1. Until recent months ASA has had on the staff of the Division of Cryptography, Dept of State, an officer assigned as a working member of that Division and also as Our Liaison Officer to that Div. (Major W. H. Carter, Capt. Lester). Since Lester left we have not filled that 'vacancy'.
2. I think it might be to Army's advantage to continue such relationships as has existed in the past - if we can spare the man. Otherwise, only Navy is in the picture and some day we might find ourselves at a serious disadvantage, lacking the contract.

3. Rec thought I be given to this, maybe we should begin by asking Capt, Parke if he needs anybody from here. Or would like to have somebody, either on a full or part-time basis, to fill the job instead.

This correspondence is the files on this if you wish to sent. Gen. O. decided not to refill and got out of it.
This appears to me to be a closed issue so far as staff is concerned. They have made some good points. They have overemphasized the point about some security & underemphasized their about possible value in the Cintel field. But on the whole, I don't think we'll want to argue with them unless you have some weighty facts.
Reference attached memorandum, same subject, better inter-Departmental liaison is always desirable. However, the following comments are made regarding the proposed methods of achievement.

2. The Army and the Navy admitted have an interest in the security of State Department communications, and the Cryptographic Security Board should take measures to insure such security. In this connection, liaison between the three departments should be continuous. It is felt, however, that each department should provide for proper security of its own communications. Present concept dictates that it is not the duty of any one department to furnish all the personnel to provide such security. The placing of Military or Naval Attachés as cryptographic security officers at the various embassies would make the Army and Navy responsible for functions properly the responsibility of the State Department. This is not considered within the Army Security Agency's scope of responsibility and is not particularly desirable. If, at present, the State Department has poor security and no facilities for adequately training cryptographic security personnel, it may be advisable that they be permitted to enroll personnel in the appropriate Army or Navy schools for such training. This would insure that the State Department had sufficient personnel of its own without making excessive demands on the limited personnel of either or both of the other departments concerned.

3. With regard to the proposed clearance of Military Attachés for the purpose of obtaining "cribs" to assist in cryptanalysis, the following is to be considered:

a. The present method of requesting the Military Attachés to pick up such items as telephone books, directories, magazines, newspapers, etc., provides collateral information from readily accessible sources.

b. To obtain further information, it would be necessary to "clear" Military and Naval Attachés and make available to them material of the highest classification; and to train some fifty additional officers, as well as their replacements, rather extensively in cryptographic and cryptanalytic operations, before assigning them to their duties. Such clearance and assignment involve:

(1) Giving highly classified information to personnel located in foreign countries for a special assignment which would require a very small portion of their time. In addition, it is believed that the amount of material so obtained may very well be negligible in comparison with that is available from other sources.
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1. Exposing to compromise by an over-sealous person signal intelligence which may have been achieved with great difficulty. This problem of clearance of attaches is of particular concern to the Director of Intelligence at this time.

   a. To fulfill the ultimate objective, personnel are required who are highly trained in espionage activity. There are already available other organizations with this specialized training who accomplish this type of work successfully without the precise knowledge of what agency needs the material and why it is needed.

   b. Much of the "crib" material that the Attaches would obtain may be available at the State Department here, or can be picked up in SHAHOK operations.

   c. The method of obtaining material we desire and require to fulfill our mission, without revealing the purpose for which the information is obtained, is the best means of acquiring the maximum of such material without risking a compromise of operational activities.

4. It is concluded that:

   a. The Army Security Agency should not be made responsible for State Department communication security since it infringes on a basic responsibility of that Department.

   b. Attaches should not be charged with obtaining what they know to be signal intelligence "cribs", because:

      1. Of the extensive training responsibility which would be assumed by this Agency.

      2. Of the security considerations regarding their clearance.

      3. They can continue to obtain all routine collateral information which is desired by this Agency.

      4. "Crib," obtainable only by surreptitious means, can be and should be handled through other channels involving fewer security considerations.

5. The proposal on either point is not favorably considered at this time.

GEORGE A. BICHER
Colonel, Signal Corps
Deputy Chief, Army Security Agency

1 incl.
Ltr dtd 21 Feb 46, same subj.
to Director of Comm Research

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