NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY
Washington 25, D. C.

CONFIDENTIAL

NSA REGULATION
NUMBER 122-1

EFFECTIVE UNTIL 1 MARCH 1956 UNLESS SOONER
RESCINDED OR SUPERSEDED

PERSONNEL SECURITY

SECTION I - SUPERSESSION

This Regulation supersedes NSA Regulations 122-1, dated
22 April 1954, 120-3, dated 27 January 1954, and Chapter III of
the NSA'Security Manual.

SECTION II - PURPOSE AND SCOPE

This Regulation prescribes the personnel security standards
applicable to personnel of the National Security Agency.

SECTION III - GENERAL

The nature of the National Security Agency's operation is
such that all NSA personnel, whether civilian or military; and
regardless of the level or nature of employment, are in a position
to endanger or compromise national security. All NSA positions
are designated "sensitive positions"; therefore, clearance of all
employees or assignees prior to assignment is required. Per­
sonnel security does not stop with clearance. All personnel must be
alert, observant and aware of the ever present danger of infil­
tration and subversive action. To insure this, continuous super­
vision and education of personnel are necessary.

SECTION IV - SELECTION STANDARDS AND CRITERIA

1. Selection Standards. To meet NSA selection standards an
individual:
a. Must be of excellent character and discretion, and of unquestioned loyalty to the United States. Exceptions to this requirement may be made only as agreed by USCIB.

b. Should be a native born citizen of the United States. If a citizen by naturalization, final papers should be dated prior to 1 September 1939. The members of his immediate family should be United States citizens.

c. Should be a person, no member of whose immediate family nor any person to whom he may reasonably be supposed to be bound by ties of affection, kinship, or obligation is of dubious loyalty to the United States.

d. Should be a person, no member of whose immediate family nor any person to whom he may reasonably be supposed to be bound by ties of affection, kinship, or obligation, is a resident of a foreign country having basic or critical national interests opposed to those of the United States.

2. Exceptions. Exceptions to any of the foregoing requirements, except the first, may be made by the USCIB member of a member department or agency but only in case of compelling need after every reasonable assurance has been obtained that, in the circumstances, the security risk involved is negligible.

3. Waiver of Selection Standards. It is inevitable that strict application of paragraph one will bar some individuals of great talent from duty or association with the Agency. Therefore, in cases of urgent operational need exceptions authorized by paragraph two may be made. When such exceptions are desired, requests shall be submitted to the Chief, Security Division, in writing, to include the following:

   a. A statement of the unique qualifications possessed by the individual in question

   b. A justification, in terms of compelling operational need, for accepting the calculated risk involved

   c. The signature of the Chief of the Staff Division or Office concerned.

4. Criteria for Determining Eligibility for Clearance. Acceptance or retention is based on an evaluation of all available information regarding an applicant or employee. There follows a list, which is not all inclusive, of types of information which may indicate that an individual's employment or retention is not clearly consistent with the interests of National Security:
a. Depending on the relation of the Government employment to the national security:

(1) Any behavior, activities, or associations which tend to show that the individual is not reliable or trustworthy

(2) Any deliberate misrepresentations, falsifications, or omission of material facts

(3) Any criminal, infamous, dishonest, immoral, or notoriously disgraceful conduct, habitual use of intoxicants to excess, drug addiction, or sexual perversion

(4) Any illness, including any mental condition, of a nature which, in the opinion of competent medical authority, may cause significant defect in the judgment or reliability of the employee, with due regard to the transient or continuing effect of the illness and the medical findings in such case

(5) Any facts which furnish reason to believe that the individual may be subjected to coercion, influence, or pressure which may cause him to act contrary to the best interests of the national security

b. Commission of any act of sabotage, espionage, treason, or sedition, or attempt, threat or preparation therefor, or conspiring with, or aiding or abetting another to commit or attempt to commit any act of sabotage, espionage, treason, or sedition.

c. Establishing or continuing a sympathetic association with a saboteur, spy, traitor, seditionist, anarchist, revolutionist, or with an espionage or other secret agent or representative of a foreign nation, or any representative of a foreign nation whose interests may be inimical to the interests of the United States, or with any person who advocates the use of force or violence to overthrow the government of the United States or the alteration of the form of government of the United States by unconstitutional means.

d. Advocacy of use of force or violence to overthrow the government of the United States, or of the alteration of the form of government of the United States by unconstitutional means.

e. Membership in, or affiliation or sympathetic association with, any foreign or domestic organization, association,
movement, group, or combination of persons which is totalitarian, Fascist, Communist, or subversive, or which has adopted, or shows, a policy of advocating or approving the commission of acts of force or violence to deny other persons their rights under the Constitution of the United States, or which seeks to alter the form of government of the United States by unconstitutional means.

f. Intentional, unauthorized disclosure to any person of security information or of other information disclosure of which is prohibited by law, or willful violation or disregard of security regulations.

g. Performing or attempting to perform his duties, or otherwise acting, so as to serve the interests of another government in preference to the interests of the United States.

h. Refusal by the individual, upon the ground of constitutional privilege against self-incrimination, to testify before a congressional committee regarding charges of his alleged disloyalty or other misconduct.

5. Foreign Residence. In view of length of time and difficulty involved in conducting investigations in foreign countries, no persons who have spent long portions of their lives abroad should be considered for NSA employment or assignment unless the Chief of the interested Staff Division or Office provides written justification stating that no other person with the required qualifications is available.

6. Evaluation and Declaration of Ineligibility for Clearance. If, after careful evaluation of all the facts in a particular case, doubt exists as to whether the individual's employment or retention under the foregoing Selection Standards and Criteria is clearly consistent with interests of national security, the individual concerned shall not be cleared for access to classified information.

7. Applicants Disapproved for Hire - Reconsideration. When the compelling operational need for the qualifications of an individual, whose application for hire (either permanent, temporary, contractor, consultant, or WAE, etc.) has been disapproved for security reasons, is deemed sufficient to justify reconsideration, the Chief of the Staff Division or Office concerned may resubmit the application to the Chief, Security Division, accompanied by written justification for reconsideration.

SECTION V - PERSONNEL CLEARANCE

1. Clearance Requirements for Access to COMINT information. Persons requiring access to COMINT information within the scope
of this Agency's operation, or access to areas in which such information is being collected, produced or prepared for dissemination, must have been cleared and indoctrinated for COMINT. Such a clearance and indoctrination establishes eligibility for access to any category of COMINT the "need to know" requires. In this category are all employees or military assignees, all consumers, contractors, consultants, advisors and certain custodial personnel.

2. Clearance Requirements for Access to Classified non-COMINT Information. Persons requiring access only to non-COMINT classified information in the conduct of their business with this Agency require clearance based on investigative requirements and to a classification level commensurate with the classification of the information to which they must have access. Employees of NSA who are indoctrinated for COMINT also have cryptographic and Top Secret clearance.

3. Pre-employment Security Check. The Chief, Security Division, shall be furnished one copy of the "Statement of Personal History," (DD Form 398), with NSA Supplement; one "Finger Print Chart," (CSC Form 87); and four copies of "Security Investigation Data for Sensitive Positions," (CSC Form 86). These forms shall be completed with no omissions and all periods of time accounted for. The Chief, Security Division, shall review these forms for completeness and shall make an initial determination that the individual meets selection standards.

4. Pre-employment National Agency Check for Sensitive Position. The pre-employment National Agency Checks are conducted by the Civil Service Commission on all civilian applicants for government employment.

5. Pre-employment Security Interview. A security interview by qualified interviewers is required.

6. Background Investigations. The three military services and such other components of the Federal Government as have administrative or statutory obligations for the conduct of personnel security investigations make the investigations required for the clearance of NSA civilian employees. They also conduct the required investigations of military assignees to this Agency and of military consumer personnel, but at the request of the service concerned and in accordance with the clearance procedures of that service. Civilian consumer personnel and certain custodial personnel are investigated in accordance with the recognized policies of the agency, bureau or department concerned. Contractual personnel are investigated in accordance with the regulations of the service performing the procurement for NSA.
7. Clearance of Military Assignees and Civilian Assignees. Subject to the Director's review, the heads of other government departments or agencies grant clearances to military or civilian personnel provided by them for NSA duty or administrative support, and whenever access for their own personnel, civilian or military, to classified information of NSA is required.

8. Interim Clearance. In response to compelling operational need, interim clearance may be granted. As this type of clearance, is given, is prior to the completion of all clearance procedures, it should be strictly limited to cases of compelling operational need. Persons having an interim clearance are indoctrinated for and may have access to all material available to persons having a final clearance. The granting of this access would also be limited to compelling operational need and each case should be handled on an individual basis. Persons having interim clearances will wear a distinctive badge. This badge will have a diagonal white bar through a dark color field or a diagonal blue bar through a light color field.

9. Involuntary Separations. Such separations from this Agency on security grounds shall be accomplished in accordance with the provisions of Executive Order 10450, P. L. 733 and Civil Service Regulations. Whenever military personnel fail to meet clearance standards which results in denial or revocation of clearance for access to this Agency's material, the Chief, Military Personnel Branch, shall be advised immediately to take the necessary action to return the individual to his parent military service.

10. Reinvestigation. Four years after the date of last evaluation, and if the need for clearance still exists, investigations shall be reopened to the extent necessary to bring them up to date and to justify extension of clearance. For this purpose, a new Statement of Personal History must be obtained and reviewed by the Chief, Security Division, as required.

11. Clearance Records. The NSA Security Division is the office of record for clearances granted NSA personnel and other persons performing services for NSA.

SECTION VI - PERSONNEL SECURITY SUPERVISION

1. Employees of the National Security Agency, having access to sensitive classified material, have a prime responsibility to see
that by their actions they do not expose their knowledge of this material to persons who could or may use it to the detriment of the United States Security cannot depend solely on rules and procedures to assure that employees recognize their individual responsibilities. Generally, as in any work to be performed by an employee, supervision is necessary.

2. The initial responsibility for the security supervision of employees of NSA is placed on the individual employee's immediate supervisor. The supervisor should be a constant reminder to the people under his or her supervision, by example and instruction, of security rules and good security practices. He should report any violation of personnel security coming to his attention.

3. Incidents or allegations affecting the clearance status of any other employee should be directly and immediately referred to the Chief, Security Division. No evaluation or investigation should be made by the person reporting the information.

4. The overall responsibility for the security supervision of NSA personnel including any necessary counter-intelligence measures is the responsibility of the Chief, Security Division, and all matters relating to Personnel Security should be referred to him.

5. In carrying out his responsibility, the Chief, Security Division, is responsible for maintaining liaison with other Federal and local governmental counter-intelligence, investigative and law enforcement agencies. All contacts with personnel of other agencies on NSA security matters should be made through liaison as established.

6. In order to assist in the proper supervision of NSA personnel, the Chief, Security Division, shall organize and effectively use a Security Education Program.

SECTION VII - SECURITY EDUCATION

1. Initial Orientation.
   a. During the new employee's processing (on his first day of duty), a preliminary security briefing will be administered by Civilian Personnel Branch, Personnel Division.

   b. All military and civilian personnel entering on duty with this Agency will read Title 18, Section 798, USC, and so certify by completing NSA Form G1971 attached thereto, during initial processing into the Agency. The Chief, Personnel Division, will forward the signed certificates to the Chief, Security Division, for the file.

a. Upon arrival of the new employee or assignee at the NSA School and during the first week of his orientation period, he will receive instruction concerning his security responsibility as an NSA employee, sound security practices to be observed, and regulations governing his conduct while an employee of the National Security Agency.

b. Administration will be effected by the NSA School Staff.

3. Indoctrination.

a. Upon the granting of a clearance, all personnel will be indoctrinated for COMINT and subscribe to an oath of secrecy. This indoctrination shall include a discussion of the general mission of the Agency, with emphasis on the need for sound security practices by the individual employee, an explanation as to some of the possible disastrous results in cases of violations of security and a reading and explanation of such public laws and directives as are applicable to employees of this Agency.

b. Further briefing on the more sensitive phases of the cryptologic endeavor shall be accomplished by the branch chief or other supervisory officer when the individual reports to his duty assignment and will be administered on a need-to-know basis. This briefing shall include an explanation of the particular mission of the organizational segment and its part in the general cryptologic effort of the National Security Agency. Such indoctrination and briefing will entitle the individual to access to Category I, II and III COMINT on a "need-to-know" basis.

c. Upon the assignment of a cleared individual to an operational element, NSA Form No. G1927 will be accomplished immediately by the Chief of the Staff Division or Office concerned or his authorized representative and forwarded to the Chief, Security Division.


a. To maintain a constant awareness by the individual employee or assignee of his security responsibility, a planned program of continuing security education will be promulgated and administered by the Chief, Security Division. Requests for talks, lectures or other types of special security education should be directed to the Chief, Security Division.

b. Beginning 1 January 1955, all cleared civilian employees and military personnel assigned to Staff Divisions and Offices will be re-instructed annually as of 1 January of each calendar year on all
phases of on-the-job security. This is the responsibility of the Chiefs of the Staff Divisions or Offices concerned. A certificate (RCS-276), to the effect that all assigned personnel have been re-instructed, will be sent to the Chief, Security Division, no later than 31 January of each calendar year.

c. Chiefs of Staff Divisions and Offices are responsible for insuring that all of their personnel understand the provisions of Title 18, Section 793, USC, at all times.

d. NSA personnel who have been assigned to TDY or PCS outside the continental limits of the United States will be briefed concerning their security responsibility prior to departure for overseas areas.

e. The Chief, Security Division, shall be notified of the employee's assignment by the Chief of the Staff Division or Office concerned, at least ten days prior to the employee's date of departure.

f. The Chief, Security Division, will prepare for publication material concerning security. This material will be disseminated to all NSA personnel. Requests for this type material should be directed to Chief, Security Division.

g. Visual aids, being an integral part of a security education program, will be prepared and disseminated on a regular program basis.

5. Debriefing.

a. Each person being separated from association with NSA shall be debriefed.

b. Separation shall include, but not be limited to the following:

(1) Permanent separation

(2) Temporary separation for 30 days or more due to:

(a) Personal foreign travel

(b) Illness

(c) Maternity leave

(d) LWOP for any purpose
(e) Educational purposes including training under Agency sponsorship

Any requests for exceptions to the debriefing requirement should be addressed to the Chief, Security Division, by the Chief of the Staff Division or Office involved.

c. It shall be the responsibility of the Chiefs of the Staff Divisions and Offices concerned to insure that each person being separated from association report to the Chief, Security Division, for debriefing prior to departure. Execution of a Debriefing Oath is a part of the process.

d. The debriefing shall include a review of the punitive laws concerning the unauthorized disclosure of classified security information and the execution of a Debriefing Security Oath. The debriefing shall also include an exit interview during which the individual shall be cautioned to continue to report violations of NSA security regulations which may come to his attention. In the case of military personnel, a copy of the debriefing oath shall be forwarded to the parent service whenever assignment to duty with NSA ceases.

SECTION VIII - SUPERVISION

Supervision for the implementation of the policies established herein is the responsibility of the Chief, Security Division.

BY COMMAND OF LIEUTENANT GENERAL CANINE:

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DISTRIBUTION IV