12 June 1945

SUBJECT: Japanese Army Problem

TO: Control Officer
    Signal Security Agency
    Washington 25, D. C.

1. The Control Survey Committee of which I am a member has completed its study of all the aspects of the Japanese Army Problem. This is a vast enterprise upon which many thousands of people are working all over the world. In all cases, however, we find that all work is done on collateral levels in much the same manner as international machinery is set up in what is called multilateral treaties or agreements. From the standpoint of the direction of activities, however, this is bad organization. Within the Intelligence Division we find the Division Chief in charge of four of these Branches, B-I, B-II, B-IV, and I & L. The Division Chief is also the Chairman of the Japanese Army Coordination Committee which includes representatives of these Branches, plus the Chiefs of X and G Branches of the Operating Services Division. Over and above that, we have the Commanding Officer of the Signal Security Agency, in general charge of the world-wide aspects of the problem, including coordination with other United States and British centers.

2. The result of this method of organization gives rise to a laissez faire attitude. As long as things seem to be going smoothly -- well and good. Only when trouble arises is a judgment made in settling an argument. One evil resulting from this scheme is that the squeaking wheel gets the most attention. Another is that often trouble is not foreseen until it is too late.

3. It was apparent to the Committee and to the great majority of personnel interviewed that the problem was one problem and not a great number of isolated problems. The lifeblood of the Japanese Army problem is the traffic, and any organization set up to cope with it should recognize this fact. It should be built on a structure that would start with the raw material and end up with properly evaluated
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intelligence. Actually we find the flow of traffic crossing over many artificial boundary lines into territories which have little in common with each other, each concerned with its own problems rather than the overall problem.

4. Under existing circumstances, it is believed that the following plan would represent a workable arrangement for an improvement in the present situation:

a. The formation of a Japanese Army Coordination Section under the direct supervision of the Chief, Intelligence Division.

b. The functions of this Section would be as follows:


2. The operation of a message center for coordinating outgoing wires and documents and the dissemination of incoming wires and documents.

3. Coordination of liaison with MIS, Navy, and other centers.

4. Establishment of IBM priorities.

5. Operation of the Control Room.

6. Coordination of inquiries from MIS to various Branches.

7. Administration of records and files (which already has been set up).

c. The personnel to man this section could be taken from among those who are now performing these duties, hence no additional personnel would be required. It might even result in a decrease in the overall number of personnel.

d. The result of this move would place a continuing body, whose purpose it is to handle those problems which no one Branch alone can handle, on a level above the collateral operating Branches.

e. Theoretically, the position of the proposed section should be on Agency level rather than Division level since E and G Branches are organizationally located in a different division. Since such an arrangement would probably
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not be feasible, it might be well to place in this section permanent members from these two Branches.

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