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This represents all remarks contained in NSA Daily Brief on items of particular comint/comb sec interest since 16 Nov '53.
COMINT production affected by expanded use of VHF by

Continued expansion of the use of very high frequency (VHF) and of near-VHF (27-29 mcs.) communications by will "materially affect COMINT production, with the intercept facilities now available."

The use of VHF by other than was first detected last April. Since that date, VHF communications have been observed in

Note: The comments on Viet Minh which appeared in the Daily Brief of 8 March were further developed in of 9 March (Item #5) under the title New major cryptographic systems reflects increased security in Viet Minh communications.
Viet Minh reportedly [U.S. OFFICIALS ONLY] reports that codes now used by Viet Minh general staff headquarters and between division headquarters are [U.S. OFFICIALS ONLY]. He states that the [U.S. OFFICIALS ONLY] have been working on these codes for the past two months without success and are beginning to believe that they may be unbreakable.

According to [U.S. OFFICIALS ONLY] which in the past provided the basis of estimates on [U.S. OFFICIALS ONLY] to the Viet Minh, have substantially dried up over the past four months. Their information on this aid is now derived [U.S. OFFICIALS ONLY] This information does not permit accurate estimates of monthly tonnages or justify statements indicating substantial increases.

Comment: Analysis of Viet Minh radio communications through 28 February, the date of latest available information, provides no evidence of a significant change in cryptographic procedures. In addition, [U.S. OFFICIALS ONLY] indicate accurate and timely exploitation of messages from Viet Minh headquarters to the divisions and between the divisions as late as 19 February.

The resemblance between the cipher systems employed by Viet Minh headquarters and the [U.S. OFFICIALS ONLY] has been noted since 1951 but it is too general to permit definite conclusions. The higher degree of security evidenced in some of the systems used by enemy headquarters since 1 December may be the result of increased experience.

The official [U.S. OFFICIALS ONLY] indicate a steady increase in [U.S. OFFICIALS ONLY] during the past two years. There is no evidence to suggest that this trend has changed significantly.
These developments are believed to be a continuation of the major changes introduced on these nets on 14 December when reporting procedures and formats as well as call-signs and frequencies were altered. The over-all pattern of these changes reflects progress in communications security. They will also restrict, temporarily at least, a valuable source of air intelligence.

EO 3.3(h)(2)
PL 86-36/50 USC 3605

French military effort in Indochina criticized:

The U.S. army attache in Saigon reports his opinion that staff and procedures at French headquarters are of the "1935-1939 vintage" and that General Navarre's strategy and tactics approximate those of his defense-minded predecessor, General Salan. Moreover, the attache is convinced that Navarre has been directed by Paris to conduct a "minimum-casualty holding action" with a view to eventual negotiations. He cites as examples of this the French commander's failure to neutralize the outnumbered enemy in central Laos, his mistake in permitting the Viet Minh to tie up troops and supply facilities at Dien Bien Phu, and the absence of aggressive French patrolling.

According to the attache, the consensus of U.S. military opinion in Indochina is that the factors militating against French success are the lack of support from Paris, inadequate training, and a defensive psychology. He observes that "the addition of unlimited supplies of the latest U.S. equipment will not correct these deficiencies."

VIARMA, Vietnam, 3 February 1954.

Comment: Over the past few weeks, the attache has been highly critical of French military strategy in Indochina.
will probably result in the enforcement of security measures recommended by intelligence headquarters at Hanoi, according to a report prepared by G-2, SHB, on 11 and 12 January. Although there has been a general tightening of security throughout the messages further recommend the restriction of documents and information reflecting COMINT sources to high levels of the

EO 3.3(h)(2)
PL 86-36/50 USC 3605

21 Jan '54
that "the Chinese anti-Communist ex-prisoners of war will arrive at the entrucking point south of the demilitarized zone. They will arrive at 15-minute intervals in convoys of 16 trucks, 30 men per truck. Here they will be processed, clothed and fed, and then sent to Inchon for loading aboard LSTs for the voyage to Formosa."

* Ascoc City - Armed Services Communication City, near Taejong between Seoul and Inchon.

As a result, a tightening of Viet Minh communications security was anticipated which might produce "extremely grave" repercussions.

Comment: [U.S. OFFICIALS ONLY] A recent report from Indochina stated that the adopted by Viet Minh units in north Viet Nam and central Laos at the end of November. [U.S. OFFICIALS ONLY]

The 183rd battalion was last reported to have been operating in north Viet Nam in the area south of Lao Kay.

NSA Daily Brief
19 Jan. 54
Comment: Responsible NSA officials do not as yet regard the above reported flights as indicative of the pattern of activity.

This change occurred one month prior to the date of a predicted probable change. The significance of this change is that and thus increases the security of this cipher system.

the possibility exists that they will resume the schedule as the change was started 31 January 1953. The period of reduced readability does, however, continue a trend which has been apparent in the history of the cipher.

MSA Daily Brief
4 Jan '54
soldiers with commando training are scheduled to launch a series of raids, to begin this weekend, against Jordan frontier villages. The commandos will be organized in teams of 4 to 8, and will not carry any identifying markings.

Both sources believe __________________________ on 21 December were the precursors to these raids.

28 Dec 53

NSA Daily Brief
30 Dec ‘53