On the occasion of my assumption to command of the Army Security Agency I wish not only to extend greetings to all personnel of the Agency but also to express my pleasure upon receiving this assignment.

Although I have never been directly associated with ASA before, I am familiar with the outstanding contribution made by this organization during World War II and the present conflict in Korea. While serving in Frankfurt, Germany, I had the opportunity to observe the Army Security Agency, in Europe, where I gained firsthand knowledge of the exceptional types of personnel in the organization, which I believe is an admirable representative of ASA units.

It is a privilege to share in this associated military and scientific effort of very high priority and to have a part in the continuance of the worthwhile traditions which have been developed throughout the years.

I shall look forward to meeting all personnel upon my future inspections of your individual activities.

[Signature]

Major General U.S. Army

July-August 1951
The War in the Ether:

Cryptosecurity at Brest-Litovsk

Translated from original German materials by Dr. Ray W. Pettengill

Insight into the way the Germans intercepted the Russian traffic and rigged the secret Russian conference room in preparation for the Brest-Litovsk conference, provides another interesting chapter in the story of German cryptography. This was back in November 1917, shortly after the Bolsheviks had swept into power.

One of the main goals of the Bolshevik Government immediately after it seized power in the period of World War I was to bring the war to an end. Not merely the war between Russia and the Central Powers, but the World War as a whole and on all fronts. This was the burden of the appeals which went out by radio from St. Petersburg and Moscow. They were directed to the working population of the Western Powers, and to their organizations and representatives.

But it soon appeared that the political power of these organs was far too small to have any decisive influence on the attitude of the governments of these countries. On the basis of this discovery, the Soviet Government decided on separate negotiations with the Central Powers to bring about a separate peace. On 22 December 1917, at Brest-Litovsk, conversations began between the Russian delegation headed by Joffe and the representatives of the Central Powers whose spokesman was, in the main, General Hoffmann. The course of the negotiations is, in general, well known; what is not known, however, are certain circumstances which will be mentioned here for the first time.

The special character of these peace negotiations lay in the fact that here there sat at the conference table to end war not merely representatives of the two countries or groups of countries which were in a state of war, but that here two philosophies stood opposed to one another between which - from the point of view of ideologies - there was no bridge. There was added the fact that the Bolshevik Government had been in power only a few weeks, and this power was exercised in the world's largest state. On the side of the Central Powers there was, therefore, a very great interest in gaining insight into the actual situation of the newly created Soviet Union as well as into the thoughts of its delegation. Accordingly, in all haste a large radio intercept center was set up in Brest-Litovsk whose task it was to intercept all Russian internal radio traffic and to exploit it for the information of the German and Austrian delegation. A great staff of evaluators and analysts with linguistic ability was at work day and night.

A teletype line for direct exchange of telegrams with the Soviet Government had been placed at the disposal of the Russian delegation. The Russians even had permission to use cipher. The Hughes teleprinter at Brest-Litovsk was operated by Russian personnel.

Without the Russian telegraphers' knowing anything about it, other teleprinters had been wired in parallel with the Hughes teleprinters used to transmit telegrams. The tapes produced here went at once to the cryptanalytic bureau set up especially for the purpose, where 15 cryptanalysts were sitting who began work at once. At that time the German cryptanalytic service
succeeded on the third day of the proceedings in solving the cryptographic system used by the Russians. From then on, all incoming and outgoing telegrams could be deciphered, and General Hoffmann received their contents currently; sometimes the deciphered messages were laid before him during the conversations.

Aside from these two intercept devices, there was a third listening device installed in Brest-Litovsk. In the conference room of the Russian delegation, the Germans had installed in the chandelier several microphones from which well-disguised leads ran to a listening room. Here sat several interpreters who took down in shorthand the conversations of the Russians. Moreover, behind the wallpaper in the living-rooms of all members of the Russian delegation there had been concealed a series of microphones from which there were leads to the above-mentioned listening room. Thus, every conversation of the Russians could be heard.

Central Powers Well Informed

The net result of these three listening devices was that the chief negotiator of the delegation of the Central Powers was not only very well-informed at all times regarding the sometimes very unclear situation within the Soviet Union and regarding the actual power of the new government, but was also informed regarding all instructions which the Russian delegation received, all reports which it sent to Moscow, and all ideas discussed within the delegation. They knew precisely how far they could go, how far the Russians were ready to go, and what they could answer to the threats of Joffe and later of Trotzky. The Russian delegation could bring up anything it wished, but this did not make the slightest impression on General Hoffmann, since he often knew the enemy's situation better than the Russians themselves.

Twice it happened that General Hoffmann said too much in the heat of debate so that the Russians noticed that their correspondence with Moscow was being read by the Germans. Thereupon, they changed their cryptographic system but this too was broken in barely a week, and the total picture was now the same as before. The Russians, from a technical standpoint, found themselves in a hopeless, defensive position and could not go a single step forward.

Then on 10 February 1918 Trotzky declared that Russia regarded the war as ended and would dispense with a formal treaty of peace, and he broke off the negotiations.

On the German side, this step by the Russians was used as a pretext for doing away with the armistice; German troops then occupied Livonia and Estonia as far as Narva, beginning 18 February 1918, and thus threatened St. Petersburg. The Soviet Government found itself forced to give in, and on 3 March the treaty was signed at Brest-Litovsk.

In the meanwhile, a government had been formed in the Ukraine which was quite independent of the Bolshevik Government; it had come into being with German support; on 9 February it concluded a separate peace with Germany and Austria-Hungary which provided for the entry of German and Austrian troops into the territory of the Ukraine. Beginning 18 February the troops of the Central Powers marched into the Ukraine, occupied Kiev, Odessa, and Kharkov, and early in May advanced to the Don. In the south the Crimea was occupied.

In spite of the conclusion of peace the situation in the east remained very strained, indeed - from a military point of view - it became still less favorable than it had been up to February 1918, since in the enormous expanse of the western and eastern Ukraine there was stationed only a relatively thinly distributed force of the Central Powers. The Soviet Government on its part now set about with great zeal organizing a new "Red Army," and let it be recognized that it had no thought of tolerating permanently the situation in the Ukraine.

Watchful Eye On Developments

It was now necessary for the Central Powers to keep an exceptionally watchful eye on the development of the situation in the Soviet Union, in order to be protected from surprises. A whole net of radio intercept stations was set up by German and Austrian troops in the Ukraine and in the occupied northern territories, in order to monitor the entire radio traffic within Russia. The results were so good that actually a completely clear picture could be currently secured.

Along with their entire governmental
apparatus, the Russians also had to reorganize their entire radio service, and in the early months made the same mistake as once before by sending out their measures and arrangements all too frankly into space. But they soon made up for this error in another way. They began to send over their high-power transmitters a propaganda campaign in the German language which was directed to the German and Austrian soldiers. These transmissions were intercepted by all German receiving stations, and despite all security measures were soon trickling through everywhere. The German and the Austrian soldiers weary of war, were receptive to the propaganda. The reports of the Russian transmitters were calculated to undermine confidence in the leading class of the Listener's own country. The system of radio propaganda used here for the first time in history began to bear very serious fruit in the summer of 1918 in connection with the entire development.

The war in the east was ended, to be sure, but - and this signified far more the troops which had been left there began to drop out of the picture as a dependable military force for the Central Powers. At that time Russia became the first country to make use of the value and power of modern radio propaganda.

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**ASA EXTENSION TRAINING GROWS**

*Confidential*

**Lt Col Curtis M. Banks**

The interest of ASA personnel in the extension training program has greatly increased in the last few months. The number of students has risen from 1668 as of 31 July 1950, to 2624 by 30 April 1951, approximately a 57% increase. In July 1950 the number of lessons submitted monthly averaged .99 per student, while in April 1951 this average had risen to 2.86. This compares very favorably with the average of all extension schools, which was 1.74 for April 1951. The average ASA extension student ranks third compared with students enrolled in the other 17 Army extension schools in lessons completed each month.

**Popular With Enlisted Personnel**

Most popular of the numbered subcourses is the 10-series, usually taken by enlisted men. In April, this series accounted for approximately 70% of the total enrollment. Another 19% of the students were enrolled in the 20-series for 2d Lieutenants, while the remaining 12% were taking the 30-, 40-, and 50- series, or certain special courses. Particular interest has been shown by personnel recently recalled to extended active duty, who are applying for courses which relate to their new assignments.

Periodic revision is made of individual subcourses published by ASA in order to conform to changes in Army doctrine, to implement suggestions made by student critiques, and to make available the latest ASA developments in material, technique, and organization.

In January, Lt. Colonel C. M. Banks, (Arty), a graduate of the ASA Officers Course, was designated as Chief of the Extension Training Division, and Captain Wm. J. Jackson, Jr. was later named Assistant Chief. The duties of the division include processing applications, grading lessons, preparing completion certificates, maintaining student records, issuing academic materials, and other details involved in the operation of a correspondence school of over 2500 students.

**Three Categories of Courses**

Enrollment in the courses is normally made in a numbered series according to rank and in a category according to interest or duty assignment, although special courses in Cryptanalytics and Traffic Analysis are available. Categories are designated as A, which emphasizes Material and Administrative activities; B, which is concerned with Communications Security; and C the "Cryptanalytics Major." The Extension Training Division encourages all eligible personnel to examine the 1951-1952 catalog of the Division for detailed information regarding courses.