Machine Unit Personnel In ASAE Offer Aid With Analytical Problems

When the first use of Electric Card Accounting Machines in Signal Intelligence was made before World War II, few people believed that these machines would one day play a major part in the expansion of both the Army and the Armed Forces Security Agencies.

As time progressed and new methods and procedures were developed, machine installations were set up in all theatres during World War II by both the Army and Navy. This equipment played a major part in solving difficult problems that arose in a fraction of the time that it would require under manual systems.

With the inception of the Armed Forces Security Agency after the war, a large part of the responsibility in accomplishing many objectives was placed in the machine unit's hand. From that time until now the unit has grown rapidly until today it is one of the large sections in this headquarters. Much new equipment has been added to the standard punched card line in order to meet changing conditions.

The Army Security Agency has set up two field installations, one in the Pacific and one in Europe. Theatre level problems have been handled with tremendous saving of time and personnel. With machine and operational personnel working closely together, it has been possible to complete jobs in a fraction of the time required solely by manual means.

The section has been able to keep abreast of recent developments in the new techniques in the IBM field, and, just as in the States, is served by IBM personnel.

By having machine personnel conduct classes for the operational sections in all phases of machine accounting in order to familiarize operations with punched card principles, it has been possible for the operation sections to present problems of varying nature to the machine unit that may never have come to the fore otherwise. This has made it possible to reduce many large complicated jobs from a tedious manual system to mere routine through the expert use of punched card accounting machines.

Different machines are styled for different tasks, but they all work on the same principle - a little card with oblong holes punched into it. Once the card is punched from the source document, it is possible to run various reports on an accumulative basis to achieve the desired results with no chance of the human error.

Although the machines keep a steady flow of reports and information flowing at all times, they are so versatile that it is possible to still find time to take on odd jobs for various units in need of information such as personnel reports, tables of organization and equipment, classifications etc.

The machine unit in ASA Europe extends an open invitation to all ASA Europe personnel to bring any problems they may have to them and to see if some plan cannot be worked out that would benefit all parties concerned. There are few specialized jobs that cannot be accomplished by the machine personnel, and it should be remembered that the more information an analyst has, the more opportunities he has of solving his problem.

Typical IBM equipment: Alphabetic Key Punch

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From September 1915 to the end of May 1916 virtually nothing occurred in the east, operationally speaking. Then in June 1916 on the Austro-Hungarian front the famous Brusilov offensive broke loose, just at the moment when the Austrians had committed all their available forces on the Italian front. This offensive was not quite unexpected by the Austrians, for the Austrian radio intercept service along with the Arendt service had picked up many indications of an impending large scale operation. In particular, there was a telegram of the Russians sent on 3 June which betrayed to the Austrians the impending large scale attack. But in downright frivolous underestimation of the fighting strength of the Russians, the Austrians had taken the matter lightly and made almost no preparations to ward off the Russian attack. Thus Brusilov was able to penetrate deeply in the region of Lutsk and particularly in the Bukovina before reinforcements led in from other sectors brought the wavering front to a stand.

The Russian attack met with well-organized resistance. Even at the end of 1915 the Russians were still supplying plenty of material for the opposing intercept service. Only slowly did the recognition of the danger lurking in the careless use of technical means of communication begin to spread among them. Late in 1915 one station of the Russian Fourth Army was ordered to monitor the work of its own stations. This was the first attempt noted to increase the security factor by monitoring their own radio discipline; at that time, however, it was already too late.

In the spring of 1916 the Russians attempted a radio deception on the Austrian front, and this caused much amusement in the Austrian intercept service. To veil the withdrawal of two corps, they had several radio stations carry on deceptive traffic. Ronge reports that the Russians, innocent as children, announced this in advance in a radiogram which was solved, naturally, by the Austrians. Moreover, they prefixed to every fake telegram an enciphered sentence with the following content: "Do not be alarmed; this is just deception". This intermezzo was comforting to the Austrians, inasmuch as it showed that the Russians had no idea that their enciphered messages were being deciphered currently by the enemy.

The Brusilov offensive was the last attempt by Czarist Russia to turn the fortunes of war in its own favor. With its expiration in September 1916 and with the

Translated from original German materials by
Dr. Ray W. Pettengill
outcome of the following campaign in Rou-
mania, the war spirit in Russia had disap-
ppeared. Intercepted Russian telephone 
 conversations revealed a rapid decline in 
 fighting morale and a clear rise of re-
 volutionary tendency. Over the telephone 
 men scolded openly about their officers, 
 and talked about the senselessness of pro-
longing the war. The thoughts of the Rus-
sian soldier turned more and more toward 
 home rather than to the front and to the 
 enemy. Even among the officer corps cur-
cents could be recognized which aimed at 
 ending the war, since a military victory 
 was no longer considered possible. Supply 
 was inadequate; the ammunition situation 
 was bad. Social tensions began to occupy 
 more and more space in all conversations. 

In March 1917 the revolution broke out 
in Petersburg. Czar Nicholas II abdicated 
in the night of 15 - 16 March. The middle 
class democrats and the moderate social-
ists under Kersenki took power. In spite 
of the war weariness of the soldiers, they 
determined to continue the war. Moni-
toring of Russian internal traffic showed 
that a new wave of energy from above poured 
out over the country and the army. There 
was an attempt under national democratic 
watchwords to reinvigorate the military fight-
ing spirit at the front. 

Very soon the intercept service learned 
that the Russian front was stabilizing 
itself anew, and was preparing for offensiv e 
 battles. While the Germans were en-
gaged in violent defensive battles in 
 Flanders, and the Austrians stood at the 
 Isonzo, the Russians under Brusilov, who 
 had meanwhile become Commander-in-Chief 
of the entire Russian Army, attacked on 1 
 July 1917. The impending attack had long 
since been recognized by the German and 
 Austrian intercept service. They had had 
ample time to prepare for it. The men at 
the instruments sat tense and listened to 
every conversation which referred to the 
attack and its execution. From Riga to 
 Smorgon the storm broke before the German 
 lines. Only in Galicia did the Russians 
 have partial success. But in the counter-
thrust German and Austrian troops broke 
 through the Russian lines near Tarnopol, 
 and caused the entire Russian front to 
 waver. All of East Galicia and Bukovina, 
 which had been lost the year before, were 
am again occupied.

To complete the military collapse of 
Russia, on the left flank the German Eighth 
Army attacked and took Riga on 3 Septem ber. 
The islands Oesel, Moon, and Dagoe were occupied in October.

Meanwhile, the intercept service had 
learned of the complete break-down in mor-
ale of the Russian front. The former war 
weariness of the Russian soldiers had made 
way for a definite hostility toward war. 
The tension between men and officers 
changed into open conflict. The social factor 
came into the foreground, sharp and clear. 
All conversations turned on the ending of 
the war and the readjustment of social 
problems. They talked only about capital-
ists and bourgeois as parties interested 
in the war; it was clearly to be felt that 
the war on the eastern front was virtually 
at an end. On 7 November the second re-

duction broke out in Petersberg. Keren-
ski was overthrown. The Bolshevists took 
over the government. Now propaganda radio-
dograms and instructions from the new govern-
ment went out all over the country by the 
dozen, and were heard by the German and 
Austrian intercept services as well. The 
major activity of these services was now 
turned from monitoring Russian military 
radio traffic to listening to Russian in-
ternal traffic. It was a question of gaining 
clarity regarding events in Russia. The 
military intercept service in the east 
 had completed its assignment; now the 
 political assignment stepped into the 
foreground.

After the end of the First World War, 
General Hoffman, in his book, "The War of 
Missed Opportunities," stated with regard 
to the intercept service that during the 
e
tire war in the east this service 
 had supplied the German command currently 
with such complete information regarding 
the enemy that it was always fully inform-
ed regarding the situation on the enemy 
side.

From Tannenberg to the end of the war 
the interception of Russian technical 
means of communications had given the Ger-
man and Austrian command so many suggest-
ions for the execution of their own meas-
ures that it is inconceivable to think 
through to the conclusion how the war in 
the east might have gone, if this means of 
intelligence had not been employed by the 
Central Powers, and if the Russians had 
not used their technical means of communi-
cations in such a careless manner.
LIFE WITH THE 352ND COMM RECON COMPANY

TOP: Group LtoR; Col Greiner, Chief, ASAPAC, Gen Duff, Lt Col Eddy, and others. SCENE: Front view of company area of 352d, Seoul. MIDDLE: Left, Rear view of company area showing motor pool; Right, New outdoor patio. BOTTOM: Party for south Korean children given by the personnel of the 352d. Notice that the Korean children are warmly clad; some of them have their hands in their pockets to help keep warm. Since the pictures were taken the season has changed.