What do you mean by "a deep, dark secret"?"

The second sentence of the last para suggests Alsep's article can't be written, or at least mentioned. (ultimate)

I'll bet the source of Alsep's information is at least a Major General, Congressman or Cabinet member.

R. A. L.

FROM NAME OR TITLE

Friedman

DATE

24 Jan 55

Approved for Release by NSA on 12-16-2014 pursuant to E.O. 13526
BY THOSE WHO should know, this country is now given about an even chance of beating the Soviet Union in the race to be first to get an intercontinental ballistic missile into the air.

Although this whole subject may seem impossibly remote to most people, this should rate as about the best news the country has had for a long time, for until rather recently, intelligence studies of the Soviet effort in the field of long range guided missiles strongly suggested that we would almost certainly lose the race for the intercontinental ballistic missile—the I.B.M. And this is a race which the United States simply cannot afford to lose.

The I.B.M., married to a hydrogen warhead, is the true ultimate weapon. It can be fired from one continent to another to destroy a great city, in much the way that a murderer fires a bullet through his victim's head. The difference is that a man can hide, and a city cannot.

As of today, at least, there is hardly even a theoretical defense against the true intercontinental guided missile, except to get the weapon first, to make it better, and to make it in greater numbers. Until recently, the effort to win the I.B.M. race was strangled in red tape and hobbled for funds. Today, a greater effort could, and undoubtedly should, be made. But at least the effort is now a serious one. And it is already beginning to pay off.

IF WE BEAT the Russians to the I.B.M.—and thereby avert what would surely be world catastrophe—a good share of the credit, according to those who know, should go to a youngish California engineer-businessman, called Trevor Gardner. Gardner was brought into the Air Force by Secretary Harold E. Talbott to get the long-range missiles into the air.

In the process, Gardner has stepped on a great many toes—so many that his appointment as Assistant Secretary of the Air Force has been held up in the Senate. But Talbott and Air Force Chief of Staff Nathan F. Twining have backed him up, for which they also deserve credit. By dint of toe-stepping, much has been accomplished. The Pentagon red tape has been slashed. An able Air Force man, Brig. Gen. Bernard Schriever, has gone to the West Coast to ride herd on the big companies, like Northrop, North American, Convair and Lockheed, which are doing the actual work on the missiles.

Totally unrealistic requirements—like the requirement limiting the margin of permissible error in an intercontinental missile to 1500 yards—have been rescinded. And funds for the missile efforts have been fairly and sharply increased. The amount of increase is hidden in the overall Air Force budget, but it is said to be substantial.

As a result of all this effort, the timetable for our entry into the age of the long-range guided missile has been revised downward all along the line. Most significantly, the State Department and the British Foreign Office are now negotiating for a 5000-mile missile firing range, extending into the Atlantic from Florida to the Ascension Islands.

The immediate reason for this negotiation is the Snark, the jet-propelled, pilotless aircraft guided by the stars, and which flies just under the speed of sound. But the Snark is only the forerunner.

After the Snark comes the Navaho, the ram-jet which is a true guided missile, flying more than twice the speed of sound. Then comes the mighty Atlas, the true intercontinental ballistic missile which climbs an incredible 600 miles into space before it plunges to the kill. And at some point—depending on a decision which has not yet been made—there comes the first man-made artificial earth-satellite. But, for the immediate future, Atlas is the decisive weapon.

THERE WILL be a further report in this space on these strange and terrible gadgets. Here it is enough to say that in each case the prospects for early success are measurably brighter than they were a year ago. But there is still no cause for complacency. Our chances of winning the I.B.M race have improved—but they are still no better than even.

Those in a position to judge believe that we could be almost certain of winning this race if we put in one condition. This condition is a national sense of urgency, leading to a major effort on a wartime scale to win the race. This would involve greater expenditures. But the concentration of energy and talent which a national sense of urgency brings forth is a more important element in the equation.

And this sense of urgency is now lacking for a very simple reason. The secrecy syndrome from which this Administration suffers has made the I.B.M an unmentionable subject. This in turn makes it impossible to acknowledge that the problem of winning the I.B.M race really exists—or even to take credit for the genuine advances which have been made.

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