Who is it that Ed. Allsopp wants in on this?

Who pays he does?
Concerning studies now carried on in the Military Intelligence Ser. and SSA. (Cryp. and traffic analysis)

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<tr>
<td>To:</td>
<td>Mr. Friedman</td>
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Major Spitz called about the draft for the terms in
apparatus in entirely but does not feel that a formal joint agreement is necessary. It will now be necessary to see if common man approves of draft and agrees with Clarke's idea above.

m.c.
As discussed
As requested
Comments and return
Information and file
Information and forwarding
Information and return
Recommendation
See note on reverse
Signature if approved
Your action

SIS-SC Form No. 96 (Rev)
23 August 1944
The attached A655135 of a memo which was to be presented to you & Col Clarke for approval was the result of a recent conference with Maj Spitzer & Capt Compton. See Rhodes note attached binder ten: be let me know what you wish done.

J.

I agree with Col Clarke. An informal understanding should be sufficient.

APC
There are certain studies now carried on in the Military Intelligence Service and the Signal Security Agency which have many phases in common. One such study involves the determination and evaluation of Japanese sources of intelligence, the accuracy of the data obtained by them, and the probable effect that this intelligence has upon their operations. The Military Intelligence Service is interested in all phases of the studies in this field, but the Signal Security Agency is only interested insofar as "Special Intelligence" (cryptanalysis and traffic analysis) is concerned, (1) because of clues it yields as to the security or insecurity of our own cryptographic aids, as well as of the methods and procedures connected therewith, and (2) because of the effect a knowledge of what the Japanese can do in these fields can have upon the methods and procedures employed in (a) the interception and solution of Japanese military communications, and (b) in radio countermeasures adopted by our own forces. However, the basic source material for both organizations undertaking the subject research in the same, and the screening process must be the same.

In order that unnecessary duplication of effort be avoided, it is agreed that the members of each working group in the Military Intelligence Service and the Signal Security Agency shall have free liaison with the other, and that the files of each will be made accessible to the other. Such results as are obtained by one organization and are of direct interest to the other organization in carrying out their respective missions will be exchanged. Where additional facilities and personnel are needed to screen and isolate the material for adequate coverage, equitable provision will be made by mutually agreeable arrangements.