MEMORANDUM FOR GENERAL MARSHALL:

Subject: Signal Intelligence (Communication Intelligence).

Reference: (a) My Top-Secret memorandum of 18 September 1945.
(b) Your Top-Secret memorandum of 18 August 1945.
(c) Your Top-Secret memorandum of 25 September 1945.

1. If reference (a) gave the impression that I do not desire integration of our signal intelligence activities, my point of view was not made clear. My intention was to indicate acceptance of your proposal to have ANCIB "recommend procedure to insure complete integration," mentioned in reference (b) as an alternative to the suggestion for physical combination of Army and Navy activities.

2. Progress toward effective coordination and integration during the war has been increasingly beneficial. It appears that we are both in full accord that this collaboration should be extended as far as practicable.

3. I note that we agree that the control and dissemination of Navy and Army operational signal intelligence should be exercised by the service concerned. In addition, I believe the following principles have already been implemented or agreed upon:

(a) Intercept, direction finding, and associated communication activities should be conducted by separate Army and Navy units, subject to coordination as at present.
(b) Military and naval traffic should be processed by Army and Navy personnel respectively.
(c) The processing of non-military and non-naval traffic should be jointly undertaken. (The Army believes this should be accomplished by merger, and the Navy by ANCIB allocation).
(d) Strategic non-operational signal intelligence should be evaluated and disseminated as a joint product.
(e) There should be full exchange of technical information, collateral information, and signal intelligence (Subject to paragraph 4).
(f) Security standards of signal intelligence must be jointly maintained.
(g) Negotiations and coordination with other intelligence agencies should be jointly conducted.
2 October 1945.

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I believe that, if we start on this common ground, a plan can be worked out to insure complete integration by means short of physical merger of all facilities.

4. I feel that the Navy's complete and independent control of its production, evaluation, and dissemination of naval operational intelligence is essential to naval command. If a complete merger were effected, such control might be endangered by the establishment of a national intelligence agency (or central controlling authority) which would not be responsible for military operations and probably would not be properly conscious of operational requirements. A single merged unit would be more susceptible to absorption. However, I recognize a real need for one joint center, physically located in one building, into which all material of common interest shall be fed by the Navy and Army cryptanalytic processing units. This joint unit should also contain a joint collateral center and a joint evaluation unit. Intelligence produced by the evaluation unit should be made available to State, War and Navy, as appropriate.

5. If you concur with these reactions to reference (c), I will direct the naval members of ANCIB to proceed accordingly. It appears that much of the misunderstanding has arisen from a confusion of the terms "combination", "integration", "consolidation", "merger", and "joint effort", all of which have been used in the exchange of correspondence. Therefore, I have instructed the naval members of ANCIB to insure that their understanding of these terms is identical with that of the Army members.

[Signature]

Fleet Admiral, U. S. Navy.