I handed this to OOB. He said he was going to forward it to DIA AFSA saying "Concur."

Declassified and approved for release by NSA on 07-02-2014 pursuant to E.O. 13526
MEMORANDUM FOR ADMIRAL WENGER

SUBJECT: Release of the CCM to Turkey for Diplomatic Communications

1. In connection with the Director's statement at the Staff meeting on 1 July 1952 to the effect that he does not intend to bring the subject item before USCIB, I wish to call your attention to the following:

   a. On items of intelligence derived from COMINT military matters, COMINT consumer Departments and Agencies outside the Department of Defense have an interest. The primary organ for exercising control over COMINT of interest to those Departments and Agencies outside the Department of Defense is USCIB. For this reason, it appears desirable for USCIB members to review release of the CCM for such use. On the other hand, it may be that U.S. diplomatic interests and policy might be in favor of providing the Turkish Government with the desired machines, rather than see some other government, provide them or than find Turkey purchasing the new Hagelin machines.

   b. During the discussion in USCIB on release of the Typex to Western Union and, later, of the CCM to NATO for use of NATO forces, there were certain reservations expressed by the Department of State members on use of the CCM. The State Department members believed that the machines should be specifically limited only to those military communications of the signatory nations that concern North Atlantic Pact defense matters. Release of the CCM for diplomatic purposes appears to exceed the intention of USCIB at one time to allow the CCM for essentially military usage.

   c. It may be assumed that the State-Defense Military Information Control Committee /S-D MICC/ would refer a matter of this nature to USCIB for comment before taking action. If this were indeed true, time would be lost by referring the matter first to S-D MICC, then going back to USCIB.
Memorandum for Admiral Wenger
Subject: Release of the CCM to Turkey for Diplomatic Communications

interests without at least consultation. The vehicle for such consultation is, of course, USCIB.

2. My recommendation is that the attached paper be forwarded to USCIB.

Enclosure - 1
Memo for the members of USCIB (Draft)
MEMORANDUM FOR THE MEMBERS OF USCIB

SUBJECT: Release of the Combined Cipher Machine (CCM) to Turkey for Diplomatic Communications

1. The Turkish Ambassador recently made a formal request to the Department of State for assistance in acquiring automatic cipher machines for use in communications between the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Turkish diplomatic representatives abroad. The request was referred for comment to the Director, Armed Forces Security Agency, through the U.S. Navy member of the State-Defense Military Information Control Committee [S-D MIC]. A copy of the correspondence is attached as an enclosure.

2. Two cipher machines are currently authorized for NATO use, the British Typex, Mark II, and the Combined Cipher Machine, in both the U.S. and the British versions. The CCM will be provided for Turkish forces in NATO; therefore, the cryptographic principles of the CCM will be known to the Turkish government.
4. A distinct impression has been conveyed by the Turkish representatives in Washington that the Turkish government is prepared to seek assistance elsewhere in the event the U.S. declines to furnish the cipher machines requested. Other sources to which Turkey might turn are summarized below.

a. The British government might be approached with a request similar to the one made to the U.S. If, however, the U.S. decides not to provide Turkey with the assistance requested, USCONB recommendations to LSIB that the British also refrain from providing British machines should carry considerable weight, although this would not be an absolute guarantee that the British would not go ahead with plans to furnish Turkey with machines. If the British concur with a U.S. recommendation that neither the U.S. nor the British provide machines, Turkey could turn to commercial producers of cryptographic equipments.
SUBJECT: Release of the Combined Cipher Machine (CCM) to Turkey for Diplomatic Communications

5. The course of action which seems to offer the least long-range advantage is the release of the CCM to Turkey. If Turkey obtains assistance from any other source,...

6. The USCIB Coordinator recommends that USCIB:
   a. Concur in release of the CCM to Turkey.
   b. Authorize the Coordinator in his capacity as Director, AFSA, to inform the State-Defense Military Information Control Committee of its decision.
   c. Inform the London Signal Intelligence Board of its decision (Enclosure).