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Declassified and approved for release by NSA on 01-24-2014 pursuant to E.O 13526
MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Intelligence, GSUSA

SUBJECT: Maximum Exploitation of COMINT

1. Herewith is a proposed memorandum for the Chairman of DSCIA, subject: Maximum Exploitation of COMINT.

2. This paper has as its object the establishment of a single organization for the evaluation and dissemination of communication intelligence. It proposes to go further in the case of COMINT, at least in respect to the manner of evaluation, than is proposed for other types of intelligence in the paper on the subject: Establishment of a Joint Intelligence Bureau.

3. A Joint Intelligence Bureau and a central organization for the evaluation and dissemination of COMINT would complement each other in important respects and both steps would take us a long way forward in establishing a much more efficient intelligence service for the U.S. Government.

4. The final step would be, of course, the real integration of COMINT processing, by unifying the operations of the latter processing agencies under a single head, either along the lines proposed by the Army in the Stone Report or along similar and possibly stricter lines.

CARTER B. CLARKE
Colonel, Signal Corps
Chief, Army Security Agency

1 Inc1
Proposed memo

(Sec. 1 Dec 60 Apr 49)
MEMORANDUM FOR: THE CHAIRMAN, USCIB.

SUBJECT: Maximum Exploitation of COMINT.

1. Under the present organization of US COMINT, the government is not provided with total intelligence derivable from COMINT source material.

2. A review of the present methods of producing and disseminating intelligence from this source indicates that radical changes in these methods must be made if USCIB is to fulfill all of its responsibilities.

3. A study has been prepared by ID, 3SUSA, which examines present US COMINT exploitation and dissemination with the purpose of determining a method which will provide full exploitation of this source and insure maximum efficiency, security, timeliness, and economy. In this study, the following recommendations are made:

   a. That a central COMINT evaluating unit be set up at one of the cryptanalytic processing agencies.

   b. That this unit be responsible for the production of all intelligence based on COMINT and for the publication and dissemination of all such intelligence to U. S. government personnel authorized to receive it.

   c. That each USCIB member contribute personnel to this center, such personnel to be administratively subordinate to their respective departments and operationally subordinate to the Chief of the technical agency and to have the dual responsibility of producing total intelligence.
for the National Security Council and intelligence of primary interest to their respective departments.

d. That, upon the establishment of the central unit, all existing COIN evaluating units of the five USCIB members be dissolved. The complete text of the study is attached as Inclosure 1.

4. It is requested that the recommendations made in this study be placed on the Agenda for discussion at the next regular meeting of USCIB.

1 Incl.
SUBJECT: Maximum Exploitation of COMINT.

1. The Problem: To examine present US COMINT exploitation and dissemination in order to determine a method which will provide full exploitation of this source with the maximum efficiency, security, timeliness, and economy.

2. Facts Bearing on the Problem:
   a. The U.S. annually expends approximately $35,000,000 for the technical production of COMINT raw material. It has roughly a $48,000,000 plant investment in the facilities of ASA and CSAH.

   b. Each of the members of USCIB maintains a COMINT evaluating and disseminating unit. For the most part, the work of these five units is not coordinated and, to date, there has not been produced an integrated, comprehensive, COMINT estimate covering any given subject from the point of view of total U.S. intelligence requirements. Under the present arrangement, there is no provision for the timely application of total COMINT to the intelligence requirements of the National Security Council or the policy planners of the departments or agency represented on USCIB.
3. Discussion

a. The unique and vital nature of COMINT and the cost of COMINT production dictate that arrangements be established which insure maximum exploitation of this source. The present arrangements for the evaluation and dissemination of COMINT preclude such exploitation. They are not efficient, not secure, and not economical, and, moreover, they fail to insure timely dissemination of intelligence.

(1) Efficiency: The five COMINT evaluation units produce and disseminate a number of publications covering fields of primary interest to their respective departments—e.g., the MILITARY DIGEST (Army); the SOVIET INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY (Navy); the DIPLOMATIC SUMMARY (produced largely by State under the authority of USCIC); ORDER OF BATTLE (Army, Navy, Air); and special studies (all departments). These publications contain evaluated COMINT on various subjects. Occasionally, the same raw material—evaluated from the point of view of the department or agency involved—is used as the basis for reports from two or more of the units. To date, there has not been produced an integrated COMINT estimate covering any given subject from the point of view of total U. S. intelligence requirements. For example, there is not available to the National Security Council a combined COMINT estimate of the military capabilities and industrial potential of the USSR. Nor, under the present arrangements, could a combined estimate be produced with sufficient speed to make such an undertaking practicable, and policy level recipients of COMINT receive a variety of SHINT reports, which may duplicate,
or conflict with, one another, and which the reader himself must synthesize.
In addition to its separation from other COMINT units, each of the five
evaluating units functions more or less apart from the general intelligence
units within its department or agency and, of course, from the general
intelligence units of the other departments or agency. Such arrangements,
although necessary for COMINT security under present conditions, inhibit
rapid, direct application of collateral intelligence to COMINT and militate
against the timely production of total intelligence on a given subject both
within and among the USCI members.

(2) Timeliness: Clearly, the value of all intelligence depends
to a large extent on its timeliness. This is particularly true in the
case of COMINT. A message indicating impending attack disseminated after
the fact is of academic interest only. Under the present arrangements,
however, the inevitable time-lag resulting from the separation of the
five evaluating units from each other, and of each of them from one or
both of the cryptanalytic processing agencies, effectively reduces the chances
of receiving such a message before it is too late to act. (It is assured as
a strong probability that no single message will contain positive, self-
evident indication of hostile intent—without evaluation on the basis of
other information available at one or all of the intelligence units.) In
addition, the separation of evaluating and processing units makes impossible
the timely preparation of basis COMINT studies on subjects of joint interest
and the maintenance of such studies at a current date level.

(3) Security: The distribution of COMINT raw material to
five intelligence units in Washington presents an obvious physical security
hazard. The separation of these units from the processing agencies requires the publication of individual message texts, notated so as to reveal the cryptographic system in which they were sent and the radio circuits from which they were intercepted—a practice which reveals the core of US COMINT operations: specific status of cryptanalytic attack.

The possibility cannot be ignored that the rigid security measures adopted are a direct result of the insecurity inherent in the present COMINT organization in the United States.

(4) Economy: The existence of five COMINT evaluating units results in excessive expenditures for personnel and equipment and considerable duplication of effort. This duplication of effort results in a dissipation of the limited, available, qualified manpower and adversely affects the quality and quantity of COMINT produced. In addition, it creates the need for publishing many copies of the COMINT raw material, for an extensive courier service, for several files of the same material, and for the publication by the processing agencies of many items which could have been discarded at the first stage of processing if an evaluating group had been close at hand to guide the work of the technicians.

b. The establishment of a single COMINT evaluating and disseminating unit, to be located at one of the cryptanalytic processing agencies, would eliminate the disadvantages described above, and would permit better, and possibly maximum, exploitation of COMINT. The contrast between the situation resulting from the present arrangements and that which would
result from the establishment of a single unit for evaluation and dissemination is demonstrated by examining the same elements as were discussed in paragraph a above.

(1) Efficiency:

(a) Such an arrangement would provide, at the very least, the physical conditions necessary for collaboration among the COMINT evaluating personnel of the USCIB members.

(b) Basic COMINT evaluation would be improved, for the following reasons:

(i) The raw material would be evaluated at its source—optimum condition for accurate intelligence production.

(ii) Integration of other source intelligence with COMINT would be facilitated. The processing agency, for cryptanalytic purposes, must maintain central files of intelligence reports from all sources. The single evaluating unit, through the collateral files of the processing agency, would have direct access to the material from other intelligence sources now separately held by each of the five USCIB members.

(iii) Exploitation of COMINT in the fields of primary interest to each of the USCIB members would be improved by the proximity of evaluators to translators and traffic analysts.

(c) COMINT operations as a whole would be improved. The quick and unimpeded exchange of new ideas, new developments, and new intelligence or technical requirements would greatly increase the efficiency of both technical and evaluating personnel.
(d) Finished GLINT intelligence would be available for dissemination to policy-level recipients in a form designed to meet their needs—i.e., they would receive total COMINT on a given subject, in one synthesized report.

(2) **Timeliness:**

(a) The proximity of evaluating personnel to technical personnel would permit discarding of unimportant material at the earliest stages of cryptanalysis and, in so reducing the mass of material fully processed, would expedite the processing of vital material.

(b) Basic intelligence studies of joint interest to all consumers could be expeditiously initiated and currently maintained.

(c) Elimination of the publication and delivery of many copies of COMINT raw material would substantially reduce the time lag between message solution and evaluation.

(3) **Security:**

(a) The dissemination of COMINT raw material outside the processing agencies would be reduced to a minimum.

(b) Knowledge of the degree of specific cryptanalytic success could more easily be limited to working personnel with the need to know and, in the case of evaluating personnel, confined to one installation.

(4) **Economy:**

(a) Discard of unimportant material at earliest stages of cryptanalytic processing would reduce the total cost of intelligence produced in relationship to total material processed.

(b) Publication costs would be materially reduced.
(e) Duplication of intelligence files, with its attendant uneconomical use of limited space and personnel, and unnecessary duplication of effort at the evaluation level would be eliminated.

4. Conclusions:
   
   a. A central COMINT unit should be established at one of the cryptanalytic processing agencies, with the responsibility for producing all intelligence based on COMINT and disseminating all such intelligence to U.S. government personnel authorized to receive it.
   
   b. Each of the five USCIB member departments or agency should contribute personnel to this center. Such personnel should perform the dual function of producing total intelligence for the National Security Council and intelligence of primary interest to their respective departments or agency.
   
   c. Upon the establishment of the central unit, all existing COMINT evaluating units of the five USCIB members should be dissolved.

5. Recommendations: It is recommended that:

   a. A central COMINT evaluating unit be set up at one of the cryptanalytic processing agencies.

   b. This unit be responsible for the production of all intelligence based on COMINT and for the publication and dissemination of all such intelligence to U.S. government personnel authorized to receive it.

   c. Each of the five USCIB member departments or agency contribute personnel to this center, such personnel to be administratively subordinate to their respective departments or agency and operationally subordinate to the
Chief of the processing agency and to have the dual responsibility of producing total intelligence for the National Security Council and intelligence of primary interest to their respective departments or agency.

d. Upon the establishment of the central unit, all existing COMINT evaluating units of the five USCIB members be dissolved.