MEMO ROUTING SLIP

Name or Title: Mr. Friedman
Organization and Location: S/Ass T

Commit Security
Leaks file

Remarks:

Hereewith a copy (typewritten) of an article by Hanson Baldwin which appeared in the 12 Sep 54 issue of the New York Times. Mentioned therein is the term ‘electronic intelligence’.

Our file copy is in microfilm form - hence this form of copy.

From Name or Title: Henry W. Wellington
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Date: 07 Nov 54
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The United Nations Security Council has before it the official complaint of the United States Government listing the attacks of Soviet aircraft against American planes.

The complaint, presented ably by Henry Cabot Lodge Jr., chief United States delegate to the United Nations, stemmed from the latest tragic "incident" in the "cold war." That was the shooting down by two Soviet MIG jet fighters of a Navy Lockheed Neptune patrol bomber over the Sea of Japan on Sept 4. One United States naval officer was lost in this attack. In a sense, Mr Lodge's logical and detailed presentation served as an obituary, requiem and justification for this officer and for the forty-five other American airmen on missions who have lost their lives in seven major "incidents" with Russian aircraft since April, 1950.

The nature of these missions, flown around the periphery of the Iron Curtain, and their high importance to the security of the United States are not as fully understood, even to the men who fly them, as they should be.

The purpose of these flights near the Iron Curtain is not provocation but security. For eight years, and particularly since the start of the Korean War in 1950, United States Air Force and naval planes have skirted the borders of the Soviet Union and in a few cases have crossed those frontiers. They have been seeking positive and negative information of diverse character. Where the proximity of Soviet bases makes similar action feasible, notably in Europe, in Japan and Korea and in the Northeast Siberian-American area, Soviet reconnaissance aircraft have performed similar missions close to and over, our frontiers and those
and those of our allies.

This mutual search for information about what the other fellow is doing is symptomatic of the insecurity of the atomic age and the awful penalty that can be paid today by any nation that is not alert to the terrible dangers of a surprise atomic attack.

The reconnaissance missions flown near the Iron Curtain have many objectives.

One is photo-reconnaissance, supplemented when possible by visual reconnaissance. Some years ago this was a more important activity than it is today, when most United States aircraft are limited to approaches no closer than twelve miles to any Soviet frontier or coastline. At 50,000 feet aerial cameras in a plane skirting the twelve-mile limit could, under good visibility condition, photograph areas well behind the Iron Curtain.

Weather missions are also flown, particularly in the Sea of Japan and Alaskan areas, not far from the Iron Curtain. Weather in the north-west Pacific usually "makes up" in the west and moves eastward, and ordinarily weather reports from Siberia are not noted for either regularity or completeness.

Shipping and submarine patrols, the particular responsibility of the Navy, are flown by patrol bombers like the P2V shot down over the Sea of Japan almost two weeks ago. Most of these patrol planes are equipped with such special anti-submarine detection devices as radar, sonar buoys and "M.A.D." (magnetic airborne detectors).

Electronic intelligence is the particular objective of specialized flights and also of most of the routine patrol and weather missions. Some aircraft are specially fitted with delicate apparatus that will record the pulse and approximate location of Soviet radar stations, and some,
like the Navy's far-ranging mid-ocean Constellations, provide airborne warning stations to detect unidentified aircraft at great distances.

A few specialized planes also maintain patrols, usually well away from the Soviet frontiers but at great heights to determine the radioactivity in the atmosphere by air-sampling techniques. Such flights, coupled with observations from ground stations, can yield information about Russian Atomic explosions.

All these fact-finding missions fly well clear of the Soviet frontier unless their crews make bad navigational errors. These occur occasionally but not often.

A few other American—as well as Soviet—aircraft probably deliberately penetrate the other nations air frontiers. The missions of these planes might be termed an espionage one, as distinct from the routine and continuous reconnaissance flight over the high seas or over friendly territory. Agents could be dropped by a parachute and photographs or electronic recordings made in the air space above the other nation's territory.

It is this silent "war," this ceaseless search for information that must be inevitably a part of the "cold war." We have no confidence in the intentions of the Soviet Government, yet we know that the Soviet Government has the capabilities of devastating destruction against the United States unless we are alert.