by 15 December in the northern sector
of the Army's front, and operations were being executed to further the
advance over the KOLN Plain.

A brief review of the FUSA's operations up to 16 December will
indicate the Army's status. (1) The Co-And Port of FUSA opened in
Brest, France, on 20 October 1943, and this Army became the command
headquarters for the American forces in the British Isles. It was the 6
June 1944 Invasion "ray," comprised of the V and VII Corps. By early
July, the Army was again augmented by the VIIIth and XXI Corps, and a
breakout drive from the NEOM-NEFY beachhead was executed during late
July, called Operation COHE. This campaign was exploited during
August, early September. PARIS was captured on 25 August, and the
enemy was pursued through northern France and Belgium, to the Belgium-
Germany border, where the Army was located on 13 September. This
arrival on the army's FIRST BAIL inaugurated the Battle of Germany,
which continued until intermed by the enemy's Ardennes Counteoffensive
on 16 December.

FUSA's zone on 13 September ranged between the British Twenty-First
Army Group on the north and Third U.S. Army on the south. As of this
period, FUSA occupied the northern zone of the Twelfth U.S. Army Group.
North to south were positioned the Army's three Corps, the XIX, VII, V,
from northern HOLLAND, generally southward along the German border of
BRIGA and BEMERALD, to the bounds of the First and Third Armies on
the OER River, slightly below CREVENSHACH, Luxembourg. During the
remainder of the month the XIX Corps drove to the Holland-Germany
border, and slightly beyond portions of it, where the northern flank
of the VII Corps fought beyond the Belgium-Germany border, moving north
to invest AACHEN, Germany, but only approximately half of the city
was surrounded by the end of the month. The southern flank of the VII Corps,
and the V Corps on its south(right) generally fought up to the border
or slightly crossed it in some parts.

Intentions for the future were declared on 29 September, in a
Letter of Instruction (In HSB files, 101-311 (45500) Master.)
FUSA was to launch a coordinated attack about 1 October "with
the object of reaching the HILM and capturing KILM and EILM." Letters
of Instruction on 26 October, 23 November, and 6 December reiterated
the Objectives. That of 6 December stated: "First U.S. Army continued
its attack in the direction of KILM-KILM to reach the Rhine River in
the vicinity of KILM. Advance beyond the ROPERS River will be at Army
order." The R10th Army on the left and the Thirs on the right(south)
were "permitted to attack in their zones to reach the Rhine River."  

Operations during the 1 October - 15 December period were in the northern zone of the First Army, while the southern part was relatively inactive and defensive. (2) JOACHIM was captured on 21 October, and the advance to DURKH and beyond to the RHINE RIVER involved the offensives of November and December on the MORTAIN Forest, SCHMIDT, and the BCOR River dams. It was this BCOR dams area northwest and east toward KOHN that constituted the northern zone of the FUSA, and as of 15 December, two of the three Army Corps were engaged in offensives in its sector, and, on the 15th was clearing west bank resistance, the Army's advance beyond the BCOR was critically handicapped. As noted in the last paragraph of instruction of 20 November and 1 December, an advance beyond this river was to be made only on the Army's order. The enemy could flood American forces below the BCOR's dams by destruction or opening their gates, thus the FUSA's advance was delayed until these four dams were removed from German control. An attack to capture the dams was launched by FUSA on 13 December, executed by the 7th corps and the VII Corps, the two northern corps. They were continuing their offensive when the German Counteroffensive was launched against the inactive, defensive VIII Corps on 16 December. This southern Corps was ranged slightly north of JOACHIM, southward generally along the Belgian-Germany border and the Luxembourg-Germany border to the VIII Corps juncture with the Third U.S. Army in the vicinity of the southeast corner of LUXEMBOURG.

In a word, the First Army conducted an offensive during October, November and was continuing it on 16 December in its northern zone, whereas the southern zone was inactive and defensive during this period, but was the locale of the German attack of 16 December.

Specifically, according to the G-3 Sitrep 5386, 151200A-152400A Daurke, the operations of the First Army during the last 12 hours of 15 December were defensive activity on the VIII Corps front and offensive on the V and VII Corps. (VII)

"VIII Corps.

The 4th Div, 28th Div, 106th Div and 9th Arm Div were 80"B" defended present positions.

"V Corps.

The 39th Div continued attack against strong enemy fortified positions. ... The 7th Div less 311th Inf continued attack with slight advances. ... The 8th Div plus 311th Inf consolidated and improved positions as 101st Co, 311th Inf cleared small enemy pockets. 80"B", 5th Arm Div and 80"B", 5th Arm Div remained in Corps reserve. ...

"VII Corps.

The 104th Div and 6th Div occupied and improved position on the west bank of the BCOR River. The 6th Div less 2nd Bn 330th Inf continued attack at 1200A with 331st Inf against generally light enemy resistance. ... The 5th Arm Div with 2nd Bn, 330th Inf attacked consolidated positions secured during the morning. The 1st Div and 3rd Arm Div continued training and rehabilitation. ...
II. Trend of FUSA Opinion of Enemy Capabilities.

Summary.

From 10 July through 10 December, the FUSA G-2 Estimates expressed optimism ranging from collapse or surrender of the early period downward to counterattack possibilities of the latter period. But, an enemy counteroffensive on his own initiative was discounted, and FUSA's expectation of a counterattack placed the locale considerably north of the actual 16 December assault area.

Enemy potentialities were considered only in terms of the current, tactical operation prior to 10 July, on which date larger aspects, specifically collapse or surrender, were not considered. A month later, on 13 August an alternative to the optimistic possibility was proposed, that of enemy retirement to the LINE then to the WEST WALL, if necessary. But, on 25 August superior allied solvency was expected to prevent the latter. For the first time, Allied limitations, e.g., autumn rains and poor flying weather, were mentioned on 31 August. High optimism was again expressed shortly afterward on 3 September, to the effect that a successful defense of the SIEGFRIED Line would be prevented by overwhelming air and ground abilities. Perhaps more as a military contingency consideration than as a worry, the RHINE River was used for the first time as a possible defense line on 11 September, but FUSA believed that its conquest of the SIEGFRIED Line would depelte the enemy that the RHINE could not be adequately manned. Three days after FUSA's arrival on the SIEGFRIED Line, the 15 September Estimate claimed FUSA possessed the strategic opportunity of a swift advance to the RHINE. Following the 29 September FUSA order directing a coordinated attack on 1 October to reach the RHINE and to capture KOLN and BONN, the 9 October Estimate avered that the sustained defense of the WEST WALL capability was destroyed. After the capture of AACHEN on 21 October, the enemy was on the passive defensive, according to the 31 October Estimate. Nevertheless, this Estimate introduced the counterattack concept as a capability, but designated such a locale as the VESLO-HERLENKIRCHEN area, which was well north of the actual 16 December assault zone. This counterattack capability was derived from the fact that the enemy was currently attacking the Second British Army in the north and that the enemy's defense doctrine called for counterattack action. The 12 November Estimate asserted that the enemy had to launch its expected offensive before FUSA unleashed its planned operation towards the ROER dome. FUSA's commenced on 16 November, but the enemy's did not, and the 20 November Estimate announced that the enemy had lost his opportunity. In fact, his strategy appeared to be based on counterattacks rather than a planned offensive opened on his own initiative. FUSA did not, as of 20 November, believe a defense west of the RHINE to be a reasonable expectation. Although the enemy, according to FUSA, required the development of the soft spots or the breakdown of the Allied offensive before undertaking a counteroffensive, during the next twenty days FUSA observed counterattack indications and expected one. The 10 December Estimate expressed that expectation, but stated that the attack would occur after the ROER had been crossed by major Allied forces, and its locale would be between the ROER and RHIT rivers, and south to north, between SCHLEIDEN and BONN.
Methodology.

Current opinions on the enemy capabilities were not expressed in the usual, presumed section of ENEMY CAPABILITIES in the daily G-2 Periodic, but were declared in the frequently issued G-2 Estimate. (IV,B; III) That section of the Periodic consistently referred to the latest G-2 Estimate for an analysis of the subject. The Estimate tended to consider the whole potentiality of the enemy.

FUSA issued its G-2 Estimate prolifically, thus providing a frequent expression of the Army's view. The first one issued following the 6 June 1944 D-Day was #3, Special G-2 Estimate, 6 June. Then, 33 Estimates were issued during the next approximate 25-week period until 10 December, when #37 was issued, the last prior to the Counteroffensive. Arithmetically, at least one per week was issued. Note is taken, however, that half of them were issued during August and September, a total of 17, whereas the other 17 were distributed these: June -- 3, July -- 1, October -- 2, November 1 -- 1. Whatever the reason, after the Army reached the SECTOR III Line on 12 September, only 17 Estimates were issued through 10 December. Only two were issued in November, the 12th and 20th, then none until that of 10 December. Thus, although the earlier issues provided a very frequent expression of view, those of the later period were infrequent, and, in a sense, were more significant.

In addition to the significance inherent in the frequencies of the Estimates, their subject content traced the development of FUSA's G-2 consideration of enemy potentialities from those pertaining only to the immediate, current operations to the broader aspect of German intentions and capabilities, such as collapse or surrender, defense of the home country, or counteroffensive possibilities. An analysis of the individual Estimates from that of 8 June to 10 December delineates this history. One topic is excerpted from the subsequent scrutiny of the Estimates, that of comments relating to a reserve army and/or the Sixth SS Panzer Army, which was such a force. Another section in this CRITIQUE will discuss this subject.

Chronology.

1. FUSA's opinions of the enemy capabilities were restricted to and pertained only to the current action during June and until 10 July. On that date, however, FUSA's think was apparently in larger terms. Broader aspects were considered, namely collapse or surrender of the nation of Germany. From this date onward FUSA's views became gradually more comprehensive in their scope, thus expressing FUSA's opinions of the German potentialities.

2. By August, military collapse and wholesale surrender were considered almost certain, preceded by either a governmental coup & state or field defeat. Furthermore, FUSA disbelieved in the possibility of the enemy regrouping in northern France to prevent an advance toward Germany, because of Hitler's 'no retreat' policy and Allied military dominance.
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Current opinions on the enemy capabilities were not expressed in the usual, prescribed section of EMISY CAPABILITIES in the daily C-2 Periodic, but were declared in the frequency issued C-2 Estimate. (WP, PP 111) That section of the Periodic consistently referred to the latest C-2 Estimate for an analysis of the subject. The Estimate tended to consider the whole potentiality of the enemy.

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2. By 1 August, military collapse and wholesale surrender were considered almost certain, preceded by either a governmental coup & civil or field defenses. Furthermore, FUSA disbelieved in the possibility of the enemy regrouping in northern France to prevent an advance toward Germany, because of Hitler's 'no retreat' policy and Allied military dominance.
2. The collapse or surrender concept continued throughout August to and including the last Estimate, that of 10 December, to be an integral portion of FUSA's opinion of the enemy potentialities. Virtually, such list of capabilities included it. Collapse or surrender, however, varied in prominence among the FUSA opinions. As will be noted, FUSA frequently regarded the enemy capable of less drastic action and that more protective to Germany. The initial instances of FUSA defining as alternative to collapse or surrender appeared in the 13 August Estimate. Retreat could be attempted to the ALSNB, then to the WEST WALL, if necessary.

4. On the 31st of August FUSA declared that the enemy tactics and reactions demonstrated the lack of a cohesive plan for the defense of the west as a whole. His situation was so serious that he was incapable of concerted action or movement on a large scale, and could not delay by piecemeal commitment of divisions.

5. Four days later on the 29th, surrender or collapse was thought increasingly probable, and, while retirement to the ALSNB was believed highly probable, retirement to the WEST WALL was regarded as doubtful because superior Allied mobility would prevent movement of the First and Fifteenth Armies.

6. Enemy difficulties and Allied optimism had been the subject of FUSA's interest from 20 July, but Allied limitations were mentioned for the first time in the 31 August Estimate. Autumn rains and poor flying weather would confront the Allies with problems. The enemy would, therefore, likely delay upon favorable terrain of forests, mountains, and rivers to permit the escape and retirement of its armies to the WEST WALL line.

7. In this WEST WALL, the 2 September Estimate expressed the view that although the enemy's first capability was the meaning of its for an all-out defense, FUSA did not believe the line could be successfully defended in face of overwhelming air and ground superiority.

8. The RHINE River as a defense line was injected into consideration for the first time in the 11 September Estimate, probably not so much as a substitute of worry as a contingency. FUSA believed that while the RHINE was the best natural defense line, German national pride would require a stand on the WEST WALL. Moreover, FUSA believed that the RHINE's thinly-congested would be depletes the enemy forces to face immediate crossing of the RHINE unless troops were evacuated from Finland, Norway, and the Balkans.

9. FUSA's arrival on the WEST WALL on 12 September inaugurated a new period of operations, that of encircling in Germany itself. The first Estimate during this new period was that of 13 September, which expressed the view that while the army's all-out defense of the WEST WALL was the current capability, FUSA passed the favorable opportunity of advancing swiftly to the RHINE. Encirclement of the Rhine-land would be forced, the I and II SS Panzer Corps might be destroyed, possibly the RHINE bridges could be added intensity, and collapse of
10. During the remainder of September the First Army penetrated the Ettendu line, and the FUSA believed that the VISA’s determined defense could continue. Consequently the line of defense at the KUS was broken. A successful operation had been achieved.

11. Having reached the German border, FUSA issued its order on 29 September for major operations, which prevailed during the next 2 months until interrupted by the 16 December Counter-Offensive. A continued attack on about 1 October was directed to reach the KUS and to capture KIO on 30 October. The First Estimate relating to this offensive was issued on 9 October, and its lead sentence claims:

"... the enemy’s capability of sustained defensive battles along the KUS VAL, is the sector of the First Army, has been destroyed."

Thus, the capability of the enemy to retreat to the KUS River, then to the KUS and to the KUS RAY, if necessary.

12. Eight days later, the 17 October Estimate optimistically dropped both the KUS and the KUS RAY as specific defense lines and capability II was described as the "defense of the only general area between the German border and the KUS RAY." The optimist was anticipated by FUSA’s belief in the lack of resources. While the enemy’s main reserves were at least the 9 Pw, and 2, 9, 10, 12 SS Divisions, troops in Hungary, Czechoslovakia, Norway, Belgium, these, and Italy were not generally available, being required in these countries.

13. Four days after the 17 October Estimate, KOS was captured, causing the 31 October Estimate to admit that the enemy was on "the defense position" on that part of FUSA’s front, and elsewhere on its front the enemy appeared "content with the temporary stabilization of the situation."

Optimism, however, was markedly tempered by the 31 October Estimate in that it (1) introduced the concept of enemy counterattacks, and (2) designated the counterattack areas in the region very distant from that assaulted on 16 December.

The enemy’s actual current operations aroused FUSA’s concern over the counterattack capacity. He is currently attacking the Second British Army in AGER, Holland, adjacent in the north to the First U.S. Army, also in that country, and between the British and FUSA. In consequence of this attack, the 31 October Estimate considered the counterattack concept for the first time since the early invasion days, and certainly for the first time since the FUSA pursuit of the enemy across France and Belgium, and the penetration of the SHERMAN Line. The Estimate observed that the enemy’s defense doctrine called for counterattacks, and passive defense was employed only when "practically impossible," as such as his counterattack divisions had only four to six weeks fuel, the enemy then incapable of large-scale counterattacks or a major offensive. Disastrous objectives were to stem the FUSA offensive, and mainly to stem the German roll.
FUSA listed five capabilities, and the first three priority efforts related to counterattacking:

1. To continue the Second British Army attacks.
2. To attack simultaneously the Second British and Ninth U.S. Armies, to retake Askawa and to clear them from their soil.
3. To attack FUSA to retake Askawa and drive FUSA over the border.
4. To continue stabilization of the situation and prevention of further advance.
5. To employ the V-1 and V-2 in tactical roles.

Sharing significance with the counterattack concept was the fact that FUSA considered the VISEL-CHELPECHI sector as the locale for the enemy's attack, a sector well north of the FUSA's own operations, yet the 23 January counterattack was launched against the FUSA's southern sectors.

14. The counterattack potentiality discussed in the 31 October Estimate was deemed a matter of urgency by the 13 November Estimate. FUSA declared: "It is now a race against time. Can the enemy complete his dispositions for his offensive prior to the launching of our attack?" The enemy had waited his attack against the Second British Army, and he was "passive between Askawa and BAKRA, except for his vigorous patrols ... for identification." 

His current capabilities were a sustained defense, but an offensive against the Second British and Ninth U.S. Armies was viewed as "of high probability." It was believed that this entire front has been stiffened to hold age not an allied offensive while he launches his blow in the north, probably between Askawa and CEBLO, with the possible scheme of maneuver of a penetration to the rear and southwest on both banks of the KEBBA.

15. According to the next Estimate, that of 20 November, the enemy's offensive in the north did not materialize. Rather, FUSA had launched its own offensive towards the ROER River on the 16th, "unnoticed by enemy action." This Estimate claimed: "the enemy's capability of a spoiling attack is now lost." The enemy's strategy was thought to be the "defense of the RHOB west of the ROER." Due to the pressure by the Seventh Army, and the lack of "sufficient mobile reserves of counterattacking quality, especially armor, to seal off penetration and prevent major breakthrough." FUSA announced that it did not believe a defense west of the ROER was a reasonable expectation. Instead, FUSA expected a forced retirement behind the RHOB. This Estimate stated: "with the giving up of his bridgehead over the ROER and the launching of the KEBBA offensive, the enemy's strategic plan appears to be based on counterattack rather than a planned offensive, opened by his own initiative." FUSA believed that the withdrawal and activity of the Ninth Panzer Army forced the key to the enemy's strategy. The enemy would need to wait for the development of Allied soft spots or the breakdown of the Allied offensive before going over to the counteroffensive himself. If the enemy did not attempt the restoration of the KEBBA line in the Ninth and First Armies sector, his next defensive battle would be based on the ROER KEBBA.
After twenty days passed after the 20 November 1 timete before FUSA issued its next one, on 10 December, and the last prior to the battle offensive. During that 20-day period FUSA believed that it received several counterattack indications, e.g.: stubborn defense,模样, preparation of fortifications, buildup of both troops and materiel, suspension of certain V-1 firing so railroads could instead haul building materials, training of English speaking personnel for pilots, increased moves among FCs, and above all the apparent acceptance of defense or offensive in the south in the S.W. and L.P. region, and concentration of reserves between DUSENTHOF and KOLM, in order to achieve decisive success in the north. This 10 December timete asserted: "It is plain that his strategy in defense of the Kolin is based on the exhaustion of our offensive to be followed by an all-out counterattack with armor, between the VORR and the FUST, supported by every weapon he can bring to bear." FUSA claimed "it is apparent that Von Rommelstett" without the benefit of intuition was skillfully defending, maneuvering his forces, and preparing for his part in the all-out application of every weapon at the focal point and the correct time to achieve defense of the battle west of the HUN by inflicting as great a defeat on the Allies as possible. Indications to date point to the location of this focal point as being between HUNDO and SOESTEN, ..."

In a note, by 16 December, FUSA expected an all-out counterattack in an area well north of that actually launched on 16 December. Furthermore, the attack was not expected until FUSA's and/or Allied major ground forces had crossed the HUNDO River.

Analysis of the 7 timetes, 6 June - 10 December.

Beginning with the first F timete issued after the 6 June D-Day, that of 12 on the 9th, through that of 29 June, the 7 timetes expressed opinion only upon the current, 7-solice tactical operations. The July timetes, 19, inaugurated consideration of the broader aspects of the enemy's potentialities, and the following study of the FUSA 7-2 7 timete therefore begins with that issuance.

The 10 July timete listed the Capability: "The enemy is capable of collapse or surrender." This was the first mention of such a possibility, and the initial declaration of an opinion relating to large considerations rather than only to the action of the moment. While this capability was described as of "low level of probability," it should not be overlooked. This collapse or surrender possibility continued to represent the FUSA's larger considerations during the remaining July timetes. According to the next one, on 23 July, collapse or surrender was a growing possibility particularly in view of the our out British进展 at the eastern end of the bridgehead. No. 11, 24 July was inapplicable, in that it was titled, POLITICALLY, and dealt with the consequences of Hitler's attempted assassination four days previously. No. 12, 25 July asserted that the collapse or surrender was "of increasing probability in direct proportion to the
According to the 1 August Estimate, a "military collapse and wholesale surrender" was "regarded as an almost certain eventuality either preceded by a coup d'etat to replace Hitler with a high military personage who would sue for peace, "or occurring successively as units are defeated in the field." A doubt was expressed that the NUREMBERG forces could continue more than four to eight weeks as a fighting machine. Another heavy defeat such as the 25 July breakthrough battle would probably force collapse of the forces at the base of the GERMANY Peninsula. Surrender or disorganized retreat would be the alternate issue. In fact, "in the next four to eight weeks the current situation may change with drastic suddenness into a race to reach a chaotic Germany."

The 1 August Estimate signaled the inauguration of a highly significant stage among the FSSA opinions of the enemy's potentialities. It introduced the added capability factor of the relationship of German resistance to the German homeland. Capability #2 stated: "The enemy is capable of giving up the 'no retreat' policy and by withdrawing from southern France endeavoring to regroup his forces in northern France to prevent an advance toward GERMANY."

By 8 August, the enemy was regarded as being forced to the defensive, his reinforcement rate and supply were considered limited due to impaired communications and constant air attacks. These factors and the constant attrition of his divisions were expected to lead first to a defensive role and second to surrender or collapse.

No discussion of enemy capabilities was contained in the Estimate of 13 August, but that of the 18th listed seven, most of which dealt with the current campaign. For the first time, mention was made of the enemy's retirement to specific locations. In case of necessity, he could attempt retreat to the heights of AISNE, then to the MARDEN, unless a surrender or collapse was forced by Allied pressure or internal disorder. This was the initial reference to the MARDEN.

The Estimate of 18 August reported no changes in capabilities; and the only differing view expressed by the next day's issuance was that current enemy dispositions continued to favor the enemy's withdrawal across the AISNE.

Optimism was expressed in the Conclusion section of the 21 August Estimate, to the effect that the enemy's tactics and reactions showed "plainly that there is no longer exists a cohesive plan for the defense of the North as a whole." A large-scale deceiving notion and pessimistic commitment of divisions were the enemy's best capability. He was incapable of any concerted action or moves at all on a large
...l'ift.

The enemy's situation was considered even graver by the 25 August Estimate in that surrender or collapse were regarded as of "increasing probability" as the field army commanders fully appreciate the hopelessness of the military situation in France. Retirement to the West Wall was believed to be highly probable, but retirement to the WEST WALL was thought to be doubtful due to the English logistic difficulty in moving the First and Fifteenth Armies in the face of superior Allied superiority.

Fifteenth Army delaying actions between the BRIE and the SEINE were the first capability described in the 27 August Estimate. Collapse or surrender were the second capability.

For the first time among the FUMA Estimates, that of 31 August mentioned factors advantageous to the enemy. The enemy must appreciate that the largest factors operating in his favor are the logistic problems confronting the Allied armies in France, and the approach of adverse rains with its mud and poor flying weather. It is, therefore, probable that he will delay upon favorable terrain, such as the RENNES and ARBOIS Forests, the heights of the VOSGES, the VOSGES Mountains and on the SEINE, to permit the escape of the Nineteenth German Army from the south and the retirement of the First, together with the Fifteenth and Nineteenth to the Siegfried Line.

Four days later, on 3 September, the view was expressed that while the first capability was the running of the WEST WALL for an all-out defense, it was "not believed the West Wall can be successfully defended in the face of overwhelming air and ground superiority." A further interesting point was the view that the enemy was capable of revolution leading towards Bolshevism or with a "government created with the West." On Tilla warfare by women and children was the fourth capability.

The Estimate of 11 September referred to the RHINE River as a defense line. Up to this Estimate, the SIEGFRIED Line was the consideration, but, with the First Army on the verge of reaching the SIEGFRIED Line, on 12 September, the FEURA area of the enemy was projected beyond the WEST WALL geographically. This Estimate observed that although the RHINE was "the best natural line of defense for Germany, it is believed that a stand will be ordered on the West Wall for reasons of prestige." The loss of the territory west of the RHINE would be interpreted as constituting a staggering blow to national pride. Furthermore, the army needed and was using his airfields west of the RHINE.

However, FUMA believed that the ALLIED over-running of the WEST WALL would so demoralize the army's forces that he would lack the manpower to defend the RHINE, unless troops were evacuated from Finland, Norway, and the Balkans. Actual capabilities were listed as:

1. An attempt for an all-out defense of the WEST WALL.
2. Retirement to the RHINE after the overrunning of the West Wall.
3. Collapse or surrender.
VF I •

A first estimate issued after FUSA's arrival on the SEPTEMBER 24th, has dated 15 September, three days after that event. This was a particularly significant because it expressed an opinion on the long-range potentiality of both FUSA and its enemy, the dependence of the German action upon the American operations, in FUSA's eyes. According to this mid-September estimate, the reaching of the ETO-HED on line presented an "enormous" strategic opportunity to FUSA. A "swift advance to the Rhine" would be possible if the two northern FUSA corps, the VII and XXI, broke through the WEST WALL. With the formidable river obstacle at his back, the enemy would be forced to evacuate the Rhineland. A rapid exploitation of the approaches to the RHINE bridges should destroy the I and II SS Panzer Corps, and possibly the RHINE bridges could be seized intact. This estimate reached the conclusion that while the enemy's all-out defense of the WEST WALL capability was still current for the moment, the execution of the above described strategic possibilities would eliminate the retreat to the RHINE capability and reduce the enemy to collapse or surrender.

During the remainder of September the Army penetrated the ETO-HED Line particularly with the object of capturing AACHEN. Four days before the month's end, on the 26th, the last FUSA estimate of September was issued. It pointed out that "determined defense of the WEST WALL" was current and would continue as long as possible. A retreat to and defense of the RHINE depended upon unsuccessful defense of the WEST WALL. Collapse or surrender were unpredictable, but FUSA felt that even in the event of a retreat it was "bound to decline" the settlement of the problem.

As noted in the section of this CRITIQUE dealing with the FUSA operations, following the First Army's arrival on the ETO-HED Line on 12 September, it penetrated against strong resistance during the remainder of the month, while plans were made and issued for long-range operations from that strategic position. On the 27th the FUSA letter of instruction directed a coordinated attack about 1 October with the object of reaching the RHINE and capturing COBURG and BOHN. The FUSA operations during the next two and half months, until interrupted by the 16 December Counteroffensive, were directed to arduous fighting. This was significant, because of the tendency or lack of it of the FUSA G-2 to regard the enemy potentialities as reactions to FUSA's own activities.

After several days of the new offensive, but about two weeks preceding the decisive 21 October capture of the first German city, AACHEN, a G-3 Estimate was issued on 9 October. Its opening sentence pronounced: "The enemy's capability of sustained defensive battle along the West Wall in the sector of the First U.S. Army has been destroyed. The West Wall is now breached in four places and passages through it have been established. Defense of the WEST WALL was declared inoperable, and the enemy's capability becomes that of retreat (1) to the east bank of
The MIFK and "defending hastily constructed field fortifications, (2) to the MIFK, (3) behind the MIFK, or (4) collapsing or surrendering. This estimate expressed the view that Nos. 1 was then current, and Nos. 2 and 3 would follow if necessary, although withdrawal behind the MIFK was thought to be of low probability. Continued frontal attacks and unsuccessful with secret weapons would increase the probability of collapse or surrender. The enemy, under this estimate of 9 October, was "faced with problem of garrisoning a long line with insufficient troops and of necessity must determine priorities in the disposal of his few reserves. There is not evidence yet that he has recognized the threat of 1st U.S. Army's attack by committing reserves, especially of armor, to meet this threat."

Optimism continued. Four days before the fall of AACHEN, the estimate of 17 October dropped the MIFK as a defense line capability, and substantiated the MIFK. Capability No. 1 was defense of the general area between the German border and the MIFK, No. 2 was retirement behind the MIFK, and (3) was collapse or surrender. This estimate analyzed the enemy's reserve condition, and concluded that although four of his Panzer or Panzer Grenadier Divisions one of "first quality" had appeared on the FUSA front, mainly piecemeal fashion, he had at least five more, the 9, 10, 9, 10, 12 SS divisions. Other reserves were the Doderer-issuing wave of the 500 series, the Pilsa series, and a few consolidated divisions from the Russian front. "Reserves left to GERMANY for the Eastern front are currently being used as ams until the GASTON front on EASTERN's doorstep is stabilized. The garrisoning of a restless EASTERN will consist of other reserves. Divisions from GERMANY, FINLAND, and GREECE are not currently available, nor even anything substantial be further spared from ITALY."

According to the 31 October estimate, following the fall of AACHEN in the north, the enemy was "on the passive defensive, improving positions and making local adjustments in troop dispositions, using prisoners for intelligence purposes." In the north, however, in the 900 and British 21st Army's sector, the enemy was attacking in a "limited offensive" in the NIHIL(2000) area with three panzer divisions. He prepared pressure upon the 21 Army Group to relieve the threat, and to threaten the Ninth U.S. Army at a time when he suspected the U.S. of mounting an offensive. Elsewhere on the Western Front, the enemy appears content with the temporary stabilization of the situation. To reserve, "can more, the priority or reserves within the Ninth has gone to the east. The losses being suffered by the German Army Group South in UKRAINE in Hungary are among the greatest of the year. The 2, 11 and 16 Panzer Divisions had been withdrawn from the Eastern Front and were "probably west of the MIFK, serving as mobile reserves while refitting."

Since the arrival of EUSA on the SIEGFried Line on 12 September, the 1-2 estimates of 15, 26 September, and 9, 17 October, considered the enemy capabilities in view of defense of the MIFK, of the Oder River line, and then of the MIFK River line, without reference to the enemy's counterattack possibilities. This 31 October estimate, however, introduced the counterattack concepts, marking a notable change
In FUSA’s thinking, the reader is invited to scrutinize this counterattack concept as to whether the action was (1) a reaction to the FUSA offensive, (2) an attack to prevent a FUSA offensive, or (3) an independent one on the enemy’s part to achieve objectives of his own choosing, and having no apparent relationship to the FUSA operations; (4) was located in the north where FUSA was conducting its operations, or in the relatively inactive and defensive central-southern sectors of the FUSA zone, or north of FUSA zone, before LUXEMBURG, in the Third U.S. Army's area.

In its section titled Conclusion, this 31 October estimate observed: “The German doctrine of defense calls for countercounterattacks, and he assumes the passive defense only when he is powerless to do anything else. Having had four to six weeks rest for his countercounterattack divisions, he is now capable of large-scale counterattacks or a minor offensive. His strategic objectives are, first, to block our expected offensive against Germany and second, to drive us from German soil. The goal is AACHEN and falls to the Allies, and the enemy had launched an attack against the Second British Army in the north, the following capabilities provided:

1. Continuation of attacks on the Second British Army, thus threatening the flank of the 9th U.S. Army, which was situated between the FUA and the Second British Army in the north.
2. Simultaneously attacking the Ninth U.S. Army and the Second British Army with 50 percent of its three longer divisions in rest at rest of the FUA, to block attacks and turn against an Allied withdrawal from German territory.
3. Attacking FUA to retake AACHEN and drive FUSA beyond Germany’s border.
4. Continuing efforts to stabilize the situation and prevent a further advance into Germany.
5. Replacing the 7-1 and 7-2 in a tactical role.

Of these five capabilities No. 1 was current, and if it succeeded, No. 2 was to be expected, with No. 3 as a minor probability. If, however, No. 1 failed, then No. 4 would be the highest probability, and no advance could be anticipated at any time.

It is important to note the geographical area which FUSA considered subject to German attack. A breakthrough by his concentrations in the VERDUN-HEISTELEN sector would enable him to turn south on both banks of the MAAS (HEISTELEN). The VERDUN-HEISTELEN sector was well north of the FUSA’s own operations, not in the southern portion of the Allied front below AACHEN.

An air urgency was expressed in the next Estimate, that of 12 November, which was four days prior to the FUSA’s 16 November offensive towards the HEISTELEN. Preparatory to its discussion of the German potential FUSA pointed out that the limited German offensive of the VERDUN-HEISTELEN area in progress when the 31 October Estimate was written, had since "halted by the enemy on the arrival of additional
forces on this front. Since the offensive the enemy has been pressing between ARDEN and WILFORD, a line of vigorous patrols all along the front for identification. West of ARDEN he has been forced north of the KAAW.

Respecting the enemy's strategy, the 22 November estimate stated:

"The value to the army of this breakthrough over the KAAW at ARDEN-WILFORD is apparent. His objectives are (a) to smash Allied lines of communication, and (b) to drive our forces from German soil. A successful attack covering the west bank of the KAAW in conjunction with the break-through in the SINTORS-WILFORD sector would offer the enemy much booty in the way of desperately needed supplies. This might compel the withdrawal of the first and Ninth U.S. Armies to a second Assault on the KAAW area could be subsidiary to the main plan, and might possibly, if a pocket were achieved, for the lower bank of the SINTORS the 1st and 2nd strategy of the German.

The enemy has obviously steered all on the defense of the west by defending on the west bank of the KAAW. It is a hazardous position for an army to fight with an obstacle like the KAAW at its back, increasing the lines of supply from its major bases. The only justifications for this strategy were the two main forces of the enemy at that location. It is believed that the enemy are weakened to the KAAW-WILFORD area by our obvious weakness at this point."

These operations were similar to those occurring at the Al CASSAR situation, an offensive against the sector British and Ninth U.S. Armies was viewed as of high probability, and against the KAAW only as a secondary probability. However, the enemy's continued defense is the current probability, using his armor as a counterattack to clear off Allied penetrations. Employment of the Seventh U.S. northern tactical air expected at any time.

The following was assessed as the reason for the above actions:

"It is not a race against time. Can the enemy match his dispositions for his offensive prior to the arrival of our attack? With the approach of winter in the EAST, it is believed the enemy will stop all on an offensive in the WEST, a desperate failure by a desperate foe. It requires, by its very character, a time by time U.S. Army will influence his offensive plans. He is major. By reinforced this front with armor, the First U.S. Armies taken in these areas report that the KAAW on 10 November, surviving the next evening in the SINTORS area. It is believed that his entire front has been attempted to hold against an Allied offensive while he launches his blow in the north, probably between ARDEN and WILFORD, with the possible release of an advance to the west and southwest on both banks of the KAAW. Although his immediate stocks of fuel are probably ample, it may be difficult for him to maintain a sustained offensive."

The expected German offensive in the north did not materialize, according to the next estimate, issued on 28 November, only eight days
after that of 12 November. In the meantime, FUSA had launched its own offensive on the 16th, "uninfluenced by enemy action." The last sentence of this estimate announced "the enemy capability of a spoiling attack in new style." While he had resisted the FUSA's attack behind wire and minefields, he had not been forced to throw in any reserve of armor or high quality infantry, he had been content to remain on the passive defense in the V and VII Corps zones.

This 29 November Patients appraised the enemy strategy as the following:

"The enemy's overall strategy on the Western Front can be summed up as the defenses of the BEF and the Ruhr. This effort is proving difficult under the synchronized attacks of seven Allied armies. In order to sustain pressure on a 200-mile front, the enemy appears to lack sufficient mobile reserves of counterattacking quality, especially tanks, to meet off penetrations and prevent major breakthroughs. It is not unreasonable to believe that the defense of the Ruhr will be unsuccessful and that he will soon be forced into retreat behind the Rhine, which, skillfully executed, may lead to another military disaster comparable to the Battle of France.

With the giving up of his bridgehead over the Rhine and the launching of the Allied offensive, the enemy's strategic plan appears to be based on counterattack rather than a planned offensive, opened on his own initiative. The key to his strategy probably will be found in the whereabouts and activity of his Sixth Panzer Army. He may either roll until a soft spot develops, or until the Allied defenses break down with heavy losses. Possibly he will be compelled to retreat to the Rhine, or else counterattack the Allied II Corps and XIX Corps. The restoration of the Fünf Fallen in the name of sixth and First U.S. Army may yet be attempted, but if not, his next defensive battle will be based on the Rhine defenses of which may be assailed by incursions caused by heavy rains on the upper Ruhr."

principal reserves available to the commander in chief west were delivered to consisted of the Sixth Army in the Army Group B area, comprising the 1, 2, 9 and 12 SS and 9 Arm Divisions, none of which had been committed. Of the First Army, the 1, 3, 5, 6 Arm Divisions remained encircled, by early 15th, and four divisions might be diverted from the front of the Sixth U.S. Army Group to the Corps of the Third U.S. Army. The employment of the enemy's reserves, according to this estimate, would now be dictated by Allied unit usage through his field fortification and with the loss of initiative their employment as reserve is dubious. In Army Group E it has to date been preponderant, as the XVII Corps has employed First in the NJUH-LEH area and now in the CHERBOURG sector. If this pattern be followed Sixth Panzer Army will not be employed as a unit, with increasing pressure from Second British army
further north, thus lengthening the threatened front, the
enemy will almost be forced to employ their last reserve divisional-line.
The only other assets are German Airborne Divs and the intensive field
fortifications which he has had two months to construct.

A similar threat to the enemy concerns the use of his forces, his
situation on front of the Third U.S. Army was described as deteriorated,
and his loss of ground before the Seventh U.S. and First French
Arrows demonstrate the insufficiency of his reserves to meet the
offensive of the southern Allied armies. In the north, he had only
five armoured Panzer Grenadier division in Army Group B, to meet the
Second Polish, Ninth and First U.S. Armies, having committed four
or five such divisions. If this army be held in the north, his southern
front will deteriorate further, whereas if they are sent south to
pitch up the U.S. or BEF/CANZ welcome, his northern flank will be
seriously thinned, particularly if good weather continues.

The enemy's current capability was that of "defense of the thick
belt of the RHINE, probably along the general line DOCHMANN-HETT and
RHEIN RING, and in the Third U.S. Army area PASSIVIT LINE-RETZ (L),
and the PASSIVIT. His retirement at a "defensive line behind the RHINE" 
was thought "to be correct strategy. Collapsing action was an increasing
possibility in direct proportion to the success of the current
Allied offensive. No surrender of the present government is believed
possible, and if the strategic opportunity of destroying the German
army west of the RHINE with an irreplaceable back in exploited, the
collapse of large groups may be expected, possibly leading to
collapse, particularly if the RHINE is crossed. However, resistance
to the death from Nazi Freikorps and guerrilla bands should be expected,
especially in THURINGIA and SACHSEN. Capability No. A was
described as "an air blitz to regain air supremacy in limited visual
crane," and A "may well be attempted but will be of short duration and
limited in scope.

10 DECEMBER C-2 ESTIMATE:

The last C-2 Estimate preceding the 16 December Counteroffensive
was issued on 10 December. This expression of opinion was replete
with references to an expected German counterattack, but they should
not be accepted per se. Stress is therefore laid upon the following
points:

1. This Estimate's view continued the trend of opinion
expressed in its predecessor Estimate since FUSA's arrival on the
SIEGELFELD Line on 12 September, and did not constitute a radical
alteration of viewpoint.

2. FUSA expected a counterattack, and unequivocally announced
that opinion. These facts, nevertheless, were not the more significant
points of interest, which were:

A. The reader is invited to consider the locales of this
counterattack as the paramount, dominating point, and FUSA's enemy intentions for considering this geographical area.

B. Also, the reader is invited to consider the question of whether FUSA regarded this counterattack as independent of the FUSA offensive, as an intiative of the enemy, or was the same attack expected to occur in direct relationship to FUSA's offensive, when the enemy decided the timing to be advantageous to him.

**Enemy Counterattack Intentions & Locales.**

The keynotes of this 10 December Estimate were asserted in the following two statements:

"It is plain that his strategy in defense of the Reich is based on the exhaustion of our offensive and to be followed by an all-out counterattack with armor, between the Kober and the Eifel, supported by every weapon he can bring to bear."

"It is apparent that von Rundstedt, who obviously is conducting military operations without the benefit of intuition, has skillfully defended and husbanded his forces and is preparing for his part in the all-out application of every weapon at the focal point and the correct time to achieve defense of the Reich west of the Rhine by inflicting as great a defeat on the Allies as possible, indications to date point to the location of this focal point as being between KOBERN and SCHLEIDEN, and within this bracket this concentrated effort will be applied to the Allied forces judged by the German High Command to be the greatest threat to successful defense of the Reich."

Stresse is laid upon the fact that the FUSA G-2 announced in this Estimate his opinion of the location of the expected counterattack, and that it was well north of the actual assault area of 16 December. The expected locale was in the northern portion of the Allied front. It was west to east, between the Kober and the Eifel Rivers, and south to north, between SCHLEIDEN and KOBERN. The actual assault area began at a point somewhat below (south) of SCHLEIDEN. Furthermore, according to the Twelfth Army Group's Situation Map 101200 December, only the approximate southern half of this expected locale was even within the First Army's zone, the balance being divided between the Ninth U.S. Army and the Second British Army, most in the latter's zone. In short, the anticipated locale for the enemy's counterattack was well north of the actual stricken region. Even the portion within the FUSA's zone between SCHLEIDEN and KOBERN was north of the 16 December assaulted area, which was at the junction of the VII and VIII Corps sectors and concentrated southward in the VIII Corps.

**Counterattack Evidence.**

FUSA believed that there were several indications of the enemy counterattack intentions.

1. Since the publication of the last Estimate, on 20 November, "the enemy has stubbornly contested every foot of ground
in the zone of action of the First U.S. Army. He did so with 18 infantry, one armored, one para, and one panzer grenadier divisions.

2. He had "intensified his defense zone by fortification in depth," behind the FOK, converting each village into a strongpoint, and strengthening the FOK fortifications on the RHINE River line.

3. His effort for now appeared to be quartered in heavy lines and zones along the railroad generally in a semi-circle, from BURGUNDY to KOBEN, with KOBEN as a center point.

4. He continued to bring up Army and Corps artillery formations, and to build up fighter and fighter-bomber strength on the eastern front.

5. The suspension of V-1 fire from the EBBEOLDER area and the FOK area is believed to be based on the use of his railroads for the bringing in of new Volksgrenadier divisions west of the Rhine and for the buildup of the necessary artillery and supplies to support his all-out ground counterattack.

6. It is thought probable that the army's current production of V-1's was being routed to new sites in the BLACK FOREST and elsewhere east of the RHINE to support the counterattack by intervention and bombardment of supply installations and artillery areas.

7. Although Von Kondstedt had reluctantly disposed of his carefully guarded reserve to the Third U.S. Army's petition in the BLACK Forest, its commitment revealed that its two month WESTERBURG informing and refitting had "failed to bring it up to the strength and standing of the 1943 first-class Führer." The Führer's ground forces indicated a buildup in the WESTERMANN area.

8. A captured diary for the case-out of selected personnel who spoke the American dialect" obviously presages special operations for sabotage, attacks on OP's and other vital installations by infiltrated or parachuted specialists.

9. An extremely intelligent Führer whose other observations check exactly with established facts stated that every means possible is being gathered for the coming all-out counteroffensive.

10. The morale of freshly captured Führer's "recently achieved a new high..."

Augmenting the evidence of his unfolding strategy, the army's unfolding strategy indicated his intentions, according to this intelligence Estimate. The lead sentence of the section on strategy read: "The restoration of the seigfried line is still a probable strategic objective." This was the only mention of that topic, and the section was devoted to consideration of the more immediate point summarized thus: "Von Kondstedt apparently is accepting defeat in the south rather than compromise his hope of a decisive success in the north. This would appear to be the keynote of his strategy in the defense of the REICH west of the RHINE."

The army is apparently reconciled to the loss of ALASKA and is now fighting behind the upper RHINE. It is now fighting in the FAHRNAS and area and along the USBR river in defensive action similar to that in the NORTH sector. There is no disposition to retire behind the RHINE except where he has been forced to do so, and this occurred in a sector where his West Wall is east of the RHINE. The Estimate pointed out...
that the enemy has let his situation in both the upper RHINE and south of the MOSELLE deteriorate while still conserving reserves between DURENS and ESCH." He had accepted the defeat of the Nineteenth Army and its retreat across the upper RHINE "without a drain on the armored reserve of the Sixth Panzer Army." But, the "retreat to the SAAR has been met by the dispatch of 1st Lehr, three Fifteenth Army divisions, and will probably call for the commitment of one Inf Div and another 1st Div." As part of the strategy: "During the past month there has been a definite pattern for the seasoning of newly formed divisions in the comparatively quiet sector opposite VIII Corps prior to their dispatch to more active fronts." Furthermore, the enemy was "well aware of the tactical ace' which he holds in the ROER River dams." He had reacted to unsuccessful Allied bombardment of the dams by augmenting his forces on the "route of approach to the SCHRAM-MAUER and the UNTERMAUER, the key dams," with reserves of the Sixth Panzer Army divisions and the 2nd and 116 Panzer Divisions "conditionally available for local counterattacks in the defense of the dams."

**Reserves:**

The limit of reserves available to the C-in-C West appeared to be the Sixth Panzer Army, the 2, 3, 5, 6, 7 and 8 Panzer Divisions of the First Panzer Army, two or three Panzer Divisions from Germany, one or two divisions from Norway, and the possibility of one or two reconstituted panzer divisions from the East. "During the month of November the enemy suffered losses amounting to roughly four divisions a week. He has been replacing these losses from reserves east of the RHINE at the rate of about one and one-half per week, with the divisions being made up by the saving of five or more divisions from He and other reserves on hand west of the RHINE. There is reason to believe that he can continue to meet this heavy attrition for the next month or two by drawing next on divisions now enroute to Germany from Norway, in addition to the continuing flow of six divisions a month from Germany. When the Norwegian divisions are exhausted, he may still have other reserves made available by the shortening of his Italian front, and from the Balkans."

**Enemy Capabilities:**

In the opinion of this 10 December estimate, the current enemy capability was continuance of "his defense of the line of the RHINE north of the BURGEM, his present front line west of the RHINE covering the dams, and thence south along the Rhine valley." Capability No. 2 was described as a "concentrated counterattack with air, armor, infantry secret weapons at a selected focal point at the time of his own choosing." Implementation of No. 2 was expected when our major ground forces have crossed and the RHINE River, and if the dams are not controlled by us, maximum use will be made by the enemy of flooding of the RHINE in conjunction with his counterattack. If his counterattacks were unsuccessful, then Capability No. 3 would become operative, that was defense "on the line of the MÖT and subsequently retiring behind the RHINE." The fourth capability, that of collapse or surrender was still considered as a possibility. It might be produced by any of several events: popular revolt; induce by the shock of military or psychological defeat; Antony; strikes.
III. Some Evidence Contributing to Appraisal of Enemy Potentialities.

A. Enemy Build-up.

According to the December 6-2 daily summary and conclusions about enemy operations a titled TARGETS, there was a strong buildup of reserves in the north between the ROER and RHINE rivers and generally ranged south to north on the approximate line of ANRAIILI-NEUWIESKORN-
DURM-JULICH. Troops were bivouaccd in towns and villages close to detaining points. In the south, the TAEK-FRIED sector, 3-4 divisions with armor and some bridging equipment had moved in since 28 November, but bad weather had prevented observation for as long as four days of large movements in and out of the sector. At least as of 5 December, reinforcement arriving in the KITZING-KITZBURG area indicated that the SIPPEFEL Line in the KITZ was "very lightly held and that fresh troops [were] arriving for reserve or relief."

The 6-2 section issued a daily document titled TARGETS which summarized enemy operations, and FUSA expressed its appraisal of the German activity in a section titled Conclusions.(V) FUSA records contained this document for the 2-3, 4, 5, 12, 13, 14, 15 December, but not those of the other days during the first half of December. The extent fears, however, particularly those 12-15 December, suggested the extent of FUSA's recognition of the enemy buildup efforts.

On 2-3 December, "the build-up of SS, Armor, and other troops is continuing along the lines (1) DURAND-REGEN-REGEN-SCHLEIDEN, with these named towns as centers of activity, and (2) RABON-REICH-SCHLEIDEN-
GERMANN-EHLING-JULICH."n

According to the 4 December report: "Detaining of units to be held in reserve: as taken place in previously reported towns and villages from RENNS to JULICH to DURAND to HOBEN to EELDORF. There are indications that the enemy is utilizing more billets in towns, villages, and farms, and fewer wooded areas than was the case in the period 19 October to 15 November 1944."

On the next day, 5 December, "further verification of reinforcements arriving during the past week in the KITZING-KITZBURG area confirms the fact that the SIEGSCREIST Line in the Eifel has been very lightly held and that fresh troops are arriving for reserve or relief. The enemy is continuing in their normal movement and are recommended for immediate priority targets. Heavy traffic continues on both sides of the RHINE with yesterday's activity on the SIEGSCREIST-ZAGNER-LINE triangle, which presents a concentrated rail and bridge area."

No further issues were noted among the records unto that of the 12th, which stated that the 'enemy continued strengthening his
positions both on the RHINE plain and in the HINEL with emphasis on
securing cover for launching counterattacks.' The 13 December issue
reported no change in conclusions.

Of 14 December, no rail movement of note was observed west of the
RHINE, except considerable activity in the marshalling yards at TRIER
and MANNHEIM. East of the RHINE, four make-up trains of medium length
were seen in the marshalling yard at OBERRHEIN, and other scattered
activity was observed farther eastward, "but no trend of movement was
indicated..." Sightings of vehicular activity were less than at any time
previously. In general, the conclusion was the "troop concentrations in the EISOPH-SULPHUR Line continues."

The 13 December Target report offered the following:

"a. Units previously reported have detrained close to
defensive positions between the EDER and the MERT Rivers. They have not
been committed (except for artillery) and are held in reserve, bivouced
in towns and villages close to detraining points. The same towns
previously reported are still being used for evacuation and supply.

b. In the TRIER-PFALZ sector, 2-4 divisions with armor and
some bridging equipment have moved in since 28 November. Bad weather
has prevented observation of large movements into or out of this sector
for periods as long as four days at a time. There is no indication
of change in the enemy's use of rail junctions, railheads and rear
echelon establishments from the list previously submitted."

N.B. --- Two references to previously reported towns
and lists were to a memorandum by the FUSA, G-2, Target Subsection,
6 December, apparently to G-3, listing rail and troop points indicating
concentrations of reserves or dispositions of forces.

B. Attack Evidence Reported by Divisions.

As noted in the Division Levels, certain VIII Corps divisions
acquired during 12-15 December and reported four data that appeared to
constitute attack evidence, and FUSA was aware of it through the Corps.
Two described an accelleration of enemy traffic, a civilian woman
described a build-up instance, and a F: claimed a large-scale attack was
imminent. FUSA merely mentioned the first without interpretative
comment, and noted that it already was aware of the last too, though
through additional informational sources, thus indicating lack of relative
interest in these new, division-reported specific incidents.

FUSA's Disposition and Evaluation:

First Army received these four data from VIII Corps, and
reported them in its G-2 Periodics (IV, D, VI, A) The woman informer's
data was also reported in an ISC, and in an midnight description of
incoming information. This 12-15 December data was thus mainly recorded
in the G-2 Periodics, but not in the G-2 Estimates, perhaps because none
was issued after the 10th. Whatever influence this attack evidence
acquired by divisions exerted upon FUSA, there was no expression that
FUSA undertook protective measures as a reaction.

In general, the specific incidents represented in this data did
not appear to be of particular interest to FUSA. But, the subjects of
attack claims and of buildup were significant in that they were supported
by other evidence to that effect, and FUSA's reaction was apparently
more on the basis of being more concerned over the other already
perceived evidence than with these new incidents. (1) Increasing
traffic activity is a barely described in a single sentence of the Periodic,
without interpretative commentary, suggesting no special importance
being attached to it. (2) Although the 106th Division and the VIII Corps
had reported only one case of a FE claiming an impending attack, FUSA
declared that many FE's made the claim. FUSA regarded the claim as
propaganda to bolster German troops morale, but that a limited offensive
might be launched as a Christmas morale "victory" for civilian consumption.
(3) As to the women's build-up data, FUSA thought it "very interesting."
TAC/R and FE's had indicated a build-up was being executed. FUSA felt
that the mentioned engineers and bridging equipment suggested offensive
rather defensive action.

Detailed Accounts of Four Data

Actually, three divisions of the VIII Corps acquired seven
data between 12-15 December that ostensibly constituted evidence of an
imminent large-scale attack. (Div. Level, p. 5-7; Corps Level, p. 2)
Only four, however, were reported to the Corps; three FE claims of
an impending attack were not reported.

Two Traffic Acceleration Data.
The 23rd and 106th Divisions observed increasing enemy
traffic activity during 12-15 December, and so reported it in their
0-2 Periodics. It significance was diminished because no pattern of
action could be deduced from the several, separated instances. Without
commentary, the VIII Corps reported it in its 0-2 Periodics. FUSA men-
tioned it only once, in its 0-2 Periodic for 15 December, in connection
with VIII Corps operations, thus: "Considerable vehicular traffic was
heard through the period opposite the northern flank of our 80th RMP salient." (L-456(1a))

One FE Attack Claim Data.
Although the 4th and 106th Divisions captured two FE's each
on 15 December, who claimed a large-scale enemy attack was impending,
only one by the 106th Division was reported to the VIII Corps, by message.
Their information was obtained by hearsay or rumor, and unsupportedly
unsupposed by official orders or plans. The only FE whose claim was
reported was inept, being under the influence of morphine.
The VIII Corps reported this FE's information in its 0-2
Periodic for the day, 15 December.
FUSA made no direct reference to this incident. Instead, ih
discussed other FE attack claims apparently unrelated to this
recent main line event. [IV, 4] The section on reserves of the G-2 Periodic
for 29 December asserts: "Although the enemy is resorting to his
attack program to bolster morale of the troops, it is possible that
a limited scale offensive will be launched for the purpose of
achieving a Chindit morale "victory" for civilian consumption. Many FE's now speak
of the coming attack between the 17th and 29th of December, while
other reports press the 'reoccupation' of HICHA as a Christmas
gift for the Buddha."

The source of information concerning these multiple FE
claims as to an attack was not located among the records. There was no
other mention in the data. FE's own daily Prisoner of War Interro-
ation reports for 10-15 December did not contain a single reference to
this at all. (L555(20,22) ) This would seem to be a logical
location for such information, but no FE mentioned it.

One Data on Build-up by Roman Civilians.
A Lusibomay woman gave herself up to the 28th Division
on 24 December, and described enemy build-up in the VIANOVA-SARDIN
area. The 28th declared that she had noted nothing of military
significance on her main travel route, her comments were reported to
the G-2 Force by both message and in the division's G-2 Periodic
on the line.

The Corps forwarded it in its G-2 Periodic of the 1st, and
in the Intelligence Summary of L2598A-142800A.

The FE A reported to this Corps' ISIB at 150210A December, it
subsequently received a report on the woman from earlier sources than
when the G-2 Periodic and 1578.(VI) FE A reported the same princi-
ple, but merely received the two Corps Intelligence. The Intelligence
19. L2598. Final daily summary of acts at 145845A Tuesday, which
originated her data. Another instance was the FE A G-2 ISIB
19-922 for 24 December, which was included and filed in the FE A G-2
Journal File by 142800A December. It also described the woman's information
in detail. The description was likewise stated in the FE A G-2
Periodic for 24 December, in the section dealing with reserve and
stabilizer capable of intervention. (IV, 6) FE A commented: "It seems
interesting report. Build-up of troops has been confirmed by G-2/A and
intelligence. However, presence of large numbers of engineers with
bridge equipment suggests preparation for offensive rather than
defensive action. No division from ITALI has been reported on the move
to the front by Higher Headquarters but the possibility always
exists that such a move has, in fact, taken place."

7. Reserve Forces --- Sixth Punjub Army.

This reserve force is considered as the key to the enemy's
strategy in respect to Guma counterattack possibilities, but Allied
forces might form its pleasant dividend. Despite the enemy's
desire to maintain it as a unit. As of 10 December, the Sixth Punjub
Force was believed to be located between the RS A and the PRUE
divisions, the northern town any probably ranging from PULICHEN-GORHAM
to INCH. The components were believed to be the 1, 2, 9, 12 SS Punjub
Divisions, and perhaps the 3 SS Punjub Division, once perhaps the 3 SS Punjub
Division, and perhaps the 2 Punjub Division as also.

Two reserve areas, however, were not initial or all force on 16
December, in that it was not confirmed on that day.
G. FUSA's evaluation of this array was reflected in a single G-2
bulletin, that of 20 November, and several daily G-2 Periodicals
(HIC, 20 Nov; IV, G)

Fifth Army's appraisal of the situation and deployment of the Sixth
Panzer Army was expressed only in the G-2 bulletin of 20 November.
During a discussion of German counterattack possibilities, this
commander stated: "The key to his strategy will probably be found
in the operations and activity of the Sixth Army,"" in search
of which he had not launched his expected counterattack in the north
between MACAIR and FUSA against the Second British and the Ninth U.S.
forces prior to the FUSA launching of its 16 November offensive towards
the Fifth Army. This 20 November bulletin declared that the enemy had lost
the initiative on a Retaining attack. This loss of initiative and
because of the employment of reserves would be distorted by Allied
penetrations, all prompted FUSA to express the view that the employment
of reserves or reserve was dubious. If the pauer of the past were
repeated, the Sixth Panzer Army would not be used as a unit, according
to MacArthur, but to be maneuvered in parts.

Sally G-2 Periodicals traced the development of FUSA's acquisition
of information about this reserve army. The initial mention of a
possible reserve force which FUSA became aware of was made on 22 October.
The Bulletin of that date stated that indications continued to be
received of a buildup of enemy reserves in the SIEGR(F) area. Further-
more, "Reports from Germany mention the possibility of the formation
of a new Panzer Army or perhaps all the battered panzer
divisions from ENGLAND, particularly the SS formations. At least five
of these divisions have been in the Reich since early September."8

On 25 October the Periodicals quoted SHAEF as the source of the information
that G-2 of Gen. Dietrich was probably the commander of a panzer
army then forming in Northwest Germany, with headquarters at KHMAl(F-59)
on 15 October. However, on 2 November, FUSA listed the higher German
units on the Eastern Front and their locations then known to FUSA, but
omitted the Sixth Army. The First, Fifth, Tenth, Eleventh, Nineteenth
and Twenty-one Armies were listed for the known armies.

Again, citing another source as the source, a Weekly Army Group
Periodic Report, the 5 November FUSA G-2 Periodical stated that a deserter
reported on 10 October that the Sixth Army was regrouping in
the BEEFAL area, commanded by Gen. Gen. Dietrich, and including the
2, 10, 12 SS and 7th Lehr Divisions. The Sixth Army Group reported,
"The presence of such a Panzer Army, with Dietrich in charge, has been
suspected."9

The first instance in which FUSA mentioned this reserve army by
name, on its own initiative and without reference to another source
of the source of information, occurred in the 8 November Periodical.
First, a description of the arrival of some enemy forces on its front,
FUSA commented: "Whether these arrivals were new infantry divisions, a
part of the newly identified Sixth Panzer Army from BEEFAL of the RHAF,
or merely a part of the forces held behind the line in tactical reserve,
such as 2 and 9 Panzer Divisions, is not yet clear."10
From this it is evident that the received frequent data about this army, and reported it in the daily 0-2 Periods of 14, 15, 17, 19, 20, 22, 24, 26, 27, 29, 30 November, and 1, 3, 4, 10, 13 December. Of the last several days preceding the 16th, no mention was made of this force in the Periods of 11, 12, 14, 15 December. For the only comments on these days, the reader is invited to read them among the DOCUMENTATION (IV, c).

The most interesting and significant of the November-December comments in the Periods were those on 20 November and 10 December. The former expresses the opinion of at least part of the purpose of the Sixth Panzer Army. F/W observed that the 10 SS Panzer Division might be moved to the F/A front, and that this movement "to the ACHER-LÜDIECK corridor may be taken as an indication that the enemy intends to keep the 10th Panzer Army intact as long as possible and avoid committing his major reserve piecemeal as he did in 1940, Northern." 

On 20 December, F/W noted that following a three-page commentary on the Sixth Panzer Army in its 02 Periods of that day, this was followed by a F/W's knowledge of the dispositions and whereabouts of the army's units at the period, F/W did not, however, discuss the location of this reserve army. Information about the army's locations since its move from its reforming and training area in WESTFALEN came from F/W's who had either recently passed the area in question or picked up information concerning the whereabouts of those units in area. Interrogation of civilians provided some clue in solving the puzzle of the Sixth Panzer Army, as on 10 December, F/W described the location of the Sixth Panzer Army thus:

"The Sixth Panzer Army exercises the area between the 50°E and the Rhine River. The northern boundary of this sector probably runs from PANZER-GLADBACH to HAUK. From this line south, the divisions are located in almost every town and village, and most of their armored heavy equipment such as artillery is found to be stored in buildings, while the rest is not doubt stored in wooded areas. These concentrations of men and matériel continue south to a line extending from HÜLSE to OTTEN (200). The pattern of rail and road movement observed by F/W confirms the presence of at least four Panzer divisions in the area described above."

At least four SS Panzer Divisions are suspected as part of Sixth SS Panzer Army. They are probably grouped under I and II SS Panzer Corps. It is thought likely that another Panzer Divisions and possibly two more will be added to this Army. I Pz, 9 Pz, 9 SS, and 12 SS Panzer Divisions are the divisions suspected under Sixth SS Panzer Army, and it is thought that 4 SS Panzer Divisions, as well as 4 SS Panzer Divisions, are probably also in this sector.

For detailed divisional locations, the reader is invited to refer to the DOCUMENTATION (IV, c). The 2 SS and 3 SS Panzer Divisions were placed in the North to the front of Ninth U.S. and Second British Armies. 12 SS and 1 SS Panzer Divisions would come into the zone of action of VII and VII Corps of First U.S. Army respectively. 5 SS Panzer Divisions are present, and 2 SS Panzer Divisions are probably also in your zone of action."
No mention was made of this army in the 6-2 Periodics of 11, 12, 14, 15 December, but the 23 December Periodic discussed the 3 Panzer Division as being depleted and that its reorganization would likely be another organization available on the Eastern Front, rather than one of the divisions of the 6-2 Panzer Reserve counterattacking reserve, 6 Panzer Army.

The next reference to the Sixth Panzer Army occurred in the 6-2 Periodic, 16/30014-16/30094 December. According to this issuance, the army was still uncommitted at the close of 15 December, it comprised the 1, 2, 3, 9, 10 Panzer, 5 Panzer, 6th and 9th Infantry Divisions. However, the Order of Battle Notes attached to this Periodic noted among its new identification section that a PFA was taken from the 3/26 CS PA or Regt of 12/14 Ft My at F-017039, who stated that his regiment had participated in an attack in this area on the afternoon of 15 December. PFA commented: "This could constitute the first identification of any elements of Sixth CS Panzer Army in the battle area."

2. Importance of FINELINE to Germans.

It is noted among the 6-2 dateline of September onwards the PFA 6-2 frequently referred to the significance of the FINELINE to the enemy that he could defend it strongly and that he might counterattack to force the Allies across the border fortification off of German soil. Perhaps one unconfirmed source which prompted PFA to help those views on the Hitler order to defend the line.

The PFA 6-2 cited this order in its Periodic for 5 October: (V, 4)

This is quoted from the Second British Army Intelligence Summary #20, 2 October, which reported that this order of 15 September was Hitler's, he had been described as not to be countermanded under any circumstances.

It was a telephone message from the C-in-C B.E.F. stating:

"1. The FINELINE Line is of decisive importance in the battle for Germany.

2. I order:

The FINELINE Line and each of its defensive positions will be held to the last stand and until completely destroyed. This order will be disregarded forthwith by all ADS, military and civil troops.

3. Air Reconnaissance.

The northern portion of the front, the 5 and VII Corps zones, and north of them was the locale of enemy activity during the several weeks preceding the Counteroffensive, according to aerial reconnaissance. While XII.c noted and drew new conclusions about the activity, it did not change the meaning and purpose.

The situation was summarized on 15 December, enemy defenses had been improved and of the 1.215, particularly north of BUREN, during the past several weeks, by additional entrenching, shifting of artillery, etc.
Although its significance was not discussed, FUSA stated: "Considerable movement in the VII Corps zone between the ROC and ERT Rivers has been taking place. Although long convoys or large concentrations of mobile vehicles were not evident, a few vehicles could be seen at one time or another in almost every small village in this area. Motor convoys on the roads here likewise been traced to a few vehicles in any one locality with no definite trend in direction." Rail traffic had been heavy, and not confined to main lines, inasmuch as the network of secondary railroads was apparently kept operating. Cat tracks were sparsely reported giving "cable indication of the importance attached to this form of transportation." So bridges had been prepared by the enemy for movement, and generally the movement was toward the north in the VII Corps path.

High priority was apparently given to rail road bridges on the 

AUCHER-ERT-FELD line and those paralleling the ERT River.

FUSA made the above 13 December narrative in its G-2 Periodic for that day, in the G-2(Air) Summary of Movement. (IVG) Information for 15 new air columns is held by the IX Tactical Air Command A-2 Section, which transferred its daily periodic to the FUSA G-2(WI). This report referred to air columns, which reported air operations but lacked a periodicity, and (2) in the G-2(Air) Summary of Movement contained in the FUSA G-2 Daily Periodic. This second section was the most informative as to both trend and facts. (IVG) The more pertinent of these C-2(Air) Summary of Movement sections are noted below, to supplement the above recapitulation of the situation in the 13 December issuance. The following commentary is a resume only, and details may be found in the ECODATION section under IVG.

According to the 1 December Periodic, the enemy activity for the preceding week indicated three axes of movement. In order of density, they were: 1. ELSA-PPEN, 2. KLA-KIRCHEN-KALL line, 3. DORF-GRUNENHOCH line and the ELSA-ECKLING line. There were 16 sighting on the ELSA-PPEN line, 16 sightings on the KLA-KIRCHEN-KALL line, 17 trains on the DORF-GRUNENHOCH line, and the KLA-KIRCHEN-KALL line and the ELSA-ECKLING line on both sides of the ELMS showed regular expected daily usage.

The 2 December Periodic stated that there were two days during the preceding week in which no sightings were made due to over weather, but the rail lines within the FUSA zone were well covered during the remainder of the week. The most significant fact which has been brought out is that on all rail lines in the V and VII Corps zone, to and including the ETLF. Finally there has been train movement at some time during the week.

Following the 13 December summary, reports were made on daily basis for the rest two days preceding the Combat Interval.

On the 14th, observations were made only between 1200 and 1600 hours, due to fog and ground haze over the hours, although the skies were generally clear. No rail movement or not was observed west of the SCHER except in the FUGER area, where the marshalling yards showed considerable activity, as well as at ERFER. East of the SCHER, the marshalling yards at OBERJAC(F5.47) contained four or five trains of
medium length. Some other scattered activity was observed further to the east, but no trend of movement was indicated. "Sightings of vehicular activity were less than any time previously."

Observations covered only the 1030-1130 period on the 15 December. Enemy movements were practically negligible, except for movements facing west at FRÉTHÉNCH. The movement of 60 of vehicles into and out of KEMENICH (1127) might indicate a straight.

IV. FUSA's Opinion of Attack's Significance, 16 December

Methodology.

1. Because of their high level strategy implications, the interviews with senior FUSA officers, personally by Dr. Forrest C. Pogue, are not discussed in this paper. On the official FUSA documents among the archives of the Historical Records Section, USAFFE, were examined.

2. Furthermore, the FUSA After/Action Report for December 1944 is not discussed as a source of information. (A-9661) This document was not objective. It was submitted 7 April 1945, several months after the event, and partiality was injected into its pages.

The Intelligence Section contained a six-page analysis titled, "Buildup for the Counteroffensive," p. 192. It is of 50-55, listing attack signs. This data, to be sure, individually contained in the current issues of 1-2 Periodics and 1-2 Intelligences, but the data was not currently designated or as slick symptoms in these pre-counteroffensive documents. Yet, the retrospective After/Action Report labeled them as attack evidence, giving the erroneous impression that they were recognized as such BEFORE THE EVENT by the 1-2 Section, and applicable to the actual assault area. As noted elsewhere in this CUMULATION, FUSA expected a counterattack, but in the north, not in the southern portion of its front where it occurred.

3. FUSA's 16-2 Periodic #320, 160001A-162400A and Intelligence Summary #992, 161300A-162400A December were the major sources of information concerning the assault on 16 December. (IV, E; VI, B)

Commentary.

Identification of Attack.

According to the IPET JSR of 1800A-2400A hours to FUSA's superior commanders, a heavy enemy artillery fire fell along most of the Army's front, starting at about 0930, with sporadic fire falling in rear areas at ST. VITH, MALLE, JENNY, LAURIE, and ETTER. Beginning at 0600A, counterattacks were launched at numerous points on the VII Corps and the southern 7 Corps fronts, with two small attacks on the VII Corps front.

RESULT.

FUSA asserted in its 1-2 Periodic 16001A-162400A December that the German attack was an all-out one, that the enemy was attacking all on this offensive, that his current capability was to drive through FUSA's rear areas and seize bridgeheads over the MAISIE River.
Although the enemy had attacked with 22 divisions, five of which had not been previously identified by FUSA, he still possessed strong uncommitted, reserve forces, mainly the Sixth Panzer Army.

Evaluation of the Attack

FUSA's opinion of the assault's gravity was expressed in the G-2 Periodic for the 16th. The discussion of reserves and intervention forces asserted:

"There was no doubt that the enemy was making an all-out effort to smash through our lines and achieve objectives deep in our rear areas. Therefore, the only commitment of a large portion of the remaining enemy reserves must be expected in both the V and VIII Corps sectors, with perhaps the greatest pressure being exerted along the boundary of the two Corps."

During the analysis of enemy capabilities, the G-2 expressed the view:

"Present indications are that this is the enemy's all-out bid for victory, it must be now or never. He has moved out of his bunker and permanent fortifications. Reserves are still available. The enemy has struck all on this offensive, he cannot afford to halt its momentum now."

First Army's reasons for the above conclusions were not announced, but doubtless a major evidence on the assault's gravity consisted of certain captured documents acquired by FUSA during the day. At 1244 hours the G-2 received the translated text of Von Rundstedt's Order of the Day of 16 December, which announced the Counteroffensive and its importance to German troops. (F1B) This document was captured during the morning by the V Corps and forwarded to the FUSA G-2. Furthermore, although the number and size of receipt were indeterminable from the records, the FUSA G-2 acquired during the day a group of documents containing (1) the Order of the Day about the Counteroffensive by the commanders of the Army Group B and the Fifth Panzer Army, (2) a document pertaining to the Operation GHEIP, and (3) some miscellaneous papers. These were captured by the 106th Division and forwarded to the VIII Corps (Corps Level), VIII Corps, p. 37. Neither the VIII Corps nor the FUSA records, however, indicated how and when FUSA acquired these three groups of documents, which, nevertheless, were doubts obtained from VIII Corps. Even so, FUSA persisted and attached them to its G-2 Periodic for 16 December, also, FUSA described these in detail in its G-2 ISSM 1800-2300 hours, stating that "captured documents ... clearly indicates large scale
offensive launched today with XI. Vith its first major objective and two more drive to east and north east."

enemy capabilities:

These were stated in the ENEMY CAPABILITIES section of the 16 December 0-2 Periodic. The current one was the attempt to exploit initial gains by driving through FUSA's rear areas and gaining bridgeheads over the Rhine River. The second capability consisted of outflanking the attack to the limited objective of driving FUSA from the German soil and regaining its WEST WALL positions. Defense of the current gains was the third capability, but FUSA considered it unlikely at that time, because the gained ground was not so defensible as WEST WALL positions just departed. Moreover, the enemy's low supply required forward movement to live off captured supplies. FUSA also expressed the thought that "if the enemy attack shows signs of bogging down, then FUSAFDET may decide that AACHEN would suffice for the Funcher's Christmas present."

Strength and Composition of Enemy Forces:

Comparison of the Units in Contact sections of the 15 and 16 December 0-2 Periodic indicated that FUSA was aware of the presence of elements of 18 enemy divisions on its front, whereas, 22 actually struck on the 16th.

The following tabulation indicates the differences:

Elements of Divisions

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According to the table, elements of five enemy divisions struck on the 16th which had not been previously identified. One of these,


Official records, e.g., daily O-2 Periodic and Intelligence
Summaries, were the major source of information to the FUSA. Each
Army's O-2 Journal File was replete with copies of such summaries,
from subordinate commands, adjacent armies, and their groups, the
British Second Army, and superior commands of Twelfth Army Group
and ( Eğer (Historical Records Section files.) Very little seemed to have
been received from 21st Army Group, but FUSA was sent the Twelfth Army Group
O-2 summaries regularly. Of the Group's O-2, the 1st to 5th were the
Nos. 131 and 132 for 14 and 15 December, the latter being received
160715: December 15th of the Twelfth Army Group O-2 Periodic, 1416164:
December arrived at 160632 December. (17) The
12th's reached FUSA O-2 on 150620, the 13th's on 140910A, the 14th's
on 160720, and the 15th's on 120920A December.

Of particular interest is the receipt of information as whether or not FUSA received reports on the available attack evidence
provided by certain VIII Corps divisions. Two data concerned an
acceleration of enemy traffic activity during 12-15 December, one
related to the build-up data provided by a civilian woman on the
15th, (DIV., lorn., p. 5-17; Corps Level, VIII Corps, p. 36-37)

The first three and one of the latter were reported to the Corps,
which in turn, through its O-2 Periodic, reported the four data to FUSA.

There four data were received and reported by FUSA. (see Attack
Intelligence Report of Divisional section of this CRITIQUE) (1) The
traffic increase mentioned in the FUSA O-2 Periodic for 15 December,
(2) although only one PA claim about an imminent attack was forwarded
to the VIII Corps and then to FUSA, the First Army's O-2 Periodic
for 15 December referred to "many PA's" making such a claim. Its
amount of information on this subject was not stated, and no claim
was found among the FUSA records, certainly not among the daily PA
Intelligence Reports. (3) The build-up data volunteered by the
civilian woman was received and forwarded by the VIII Corps to FUSA
in the Corps O-2 Periodic 16 December and in its ISC for
120920A-121210A. This Corps ISC was received by FUSA at 160910A
December. However, FUSA obviously received the data, maybe by message,
from other sources than the Corps O-2 Periodic and ISC, but the records
did not indicate the time and manner of receipt. FUSA possessed the
Let us now consider the intelligence data in detail.

The First Army reported its intelligence data through its daily
Periodical and its G-2 Estimate. As noted in the Enemy Capabilities
section of this CIRCULAR, FUSA issued G-2 Estimate between 8 June,
the first one after D-Day, and 10 December, the last pre-Counteroffensive
G-2 Estimate issuance. The Estimate was more expressive of the FUSA
opinions on the enemy potentialities. In fact, the ENEMY CAPABILITY
section of the G-2 Periodical referred to the Estimates for that subject.
FIRST U. S. ARMY

DOCUMENTATION

I. FUSA's Official History.

a. First United States Army REPORT OF OPERATIONS, 20 OCTOBER 1943 - 1 AUGUST 1944.

(Source: In Historical Records Section.)

Advance elements of the FUSA staff arrived in the United Kingdom in late September 1943, and one day following its arrival on 19 October the Headquarters of FUSA opened its Command Post at Clifton College, Bristol, England. FUSA superseded the V Corps as the command headquarters of American forces in the British Isles. This was the invasion Army on D-Day, 6 June 1944, with the V Corps and the VII Corps landing on the OMAHA Beach of Normandy and on UTAH Beach of the Cotentin Peninsula, respectively. By early July the Army was augmented by the VIIIth and XIX Corps, and a breakout drive from the Normandy beachhead as executed during late July, called Operation COBRA.

b. First United States Army REPORT OF OPERATIONS, 1 AUGUST 1944 - 22 FEBRUARY 1945.

(Source: Ibid.)

This breakthrough at ST. LO was exploited during August and early September. PARIS was captured on 25 August, and the Army was pursued through northern France and Belgium to the Belgium-Germany border, where the Army - a located on 13 September. (Situation Map 35)

This area was the beginning of the Battle of Germany, which continued until interrupted by the enemy's Ardennes Counteroffensive on 16 December. The FUSA area on that date ranged between the British Twenty-First Army Group on the north and Third U.S. Army on the south. North to south were positioned the Army's three corps, the XIX, VII, VIII, from southern HOLLAND, generally along the Germany border of BELGIUM and LUXEMBOURG, to the boundary of the First and Third Armies on the ODER RIVER, slightly below CERVEZIER, Luxembourg.

During the remainder of September the XIX Corps drove on to the Holland-Germany border, and slightly beyond portions of it, while the northern flank of the VII Corps fought beyond the Belgium-Germany border, severing north to invest AACHEN, but the month ended with only approximately half of the city surrounded. The southern flank of the VII Corps and the 7 Corps to its south, generally fought up to the border or crossed slightly in some parts.
AACHEN was captured on 21 October, thus completing the first phase of the First Army's letter of instruction of 29 September, with the advance to CHAMPAGNE and beyond to the RHINE River still to be made. This involved the offensives of November and December on BURGLIN FOREST, SCHONHOF, and the ROER River dams.

As of 12 December, two of the three Army Corps were conducting an offensive. The major effort of the Army was being made on the north flank towards KÖLN on the RHINE River. However, although the VII Corps had generally reached the RHINE River near DÜREN in its sector, and as of 12 December was clearing the resistance on the west bank, the First Army's advance beyond the RHINE was critically handicapped. A large-scale crossing of the RHINE below the river's four dams south of KÖLN was dangerous. If the German should destroy them or open their gates, the area in the DÜREN region would be flooded, cutting off advancing units from support and supply or destroying men and equipment. Trenches, air attacks had not destroyed the dams prior to ground forces arrival, the First Army attacked the dams area. The III Corps began its attack on 13 December, and was continuing it on 15 December. FUSA's southern corps, the VIIIth, was ranged from slightly north of LOCHRIV southward generally along the Belgium-Germany border and the Luxemburg-Germany border to the VIII Corps juncture with the Third U.S. Army in the vicinity of the southeast corner of Luxemburg, approximately where the France-Germany-Luxemburg borders met. This zone was defensive, as it had been for approximately two months, and on 15 December was quiet and inactive.

Thus, during the two month period from the FUSA's arrival on the SIMEZ line on 12 September to the 16-December Counteroffensive, the northern portion of the front was engaged in an offensive towards KÖLN, whereas the southern flank was defensive and relatively inactive. The two northern corps, the Vth and VIIIth were attacking on 15 December towards and on the LÖCIN River, respectively, while the VIIIth Corps was defending in the south on an inactive front.

II. After/Action Report, December 1944.
(Source: L-496(1))

FUSA After/Action Reports were date retrospective, being written well after the close of the month. The December report was dated 7 April 1945, a substantial period intervening between the Counteroffensive's termination in January 1945 and the composition of this report. The point was true of the November 1944 and January 1945 reports, which were issued 27-February 1945 and 21 April 1945 respectively.

The writer has not extracted data from this December report as a contribution to the body of information denoting FUSA's knowledge and opinion of the enemy. He does not consider the 47-page Section II, BATTLEFIELD REPORTS, as historically objective. It lists events as of the attack's beginning, but this list was compiled after the event, not prior. The composition was largely from the daily Co. Progress Reports, but there documents did not necessarily specify the data as constituting attack indications. While the writer does not accept this data as historical evidence, because he regards it as unobjective,
the reader is invited to examine the USA After/Action Report, Intelligence Section, for December 1944, to form his own judgement.

Except for the interpolation of the G-2 Estimates of 20 November and 10 December, the compilation consisted of daily, applicable extracts from the G-2 Periodicals. The section opened with the statement: "On 7 December the concept of the enemy capabilities was still as expressed in G-2 Estimate No. 30 dated 20 November 1944. Following the quoting of that essay capabilities section the assertion was made: "Evidence accumulated rapidly to alter this estimate. Outstanding items of intelligence must were (from Daily Periodic Reports issued by G-2 of 5, G-2, First U.S. Army)." Extracts from the daily G-2 Periodicals were then listed chronologically until after the 7 December entry, at which point the G-2 Estimate 33 dated 10 December was quoted verbatim, as a summary of the intelligence received during 1 and 10 December...

"After the issue of this estimate, corroborative evidence continued to accumulate. Entries for the 12th, 13th, 14th and 15th of December followed. That of 15 December is herein quoted as an example:

"15 December: "Reinforcements for the front are now expected to indicate that at least three or four newly reformed divisions along the Army front must be reached with during the next few days. although the enemy is reacting to his attack propaganda to bolster morale of the troops, it is possible that a limited scale offensive will be launched for the purpose of achieving a Christmas morale 'victory' for civilian consumption. Many PFA's now speak of the coming attack between the 17th and 25th of December, while other reports point to the capture of Aachen as a Christmas present for the House Father.'

"VIII Corps reports that an abrupt change of routine of enemy personnel opposite 9th US Armored Div strongly suggests that new troops may have arrived in that area. (Comment: Very likely a recently arrived Jeesleiter Division coming in to relieve 212 Volksgrenadier Div.)

"Enemy continued to restrict his activity to packing and improving defenses. Patrolling and one large patrol consisting of 34 men observed in the vicinity of L-0495. Considerable vehicular traffic was heard throughout the period opposite the southern flank of our SCHOFEN salient."

III. G-2 Estimates
(Sources: F-244(9), 552(16), 554(16))

A. Explanation.

The object of the examination of the G-2 Estimates was to trace the development of the USA's opinion of the broadest aspects of the German intentions and capabilities, that is, those beyond an immediate current campaign. For instance, each Estimate up to 10, 10 July, was...
considered only with the action of the period. The issuance of that
date, however, referred to the collapse or surrender of the
army, indicating that the FCSM opinion was being projected to
large considerations. In order to trace the progression of FCSM's
views leading up to the Counteroffensive, the following analysis of
the G-2 Estimates was compared with this June issuance, although
the Army's campaign was still prior to the breakout from the beachhead,
which occurred later that month.

As noted below, the First Army prolifically issued G-2 Estimates.
The first one after the 6 June E-Day was the Special G-2 Estimate
13, on 8 June, and there were 13 intervening ones until 37 was issued
on 20 October. Thus, the last one prior to the Counteroffensive. There
were approximately 25 weeks during that period, and 33 issuances,
articulated them in a week.

**B. Chronological List, 6 Juny '44 - 37, 21 Dec. '44.**

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<td>3.</td>
<td>Special G-2 Est., 5 June</td>
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C. Extracts from Texts.

#10. 10 July.

**2. Conclusions.**

a. Enemy Capabilities.

... (6) The enemy is capable of collapse or surrender.

b. Discussion.

... Implementation of 2(a) is of low immediate probability but should not be overlooked.*

#10. 18 July.

**2. Conclusions.**

a. Enemy Capabilities.

... (4) The enemy is capable of collapse or surrender.

b. Discussion.

... The implementation of collapse or surrender capability 2a(4), is of growing possibility, particularly in view of the current British success at the eastern end of the bridgehead. **...**

#11. 24 July.

This estimate was titled an Political. It discussed the consequences of the attempted Hitler assassination on 20 July. It considered the overthrow of his government by internal revolution or revolt of field armies, or government would sustain itself in office by suppression of opposition.

#12. 26 July.

**2. Enemy Capabilities.**

b. (1)...

... (5) The enemy is capable of collapse or surrender.

b. Discussion. ... The implementation of 2a(5) is of increasing probability in direct proportion to the success of our operations. Information of LXXXIV Corps is believed at hand, and the destruction of II Par Corps is an immediate possibility.**

#13. 1 Aug.

**2. Conclusions.**

a. Enemy Capabilities.

... (2) The enemy is capable of giving up the 'no retreat' policy and by withdrawing from southern France, endeavoring to regroup his forces in northern France to prevent an advance toward GERMANY.

... (4) The enemy is capable of a coup d'etat which will replace Hitler by a high military party who will sue for peace with
the British and Americans, while making no further against the Russians.

(5) The enemy is capable of a military collapse, and total surrender.

b. Discussion. ... The adoption of 2a(2) is believed of low order of probability because of Hitler's 'no retreat' policy and the impracticality of performing any large-scale regrouping due to the present state of rail and highway communications and the dominance of our air force. ... 2a(4) is of increasing possibility despite the Gestapo. 2a(5) is regarded as an almost certain eventuality either preceded by 2a(4) or occurring successively as units are defeated in the field.

c. Reasons. Doubt was expressed that the NORMANDY forces could continue more than four to eight weeks as a fighting machine. Only discipline and habit of obedience to orders kept the front lines fighting. Another heavy defeat such as the breakthrough battle begun on 25 July would probably force collapse of the forces at the base of the CHarente Peninsula. Surrender or a disastrous retreat would be the alternative. "In the next four to eight weeks, the current situation may change with dramatic suddenness into a race to reach a shootout Germany."

#14. 8 Aug.
"2. Conclusions.

a. Enemy Capabilities.

(2) The enemy is capable of surrender or collapse.

b. The capabilities are in order of probability."

#15. 13 Aug.
No discussion of enemy capabilities.

#16. 15 Aug.
"2. Conclusions.

a. Enemy Capabilities.

(1) To continue to hold the shoulders of the FAJAFY-ARGENTAN gateway to extricate the almost encircled forces.
(2) To fight a series of delaying actions in rear guard while he retires to the SEINE and the WANS.
(3) To attempt a stand on the SEINE and WANS.
(4) To retire to the heights of the AISNE.
(5) To retire to the SEINE.
(6) To surrender or collapse.
(7) To employ new or secret weapons.

b. Discussion. 2a(1) is current. 2a(2) is believed of high probability. 2a(3) is next in sequence and in likelihood followed by an attempt to extricate 2a(4) and (5), unless 2a(6) is forced upon
the enemy by Allied pressure or internal disorder. 2a(7) will probably
be implemented if new devices are at hand and practical.

\[17. \ 18 \ Aug.\]

Capabilities unchanged from \#16.

\[18. \ 19 \ Aug.\]

Enemy Capabilities: "No change since Estimate No. \#17. Present
enemy dispositions continue to favor the capability of an enemy
withdrawal across the SEINE River."

\[19. \ 20 \ Aug.\]

Titled: Counterintelligence.

\[20. \ 21 \ Aug.\]

"CONCLUSIONS. Enemy tactics and reactions to our moves show
plainly that there no longer exists a cohesive plan for the defense
of the West as a whole. At best the enemy is capable of fighting only
a large-scale delaying action, throwing his remaining divisions into
battle piecemeal wherever the situation is most critical for the moment.
He is incapable of any concerted action or maneuver on a large scale.
His hope of receiving further reinforcements with which to stem the
tide, regain control and consolidate his position, are almost nil."

No other remarks about capabilities.

\[21. \ 25 \ Aug.\]

"2. Conclusions.

a. Enemy Capacities. of the capabilities listed
in C-2 Estimate No. 2a/16, this headquarters, the following remain:
(1) To retire to the heights of the AISNE, probably
using the historic SEINE-SOMME-AISNE-MARNE or MEUSE barrier.
(2) To retire to the West Wall.
(3) To surrender or collapse.
(4) To employ new or secret weapons.

b. Discussion. Since the line of the SEINE-MARNE is compromised, it is believed that 2a(1) is of high order of prob-
ability. 2a(2) is viewed as of doubtful probability due to the logistic
difficulty of the enemy being able to move his Fifteenth and First
Armies to the West Wall in the face of our superior mobility. 2a(3) is
believed of increasing probability as the field army commanders fully
appreciate the hopelessness of the military situation in France. ...

c. Reasons. Whatever elements of the Seventh Army would
escape across the SEINE would be thoroughly demoralized and would need
rest and reorganization; ... However, the routes to Germany will be
guarded only by the First German Army, which is insufficient to protect
so long a front against the Allied forces. A delaying action is believed
all that can be accomplished.

\[22. \ 27 \ Aug.\]

Enemy Capabilities.

"(1) ...
(2) The enemy is capable of collapse or surrender.
(3) ..."
§23. 31 Aug.
1. Summary of the Enemy Situation.
   a. First German Army.

   **Mission.** The First German Army, like the
   Fifteenth and the Nineteenth, is definitely on a defensive mission; that
   is, to prevent a breakthrough to the east, thus keeping open the
   RHONE Valley for the withdrawal of German units from southwest and
   southern France, while keeping contact with Fifteenth Army on its
   right (west). A retreat to the West Wall with as much as can be saved
   from the debacle in France is now believed to be its paramount task.°

   2. Conclusions.
   a. Enemy Capabilities.
      1. To withdraw as rapidly as possible for final
         stand on West Wall under concept of Fortress Germany.
      2. The enemy is capable of collapse or surrender.
      3. The possibility of use of special and novel
         weapons: No change.
   b. Discussion. The enemy must appreciate that the largest
      factors operating in his favor are the logistic problems confronting
      the Allied armies in France, and the approach of autumn rains with
      its mud and poor flying weather. It is, therefore, probable that he
      will delay upon favorable terrain, such as the ARDENNES and ARSONNE Forests,
      the heights of the FOIRE, the VOSGES Mountains and on the PEUSE, to
      permit the escape of Nineteenth Germany Army from the south and the
      retreat of the First, together with the Fifteenth and Nineteenth,
      to the Siegfried Line.°

§24. 3 Sept.
1. 2 Conclusions.
   a. Enemy Capabilities.
      1. The enemy is capable of manning the West Wall
         for an all-out defense.
      2. The enemy is capable of revolutionary leaning
         towards Bolshevism.
      3. The enemy is capable of revolution with a
         government oriented with the West.
      4. The enemy is capable of guerrilla warfare conducted
         by women and children under Nazi Party leadership.
   b. Discussion. The implementation of 2a(1) is, of course,
      axiomatic ....
   c. Reasons. It is not believed the West Wall can be
      successfully defended in the face of overwhelming air and ground
      superiority.° The Catholic Church, particularly in southern Germany,
      was believed strong enough to assume leadership and control during
      the chaos of defeat. The military opposition's influence was awoken
      by the failure of the July coup d'état, the leadership purged. The
      underground would not be generally strong enough to dominate the
      situation.

§25. 11 Sept.
Titled: Counterintelligence in Belgium.
#26. 11 Sept.
"1. Summary of the Situation.
...
4. Although the RHINE is the best natural line of defense for Germany, it is believed that a stand will be ordered on the West Wall for reasons of prestige, and the fact that the loss of Germany west of the Rhine will be a staggering blow to national pride. Furthermore, air fields west of the RHINE are needed and are currently being used. A study is being made of the possibility of the defense of the RHINE. It is believed that the over-running of the West Wall will cost him so much of what remains of his Western armies that unless troops are evacuated successfully from Finland, Norway, and the Balkans, he will not have the manpower necessary to man the RHINE.

2. Conclusions.

a. Enemy Capabilities.

(1) The enemy is capable of an attempt for all-out defense of the West Wall.
(2) The enemy is capable of retirement to the RHINE after the overrunning of the West Wall.
(3) The enemy is capable of collapse or surrender."

#27. 12 Sept.
Titled: Counterintelligence in Germany.

#28. 15 Sept.
"1. Summary of the Situation.

a. Enemy Capabilities.

(1) The enemy capabilities listed in C-2 Estimate No. 26, dated 11 September 1944, were: The enemy is capable of 2a(1) an attempt for all-out defense of the East Wall; (2) of retirement to the RHINE after the overrunning of the West Wall; (3) of collapse or surrender.
(2) The exercise of capability 2a(1) cited above is now current. ..."

b. Strategic. The enemy has committed the major portion of his effective to defense of the NEIZ-VERDUN gateway. He has apparently withdrawn no substantial part of his beaten armies from Normandy behind the RHINE to rest and refit, but has kept them in the RHINELAND. In addition he has brought flak troops from southern and central Germany across the RHINE for use in a ground role and the defense of airfields, highways, and bridges. The Fifteenth Army is thoroughly engaged in extirpating itself across the SCHELDE and out of Holland to escort the Second British Army. The scratch formations holding the shoulders on the right (east) flank of the Second British Army running over to the left (north) flank of the First U.S. Army are concerned with a defensive role. The bulk of the German Western forces are engaged in the battle of the SCHELDE as a covering position for the West Wall and in preparing to defend the SCHLESS and the West Wall to the Swiss frontier. For the first time the enemy has succeeded in anchoring his floting left (southeast) flank.

c. The strategic opportunity offered at the moment to the First U.S. Army is enormous. A breakthrough in the sector of the V
and VII Corps of the West Wall offers the possibility of a swift advance to the Rhine. This would force the enemy to evacuate the RHINELAND because he could then occupy a compromised line with an obstacle at his back. The cutting of strategic roads and bridges and the prevention of withdrawal across the RHINE could effect the destruction of the remaining enemy western field forces. Having pierced the first belt of the West Wall south of AMMEN the VII Corps has the glittering possibility of rapidly piercing the second, and proceeding via STOLLENEN to CRUSEN. The VII Corps has the possibility of continuing its drive north of the RHINE, along the valley of the AHN to ANDERNACH. A rapid exploitation of the approaches to the RHINE bridges should effect the destruction of the I Corps, II Corps and offers the possibility of seizing the RHINE bridges intact with bridgeheads on the eastern banks.

29. Conclusions.

29a. The enemy capabilities cited in 29(1) above remain unchanged for the moment. However, exploitation of the strategic possibilities would eliminate 29(1) and (2) cited in para 1, and reduce the enemy to a third capability, that of collapse and surrender.

29b. At this Political and Psychological.

29c. 26 Sept.

2. Conclusions.

a. Enemy Capabilities.

1. If given time to assemble the above reinforcements the enemy is capable of determined and sustained defensive battle along the West Wall.

2. The enemy is capable of retiring to the east(right) bank of the Rhine and continuing to defend.

3. The enemy is capable of collapse or surrender and, in either case, the continuation of partisan warfare.

4. The enemy is capable of using new weapons and chemical warfare.

b. Discussion. Determined defense of the West Wall is current. The enemy will continue it as long as possible, using the time gained to bring reinforcements, to create reserves and improve his command organization, logistics and fortification. Some evidence has appeared of fortification on the right bank of the Rhine. The implementation of capability 29(2) will, therefore, be determined by his success in defending the West Wall. The implementation of the capability of collapse or surrender is unpredictable. The emotional uplift connected with the defense of the homeland is bound to decline from war weariness and the realization of the hopelessness of the war situation. Though the army in the field and governments in the base area cease to function, partisan warfare may be continued by large elements from chauvinism as well as from desperation.

The implementation of the capability causing the so-called V-weapons is current. Use of chemical warfare is problematic.
file. USA. Documentation.

31st 1 Oct.
Titled: Political and Counter-Intelligence - The Netherlands.

32nd 9 Oct.

a. Summary of the Situation.

1. General. The enemy's capability of sustained defensive battle along the west wall in the sector of the First U.S. Army has been destroyed. The west wall is now breached in four places and passages through it have been established. In the meantime it has been re-defined by German propaganda to include the area between the German border and the Rhine. This sleight-of-hand does not alter the fact that the capability referred to in C-2 Estimate No. 20 is gone. The terrain between the Frisian and the Rhine provides two features of value for defense, particularly against armor, in the River ROHR and in the River RHINE. These natural features and the intensive community digging are believed to indicate the enemy's tactics. The enemy is being driven from the ROHR.

b. Enemy Forces.

1. The line-up of enemy forces on the west front is:

   a. Army Group B: Seventh, Fifteenth, First Para Armies.
   b. Army Group C: First, Nineteenth, and Fifth Panzer

2. Conclusions.

a. Enemy Capabilities.

1. The enemy is capable of retiring to the east(right) bank of the RHINE and defending in hastily constructed field fortifications.
2. The enemy is capable of retiring to the east(right) bank of the RHINE for the same purpose.
3. The enemy is capable of endeavoring to withdraw behind the RHINE.
4. The enemy is capable of collapse or surrender.

b. Discussion. Photo interpretation indicates that a line following generally along the east bank of the ROHR has been prepared and the implementation of its defense is current. Implementation of capability 2a(2) can be expected to follow when the enemy is driven from the line of the ROHR, if his withdrawal is not prevented and if he can man the RHINE. The implementation of capability 2a(3) is viewed as of low probability at this time, but may be expected to follow when the line of the RHINE is compressed. Implementation of capability 2a(4) is of increasing probability, as defeat continues to engulf German territory and the hope in secret weapons proportionately fails. The rigid control of the German people by the RDFP is weakening in areas approached by our forces and an increasing number of civilians are endeavoring to remain behind rather than evacuate their homes under SA and SS compulsion. The enemy is faced with the problem of garrisoning a long line with insufficient troops and of necessity must determine priorities in the disposal of his reserve. There is no evidence yet that he has recognized the threat of First U.S. Army's attack by committing reserve, especially of armor, to meet this threat.
17 Oct. 43

The situation.

A. General. The enemy has reacted to the larger penetration of the Siegfried Line north and south of AACHEN and the isolation of AACHEN by sending at least four of his best mobile divisions for a counteroffensive to restore the front and to expel the invaders from German soil. After ten days of piecemeal reinforcements which involved... the enemy has drawn from the reserves of his armies at least four of his few remaining counterattack divisions... The enemy's reactions have been characterized by piecemeal counterattacks which were shattered by artillery and air action. His counterattack ordered for 15 October was cancelled shortly before 0900 because the weather was good. On 15 October he recommenced counterattacking with the arrival of bad weather. It is believed he is convinced that he cannot counterattack successfully in weather when fighter-bombers cannot fly and the artillery observation planes afford our artillery superior observation. It is believed that his highest command has yet to learn that its troops cannot counterattack successfully in the face of our vastly superior artillery, TD, and other heavy weapon support.

b. Reserves. Although four of the Pa or Pa Gr Div of first quality have appeared on our front, it is believed that he has available at least five more. There are 9 Pa, now believed reconstituted and diverted from 116 Pa Div, 98, withdrawn from Second British Army front a fort night ago, 10 SS, 2 SS and 12 SS, 17 SS, Pa Lehr and other ghosts from KUBAN may be revitalized but are believed to be for the time being out of the picture. Other reserves are the famous Goettingerwurms of the 500 series, the Furlough series, and the mixing platoon list of reconstituted divisions from RUSSIA available to the enemy for the Western Front. Reserves left to GERMANY for the Western Front are currently viewed as slim until the HUNGARIAN front on AUSTRIA's doorstep is stabilized. The garrisoning of a reserve CZECHOSLOVAKIA will contain other reserves. Divisions of BULGARIA, FINLAND and GREECE are not currently available, nor can anything substantial be further expected from ITALY.

C2. Conclusions.

a. Enemy Capabilities.

1. The enemy is capable of defending his re-defined West Wall, which included the area between the German border and the BEF.

2. The enemy is capable of retracting behind the RHINE.

3. The enemy is capable of collapse or surrender.

b. Discussion. Capability 2a(1) is current. Capability 2a(2) will be exercised only when forced upon the enemy. Capability 2a(3) may well follow a decisive defeat west of the RHINE.

31 Oct. 43

The situation.

a. General. Since the fall of AACHEN, the enemy in the First U.S. Army sector, mainly 6th, now German Army (SG: Gen der Pa Tr Erich Brendelberger), has been on the defensive, improving positions and taking local readjustments in troop disposition, and sowing for intelligence purposes. Farther north, however, in the
sector of Second British Army, the enemy has launched a limited offensive in the Neuilly (7065) area with 9 Panzer Division, 15 Panzer Division, and possibly 7 SS Panzer Division, all three divisions probably under command of the Seventh Panzer Corps. The purpose of the enemy's attack is twofold: first, to relieve pressure on his hard-pressed troops in Holland and Western Belgium by forcing a diversion of divisions within 21 Army Group from other combat areas to meet the threat; secondly, to threaten the flank of Ninth U.S. Army and cause similar repercussions within 12 Army Group. At this point the enemy may be counting on some element of surprise. Elsewhere on the Eastern Front, the enemy appears content with the temporary stabilization of the situation. This period of comparative inactivity has afforded him the long-desired opportunity to substitute armor for infantry in the line. The eleven armored divisions under command of 8-in-G West are at present disposed as follows: 10 SS Panzer Division is engaged in Holland; 9 Panzer and 9 SS Panzer Divisions are involved in operation around Neuilly; 1 SS, 2 SS, 12 SS, and 16 SS Lehr Divisions are reforming in Northwestern Germany under a Panzer Army headquarters; 2, 11 and 116 Panzer Divisions have been withdrawn from the line and are probably west of the Rhine, serving as mobile reserves while refitting. Finally, 21 Panzer Division has been reported en route to the Seventeenth U.S. Army sector. Although the tank regiments of these divisions have not been identified, in most cases, since the retreat across France, their early reappearance must be reckoned with. A revised estimate of the German tank production figures shows production to be in the neighborhood of 900 tanks per month. Despite the heavy demands of the Panzer Divisions engaged in the east, it is safe to assume that certain proportion is being allotted the Panzer forces of C-in-C West.

b. Reserves. Once more, the priority of reserves within the Reich has gone to the east. The losses being suffered by the German Army Group South Ukraine in Hungary are among the greatest of the war.

c. Air. The enemy's air effort in support of his ground forces in the west is still only on a limited scale. Recent large-scale Allied daylight attacks have forced the enemy greatly to reinforce his single-engine fighter force defending the Rhine at the expense of his tactical air force. Even during the enemy's major counterattack against our forces in the Aachen gap, and more recently during the attack on Neuilly, he failed to produce the fighter strength necessary to prevent our planes from bombing and strafing his troops almost at will. Such tactical support as can be spared from the defense of the Reich is directed toward protection of key communications points immediately behind the front lines, and then the operational effort seldom exceeds more than 100 sorties per day. It is possible, however, that the frequent rounding of our strategic air force due to bad weather will release a considerable number of enemy fighters.

"2. Conclusions.

a. Enemy Capabilities.

(1) The enemy is capable of continuing his attacks on the front of the Second British Army and thus threatening the flank
of Ninth U.S. Army.

(b) The enemy is capable of simultaneously attacking Ninth U.S. Army and Second British Army with any or all of the three German divisions now in reserve west of the RHINE with the object of driving Second British Army and forcing an Allied withdrawal from German soil.

(c) The enemy is capable of attacking on the front of First U.S. Army with the object of retaking ASCHEN and driving First U.S. Army from inside his border.

(d) The enemy is capable of continuing his efforts to stabilize the situation and prevent a further advance into Germany.

(e) The enemy is capable of employing V-1 and V-2 in a tactical role.

5. Discussion. Capability 2a(1) is current. Capability 2a(4) is of highest probability if capability 2a(1) fails. If capability 2a(1) succeeds, capability 2a(2) is to be expected. Capability 2a(3) is of lower probability. Capability 2a(5) may be expected at any time.

6. Reasons. The German doctrine of defense calls for counter-attack, and he assumes the passive defense only when he is powerless to do anything else. Having had four to six weeks rest for his counter-attack divisions, he is now capable of large-scale counter-attacks or a minor offensive. His strategic objectives are, first, to spoil our expected offensive against Germany, and, second, to drive us from German soil. A breakthrough by his concentrations in the VENLO-GERWETZEN sector would enable him to turn south on both banks of the RHINE (HEUS). A successfull maneuver of this kind would achieve both of the above objectives. For his supply situation, particularly fuel, we must permit this is problematical. However, his desperate strategy may be based on the hope of raising our supplies of sector fuels, similar to his plan in Tunisia to break through to TEBESIA, supply himself from our dumps, and then cut north.

85. 12 Nov.

1. Survey of the Situation.

a. Since the publication of G-2 Estimate No. 34, dated 31 October 1944, the limited offensive of 9 Pz and 15 Pz Gr Divs in the WESTPHALIA AREA area was halted by the enemy on the arrival of additional forces to strengthen his front. 9 Pz Gr Div has now been withdrawn and contact with 15 Pz Gr Div is slight. There were indications that another division, probably 9 SS, was nearby in order to exploit any weakness which might have developed. Since that offensive the enemy has been passive between ARNHEM and BURG, except for rigorous patrols all along the front for identification. West of ARNHEIM he has been forced north of the RHINE.

1) 9th German Army. TacR has revealed considerable train movement and PzG have stated that reserves are being brought up.

... The appearance of the 272 Inf Div in the line will probably be followed by other Volksgrenadier Divisions in order to strengthen his front with infantry so that an offensive, if launched, would not place his line by a concerted thrust in another sector and compel him to divert his strength elsewhere.
(2) First Para Army. Student's command in the enemy bridgehead west of the PAN will probably soon have a mobile reserve. Although the exact locations 3, 5 and 6 Para Divs are unknown, all indications point to their refitting in the First Para Army area near the RHINE ... If this reserve is given mobility it should form an offensive force to be reckoned with. A study of the terrain adjacent to the RHEIN-JUIN-RUHR area reveals unsuitable tank country. Low plateaus of sand or gravel, scattered heath and bog make patchy going for armor. It is reasonable to assume that, should the enemy be able to make his Para Divs mobile, their employment in this area would be more effective than the armor under XVII F.A. Corps.

(3) Fifteenth German Army. The battered elements of this army are now behind the PAN and retiring under pressure by successive delaying actions along favorable terrain obstacles like the RHINE, the SIEGEL MULLER and the JUSSIL is probably the plan. The systematic and unnecessary flooding of Holland supports this view.

b. Enemy strategy. The value to the enemy of his bridgehead over the PAN at LENZBURG-VERDEN is apparent. His objectives are (a) to reach the coming Allied offensive, and (b) to drive our forces from German soil. A successful attack down the west bank of the PAN in conjunction with the breakthrough in the SIEGEL-MULLER sector would offer the enemy such huge tracts in the way of desperately needed supplies. This might compel the withdrawal of the First and Ninth U.S. Armies from Germany. An attack in the SIEGEL area would be subsidiary to the above penetration and might possibly, if a penetration was achieved, form the lower hook of the 'Hell und Kell' strategy of the Germans. The enemy has obviously staked all on the defense of the West by defending on the west bank of the RHINE. It is a hazardous position for an army to fight with an obstacle like the RHINE at its back. In crossing the lines of supply from its major bases, the only justification of such strategy apart from the sentiment of one of defending over foot of German soil is that a successful counteroffensive can be launched from such a position. It is believed that the enemy was attracted to the VERDEN-UNNEN area by our obvious weakness at that point.

c. Reserve. The bulk of the enemy's reserves is armor under the newly identified Sixth Panzer Army in the RHINE area, plus the parachute division already mentioned. A new command may be set up to control these units.

2. Conclusions.

a. Enemy Capabilities.

(1) The enemy is capable of an offensive against the Second British and Ninth U.S. Armies.

(2) The enemy is capable of an offensive against First U.S. Armies.

(3) The enemy is capable of a continued defense, using its armor as a counterattack force in order to seal off any penetration.

(4) The enemy is capable of the employment of V-1 and V-2 tactically.

b. Discussion. The implementation of capability 2a(1) is viewed as of high probability. 2a(2) is regarded as of secondary probability. 2a(3) is current and 2a(4) may be expected at any time.
...enemies. It is for a race against time. Can the enemy complete his dispositions for his offensive prior to the launching of our attack? With the approach of winter in the east it is believed the enemy will make his offensive in the east, it is a desperate gamble by a desperate foe. It remains to be seen if the attack by Third U.S. Army will influence his offensive plans. He has already reinforced this front with armor, i.e., from 11th Arm Div, taken in this area report that they left 179 on 16 November, arriving the next evening in the Cutler area. It is believed that his entire front has been stiffened to hold against an Allied offensive while he launches his blow in the north, probably between Aachen and Trier, with the possible objective of a penetration to the west and southwest on both banks of the Rhine. Although his immediate stocks of fuel are probably ample, it may be difficult for him to maintain a sustained offensive.

26 Nov

4. Summary of the Situation.
   a. General. Since publication of G-2 Situation No. 35, dated 12 Nov 44, the enemy's capability of a spoiling attack is now lost, since First U.S. Army's attack was launched on 16 November, uninfluenced by enemy action. On the First Army front the enemy has resisted our advance behind his wire and minefields and to date has not been forced to throw in any reserves of armor or high quality infantry. In the zone of V and VII Corps, the enemy has been content to remain on the passive defense. The enemy responded to penetration on the Ninth Army front of his defenses in the Isdorper area by throwing in 9 Ps and 15 Ps Gr Divs.

(1) Seventh Army. The 36th Div was sent from Seventh Army area to help First Army area in the Eupen area, while 52nd Div was sent in to take its place. In addition 276, 36, 277 have appeared since the previous estimate; therefore, the trend of reinforcing the force west of the Rhine with all formations available from Germany and Belgium continues.

(2) Fifth Panzer Army. Fifth Panzer Army has apparently shifted 201th Panzer Corps south from the Vaux-le-Vicomte area, for 9 Ps Div and 15 Ps Gr Divs have appeared in the Ghent-Kortrijk area. Apart from this shift, no other armor has been committed, particularly out of the XII SS Corps, which is believed to be the backbone of Fifth Panzer Army.

(3) Sixth Panzer Army. Although trains move into, trains and refugees indicate heavy movement from BASTOGNE - TACHERON - CHALMERS across the Rhine into the battle area, none of the following divisions: 1 SS, 2 SS, 9 SS, 12 SS, 13 SS, and 90Inf, have yet been committed.

(4) First Army. The success of Second British Army's attack west of the Meuse indicates that the enemy is giving up his bridgehead west of the river and apparently intends to defend on the east bank from Mt. St. Hubert to St. Adolphe.

(5) Fifteenth Army. The Fifteenth Army appears to be executing a delaying action or a withdrawal, probably to the IJSSJE position.

b. Enemy Strategy on the Western Front.
   (1) With the giving up of his bridgehead over the Rhine and the launching of the Allied offensive, the enemy's strategic plan
appears to be based on counterattack rather than a planned offensive, 
orded on his own initiative. The key to his strategy probably will 
be found in the whereabouts and activity of his Sixth Panzer Army. 
He must either wait until a soft opportunity on the Allied front or 
until the Allied offensive breaks down with heavy losses before going 
over to the counteroffensive. Possibly he will be compelled to 
limit himself to defensive counterattacks. The rector ion of the WEST 
FALL in the areas of Ninth and First U.S. Armies may yet be attempted, 
but if not, his next defensive battle will be based on the RHINE River, 
the defense of which may be assisted by inundations caused by blowing 
dams on the upper RHINE.

(2) The enemy's overall strategy on the Western Front 
can be summed up as the defense of the RHINE west of the Rhine. This 
effort is proving difficult under the synchronized attacks of seven 
Allied Armies exerting pressure on a 600-kilometer line. The enemy 
appears to lack sufficient mobile reserves or counterattacking 
quality, especially armor, to seal off penetrations and prevent 
major breakthroughs. It is not unreasonable to believe that his defense 
of the Rhine west of the RHINE will be unsuccessful and that he will 
soon be forced into retirement behind the RHINE which, skillfully executed, 
may lead to another military disaster comparable to the Battle of France.

c. Reserves Available to the C-in-C West.*

(1) In the area of Army Group B it seems quite possible 
that Sixth Panzer Army, consisting of 1, 2, 9, and 12 SS, and Pz Lehr, 
constitute the principal reserves. Ground reports from Pz and civilians, 
together with tank reports of train movements, appear to substantiate 
the disposition of this reserve approximately in the following 
areas: 1 SS Pz Div, ALEMARK area; 12 SS Pz Div, DÜREN; an unidentified 
Pz Div at KOLN and another at FRANKFURT. The whereabouts of the 
Fifth Panzer is obscure. Of the other three Pz Divs and Pz Gr Divs in 
Army Group B, viz: 2 Pz, 3 Pz Gr, 9 Pz, 15 Pz Gr and 116 Pz, all are 
now committed except 2 Pz, which has been reported resting and refitting 
southeast of COLOGNE, but may be the division unloaded near MAINZ 15 
Neustadt, nothing is known of 12 SS Pz Div, which was last seen north 
of AACHEN.

(2) The reserve situation for the First Panzer Army 
remains unchanged with 2, 3, 5 and 6 Panzer uncommitted, with rumors 
that the area of these divisions may be extended with non-Jumping para-
chutists but selected and, therefore, high quality infantry.

(3) The reserve situation of Army Group 9, particularly 
with respect to armor and Pz Gr, appears poor and C-in-C West may divest 
any of the foregoing divisions to the front of the Third U.S. Army.

d. Conclusions.

2. Enemy Capabilities.

(1) The enemy is capable of defending the Rhine west 
of the RHINE, probably along the general line JUSSEL-MANS-NOER and 
WEST FALL, and in the Third U.S. Army area MAINZ-LINT-WEST FALL and 
the RHINE.

(2) The enemy is capable of retiring to a defensive 
line behind the RHINE.

(3) The enemy is capable of collapse or surrender.
(4) The enemy is capable of an air 'blitz' to regain air supremacy in limited vital areas.

b. Discussion. The implementation of capability 2a(1) is correct. 2a(2) is at the moment remote, with 2a(3) an increasing possibility in direct proportion to the success of the current Allied offensive. No surrender of the present government is believed possible, yet if the strategic opportunity of destroying the German Army west of the RHINE with an obstacle at its back is exploited, the surrender of large groups may be expected, possibly leading to collapse, particularly if the RHINE is crossed. However, resistance to the death from local rearGuard and guerrilla bands should be expected, especially in THURINGIA and BADENBURG. 2a(4) may well be attempted but will be of short duration and limited in scope.

c. Reserve. The deterioration of the enemy situation in the sector of the Third U.S. Army and his current retreat to the RHINE LINE and possibly the WEST WALL in the zone of the XII and XII Corps, together with the continuing loss of ground on the front of the Seventh U.S. and First French Armies, shows he has insufficient reserves to meet the offensive of the southern Allied armies. In the north, of the ten armored or Pz Gr Div in Group B he has now committed four or five, leaving five to meet the pressure of the Second British, Ninth and First U.S. Armies. If this armor be held in the north, his southern front will deteriorate further, whereas if they are sent south to pitch up the WEST or BRIEFER gateways, his northern flank will be seriously threatened, particularly if good weather continues. The enemy lost a big advantage in not being able to put in a spoiling attack prior to the commencement of the present Allied offensive. The employment of his reserves will now be dictated by Allied penetrations through his field fortifications and with this loss of initiative their employment on mass is dubious. In Army Group B it has to date been counterwise, as the XVI Pz Corps was employed first in the FRANKFURT area and now in the GELINTHORN sector. If this pattern be followed Sixth Panzer Army will not be employed as a unit. With increasing pressure from Second British Army farther north, thus lengthening the threatened front, the enemy will probably be forced to employ these last reserves division-wise. The only other assets are Volksgrenadier Div and the intensive field fortifications which he has had two months to construct.

For Table of Reserves in Germany.
For Divs were dissolved and a further Div, 3 Para, is badly mauled. (See Order of Battle Notes, Annex No. 1, G-2 Periodic Report No. 176, 5 Dec 44.) Each of the line of the KIEF he has intensified his defense zone by fortification in depth, converting each vi posto into a strongpoint, and has notably strengthened the field fortification on the line of the EMT. His armored reserve appears to be quartered in houses and barns along the railways generally in a semi-circle from DUSSELDORF to KOBLENZ, with KOBLENZ as a center point. As has brought up and continues to bring up Army and Corps artillery formations and to build up his fighter and fighter-bomber strength on the Western Front. It is plain that his strategy in defense of the Reich is based on the exhaustion of our ability to be followed by an all-out counterattack with armor between the KIEF and the EMT, supported by every weapon he can bring to bear. The suspension of V-1 fire from the BAHNHEIDER area and the EMT site is believed to be based on the use of his railways for the bringing in of new Volksgrenadier divisions west of the RHINE and for the buildup of the necessary artillery and supplies to support his all-out ground counterattack. It is very probable that his current production of V-1's is being routed to new sites, the WAZER FORREST and elsewhere east of the RHINE, where they can be brought to bear in support of his all-out counterattack by interdicting and bombarding our supply installations and artillery areas. If's mentioned seeing artillery units with new guns preparing to fire the compressed air shell, and the use of other secret weapons is to be expected. In the face of the Thirs U.S. Army's penetration toward the SAAR Basin, Von Rundstedt reluctantly dispatched Pa Lehr from his carefully banded reserve. Its commitment revealed, however, that two months spent in WESTFALIA reforming and refitting had failed to bring it up to the strength and standing of the 1943 first-class Pa Div. Persistent rumors from G's and from other sources give grounds for suspicions that 3 88 Pa Div Maik has replaced Pa Lehr in Von Rundstedt's armored reserve. Top and ground sources further indicate a buildup in the BITBURG- MINDT area, where Pa Div Großdeutschland has been reported by G's and Pa Lehr or elements thereof by a usually reliable source. A captured order for a comb-out of dislocated personnel speaks the American dialect to report to Eq Schoney at FRIEDENFELD, near GRATZENBURG, by 1 November, obviously presaging special operations for saboteurs, attacks on CP's and other vital installations by infiltrated or paratrooper specialists. An extremely intelligent G whose observations check exactly with established facts stated that every minute possible was being gained for the coming all-out counteroffensive. It is notable that morale among Pa's freshly captured, both in the Army cage and at Concentration Zone camp, recently achieved a new high. This has been expressed by attempts to escape and avowed eagerness on the part of the prisoners to return to the battle for Germany. It is apparent that Von Rundstedt, who obviously is conducting military operations without the benefit of intuition, has skillfully defended and husbanded his forces and is preparing for his part in the all-out application of every weapon at the focal point and the correct time to achieve defense of the right bank of the RHINE by inflicting as great a defeat on the Allies as possible. Indication's to date point to the location
of this vocal point in being between SELONIG and SCHELTER, and within
this bracket this concentrated force will be added to the Allied
army behind by the German High Command to be the greatest threat to
successful defense of the Ruhr.

(1) Seventh German Army. The right (north) wing of the
Seventh German Army has been strengthened by a sidestepping to the
right and north of German frontal on the front, by the bringing of
351st Div from the W25 to the S25 sector, by the bringing of 3
Pz Div from First Panzer Army to the BERGEN sector, and by the buildup of
additional forces in the BILUENHORN-SCHLEITZ area. The left wing, and
the general front of the Seventh German Army appear to have been strengthened
by the arrival of Volksgrenadier divisions out of Germany. 552 Pz Div is
indicated by a reporter as being in the VIII U.S. Corps sector, and
unexplained troop movements to HITLER and to ZUERICH-SCHWIND suggest
others.

(2) Fifth Panzer Army. Fifth Panzer Army has shared the
strengthening by the use of 92 Pz Div of the Sixth Panzer Army.
Although 10 SS is apparently withdrawn from the line after being bolstered
in the GELLENHORN sector, its presence immediately northeast of SELONIG is continually alleged by Pz Divs.

(3) Sixth Panzer Army. Sixth Panzer Army is listed in Annex
1 to 3. Divisions, No. 26 is known to have lost 2 Pz Lehr, but it is suspected
to have obtained 2 SS Pz Div backing in its stead.

(4) First Parachute Army. First Parachute Army has yielded
one Pz Div to the needs of the AACHEN sector, but has probably gained
replacements from the Seventeenth German Army and still is probably
possessed of 2, 5, 6, 7, and 8 Pz Divs, although
a ground report indicated 5 Pz Div was en route to the AACHEN sector.
Pure logic would expect 5 Pz Div to be committed in the BILUENHORN-SCHLEITZ
area in the defense of the dunes, with other good quality infantry
possibly being used by Von Rundstedt for this purpose.

(5) Fifteenth German Army. Due to the flood conditions on
the BILUENHORN and demolition of Selecta, this army has relented for
use on other fronts the following divisions: 224, 245, 250, 321, and 363 Inf
Divs. Few of these have been reorganized, leaving 321 and 363 still
available. One or both of these may be committed in other sectors
with possibly one in First U.S. Army area. 59 and 366 Divs have also
disappeared from the line in Holland and their present strength
are unknown. Christmas's Holland Corps appears to have taken over
the sector formerly occupied by Fifteenth Army on the 7th (east bank)
of First Panzer Army, as the whereabouts of General Von Zangen's
headquarters at the present time remains uncertain. Evidence from
the point to the new location of Fifteenth Army at CHOLET shows, perhaps
with Von Rundstedt's 17th Panzer Army taking as Panzergrenadiere, sub-
ordinates to 15 in such a way that an armored Panzergrenadier
functioning under General Army in NORWAY.

2. Strategy. The variation of the last call is still a probable
strategic objective. The dilemma which has confronted the enemy in the
defeat of the Fifteenth Army and its retreat across the Rhine has been accepted without a strain on the armored reserve of the Sixth
Panzer Army. The retreat to the SAH has been set by the dispatch of
As before, three Fifteenth Army divisions, and will probably call for the replacement of one Italian and another Panzer division. The Army has let its situation in the upper Rhine and the Rhine Valley deteriorate while still conserving reserves between DUSSELDORF and the Rhine. Von Rundstedt apparently is accepting the fact that in the south rather than attempting to separate his forces in the north. This would appear to be the keynote of his strategy in the defense of the Rhine east of the Rhine. During the past month there has been a definite pattern for the assignment of newly-formed divisions in the comparatively quiet sector opposite VIII Corps in their disengagement to more active fronts. The enemy is well aware of the "tactical face" which they hold in the Rhine River area. Our recent attempts to break the Panzer divisions by air bombardment, as yet unsuccessful, have served to emphasize our own concern with the crossing of the Rhine Valley. The enemy has reacted to build up his forces on the Rhine, thus giving the impression of a race against time toward the upstream and downstream, and the RHINE, and the RHINE, the key point in the system of defenses. Besides the divisions in the Sixth Panzer Army, the enemy has 2 Pz and 116 Pz Divs available for local counterattacks in the defense of the Rhine, in addition to at least two Volksgruppen divisions which are available from the VIII Corps sector.

c. II Corps Available to 3-in-6 West. Sixth Panzer Army, as mentioned above, 255, 6, 7 and 8 Para Divs of First Para Army, two or three VG Divs from Germany, one or two Divs from Norway, and the possibility of one or two reconstituted Pz Divs from the East appear to be the present limit of reserves available to 3-in-6 West. During the month of November the enemy suffered losses amounting to roughly four divisions a week. He has been replacing these losses from reserves east of the Rhine at the rate of about one and a half per week, with the divisions being made up by the assigning of five or more divisions from Holland plus other reserves on land west of the Rhine. There is reason to believe that he can continue to meet this heavy attrition for the next 18 months or two by drawing new divisions now enroute to Germany from Norway, in addition to the continuing flow of six divisions a month from Germany. That the Norwegian divisions are exhausted, he may still have other reserves made available by the shortening of his Italian front, and from the Balkans.

*2. Conclusions.

a. Enemy Capabilities.

1) The Army is capable of continuing his defense of the line of the RHINE north of DUSSELDORF, his main front line west of the RHINE covering the dams, and the coastal front along the west coast.

2) The Army is capable of concentrated counterattack with air, armor, infantry and support weapons at a selected focal point on the line of his own choosing.

3) The Army is capable of defending on the line of the RHINE and subsequently retiring behind the RHINE.

4) The Army is capable of collapse or an order.

b. Discussion. Capability 2a(1) is current. The exercise of capability 2a(2) is to be expected when our major ground forces have crossed the ROHR River, and if the Axis are not controlled by us, maximum use will be made by the Army of flooding of the ROHR in conjunction with his counterattack. Implementation of 2a(3) will occur most probably in the event his counterattacks are unsuccessful.
He will hold on the ENFT in the nature of a delaying action to cover
the retirement of his armies east of the RHINE. He may be expected to
contour defending on the east of the RHINE with every means he has
ever used, and the forces now west of the RHINE, plus Volkssturm and other
reserves. The implementation of capability 2a(4) is still a possibility.
An severe defeat inflicting shock on the enemy, either militarily
or psychologically, may result in popular revolt, general strikes,
road strikes, or even mutiny of part of his forces. Any one of
these events might produce collapse and surrender by groups. No
surrender by the Nazi Party is to be expected.

d. Reasons. The enemy is apparently reconciled to the loss
of ALMAG and to defending behind the upper RHINE. He is now fighting
in the SIEGFRIED area and along the RHINE River in defensive action
similar to that in the AACHEN sector. There is no disposition to
retire behind the RHINE except where he has been forced to do so, and
this occurred in a sector where his West Wall is east of the RHINE.
The continual building up of forces to the west of the RHINE points
consistently to his setting all on the counteroffensive as stated
in capability 2a(2).

23. 20 December 1944.

IV, G-2 Periodic Reports.

A. Hitler's SIEGFRIED LINE Order.
(Source: IILG, 5 Dec. 1040. In L-553(25))

"1. SIEGFRIED LINE ORDER..."

...d. Second British Army reported that the order translated
below has often been referred to as the order for the Luesser which
cannot be countermanded under any circumstances.

"Local Defense Bn 1/6

Telephone Message

1. THE SIEGFRIED Line is of decisive importance in the battle for
GRENADA.

2. In order:

The SIEGFRIED Line and each of its defensive positions will
be held to the last round and until completely destroyed.
This order will be communicated forthwith to all units,
including formations, battalions, and troops.

G-1 In C WEST

Time of Origin: 3:13 hrs. Transmitted by Signal Reporting
Time of Receipt: 3:45 hrs. Center (Pab. 3367)

(Received by PCU. 1022)

(Source: Second British Army Intelligence Summary No. 120, 2 Oct 44)"
B. ENEMY CAPABILITIES, 1 Sept. - 15 Dec. 1944.
(Source: Sept-Oct., L-553(25); Nov., L-554(16); Dec., L-496(11))

The ENEMY CAPABILITIES section's title was included in the daily B-2 Periodics, but narrative discussions were not provided. Instead, under that section's title was the phrase: See G-2 Estimate No.____, Dated ____, referring to the latest G-2 Estimates. As noted elsewhere in this DOCUMENTATION, under G-2 Estimates, very frequent Estimates were issued, and the enemy capabilities were discussed in them.

Supplementing its own views, the FUSI G-2 Periodic #180, 6 Dec., contained Annex #3, titled BRIEF VIEW OF THE ENEMY SITUATION. This was the FUSI Weekly Intelligences Summary No. 17, for the week ending 3 December 1944. Its entire section ENEMY CAPABILITIES was quoted.

C. Sixth SS Panzer Army.
(Source: Oct., L-553(25); Nov., L-554(16); Dec., L-496(11))

B.N. — This Sixth SS Panzer Army was a reserve German army which struck the American forces westerly during the Counteroffensive. Because it was an unknown, but potential factor, the object of this section is to cite the FUSI's opinion's about this force, as they appeared in the daily G-2 Periodics.

In order to accomplish this purpose, each G-2 Periodic 1 Sept. - 15 December was examined. The scrutiny was commenced with 1 September, even before the FUSI reached the SHANKED line on 12 September, in order to locate any possible reference to the formation of an army, regardless of it is designation.

F335. 22 Oct.
1.e. Reserves and Other Forces Capable of Intervention.
4.1. Indications of a build-up of enemy reserves in the HEUSY(1270) area continue to be received.
5.2. Reports from Germany mention the possibility of the formation of a new Panzer Army which will be grouped all the battered panzer divisions from HEUSY, particularly the SS formations. At least five of these divisions have been in the Reich since early September.

F442. 29 Oct.

Order of Battle Notes:
69.2. HIGHER COMMANDERS OF THE FUSI SS - IN THE
HEUSY(HEUSY: SHANK DIAGN 143) (1.5)

An considerable doubts as to the commanders of higher SS formations in the FUSI persist, the following summary of information is supplied:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>COMMANDER</th>
<th>RANK</th>
<th>RECENT INFORMATION</th>
<th>PROBABLE ASSIGNMENT</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>OBST FT</td>
<td>Obst Gt</td>
<td>HQ at HOHierhald(35-59)</td>
<td>No Pan Army forming</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>on 15 Oct.</td>
<td>HF GERMANY #</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
147. 3 Nov.
Order of Battle Notes.
Infor-mation from P/As and other sources provides the
following locations:

Supreme HQ East and Army Group D
Fed BAD E5, Main BORIS HAUHEIM
Army Group S
Fed KANTER, Main BESEL(A-2)
Army Group C
Fz(V-9999) Main OSNABRUECH

First Army
ST. AUGS (3-256)
First Panzer Army
STRENG and/or DINNEFORD
Seventh Army
"HINDENBURG" (DG5 41/6/31/7
Fifteenth Army
(TETENIC (recently beseiged,
Nineteenth Army
probably moved)
Fed MEYERSBERGER, Main?
HATZSCH".

N.B. — The object of listing the above is to indicate
the existence of the Sixth SS Fz Army.

149. 5 Nov.
Order of Battle Notes.
G.e. A deserter reports that on 16 October, the Sixth
Panzer Army was regrouping in the BEMERK BETHELM area, comand
ed by SSF DISTRICT. It is said to include 2 SS, 10 SS, 12 SS and Fz
DEER Divisions. CENTRE: The presence of such a Panzer Army, with
DISTRICT in charge, has been suspected. 10 SS Fz Div. however, is
still in the ARMEF sector, and it seems probable that 1 SS Fz Div.
in the BEMERK BETHELM area, is the division in question.
(Sources: 12 Army Group P.R. No. 153) *

152. 8 Nov.
O.c. Reserves and Other Forces Exhausted of Intervention.
The following view of current enemy reserves is taken
by Higher Headquarters:

(1) ...
(2) The only new arrival on the Western Front
during the period has been the 18 Volksgrenadier Division. This is in
contrast to the arrival of 369 Infantry Division and the reappearance
of 91 and 361 Infantry Divisions the preceding week. However, it spite
of lack of identifications it is apparent that some reinforcements did
arrive. Tacttical reconnaissance late in the week showed what appeared
to be heavy troop movements into the Northern part of First US Army's
sector. Whether these arrivals were new infantry divisions, a part of
the newly identified Sixth Panzer Army from East of the RHINE, or merely
a part of the forces held behind the line in tactical reserve, such
as 2 or 9 Panzer Divisions, it is not yet clear. Since tanks have not been
in any of these movements, it is conceivable that the movements may
account for the arrival of infantry only. It is not likely that the
German High Command will use it to expand its last reserve of armor
East of the RHINE, at least not until vital are are immediately
threatened. This will certainly be true as long as tactical reserves i
in the form of 2, 9, and 10 SS Panzer Division exist in the North and 9 Panzer is available in the South, possibly bolstered by other mobile units. 116 Ps Div is now committed at SCHMIDT.

"...

\#158. 14 Nov.

8d. Reserves and Other Forces Capable of Intervention.

1. Photo reconnaissance of 6 November covering possible entrenching stations in the PADERBORN (B-74) area, reveals that the main PADERBORN railway station was heavily loaded including many flats. Four trains were present, two of which were in motion, one being double engine he d. Sidings near BAD LEIPPERING (B-65) and \(S\)ENNDORF (B-65) were handed mainly with empty flats. This heavy activity may indicate preparation for a movement from that area and very likely involved units of PANZER ARMEE SIX.

"...

\#160. 16 Nov.

8e. Reserves and Other Forces Capable of Intervention.

1. Ps captured by \(V\) and VII Corps during the period state that 9 SS Ps and 12 SS Ps Div have arrived in the DURHER(1246)-ELGOLI(FR0605) area within the past few days. These statements serve to confirm the belief that the movement of Six Panzer Armees (1 SS, 2 SS, 9 SS, 12 SS, Ps Lehr Div) from the PADERBORN-BERLIN KÜSHER area, starting on 6 November had as its ultimate destination the area west of the RHINE covering the approaches to COLOGNE. Due to the constant delay imposed on enemy rail traffic by our air attacks, it is unlikely that more than two, or possibly three, of the five divisions could have arrived in the area prior to 16 November. If this is the case, then we may well have caught the enemy in the midst of detaining the remainder of Six Panzer Armees and inflicted heavy losses on him during the course of the day's air preparation which included extremely heavy attacks on key communication points in the rear areas. See Far 3b.

"...

\#161. 17 Nov.

8f. Reserves and Other Forces Capable of Intervention.

1. No further information was received during the period from \(T\)ACFR or other sources regarding the arrival of units of Sixth Panzer Armees in the JULICH-DURER-BIRKEN-FUKIRCHEN area during the past few days. FC statements, however, continue to confirm the presence of 9 SS Ps and 12 SS Ps in the rear area.

"...

\#163. 19 Nov.

8g. Reserves and Other Forces Capable of Intervention.

1. The entry of 15 Ps Graa Div into the line on the right (south north) of 9 Ps Liv in the Ninth U.S. Army sector, leaves only 2 Ps Div as an unlocated reserve -- excluding the divisions of Panzer Armees Six. Of the five divisions which are believed to form Panzer Armees Six, three (15b, 9 SS and 12 SS) have been located in the AACHEN-COLOGNE corridor with 2 SS Ps Div and Ps Lehr Div still to be accounted for in this area. A statement by an officer prisoner
Eisenhower was initially impressed by the German defense system around the Rhine. However, he recognized that the Allies would need to capture vital bridges to enable a crossing of the river. Guards over these bridges included the 2nd SS Panzer Division, placed near the possible battlefield area of the IX Corps. Eisenhower planned to use a combined effort between the Ninth and First U.S. Armies, with the Ninth Army establishing a northern front on the order of the First Army's southern front. This would enable the Ninth Army to reach the Rhine faster than expected. Eisenhower informed his forces that the crossing of the Rhine would begin on February 16th. During his conversation with the 12th SS Panzer Division commander, Eisenhower wanted to ensure a rapid crossing of the Rhine to minimize the risk of the enemy's counterattack. The Allies had to be prepared to cross the Rhine and move towards the Danube, where additional forces would be engaged. Eisenhower also informed his commanders that the Ninth Army would create a bridgehead during the night of February 15th, which would be secured by the 12th SS Panzer Division. Eisenhower's strategy was to ensure a rapid and decisive capture of the Rhine bridges to avoid any delays caused by the enemy's counterattacks.
Although it is possible that 56 divisions in Pa Armee were under Parachuter and Other Forces capable of intervention. The intervention of a number of Panzer divisions in Heeresgruppe A has produced several interesting facts about its Parachuter. All Panzer divisions were formed that there were six Panzer divisions in Heeresgruppe A. While their division was

Parachuter (Ex. 3rd, 5th, 12th SS Panzer Divisions, 2nd Panzer Panzer Divisions). It is stated that the intention was to use these six panzer divisions together in one unit. Last week, however, the situation in STRASBOURG was still so critical that the 78th Rgt. Div. was detached to the south.

6th NoV.

b. Reserves and Other Forces capable of Intervention.

(1)...

(2) The U.S. Armies quote a Panzer Div. (10 SS Panzer Div.) as stating that his division is soon to be relieved by 1st, 2nd, or 3rd SS Panzer Divisions. (Context: The presence of 3rd SS Panzer Div. east of the Rhine into reserve is accepted. It is unlikely, however, that the enemy will commit one of the carefully selected divisions of six panzer divisions in the last month of the war, unless the situation becomes too critical to be waited or mounted.)

7th, 8th NoV.

c. Reserves and Other Forces capable of Intervention.

(1) Panzer Divisions deployed by the Third U.S. Army, which took 5th SS Panzer Div. in WESER. The division in the vicinity of AACHEN during November. 1944. Twelfth Army Group states that the 5th SS Panzer Div. has not been identified in the French front for some time. This division has been considered to be in the Rhineland; and has recently routed that 5th SS Panzer Div. in WESER would bring the number of panzer divisions under Panzer Armee six to a total of six (including Panzer Armee) which confirms statement to that effect made by other Panzer units. Previously, 2nd Panzer Gruppe was considered the only other combat unit available for the role of sixth unit in ...

Order of Battle latest:

#2. Reserves:

---
Unfortunately, the divisions of Sixth Panzer Army are popular with the enemy forces as long as there exists a chance of being relieved by them.

**184. 10 Dec.**

"..." a Reserve and other forces capable of intervention.

(1) The possibility exists that a second panzer division has been withdrawn from the original six divisions of Sixth Panzer Army and been sent to the south in the wake of Panzer Div....

**185. 9 Dec.**

"...Reserves and Panzer forces capable of intervention."

(1) The growing influence of HISSER in German military affairs is evidenced by the fact that Sixth Panzer Army is an SS Army. An extremely cooperative and well-informed 2/4 states that the full designation is 'SS Panzer Army'. (See Annex 1.)

Order of Battle (see Annex 1.):

(1) A cooperative and well-informed 2/4 states that the Army controlling 1SS Panzer Div while in EASTFRALIA was designated Sixth SS Panzer Army. 2/4 also stated that 4/8 Panzer Corps, 2 SS Panzer Div, 'Kraut-Reichel' and 16 SS Panzer Div 'Friedeburg' were also under control of Sixth SS Panzer Army, since 2/4 claimed he had the designation 'SS Panzer VI' on his document appointing Major (CSS) REINSTEIN as head of special services, formerly of 130 Panzer Div, as 6-4 (FB) of this Army early in November. 2/4 also stated 73 Obergruppenführer (SS Lt Gen) WAPPN DITTMANN commands Sixth SS Panzer Army.

(2) It has been suggested that the Panzer Army which reformed in EASTFRALIA was designated Sixth SS Panzer Army, but this is the first concrete evidence of the SS designation. Logically, this title would be appropriate since the Army is commanded by an SS General and includes at least four SS Panzer Divisions (1, 2, 9, and 12) and two SS Panzer Corps (I and II). Further, the same tactics with the outcome of this new Army, just as DITTMANN's SS Panzer Army, were directed toward the destruction of all enemy forces. Under these circumstances, it would seem logical for the Sixth to honor the new Army with the title SS XXXX XXX.

(Courtesy: Third U.S. Army)."

**184. 10 Dec.**

Annex 5A: SIXTH SS PANZER ARMY.

'...Since the move of Sixth SS Army from its starting and training area in EASTFRALIA to its present location, much has been said about the disposition of the divisions under its command. The vast majority of reports regarding these locations have been furnished through interrogation of Poles who had higher recently passed the area in question or picked up information concerning the whereabouts of these units by hearsay. Interrogation of civilians also supplied a number of clues which were helpful in solving the puzzle of the Sixth Army.'
... in a whole occupying the area between the MUR and the RHEN Rivers. In the northern boundary of this sector probably to be found the bulk of SS troops east of the Ruhr, almost every town and village, and much of their equipment, such as artillery, thought to be stored in buildings. The rest is within the area described above.

At least four SS Panzer divisions are reported to be part of this SS area. They are probably grouped under one SS Panzer Corps.

It is thought likely that another Panzer division and possibly two, may yet be added to this group. 1 Panzer, 2 Panzer, 9 Panzer, and 12 SS Panzer Divisions are reported to be under Sixth SS Army, and it is thought that 1 SS Panzer Corps and 5 SS Panzer Divisions may yet appear.

Dispositions are estimated to be as follows:

1. 2 SS Panzer Divisions:

These locations show a possible route of entry into the area. However, it is thought likely that the division is now located in the area bounded by the following points at which elements were also reported on the given maps:

- Vielen of FIESCH (P 1682) on 30 November.
- FIESCH (P 1683) on 3 December.
- FIESCH (P 1683) on 3 December.
- VIENNE Julas (P 1684) on 8 December.
- VIENNE Julas (P 1684) on 8 December.

The above sector 2 SS Panzer Divisions as the northernmost formation of Sixth SS Army.

2. 9 SS Panzer Divisions:

Not much has been heard of this unit, and in fact a very recent report points out that it is not a Panzer Div instead of Panzer as it was in 1944-45. Nevertheless, it is thought that part of it may be part of the SS Army. Information on this division was reported as follows:

BONN (P 1685), East of JUELICH (P 1685), JUELICH (P 1685).

Further information on the ground is believed to hold that 9 SS Panzer Div. is a very pleasant, since there is sufficient natural cover to be effectively concealed troops and equipment.

3. 12 SS Panzer Divisions:

More reports have been received regarding this division than any other one of Sixth SS is Army. East of them claimed the division to be in the area East of JUELICH or between JUELICH and GÖLLENE, as this fearsome southern sector.

2 December - at Berchtesgaden (P 2462) and vicinity.

The sector area East of JUELICH, as shown above, holds 9 SS Panzer Divisions. However, it is not improbable that some elements of 12 SS Panzer Div are
locate there as well, since there is sufficient concealment available. It will be noted that the normal pattern of the 1st division runs roughly from DIREK to COJWIN. Most of them are again in and around selected areas that provide cover for troops and equipment. Thus we estimate it is fairly certain that the main assembly is in the vicinity of DIREK and in the woods to the north and south of the rear element may still be between DIREK and COJWIN. This brings the division into the First U.S. Army zone of action, probably in front of VII corps.

4. 1st Fr Div

The division is not doubt preparing to take a hand in future operations, and since it has no assigned sector as yet, it must be ready to take part in any engagement. From reports, 1st Fr Div is presently located in front of First U.S. Army, probable in the general area north of DIREK (2906) and further north. Enemy troop concentrations were reported here as well, adding confirmation to the belief that a fanfare formation is in this area.

5. 5th Fr Div (LINC)

Reports regarding this division have been vague. It had been reported retreating to "TEVEN" in October as part of Sixth U.S. Army. It is reported to be located in rear of 2nd Fr Div in the vicinity of 2906 recently. A definite location cannot be given but since it is not out of contact at the BEIJING front, it is in a prospect for attack in SAKI in Fr Div area.

6. 6th Fr Div

This division was known to be retreating since early October. Most recently placing it in SAKI, but now it is reported to have moved to the general area of the RENKE river. On 6th December, it was reported to be in the general area between KUKES and RENKE, and then reports vary actually be referring to troops of 2nd Fr Div. On 6 December, 3rd Fr Div was reported in 2S1906 (1155) and vicinity. It had been reported in the area between 3008 and 3150 with no evidence of movement. The situation information it must remain here. Other reports from army are equally unreliable, maintaining the division in the RENKE-TEVEN area.

Conclusions

Here are shown the active locations of Sixth U.S. Army's divisions. This places 1st Fr Div in the area to the front of Sixth U.S. and 2nd Fr Div in the area to the front of Sixth U.S. and 3rd Fr Div in the area to the rear of Sixth U.S. Army since, however, 3rd Fr Div is 12th December, and 2nd Fr Div was probably also in the same of action.

Remarks concerning "FRANCISCAN" Fr Div places it in the area March to the 2nd December with it is not thought this might this division could appear as a matter of Sixth U.S. Army.

6th Fr Div has not been reported in the talks it is out of contact on the RENKE front, but lacking information no definite assertion regarding its whereabouts can be made at this time.
12 Dec.

Reserves and other forces capable of intervention, Pls from the 3 Para Div (1 Para Regt) continue to state their division was to be relieved by the 12 SS Panz. VII Corps. Comment: It is now apparent that the majority of the 3 PARA Div is east of the ROHR River. Day to day reports indicate it is here to assume that it will be relieved. The 12 SS Panz. Div's desire to take the place of the 3 PARA Div in the line. (Many comments with a number of volksgrenadiers and a few they are and panzer division still available in the Fest.)

13 Dec.

Reserves and other forces capable of intervention. Train movements indicate the building of enemy forces on the eastern side of the MOSEL valley continues. CROSSFIRE (1) DIV has again been reported to be in the area by 7th. A conservative estimate would place at least two Volksgrenadier and one Panzer or Panzer-Grenadier divisions in the area. It is also reported that BATTU (2) DIV has continued to be in the area. 88 DIV, the 12 SS Panz. Div, is in the area and is reported to be in the area. A conservative estimate would place at least two Volksgrenadier and one Panzer or Panzer-Grenadier divisions in the area. This is expected to be particularly of enemy forces in the area are sustained, particularly of enemy forces in the area are sustained, at present high levels.

14 Dec.

Reserves and other forces capable of intervention.

Summary of Movements

(2) & (3) are reports, whose statements are believed to be reliable. A report to VII Corps has included the following information of movement of troops observed behind the front lines during the 3 days beginning 10 Dec. The 8th army transport vehicles, pontoons, small tanks and other river crossing equipment coming from the direction of HITZUG (L-353) and moving east through CROSSTON (F9452). In HITZUG, she overheard a man say military personnel saying that he had taken 3 weeks to get there from ITALY. There were also troops in the town with gray uniform and tank roller patches. She also stated that she had
seen many artillery pieces, both horse-drawn and carried on trucks. 
(Comments: very interesting report. Build-up of tr ops has been 
confirmed by TAC/R and FM statements. However, presence of large numbers 
of engineers with bridging equipment suggests preparation for 
offensive rather than defensive action. XXXI Corps has 
been reported on the move to the West front by Higher Headquarters 
but the possibility always exists that such a move has, in fact, taken 
place. )


R. Reserve and Other Forces Capable of Intervention.

2) Reinforcements for the WEST WALL between DUNKEN and 
HANNA continue to arrive. The identification of at least three or four 
newly reformed divisions along the Army front must be reckoned with 
during the next few days. Although the enemy is resorting to his attack 
propaganda to bolster morale of the troops, it is possible that a 
limited scale offensive will be launched for the purpose of achieving 
a Christmas morale 'victory' for civilian consumption. Many PTs now 
speak of the coming attack between the 17th and 25th of December; 
while others relate promises of the 'recapture of AACHEN as a 
Christmas present for the HESS Emperor'.

3) VIII Corps reports that an abrupt change of routine 
of enemy personnel opposite 9th U.S. Arm Div strongly suggests that 
new troops may have arrived in that area. (Comments: Very likely a 
recently arrived V.C. Div coming in to relieve 212 V.C. Div.).

2. Enemy Operation During Period.

a. General Summary.

1) First U.S. Army Sector: Further advances were made 
by our troops to the west bank of the NEER PANH River in the VII Corps 
sector against decreased enemy opposition. Principal gains in the 
V Corps sector were in the KESTERMICH (FO024) area.

Order of Battle Notes.

"L. O.P. 1/1/54 - ACT - North to Sothe:

a. VII Corps Sector: 216 Volksgrenadier Div, 3 Para 
Div, Ele 17 Volksgrenadier Div, 333 Inf Div, 
981 Or Igt of 277 Volksgrenadier Div, Ele 
344 Volksgrenadier Div, and 6 Para Rifle Igt, 
and II/Sternwetter Igt (85 Inf Div).

b. V Corps Sector: Ele 344 Volksgrenadier Div, 
Remonte 89 Inf Div, 326 Volksgrenadier Div, 
272 Volksgrenadier Div, 277 Volksgrenadier 
Div, Ele 1A Volksgrenadier Div, and Ele 12 
Volksgrenadier Div.

c. VIII Corps Sector: 18 Volksgrenadier Div, Ele 116 
Pr Div, 26 Volksgrenadier Div, 352 Volksgrenadier 
Div, Ele 296 Volksgrenadier Div, and 212 
Volksgrenadier Div.

(* identified after close of period)"
seen many artillery pieces, both horse-drawn and carried on trucks.

(Comment: A very interesting report. Build-up of troops has been
confirmed by TAC/R and P&O state-ents. However, presence of large numbers
of engineers with bridging equipment suggests preparation for
offensive rather than defensive action. No division from ITA-I has
been reported on the move to the front by Higher Headquarters
but the possibility always exists that such a move has, in fact, taken
place.)

1109. 15 Dec.
"R. Reserves and Other Forces Capable of Intervention.

"(2) Reinforcements for the WEST FALL between DUSCH and
FRUS continue to arrive. The identification of at least three or four
newly reformed divisions along the Army front must be reckoned with
during the next few days. Although the enemy is using his attack
propaganda to bolster morale of the troops, it is possible that a
limited scale offensive will be launched for the purpose of achieving
a Christmas morale 'victory' for civilian consumption. Many P&O's now
speak of the coming attack between the 17th and 23rd of December,
while others relate promises of the 'reapture of AACHEN as a
Christmas present for the HESS Führer'.

"(3) VII Corps reports that an abrupt change of routine
of enemy personnel opposite 9th U.S. Arm Div strongly suggests that
new troops may have arrived in that area. (Comment: Very likely a
recently arrived V.G. Div coming in to relieve 212 V.G. Div.)

2. Enemy Operations During Period.

a. General Summary.

"(1) First U.S. Army Sector: Further advances were made
by our troops to the west bank of the MUR River in the VII Corps
sector against decreased enemy opposition. Principal gains in the
V Corps sector were in the WESTERbach (F002) area.

Order of Battle Notes.

9. UNITS IN CONTACT - North to Settola: -- 

a. VII Corps Sector: 257 Volksgrenader Div, 3 Para
Div, Ele 17 Volksgrenader Div, 333 Inf Div, 961 Or Bngt of 272 Volksgrenader Div, Ele
344 Volksgrenader Div, and 6 Para Rifle Bngt and 11/Norman Bngt 2 (Inf Div).

b. V Corps sector: Ele 344 Volksgrenader Div,
Foumerte 89 Inf Div, 266 Volksgrenader Div,
272 Volksgrenader Div, 277 Volksgrenader Div, Ele 18 Volksgrenader Div, and Ele 12
Volksgrenader Div.

c. VIII Corps Sector: 26 Volksgrenader Div, "Ele 116
Inf Div, 26 Volksgrenader Div, 332 Volksgrenader Div, "Ele 226 Volksgrenader Div, and 212
Volksgrenader Div.

(* Identified after close of period)"
PHOTO 19 Dec.

To Harvest and Other Persons Capable of Intervention,

(2) Reinforcements for the NOLL FALL between NUREN and 
STiT continue to arrive. The identification of at least three of four 
planes recorded in the foregoing diary will be recorded with 
(7) the news this evening. Although the enemy is reported to the attack 
Propaganda to bolster support of the troops, it is possible that a 
United front offensive will be launched for the purpose of achieving 
(8) of the coming attack between the 17th and 25th of November, 
which is to relieve pressure of the capture of AACHEN as a 
Christmas present for the Xmas troops.

(3) VIII Corps reports an abrupt change of routine 
of their personnel opposite 9th U.S. Arm Div strongly suggests that 
the troops are in the vicinity of the area. (Unexpectedly arrived 9th U.S. Div enemy to relieve 212 7th. Div.)

2. Enemy Operation During Period

a. General Summary

(1) Ninth U.S. Army Sector: Further advances were made 
by our troops to the south bank of the ROE River in the 71st Corps 
sector and the 2nd Corps sector were in the AACHEN(GO024) area.

[Text continues]
RESERVED and other forces capable of intervention during the period, the enemy committed no less than seven, possibly eight, new divisions to the front of the First U.S. Army. The attack was mounted in the V and VIII Corps sectors, with the bulk of the new divisions operating on the VIII Corps front. The following known reserves remained uncommitted at the end of the period:

First United States Army Zone

SEVENTH PANZER ARMY

1st PA Div
2nd PA Div
9th PA Div
5th Panz Div
5th Inf Div

RIPEL Area
At least 10th U.S. Div
11th PA Div
One unidentified Div

Ninth U.S. Army Zone: 9th PA Div; 10th PA Div)

There was no doubt that the enemy was making an all-out effort to smash through our lines and achieve objectives deep in our rear areas. Therefore, the only two elements of a large portion of the remaining enemy reserves must be expected in both the V and VIII Corps sectors, with perhaps the greatest pressure being exerted along the boundary of the two corps.

2. BEST CAPABILITIES

a. The enemy is capable of attempting to exploit his initial gains by driving through our rear areas and raising bridges over the River. He will move at night or in low hadropal and proceed to execute nightly parachute operations. He intends to use all of his replacement units.

b. The enemy is capable of attacking with the limited objectives of driving us from German soil and regaining his best held positions.

c. The enemy is capable of defending his present gains.

2. (1) Capability b. (1) is currently being implemented.

Current indications are that the enemy is all-out bid for victory. He has moved out of his former line and proceeded to exploit it. He has lost many men and equipment, but reserves are still available. The enemy has started all of these offensive actions, he cannot afford to wait for counterattacks.

(2) If the enemy attack shows signs of bogging down, then

(3) Capability a(3) is considered unlikely at this time. The ground the enemy has gained to date is, in many cases, not as suitable for the defense as the ground previously held. Furthermore, his supplies at the front are such that he must continue forward in order to life off captured supplies.

(4) Capability a(4) is possible at this time.
Order of Battle T. 105:

"1. Units in Contact - North to South:
   a. VII Corps Sector:
      76 Div - 417, 216; 292 (941 Gr. Rgt); Remnants of 366.
      Para Div - 2, 5 Para "Mk 10" Rgt.
      Inf Div - 637 (337/11 German Operating Trg. Rgt.);
      ORGA 355 (Remnants).
   b. V Corps Sector:
      242, 271; 277, 362.
      SS Pz - 179.
      Inf. - 369 (116 Inf. Rgt)
   c. VIII Corps Sector:
      76 Div - 12; 286; 624; 352; 560; 216; 278.
      Pa Div - 2, 116.
      Para Div - 37

2. New Identifications:
   a. Elements of 3 Para Div.
   b. " of 115 Pz Div.
   c. " of IV Panzer Division taken from the 2/25 SS Pz Gr. Regt of 12
      46 Pz Div at B-Liff. To state that the regiment participated in
      an attack in this area on the afternoon of 16 December and that it
      was to resume the attack on 17 December. C tribut: This would constitute
      the first identification of any elements of Sixth SS Pz Army in the
      battle area.
   d. Elements of 62 Inf Div.
   e. "2/8 Identification of 10 GAP Div was not accepted by FSSA.
   f. Elements of 37 Inf Div.
   g. " of 2 Pz Div.
   h. not listed as omitted, possibly carelessness
   a. Elements of 500 VC Div.

Other 2. Translation of German Documents:

These pertained to the attack's scope and importance and were identical with those of the VIII Corps. However, the von Bistenreich
Order of the Day, 16 Dec, the last significant of the VIII Corps(16th
Div.) captured document, was not included. This Order proclaimed
"The Counteroffensive."

1. 0-2 Periodic (151, 17 Div.
   a. 0-2 Air Summary of Events:
      In the attack areas, heavy concentrations were seen and
      movement was to the west and north-west. Due to general fluidity,
      no coherent picture can be drawn from operations in these areas except
      that the enemy seems to have concentrations to the rear which he is
      bringing up.

   **
4. Air Reconnaissance.

222. 11 Nov.

4. Go-2 (Air) Weekly Summary of Rail Movement (For Week Ending 01 Dec). 

(a) A definite pattern of rail movement in the first half of the week has been established from plotting over a week's period. There were three main areas of interest; these were in order of:

1. BURN - EIKIN.
2. BURN - BURKIN - KALL line.
3. BURKIN - KALL line and the KOL line.

(b) In the BURN - EIKIN line there were 24 sightings which were all to the east of the Nai-T River, while between BURN and BURKIN 1, 9 trains were seen. The total number of trains passing in the 24-hour period in this area was 25. The marshalling yard at EIKIN (13-15) showed considerable activity over the period with sightings of up to 290 cars on the yard.

(c) On the BURN - KOL line there were 17 sightings on the 1st, with four trains (8th Nov) and 17 sightings or up to 200 cars were made in the marshalling yard at BURKIN. There was daily sighting of trains standing at sightings at EIKIN.

(d) The KOL - BURKIN lines along both sides of the BURN showed very high daily usage throughout the period as could be expected.

(a) An interesting build-up took place at WETTEN (2039), this was reported at the beginning of the period by a PS as being a railway and with different train sights there daily, it is believed that statement has been confirmed.

(c) Other aerodrome sightings were made which indicated use of the ARGIRICH (P-75) - BURKIN (1332) line, the BURKIN - ARMELIA line and the BURKIN - LEBIAR line.

233. 9 Nov.


(a) There were two days during the week in which no sightings were made due to poor weather conditions, however, during the remainder of the week there were 178 sightings. In the Army area, there were 16 sightings and some interesting observations have been made. The most significant fact which has been brought out is that no rail lines in the Y and Y Corps zone, 10 and including the INILE Valley, there has been movement at any time during the week.

(b) The KALL-ERKINCHEN line showed its greatest activity during the early part of the week and apparently subsided thereafter due to blocking of KALL and ERKINCHEN marshalling yards, or some considerable build up occurred.

(a) The ERKINCHEN - LEBIAR - KALL line showed some activity throughout the week with a heavy build up of goods trains in the LEBIAR yards on 5 December. The BURN-ERKINCHEN-KALL line showed the greatest activity on 5 December; however, some traffic on this line has been sighted throughout the period. It is possible that the heavier traffic during the 5th was the result of a large troop movement into or out of the ERKINCHEN - LEBIAR area.
(a) The main EUREX-KLIN Line showed sporadic activity throughout the week. The most numerous sightings along this line, however, were at LEUVEN (F3173). This indicates that KLIN is a determining point for troops and only necessary supply trains are being run further up to SMIR and KLIN.

(b) Considerable activity has been noted throughout the week at ANVERSILDE and in the yards to the east. Tanks on floats have been seen here and it seems quite likely that this is a rail-head for a power division in reserve or refitting in this area. In view of the mass of this area sightings of vehicular activity in the vicinity is also probable that a large supply installation is located here and being fed by the EUREX-ANVERSILDE Line.

(c) Numerous sightings were made throughout the period on the lines running on both sides and parallel to the Rhine between KLIN and KLIN. The bulk of this movement was north. Ten ace up trains sighted in the KLIN yards indicates that sufficient repairs have been made in the yards to handle traffic into and out of the first and Ninth Army zones.

1/24. 10 Dec.

"a) 0-2 (Air) Summary of Movement.

(b) Observations today were limited to the period between 1200 hours and 1500 hours.

(c) Scattered TF movement was observed in all the forward areas in front of V and VII Corps. The larger groups were sighted in the areas around BEKEN (F3173), where twenty (20) trucks were observed, P3267 where thirty (30) vehicles were seen moving southwest and KORNHOF (F3118) where thirty (30) TF were seen. The latter falls in an area of suspected Panzer concentrations.

(d) The town of VEITRUP (F1938) showed considerable rail activity by again today, with the sighting of two (2) trains, one (1) of fifty (50) cars and the other of twenty-five (25) cars. . .

(e) On the eastern bank of the Rhine River normal TF activity took place. Large traffic on the Rhine itself was up to its normal heavy rate.

(f) No definite sighting of armor took place."

1/25. 11 Dec.

"1/0-2 (Air) Summary of Movement, for 11 December, 1944.

(a) Observations were very limited throughout the day, thereby making a comprehensive summary difficult.

(b) Rail movement was seen on the EUREX-BUSKIRCHEN-KORN line with the sighting of one train moving east from VEITRUP. This, together with the sightings of the trains at VEITRUP yesterday and ten vehicles seen moving in both directions between VEITRUP and GLADINGEN (F2311) today, indicates that VEITRUP is again active as a railhead.

(c) The sightings of two trains of approximately twenty-five cars containing vehicles or tanks, parked on sidings of three different rail lines within a four mile radius of BUSKIRCHEN, may mean that since BUSKIRCHEN re-sighting yards have been subjected to continued bombing, trains are now being dispersed on various sidings within the area for unloading instead of being bunched in one yard.

...."
(d) Vehicular traffic wassparse and scattered with a
majority of movement in the EMB (F-2924) -EKEN(2511) - BERPAT (2412) area with no predominate direction indicated. There was also a few
of ten vehicles spotted moving east about three miles east of 
BERPAT (F-2924).

*2* Additional activity noted on air routes: 4 probable
ranes in the vicinity of BERNSTAD (Y-1544). Also 15 vehicles in the
courtyard of the building at F17252. Vehicular activity in the vicinity of 
BERNATEN where heavy track activity is seen in the vicinity of the
woods at F27627 and a convoy of 25 vehicles moving south-west
between "EBEREN" (F2292) and RAPAT (F12327).

*3* The air staff of the 313 VT Div (244) stated that they had
been asked to replace for the unit on October, although they
had been scheduled for the 116 Fr Div. They stated that the 116 Fr
Div as of 9 December was in EMBERCAL (F-69).

186. 12 December.
No mention.

187. 13 Dec.
*4* Defensive Organization.

(1) General Photography. During the past several weeks
the enemy has continued to improve his defenses east of the R our River,
particularly north of DEM. During this time wire has been placed in a
front of trenches and additional entrenching has been accomplished.
A shift of artillery stock has been apparent and at the present time a
concentration of artillery in the ERENFUR(2531) -COFTON (F153) area
is indicated.

Considerable movement in the VII Corps zone
between the BER and EMBR Rivers has been taking place. Although long
convoy or large concentrations of another vehicles have not been evident,
a few vehicles could be seen at one time or another in almost every
small village in this area. Motor movement on the roads has likewise
been limited to a few vehicles on any one locality with no definite
trend in direction. Tracks in and near roads are frequently observed.
Railroad activity has been very heavy and the
speed with which car trackage is required gives ample indication of the
importance attached to this form of transportation. Each activity
has been observed at HOBEN, EKENTH, WINDEN, STENDRI, EMBR, V-14, RAP
and EMBEKE. Traffic has not been confined to main lines and
the network of area enemy railroad is apparently kept operating.
Opposite the First Army about 60 bridges have been
prepared for demolition, the majority of them being toward the north
in the path of the VTH Corps. The railroad bridges on the EKEN-DEM- 
BER line and the bridges on the railroad that parallels the EMBR River
appear to have a high priority in these preparations.
233. 1 Dec.

"10-0 2 (Air) Summary of Movement:

(a) Although skies were generally clear, fog and ground haze over the bases limited operations. Observations were made only between 1000 and 1600 hours.

(b) No rail movement of troops was observed east of the Rhine except in the TRIPOL area. The K/2 at TRIPOL and EMBASSY (Z234) showed considerable activity and two trains (one southward one en route) were sighted between EMBASSY and TITUSKAMP (Z266). East of the Rhine, the K/3 at TRIPOL (P267) contained four made up trains of medium length. Other scattered activity was observed further to the east but no trend of interest was indicated.

(c) Sightings of vehicular activity were less than of any type previously. The one sighting of interest was that of a concentration of 10 tanks and 4 trucks together with 200 foot troops along the road about two miles northwest of KESSENDORF (P0675)."

239. 15 Dec.

"110 2 (Air) Summary of Movement: Railroad movement as seen by aerial reconnaissance was practically negligible, with the exception of the trains facing east at KESSENDORF. A sighting of eighty freight cars near KESSENDORF (F0680) and twelve to fourteen vehicles in the same area may indicate KESSENDORF is still being used as a supply point or loading and detaining area. This activity at KESSENDORF and the sighting of a thirty car train moving south out of KESSENDORF (F0677) may have some connection, possibly the movement of replacements or a unit into or out of the northern part of VII Corps sector using KESSENDORF as a detraining or entraining point.

A truckhead at KESSENDORF (F0677) may be indicated by the sightings of thirty four vehicles moving into and out of the town.

Observations only covered the period from 1030 to 1330 hours."

S. Receipt of Twelfth Army Group 0-2 Esmeux Periods.

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V. 0-2 Targets.

The 0-2 "area" bulletin issued by the Office of the JG of 6, 0-2, 2 G-2 Target Section was established 10 July 1944, to cover the Air Force targets for all of in areas of interest to the First U.S. Army. It used information from higher and lower headquarters, photo interpretation, FF and civilian interrogation reports, etc.
(Source: FUSC REPORT OF OPERATIONS, 20 October 1944 - 1 August 1945, Annex 5b, 0-2 Section, p. 131.)

The following citations will large pertain to the Conclusions of the reports, research as they indicate the trend of opinions.

*****

(Target = 2-3 Dec.

6. Conclusions.

a. The build-up of SS, armored, and other troops is continuing along the lines: (1) DUSSEN-BITTEBERG-GENEMOED-SCHNEDEL, with those same towns as center of activity, and (2) KLEEF-PATHEIM-GLADACH-ETHICH-BECHTELER. The following named towns have appeared as centers of activity during the past week in the role of: (1) higher headquarters (2) troop and supply detaining, and regulating stations (c) mobile, equipment supply points. They are considered to be defended villages and profitable targets for aerial bombardment.

KLEEF, PATHEIM, HOBTH, HOBTH, ASHGROVE, GLADACH, ZULFOCH, ZULFOCHEN, GEMEDE, KAL, HOBTH.

b. The KLEEF industrial area is furnishing considerable electrical power and partially processed coal for synthetic fuel, is concentrated in a comparatively small area, and its destruction would further hamper enemy movements.

Target = 4 Dec.

7. Conclusions. -- Detaining of units to be held in reserve has taken place in previously reported towns and villages from MAKES to JURICH to DUSSEN to ZUPFCII to BESCHEROER to MARCHEINER by many small trains and small units well dispersed. Marshaling yards are no longer long enough to the dispersion of small units in towns and villages E of the EER and S of the BEILICH. There are indications that the enemy is utilizing more billets in towns, viliges, and farms, and fewer wooded areas than was the case in the period 15 October to 15 November 1944.

Target = 5 Dec.

8. Conclusions.

a. Further verification of reinforcements arriving during the past week in the BITTEBERG area confirms the fact that the BITTEBERG LINE in the WEST has been very lightly held and that fresh troops are arriving for reserve or relief.
b. The rail movements and riding at BIEBER (F334) and LIEBNA (F363) continue in their marked activity and are recommended for immediate priority targets.

e. Heavy traffic continued on both sides of the Ribeauvillé road, with evidence of activity on the STRASBOURG-STUTTGART triangle, which presents a concentrated rail and bridge area.

Target - 13 Dec.

Weather prevented aerial reconnaissance for both photos and observation of enemy rail movements.

4. Conclusions. No change.

Target - 12 Dec.


The enemy continued strengthening his positions both on the SEEBLINGE plain and in the HURTIGZELL area with emphasis on securing cover for launching counter-attacks.

Target - 14 Dec.

a. 3-2 Air Summary.

1. Although skies were generally clear, fog and ground haze over the bases limited operations. Observations were made only between 1400 and 1600 hours.

2. No rail movement of note was observed west of the Rohrheide except at the STRASBOURG area. The 3-2 at STRASBOURG and ENTZING showed considerable activity, and two trains (one south and one on the ridge) were sighted between DURINGEN and ENTZING. East of the Rohrheide, the 3-2 at OBERLINGHAIN contained four make-up trains of medium length. Otherwise, little activity was observed further to the east, but no trains of movement were indicated.

3. Sightings of vehicular activity were less than at any time previously. The one sighting of interest was that of a concentration of 10 tanks and 6 trucks together with 200 men troops along the route about 2 miles north of BIRNBACH.


Troop concentrations in the BIEBER-VULFOOR area continues.

Target - 15 Dec.

1. Summary of Enemy Movements:

a. 3-2 Air Summary of Rail and Highway Movement. Rail movement as seen by aerial reconnaissance was tactically negligible with the exception of two trains facing East at RHEINBACH. Observation covered only the period 1000 to 1300.


a. Units previously reported have detrained close to defensive positions between the MOER and the DUTCH lines. They have entered various sectors of the front line, and are held in reserve, bivouacked in towns and villages close to detraining points. The same troops previously reported are still being used for evacuation and supply.

b. In the STRASBOURG sector, 3-4 divisions with armor and some bridging equipment have moved in since 20 November. Bad weather has prevented observation of large movements into or out of this sector.
sensor for periods as long as four days at a time. There is no indication of change in the enemy’s use of rail junctions, railheads, and rear echelon establishments from the list previously submitted.*

B. Target Sub-section File, 6 Jan. 44, apparently to 1-3,
(Source: In L-496(21) Air Missions.)

*Data:
  1. The enemy has moved units practically to front lines by rail. He has chosen cities, towns, and farm villages for billets and has kept his career on unmetalled roads to avoid indicating armored movement by tracks.
  2. This study has produced the names and approximate coordinates of all towns and rail junctions in which enemy reserves are known to have billeted, in which they are known to have disarmed, and the principal rail junctions, crossovers, and switching centers through which their trains must pass within Army’s zone of action. There are 38, fifteen of which are within medium or heavy artillery range.
  3. They are arranged in three lists:
     a. List 1. — Important Rail Billeting Points beyond effective artillery range — recommended as targets for heavy and medium bombers.
     b. List 2. — Troop Concentration Points and rail junctions within effective medium/heavy artillery range — recommended as targets for artillery and fighter bombers.
     c. List 3. — Troop Concentration Towns beyond artillery range — primarily fighter bombers targets — two rail junctions (ABRECOM and BULLEHLEM) are included although not troop concentration points in order to complete breaking up of the rail net.

*4. ...*

Lists were attached.

VI. 9-2 Journal File.

A. VIII Corps Woman Informer.
(Source: 9-2 Jnl. File, 14 Dec., In L-355(7))

F.6. — This woman was taken by the 28th Division on 14 Dec. See also Division and Corps Levels for details, particularly the Corps for evaluation.)

Item 774. Jnl. entry: 142400A Dec.
9-2 Midnight Roundup, 142455A Dec.
9 Corps ...
  VIII Corps: A German woman, who had been given permission to pick up some of her clothes in the SUAUN (POFO) area and was picked up by German patrol and sent to the rear for interrogation, gave the following information of her observation behind the German lines during the 3 days beginning 10 December. She saw many horse-drawn vehicles, small boats and other river crossing equipment coming from the direction of BIRKEN (1432) and moving west through CORSOGLANO (POFO). In BIRKEN she overheard some military personnel saying that it had taken 3 weeks to get there from ITALY and that she had seen
16 1017th Troops, with gray uniforms and black collar patches. She stated she had seen many artillery pieces both horse-drawn and carried on tracks.

The troop's course was jangled quite a bit, when, while returning to our lines after escaping from the Germans, she struck a trip wire and exploded a 75mm min. However, she is believed to be reliable.

**VII CORPS, 16 Dec.**

**Item 475. File entry: 14,2400A Dec.**

**FHJDA 5-2 1920, FB-9222, 14 Dec.**

"...German woman who was behind enemy lines for three days beginning 17 December and escaped to our lines stated that in BITBURG (2000) she saw troops with gray uniforms and black collar patches. Also stated in ORRICHINGEN (Peter 103) she saw horse-drawn vehicles, pontoons, small boats, and other river-crossing equipment moving west from direction of BITBURG. In BITBURG she heard some military personnel remark that it had taken them three weeks to get there from ITALY. She also saw many horse-drawn and truck-drawn artillery pieces, but no armor.

(2) Item 45. File entry: 150222A Dec. Received: 150220A Dec.**

**VIII Corps IDN 5222, F221, 141850A-141850A Dec.**

...General Civilian reports considerable trucks, horse-drawn vehicles, 75s, pontoon, small boats, and other river-crossing equipment moving west at ORRICHINGEN (Peter 103) on 10 December. Some source reports 8 troops in BITBURG whose conversation indicated it took 3 weeks for them to come into this area from ITALY."

**B. Entries on 16 December.**

**(Sources In L-555(2)), 16 Dec.)**

**16. 160822 Dec.**

Twelfth Army Group, G-2 Periodic, #193, 141850A-151800A Dec.

**26. 161448 Dec.**

G-2 received the following messages from the V Corps, 161448 Dec.

1) Just below right flank of T Corp enemy has taken LANDSTATT (1330).

2) Document taken at 19124715 raid by...soldiers on the Western front your great hour has struck. Your attacking armies are advancing today. Everything is at stake. You bear in yourselves a holy duty to give everything we've achieved to the super human for our fatherland and for our Fatherland."

*This call to arms to be made known to all soldiers without exception at once before beginning of attack.*

12 VC TIV

*(Note has been given to VIII Corps)*
The R.A.S. indicated it was sent to 0/8, 0/3, 0/1, 0/6, 0/7, 0/9, 0/10, 0/11, 0/12, and 0/13. The last three, however, did not check having received it, although their names were pencilled on the distribution slip.

FUSA 3-2 IAW PT-927. 0600-2400. 16 Dec., Operational Agent.

The IAW was filled in the FUSA 3-2, Jr, File 162404A Dec.

"Early this morning, starting about 0530, Able, heavy enemy anti-armor fire fell along most of the enemy front with sporadic artillery fire falling in rear areas at St. Vieth (Peter 058), Wolken (Peter 671), Viervord (Peter 673), and Groen (Peter 677). Beginning at 0600/1 and throughout the morning the enemy launched counterattacks at numerous points along the Cassino-Cassino-Cassino VIII Corps and Southern V Corps front, with two small attacks on VII Corps front. Elements of six newly appeared divisions, including two panzer divisions, were identified. These were the 21st and 116th Panzer Divs., and the 12th, 21st, 30th, and 77th Inf Divs. In addition there is very scanty evidence for possible presence of elements of 5 Panzer Div and 365 Inf Div. Documcns signed by CO, 12th VC Div, and captured this morning told German soldiers that their great hour had struck, that strong attacking attacks were advancing today, and that everything was at stake, calling upon them to give their all for Germany, the Führer, and Rundstedt.

Captured documents taken from body of German officer in 116th Panzer Div sector including operational orders and Orders of the Day from Rundstedt, Fischel, Mainzer, and Commanding Generals of 66th and 62nd Divs. Clear indications of large scale offensive launched today with St. Vieth as first major objective and subsequent drive to East and Northwest. Rundstedt's Order of Day states: quote large armies are attacking the Australians, to capture everything in this operation unquote. Quote of divisions on accompanying map show 62nd Panzer Div in sector (Peter 2570-2572), with 116th Panzer Div to the south in sector (Peter 9475-9477). 11th Panzer Div next in line to the north and 21st Div below 11th Div. South boundary of 66th Corps, shown as running from (Peter 98732 to 917312) which is also south boundary of 62nd Div, Operation is known as quite brief unquote and Rundstedt's Order of Day was addressed to both units of I.P.W. and is quite unquote."
G-2 Air daily note to USA 0-2, statistically reporting aerial reconnaissance missions by IR Tactical Air
Highland and weather.

VI.B. The above were in addition to the 0-2 Air Summary section of the daily 0-2 Periodical and the 0-2 Targets, both cited in IV,0 and in V respectively of this Documentation.

VII. Army Group Intelligence Summaries Receipt.

These were received by the USA 0-2, the last ones being the following:

VIII. 0-2 B Siteop 6366, 151200h-152400h Dec.
(Source: In L-555(6), 16 Dec., Item 42, Filed 160911 Dec.)

VII Corps:
The 4th Div, 38th Div, 106th Div and 9th Arm Div less 9th
occupied recent positions.

V Corps:
The 99th Div continued attack against strong enemy fortified
positions... The 7th Div less 33rd Inf continued attack with
slight advance... The 8th Div plus 311th Inf consolidated and
improved positions on 'K' Co, 311th Inf cleared small enemy pocket.
9th, 9th Arm Div and 9th Arm Div occupied in Corp's reserve...

VII Corps:
The 104th Div and 9th Div occupied and improved positions
on the west bank of the Rod River. The 33rd Div less 2nd BN 330th
Inf continued attack at 1200h with 331st Inf against generally light
enemy resistance... The 5th Arm Div with 2nd BN 330th Inf attacked
consolidated positions secured during the evening. The 1st Div and
9th Arm Div continued training and rehabilitation...