Admiral Wenger asked that you be informed that Dr. Shinn is a member of the committee which is going to take up the attached matter. Dr. Shinn will probably contact you in regard to the attached papers.
21 January 1953

TOP SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE MEMBERS OF USCIB:

Subject: Release of GCM to the Turkish Government.

1. The Chairman, USCIB, has received a memorandum from the Chairman, LSIB, which suggests that USCIB acted prematurely in reaching a decision on the above subject without prior consultation with LSIB (see Enclosure 1).

2. The Director, NSA, was requested to prepare a draft reply to this memorandum for USCIB consideration. The reply proposed by the Director, NSA, is contained in Enclosure 2, herewith.

3. It is requested that your views with regard to the proposed reply be entered on the attached vote sheet, which should be returned to the Secretary by Tuesday, 27 January 1953.

H. H. JONES
Acting Executive Secretary, USCIB

Enclosures - 2
1. LSIB/317/52, 8 Dec 52.
2. Draft Memo to Chairman, LSIB, from Chairman, USCIB.

USCIB: 2/25
Page Denied
MEMORANDUM FOR THE CHAIRMAN, LONDON SIGNAL INTELLIGENCE BOARD

SUBJECT: Release of CCM to Turkish Government.

1. Reference is made to your memorandum of 8 December 1952 respecting the release to the Turkish Government of CCM equipments for diplomatic communications (LSIB/317/52).

2. USCIB is pleased to learn that LSIB concurs in USCIB's decision to release the CCM to the Turkish Government. It is regretted, however, that LSIB finds cause for surprise and concern in that a decision seems to have been made by USCIB without consideration of LSIB's interest in the matter. USCIB desires to assure LSIB that its accession to the Turkish request, without prior consultation with LSIB, was not a conscious omission but resulted rather from an uncertainty as to the need for such consultation. This uncertainty arose from a combination of circumstances.

3. On 25 April 1952, informal notification was received from the Director, GCHQ, via the British Liaison Officer in Washington, that "the Foreign Office have been informed by a member of the Turkish diplomatic staff that 50 cypher machines are being bought from the U.S.A." The British Liaison Officer advised that the Director, GCHQ, "would like to know, if possible, whether the Turkish statement is correct and if so what type of machine it is intended to supply."

4. The matter was placed before USCIB in July 1952. In weighing the advisability of aiding the Turks, USCIB gave careful consideration to

5. general agreement in principle had been reached on the necessity of improving the over-all communication security of those Powers, so that USCIB felt that the release of the CCM, under certain conditions for that purpose, was warranted. It was felt, moreover, that the situation differed materially from that involved in since the initiative had been taken by the Turks, and it was, therefore, presumed

that they were already aware of the actual or potential insecurity of their communications.

were likely to be available to the Turks and an intimation by the Turkish representative in Washington that the Turkish Government might seek other means of fulfilling their needs if U.S. assistance were not forthcoming.

6. Based upon these considerations, a decision was finally made by USCIB in favor of assisting the Turks, and LSIB was advised of U.S. intentions in advance of any definite commitment to the Turks. In fact, the machines requested by them have not yet been provided nor has any other technical assistance been supplied.

7. With respect to your inquiry concerning "technical assistance as an alternate or supplement," the latter refers to changeable elements, instructions for operation, security regulations, etc., and even the possibility of providing keys and of wiring rotors. The former refers in particular to a paper and pencil cryptographic system as a substitute for a cipher machine. However, a suggestion that such a system might be used met with no interest on the part of the Turkish representative.

8. Although there is no explicit provision in the U.S.-U.K. COMINT Agreement governing cryptographic assistance to third parties, USCIB desires to assure LSIB of its belief that consultation prior to action is desirable when questions arise concerning such assistance which may