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ORGANIZATION AND LOCATION

FROM NAME OR TITLE

21 Aug 51

REMARKS

Your comments on staff meeting this morning in re COMSEC leads me to send this to you as a matter of info. Will keep you advised as to what I learn. Have a feeling that some of the decryptions of our COMM sources may be attributable to this kind of leakage.

FROM NAME OR TITLE

Friedman

ORGANIZATION AND LOCATION

001
MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief of Staff, AFSA

SUBJECT: Security of AFSA COMINT Communications

References: (a) Memo from AFSA-OOA to AFSA-001, 14 April 1950, on same subject, with Comment No. 1, AFSA-001 to AFSA-004, 3 May 1950; and Comment No. 2, AFSA-01 to AFSA-00A.
(b) Memo from AFSA-04 to AFSA-02, Thru: AFSA-00A and AFSA-00B, 23 May 1950, on same subject, with Comment No. 2, AFSA-02 to AFSA-014, 2 June 1950, and Comment No. 3 from AFSA-00B to AFSA-014, Thru: AFSA-00A, 7 June 1950.
(c) Memo from Technical Director, AFSA-02 to AFSA-00B, subject: Cryptosecurety of AFSA Communications, 17 April 1951.
(d) Memo from AFSA-00B to AFSA-02, 20 April 1951, commenting on reference (c).
(e) Memo from AFSA-00X to AFSA-00B, 26 April 1951, and from AFSA-13 to AFSA-00B, 14 May 1951, commenting on reference (c).

1. The references are cited not only because of their direct bearing on the subject but also because the number of them indicates that the subject has been one of some concern for some time.

2. So far as I am aware, and so far as can be seen from the references, very few constructive steps have been taken thus far to correct a situation which appears to be quite dangerous to the security of our COMINT sources. Even if minor violations of COMSEC that are discovered in the usual surveillance exercised by AFSA-41 are corrected on a continuing basis, unless the basic problems involved in improvement are studied and answers obtained to them, our COMSEC situation will probably continue to be defective. To have this sort of a situation exist at the fountain head of COMSEC within and for all the Armed Forces seems to me to call for prompt attention and action, since the example set by AFSA would hardly be a salutary one for the Services.

3. Information and comments from AFSA-014 on this subject would be helpful.

WILLIAM F. FRIEDMAN
AFSA-00T