11 July 1951

MEMORANDUM FOR THE MEMBERS OF USCIB:

Subject: Dissemination of Intelligence Based on COMINT to Foreign Nationals Serving in NATO or Similar Commands.

1. The attached memorandum from the Chairman, Joint Intelligence Committee, is forwarded at the direction of the Coordinator.

2. This subject has been added to the final agenda as an item to be considered at the Sixty-sixth Meeting of USCIB, 13 July 1951.

H. D. JONES
J. W. Pearson
Secretariat, USCIB

Inclusion 1 Memo for Chairman, USCIB from Chairman, JIC, dated 9 July 1951.

USCIB: 14/141
MEMORANDUM FOR: THE CHAIRMAN, USCIB

Subject: Dissemination of Intelligence Based on COMINT to Foreign Nationals Serving in NATO or Similar Commands

1. At the request of the Chairman, Armed Forces Security Agency Council (AFSA-123/wpm, Serial 00089, 18 April 1951), the Joint Intelligence Committee has considered the problem of dissemination of intelligence based on COMINT produced by the United States and the to foreign nationals serving in the forces of NATO or in the forces of similar organizations in which the United States may participate and has reached the following conclusions:

   a. The dissemination of intelligence based on COMINT produced by the United States and the to foreign nationals serving as commanders or on the staffs of the forces of NATO or similar organizations in which the United States may participate is essential to the efficient exercise of the command of such forces and to the security of troops of the United States which may be assigned thereto.

   b. All intelligence based on COMINT produced by the United States and the should be disseminated to NATO commands and staffs by Security Officers of the United States, except to recipients in wholly commands. In the latter case, the terminal may be manned by personnel as appropriate.

   c. For the purpose of dissemination to foreign nationals serving as commanders or on the staffs of the forces of NATO or similar organizations, the security of the United States requires that COMINT be divided into the following types:

   Type A: COMINT which may be derived from the highest or her Satellites.

* Implementation of JIC 463/40.
Type B: COMINT derived from cryptographic systems of all other powers, from the analysis of Soviet traffic, or from the plain language traffic of the Soviet Union or her Satellites.

Type C: COMINT called Traffic Intelligence.

Type D: COMINT defined as Tactical COMINT.

d. Dissemination of intelligence based on COMINT produced by the United States and the United Kingdom should be in accordance with the following rules:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Command Element</th>
<th>Peace</th>
<th>War</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Supreme Allied Commander (SAC) and Deputy</td>
<td>Type A to SAC and Deputy</td>
<td>All types of COMINT*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Supreme Allied HQ, C</td>
<td>Type A disguised***</td>
<td>(at direction of SAC)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>of S, G-3 and Deputy, G-2 and Deputy</td>
<td>and Types B, C and D</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| Major Force (e.g., Ground Forces Central Europe) | Type A disguised (at direction of SAC) | All types of COMINT |
| CG, Deputy CG, C of S, G-3, G-2              | and Types B, C and D                  |                      |

| Minor Force (e.g., Allied Forces Norway) | Types B, C and D | Type A disguised and Types B, C and D |
| CG, Deputy CG, C of S, G-3, G-2            |                    |                                    |

| Army Group (or equivalent) | Types B, C and D | Type A disguised and Types B, C and D |
| CG, C of S, G-3, G-2       |                    |                                    |

| Army (or equivalent)      | Types B, C and D | Types B, C and D                  |
| CG, C of S, G-2, G-2      |                    |                                    |

| Corps, or, where necessary, Type D | Type D |
| division                          |                |

** Army terms are used throughout this paper in describing echelons of command; Navy or Air Force terminology should be interpolated as appropriate in each case.

*** Disguised as Type B, C, or D, as appropriate.
A combined cipher susceptible to exclusive keying and of adequate security to transmit the highest grade COMINT should be made available to allied commands within NATO and other similar organizations in which the United States may participate.

Although the command structure and tactical organization of NATO are not yet clear, the principles set forth herein are considered sufficiently well established and their implementation sufficiently flexible to provide a guide for the dissemination of intelligence based on COMINT to allied commands within NATO and such other international commands in which the United States may participate.

2. The Joint Intelligence Committee considers that USCI should adopt the above conclusions as the basis for the policy of the United States governing the dissemination of COMINT produced by the United States and the [ ] to foreign nationals serving as commanders or on the staffs of the forces of NATO or similar organizations in which the United States may participate.

Copies furnished:
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Maj Gen C.P. Cabell, USAF
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