MEMORANDUM FOR [REDACTED]


1. This is to brief you on certain preliminary determinations that SECCOM has made on this question and on an interim report which it has accordingly passed to the Chairman, USCIB, and which the latter may bring up at the Friday meeting.

2. SECCOM is agreed:
   
   (a) That any practicable and efficient measure for the improvement of [REDACTED] will necessarily hurt our COMINT.
   
   (b) That, as and to the extent that our [REDACTED] becomes close and effective, the security of [REDACTED] possessed by the two countries in common becomes of more importance to us than the preservation of our [REDACTED] COMINT source.

   (c) That, because of general governmental insecurity, an improvement now in [REDACTED] would not provide real security of information, and would merely rob us of information without robbing the Russians of it.

   (d) That, nevertheless, if we are eventually going to improve [REDACTED] there is an advantage in starting soon.

   (e) That, when and if [REDACTED] is to be improved, it should be done through the use by [REDACTED] of a US-UK machine system.

   (f) That, all conflicts considered and weighed, we should endeavor to install [REDACTED] within a "secure enclave" in [REDACTED] as soon as one is determined to exist (and not before), and to expand the [REDACTED] as the "secure enclave" expands.

3. Accordingly SECCOM is recommending, in effect, that the [REDACTED] be kept off the agenda of all conversations with the until the "secure enclave" is known to exist, and the show a disposition and capacity to expand it.

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