MEMORANDUM FOR: General McNarney

SUBJECT: Establishment of a Single Communication Intelligence Evaluation and Dissemination Center

1. There was recently submitted to you a draft of a proposed Consolidation Directive having as its aim the integration of all cryptologic activities of the Armed Forces, including those connected with the security of our own communications as well as those devoted to the interception and cryptanalytic processing of foreign communications. If that directive is adopted, it is believed that a great step forward will have been taken in the overall efficiency of those activities.

2. The present memorandum deals with a phase of communication intelligence activities not covered in the above-mentioned directive and perhaps of equal importance with integration of interception and cryptanalytic processing of foreign communications. It is obvious that maximum benefit from all the effort and funds devoted to these two expensive operations will be obtained only if there is maximum efficiency in the exploitation of the fruits thereof. The exploitation involves, as preliminary steps, the evaluation, publication, and dissemination of the results of cryptanalytic processing. As you are no doubt well aware, the latter three steps have for a long time been regarded strictly as intelligence activities which must be conducted within and under the direct supervision of the Intelligence organizations of the respective Services, a thesis with which I am generally in agreement. However, these Intelligence organizations now function independently, with separate staffs and plant facilities, and therefore, although they are provided with or have access to all the data which we call COMINT raw material (that is, the final translations of solved messages resulting from cryptanalytic processing), the evaluation, publication, and dissemination operations are conducted independently and separately by those organizations. There is some limited coordination, it is true, but that cannot be as efficient as unified direction. In fact, the present situation not only results in unnecessary duplication in certain types of studies, with occasional inconsistencies in final results, but also disperses the U.S. effort so that certain types of studies cannot be made because of lack of personnel and facilities.

3. a. Another element in the picture serves to complicate the situation. The respective Intelligence organizations of the Armed Forces must necessarily have close relations with the Department of State and the Central Intelligence Agency. The United States Communication Intelligence
Board (NSCIB), an organization under the jurisdiction of the National Security Council, was established by the NSC in its Directive No. 9 (Inclosure 1, par. 1), "to effect the authoritative coordination of Communications Intelligence activities of the Government and to advise the Director of Central Intelligence in these matters in the field of Communications Intelligence for which he is responsible". The NSC Directive No. 9 (Par. 2) also fixed the composition of the Board to consist "of not to exceed two members from each of the following Departments or Agencies: The Departments of State, the Army, the Navy, and the Air Force, and the Central Intelligence Agency". Consequent with the definition of "Communications Intelligence activities", given in Par. 12e of NSC Directive No. 9, the coordination mentioned above includes the coordination of the evaluation, publication, and dissemination of communication intelligence. Now Par. 4 of the NSC Directive states that "Decisions of the Board will be based on the principle of unanimity" and Par. 10 of the Directive states that "The Board shall have the internal administration and operation of Communications Intelligence activities to the member Departments or Agencies". Hence, as is inherent in the nature of a Board such as the foregoing, which has only coordinating functions, no authority to implement its decisions, and is composed of members responsible to separate agencies sometimes having conflicting aims, ideas, and opinions, its efficacy, even in the matter of coordination, is questionable.

b. The accompanying Inclosure 2 is a study dealing specifically and solely with the present situation as regards evaluation, publication, and dissemination of communication intelligence, giving a quite succinct picture of the defects therein and presenting certain recommendations for its improvement.

c. Based upon the recommendations embodied in Inclosure 2, a proposed Consolidation Directive has been drafted for your consideration, and is presented herewith as Inclosure 3. A few words of explanation of certain features thereof may be in order.

d. a. First of all, the classification given the proposed Directive is necessitated by the clear implication that we are now deriving intelligence from foreign communications, a fact which must be kept quite well hidden to prevent countermeasures that might dry up this type of intelligence at its sources. The classification TOP-SECRET-GLINT has therefore been applied to the Directive in accordance with current applicable regulations.

b. Arising from the necessity of affording ample security protection to the activities covered by the proposed Directive, but because some
name must be given to the contemplated centralized office for purposes of reference and designation in correspondence, etc., the rather innocuous designation indicated in Par. 1b thereof is suggested. Also, for reasons presently to be given, the prefatory qualifying adjective "Consolidated" rather than "Armed Forces" has been employed.

e. Referring to Par. 9a, it is obvious that a Directive signed by the Secretary of Defense cannot be binding upon organisations outside the DOD, and therefore the wording "are cordially invited to participate" is employed in the present draft in referring to participation by the Department of State and the Central Intelligence Agency. But it is suggested that should preliminary negotiations with the Secretary of State and the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency be successful in gaining their acceptance of the thesis upon which the proposed Directive is based, the quoted phrase would be replaced simply by the words "will participate" or "may participate"; also, the introductory clause of Par. 9b, "If the foregoing invitation is accepted", would be deleted.

d. Referring to Par. 9a, it is deemed essential to locate the contemplated central evaluation, publication, and dissemination office at a cryptanalytic processing center in the Washington area because of the better technical efficiency that will accrue to both categories of operations involved. This point is explained in Par. 3d of Inclosure 2.

e. Referring to Par. 9b, it is deemed advisable to make it clear that the central dissemination office must be ready to meet an emergency dissemination situation at any moment, and in order to be in a position to do so the means and facilities thereafter will have to be provided for in budgetary arrangements.

f. Referring to Par. 11a, it is deemed essential to the security of our communications intelligence activities, techniques, and operations themselves to eliminate at the earliest possible moment the present rather wide distribution of the texts of solved and translated messages, now unavoidable because the currently decentralised operations of evaluation, publication, and dissemination make it necessary to distribute copies of translated texts to the five organisations separately engaged in conducting those operations. It is realised that imposition of a prohibition against routine dissemination, a measure which is necessary for security reasons, may meet with strenuous objections from the Department of State and from the Central Intelligence Agency should these two organisations be unwilling to subscribe to the proposed Directive, but at the same time, firmness and insistence on this point by the Armed Forces, which are the producers of the basic material, may have the desired persuasive effect on these two organisations to join with us in establishing the single central office...
forming the subject of this paper, to the ultimate advantage of all
the agencies involved. Should this seem to pass the adjective "Consolidated",
would be particularly applicable as part of the designation of the central-
ised office.

g. It will be noted that the Directive provides that the chief
of the central dissemination and evaluation agency is subordinated to the
Director, Armed Forces Security Agency. This is considered essential if
the consolidated agency is situated at the cryptanalytic center, Armed
Forces Security Agency. To do otherwise would violate a fundamental
principle of command. If, however, this consolidated agency is located
in the Pentagon or elsewhere, Paragraphs 2a and 2b of the Directive might
read as follows:

"2. a. The office of the CONSIDO serving the HQ, JCS will
operate under the general supervision of the Director, Joint
Chiefs of Staff and will be designated as CONSIDO-WASHINGTON.

b. The Chief, Joint Intelligence Group, under the
general direction of the Joint Intelligence Committee will
serve also as Chief, CONSIDO-WASHINGTON, and for the purpose
of assisting him in executing his functions in the latter
capacity he will have a deputy from each of the Services
other than the one to which he belongs."

CARTER W. CLARKE
Colonel, Signal Corps
Chief, Army Security Agency

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL INTELLIGENCE DIRECTIVE NO. 9

COMMUNICATIONS INTELLIGENCE

Pursuant to the provisions of Section 101 and Section 102 of the National Security Act of 1947, the National Security Council hereby authorizes and directs that:

1. There is hereby established under the National Security Council the United States Communications Intelligence Board (hereinafter referred to as the "Board") to effect the authoritative coordination of Communications Intelligence activities of the Government and to advise the Director of Central Intelligence in those matters in the field of Communications Intelligence for which he is responsible.

2. The Board will be composed of not to exceed two members from each of the following Departments or Agencies: The Departments of State, the Army, the Navy, and the Air Force, and the Central Intelligence Agency. Only those Departments or Agencies designated by the President are authorized to engage in Communications Intelligence activities.

3. The Board members will be vested with authority to represent their respective Departments or Agencies in the field of Communications Intelligence and each member Department or Agency will be represented at each meeting by at least one member, or alternate, with the necessary powers to act.

4. Decisions of the Board will be based on the principle of unanimity, which shall be a prerequisite for matters within the purview of the Board, except that the Chairman shall be elected by majority vote. When decision cannot be reached, the Board will promptly refer the matter for resolution to the National Security Council; provided that, when unanimity is not obtained among the Department heads of the National Military Establishment, the Board shall present the problem to the Secretary of Defense before presenting it to the National Security Council.

5. Decisions and policies promulgated by the Board within the scope of its jurisdiction shall be applicable to all Departments and Agencies represented on or subordinate to the National Security Council and any others designated by the President, and shall be implemented by those Departments and Agencies of which action is required.
6. The special nature of Communications Intelligence activities requires that they be treated in all respects as being outside the framework of other or general intelligence activities. Orders, directives, policies, or recommendations of any authority of the Executive Branch relating to the collection, production, security, handling, dissemination, or utilization of intelligence, and/or classified material, shall not be applicable to Communications Intelligence activities, unless specifically so stated and issued by competent departmental or agency authority represented on the Board.

7. The Board shall act for the National Security Council to insure proper and full implementation of Council directives by issuing such supplementary directives as may be required. Such implementing directives in which the Board concurs unanimously shall be issued to and implemented by the member Departments and Agencies. When disagreement arises in the Board upon such directive, the proposed directive, together with statement of nonconcurrence, shall be forwarded to the National Security Council for decision as provided in paragraph 4.

8. Other National Security Council Intelligence Directives to the Director of Central Intelligence and related implementing directives issued by the Director of Central Intelligence shall be construed as non-applicable to Communications Intelligence activities under the authority of paragraph 6 above, unless the National Security Council has made its directive specifically applicable to Communications Intelligence.

9. The Board will perform such functions as may be required to accomplish its objective set forth in paragraph 1 above, and in the exercise of responsibilities and authority delegated to it by the National Security Council in this directive.

10. The Board shall leave the internal administration and operation of Communications Intelligence activities to the member Departments or Agencies.

11. All currently effective decisions, policies, and operating arrangements of the Board and its predecessors, the Army-Navy Communications Intelligence Board, and the State-Army-Navy Communications Intelligence Board, as previously constituted, which are not in conflict with this directive, will remain in full force and effect unless changed by subsequent decisions of the Board.

12. Definitions. For purposes of this directive the following definitions apply:
Foreign communications include all telecommunications and related materials (except Foreign Press and Propaganda Broadcasts) of the government and/or their nationals or of any military, air, or naval force, faction, party, department, agency, or bureau of a foreign country, or of any person or persons acting or purporting to act therefore; they shall include all other telecommunications and related material of, to, and from a foreign country which may contain information of military, political, scientific or economic value.

Communications Intelligence is intelligence produced by the study of foreign communications. Intelligence based in whole or in part on Communications Intelligence sources shall be considered Communications Intelligence as pertains to the authority and responsibility of the United States Communications Intelligence Board.

Communications Intelligence activities comprise all processes involved in the collection, for intelligence purposes, of foreign communications, the production of information from such communications, the dissemination of that information, and the control of the protection of that information and the security of its sources.
SUBJECT: Maximum Exploitation of COMINT.

1. The Problem: To examine present US COMINT exploitation and dissemination in order to determine a method which will provide full exploitation of this source with the maximum efficiency, security, timeliness, and economy.

2. Facts Bearing on the Problem:
   a. The U.S. annually spends approximately $35,000,000 for the technical production of COMINT raw material. It has roughly a $45,000,000 plant investment in the facilities of ASA and CSAN.
   b. Each of the members of USCIB maintains a COMINT evaluating and disseminating unit. For the most part, the work of these five units is not coordinated and, to date, there has not been produced an integrated, comprehensive, COMINT estimate covering any given subject from the point of view of total U.S. intelligence requirements. Under the present arrangement, there is no provision for the timely application of total COMINT to the intelligence requirements of the National Security Council or the policy planners of the departments or agency represented on USCIB.

3. Discussion:
   a. The unique and vital nature of COMINT and the cost of COMINT production dictate that arrangements be established which insure maximum exploitation of this source. The present arrangements for the evaluation and dissemination of COMINT preclude such exploitation. They are not efficient, not secure, and not economical, and, moreover, they fail to insure timely dissemination of intelligence.

   (1) Efficiency: The five COMINT evaluation units produce and disseminate a number of publications covering fields of primary interest to their respective departments--e.g., the MILITARY DIGEST (Army); the SOVIET INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY (Navy); the DIPLOMATIC SUMMARY (produced largely by State under the authority of USCIB); ORDER OF BATTLE (Army, Navy, Air); and special studies (all departments). These publications contain evaluated
COMINT on various subjects. Occasionally, the same raw material—evaluated from the point of view of the department or agency involved—is used as the basis for reports from two or more of the units. To date, there has not been produced an integrated COMINT estimate covering any given subject from the point of view of total U.S. intelligence requirements. For example, there is not available to the National Security Council a combined COMINT estimate of the military capabilities and industrial potential of the USSR. Nor, under the present arrangements, could a combined estimate be produced with sufficient speed to make such an undertaking practicable, and policy level recipients of COMINT receive a variety of GLINT reports, which may duplicate or conflict with, one another, and which the reader himself must synthesize. In addition to its separation from other COMINT units, each of the five evaluating units functions more or less apart from the general intelligence units within its department or agency and, of course, from the general intelligence units of the other departments or agency. Such arrangements, although necessary for COMINT security under present conditions, inhibit rapid, direct application of collateral intelligence to COMINT and militate against the timely production of total intelligence on a given subject both within and among the USIC members.

(2) Timeliness: Clearly, the value of all intelligence depends to a large extent on its timeliness. This is particularly true in the case of COMINT. A message indicating impending attack disseminated after the fact is of academic interest only. Under the present arrangements, however, the inevitable time-lag resulting from the separation of the five evaluating units from each other, and of each of them from one or both of the cryptanalytic processing agencies, effectively reduces the chances of receiving such a message before it is too late to act. (It is assumed as a strong probability that no single message will contain positive, self-evident indication of hostile intent—without evaluation on the basis of other information available at one or all of the intelligence units.) In addition, the separation of evaluating and processing units makes impossible the timely preparation of basic COMINT studies on subjects of joint interest and the maintenance of such studies at a current date level.

(3) Security: The distribution of COMINT raw material to five intelligence units in Washington presents an obvious physical security hazard. The separation of these units from the processing agencies requires the publication of individual message texts, noted so as to reveal the cryptographic system in which they were sent and the radio circuits from which they were intercepted—a practice which reveals the core of US COMINT operations: specific status of cryptanalytic attack. The possibility cannot be ignored, that the rigid security measures...
are a direct result of the insecurity inherent in the present COMINT organization in the United States.

(4) Economy: The existence of five COMINT evaluating units results in excessive expenditures for personnel and equipment and considerable duplication of effort. This duplication of effort results in a dissipation of the limited, available, qualified manpower and adversely affects the quality and quantity of COMINT produced. In addition, it creates the need for publishing many copies of the COMINT raw material, for an extensive courier service, for several files of the same material, and for the publication by the processing agencies of many items which could have been discarded at the first stage of processing if an evaluating group had been able at hand to guide the work of the technicians.

b. The establishment of a single COMINT evaluating and disseminating unit, to be located preferably at the cryptanalytic processing agency (assuming approval of proposed Directive establishing Armed Forces Security Agency), would eliminate the disadvantages described above, and would permit better, and possibly maximum exploitation of COMINT. The contrast between the situation resulting from the present arrangements and that which would result from the establishment of a single unit for evaluation and dissemination is demonstrated by examining the same elements as were discussed in paragraph a above.

(1) Efficiency:

(a) Such an arrangement would provide, at the very least, the physical conditions necessary for collaboration among the COMINT evaluating personnel of the USICB members.

(b) Basic COMINT evaluation would be improved, for the following reasons:

(i) The raw material would be evaluated at its source—an optimum condition for accurate intelligence production.

(ii) Integration of other source intelligence with COMINT would be facilitated. The processing agency, for cryptanalytic purposes, must maintain central files of intelligence reports from all sources. The single evaluating unit, through the collateral files of the processing agency, would have direct access to the material from other intelligence sources now separately held by each of the five USICB members.

(iii) Exploitation of COMINT in the fields of primary interest to each of the USICB members would be improved by the proximity of evaluators to translaters and traffic analysts.
(a) COMINT operations as a whole would be improved. The quick and unimpeded exchange of new ideas, new developments, and new intelligence or technical requirements would greatly increase the efficiency of both technical and evaluating personnel.

(d) Finished GLINT intelligence would be available for dissemination to policy-level recipients in a form designed to meet their needs—i.e., they would receive total COMINT on a given subject, an one synthesized report.

(2) Timeliness:

(a) The proximity of evaluating personnel to technical personnel would permit discarding of unimportant material at the earliest stages of cryptanalysis and, in so reducing the mass of material fully processed, would expedite the processing of vital material.

(b) Basic intelligence studies of joint interest to all consumers could be expeditiously initiated and currently maintained.

(c) Elimination of the publication and delivery of many copies of COMINT raw material would substantially reduce the time lag between message solution and evaluation.

(3) Security:

(a) The dissemination of COMINT raw material outside the processing agencies would be reduced to a minimum.

(b) Knowledge of the degree of specific cryptanalytic success could more easily be limited to working personnel with the need to know and, in the case of evaluating personnel, confined to one installation.

(4) Economy:

(a) Discard of unimportant material at earliest stages of cryptanalytic processing would reduce the total cost of intelligence produced in relationship to total material processed.

(b) Publication costs would be materially reduced.

(c) Duplication of intelligence files, with its attendant uneconomical use of limited space and personnel, and unnecessary duplication of effort at the evaluation level would be eliminated.

4. Conclusions:

a. A central COMINT unit should be established at the cryptanalytic
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processing agency, with the responsibility for producing all intelligence based on COMINT and disseminating all such intelligence to U.S. government personnel authorized to receive it.

each of the five USCIB member departments or agency should contribute personnel to this center. Such personnel should perform the dual function of producing total intelligence for the National Security Council and intelligence of primary interest to their respective departments or agency.

c. Upon the establishment of the central unit, all existing COMINT evaluating units of the five USCIB members should be dissolved.

5. Recommendations: It is recommended that:

a. A central COMINT evaluating unit be set up at the cryptanalytic processing agency.

b. This unit be responsible for the production of all intelligence based on COMINT and for the publication and dissemination of all such intelligence to U.S. government personnel authorized to receive it.

c. Each of the five USCIB member departments or agency contribute personnel to this center, such personnel to be administratively subordinate to their respective departments or agency and operationally subordinate to the Director of the Armed Forces Security Agency, and to have the dual responsibility of producing total intelligence for the National Security Council and intelligence of primary interest to their respective departments or agency.

d. Upon the establishment of the central unit, all existing COMINT evaluating units of the five USCIB members be dissolved.
MEMORANDUM FOR: _______________________

SUBJECT: Establishment of a Consolidated Special Information Dissemination Office, NMER.

1. a. In order to improve efficiency and economy in the evaluation, publication, and dissemination of communication intelligence, and with a view to giving better security protection to the sources of such intelligence, a single consolidated office for the evaluation, publication, and dissemination of all intelligence based upon COMINT raw material* resulting from the operations of the Armed Forces Security Agency will be established at the Headquarters of the National Military Establishment in Washington. Similar offices may be established in overseas theaters at the Headquarters of any Joint Command at or within which COMINT raw material is produced locally by the Armed Forces Security Agency branch office within said Theater or Joint Command.

b. For purposes of cover, a consolidated office performing the above-mentioned functions will be designated as a COMSOLIDATED Special Information Dissemination Office, abbreviated as CONSIDO.

2. a. The office of the CONSIDO serving the NMER will operate under the general supervision and operational control of the Director, Armed Forces Security Agency and will be designated as CONSIDO-WASHINGTON.

b. The Chief, CONSIDO-WASHINGTON will be appointed by the Joint Intelligence Committee. As provided in Paragraph 2a above, he will operate under the general supervision and operational control of the Director, Armed Forces Security Agency. For the purpose of assisting him in executing his functions in producing communication intelligence he will have a deputy from each of the Services.

c. The Chief of a CONSIDO serving a Joint Command will be appointed

*Defined as the published English versions of decrypted messages.
by the Commander thereof, but in view of the close technical relations which must exist between CONSIDO-WASHINGTON and similar offices operating for Joint Commands, such appointments will be subject to the approval of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

3. a. The Chief, CONSIDO-WASHINGTON will be responsible for the production of communication intelligence based upon COMINT raw material furnished by the cryptanalytic processing agency of NIE in the Washington area and for the publication and dissemination of such intelligence to agencies authorized to receive it.

b. The Chief of a CONSIDO outside Washington will be responsible for the production of communication intelligence based upon COMINT raw material furnished by the local cryptanalytic processing center and for the publication and dissemination of such intelligence to the local command, and to other local agencies as authorized by the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

4. Referring specifically to CONSIDO-WASHINGTON, the respective Secretaries of the three Service Departments are hereby authorized and directed to transfer to the control of the Chief, CONSIDO-WASHINGTON such facilities, equipment, records, and files as are now employed by their agencies in the Washington area for the evaluation of COMINT raw material and for the publication and dissemination of the resultant communication intelligence.

5. a. Military and civilian personnel will be detailed to CONSIDO-WASHINGTON by the respective Services in quotas as requested by the Chief, CONSIDO-WASHINGTON and as approved by the Secretaries of the respective Departments concerned.

b. As a matter of policy, officer personnel will be detailed to such duty for a period of not less than thirty (30) months, and civilian personnel, for indefinite periods, reserving, however, to each Department, after appropriate notification to the Chief, CONSIDO-WASHINGTON, the right to withdraw, add to, or substitute.

6. Military and civilian personnel detailed to CONSIDO-WASHINGTON will be operationally subordinate to the Chief, CONSIDO-WASHINGTON and administratively subordinate to the respective Departments from which they have been detailed. The administration will be exercised through the Senior Officer detailed from each Service to CONSIDO-WASHINGTON, which officer will report, as appropriate, to the Chief of Staff of the Army, or to the Chief of Staff of the Air Force, or to the Chief of Naval Operations for additional duty for this purpose. In addition to their other duties, the Senior Officers from each Service will be responsible for normal and routine inspection of their Service components in CONSIDO-WASHINGTON in accordance with current directives and policies respectively promulgated by the Chief of Staff of the Army, or by the Chief of Staff of the Air Force, or by the
Chief of Naval Operations. In addition, inspection or investigation of the respective individual Service components may be made by the corresponding Service representatives when so directed by competent authority, the Chief, CONSIDO-WASHINGTON being notified in each instance.

7. a. The specific responsibilities of CONSIDO-WASHINGTON are as follows:

1. To produce communication intelligence from COMINT raw material and to fuse such intelligence with pertinent collateral information received from other sources.

2. To publish and disseminate such intelligence to the JCS, to the three Services, and to other U.S. agencies as authorized and directed by the JCS.

3. To prepare summaries, studies and reports based upon such intelligence.

4. To disseminate to appropriate agencies in the Washington area communication intelligence received from a field cryptanalytic processing center, or from a Theater CONSIDO, or from a non-U.S. COMINT center with which cooperation has been authorized.

5. To maintain close liaison with the JCS and the Intelligence Divisions of the respective Services in all matters involving the dissemination of such intelligence and the establishment of priorities therein, as well as those involving procurement of collateral information from U.S. sources.

6. To execute policies established by the JCS for the exchange of such intelligence with non-U.S. COMINT agencies.

7. To exercise general supervision over the special system for the electrical transmission of such intelligence to Theater Commanders and to furnish the texts of such material for transmission, according to priorities determined by the Chief, CONSIDO-WASHINGTON.

8. To supply to the cryptanalytic processing agency pertinent technical and collateral information which may be developed in the course of evaluation and which may be of assistance in gathering and processing COMINT raw material.

9. To exercise general supervision over the security of publication and dissemination procedures, under regulations established by the JCS.

10. To maintain all appropriate files and records.
b. The responsibilities of a CONSIDO serving a Joint Command will in general be similar to those outlined in sub-paragraph g above. Its principal responsibility is (1) to evaluate, publish, and disseminate communication intelligence based upon COMINT raw material furnished by the local cryptanalytic processing agency, and (2) to disseminate to appropriate agencies within the theater, as authorized by the JCS, such communication intelligence as is forwarded by CONSIDO-WASHINGTON.

8. a. The Secretary of State and the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency are cordially invited to participate in the work of CONSIDO-WASHINGTON, by contributing available personnel, facilities, equipment, and files thereto and as appropriate to their respective needs, subject to approval of the JCS.

b. If the foregoing invitation is accepted, the personnel furnished by the Department of State and/or the Central Intelligence Agency will be operationally subordinate to the Chief, CONSIDO-WASHINGTON, and administratively subordinate respectively to the Department and/or to the agency by which they have been furnished. The administration will be exercised through the Senior Representative from the Department of State and/or from the Central Intelligence Agency for their respective personnel quotas.

c. The Senior Representative from the Department of State and/or the Senior Representative from the Central Intelligence Agency may serve as Deputy Chiefs of CONSIDO-WASHINGTON, with responsibilities similar to those of the Deputy Chiefs from the Armed Services.

9. a. The physical location of CONSIDO-WASHINGTON will be at the NME cryptanalytic processing center in the Washington area.

b. CONSIDO-WASHINGTON will operate on a continuous basis, 24 hours per day, 7 days per week.

10. This Directive will become effective on or before 1 July 1949. Thereafter, no units of the NME in the Washington area other than CONSIDO-WASHINGTON will engage in evaluating, publishing and disseminating communication intelligence and all COMINT evaluation, publication, and dissemination units other than CONSIDO-WASHINGTON will be abolished as soon thereafter as practicable.

11. a. With a view to eliminating existing security hazards, on and after 1 July 1949 no cryptanalytic processing center of the NME will disseminate as a routine matter to any U.S. Agency or personnel not operationally employed within such a center any COMINT raw material. However,
when appropriate and as determined in each instance by the Chief, COMSICO-WASHINGTON or by the Chief of a Theater COMSICO, a copy of a specific decrypt may be furnished to a U.S. Agency or to U.S. personnel, but only on the basis that the possession of such a decrypt is operationally essential.

b. The foregoing prohibition will not apply to the dissemination of COMINT raw material to cooperating COMINT centers with which exchange of such material has been authorized.