Capt M

To note.

Col J phoned on 12 Jan to say Defense member JUSC 13 is going to take it up in USD 13.
MEMORANDUM FOR COLONEL LANDING, CHIEF, NSA PENTAGON LIASON GROUP

SUBJECT: State Department Proposed Publication of Unclassified Documentary History of World War II Conferences.

1. The galley proofs furnished in connection with the subject contain the texts of two intercepted and deciphered Japanese messages of 12 July 1945 (No. 91x) and 13 July 1945 (No. 91y). (The galley proof of a third message [No. 89y] has nothing to do with the subject and was probably included inadvertently. However, there are other messages which do pertain to the same subject as do Nos. 91x and y, but are apparently not to be included in the forthcoming publication, for reasons difficult to discern. Is it possible that they are on galley sheets not sent us?)

2. It is true that the texts of the two Japanese messages (Nos. 91x and y) are in the public domain, having been published in the documents of the International Military Tribunal for the Far East and referred to in detail in the Forrestal Diaries. In this connection, Inclosure 1 will be of interest. There is also on record a radio broadcast by Mr. Drew Pearson on 23 March 1947, a copy of whose remarks on the subject matter of these messages is attached as Inclosure 2. These remarks, as well as those in the Forrestal Diaries, and the proposed footnote to No. 91x, make it perfectly clear that U.S. authorities at the Potsdam Conference knew of the approach made by the Japanese Foreign Minister to the Russians via Sato, the Japanese ambassador in Moscow, and that they waited in vain to see if the Russians would say anything about the approach that was made to them.

3. The fact that the messages are in the public domain is quite obvious. Nevertheless, whether the State Department should include the texts of the messages in the forthcoming publication because of this fact is not alone a security or technical question. It also involves questions of policy. For example, I do not believe that the Executive Branch of the Government has ever acknowledged in print that Japanese messages were intercepted and read before and during World War II, although, of course, the various boards and committees which investigated the attack on Pearl Harbor issued reports which also are now in the public domain and which include the texts of hundreds of intercepted and solved messages establishing conclusively that the U.S. engaged in cryptanalytic activities. It is not only possible but indeed quite probable that COMINT policy would prefer to eliminate from the proposed State Department publication all official revelations of U.S. success in the cryptanalytic field. For instance, to
TOP SECRET

SECRETARY

INFORMATION

WITHIN the SECRET

TOP SECRET

REFERENCES

as follows:

'I. INTRODUCTION

2. APPROPRIATE SUPPORT FOR COMMUNITY ACTIVITIES.

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resulting to all public it information which are contained in

appropriate matter within the last bit of the other

sections will be taken to

II. PUBLIC INTEREST

as follows:

1. To the extent that the information should be contained in

the text of any written report that may

be been dropped, this it would be complete to declassify it, for it to the

same be

PUBLIC INTEREST.

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that the fragmen.

II. MOTIVE

gave from that the forth;

TOP SECRET
December 8, 1954

Dear Mr. Friedman:

I quote below the text of a memorandum relating to your inquiry of December 2, with respect to a forthcoming publication on the wartime conferences. The source of the information is Mr. G. Bernard Noble, Chief of the Historical Division, Department of State:

"1. The text of the messages (there were three, I believe) is included in the volumes on the Potsdam Conference.

"2. The text is quoted from the published proceedings of the Tokyo War Crimes Trials, so the material is in print already.

"3. There is a footnote which states that the text of these messages was 'known to' US officials on July 13.

"4. There is a further footnote reference to the published Forrestal Diaries in which the process of obtaining the material is clearly identified.

"5. The text further quotes Secretary Stimson writing that he received from the Pentagon an 'interesting message' on July 16.

"6. The phrasing of the footnote mentioned in 3 above is as agreed with the Pentagon to replace a more explicit statement on the galley-proofs submitted to Defense."

Sincerely yours,

W. PARK ARMSTRONG, Jr.

Mr. William F. Friedman
Special Assistant
National Security Agency
Washington
23 March 1947

PREDICTION NO. 5, The Yalta Agreement

The State Department will soon make public the wartime secret agreements and here is my prediction regarding one important secret affecting the peace of the world. The Yalta Agreement, I predict, will show that Franklin Roosevelt urged Stalin to enter the Japanese War just as soon as Germany surrendered. In order to get such a promise from Stalin, Roosevelt and Churchill finally gave Russia the following territory: The Kurile Islands, all of Outer Mongolia, and two vital seaports in Manchuria, Dairen, and Port Arthur.

Despite this guarantee that Russia would enter the Japanese War, I predict that history will show that Stalin came to the Potsdam Conference with a Japanese peace proposal in his pocket but he did not disclose this joyful news to Churchill and Truman. Actually, they knew he had a Japanese offer because we had been decoding Japan's secret cables and so Truman and Churchill waited several days for Stalin to make known the Japanese proposal. However, when Stalin said nothing Truman and Churchill regretfully concluded that Russia did not want the Japanese war to end and I predict that history will show this was why Truman and Churchill finally decided to drop the atom bomb.

23 Mar/7 p.m.
Col. King was a bit disturbed that the proofs were returned to him with no further guidance or decision. He called here for some enlightenment. I told him that, in view of the note appended thereto indicating that haste was desired in returning the papers to their source, "rather complete notations on the pertinent parts" were made here so that the papers could be returned, and that further guidance would undoubtedly be forthcoming when you get back to the office.

20 Dec 39
JH