**MEMO ROUTING SLIP**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>1</th>
<th>NAME OR TITLE</th>
<th>INITIALS</th>
<th>CIRCULATE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
<td>Suspend</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Nov 15</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**REMARKS**

Re your memo 14 Sept Subject

3 year AFDP Comm. 

On recommendation, are 

logical & reasonable. That 

we should go ahead 

AFD-10 should be on the 

board of course. One of 

from 04, one from 03 (as 

'neutral'), one from 02 


**FROM NAME OR TITLE**

J

**DATE**

24 Inst

**TELEPHONE**
REFERENCE: Summary Report on Security of AFSA Communications, D/F from AFSA-04 to AFSA-00B dated 26 April 1951.

1. The following recommendations, concerning basic problems associated with insecurity of AFSA COMINT Communications, have been submitted by AFSA-04:

   a. That a board of at least three experienced individuals (other than those DIRECTLY engaged in COMINT production activities) should be designated by Director, AFSA to review, on a continuing periodic basis, time lags between receipt of raw material by electrical means and the commencement of analytical processing of that material to determine whether a portion of the material may be received by other than electrical means without causing an undesirable delay in productive analysis.

   b. That AFSA-13 be directed to make an exhaustive study of the possibility of establishing an Air Courier Service for exclusive AFSA use to handle the volume of data not immediately exploitable. Frequently scheduled air delivery might well provide a more effective means of handling than is possible under communications conditions existing currently. The susceptibility of strategic communications to organised jamming is an important factor in such a study.

   c. That AFSA-02 consider the advisability of implementing the proposed indicator procedure for AFSA 2-1 APOLLO Operation (forwarded from AFSA-04 to AFSA-02, D/F dated 11 September 1951) as an interim measure until the AFSAM 9 becomes available.

   d. That appropriate steps be taken to provide Director, AFSA with specific authority to prescribe means of communication, cryptographic facilities, and procedures for use in the transmission of COMINT data, and to review preventative or corrective action taken concerning violations of transmission security procedure as well as of cryptographic procedures.
TOP-SECRET

14 September 1951

MEMORANDUM FOR: OOB, OOT, O2, 13 (continued)

SUBJECT: Security of AFSA COMINT Communications (continued)

1. Continued.

   e. That at least two experienced traffic analysis officers
   be reassigned from AFSA-02 to AFSA-04 in order to permit increased scope
   and effectiveness of the surveillance program.

2. Your comments and/or recommendations are requested.

S. P. COLLINS
Colonel, U. S. Army
Chief of Staff