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The Japanese Problem in the Signal Intelligence Service - By John B. Hurt (2 copies)

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A Version of
THE JAPANESE PROBLEM
IN THE SIGNAL INTELLIGENCE SERVICE
(Later SIGNAL SECURITY AGENCY)
1930 - 1945
By
John B. Hurt

ARMY SECURITY AGENCY
WASHINGTON, D. C.
Some Notes on our work from 1930 to 1945.

Mr. William F. Friedman with the help of Major D. M. Crawford organized the Cryptological Section of the Office of the Chief Signal Officer early in 1930. Mr. Friedman, now recognized as one of the world's greatest cryptologists, had been employed from time to time on a contractual basis prior to 1921 when he took up his regular duties in that department. When first organized, the War Plans and Training Division came to include during the first 17 months of its existence the following personnel in order: Frank Rowlett, Abraham Sinkov, Solomon Kullback, myself, Lawrence Clark, Louise Newkirk, Dorothy Pearson and Nettie Janssen. Over the preceding years Mr. Friedman had through benefit of his ability and experience, laid a splendid foundation for the opening of what was to become the most effective cryptanalytic bureau we have any record of. The first thing that most of the new employees did was to take his first course in cryptanalysis, which through the years he revised regularly to keep abreast of developments. My own interests, by previous disposition, lay in the French and Japanese languages, but I took Mr. Friedman's elementary course, and I could never have gotten along without it.

Rowlett, Sinkov, Kullback and Clark took further courses, studying the methods of breaking down codes and
ciphers under Mr. Friedman's directions. I found these advanced courses too hard for me; so I fulfilled as best I could my duties as cryptanalyst aide and started to study Latin and technical French in which so much has been written on the subject of cryptography. But I was advised that I had better brush up on the Japanese written language, which I began to study intensely.

Now, sometime in that very early period, Congressman Hamilton Fish requisitioned in the telegraph offices of New York a truckload or two of Soviet code messages between the Amtorg and Moscow. We all worked a full year on that material, studying it meticulously from every angle, making every possible kind of mathematical calculation and thousands upon thousands of card indices, venturing every conceivable kind of guess, and finally winding up exactly where we started, with nothing. Nevertheless that experience did much to teach us patience and perseverance, and also to be philosophical in failure. We also made extensive frequency calculations which proved valuable later on.

Also during the period from 1930 to 1934 quite a large number of systems and inventions sent to us for examination were carefully studied and usually broken down. Considerable translation work was done; for example, I remember translating General Givierge's "Course in Cryptography" from the French and I also recall Miss Janssen
typing out an English translation of the Swede Gylden's excellent book, "The Contribution of the Cryptographic Dureaus during the World War." Much of our time then was taken up with the study in different languages of old and new works on cryptography such as those of Alberti, Porta, Vigenere, Beaufort along with those of Figi, Bazeries, Valerio, Kasiski, Langie, Lange and Soudart, Sacco, Givierge, etc. I do not recall just what code compilation work took place in that period but from then on for a number of years this was a major endeavor.

Sometime in 1933 Kullback and I were given some Japanese messages composed of a combination of code and cipher, that is, two- and four-letter substitution groups, representing an alphabetical Japanese syllabary and vocabulary. It took us several hours to begin reading the traffic; for by then we were rather well trained in that sort of thing. In any case that traffic was not new and we never intended to submit any messages for use at that time. Several years went by and I kept indexing, filling in values, and translating various types of Japanese messages in order to get a good idea of vocabulary and grammar of this neo-classical diplomatic language which was like a new language to me, because I knew only the very different spoken version. Sometime in 1933 Mr. Friedman went to Madrid as an advisor to a radio communications conference and during his absence we kept up our studies
in solution and linguistic work, Captain Mark Rhoads helping me to start a series of Japanese-language courses which continued nearly up to Pearl Harbor. Courses in cryptanalysis were being given to students away from Washington and this too consumed much of the cryptanalysts' time though its results proved most gratifying in the years to follow.

The course in Japanese that Mark Rhoads and I worked out was given at consecutive intervals to groups of six or seven people, student officers and civilian workers mixed, among them were: Rhoads, Corderman, Brown, Bicher, Miller, Jones (who came to study with us from the Coast Guard), Rowlett, Sinkov, Kullback, Clark, Newkirk, Snyder, Farner, and others whom I no longer recall. By 1934 we were beginning to find new Japanese messages highly interesting for their suspicious tone. I suppose that the first messages we submitted to G-2 were early in 1935. The very first one dealt with a suspicious fishing treaty which Japan was proposing to the Mexican authorities. It appeared that the Japanese fishermen were to be really spies. This interested the Navy, which had made I would say considerably more progress by that time than we had in the solution and use of Japanese messages, particularly with messages dealing with naval affairs.

Now let me return for a minute to Major Crawford. He took great interest in our work and was indeed a constant
source of encouragement. He studied the subject hard himself, and years later told me that he found his experiences with us invaluable to him in his capacity as delegate to a number of subsequent international telecommunications conferences.

In that first era when our Agency was so small our personal contacts both within and without the office were very close. The relative amount of work that a small cryptographic unit performs is so much more complete, satisfying, and correct than that which a vastly expanded organization can possibly perform. This should be remembered, because an agency like ours can very easily fall into the error of employing far too many workers. In fact, we have already had this experience. Indeed, it was impossible to teach properly and supervise 10,000 workers. The turnover was too great, and, of course, in proportion as we expanded, security became jeopardized. In short, a small cryptographic and cryptanalytic bureau is happier and more productive per capita. I do not mean that expansion above two or three thousand up to say five thousand would not be necessary, but I am certain that it would be wrong to exceed five thousand.

The military personnel in our Agency have risen from lieutenants to generals and memory does not serve me when I try to remember what rank they held at a particular time; so I shall simply have to leave their titles off.

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Now to return to the beginning of our cooperation with the Navy which could no longer ignore us or consider us parvenus. Several naval men came over from one end of the Munitions Building where they were quartered to the other end where we had our offices, and, after a certain amount of talk, it was decided that Naval Intelligence would cooperate with Military Intelligence. I would do wrong at this point not to mention that this arrangement was brought about at that time almost wholly by the personal friendship between Mr. Friedman and Lt. Wenger of the Navy. Lt. Wenger's everyday linguist envoy was Lt. Kramer, who had had 4 years' language study in Japan and who had acquired an especial fluency in Japanese. Of course, there were many other liaisons and this collaboration has always been extremely valuable to both of these Services and to the good of all concerned.

Up to 1935 or 1936 I was alone in my translation work. G-2 began at this period to show a rising interest in the Japanese messages we were sending them and here is a point to remember: Mr. Stimson had been railing against the Japanese invasion of Manchuria since its beginning, and he had already made up his mind that Japan had to be defeated; the men at G-2 and the officials at our State Department began at that time, instinctively so to speak, to feel the Japanese menace more acutely. Therefore, more and more messages were called for.
Around 1937 Robert Ferner, Samuel Snyder and Frank Bearce came into our Agency. They studied cryptanalysis full time and Japanese on the side. All of them achieved remarkable success in Japanese solution work though Bearce came to head the French Section. Before long all of us were devoting practically all of our time to the various phases of Japanese solution and translation work, and I, being the one and only Japanese translator, began to feel the pressure of work and to plead for expert assistance. I had to keep up with the Manchurian Incident, the trouble in China, the economic and ideological penetration of South America, the political activities of the Japanese in our own country, Canada and the Netherlands Indies. I found it all very hard to keep up with. Major Reeder joined our ranks to help Mr. Friedman who, by the way, never had sufficient or competent assistance, and it was while Major Reeder was with us that the Panay incident happened. That was a most fatiguing time for us all, because we worked day and night, but the major stayed with us and transcribed message after message for me to translate.

Apparently we could not find more translators at that time; so for our benefit, and theirs too, we began to get West Point graduates who had been language students in Tokyo for a period of 4 years. First came Frederick Munson who had spent his early years as well as his language-study years in Japan where his father, also a military man, had
been stationed. He spoke Japanese excellently and imparted a spirit among us that has long remained, a spirit of cheer and good sportsmanship. Next came Booth, one of the finest of Japanese linguists, a student of Japanese who wrote for us a splendid condensed grammar which Miss Jansen typed for us. Finally Dusenberry came and helped us greatly. If I recall rightly these men came for six-months periods respectively. I think it was in 1937 or possibly 1938, about the time when Captain Munson came that we succeeded in finding the finest kind of civilian translator, who having spent nearly all his life in Japan, knew Japanese as well as he knew English, if not better. This was Paul Cate, whose brother Philip shortly later came to work for the Navy. Very shortly after Pearl Harbor, Paul, who had performed tremendous labor, died at his post. That was indeed a loss. Hugh Erskine, who had come to us sometime before Paul's death, took his place aptly. In 1939, through Sinkov's efforts we found a splendid enlisted cryptanalyst, Stanley Kretlow.

Also sometime before Paul's death, two other language students, Doud and Svensson, came to us from the military. Both had taken the 4-year course in Japan with its attendant military tours of inspection. Doud had been doing cryptanalytical and translation work on Japanese, which was a labor of love for him, for sometime before coming to us. By then the Pacific Ocean had become somber
and foreboding. Some extra money was appropriated for us. Early in 1940 came Aurell, and Overton followed him with an increasing number of translators of varying ability, foremost among whom I would put Paul Gerhard. Many of these translators came fleeing from areas of danger. The attack on Pearl Harbor happened near the end of 1941 and the ranks of the translators, good and bad, swelled tremendously. Edwin Reischauer and Percy Buchanan instructed many picked recruits from colleges and universities in the modern classical Japanese language. I doubt if there was ever a better language school than we had, taking into consideration several rather poor methods of teaching a language outside the Indo-European group. Then too there were some Japanese-language schools set up at certain points in the nation which also did fine work, but they confined their instructions to the spoken language - a very different thing.

We must never forget our stenographers, those who handled our rapid-fire dictation with its terribly various vocabulary and so many Japanese and other foreign words. In addition to this, they had to be pretty well up on geography, history, politics, etc. Our first, Louise Newkirk, we lost before Pearl Harbor through marriage. Our second, Dorothy Pearson, we lost after Pearl Harbor through marriage. Miss Jansen is still with us. Louise Prather is also still with us as are Susan Cronise and Doris Stiverson.
I must also mention Rae Cave and Hazel Dronenburg, excellent stenographers.

In conclusion I think that the unique genius of Mr. Friedman and the immense effort he has put forth in his classic work here must be most highly praised and emphasized. Two other men whom I will always remember with great fondness are the late humane and learned Dr. Mendelssohn and Colonel McGrail.

There are many others whom I remember with varying degrees of clarity who will be brought up in further discussions.

Among that fine group of military officers who spent considerable time in our midst was language officer Joseph Sherr. His achievements and his personality, most amiable and expansive, had led us to entertain great hopes for his future. During the war he met an untimely death in an airplane crash in India, and our sorrow was great.

Immediately after the close of World War II I collapsed physically and mentally and to effect my recovery I was given a number of electric shocks. Exactly two years have passed since that experience, but my memory of many people and events is still misty and in many cases totally blank. In fact when I left the hospital in 1946 for a long time I could by no means rid myself of the feeling that I was living back in 1941. Therefore I now wish to add the names of several of my co-workers whom I recall with warm
feelings as having been fine contributors to the service; Albert Small, who came shortly after Snyder and Ferner; Delores Ekberg; Lorraine Stephens; Elma Ramssier, former employee and present wife of Herbert Yardley; Genevieve Grotjan, (a pretty blonde girl who worked with Edna very frequently as I recall); Glenn Laudig, a staid and sober young man with a sense of humor, ready to do anything he could. I would also mention with especial warmth Ulrich Kropfl, Mary Jo Dunning, Mildred Jerome, Louise Beall, Ruth Ferner, now Mrs. Ruth Johnson; Delia Ann Taylor, now Mrs. Abraham Sinkov; Miss Dorothy Froelke, now Mrs. Dorothy Brinker; Mary Barber, now Mrs. Lawrence Clark; Louise Lewis, now Mrs. Paul Dertich; Katherine Weissner, Isabel Murdock, William Bryan, Milton Berk, Ferdinand Engel, Pearl Corens, Mrs. Amelia Steele, now Mrs. Ray C. Blaine; Mary Campbell, now Mrs. Mary Thompson; Jean Reischauer, Mrs. Dorothy Brashears, and Miss Anne Dunkel.
Cryptanalysis as a profession.

I am not a cryptanalyst, but I have had a long personal association with cryptanalysts so I may say that their field of endeavor is now as difficult a science as can exist. Some writers claim that cryptanalysis is an art, others say that it is a combination of art and science. However, now more than ever the name of science is certainly more fitting. It requires now more than ever the keenest powers of observation, imagination, and memory. It further requires a staggering amount of concentration and drudgery. Cryptanalysis produces an absorbing interest that drains the resources and reserves of the body not once, but twice, but over and over again for years. Cryptographs long in use in some form or other and the machine methods of solution introduced here a dozen years ago have not lessened the cryptanalysts' labors so far as I can see. It would seem that from century to century there is some degree of relativity in this difficulty; but, even at that, the science is now somewhat harder to master. It is a question of constant research and development.

Cryptanalysis has come to be a highly restricted profession. It may be said to have three stages: first, study and apprenticeship; second, active, concentrated practice; and third, administration or expert advisorship.

The first stage almost presupposes an innate predisposition.
to analysis, persistence, and understanding of the workings of the minds of men. During this period of apprenticeship and study, lasting from four to eight years, the good student acquires in addition to what flair he must necessarily have, the habits of orderliness and patience. He must learn all he can about classical methods of cryptography and solution, and also their modern ramifications.

The second stage is the most dread period; for cryptanalysis is not a happy profession for all its interest. It is then that this scientist, as much as one concentrating on the mysteries of the universe or of atoms, ought to be protected. He ought to be protected from the impingements of administration, interruptions, and that devastating thing, noise. Unwitting though it be, it is nonetheless cruel to harass a man, thus terribly concentrating on vital matters, with notices about administrative policy, secrecy, loyalty, or this or that.

It is cruel also to place a man who is working at the core of these problems in ill-conceived, highly exposed areas. The hum and buzz of scores of workers punctuated by the click of typewriters do him insatiable harm. It is up to the several chiefs of cryptological agencies to see to such matters, because they have a background in this work.

In this second stage, the cryptanalyst is giving his all. No money or comfort will ever compensate him. Cryptanalysis is an interesting profession. Cryptanalysis is not a happy profession. What happens at the end of this period of
concentration when a man is forty-five or fifty? For only in
rare cases can the devotee practice his beloved profession,
cryptanalysis, for more than ten or fifteen years. What
happens then depends.

Antoine Rossignol served France for half a century.
Kings, queens, and regents all appreciated, protected, and
remunerated him magnificently, making it easier for him to make
the periodic adjustments. In the final phase of his work, he
developed some great cryptanalysts and laid down all the
traditional intelligence-security principles known today. Of
course, it all came to naught soon after, as all things do in
this world where one order succeeds another.

Bazeries did not fare so well in France at the turn of
the century. We have only to read his "La Routine des
Services du Gouvernement," to see how worn out he was with red
tape, heedlessness, and a base kind of competition. Poor and
broken, he began to praise the virtues of a cryptograph he
invented, which, good though it was, had already been invented
once if not more times before him. He was not let in anymore
on the secrets of bureaus where he had once served France
with eternal honor. No wonder his later writings are ironic
in tone.

Do cryptanalysts of genius fare well? Far too many of
them do not. I have known of some who after the first World
War, for example, went around with magnifying glasses. They
were looking for cryptograms in everything from blank paper and billboards to Shakespeare. They were not silly. They were not funny. Storm and stress had simply done their work and they had gone off at a tangent.

By the end of the second and most critical period, the cryptanalyst has broken the most difficult mathematical, and what is worse, pseudo-mathematical systems conceivable. And that is equally as grave, he has seen more than it is good to see of the evil side of men and nations, though, of course, he has seen rare streaks of goodness too.
Historical Cryptographic Notes and Bibliography.

We would desire, even in a booklet of this nature to give a short bibliography and commentary on cryptography. However for this I must refer the reader to the late Mr. Joseph S. Galloné's excellent "An Historical and Analytical Bibliography of the Literature of Cryptography" and to General Luigi Secco's "Manuale di Crittografia" (1747).

However, with our tongue in our cheek, we would like to present the French view of cryptography from 1519 up to 1894 which, biased as it is, is the most familiar to us, and which we can give mostly from memory.

Viètè, Rossignol, Forte, Viaris, Vigenèrc and Vesin were great cryptologists, but curiously most of them boast of solving simple substitution and transposition ciphers though assuredly they did better than that. Notable too were the more recent Bazeries, Givierge, and Cartier. Friedman, on the other hand, comes at the flood-tide of the electrification and mechanization of communications, has attended the international communications conferences, introduced modern cryptography in America, and initiated an unexcelled cipher bureau.

We are not engaging in research. We are merely transcribing memories of what we have read and heard.

Viètè lived during the latter half of the sixteenth century, and followed Henry IV wherever he went. Once while at Tours he ran into the Venetian Ambassador,
Giovanni Mocenigo, and began to boast of how he could solve ciphers. The Ambassador said, "Yes, but I'll wager you can't solve mine." "That's what you think," said Viète, swelling with the submerged pride from which he had suffered since giving up fame as a mathematician for the then more remunerative job of cryptologist, "but I'll go and get the translations and show you." He did, and the remorse of the moment after did no good; for systems were changed 12 days later. Henry saved him from disgrace. Viète introduced two-part codes in France.

Bazeries soured on the world because his government refused to buy his cryptographic instrument previously invented by Thomas Jefferson. Really, as the French War Department informed him, it did not comport the secrecy he thought it did. Also, it seems to me, Bazeries underrates transposition ciphers. One of his strong points, though, is his full and open recognition of the importance of guessing in the solution of secret messages. His bitterness is shown in his book called, perhaps with some justification, "La Routine des Services du Gouvernement."

I translated General Marcel Givierge's "Cours de Cryptographie" in 1934. In the preface to his very fine book, he says that it is all right now in our era of open and above-board diplomacy to talk frankly about cipher. What made him say that I don't know. Many have said it in any case.
Bibliography.

1519, April 13: A letter from Philip of Nassau to Marguerite of Austria. A monoalphabetic substitution with variants, using conventional signs, Greek letters, zodiacal signs, etc. (Vesin: Cryptographie devoilee. Brussels, 1840).

1555. The cipher of M. de Bassefontaine in his negotiations with several officials; monoalphabetic substitution with variants, using conventional signs and including nine frequently used words. (Bazeries, Chiffres secretes devoilees).

1586. The great Vigenère. "Traicté des chiffres".

1599. The cipher of M. de Béthune. Monoalphabetic substitution with variants, using numbers, letters and conventional signs, including 108 frequently used words. (Bazeries "Chiffres secretes devoilees". Paris, 1901).

1586. (Traicté des chiffres ou secretes manieres d'écrire). A 26-cipher alphabet substitution, each alphabet slid one letter to the right, above the table in capitals is the normal alphabet and beside it is the indicative alphabet. This table, said to have grown out of Porta's table given in "De furtivis literarum notis." (Naples, 1563). Porta's double substitution table, using eleven different 22-letter alphabets, each having to the left an indicator.
consisting of two consecutive letters. The alphabets are arranged on two lines of 11 letters each, the letters of the first line serving to encipher those of the second, and reciprocally.

1562. The cipher table of Henry IV used in corresponding with the Landgrave of Hesse (Valerio, De la cryptographie, Paris 1896).

This system used the alphabet minus j, k, q, and v, underneath each letter occur from two to four numbers. The table is completed by a number of syllables, words, and proper names enciphered with special signs, ordinary numbers, and numbers with dots or bars over them.

1691. Big and Little Ciphers of Louis XIV. Several numbers used for frequent letters and words; non-alphabetical series used; no clear words used. The "Big" and "Little" were the same save for numbers of groups used. (Le Masque de Fer, Paris 1893. E. Burgand and Major Cazeries).

18th century apparently void of cipher. Not much to be found.

1793. Cipher of the Emigrés Julius Caesar substitution, slid 3 letters, four numerical sequences for each of the vowels, complicated with digraphs for proper names. (Bazeries: chiffres secrets dévoilés, Chapter II.)

19th century shows great decline in cipher activities.

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SECRET
1813. Ciphers of Napoleon I. Big and Little cipher; alphabetical series used; several cipher numbers used under plain-letter component; no extra cipher; sometimes accents used; cipher mixed with clear. Dad compared with those of Louis XIV. (Text of messages found in Bazerics' "chiffres secrets devoiles," 3rd part, Chapter I.)

1815. Free Mason's Alphabet: $\text{Abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz}$

The Key: $\text{Abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz}$

Clear: $\text{ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZ}$

Cipher strip: $\text{ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZ}$

1880. The Saint-Cyr System.

Clear: $\text{ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZ}$

Cipher strip: $\text{ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZ}$
Take a key word, and use as many alphabets as there are letters in it. Obtain cipher text by writing, under each letter of the key word, the letter coming under the clear letter, sliding the strips along the fixed alphabet so as to make the key letter in the movable alphabet coincide with the letter A in the fixed alphabet.

1883. Kerckhoffs' classic "La cryptographie militaire".

1884. General Boulanger, Minister of War in the Freycinet (1886) and Goble (1897) Cabinets chose the cipher square. A cryptogram from him to the Minister in 1887 published in 1901 by Bazeries, employed the cipher square with a five-letter key SIROC (croix spelled backwards). The message was read in reverse (1892). In a brochure entitled "Méthodes pour chiffrer et déchiffrer les dépêches secrètes" Herman describes the use of a running key, say a page of a book, a key with the Saint-Cyr system slightly modified.

1892. The French Anarchists used a cipher called that of the Count of Paris, though it was never proven that the Count ever used it. It was a variety of the Crossfeld system using nulls, unfortunately the same length as the key word at the beginning and end of a message.
1893. F. Valeric's wonderful work "De la cryptographie" (1ère partie).
1896. F. Valeric's completion of the above-mentioned work.
1899. The Duke of Orleans and the Royalist Party corresponded in groups of 5 numbers using a substitution system. Bazeries discovered it to be the Beaufort system using days of the week and verses from Alfred de Musset's "Nuit de decembre" as keys.
1898. De Vairis - Repertoire A.B.C.
1922. Civierge - Cours de cryptographie.
1923. Cartier - Le service d'escoute pendant la guerre.
Some Guesses about why the Japanese surprised the United States at Pearl Harbor.

For some 7 years before Pearl Harbor we had an increasing amount of excellent information about the purposes and actions of Japan. After Hullback and I broke that simple monoalphabetic or rather monosyllabic code of the Japanese in 1933 we began slowly to break Japanese systems of slowly increasing difficulty. These were diplomatic codes. First the Japanese randomized these repertories, then they adopted the procedure of transposing the letters of the code and cipher groups, reaching the extreme in what we called Japanese code 19. Finally and parallel with these hand codes, they began to use a machine modeled after an older machine used by the Navy Department. We called this machine the "Red." In its solution we were engaged in very difficult mathematical calculations along with endless guessing. After this machine was solved one day we found the text so jumbled that we could not read it; however, Gates and I soon noticed that the text was merely abbreviated by the omission of vowels and the substitution therefor by infrequent letters of the ordinary Roman alphabet. It took us about two days to master this new spelling completely. In 1940 the so-called "Purple" machine was broken. Now the Japanese love puns so their name for the "Purple" machine was "hinoki." This is the Japanese word for cypress, suggesting to them the word cipher in English. Curiously "hinoki" may also mean "the Japanese
machine, the machine of the sun," or "the secret machine." That is how the Japanese like to name things.

Such a volume of traffic began to go and come between Tokyo and Berlin by the first of 1941 that a special keying system of terrific difficulty called HITAG was designed for this machine covering that circuit. This special keying method was solved on the night of April 16, 1941. The first message to be deciphered was a long one of a number of parts from Oshima to Matsuko, and I remained on the job till 11.00 o'clock that night translating it. Goering was outlining to Oshima Germany's plan to attack Russia on the following 22nd of June, giving the number of planes and numbers and types of divisions to be used for this drive and that. I was too excited for sleep that night. It was the liveliest news for many a day. Mr. Friedman, weary unto death after months of solution work, had gone home two hours earlier, asking me to call him up if it turned out to be anything interesting. Before leaving for home I called him and told him that it was a fascinating story but that it could wait till morning. We and the British informed the Russians about that, but they were too dumbfounded to believe it at first. Finally they accepted the facts, which made for a smoother military cooperation in the coming battle on the part of the Allies with Russia.

So on June 22, 1941 Hitler sent 180 divisions against Russia, against the snow and starvation that had in years...
gone by defeated so many armies, even that of Napoleon. Why did Hitler do this? Well, many, many Americans said on that day that Hitler would defeat the Communists in six weeks. Hitler, however, entertained no such delusions, for he himself said, "God only knows if I will win." The only explanation for this gamble can be found in the last analysis in "Mein Kampf."

But now let us return to the question of Pearl Harbor. As I said, we had a large amount of information about Japan's purposes, but the people at large knew nothing of this. Trade with Japan continued as usual. In spite of our democratic form of government, this should have been stopped. For several months before Pearl Harbor the competent government services could fairly accurately predict the approximate time of the attack, and in all honesty if we were to keep our integrity, our own policy could not swerve. Shortly after m showdown on Saturday, December 6, 1941, it was known by some in our Agency that Japan would surely attack us in the early afternoon of the following day. Antecedent messages, particularly the one directing Ambassadors Nomura and Kurasu to take Japan's final reply to the State Department at the precise hour of 1:00 P.M. of that December Sunday, considering all that had gone before, left not an iota of doubt in our minds as to the fact that the United States and Japan were already at war. Many now cry, why did they not know just where the attack would occur? The fact is we did not know.
Could we have known? It may sound strange, but I doubt it.
Unbelievable as it may sound to those unfamiliar with our
signal intelligence work at that time, almost to a man and
woman the personnel concerned throughout the Agency was simply
too small and too exhausted to be that analytical. We were
all too worn out to isolate and retain single details, uniquely
important as some of them turned out to be. This was true all
up and down the line. The storms and stress of those months
and years brought us all to the point where we were in the
paradoxical position of knowing and yet not knowing facts. We
walked as in dreams, and not a few in the War, Navy and State
Departments broke down rather badly under the relentless
processing, cryptanalyzing, translating, evaluating, and apply-
ing the information obtained from those dynamic Japanese inter-
cepts. Another thing, it was, all things considered, quite
impossible to have enough field operators to get all of the
important messages into our hands on time. When we consider
the huge amount of intelligence outside of the purely Japanese
field, the fact that we were confused and extremely weary
should not be hard to understand.

Outside the agencies mentioned above, there were few
people who could help us, hardly any who understood the situa-
tion. Some say that our failure was partly due to the fact
that many top linguists and analysts were not let in. The
fact is that many who were considered top authorities on Japan
and the Japanese language were let in, but by then the task had
become so complicated, that after a month or so these
genius's were glad to take side jobs. In short, our eyes
were red and glazed; exhaustion and dream-consciousness had
overcome us months before the event.

As I have indicated, what signs there may have been 6 or
8 weeks beforehand that Pearl Harbor would be Japan's objec-
tive in her amazing attack on us, were only specks in an ocean
of similar specks. It might seem now that we would have borne
in mind the naval information the Japanese began to ask for
concerning the Honolulu area. But they were asking for the
same kind of information about many other ports throughout the
world. I do not think that anyone can point an accusing
finger at any American because of the Pearl Harbor attack.

Some have always argued that President Roosevelt and
Secretary of State Hull appointed Japan, Germany, and Italy
our enemies, and forced them to attack us, but madness and
anger ruled in Germany, poverty in Italy, and extreme
fanaticism in Japan, and once started they would not stop.
President Roosevelt, musing with some friends as the hour ap-
proached, said "we have a good record." He simply wanted the
enemy to strike first.

Let us go back to the question of why we did not know
in advance where the attack would occur. Six weeks or so
beforehand there were exchanges concerning ship movements at
Pearl Harbor. The reasons why we did not pay enough attention
to this was that similar information was coming from many other
places and that by then our analytical powers were diminished by anxiety and fatigue. Immediately after those messages, diplomatic messages of the most drastic urgency flooded in in such immense numbers that we forgot the particular references to Hawaii. We somehow began to feel that Manila would be an after striking point for the Japanese. A number of people have wondered why certain messages, notably three concerning the coming attack on Pearl Harbor directly, were not translated until after Pearl Harbor. Had these people been among us and seen how buried we were in stacks of messages through the "Purple" machine which had and as far as we could humanly see should have priority, they would not wonder that we failed to process and translate a few messages in J-19 which though of a priority almost equal to the machine, rarely carried the most vital information. Several of these messages possibly reached our desks 3 or 4 days before the disaster and some of them not until nearly a month later, after the disaster. There were at that time in the War Department two people who could translate Japanese accurately and rapidly. Think of it, just two. There were others who worked on equally important material, but their production was slower and less sure.

In the foregoing I have spoken principally of some of the reasons for our failure to be ready and on the spot to meet the surprise attack of the Japanese. I have spoken almost entirely of our particular group, officers, cryptanalysts and
translators. But at that time we were not unaware of the fact that the same distress of consciousness due to the overstrain of mind and body also plagued the other competent departments, and now I finally ask myself the question: "How was it that those of us who had worked on the Japanese problem for 9 years and were so near physical ruin by December, 1941, ever lived through the 4 years that followed?" In fact not all did. Many died a little bit and some completely.

My work was always in the Japanese problem into the vortex of which were drawn the majority of the personnel of other sections which had already been well established. Concentration on the Japanese problem was the rule up to the end of the war, even though sections handling the codes of some of our friends and all of our main enemies functioned highly efficiently all along.

A Memory.

Thanksgiving Day is approaching and my wife and I have decided to spend part of Thanksgiving afternoon with some sick friends at Glenn Dale Sanatorium. I mention this to Mr. Friedman who says that he too would like to go to Glenn Dale on Thanksgiving Day to see our mutual old arch-enemy, Chief Clerk Barnett, and that he will take us in his car. After several pleasant hours, Mr. Friedman and I start back to his car while my wife lingers behind for a little while. The day is fair and a little chilly. The mists of late Indian summer hang over the wooded landscape. Our talk drifts to the
Japanese situation, and Mr. Friedman asks "What do you think is going to happen now?" I reply, "The negotiations seem about ended. They have said that if we do not give in, there will be a tragedy on the last day. The new cabinet is adamant. What do you think will happen?"

Mr. Friedman's face takes on a faraway look and he seems to gaze into nothingness across the stubbly fields, and he answers, "It means war." I look at his face anxiously and ask "Do you think we are ready?" and he replies, "I hope so."
A Note on the Solution of Japanese military messages and overlaps.

Elsewhere I have spoken of the bad results of following a too definite and misunderstood method of obtaining correct values in code. The following is one of the most striking examples I had in mind.

Poor liaison between instructors, cryptanalysts, and linguists was the cause of this. Moreover, large wings where there were constant murmuring, the click of typewriters, and too much interference on the part of supervisors made the problem much more difficult.

At Arlington Hall during 1944 and part of 1945, the day to day recovery of and assignment of plain-text values to the numerical groups coming from the various tables used periodically in the main Japanese military code systems was performed rather inefficiently. This was done on the basis of overlaps where the numerical code text was so written that the elements in the same key fell in the same column.

Now, the decrypters, being several hundred young collegians, mostly girls knowing nothing about the Japanese language at all, were primarily interested in depth and frequency in the columns. The few linguists who tried to help them were primarily interested in the re-establishment of the plain text after the frequencies had yielded a minimum of values giving cues for guessing the text.

There were not enough linguists to work backward to the
code on the basis of their value assumptions. The three or four of us whose job it was to guess had, in general, neither the time nor the mathematical skill to do so. In that section, as I said, there were far from enough linguists working on the reconstruction problem; all we could do was to pass from cadet to cadet telling each what her messages said, writing in the values underneath the unreconstructed group. Not more than ten out of a hundred of them put any reliance in the values we wrote in; for so rigorously had they been trained to work strictly on some frequency basis that nothing at all could alter this preconception. Disregarding the information we gave them, utterly oblivious to it, they worked hours, days, and weeks on the frequency principle inevitably reaching finally the same plain text we gave them to begin with.

This method of handling the problem puzzled and confused these young people. Some did profit from the linguists' efforts, but most of them began to shy away from us, doggedly declaring,

This is how we were taught to work. You don't understand our method yourself. You can't perform the simple mathematical processes we perform.

In my case that criticism was very true: I could not. But all they needed to do was to accept the words, phrases, sentences, and sometimes whole messages we wrote in for them, perform their mathematical operation, and finish their job. Hardly any of them would accept the method involving a step or two; they would take the mile-around way. Thus, we
linguists had to take seats, sit there and wait for the more sensible ones to come for our help, which few did, and much idle time was on our hands.

I have been told that in Australia, it was quickly observed that linguistic training for these workers on military systems was most essential. My informant said that they were given a course in the language and that I.B.M. machines were used to sort out the linguistic formulae necessary to solve this problem.

Now frequencies are the only weapon, or almost the only weapon, with which to start breaking a hitherto unidentified and unknown code or cipher, but after the code or cipher has been reduced to its basic system, vaster ramifications of frequency and considerations involving guesswork not at all involving this concept are the rule and not the exception. Any of the old cryptanalysts here could have corrected the teachers of these workers so they would not have gone off half-cocked and frozen the workers in the mire of this much misunderstood and misconstrued frequency method. I suppose, though, that these more experienced cryptanalysts were too busy -- too entranced in the heavy duties that weighed upon them.

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1840 was a momentous year. The rise in culture throughout Europe following the French Revolution had spread also to America. It was during that year that the great American genius Edgar Allan Poe issued his famous challenge, declaring that he could decipher any cryptogram sent to him within certain limitations, and stated that there was no such thing as an unbreakable cipher. He succeeded in every case, though it appears that in at least one instance another man solved one of the ciphers before he did. In the same year Vesin de Romanini was writing his "Cryptography Unveiled" in which he gave extensive frequency tables for the main European languages. This book is very amusing as it was intended to be, but practically speaking it has only a retrospective interest. It did however stimulate cryptological studies, particularly in France and Belgium.

In Germany during 1840 an unforgettable man named Franz Bopp was writing Sanskrit grammar, teaching, and lecturing before learned groups on comparative philology. In a paper, still famous, which he read that year before the German Academy of Science, he demonstrated the fact that a proto-Indo-European language very much like Sanskrit, if not ancient Sanskrit itself, had spread through time not only over the whole Western World but through India, a likely place of its origin, to the Pacific isles, from Hawaii to the Philippines.

Linguists often say that it is not so much the vocabulary
of a language as it is its syntax that determines what speech group it belongs to; however, it is dangerous to follow that theory too closely, because languages like the main Philippine dialect "Tagalog" have sloughed off their grammar. It is only by word comparison that it can be seen to be but another version of the language spoken long ago throughout India. We ourselves are speaking and writing today yet another version of that selfsame language.

It might sound paradoxical, but in one sense language changes rapidly while in another sense it remains remarkably static. This can be seen by the simple fact that Greek, Latin, the Romance languages, Gaelic, Teutonic, Slavic, Persian, and Hindu, all have essentially the same basic vocabulary. No amount of sociological or scientific development has altered this fact, for the older components of words are now simply put together in new ways to fit the special vocabularies of the times. The main differences in vocabulary are due to the infiltration of words from other language groups or mere slang, and these words are notable not for their multitude but rather for their relative scarcity. It is very difficult to find, for example, many words in French which are not in some form or other found in German, though in each tongue their meaning may have come over the centuries to have lesser or greater differences. For example, the French word "Commun" is found in German as "Gemein." Not only do they mean generally the same thing but they are actually identical.
What brings about changes like this in the pronunciation of words? The human throat, the tongue, the palate, the teeth and the lips, controlled by the characteristics of the human mind, cause such phenomena. The letters R, L, and W, for example, are really hard to pronounce. Now take a country, where they are pronounced with their proper values. Let a large group of people from that country become separated from it, say by emigration, and in a generation or two the new group will pronounce W like V. The R may be pronounced like L and in some cases dropped altogether, whereas L may have the sound of Y. Generally speaking, the Japanese cannot pronounce the letter L and the Chinese cannot pronounce R. Of course, they can learn the correct pronunciation, but it is difficult. The speech of children seems to be a primary factor for linguistic change, and whether or not a language remains closely intact seems to depend upon the extent to which the mass of a society regularizes the pronunciation of the adolescent. During periods of migrations, this influence is not strong and the dialects arise, sometimes developing into new languages.

Some linguists believe that there is some relation between the different speeches of all peoples. If this is so, it has never been proven. How could we expect to prove it? Men have lived on this planet for more than a million years, and we cannot trace the history of any people as far back as 7,000 years. If, indeed, man evolved in one particular place in
this world and spoke one language originally, there is not the slightest reason for thinking that one single word of that original speech would survive to this day among all the races of men.

Franz Bopp made one wrong assumption and another questionable one. First he thought that he could trace Indo-European words back to their roots. He noted the words ist, art, i.e., sind, suma, sommer, was, etc.; he noted the words and thought he found their ultimate root in the Sanskrit, as, to be. He also noted that practically the same ending that the various forms of the word "to be" have in the European languages are found in the conjugation of the verb "to be" in India 2,300 years ago. He did not realize, apparently, that had he been able to go back two or three thousand years further, the verb root would have been something different in all probability. Secondly, Bopp thought that the verb-endings could be identified with ancient pronouns, etc. This has never been done.

Yet even that far back the root "to be" might have been #, or #; for... Japanese, a language known to have hundreds of Polynesian words in its vocabulary, has # as its basic word for "to be." The Japanese word # means about the same thing as the Latin #. Japanese has the Sanskrit #, meaning the same as the English this or that.

It is wrong to go very far in identifying languages with races; for obviously people like the negroes who formerly spoke
a language in no wise related to ours, now speak English as their native language without any recollection of the language of their forefathers. Conquerors have imposed their languages on different races, and, in general, throughout the period of man's habitation on this planet, his wanderings have been far too extensive to attribute his language to any racial origin.

The earliest grammar we know anything about was written by the Hindu, Panini, some 300 years before Christian Era, and it may be said that the grammatical categories invented by him, largely on the basis of his studies and of those before him on the Sanskrit of the Vedas, have been used down to the present day by practically all grammarians in the Western World. Yet however grammarians may stabilize a language, particularly in its written form, grammar is nonetheless, an interpretation that comes not before, but rather after linguistic forms have come into existence. Some grammarians may tell us, for example, that we should say "with whom did you talk" but we feel, and correctly so, that it is better at least to say, if not even to write, "who did you talk to?"

There are some remarks I wish to make on how these messages were translated. They were carefully studied and read in Japanese in the mind of the translator and then converted into English by rapid dictation to stenographers of pristine training and ability. A good linguist can acquire
this knack in a surprisingly short time. In my opinion, able translators should not have to plead and plead for stenographers, just because others in their sections prefer the generally inferior procedure of writing translations out by hand. A good translator ought to know thoroughly the two languages involved.

Our Germanic speech is a very rich one, drawing heavily on Latin and Greek. The Japanese language is a very rich one also, drawing even more heavily on two ancient Chinese dialects. The shades of meaning in Japanese text cannot be rendered with their exact tone into English. English is not one-third as highly integrating a tongue as Japanese; so, in translating, we had to break the sentences up into shorter ones; moreover we had to use many circumlocutions and resort to a number of other devices to convey the real intended sense and weight of the original.

The uniform and stilted business and official style of English is far too poor to impart this. Learned Japanese diplomats are prone to vie with one another in the use of their classical language. They are not hampered to the same extent as most government officials are in most other countries by a set manner of writing. In perilous times, for example, foreign envoys and particularly Japanese envoys, dictate forceful and dramatic statements to their secretaries. Now, if something near the true weight, meaning and intention of their words are to be transferred into another tongue for the use
of intelligence operational officials, equally dramatic words must be used. We Americans do not seem enough aware that our official style, perhaps having something to do with our temperament, cramps us. There have been instances where failure in this very respect might have entailed serious consequences; however, I cannot say that there have been occasions where this actually happened.

There was however immediately before Pearl Harbor a border-line case which should be mentioned. The sentence night-bei kankai wa kaitai ni hensu which literally means "Japanese-American relations have passed the brink of disaster," Our Navy and the British translated it dangerously weakly. The Dutch in the Netherlands East Indies and I alone got the force of the meaning. I translated it verbatim "Japanese-American relations reach (the past tense in a short sentence) the brink of catastrophe" and the Dutch translated it "a state of war exists between Japan and the United States." Our Navy translated it "Japanese-American relations are not up to expectations," and the British translated it "Japanese-American relations are in a critical condition." I was in the hospital when the Pearl Harbor investigation took place, and when this message was referred to some of our other translators here, they wrongly went along with the conventional language of the British version, because that is how the dictionary translates it in an example under the word kaitai.*

* (Inouye's Daijiten, page 1310) which really means "catastrophe."
Japanese and English are as different as any two languages in the world can be different, and what are called literal translations were, of course, impossible. It was the exact purpose that we strove to attain. In doing this we found that rapid dictation was the most successful method, because in speaking off a message fast, we felt very intimately the tenor of what was being said -- the yes-or-no of habitual Japanese equivocation. The first natural English word-order that came to us was usually found to be the best, and subsequent corrections would only hurt the messages.

Then too, one of our major difficulties in the Japanese problem was our lack of familiarity with Japanese myths, allegories, allusions, etc.

We found code and cipher reconstruction one of the very best means of extending our knowledge of Japanese. Seventeen years ago I spoke Japanese fairly well, but I knew nothing at all of the classical language in which framework all Japanese diplomatic messages are phrased. I was totally ignorant of this antique style until I saw it come out on the work sheets, and there was just enough similarity between it and the spoken language to enable me at first to get the drift; then gradually the rationale became apparent over a number of years. Learning the several so-called Romance languages in this way is ever so much easier, because they are really nothing but Latin dialects. Still, if time is of the essence the difficult grammatical route must be followed in
training foreign tongues. Also the rapid assimilation of vocabulary must be accomplished.
The Story of the People who attacked us on December the 7th, 1941, at Pearl Harbor.

As I said earlier, the Congressional Investigation Committee on Pearl Harbor, it seems to me, did not view Japan sufficiently in the proper historical perspective. Therefore, before going on to the messages, it seems right to give a short sketch of Japan's past along with a few comments on present-day conditions. After all, it is well to remember that it was specifically the Japanese problem which haunted us from the first. Of course, the Nazis and Fascists were laying their plans of conquest even then, but their outbursts came later.

I do not think that we yet know enough about the evidently ancient Japanese people to try to judge where they came from. There are doubtless Korean, Mongolian, and Manchurian elements, but the language seems to me basically Polynesian. It may well be that Philippine conquerors of long ago came in from the south and imposed their language on the inhabitants. Then too there were ever so long ago many white men living throughout all Japan, the Ainu who are now driven northward to Hokkaidoo.

Whatever the linguistic affinities of Japanese may be, it seems totally unrelated to the language of nearby China. It is hardly an accident, on the other hand, that the native Japanese words for "that, when, what, is, metal, head, heart, core, mingle, pile, fire, day, sky, morning, etc."
unquestionably are found in India, the South Sea Islands, the Near and Middle East, and all over Europe and America. It seems probable that prehistoric Sanskrit spread from India to the Philippines and permeated the Pacific islands from Hawaii to Japan.

The nineteenth and twentieth century English Scholar Diplomats Sir Ernest Satow, Sir W. G. Aston, Sir Basil Hall Chamberlain, named Basil Hall after a great pioneer Orientalist by that name, and the now living Sir George Sansom are the unique authorities on the Japanese language past and present. It seems that most of the work of the first three are now out of print. These four men by far excelled any Japanese scholar in all time, not even excepting Motoori Noriga, in understanding and working out the rationale of Japanese grammar and bringing to light Japan's true history. Japanese word structure had been hidden for at least sixteen centuries by Chinese characters and their derivative syllabary kana, which is an abbreviation of a limited number of characters bearing the sounds of Japanese words. These four reduced it to roots, stems and agglutinative suffixes rendering it learnable.

Chamberlain was for a long time Professor of Japanese and Chinese in the University of Tokyo, and emerges as a major luminary in Japanese-language research, having begun, like some of his great predecessors, as a Secretary in H. M.'s Embassy in Tokyo. Sir George Sansom's "Historical Grammar" contributes much to the re-establishment of prehistoric Japanese.
Now let us briefly see what has been reconstructed during the last hundred years from manuscripts nearly a thousand years old, relating to the mythological period. Some scholars have sought for rays of historic light in Kojiki (Record of old things) and Nihongi (Japanese matters), but these cycles of stories are little if anything but fantasies. Some historians and historiologists attempt to link up the stories with the points from which they more or less assume the different elements of the Japanese population to have entered the country. Another very old manuscript is called Manyoshu (a myriad leaves of poetry). Now in Kojiki and Nihongi the writing is in Chinese; in fact, they may have been intended as Chinese documents, Japanese names being spelled out by Chinese characters used purely phonetically. But the Manyoshu is in the Japanese language, nearly all the characters representing purely sounds.

The Kojiki declares that the Lure man Izanagi and the Lure woman Izanami, presumably a god and goddess, descended from heaven upon an island where they began the work of creation. Their first-born were the land and the sea. This is rather paradoxical for "island" implies land and sea. Next they begot the sun goddess, Ama-terasu-cho-mi-Kami; the moon god, and Susa-No-O-No-Mikoto, the storm god; and finally certain elements, the last of which was fire, in bearing which Izanami perishes.
Grieved at her loss, her husband goes to Yomi, the land of shades, where he calls for and meets his wife at the palace door, even as Aeolus met Orssa in the shadowy Hades across the Styx and as Orpheus met Eurydice. Isanagi begged Isanami to return from this weird, otherworld back to the earth where, he says, their work was not yet completed. Isanami replies that although she has eaten of the cooking pots of Yomi, she will return, but must first go back for a brief moment to consult with the god of Yomi. Isanagi waits unduly long and finally follows her much later, only to find her dead. "Maggots had bred and putrefaction had set in. The roaring thunder, the crashing thunder, the whipping thunder and altogether eight kinds of thunder gods were born and were sitting on her head, legs, arms and groin." Thus ends the work of the first woman and the first man, and we will now take up their primary offspring.

It would appear that the moon god was begot practically for the sole purpose of siring together with his sister, Amaterasu, one Ninigi, the great-grandfather of the Emperor Kame-Yasato-Ihara-Biko-No-Mikoto (whom much later militarists found it advantageous to identify with Jimmu Tenno the hypothetical first emperor). More myth though it be, this lineage is supposed to have continued over impossibly long rules to more than 2,600 years ago.

This is indeed amazing in view of the fact that Japan's
first book was written early in the eighth century. It is stated that Yamato was a great conqueror, who, after a short stay in Izumo where he consulted its rulers, proceeded to Kyushu where his power was supreme. On the other hand, Susa-No-O descended to Izumo, married, and remained there. For was he, as a matter of fact, always a bad fellow. At times he is benevolent with a fine sense of humor. Some stories have it that he first descended to Silla in Korea and then fled from enemies across to Izumo. Witness the fairy story of the rabbit crossing water over a bridge of friendly fish to escape from a fox. This lends some support to the idea of Korean influence in Japan, amply demonstrated elsewhere by excavation. For that matter, it is said that very long ago Japan had colonies on the Korean coast. Still, as I have already stated, the whole series of myths is very questionable. Susa-No-O, upon marriage, speaks the first poem we have any knowledge of in the Japanese language. It is written in Chinese characters purely for sound and reads as follows:

Yakumo tatsu
Izumo yaegaki
Tsuma-yori ni
Yaegaki tenkuru
Sono Yaegaki wo!

Which, translated, reads:

Many clouds arise,
Everywhere they make a manifold fence,
For me to bring my wife into,
Oh, that manifold fence!

Note here the ancient and still true use of wo as an exclamation stronger than wa.
The point of this first poem is that there is a play upon the word which may mean everywhere or the Province "Isumo." Presumably from this union descend warriors, and, in consequence, nobles.

Thus ends this narrative of creation written by some Chinese scholar, most probably at the dictation of some Japanese priest or priestess and reconstructed in Japanese as best possible in the 18th century by Notoori Morinaga. His version was subsequently twice revised, more correctly each time, by Chamberlain and Aston. This narrative is indeed what we might call a Chinese book, Japanese names being spelled out by characters used for sound and not meaning.

Parenthetically, at this point I recall that I stated earlier that Chamberlain, Aston, etc., were the first people to analyze the Japanese language scientifically. That is not quite true, for I have recently read a Japanese translation of a grammar written in the 16th century by a Portuguese named Rodrigues. Facsimiles of Rodrigues's handwriting are given in this translation. It is interesting to note how this Christian missionary at that early time alienated himself from the European inflectional pattern and wrote of the Japanese noun, verb, adverb, adjective, and postposition according to their true nature and functions. This book was grossly neglected until modern times. How interesting it is to note in Rodrigues's book how much of the colloquial language of his time is now reserved as an older classical form of expression.
Just when Kojiki and its counterpart and continuation Nihongi or Nihonshoki (Record of Japanese matters) were written would appear to be somewhat problematical, but most probably sometime in the eighth century. It is said that somewhere around the sixth century when Buddhism, a benign and kindly doctrine, though not originally a true mystic religion, was first introduced into Japan, this old folklore was named Shinto (The Way of the Gods) as opposed to Butsudoo (The Way of Buddha), but I do not know. I rather doubt it. I fancy that the word Shinto was fashioned ever so much later.

The Historical Period.

As is the case in a number of races, it is difficult to distinguish the point where myths and history commence. The first date in Japanese history that would appear rather correct is 200 A.D. when an empress referred to as Jingu was ruling. It would appear that she herself led an expedition to Korea. Chinese documents of the time state that a woman headed the island empire at that time. With more assurance we can mention the date 461 A.D. with the Emperor Nintoku consolidating the Yamato clan, which continues through that early era called the Nara period. Next, strong Chinese influence began to be felt in Japan, and Buddhism was first introduced from China by way of Korea, it is asserted, in the year 552 A.D. Other waves of Chinese missionaries and traders alternated between the Canton-Shanghai area and Peking.
The former area mentioned was then called Wu and the latter Han. Previously the Japanese, being barbarians, had had no form of writing whatever. The Wu people first brought Chinese characters and their pronunciation of that time and place. The principal Buddhist sects still use the Wu pronunciation for Chinese characters in their rituals. Several hundred years later the pronunciation given these characters in the Han area gained predominance over the earlier pronunciation and has held it, mutilated though it be, to this day.

In the dawn of the historical period which we may set somewhere around 261, strong Chinese influence was felt throughout the islands, and in 607 the first ambassadors went to China, and the practice ended in 859. These envoys brought back much Chinese art, literature, governmental formulae, stories of all kinds and many customs. These customs were superimposed not only upon Japanese society but also on the mores already imported from Korea.

The city of Nara itself was built in the year 710 and from that date to 794 it remained the capital. During this epoch the Fujiwara family played a leading role. In 794 Kyoto was built and became the capital whereupon begins the so-called Heian period. Other big square cities -- symbols of Chinese civilization -- were constructed and between the years 850 to 1150 the assimilation and amalgamation of nearly all things Chinese took place.
Japan's first two documents date from the 8th century, and as stated are called respectively Kojiki (Record of old things) and Nihongi (Japanese matters). These, shall we say, books, set forth a cosmic theory of creation with possibly a few vague undertones of history. However, the language in which this particular Japanese theory is set forth is conspicuous by its extreme childishness of expression. These two documents are written in the Chinese language, Japanese names and place names being spelled out by characters representing sounds no matter what their real pictorial meaning. We may presume that some Japanese, versed in ancient lore, at the instigation of his ruler dictated these works to some Chinese scribe who wrote them down in his own language with some coloring. In any case, they may possibly have been read as Chinese documents.

The Chinese system of writing has never been well suited to the Japanese language. At first the characters were used purely for their meaning, next in some cases for their meaning, next in some cases for their meaning and in others for their sounds, and finally some eleven or twelve hundred years ago, some three hundred of them were simplified into what is now called Kana, a kind of syllabic alphabet. At the present day, we find this reduced to forty-seven rather imperfect syllables written in a square form called Katakana and in a cursive form called Hiragana (taken together making about ninety-four Kana characters.) These are presented in the poem "Iroha"
A great new Japanese literature began to flourish in the year 1000. Lady Murasaki was writing amusing stories about court life; and many Buddhist priests, venturesome novelists, and philosophers were pouring forth works based upon the new assimilated Chinese culture.

The central government, however, became bemused, atrophied and the country was divided up into manor estates like the Roman Empire or that of Charlemagne or again as in the case of many German barons, constituting a feudal system. Over these manors, military men held sway and there the military caste developed and thrived. They formed local cliques of military men, and began to harass the court at Kyoto with bloody disputes they got involved in.

Finally, however, in 1150 the first great military machine, the Taira clan, took control, ruling the nation with an iron hand for five years between 1180 and 1185. Nevertheless, the most sanguinary civil wars continued until the Minamoto clan defeated the Taira in 1185 and set up a feudal government. This period is sometimes referred to as that of the Minamoto or the Kamakura.

When the 13th century was three-quarters over, Kubla Khan and his hordes of Mongols who had defeated the Chinese and the Koreans sent a letter to whom he called the "King of Japan" pointing out the fate of China and Korea and suggesting that it might be better for Japan to surrender without
bloodshed. The Japanese in return challenged him and started out to meet his forces on their own ground. Kubla sent a fleet to subdue them, but a typhoon sent all his ships to the bottom, ending the whole affair. This victory gave the Minamoto a great place in history.

In 1333 the Kamakura feudal system collapsed and the Ashikaga family took over the reins of government at Kyoto. At first they showed strength; but though they ruled theoretically until 1568, their real power had long since vanished.

During this era, we see the emergence of another sort of feudal system -- the appearance of the Shogun, the Daimyos, and the Samurai. The Shogun were the feudal lords -- the Ashikaga. Presumably, the Daimyos and the Samurai were working for them. However, the latter two never failed to conspire against them, refusing them a share of the crops of their own land and refusing to pay any tribute. Throughout the whole of Japan, this was a period of great warfare. Many Japanese turned pirates and traders; and by both peaceful and military invasion gained strong footholds in southern China, Korea, etc. At this turn things had reached a point of pandemonium in the land of the Rising Sun.

At this point, three strong men took the stage and ushered in what we might call Japanese modern history. That is, they reunited the nation just as the Westerners were beginning to reach Japanese ports. These men were
Nobunaga (1568-1581) and Hideyoshi (1581-1598), and Tokugawa Ieyasu who won out in 1600 and founded a second feudal system, that of the Tokugawa family, which existed from 1600 to 1868. The Europeans now arrived in shiploads, among which were the Portuguese, who had first come to Japan in 1543.

But let us return to the three strong men before discussing the Europeans. Nobunaga centralized the government, but there were no emperors in outward evidence between 1521 and 1587. Nobunaga hated the Buddhists and their religious and political intrigue, and succeeded in wiping them out to some extent and in unifying the nation into an empire. His main assistant was a peasant named Hideyoshi who, on the death of his master, assumed the rule.

In 1589 the first missionary, Xavier, came to Japan where he spent two years. After his departure, more of his fellow Jesuits came. Nobunaga protected the Jesuits in order to learn all he could about things European. His greatest hate was the Buddhist priests and, as a matter of fact, he destroyed many temples and thousands upon thousands of Buddhists.

It has been suggested that Hideyoshi planned the death of his master Nobunaga by dispatching some troops to quell an uprising at some distant point. They, however, returned and surrounded Nobunaga's home and he, seeing that escape was impossible, committed suicide. Others say that he was killed by a lieutenant. As for the facts of the matter, I am ignorant.
Hideyoshi then joined Ieyasu and Nobu, a kinsman of Nobunaga and quite an opportunist. Even more than Nobunaga, did Hideyoshi hate the Buddhists, but on the other hand, he did not have the tolerance for the Christians that his predecessor had shown. He called up many Portuguese and asked them, "By what reason do you impose Christianity upon the Japanese? Why do you eat, and teach the Japanese people to eat, cattle and other animals useful to man? Why do you carry off Japanese slaves to the Indies?" He answered at their replies and in 1587 issued an edict commanding them to leave the country within twenty days. Curiously enough, however, something seems to have changed his mind rather suddenly, and the Christians were allowed to remain. Of course, they had to moderate their methods and cease breaking up Buddhist altars, symbols, etc. It is probable that the idea of trade motivated this temperance on the part of Hideyoshi, because business began to flourish between the Portuguese and his country.

Spanish Franciscans came next to the Archipelago. They were followed very shortly by tradesmen. There seems to be truth in the statement that a merchantman was stranded near the coast and a Japanese went abroad to inquire about what could be done. He asked the pilot how Portugal was able to carry on such trade and have so many colonies. The pilot is said to have replied: "This is how it is done: First the
missionaries pave the way for trade, and then conquest follows."

The Japanese returned and recounted to Hideyoshi what he had heard and the fury of the ruler knew no bounds; for he had already long been suspecting some such things. Moreover, he had actually witnessed the Jesuits and Franciscans settling one another over matters of doctrine and spheres of influence. He immediately had twenty-six Christians, native and foreign, slain in public and ordered every Christian out of the country. But before this order could be put completely into effect, death stopped Hideyoshi's hand and they remained.

Upon the demise of this great figure, Ieyasu, after a series of violent battles, defeated Hideyoshi's kinsmen, who laid claim to the power, and finally won out.

At one time in the 16th century nearly all of Western Japan, notably Kumashu, was half Christian. However, these adherents were decimated in 1639.

During the regency of the great warrior Hideyoshi, Korea was invaded. This campaign lasted for six years, from 1592 through 1598. The campaign, however, resulted in a draw testament to defeat for the Japanese whose real object had been to conquer even China. Probably, the most decisive action was fought around a large castle compound built for themselves as a fort -- the Castle of Urasan. The vital Japanese forces fled down the peninsula and took refuge in this castle and were immediately surrounded by the tall and
fearless Chinese Ming soldiers, bearing the yellow banners with the inscription TAINING (the Great Light) and by the Koreans whose allies they were. So densely was that long wall defended by fierce warriors with bows and arrows, stones, spears, swords and bomb-throwing cannon that there was not any conceivable way of escape.

According to a description of this scene by Grifflie, the Japanese burned everything available, ate rats, and succeeded in getting only a small amount of water from the neighboring springs, in doing which practically every adventurer met his death by an arrow. By the moonlight the Koreans and the huge Ming soldiers would watch these ghosts steal out from the castle and search the pockets of the dead, excares for grains of parched rice. Finally, a rescue unit forced a passage and saved them, but their numbers had diminished terribly. And when at length food and water were available, they were dealt out cautiously lest sudden plenty bring sudden death.

Hideyoshi withdrew from Korea in 1598, but, according to Grifflie, for long years after, the soldiers who had taken part in the campaign, remembering how they had slain the most beautiful girl in each Korean village by transfixing her with a spear and remembering how they had taken a terrible toll of life, would wander about Japan as armed cadiocats muttering prayers for Buddha's forgiveness. At night with alternating chills and fever, they would lay their hands on their swords, rise up screaming, and grapple with the Ming in the land of...
dreams. These night visions of horror remained with them for a quarter of a century.

After the death of Hideyoshi, the Tokugawa Shogunate prohibited all communication with the outside world and drove out all foreigners except a few Dutch in prison in Nagasaki, practically freezing the status quo as of the early 17th century. Thus, in the 19th century, Japan was two centuries behind Europe in everything. The three strong men and the Tokugawa Shogunate had stabilized the situation at home, but outside pressure became too high. Perry came in 1853, and the British, Russians, and Americans began to eye Japanese ports.

This brings us up to the memory of men now living, and the last three reigns have been those of Mutsuhito (Meiji 1868 to 1912), Yoshihito (Taisho 1912 to 1926) and Hirohito (Showa 1926—).

The Last Three Emperors.

Now let us begin a discussion of Japan within the memory of men still living, few indeed though they may be. In 1868 the Emperor Mutsuhito ascended the throne under the pseudonym of Meiji. Already the rising military, with inordinate ambitions, like halos of hell over their heads, had brought out the dusty old Kojiki and Nihongi from the shelves where Buddhism had relegated them totally.

The military ardently desired to restore the Emperors in order not only to exploit the masses to the utmost, but also to unify the nation and gird it for conquest. They took the
childish meanderings of the Kojiki, etc., known of by not more than a dozen men, and on the basis thereof created a new religion called Shintoism. The ancient nature cult could not possibly have had any such name because Shinto is Chinese and means the "Way of the Gods." Having invented this formidable political weapon, and shot the whole educational system through with their newly invented false history, these same military-minded schemers came to believe in their own creation, as Chamberlain points out.

Thus, many of these Japanese myths and historical stories have found their way into our respectable reference books, so that we have been prone to give them credence.

In Meiji the warriors found the man they wanted. He was alert, austere, and eager to learn everything possible about Occidental machinery and government, but not Occidental philosophy. So he sent men to Europe to copy all of its mechanical and governmental ideas, remodeling the Japanese Government according to that of the British, and setting up a legal system based largely on that of Napoleon. In the year when I was born, 1904, his armies were fighting China, Korea, and Russia, defeating the Russians in a surprise attack at Port Arthur in 1905, sinking the Russian fleet in a horrible manner with a cruel loss of life. Having thoroughly chastised Korea, he annexed it in 1910.

Meiji created many boards and many commissions, one reconstructing the ancient language with no admixture of Chinese;
another working out a system of Chinese characters to represent European machinery, chemistry, biology, electronics, medicine, etc. In addition to all this, he and his consort found time to write many pious Shinto poems which were inserted into what were called "Readers for the People." At the end of all these readers it was stated that the Emperor should first be worshiped in East Asia and finally by the whole world.

Meiji's reign ended in 1912, and that of Yoshihito with the pseudonym Taisho begun in 1912, lasting until 1925, a length of 14 years. Taisho is said to have hated the complexities of all things Japanese with so many superimposed customs, impossible languages, horrible inventions, government forms, etc. He is said to have hated his father, too, not only because Meiji outstowed anything he could possibly do, but also because he stood for quite the opposite. As he grew older and as the warlike trends in Japan increased, he apparently became extremely recalcitrant. More and more did he mock the throne. Once telescoping an important document which he was supposed to sign before the Diet, he looked cut through it over the members, making disparaging remarks about their appearances. Consequently, the Japanese probably thought it easier in this new regime which had to be stabilized to call him insane rather than to execute or imprison him as had been done in other eras. But I have known
several people who conversed at length with Taisho when he was an old man, and they stated with certainty that he was a very plain and natural human being with not the slightest indication of being out of his mind. I don't know.

We are now in the era of Hirohito, whose pen name is Showa. He ascended the throne in 1926. All that seems generally known of him is that he is a marine biologist.

Recent Events.

The machine age caused the population to shoot rapidly upwards in Japan and gave the ruling class increasing ambitions. Even before Meiji, these barbarous military leaders had started the war drums rolling toward invasion and expansion. In Mutsuhito (Meiji) they found their man, a most adequate collaborator and symbol. To cover their bloodthirstiness, in 1900 one Dr. Nitobe invented the word "bushido" (the way of the noble soldier) and it, along with the breath-taker "Yamato-damashi" (the Spirit of Old Japan), was inserted in the dictionaries. Already, shortly before this, the ruling classes, with the military, had invented a new barbaric religion seeking vainly to blend the worship of emperor and bloodshed with the humane kindnesses of Buddha's own specific teachings. This religion they call Shinto, but I would not vouch for any antiquity whatsoever for this Chinese compound word.

The defeat of Korea and Russia 1904–1905, in the very dawn of my life, gave Meiji, in the 35th year of his reign,
such reams that the reverberations reached the book
shelves of Europe and America; so that even we came, curiously,
to regard Mutsuhito as the great and noble Emperor of an
exotic yet progressive and noble people. I am reading it all
before me now, in an old book full of pictures of celebrities,
published in 1908. Meiji sits, haughtily and proudly holding
a fan, in his kimono just above the glowing description of the
achievements of this Mikado, a fine old Japanese word written
with Chinese pictographs meaning "August Gate," but I don't
know if this is the real meaning or not. It is regrettable
that they changed it to the Chinese Tezmac Heka "The King
of Heaven under the Throne," i.e., "His Imperial Majesty."

September 18, 1931: The Japanese Kwangtung Army accused
the Manchurians of sabotage on the South Manchurian Railway.
Quickly seizing Kirin and other key points, they soon took it
over and named it Manchukuo (Manchuria).

We were shocked, or should have been, but business men,
certain admirers of Japanese rock gardens, color prints,
pseudo-Buddhism, etc., and certain churchmen assured our
nation that President Roosevelt and Mr. Hull must go easy on
that nation of "a hundred million courageous souls" -- a
cultured nation in need of living room for the many births due
to the machine age. They said poor Japan had to have iron,
petroleum, cotton, and such like.

July 7, 1937: Another incident occurred at Luchouchiao
(Marco Polo) Bridge, at Peking, but our philanthropic business
men, etc., said that Mr. Roosevelt, Mr. Hull, and all of us
must be of temperate judgment.

Down went the Panay, and the same was the case.

Came those awesome months of October and November 1941,
and finally on Sunday December 7th, early in the afternoon,
the Japanese sent our fleet at Pearl Harbor down into the deep.
Simultaneously Thai and the Philippines were invaded.

Then everybody said that Japan had been wrong -- had done
wrong. She had wreaked ruin upon us, fool though she was
ever to dream that she could defeat us even though to fight a
two-ocean war.
A few notes on Japanese signal intelligence work.

I want to discuss briefly signal intelligence work from the Japanese side. I have a limited knowledge of this from certain Japanese messages and somewhat more information from the reports of the Target Investigation people. Still, what I will say will be rather superficial.

The Japanese, it may be said, were considerably backward in their intelligence activities in the late war. But in so saying, I can never forget the hardships we ourselves met in our intelligence work with respect to them. None knows better than a cryptologist how much difficulty small technicalities can cause, and how many people are needed to unravel them.

Nonetheless, the wonder often voiced at Japan's rapid modernization could not be justified. She has always lagged behind the West in the scientific method. We have only to reflect on Japan's historical social system to realize that despite her phenomenal industrialization, relatively few individuals could be expected to have sufficient knowledge, independent imagination, and initiative to keep abreast of all the techniques developed in America and Europe. Moreover, save for her most observant diplomats, she was almost totally blind to the stamina of her foes. Had Japan realized that, and had she possessed enough information and wisdom, Shintoism, coupled with false deductions concerning her past conquests, would not have plunged her into war with the Allies.
The Japanese War Department's Central Special Intelligence Section, after leading a nomadic existence around Tokyo, finally wound up in a government-subsidized old-age home, founded after the great earthquake mostly with American relief money, in Tokaido, Sugami Precinct of that city. Now, a booklet published by this institution opens with this wording:

"In our country, loyalty and filial piety have from olden times been regarded as the root of all virtues, and the family system based on them and the spirit of mutual aid among the people have made the establishment of institutions for destitute people of comparatively less importance. The speedy development of modern cities and rapid change of economic conditions, however, have naturally contributed to the increase in number of the dependent aged and disabled." So Japan has felt the impact of mechanics increasingly and has tried to keep pace.

Filial piety with all its family, tribal, and national implications has been the greatest means historically of achieving partial human security. But at all times and in all peoples the needs and desires of the individual are at odds with those of the group, and whatever the reasons, in the West the emancipation of the individual has been gaining momentum for centuries. During the last five hundred years, the tempo has been accelerating remarkably. This freedom has produced individual initiative in research resulting in scientific progress far beyond the capacity of Japan's powers,
however adopt.they be at imitation, to absorb or copy fully.
Rooted in antiquity, Japan's social system has been too
ironicled to permit of enough flexibility for scientific com-
petition. That requires more leisure and originality than
strict family loyalty and national solidarity of the Japanese
types allow.

Another stumbling block is the Japanese language which,
in order to convey concise scientific ideas and minute de-
scriptions, would have to be modified, yet which practically
cannot be changed.

When, half a century ago, certain Englishmen of keen
foresight made bold to warn Japan that no amount of reverence
for her Emperor, no amount of fanatical and suicidal bravery
could prevail against superior knowledge, organisation, and
material, her officials merely scoffed or became offended.
Subsequently she was so warned by many of her own more ex.
seful foreign emissaries, but being slow to develop an efficient
foreign intelligence evaluation office at home, and being
obstinate, her military and naval officers would never listen.
When, as long predicted, she finally attacked the Allies, a
great many, particularly of her foreign-trained officials,
knew that her doom was sealed. It was a heartbreaking
business for them patriotically and bravely to carry on in the
face of that knowledge.

But Japan is a thickly populated insular nation, and in
the course of time her national ambitions, unless regulated,
could drive her to strike out again in Asia time and again.
At this point, we would again state that we are not endeavoring to present any particular thesis or to minimize Japanese scientific effort and its results, but we are rather trying to present the general over-all picture. Nor must we lose sight of the possibility of the accident of a single scientific discovery of tremendous portent occurring in Japan as elsewhere.

Owing to the diplomatic nature of Japan's surrender and the consequent delay coupled with the immense distances of the Pacific, our teams of investigators who visited her scattered intelligence installations arrived late. Much equipment had been destroyed, and time was permitted for the Japanese to plan ahead for the arrival of their interrogators. The officials on the home Islands were seemingly, if not truly, rather frank and willing to talk, but in the field many of them were slow to accept defeat and a feeling of unity persisted for a long time. This was particularly true in China.

In general, our investigators found that Japan's military intelligence lacked coordination and integration; the personnel was by far insufficient by our standards; it was backward both technically and functionally. Equipment was usually rather antiquated; interception was consequently poor and limited; studies in signal intelligence were clumsily directed; and surprisingly little was known of foreign subject matter commercially procurable.

Every general army formation (Sogun) had its own signal
intelligence organization. So did most armies (gun), but the fault was that there was no effective liaison and they functioned independently.

The handling of captured documents was exceedingly slipshod, and there was practically no dissemination of information thus gleaned save within the agency obtaining it. Most communications work was confined to manual transcription. Even the use of I.B.M. machines was considered inferior to manual methods. The Japanese seemed to consider unclassified material like the magazine "Time" and radio broadcasts from the West Coast among their best sources of information. They were especially interested in announcements of ship sinkings which they dreaded so much. Being surrounded by water, it is natural that they should concentrate on naval intelligence upon which both the army and navy specialized, bad as their liaison was. The navy trained army men to work on naval communications within the army.

Rightly or wrongly, most of the Japanese intelligence officers and civilians interrogated attributed the defeat to the failure of their superiors to appreciate the importance of their work. Undoubtedly this did weaken Japan both offensively and defensively, and as the storm gradually neared her shores, the Central Special Intelligence Section, beset step by step of other sources, had to rely more and more on traffic analysis. It was in this field that they achieved their outstanding success, comparatively small and late though it was.
The Japanese army had great difficulty in obtaining operational intelligence because of these factors, and particularly the lack of systematic research. With the fall of Saipan, the home Islands became the front line of the Central Pacific defense. Hence, the line along the Volcano Islands became the only fixed warning net.

According to Major Masao Shigematsu of the Central Special Intelligence Section, in order to cope with this situation, the army as a countermeasure resorted to the evaluation of intelligence by means of traffic analysis beginning 1 October 1943. He stated that, having ample radio telegraphic material at hand, great success was achieved, but that poor signal interception, bad direction-finding equipment, and lack of supplies hampered the exploitation of this work, and that the end of the war came too soon for the realization of future plans. In general, tactical intelligence was obtained by analyzing naval traffic. Air intelligence was obtained chiefly from radio-telegraph air-ground links. Operational intelligence, including air movements and task force and shipping situations, was obtained from radio telephone traffic, though the end of the war left the latter field without much development. Though plans were underway, nothing was accomplished in research on ultra short-wave traffic because of poor equipment. Engaged in traffic analysis in the C.S.I.S. were 25 officers, 10 probational officers, 12 noncommissioned officers and 5 civilians. The Japanese army accomplished little based on direction finding, frequency, call signs, and type of signals; so greater emphasis
was placed on the study of signal communications, signifying the existence of operational activity. This is especially effective when such operational communication was known to be between commanding officers or bases.

Finally the Japanese relied heavily on espionage, but it is remarkable how little consideration they gave to the trustworthiness of their contacts.

By way of contrast, the American army achieved far greater success over a much wider field of intelligence work than the Japanese did. Our technical personnel was much better trained and of a much superior caliber; the health of our men was better; and their technical equipment and training outmatched the Japanese. Engaged in the task of intelligence research and exploitation, it is only natural that many Japanese, a naturally high-strung people, broke under the strain, suffering from shinkei suijaku (nervous exhaustion) and physical disabilities. This grew worse as the course of the war grew progressively unhappier for them.

By traffic analysis and good liaison not only were our own signal intelligence headquarters able to predict the target, but they were also in the position to foretell the hour, strength and disposition of air raids. Many instances could be presented of the complete destruction of groups of planes either grounded or in aerial combat, to mention nothing of task forces and shipping.

A number of the employees of the Central Special Intelligence Section located in the old-age home stated that the
officials heading the sections adopted a very strict hush-hush attitude and that their underlings in many cases were kept thoroughly in the dark as to the real nature of their work. There is a lesson to be learned from this; for experience amply shows that a knowledge of what he is doing gives a person in intelligence work a great boost and that an exchange of information between individuals and sections enhances efficiency.

According to Major Shigematsu, through the office analysis and collation his section was able to predict the two campaigns about two weeks in advance and the Okinawa campaign about three weeks in advance. The movements of task forces were also followed with some success, and in general the movements of naval and merchant vessels in the Western Carolinas, Marshall, Philippines, and Okinawa areas were followed, though the exact strength and organization were undetermined.

The manner in which air raids were predicted was by following a daily graph, high signal activity one day followed by silence on the day following, indicating a raid. However, as to the time and target, nothing could be foretold. The only way the Japanese could attempt to predict the target was by the grim process of elimination. However, the predictions of B-29 raids was considered quite an accomplishment.

During a critical phase of the war, five of the leading Japanese cryptanalysts headed by Colonel Isamu Nakano were
drowned, when their boat capsized during a return trip from the Philippines where they had gone to establish more intercept stations to further the work of traffic analysis. These were the men who worked primarily on Anglo-American systems and their death made it harder to get information concerning the results they achieved.

I learned the above from friends who were leaders in the Target Investigation Committees who entered Japan immediately upon her defeat. It refers to Japanese signal intelligence as compared with our own and Great Britain's, I should say. Notwithstanding all this, however, it must be recognized that in this field the Japanese did meet with some successes. As for the Japanese diplomatic service, I should say that it had possibly the best international intelligence communications system on earth and to have been able as we were to use it vicariously and exploit it with a high degree of success as we did, was of inestimable value to us.

After all, the continuity with which we followed the development of the Japanese code and cipher systems in their several fields was the only means by which we kept up with them, finally unraveling their military systems, the keys and tables of which changed with great frequency.
Before going on to another pamphlet in which a representative number of Japanese messages will be discussed we will give first a list of Japanese Prime Ministers and Foreign Ministers from 1932 to 1941. Some of these will be discussed as the occasion arises. Following this list we shall take up some of the leading Japanese envoys abroad and make such remarks concerning them and their activities as we recall or are reminded of. Our sources for the successions and foreign ministers were the Almanach de Gotha, the World Almanac, and the Japan Yearbook.

Prime Ministers and Foreign Ministers from 1932 to 1939:

Prime Ministers:

Makoto Saito (May 26, 1932 to July 7, 1934)
Katsuji Okada (July 8, 1934 to March 8, 1935)
Kaki Hirota (March 9, 1935 to February 1, 1937)
Senjuro Hayashi (February 2, 1937 to June 3, 1937)
Fumimaro Konoe (June 4, 1937 to January 4, 1939)
Kiichiro Hiranuma (January 5, 1939 to August 29, 1939)
Nobuyuki Abe (August 30, 1939 to January 15, 1940)
Mitsumasa Yonai (January 16, 1940 to July 21, 1940)
Prince Fumimaro Konoe (July 1940 to September 1941)
Hideki Tojo (October 18, 1941)
Foreign Ministers:

Makoto Saito (Concurrent with Prime Minister, May 26, 1932 to July 1932)
Yasuya Uchida (July 1932)
Koki Hirota (September 1933 to April 1936)
Yasuhiko Arita (April 1936 to February 1937)
Senjuro Hayashi (Concurrent)
Naotake Sato (February 1937)
Koki Hirota
Kazushige Uchida (May 1938)
Fumimaro Konoe (Concurrent, September 1938)
Yasuhiko Arita (October, 1938 to August 1939)
Kosuke Abe (Concurrent)
Kihachiro Nomura (September 1939)
Yasuhiko Arita (January 16, 1940 to July 1940)
Yosuke Matsuoka (July 1940 to October 1941)
Masayuki Tanaki (October 1941)
Hiroto Tojo (October 18, 1941 (Concurrent))

Some Leading Japanese Foreign Diplomatic Envoys in 1944:

Zenbei Norikiri - Ambassador at large, Europe
Baron Shii Tomi - Argentina
Akihiko Yamaji - Bulgaria (Sofia)
Masayuki Tanaki - Nanking
Suzumasa Okamoto - Copenhagen
Toyotoki Nakamura - Finland (Helsinki)
Mikio Hirose - (Military Attaché) Helsinki
Takanobu Mitani - Vichy
Kenkichi Yoshisawa - Hanoi
Hiroshi Oshima - Berlin
Kan Harada - Vatican
Yoshitaka Okubo - Budapest
Shinroku Hidaka - Rome
Morito Morishima - Lisbon
K. Yamagi - Bucharest
Yakichiro Soma - Madrid
Suzumasa Okamoto - Stockholm
Shuniohi Kase - Berne
Teiji Tsubokami - Bangkok
Sho Tamachi Kurihara - Ankara
Naotake Sato (Ambassador) - U.S.S.R.
Goro Morishima (Minister) - U.S.S.R.
Before I go on with the narrative I suppose I had as well mention some of the members of the Imperial Family. I suppose they have family names but I have been unable to find them. In childhood the present Emperor was called Michinomiya, but when he became the ruler, he took the title Hirohito, a name held too suspicious for the Japanese to say; hence, his reign has been named that of Showa and his name is also called "Showa". His wife is the daughter of the former ambassador to Washington Tsuneo Matsudaira. Her name is Negako. Since this marriage Matsudaira has headed the Imperial household. The Taira family, great warriors of old, have long been one of the most noble in Japan and the Matsudairas were at the top, but one of Tsuneo Matsudaira's immediate forebears led a rebellion and his branch of the family fell into disgrace; this branch was not restored to honor until Tsuneo came along; so when asked who his ancestors were, he has always replied, "I am my own ancestor." The Crown Prince is named Tsugunomiya, but when he becomes Emperor, if the old tradition is kept, he will be Akihito, but what the people will call him will be the arbitrary name of his reign and will be something else again. The Emperor has three brothers. I know nothing about Takamatsunomiya and Mikasanomiya, but Chichibu seems to be quite a chip off his grandfather's block. He openly scorcs the throne,
goes on binges when he can get away from things, and favors abolition of aristocracy. He is a frank, outspoken and lively fellow, but his actions have long been under governmental scrutiny, and, whenever practicable, he has been kept in subjection.

Family of Emperor of Japan.

Hirohito (formerly Michinomiya)  Emperor of Japan
Princess Nagako  Empress
Princess Shigeko (Terunomiya)  1st daughter
Princess Kazuko (Takanomiya)  3rd daughter
Princess Atsuko (Yorinomiya)  4th daughter
Prince Akihito (Tsugunomiya)  1st son
Prince Masahito (Yoshinomiya)  2nd son
Princess Takako (Suganomiya)  5th daughter
Princess Sadako  Empress dowager
Prince Yasuhito (Chichibunomiya)  Brother of Emperor
Princess Setsuko
Prince Nobuhito (Takamatsunomiya)  Brother
Princess Kikuko
Prince Takahito (Mikasanomiya)  Brother
The Use of Military Intelligence.

The topmost officials of the military and state units of the government, when they come to evaluate and apply the information gained from intercepted messages, should be very careful to start with no preconceived ideas. These intercepts, barring the comparatively few cases of deliberate trickery, represent the real ideas and intentions of the heads of foreign powers. They are much more important in almost all cases than espionage. It is possible through preconceived interpretation of deciphered messages to make enemies of friends, and to accept as friends potential or real enemies. In other words, their contents should be carefully studied, and if they come from competent officials, taken at their face value. It is not right to presume that this nation or that is our certain enemy bound to attack us, and to use the information we thus get from it, to increase our own suspicion and thus lead to crises and even war. Indeed cryptographic information may enable us to know just what men to deal with in a given place and time in order to achieve the ends of peace.

However, when, through this information, it is found that a given nation is our enemy, our officials should make it known to the public at large by whatever means may be possible considering cryptographic security.

But again I repeat that we must be sure that our aims do not involve selfish commercial interests or ideas of

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aggression. Our country has been a remarkably successful democracy and should pride in our past or ambitious interest in our present or future, lead us into ways not in conformity with our Bill of Rights and Constitution, the result will be regretted. Free men will work and fight for their freedom, but the American people if ever called upon to fight a selfish or aggressive war may not win that war.

Then no amount of information, even the finest signal communications information, can save us. In time of war all Chiefs of State have claimed that they were fighting for freedom, but we must always be sure to interpret freedom as meaning the self-evident rights of man. We should not try to settle all the disputes in the world, nor force our form of government and enterprise upon other nations, because in so doing not only would we become despised in the eyes of these countries but also we would in fact have a despotic government at home.

We already have far too many loyalty investigations, too much F.B.I. worship. It is true that there have always been wars, yet I cannot help feeling that it is horrible for men high in our armed forces to talk so blithely about who is going to strike first in the next war that is just about upon us. Nations with long histories of conscription only point up the fact that their people become humbly obedient, dependent, and do exactly what they are told to do, without having any imagination or initiative. They always wind up in war sooner.
or later and are defeated. Military conscription did not save Japan, Germany, or France. America and Britain on the other hand whose peoples were left to their own devices under the protection of charters of law and justice fought with an unequaled vengeance and won out.

Therefore, referring again to my proper thesis, it seems to me that cryptographic continuity and the regular obtaining of foreign intelligence is a much better method of foreseeing menaces to our security than simply to strait-jacket nearly all of our young men who should be studying in school into a military mode of thinking and reacting, on the assumption that we will scare this or that possible enemy. Such regimentation seems to me all the more unwise in view of an atomic stockpile.

My belief is that men will fight for real freedom. In the past war, our latent powers, undeceived by our enemies, showed up so quickly after our entry into the conflict that it amazed them. A regimented nation slowly and invisibly loses its hidden strength. Its people become lassid and frustrated and when the call to arms comes there is no zeal left for either war or industry.

If that time comes here, cryptanalysis will not be of much use. Neither will atomic bombs for that matter.
The Japanese radio-communications between 1934 and 1945 have left us a rich legacy of knowledge. We want to arrange the more interesting and important of the Japanese messages in this ten years' traffic in a sensible way so as to catch and hold the attention and thought of those who read the document we compile.

We doubt if we have anywhere a better record of international thinking and acting during the years before and the years after the totalitarian explosion. Nothing shows better than this traffic the necessity of cryptographic continuity, and, to a certain extent, some ways in which the continuity is kept up. The stream of political information overlapping changes in keys or systems will be dealt with. We do not feel, however, that we are able to discuss the technical instruction messages preceding some of such changes. That would be another job and not one for us.

We recall some messages quite a to do was made about. We want to pick them out in a nearly chronological order, and discuss them and the surrounding circumstances briefly.

There was one from the Netherlands Indies that first agitated General Akin - that gave him visibly a view of what would likely come. There was one from Oshima in Berlin that early forecast Hitler's failures in Russia which Col. Clarke could hardly believe Oshima would pen. There was one involving a change in Japanese plans in the Pacific, I think early in 1943, which excitedCols. Doud and Svensson
terribly, sending them in haste to the Pentagon for an all-day session. They came back sweating, and Col. Douc said he thought the strategic board was convinced despite contrary movements and plans already afoot. This concerned a shift of Japanese hostilities far southward.

There was one from Ankara quoting a Turkish newsman named Kallay as saying, "There amid the dark sands of the African desert and there amid the cold snows of Russia Adolf Hitler will meet his doom." Later that same reporter joined some American reporters on a mission.

There were the masterpieces from Naotake Sato in Paris, Tokyo, and Moscow. There were the more temperate messages of Shigemitsu, Yoshida, etc., over against those of the Tojo-Yamamoto group.

There were the Madrid and Lisbon messages; some of them were spell-binding - that is those of them that were really true. There were some very personal messages from Mssrs. Saito and Nomura, showing their innermost hearts.

Remembering the Japanese text of many such letters, we would like to present them in an arrangement or arrangements of our own and comment on them, remembering how we felt at the time but not with hind-sight. In the space allowable, of course, we shall not be all-comprehensive - we shall not go into such things as treaties, military details, technical matters, etc.

We wish also to pick out several messages showing how
the Japanese were reading some American codes. How the life of a German, spying and working on our side in Sweden was jeopardized by this compromise, and how he was probably saved by our finding out in time (it seems to me the American Ambassador's name was Harrison, but we are not sure any longer).

We shall go into the matter of the style and form of some of these messages to some degree, but they will speak mostly for themselves. The Japanese have a certain emotional streak - a kind of sentimentality which made a number of their messages and reports as good as, no, I think better than, the best of ours. This is largely due to the fact that the vagueness of their language enabled them to hint at shades of joy and grief for which we can scarcely find words. They were losing, and paths and reconciliatory and compensatory philosophy began to creep into their communications even unawares.

We wish to point up the necessity of knowing the range of the English language before it is possible to translate the range of the Japanese language into it.

This last comment applies to a few other languages too.

John B. Hurt
Message on page 1.

After the war Belasco, the fellow who would do anything in the world for you if he liked you but who if he did not like you would finish you off short reported to TICOM that this (TO) message business was just a hoax. In general this was good. It was in the main a scheme to steal all the money possible from Japan. Nevertheless it is a fact that through these messages the Japanese did get on several occasions important shipping news from the United States. On June 2, 1942 Suma sends a TO report to Tokyo purportedly from London on the 1st. It is reliably reported that preparations are being made for British and American pilots for another air raid on Tokyo and other principal Japanese cities at an early date. The attack is to be carried out by long distance planes. If successful this project will go on regularly from now on. Simultaneously England will carry on ceaseless air attacks on Berlin, Paris and other principal cities of occupied territory. Their ally Russia in the meantime is to divert as many Axis planes as possible to the other battle fronts.

It seems that Dakar will soon be stormed by air. This message evidently was intended both to frighten the Japanese and to make them more and more willing to pay the high price demanded for this so-called intelligence.

Message on page 2.

On June 12, 1942 Tokyo circularizes a message from Japan's representative to the Vatican to Hanking, Shanghai and Peking. It
is a very interesting message. Ken Harada is a fine, capable man and a good representative to the Vatican. On this occasion however he first learns that it is harder in many cases to deal with the laws of the Vatican than with civil laws. To begin with because of the universal character of the Catholic Church the Pope and the Vatican court cannot afford to show the slightest partiality to any land. In the second place, though often featuring war in these days as a necessary evil the real intentions of the Vatican are always in favor of peace. Consequently Harada should have known that Giovanni Pacelli looked with disfavor on Japan's invasion of China. On this occasion Mr. Harada learned also another most disturbing, baffling characteristic of Catholic prelates. It is always their strict policy to excuse themselves when they do not do what you expect them to by saying that they have been, are and will continue to be much too busy. That is an unanswerable statement and is most effective.

So on the 5th Ken Harada calls on Vatican Secretary of State Maglione thinking to question him further about whether or not they are going to let a Chungking representative come to the Vatican, but Maglione says "day before yesterday we agreed to let him in. I intended to tell you immediately, but I have been too busy." Harada says that he simply cannot understand this, but Maglione retorts that he has already tried to explain it time and again without success and now he will have to have Envoy Morelli in Japan explain it to the Japanese Government.
Harada throws up his hands and says, "you need not try to tell me anything more. All my country will know or care about is that you have reached an agreement with their enemy which will be a very, very deep shock to them. For the life of me I cannot understand why after I talked and talked to you, you have gone and done this thing to us. Now we will just have to try to postpone the assumption of office of Chungking's representative."

Maglione replied "my friend, that is impossible." Harada, crestfallen, suggests that they ponder deeply the publication of this act, but Maglione again answers "Don't you know that even if the Vatican does not publish it, Chungking will and that is absolutely no business of ours." A few minutes later Ambassador Galilia comes to Harada and in a very, very confidential tone of voice, reassures him that the Pope and the cardinals could not resist the pressure of England and the United States, and that Morelli had just told him so. Harada replies, "The only thing we can do now is to try and get the Italian Government to prevent his taking office. Let us try to get them to refuse him a visa." The Italian Ambassador however shakes his head and says "No, no, I am afraid not." The Lateran Pact makes it clear in black and white that they cannot do that.

Message on page 4.

Here we have another circular on this subject from Tokyo to Nanking, Peking, and Shanghai which precedes the foregoing message by a month and ten days. Harada wires Tokyo that he has
talked with the Italian Ambassador to the Vatican, Galilia on
the 2nd and warned him of how the Japanese will feel if the
Holy Father receives a representative from Chungking. The
Italian Ambassador however calmly replies, "the Vatican has
always been and will always be an absolutely neutral city, and
will deny to no existing country the right to send a repre-
sentative thereto. For three years we refused China representa-
tion because she is a non-Christian country, but that is changed,
because we have established formal relations with Japan who is
no more Christian than China. How do you think we could turn
down Chungking? Explain that to the Japanese. The Italian
Government would stop this if it could but the Lateran treaty
will not let it. It might perhaps be postponed however."

Finally Harada is informed that now that the Holy Father
has accepted a man from Chungking he cannot accept one from
Nanking.

Message on page 6.

The only interesting thing in this message from Suma in
Madrid is that Surer describes to him a fictitious trip he, Surer,
was supposed to have made with Franco to Rome in the course of
which trip he conversed freely with Foreign Minister Ciano. This
was all a made-up story, but Surer's last statement had become
an absolute truth by that time: "Here is something I want you to
watch out for. Ciano hates Germany."
Message on page 8.

This is a continuation of the preceding message. In it Suma reports that Sumer considers it beyond imagination for Berlin or Rome to talk of peace with England and the United States, but that on the other hand, if Germany and Italy win in North Africa, get the Suez Canal and Asia Minor, and if Japan invades India and the Indians still continue their independence movement until all India succumbs, then England and the United States will give up and seek peace. Sumer goes on to say that when he talked with Franco the latter replied to the effect that he himself intended to take the initiative in working out peace but that if the enemy strikes Gibraltar he will enter the war whether or no.

Message on page 9.

This is evidently a series of messages. Sumer is still speaking. He says that Alba, Spanish Ambassador to London, knows as much about England as an Englishman does. Alba reports that England and America have heretofore been only optimistic, but now that Rommel is almost in Egypt they are stopping to think and that Churchill has visited Washington to explain his opinions about the Soviet, and having failed, has returned to London weaker in his position than before. Sumer goes on to say that the Spanish Ambassador in Washington, notwithstanding all this, wires that England and the United States are increasing their production of various new arms and still seem to have a deepening conviction that victory will ultimately be theirs.
Suner continues by declaring that the Axis must be careful not to irritate President Castillo of Argentina who wants to be their friend. He is already being persecuted by the United States who can no longer have any effect in Argentina. There are various rumors about a second front but the Iberian Peninsula will not see it; unless the British and Americans buy off General Nogues in Tangier there will be no landing in Spanish Morocco. Yet landings are almost sure to take place on the northern coast of France. "Notice," says Suner, "how Germany's schedule in Russia is somewhat behind time. That may be because she fears the possible and probable landings."

This message foreshadows the landing of American troops not only in North Africa but also in Normandy.

Message on page 11.

The German and Italian forces are now, as it were, knocking at the doors of Alexandria. On the Russian front, the Germans are ready to begin a swift drive with complete confidence of certain victory.

So speaks Oshima and he adds: "now is the time for us to cause disturbances inside India, establish a base at Chittagong, or some such place, cooperate with the revolutionary faction in India in a program of lively military strategy. If we are to join the Germans and Italians, coordinate our actions with theirs we have got to sever India from England as speedily as possible. Only this way will we get our own place in the sun and we cannot
be too fast in carrying out my suggestions."

How common is it for us to miss obvious things, however largely they may loom before us. Oshima was by no means a fool or a simpleton. Yet it is curious to note that he failed to see that there did not and never could exist any possibility of any mutual feelings between the Japanese and the Hindus. Too many people confuse the East with the Far East. In India in all probability lies the cradle of all western culture and even language. Aryan philosophy, temperament and feeling, the genesis of Occidental religious conceptions and symbolism had their origins in India. With all this Japan has nothing in common. Hindu and Moslem may fight each other bitterly in India and both have fought in various ways against the British Empire, but for all that these are merely fratricidal combats among peoples who thoroughly understand each other and have a constant basis for making up. Nehru admired Japan's rise in the world and called the Japanese an admirable and charming people. But that was when he was a young man imprisoned by the English, as he often has been. Years later just before the war while talking with a group of Englishmen, Nehru said "yes, we Hindus have gotten much from you Britishers in the way of education, medicine and inventions but on the other hand there are even more things you can still get from us." Then drawing himself up to his full height he concluded "but for the Japanese to presume that they had any contribution to make to our mutual civilization is ridiculous."
I think it is well for us to take into account, whenever we fight, if fight we must, whether or not our foe is of a common origin with us. If this is not now realized in case of Japan, and if Japan is not permanently divested of the means of making war, in every probability we shall have to fight her again in the not too far-off future. We can fight Germany and make friends with her again. It will be possible for us to fight Russia and then make up, but I doubt if such could be the case with the Japanese and three or four other peoples. Of course, on the surface we are getting along better with the Japanese than with anyone else, but that is because they are extremely polite to strangers whom, by nature they cannot quite understand. On the other hand we are having trouble with some of our erstwhile enemies in Europe and also some of our erstwhile allies. That is because we know each other and quarrel. Sometimes we know each other all too well.

Message on page 12.

Here we have another continuation of Suma's talk with Suner. Suner says:

In conformity with the Seville Conference our relations with Portugal are smooth. The other day in Salazar's radio speech he chided England rather cruelly for having allied herself with the Communists at all by forming a treaty with Moscow.

But on June 29 the "London Times" printed an article to incite Portugal and I have always had a suspicion that Portugal was just a British colony. A month or so ago the Portuguese
colonial minister went to Lourenço Marques. I don't know when he will be back, but I believe that in a short time Portugal will issue a presidential proclamation, adjusting relations between the colonies and their homeland, so that at any time the colonies may split off, and perhaps according to Portugal's desire, go under the custody of the United States. It does not matter, however; for once we get to work on Gibraltar, we can occupy Portugal ourselves.

Portuguese Timor has been the scene of much trouble with the Japanese. Rich in resources and military bases, it has constantly been threatened by the Japanese whose position is steadily growing worse.

Message on page 13.

Here we have a message from Lisbon in which the Japanese Ambassador relates to Tokyo how on June 8 the chief of the bureau of political affairs asked him to call on him and saying that he spoke for Salazar who informed him that he had wired the following instructions to the Portuguese Ministry in Tokyo and London:


I offered a number of explanations of our conduct and said that the strategic importance of Timor was a thing to be decided upon by our military men and that they should have the last word.
This message ties in with the one last described. It angered Salazar beyond words. The Japanese found him practically as hard to deal with as the Netherlands in the Indies.

Message on page 14.

Here on July 7, 1942 we have another instance where Ambassador Sato, growing anxious over Mr. Molotov's foreign visits and agreements, visits him with Mr. Miyakaa and for 20 minutes asks in various ways:

"Has the Soviet ever made, is the Soviet making or will the Soviet ever make any commitments to the United States regarding eastern bases from which the United States may attack Japan?" Molotov replied in the negative.

Message on page 16.

At last it dawned on the Japanese that a very unusual number of their shipping vessels are going to the bottom with their cargoes between Japan, French Indo-China, and Thai. Tokyo advises Saigon that they will have to work out a secret manner of using commercial codes which are really only for abbreviation.

Tokyo says that it is realized that the Saigon staff is improving these codes of commercial concerns so that they can be safely used but that foolish blunder will have to stop. The communications department officials are negotiating with Bangkok, Saigon and Hanoi to get permits for the use of commercial codes. The Foreign Office has advised the communications department to keep in contact with the higher organs of the government lest
something goes awry. The Foreign Minister's own views are that it would be folly to let business concerns use commercial codes before they are made secure. He wonders however if it would be possible to forbid Thai and French Indo-Chinese commercial concerns in Japan to use codes and, at the same time, get Thai and French Indo-Chinese concerns to let our concerns there use codes. The Foreign Minister thinks that even if the commercial codes are rendered what might be called perfectly secure nevertheless the Foreign Office should dispatch commercial messages as courtesy messages for the respective companies in their respective codes. He thinks that the Trade Control Board at Saigon and a rather small number of other agencies control the codes because to let too many concerns use them would inevitably let the cat out of the bag. The Foreign Minister goes on to say that he pondered this deeply and immediately got in touch again with the people concerned. The message is addressed to Bangkok and Saigon and sent as instructions to Amoy.

Message on page 19.

In a message of July 12, 1942 comprising five parts complete, Oshima in Berlin wires the Japanese Foreign Office what he thinks about conditions in the United States.

He says that he believes the following: at first it appeared that the attack on Pearl Harbor had suddenly unified the United States but the people will not long tolerate their sacrifices. The isolationists and other political elements have not really lost their former attitude which now lies dormant.
Hence, the government emphasizes unity in its internal propaganda and sings the praises of the American soldiers' bravery in the front lines. The failure of the government to take forceful measures against profiteering in munitions industries and against selfish farmers and labor unions in the regulation of prices exposes the true weakness in apparent national unity. The moral equilibrium of the American people has been completely upset by the successive retreats of the Allies since the thunderbolt at Pearl Harbor. They had been taught to believe that the vast resources of the United States would carry them through thick and thin, and that the Japanese could not stand up against them for six months, and that the American Navy had no equal.

The United States has been propagandizing some huge offensive soon to take place over the world, destined to bring the war to a speedy conclusion. In short, the government officials did all they could to restore confidence in the people and to make them feel that victory was certain. This boomeranged however and the Americans began to feel too happy and too optimistic. So now they have invented the slogan "America can lose the war." Thus, the people are alarmed at Japan's constant advances which cause a rising suspicion that all may not be well with the Allied command.

The people little grasp and are not much interested in the spread of democracy over the world as was proclaimed in the Atlantic Charter. Yet the word "democracy" has a magic sound to them, and they are negatively supporting the principles of the
Charter and the joint statement in Washington of last January. The government feels it necessary to find a new name for its war objective. It finds it difficult to claim that she is fighting for freedom while she is fighting Japan, who is just trying to defeat Anglo-American imperialism -- particularly in India, so the present war has come to be a sort of racial war. But the United States herself is plagued by the racial question. What about the negro? Therefore, all the government can do is to declare for internal consumption that the negroes are being treated as equals in the war industries and in foreign propaganda, that she wishes to break the shackles of the oppressed and banish extraterritorial rights, thus taking a more general attitude than ever before.

Since Versailles, the American people are remarkably on the alert as to what shall come after this struggle. Therefore the government is assuring them that it is the unshakeable intention of the United States Government to play the main part in the reconstruction of the world, and profitably at that. The government insists, in order to satisfy the people that nothing like what followed Versailles will happen again, isolationism shall be done away with. This is the point to which we must pay heed.

The United States lies in propagandizing the Japanese Army's alleged atrocities in Hong Kong and at Java and her ruthlessness toward prisoners. Both the United States and Brazil declare that the Japanese Fifth Column is a threat to national security,
justifying the detention of Japanese. Washington is always trying to whip up hatred against the Japanese. The Red Cross in Bangkok, however, did a little bit to weaken this propaganda.

The press started out by proclaiming our attack on Pearl Harbor to be treacherous and followed it up quickly by denouncing us as villainous and inhuman. Pearl Harbor looks that way to them, and so long as they cannot see why we had to make that attack, and so long as we cannot show the American people the fundamental causes of this war, Pearl Harbor will rankle in their hearts. This is the propaganda situation in the United States and it is up to us if we can to show the facts and use it as a double-edged sword. The United States has mistreated both negro and Japanese citizens in this war. As a matter of fact, it is fundamentally a racial war; for the United States plans not only to annihilate Hitlerism but to maintain permanently the superiority of the white race and its imperialistic aims. In other words, it is really just a vast struggle between the white and colored races. A small number of American leaders already know this. Pearl Buck and Willkie are trying to save the situation, but the people and the government too want to keep postponing the settlement of the racial question. The advocacy of these wise leaders is disregarded. They can claim that the negro is free, but that does not make him so. They can claim that the other colored races are respected in the United States, but this does not make it true.
In connection with the question of Indian independence, the United States while winking at the iron heel of Britain, at the same time declares that Great Britain has guaranteed to relinquish her imperialism. "Now Japan claims to be working for the freedom of all races," observe the Americans, "but her real intentions have been shown up in China and British imperialism is highly superior, because it is so far less cruel." This sort of talk however has made England blush in embarrassment and Lord Halifax has cautioned the Americans to talk more quietly and regard the India problem more realistically -- to just tie up with England more and more. That is all. Now all this shows us that Great Britain does not intend to change her ways.

The United States fears the rising public debt and the people do not wish a future generation to have to pay it. They are worried about inflation. Really there is no guarantee that inflation will not come. Their attitude hampers the government somewhat, but to tell the truth it is no serious obstacle to the war financing policies of the government. All the big financial institutions are backing the government floating loans and getting assets turned to governmental use. They are cooperating with the Treasury Department, submitting their reports and views. Hence, it must be admitted that the United States is getting plenty of money to prosecute the war. The American Government is in a quandary, however, as to how to satisfy the different sections of the population when it comes to taxation, prices, price controls and inflation.
Message on page 27.

On July 18, 1942 the Japanese Ambassador in Vichy wires Tokyo that on June 22 the tragic figure of Laval has again stated, "I hope for a German victory." Laval has placed people of his own persuasion in the government and the outlying districts, trying to unite them and to settle the food situation, about which everyone is worried. On the other hand former Jewish deputies, de Gaullists, Communists, etc., scan the war skies as they would watch a weather vane and who favor England and the United States.

Then too, former newspapersmen of the radical school, such as Moreas of the "Action Francise," who overlook the humanity of Laval, who in his personal contacts is a mild-mannered, kindly gentleman (commenter's note: there is something true about this statement. Watching the history of Laval, you cannot help feeling the paradox of his nature); are condemning him as a traitor. Nevertheless, as things now stand, France has to buckle under to Germany and now that no initiative is left to Frenchmen in internal politics, Laval was about the only man who could hold his present position and still maintain his identity as a truly French representative. He has the double job of satisfying Germany and France at the same time. But how will the future of France turn out after all? Who knows whether Germany can defeat the Russians or not or whether the Germans and Italians can defeat the Allies in Africa? Again, how well will Germany continue to treat France?
Message on page 29.

July 20, 1942. Here we have a T0 intelligence report of the 12th from London to Madrid. Not only the military but other quarters too are now upset. The war reports coming in from the various fronts are bad. Churchill's pep talks have lost effect and the people are talking back. If the German drive in Egypt is not stopped the French officials and people will indeed be in consternation. The old slogan, "Great Britain always wins the last fight" is giving way to such queries as, "can the Russian Army stop the Germans?", "will we ever get Singapore back?", "can the British forces redeem themselves in Egypt?". These are said over and over, and we can see that Englishmen have lost their confidence in victory and fear that things may not go well in the future.

Message on page 30.

In a strictly secret message Suma from Madrid wires the Foreign Minister and explains very carefully just how these intelligence reports from Belasco's gang in England are handled in Spain. It gives an inkling perhaps of who concocted the Spanish spy myth or shall we say half myth. It was probably the Germans but if there is any definite information on this matter, it has escaped me. This intelligence is best understood if read in toto.

Message on page 33.

Perkins, Sumner Welles, Acheson and officials like them have begun to praise the Atlantic Charter and to condemn the old
philosophy of grab as grab can -- a philosophy that has done
nothing but cause war. The Atlantic Charter, they say, embodies
these views. It is held that trade should be more free and that
in the postwar world the United States, because of its rich re-
sources, is in an excellent position to take the helm. Indeed,
she is the only nation that really could do so.

The great trade expert Cordell Hull broadcasts to this
effect, going so far as to declare that an international organiza-
tion ought to be set up after the war to maintain peace and with
sufficient authority to maintain it with force when necessary.

Message on page 34.

On the 2nd of August, 1942 Oshima wires Tokyo that he has
passed the morning with Ribbentrop at the headquarters of the
Ukraine command. Oshima states that he has received instructions
from the Imperial Government and would like to communicate to
Ribbentrop that Japan was willing to cooperate with Germany to the
uttermost in every possible way short of war with Russia. Ribben-
trop replied that this was naturally up to the Japanese Government
to decide for itself, Germany being, of course, in no position to
say anything as he had already stated. He seemed worried about
the question of our joint warfare, and asked me many questions
on this point. Finally I declared "well, as the message I am
quoting states, Japan is using every available way and means to
bring this war to a victorious conclusion and she is determined
so to do. Please believe me when we say that, because we are
absolutely sincere."
Hitler was not there so I asked Ribbentrop to inform him concisely and clearly of the contents of your message. The other things we talked about are not so important as to require speed, so I will wire you about them after I get back to Berlin. Message on page 35.

Here we have a beautiful dream of some Japanese official in Russia. It certainly cannot be Ambassador Sato who is writing; for he had no such illusions.

According to this story the Russians are making a swift onslaught. Some of the Russian troops are already rebelling, pay no attention to the orders of their commanders, and are deserting in numbers. The main trouble seems to be in Georgia, where the soldiers pay no attention to the commands of the Russian officers and are deserting en masse to the Germans. When Stalin heard about all this he was dumbfounded. He returned to his old home in Georgia, had all the officers concerned executed, revamped the minority forces and infused them with a certain number of Russian soldiers. Pravda and Izvestia are calling upon the troops of all states to stick together and defend their sacred soil, making hysterical appeals to the forces not to become desperate and lose heart.

Part of this message may be true but it was not through fear of defeat that the Russian Government worked so hard upon the people. The last German offensive was to take place soon and Stalin simply wanted to wind up the business.
Message on page 36.

As for the division of the work of the Belasco spy ring the Spaniards are to do the dirty work, Germany is to pay for their endeavors in England, and Japan for their endeavors in the United States; however, we will also have to pay some of these spies in England special bonuses, so to speak, when they do fine work. The expenses of getting started and operating expenses from then on will be our burden. These agencies, as are proven by the Ruiz-Calvo incident, will be in the direst danger of their lives; and from the very nature of their work they will require very large amounts of money, so please see that this is taken care of.

When we first started out on this undertaking you sent me some money, 30,000 paper dollars, some of which is still left. When we begin the adventure in the United States, we may need much money quickly, so please send 400,000 yen to the Yokohama Specie Bank in Berlin to be placed on our account there (if possible, in Swiss francs -- otherwise in German marks). I hope you will do this by return wire.

Well, this is a familiar swindling pattern.

Message on page 37.

Yamagata in Santiago wires the Japanese Foreign Minister that he has just had a talk with the President of Chile who said "yes, I am accepting Washington's invitation to the coming conference there. That is because I want to increase the prestige of my country. Chile treats the nationals of all countries the same as
those of her own, only when there is some basis for suspicion
she warns those involved not to do anything to harm the country.
As for Chile's liberality, Waldo Frank's lectures there prove
that. When you say that Argentina is pro-Axis you must know
that it is the government and not the people you are speaking
of. When my own people heard that I was going to Washington I
had to show them where I stood because they were up in arms about
it."

Yamagata replies, "I never cease to pray that your business
to the United States will strengthen the present policy of the
Chilean Government and contribute to the welfare of all South
Americans. My government is watching the course of events
eagerly." The President thanked Yamagata and lapsed into silence.
The Japanese Minister keeps on prodding him and the President, so
the message says, drew himself up to his full height and said
proudly "no, I do not think I will meet with any unpleasantness in
the United States. Usted sabe bien que yo tengo carácter."

How many messages from South America have this tenor. From
the early days of Japanese immigration in Brazil the various
South American nations had been developing an antipathy toward
the Japanese. Like nomads their tradesmen and a considerable number
of their nationals gradually moved from country to country, leaving
behind unpleasant memories among the South Americans. No people
in the world are less adapted to life in foreign nations than are
the Japanese. They only appear to get along well. As a matter
of fact, theirs is a long history of superficial adjustment to
varying forms of government in Japan itself. The Japanese Emperor has just denied rumors that he would become a Christian and stated that his fixed intention is to remain a Shintoist like his ancestors. Well, he, his father and his grandfather were the first Shinto emperors that ever lived in Japan's many times broken imperial line. Before Meiji it may be said that Shintoism did not exist, but was merely being invented and codified. I often wonder what the ancient religions of Japan were like. The earliest Chinese records merely say that priestesses held the country under control. The question in my mind is priestesses of what? The sun goddess? I think not because at the time the Chinese references were made the stories of the sun goddess, etc., could only have been considered as fairy tales in Japan. So it seems likely that the early Japanese worshiped nature in some manner or other.

Again, I insist that the Japanese only seem to respond to existing authority and it is to be hoped most deeply that we will maintain a hold over the Japanese for at least a hundred years. By that time it is possible that they may become civilized inwardly as well as outwardly. I believe that it will be very regrettable if General MacArthur and the other Americans guiding Japanese governmental policies are deceived by the apparently warm cooperation they get, and suddenly decide that all future trouble with Japan is over with. As a matter of fact, I believe that if that should happen, no nation whatsoever in the world would finally be as dangerous to the West as Japan.
Here on August 28, 1942 we have another of these T0 (eastern) intelligences sent to Japan from Soma. It is a Spanish spy report from New York, August 23, 1942. True or not, it gave the Japanese no comfort. Landing forces are supposed to have left for Australia, among them are 12,000 picked parachute troops, each of them has a light rifle and a flame thrower.

Connection between New Zealand and Australia is effected excellently by military planes. Other distant points in the Pacific will soon be reached by the same sort of service.

A convoy of American troops with specially built heavy tanks has arrived at Aden, doubtless to be used in the great battle of Egypt which is expected to start ere long.

The number of men shipped on this convoy was about 40,000.

Now it may have been that we had already picked up the Spanish spy who purportedly at least sent this message to Spain, and had him or her working on our side to frighten and demoralize the Axis.

Message on page 40.

Here is a message of September 4, 1942 which is portentous in its meaning. I do not remember whether it shortly precedes or shortly follows an historic message which very secretly informed Japan's topmost foreign envoys that her military and naval strategy was going to shift much farther southward. I translated the message referred to and immediately gave it to Colonel Doud and Colonel Svensson and they hastened to the officers concerned with military strategy high up in the War Department. The officials they met there were amazed, and some of them, not knowing the absolutely
reliable nature of these cipher messages, told Doud and Svensson that it must be some hoax. We had gone ahead and shipped northwards in the Pacific many men, and supplies, and much materiel. Would all that have to be transferred? Finally, the two officers mentioned above convinced the competent officials to whom they had gone directly that a change of such vast proportions would really have to be made, and came back and took their seats in their office perspiring and breathing hard.
The British envoys to Japan, beginning with the reign of Queen Victoria, kept their government well advised about trends in that country, a thing which our own envoys never did efficiently. Apparently the American representatives in Japan were so naive as to be taken in by Japanese propaganda.

In the 1920's it was our practice to call the British haughty and high-handed in the Far East, but we must remember that she realized that she was dealing with relatively recently civilized savages while we imagined that we were in the company of a wonderful ancient civilization. Britain, having been forewarned by Satow, Aston and Chamberlain, foresaw Japan's attack on the Anglo-Americans half a century before it happened.

We should have realized that while we praised the poor misunderstood Japanese Empire, Great Britain was perfectly able to take care of herself, having along with the other European nations a cultural history dating back into antiquity. I have forgotten the outcome of this message, but we may feel sure that if Hirohito snubbed Edward Windsor, Edward would have been the last person in the world to have taken any notice of it.

It is amusing that Foreign Minister Koki Hirota did not know how to pronounce the name of Dr. Sakanishi, a secretary to the Japanese Embassy and librarian in the Japanese section of the Library of Congress. He pronounced it Banzai, giving it the Chinese reading and Ambassador Saito corrected him.
In 1937 and 1938 I met her many times at the Library. She had all the sweetness, grace and delicacy a Japanese girl is supposed to have. She flattered all the Americans she could meet whom she considered high toned and took them out to meals in expensive restaurants. She is an excellent linguist and it was interesting to watch her and to listen to her as she juggled her fan and her six-inch jeweled cigarette holder before her guests at The Chinese Lantern. But I have seldom seen an uglier or more evil-tempered one. One day at the Library I found her reverently holding a copy of the "Kojiki". I asked her if I might look at it and with some misgivings she handed it over, saying that only the most learned Japanese could read it (which was far from the truth). I opened it on the first page and began to read the salacious (though not so intended) story of the lure-man and the lure-woman. After a page or two her face flushed and she stamped the floor in fury, seizing the book from my hand. After that she never spoke to me again.

Well, her idea was to start a propaganda movement in the United States consisting of the use of a truckful of Japanese literature, art, etc., to camp here and there throughout the country. To make it look like an American project she attempted to get Irving Olds to undertake the tour. Just what measures we took I do not know but Olds, who had spent much of his life in Japan, was soon employed by an office subsidiary to our own in the War Department.
Incidentally let me remark that we rarely see an American born in Japan and educated entirely in the Japanese schools who is not openly or hiddenly partly Japanese at heart. On matters concerning Occidental sciences such as medicine, and other branches of our learning they are almost all skeptical, considering acupuncture and moxibustion as the real cure-alls. As a matter of fact, the sticking of very sharp needles all the way through all parts of the body save the vital organs, and burning holes down into the skin with smouldering pieces of incense can obviously do no good in any disease. I do not need to say, however, that we do not have certain equally foolish practices in the Occident, but they are simply not as wide-spread.

Message on page 3.

I do not suppose that very many people in Japan learned of this article in "Life". I read it and it was no news to me. Nevertheless, the writer used very bad taste and gave an entirely erroneous impression of Hirohito's father, the Emperor Taisho; for, as a matter of fact, he seems to have been one of the most humble and kindly of men. This I learned from elderly people who knew him personally and who knew in what scorn he held the Japanese Throne.

Moreover from time to time cartoons of Hirohito (Showa) would appear in American newspapers and magazines which were almost always detected and censored before they reached Japan. They meant absolutely nothing to Ambassador Saito who had a full
acquaintance with Occidental thought, but he had an annoying
time trying to explain to Japanese officialdom how the President
of the United States could sit back and laugh at cartoons of
himself.
Message on page 4.

Ambassador Saito like so many of his fellow career diplomats
such as Sato, Yoshida, and others was never in favor of an alliance
with the European Axis. From this very message we may surmise
that in 1937 President Roosevelt was not as strongly anti-German
as was Saito.
Message on page 5.

Typical of Secretary Hull, on receiving the earlier reports
of the sinking of the Panay and particularly in view of the
machine-gunning of its passengers, on this occasion he flared up
in great anger. Mr. Saito who was even then slowly dying, was
taken aback.

However the Ambassador's mild answers seem to have quieted
him considerably as we shall see later. Although Mr. Hull's
strong language was not meant personally for Mr. Saito he came
to regret the temper he showed.
Message on page 6.

In this dispatch Tsurumi informs Tokyo that the American
people hate war, consider China the under dog, and believe Japan
in league with evil Fascist nations. On the other hand he points
out that Lamont, Owen D. Young and David Sarnoff, being business
men, have a somewhat different view, and urge Japan not to stir up further antipathy toward the Americans in China, to maintain the open door policy there and stop incendiary propaganda so that business as usual may continue with both Japan and China. Sarnoff's expression, "all Americans respect a conqueror" was thoughtless and untrue; for whether Americans like a conqueror or not depends on whether or not he is in the right.

Message on page 9.

I had heard that a Japanese expedition discovered territory in the Antarctic prior to the expedition of Byrd. This message would certainly seem to confirm it.

Similarly Leif Ericsson discovered the new world before Columbus, but these expeditions were not government-sponsored, and received no particular notice. In any case, we would do well to remember these earlier ventures.

Message on page 10.

March 18, 1938 arrives and growing sicker and more and more weary, Ambassador Saito reports the shock Americans felt at the Austro-German "Anschluss". He underestimates the impact of this fait accompli on the United States, failing to realize that our government was even then almost ready to participate by every method short of war in the fight against Germany. Ambassador Saito recognizes the friendliness of America toward England and France, but he did not seem to grasp how intimate our relations
were, particularly with England. He seems to have been over impressed with our traditional policy of nonintervention in foreign disputes.

Message on page 12.

Here on April, 1938 Tokyo receives a dispatch from Ambassador Hotta in Rome. We get a view of Mussolini's stirring ambitions. We see him siding with Germany against the Spanish and French Leftists and playing down the effect of Germany's coup in Austria on the Italian people.

Message on page 13.

About the middle of September, 1938 the Japanese Premier wired Saito to return from Washington to Tokyo and accept the honor of being Foreign Minister. Saito did not reply until about October 3 when he informed the Premier, "pardon my not answering your several messages requesting me to accept the position of Foreign Minister. I am patriotic as I need not tell you, and under any other circumstances I would consider it not only an honor but also a duty to serve our country in that capacity, but I have tuberculosis in my right lung.

"My doctor is an eminent tuberculosis specialist, Dr. Tewksbury, and he says that if I take his own special pneumothorax treatment I should be well in six months."

In the message on page 13 Secretary Suma, to be encountered many times later in Spain, tells the Foreign Office that Ambassador Saito is in the "first stage". Well, Dr. Tewksbury's assistant
was Dr. Raymond Fenton, who had been a friend of mine for years and lived nearby my home. I called on him casually in the hope that he would mention Mr. Saito's condition. He did. He said that Dr. Tewksbury had delegated the care of the Ambassador to him and that he was administering pneumothorax twice a week. I inquired how Mr. Saito's chances were and Dr. Fenton replied, "he has had tuberculosis for years and has no chance at all. It is merely a question of months or weeks. The madam is taking it better than I ever saw anyone take such news."

After these messages it was the old woeful story of the progress of this fatal disease and one night some five months later poor Mr. Saito, reduced to 80-odd pounds, passed away at 2.00 o'clock after three hemorrhages.

Message on page 14.

Evidently Ambassador Saito enjoyed Mr. Woodring's cordiality and felt better after having it explained to him that it was through Mr. Hull's policy of moderation that so quickly cleared up the Panay incident. Mr. Woodring tells the Ambassador that this was a Christmas present for everybody but Mr. Saito seems to think that President Roosevelt and Ambassador Grew perhaps played greater roles in this matter than Mr. Hull. In any case his animosity toward the Secretary of State vanished from then on.

Message on page 15.

If I recall rightly before negotiations to appoint Brigadier General Burnett as superintendent of St. Luke's Hospital were
concluded, the General died, putting an end to the matter.

Message on page 17.

We well remember Boake Carter's broadcasts from the meeting of the League of Nations in Geneva in 1933. He was one of those who usually take a view contrary to that of any majority, and with his snappy terse comments over the radio he gained a large following.

He seemed easily persuaded to take up this cause or that, and some of us thought that perhaps mercenary considerations usually turned the trick. In this message Hirota arranges with the Japanese Consul in New York to enlist Carter's talents, and this was done with considerable advantage to Japan. Carter's main pride, according to his obituary, was that he never smoked or drank and had no bad habits.

Message on page 18.

We present this message in order to introduce some comments on certain Japanese diplomats. The message, only two parts of which are available out of four, reveals Yoshida's well-known pro-British sentiments, cautiously, of course, but nevertheless clearly in the light of what we know about his later Sato, his great colleague in Paris, upon his return to Tokyo as Foreign Minister with reckless frankness told the Diet how he and Mr. Yoshida had fought against the anti-Comintern Pact or any understanding with Germany. Mr. Yoshida was followed by Mr. Shigemitsu in London and his first message to Tokyo was the most difficult message we ever received from a Japanese diplomat. The late Mr.
Cate and I worked on its ten short sentences for two days. It was written in a Sinistic style, full of Chinese idioms and allusions contained in no dictionaries available. The substance of it was as follows: "Will you please explain to the high officials of England that your poor servant is handicapped by the loss of a leg in a bombing of Shanghai, but that he will sincerely try to maintain the most cordial relations between our country and theirs?"

"My predecessor was a very wise and good man, but I fear that he leaned over backwards in his admiration for England. I myself in many ways admire Britain but in view of circumstances, I will take more of the middle of the road policy than he did on my mission here."

Throughout the years to follow in the different positions he held, Mr. Shigemitsu, though always most intensely patriotic, was nevertheless an upright man to the end of the war. Another man of the caliber of Sato and Yoshida was Mr. Saburo Kurusu, who served his country long as an honest career diplomat. During the war he lost a son in an airplane which was shot down; soon after the war his wife, an American woman from Chicago, whom he dearly loved, died. On July 25, 1948 their daughter Teru-ko was married to an American officer, much to the pleasure of her aging father. While I am writing of first-class Japanese diplomats I had as well include Japan's final Ambassador to the United States before the war, Rear-Admiral Kichisaburo Nomura,
at whose dealings in Washington no one can rightfully point an accusing finger.

Message on page 20.

To sum this message up in retrospect, we all now realize that Mr. Chamberlain's actions at Munich could hardly have been anything other than those of a man about to depart this life and who wishes, however vainly, to do exactly the right thing. It was not vouchsafed him to speak of the peace he so much yearned for in his final words to his people.

Message on page 21.

In this message we see an earlier and better side of Suma as he endeavors to tell Tokyo that Ambassador Saito appears better to him when he knows in his heart that the Ambassador is worse. He says that Ambassador Yoshida, passing through Washington on his way from London to Tokyo will tell what he thinks when he reaches Japan. The American newspapers are already printing the news that Ambassador Horinouchi is to replace him in Washington and Suma fears to tell Mr. Saito. He thinks he had better wait until the new Ambassador arrives when perhaps they both can tell the news to Mr. Saito in a painless way. In any case he does not wish to have the Ambassador move or entertain any feelings of insecurity.

Message on page 23.

For a fleeting moment Suma imagines Ambassador Saito growing better and informs him that Mr. Horinouchi is coming. Naturally
Ambassador Saito takes the news lightheartedly and says he will be glad to move to the Shoreham Hotel on the 3rd or 4th of December.

Now to go back for a moment to Ambassador Saito's arrival in Washington after leaving London. Pictures of him appeared in all the newspapers. He was a frail, winsome looking man and I was much attracted by his smile. However, in the harbor of New York he said to reporters, "Be sure to inform the Americans that I can drink any of them under the table any time." That statement was never forgotten by a great many Americans who upon his death were quick to say that he drank himself to death. As a matter of fact, he was a rather light drinker and we may be sure in any case that tuberculosis draws no distinction between drinkers and non-drinkers.

Message on page 24.

Here we observe the success Boake Carter is achieving in his propaganda in favor of Japan and American isolationism.

Message on page 25.

Ambassador Hotta in Rome advises his government how Germany has taken the Italian people and apparently even Mussolini aback by its sudden annexation of Austria. Italy, he says, had traditionally been Austria's friend, and the Italians never dreamed that such a coup would take place. Hotta concludes, however, that it will be taken philosophically since Germany and Italy must perforce work together for their common good.
At this point it is well to point out that through all the vicissitudes they went Hitler and Mussolini never ceased to regard each other with some degree of favor. It was a curious relationship; for Hitler always held the upper hand and never credited Mussolini with much intelligence. On the other hand, long before the end of the war Ciano, who had never viewed Hitler with any sympathy, came to hate him and to lose respect for his father-in-law Mussolini. Of course, Ciano in the early days of the war cut quite a swath as a dapper young flyer on bombing expeditions, yet in his heart he was always religious and as the tragedy progressed his better self asserted itself until he finally found a brief refuge in a diplomatic post in the Vatican.


Message with our number 2905 is one from Ambassador Saito to Premier Konoye in which he says that Dr. Tewsbury (once one of my own doctors) is giving him his own special pneumothorax treatment with excellent results. I believe that this was extra-pleural pneumothorax which Dr. Tewsbury did use before any other doctor, as far as I know. Mr. Saito says that he told Dr. Tewsbury confidentially about his appointment order and asked when he could assume his duties. The doctor's reply was the tragic old story: "we are just beginning the treatment and I cannot say. Let us wait, say two or three months at least, and see how things turn out."
Message on page 27.

Mr. Saito wisely cautions Japan that the American Secretary of State and the President are succeeding by speeches and radio addresses in arousing the people of the United States for war and that President Roosevelt's position is stronger than ever.

Message on page 29.

Here we have the fourth message from Ambassador Shiratori on his arrival in Rome, a post from which he was never to return alive. He quotes Mussolini and tells him that a triple alliance must be formed without losing a day because the English, American and French are colluding against Japan, Italy and Germany. Mussolini says that another reason for the speedy concluding of the alliance is also necessary lest adverse elements in Japan grow too strong in their opposition to joining the Italians. In this message, even in translation we can see the volatile Italian temperament of the Duce.

Message on page 31.

The French and English envoys Cosme and Kerr are reported by a spy to have met with Chiang Kai-shek in the British consulate at Chungking. They offer to mediate China's war with Japan but Chiang replied that no foreigners whatsoever can ever play a part in the settling of that trouble because the Chinese people have for centuries been inured to dire hardship and will continue this fight to a just and victorious conclusion.
A message concerning code to be removed.

Message on page 34.

Former American Ambassador to Japan, Mr. Castle, tells Mr. Horinouchi how adamant Mr. Stimson is against Japan whom he has always loathed. Mr. Castle, I have heard, was always a well-meaning man who failed to understand the tact and friendliness with which the Japanese had treated him, and was taken in by their seeming cordiality.

This is apparently the case with many short-time envoys to Japan; yet they are not to be classed with certain literary men like Lafcadio Hearn who while seeing all of Japan's faults sought to sift out and portray what was really beautiful and good in her civilization. Though probably not possessing the critical powers of his friend Basil Hall Chamberlain, Lafcadio Hearn, though he loved Japan and was happily married to a Japanese woman, fully realized that Japan's art, culture and literature were far inferior to the long cultural background of the Occident. This is a fact that too few people realize about Hearn.

Message on page 35.

Ambassador Saito's remains are to be sent to Japan on the Astoria. The funeral services for the little Ambassador were held in Tokyo where kneeling before an urn containing the ashes of the little Ambassador Prince Konoye intoned from the Buddhist ceremony, "Hiroshi Saito yo, ware hanasedo, nanji kikazu."
"Hiroshi Saito nanjini koedo nanji kotaesu.

"Hiroshi Saito yo sayo nara!"

Which in English means "O Hiroshi Saito, though I speak to thee
thou dost not hear me. O Hiroshi Saito, though I ask thee ques-
tions thou dost not answer. O Hiroshi Saito, fare thee well."

Message on page 36.

Now we find a true Japanese without any appreciation of
Occidental matters in Berlin; namely, Oshima. He came up from
the ranks of the Japanese army and amid much resentment among
career diplomats was appointed ambassador to Berlin. He was per-
fectly suited to both Japan's and Germany's purposes. In this
message he speaks of how he and cultural envoy Inoue called on
Hitler on the 11th of March, 1939 and how Hitler congratulated
them on an exhibition of Japanese art in Berlin. Hitler says
that he has a deep interest in art and when he visited the
exhibition he was deeply impressed by the fact that the Japanese
and Germans both had ancient civilisations easily understandable
each to the other.

Well, I suppose that the German Chancellor knew that
nothing could be further from the truth than that.

Message on page 37.

Many of the educated Germans and many more of the old
Prussian military men always regarded Hitler as an upstart.

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Message on page 38.

Now we get an early message from Ambassador Kuriyama in Stockholm. He has talked with the Norwegian Foreign Minister who wept over Finland and expressed the fear that the Russians would attack Norway itself. He said "we are ready for them but the harder pressed Germany becomes the more she will have to stick close to Russia."

On December 2 Kuriyama talked with the King of Norway who spoke in a similar vein saying that Tally-ho England was not in a position to help even little Finland much less the four Scandinavian nations. In conclusion the king says that the only country powerful enough to withstand Russia was the United States and that now that Germany has gone over to Russia, Sweden, Finland, Norway and Denmark were totally estranged from her.

Thus we see the beginning of the internal splits and cleavages in Norway, Sweden and Denmark which continued throughout the war.

Message on page 40.

Horinouchi advises Tokyo that Mr. Stanley Hornbeck, head of the Japanese section of the American State Department, has informed Secretary Suzuki rather bluntly that as far as trade or anything else is concerned the United States Government is through with Japan. With the abrogation of the Japanese-American Trade Treaty Hornbeck finally stated "Japan is hinting that she may make up with the Soviet. I suppose that is calculated to scare us, but
whatever country Japan chooses to get intimate with is her own business." Suzuki in reply warns Hornbeck in effect that if an embargo is placed against Japan war may result.

Message on page 42.

Of course, being a democracy with freedom of religion the United States could not find it practicable to have diplomatic relations with the Vatican. Yet, the Vatican is one of the most reliable sources of intelligence in the world, and regardless of whatever political position it takes, it always favors peace.

Message on page 43.

Am.au from Rome advises Tokyo that Mussolini and the King of Italy are having talks with the Pope. Although the Pope detests Russia's actions against Finland, he still puts hopes in the League of Nations. Furthermore, Taylor's advent will probably strengthen the Vatican's position in peace endeavors.

Message on page 45.

Extricate this message as it concerns codes to be described later.

Message on page 46.

One month before this message Germany invaded Norway and Denmark in what she called her "lightning war" tactics. Now on May 10, 1940 she quickly begins her "blitzkrieg" against Belgium, Holland and Luxembourg. Belgium and Holland decided to resist, but Leopold is soon to give up the fight and Wilhelmina cannot save Holland. England and France realize what is going to happen,
but France is too fearful and England too busy arming to the teeth to give any assistance. 

Message on page 47.

Henry Pu-ji, Kangteh, Japan's puppet emperor of Manchukuo, is going to visit Japan for a few weeks.

A delicate lad educated in England and with not many more years to live, the Japanese with much fanfare set him up as emperor of Manchukuo. This suited their purposes, but it was a sad thing to do.

Message on page 48.

Here in the second part of a two-part message Kuriyama in Brussels is evidently talking with the Belgian Foreign Minister. The Foreign Minister states that, terrible as the German "blitzkrieg" is, the tables may eventually be turned, and that British forces are landing that very day, the 11th, a foreshadowing of the evacuation of Dunkirk.

Message on page 49.

How quickly on the 11th of May does Foreign Minister Arita send a message to The Hague and circularize it to all ambassadors and ministers. He is so sorry that poor Holland has to suffer. He cannot afford to waste time and must very quickly consolidate the Japanese trade position in the Indies lest public opinion in both Japan and Holland be more and more affected by propaganda and lies. (Really what is back in his mind is to get everything he can in Asia before Hitler reaches that area as he feels sure
he-will). In fact he says that he wants to clear away all
troubles so that the Japanese may cope with all difficult situa-
tions as may occur in the future, suggesting that the place of
the negotiations be changed from The Hague to the Indies. Here
we see one of the most fundamental developments that led to our
war with Japan. The Dutchmen are a tough race and their
officials in the Indies were even more obstinate than at The
Hague. Fully knowing that their verbal arguments against the
Japanese would end fruitlessly in war and foreseeing the tragic
days ahead for them, the Dutchmen officials turned hands down
on every Japanese proposal. For 15 months though they received,
of course, encouragement from England and America, the decision
to resist was their own, and they would have made the decision
without any backing. It was during these negotiations in Batavia
over oil, rubber, tin, etc., that the temper of the Japanese grew
white hot and a number of envoys from Tokyo began to wire their
government for a showdown. One captain wired Arita, saying:
"Here we are blocked completely by the obstinate Dutchmen
beaked by the dastardly Anglo-Saxons. It is a time for decision.
If the Armageddon of our times must be fought in the Pacific, let
it come now here in these islands." That message was the first
one really to arouse anxiety in General Akin. He read it over and
over and came and asked me whether or not I thought the captain
joking. All I could say was that I did not know, but shortly
later General Akin began to lay plans for our intelligence work
in the Orient.

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Message on page 51.

At this juncture I take from the files of the Mexican messages one from the Mexican Foreign Minister to his Ambassador in Rio de Janeiro. Apparently as of May, 1940 Mexico is determined to maintain a policy of neutrality. It will do so in the face of opposition from some of her sister republics. Nevertheless we can see from the President's declaration that he is taking a strong position against the Axis, censuring those nations who have not already prepared to defend helpless, invaded people. His last statement to the effect that he hopes that it will be the workers of the world who will stop the advance of imperialist war and guard the sacred rights of the people sounds Communist, but as a matter of fact Mexico has come to be an enlightened nation with broad sympathies for all of the oppressed, and welcomes people of good will from all lands. We used to consider Francisco Villa as a brigand but now we are beginning to see him in the same light as Mexico has long viewed him, that is, as a liberator. It would appear that the temperament of Mexico for some reason or other differs from that of the Spanish and Portuguese-speaking nations of South America and that she takes a view of human rights not unlike that of the founding fathers of the United States.

While Ambassador Hayes of the United States and Sir Samuel Hoare of Great Britain were consorting with and praising Franco
and playing a great part in quieting the outraged feelings of their peoples, Mexico's assistance to the common people of Spain and her righteous anger at the Spanish Conservatives aided by Germany and Italy never flagged.

Message on page 52.

We well remember how amazed we were at the faintheartedness of King Leopold of Belgium in capitulating so quickly to the Germans. Even while the British and French were moving in to help Belgium, Leopold ordered his armies to surrender and we all know how our future Allies were trapped and what slaughter took place before the evacuation.

Message on page 54.

Shiratori is dead and now Amau, taking his place for a short time, wires from Rome to Tokyo an address by Mussolini to Fascist leaders. It seems that he got this information confidentially and that this was a secret talk by the Duce.

Briefly Mussolini says that Italy is united behind him, that the map of Europe is about to be changed, and Italy can no longer stay out of the main stream of human history.

This is the old dream of the glory of Greece and the grandeur of Rome. The Greek Empire in every way was the greatest in human history. That of Rome was hardly less great, but that was when the world was much smaller and the Mediterranean was the world's chief water area. If there is anything in history that points a lesson it is this, that once a nation has reached

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its height and declines it never reaches that height again. Mussolini should have realized that and been content with Italy's great art, music, beautiful architecture and joy of life which after all are enough.

In this blustering talk Mussolini appears somewhat ridiculous and amusing. "Fight we will," he says.

Message on page 56.

The 15th of June, 1940 arrives. Paris has given up in order to save itself from the rapidly advancing German army. Ramadier, the Premier, declares to the world by radio that France would never surrender. Marshal Petain is aging and thinking of peace. He is in consternation. Laval, in my own opinion, more honestly than most people think, considers that at last the time has come to make permanent peace with Germany. Of course, there was perhaps a certain amount of miscalculation and opportunism in Laval, but I always thought him patriotic at heart as further developments would seem to show. We must remember that he more than any other Frenchman was under the heel of the Germans.

Message on page 57.

Another message from Amau in Rome. Both Germany and Italy were astonished at how quickly France capitulated. Now what will England do, having lost France, and what will America, so far away and unprepared, do?

After telling Secretary Sakamoto this on the 17th of June

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Chief of the Americas Section continues, "as for Germany's and Italy's demands on France being over-harsh, that will not be the case."

It was probably true that Germany did not then intend to be hard on France but as the three fateful years passed her worsening military situation forced her to bleed France terribly.

Message on page 58.

June 17, 1940 France has fallen. Will England fold up too? The eyes of the American people are turned anxiously on Europe and they are also mindful of Japan. Many of them condemn trade with Japan, even going so far as to demand an embargo.

Lippman, however, advocates speedily reaching a conciliation with Japan so that the United States can prepare for any eventuality in Europe. Wakasugi in New York advises Tokyo that now is the time if ever to have Ward and Walsh increase their endeavors in Japan's behalf. I never knew exactly who Walsh was other than that he was a prominent cotton dealer. From the many messages pertaining to him I got the impression that he had a completely dual view of life. One side of him was all sternly business and money. The other side was all softness and tolerance toward all peoples. In any case he did our cause much harm.

Message on page 59.

Here we find a plain-text message from Horinouchi in Washington dated June 22, 1940. A week after the fall of France President Roosevelt is appointing Knox and Stimson as Secretaries

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of the Navy and War Department respectively. This has caused a shock everywhere and the American people think that the President is forming a coalition cabinet but Knox has been supporting the views of the President and Stimson has been advocating all conceivable help for England. Of course, both of them oppose the Administration's New Deal policy. Of course, President Roosevelt felt naturally that both parties should be united in the face of war and in Stimson he found a particularly good man for his purpose. During his frequent residences in different parts of Great Britain, Stimson had long before learned the truth about Japan's so-called civilization. British diplomats told him that, and he came instinctively to fear Japan as an enemy of the United States. I do not know further what it was, perhaps his ancestry, that made him so pro-British. In fact he went to the various British Isles frequently to play golf and hunt. In any case he was one of the first Americans of any prominence to take an actively hostile attitude toward Japan and a strong stand against the Axis.

On the afternoon of December 7, 1941 I saw him arrive at his door in the Munitions Building. He struck it violently several times with his cane and I could clearly hear him cursing the Japanese out loud. Mr. Knox had long been interested in establishing bases for aerial action. He did remarkably well during the short tenure of his position before his death.

Message on page 61.

In this dispatch from Sakane in Bogota to Tokyo to Washington
the local German Minister Wolfgang Dittler informs the Japanese Minister that he has received orders to cooperate fully in exchange of all documents pertinent to conditions in that region, if and when necessary. Dittler hints that before long things may get hot there. Sakani informs Tokyo that he got the impression that after England folded up within two months, depending upon how the United States acted, there was a great possibility of a direct attack upon the Panama Canal because of its strategic position. Well, those were the happy days for the Germans and Japanese.

Kurihara from Bern advises Tokyo that the Spanish Ambassador on the 7th of July told him that while France had issued no declaration of war against England she was coming closer and closer to the Axis, knowing that she had only been a tool in the hands of England. The Spanish Ambassador went on to say that France had better belong to a continental federation fathered by Germany and Italy and designed to prevent Great Britain from again rising to prominence; that Petain and Laval were staging a bloodless revolution, making France over again; that Spain would help the French all she could; that Hitler would not hurt France but would nevertheless disarm her; and that far from hurting France, Spain would help her rise again along new lines, French Morocco being about all Spain wanted. After that the Spanish Ambassador was careful to point out to Kurihara that they would

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have to be on the lookout against Washington and Moscow.

There was always something wrong with the German-Italian view of France. There has always been something wrong with our own view of France. France is not one of the so-called Latinistic nations. Her people are predominantly Celtic with a large admixture of Teutonic blood. In no country of the world have the mass of the people been so imbued with the spirit of freedom as have the people of France. The word liberty casts a magic spell over them. This spirit achieved its highest expression in Rousseau and Voltaire and also in such military leaders as Lafayette. Many, many modern French politicians have held widely divergent views and indeed some of them favored a tieup with Germany, but knowing something about France, I affirm that any such marriage of convenience was destined to break up violently. Petain's and Laval's seeming willingness to cooperate fully with the Germans was the result of rationalization on the part of both these men. In their hearts both men always disliked the Germans. It is further true that during the last 20 years German culture has grown in France. German music is performed in France quite as well as in Germany. Even German cooking gained great vogue. That is because the French are not as different from the Germans as are the Italians and the Spanish. In any case no nation has shown the light of liberty to the whole world in such an extent as France. No other city has ever equaled Paris in charm. We would do well
to see to it that France again achieves a position of a first-rate power.

**Message on page 63.**

This is a very fanciful message. Churchill always maintained his strong position during the war. The Duke of Windsor never even attempted to influence the weak-willed King George. Churchill never even thought of replacing Chamberlain with Lloyd George. The Duke of Windsor was not opposed to Churchill though Sir Samuel Hoare did try to influence him. Edward and Sir Samuel never met and conferred in Madrid.

**Message on page 65.**

Yamagi in Vienna probably strikes very near the truth of the situation when he said that most of the peace rumors current as of July 19, 1940 seem rather fanciful to most people. He goes on to relate that the British Foreign Office had a report that Roosevelt is about to try to mediate the war by having Hitler approached on the one hand, and on the other by having Hayes approach Sir Samuel Hoare in Madrid in order to get the Spanish Government to work upon Germany and Italy and that the British Foreign Office understands that these two ambassadors are about to begin.

Well, American Ambassador Hayes was never respected by many Americans and Sir Samuel was always regarded as quite a ridiculous man by the United States and for that matter by most Englishmen.
Message on page 66.

On November 14 Morishima reports from Washington a statement of the 10th by Kennedy, the American Ambassador to London. The late ambassador was always incapable of following a consistent course, making one contradictory statement after another. At times he praised England most highly, and at other times, he declared that democracy was dead there. There was one thing, however, in which he was quite consistent. He was an American aristocrat with little feeling for common men anywhere.

A note on Pearl Harbor.

The last message described was of November 14, 1940 and the next one that I shall take up will be of December 9, 1941, an interval of almost 13 months. That was a period which, for one thing, is too painful for memory to keep. So many were the messages and so few were there to work on them, at most only two or three people on translation work, that it would be futile to go through a minute description of their separate contents.

Having said that we shall now present as clear a picture as possible of what these dispatches contained in that interval, with particular reference to Japanese-American negotiations. After the fall of France the mood of the American people made it possible for the United States gradually to build up a war potential, ostensibly aimed entirely against the European Axis. So great was our trade legal and otherwise with Japan that an embargo
was hard to get started. Due to ignorance our people as a whole viewed Japan with relative unconcern, that is, save in the high government offices in Washington where great labor, anxiety, perplexity and suffering were taking place. For there it was unknown whether it would be in Asia or Europe that we would have to fight first.

As previously pointed out, Japan was exerting intolerable pressure on the Netherlanders in the East Indies, and it became clear to the Japanese that they would not yield even if permitted to do so by the Netherlands, the United States, and England. They were negotiating more and more feverishly with the Portuguese for the resources of Timor and Doctor Salazar would not budge. The Japanese saw some six months before Pearl Harbor that if they were ever to win the war against China they would also have to either obtain the resources of these islands or else seize them along with the Philippines, Thai and Burma. Of course, they dreaded a war with the United States. Their best-advised officials in every department of their government advised the hot-headed warlords not ever to attack the Anglo-Saxons; so Japan planned a course of negotiations with Secretary of State Cordell Hull through Ambassador Nomura. They did this because it had dawned upon them that they could not achieve their objective short of a miracle, that is, unless they could win us over without a fight.

They first presented proposal A, whereby they were to get
everything they wanted for their co-prosperity sphere in East Asia. While maintaining complete cordiality with Mr. Nomura whom he personally liked, Secretary Hull, having previously studied the proposal received from our office, turned it down after merely glancing over it. Along with proposal A, Tokyo had sent what they called a stop-gap proposal B. Some six weeks before hostilities broke out Mr. Nomura on word from Tokyo presented the second proposal which was couched in vague terms and seemed to demand considerably less. Mr. Hull studied or seemed to study this document for sometime, probably to gain time, but Foreign Minister Matsuoka was dead of consumption and Tojo held the concurrent offices of Premier and Foreign Minister, backed up by a small but powerful clique of army and navy officers capable of wielding tremendous power over the military forces. Save for Oshima and a relatively few other semi-diplomats Japan's diplomatic corps was almost uniformly against war with the Allies because they knew what the outcome would be. Even powerful army and navy officers warned Tojo and his clique not to attack us under any circumstances though they themselves detested us. The Emperor and Prince Konoye did not know what to do. I do not know if they actually had any definite feelings in the matter or not. But Tojo evidently felt cocksure and he and his cohorts began to scheme war in the Pacific.

The sands of time were running out. Secretary Hull had held
proposal B under consideration as long as he dared. The British, Australian, Netherlands, and Chinese Ministers met with Mr. Hull and President Roosevelt in the White House and a day or so later Secretary Hull asked Ambassador Nomura and Ambassador Kurusu, who at Nomura's request was sent him from Japan to help in the negotiations, to call at the State Department. The Secretary then handed Mr. Nomura counter-proposals of the United States demanding that the status quo of before the war be restored in East Asia. Both of the Japanese were profoundly shocked and Mr. Nomura said that he could not cooperate even to the extent of sending the American proposal to his government. However, he did send it and then the Japanese began one of the stealthiest actions in all military history. They wired Nomura to sit tight and pretend that negotiations were being kept up. Frightened, he wired back that he should have gone out with the former peace cabinet of Arita; did not wish to be left here like the carcass of a dead horse; that he did not want to keep going about deceiving people (in 1946 in Tokyo Mr. Nomura told the American officials that he remembered sending that message, but meant that he did not want to go on deceiving even the Japanese as to his true feelings); that even though the members of his embassy were turning against him he always knelt down at night on his knees and prayed that the crisis would pass without war. Tojo replied that it was not a question of one man's opinion or desire; that the ambassador was in the most strategic place in the world, and that he should calm
himself and carry things through to their conclusion.

Then came a very peculiar message to be presented to Secretary Hull. The Japanese had already told the ambassador that negotiations were de facto ruptured upon receiving the counter-proposals of the United States and to merely play for time. Yet in this message several days later they apparently again sought a modus vivendi (I think it was Mr. Hull himself who first used that expression) from Secretary Hull who was certainly perplexed by it. What prompted that message I never knew. Perhaps it was part of the trick; perhaps, on the other hand, something may have prompted Tojo to reconsider temporarily in the face of fear.

Ere long a very secret message was sent from Tokyo to Oshima for Ribbentrop and Hitler who were to inform Mussolini of its contents. In it Tojo said "say very confidentially that we are ready to attack the Anglo-Saxon nations and that this attack may come about sooner than anyone dreams to some clash of arms." Some months previously on sending the proposals Nomura had been advised that unless the United States accepted proposal B there would be a "tragedy" on the last day of negotiations. From a number of naval messages we somehow began to imagine that Japan's attack would come in the Philippines; however had we read or rather had it been humanly possible for us to read several messages arriving shortly before Pearl Harbor and several some days and weeks after it we would have known clearly that Hawaii was to
be Japan's objective. Of course, in retrospect we can see how some six weeks before Pearl Harbor we might have been able to have determined this but there was simply too much work for our personnel on material which by all good judgment on our part had the priority that we were simply too fatigued in the pertinent War Department offices to be that analytical. Of course the United States might have attacked Japan first but the President said as he sadly mused over the situation some hours before the event happened at Pearl Harbor, "we have a good record."

A description of the war taken largely from Major George Fielding Eliot's account in the "Information Please Almanac."

At this point in order to clarify the sequence of messages to follow we shall have to give at least a brief summary of the general course of the war from the autumn of 1939 to the autumn of 1945. The war lords of Japan from even before the beginning of the reign of Meiji had been scheming to obtain rubber, coal, oil, iron and tin which they lacked for modern industry. In order to do this they schemed to acquire the Netherlands East Indies and the Malay Islands and to defeat China in order to make her a market for Japanese manufactures. The war lords further planned to force Russia out of Sakhalin and back west of Lake Baikal.

Some of the Japanese military thought China should come first and indeed they started out with the Chinese program in Manchuria in 1931 but the fighting for ten years proved harder than they had anticipated. It is true that they gained many
strategic points and all the while we were supplying them with iron, oil and other products for this invasion. After the first five years Japan was appalled at the overwhelming numbers of Chinese soldiers against whom she began to realize that she was wasting her strength and resources. So she began to look more and more to the United States for supplies. But the attitude of our country was changing. We began to supply them less and less and about a year before Pearl Harbor hardly anything was going to Japan. It was then that Japan put forth so desperate an effort to convince us that she was in the right. She spent tremendous amounts of money on all kinds of schemes to influence us through many of our own people who for one reason or another saw or seemed to see some justification on Japan's side. How terribly wrong were some of our missionaries, newscasters and above all, business men.

So after the first five years of her struggle in China Japan began to look enviously at the Netherlands Indies and Malaya but she feared to antagonize the United States, Holland and England, confining her activities to ever-increasing negotiations in Batavia, etc. In 1939 war came in earnest in Europe which delighted the Japanese. Germany quickly overcame France and Holland and we were turning our attention toward Europe, alarmed at the fall of France and fearing lest England and Russia meet defeat.
The Japanese military thought they foresaw a quick German victory over Russia and were not anxious to have Hitler over in the Orient demanding rich booty. They wanted to have their sphere in the Orient completely consolidated and in their power before this happened, therefore, they quickly schemed to seize Malaya, Singapore, the Netherlands Indies and the Philippines. The American fleet was at Pearl Harbor and they figured that if they could deliver it a knockout blow they could quickly achieve their objectives. That is why they attacked Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941. Of course, they wanted to keep us out of Australia and to take Australia so that we could not get a foothold there, in short, the Japanese planned to leave us no bases for a combat. Before the attack Admiral Sakamoto, a known hater of all things American, was called into conference and questioned as to the advisability of the attack. His reply was that for all his hatred of the United States, if such a plan were carried out, it would end in a defeat for Japan in about four years. Those who heard this opinion from Sakamoto screamed "traitor". Later finding the destination of an airplane bearing Sakamoto through a code message, we shot down his plane and he was killed.

But Japan's plans like those of Germany, for that matter, were based on the assumption of quick victory. Doubtless they realized that the Allies were potentially stronger but they fell immensely far from a correct estimate of our resources and latent powers. So the Japanese and Germans both had a necessary time
limit for their operations. The Germans planned to defeat the Russian army in the late autumn of 1941 and the Japanese planned to consolidate all their successes by the end of 1942. In these projects both Germany and Japan failed most miserably. Germany failed because Hitler decided that instead of continuing his siege of Moscow and destroying the main Russian reserves east and northeast of it, retracted and decided, against the advice of his generals, to drive east to the Volga in the Stalingrad sector and to invade the Caucasus in order to cut Russia in two. Doubtless he fancied he could conquer the Middle East and India by double thrusts, one from the Caucasus through Tiflis and the other from North Africa across Egypt, Palestine and the Arabian Desert as General Marshall has observed.

So the German armies drove far, far away and successfully too to the gates of Stalingrad and the foothills of the Caucasus. At Stalingrad for the first time it began to dawn on the Germans that they might not be able to defeat Russia; for there reserves began to pour into the city and German onslaught after onslaught fell back. The Russian armies were consolidated at last and back swiftly from the Caucasus they drove the Germans whose communications and supplies had been long severed. From then on Germany met only with defeat in her attacks both offensive and defensive in Russia.

We will not go into details of Japan's early successes at Singapore, in Burma, Rangoon, Mandalay, Thai, the Burma Road,
New Britain, Australia, New Guinea, the Solomon Islands and Corregidor, the Philippines and the Dutch East Indies. Then Japan set out to prevent us from ever interfering with her holdings. They sent a fleet toward Port Moresby, on the south shore of Australian New Guinea, but in the Coral Sea we stopped them once for all in the direction of Australia though at great cost to ourselves. In June, 1942 the Japanese made their second great sea attack, this time against Midway Islands, after which they were to proceed on and take the Hawaiis but by that time our men and materiel had caught up with our intelligence work. There in the Battle of Midway occurred the worst disaster the Imperial Japanese Navy has ever suffered in its history. The Japanese at about that time attempted to gain a foothold in the Aleutians and attacked Dutch Harbor by air, but all they accomplished was the occupation of two tiny islands, Kiska and Attu. But Japan's forces were then still stronger than ours and they assembled them in the Solomon Islands where they built a large airfield on Guadalcanal for a drive south to the New Hebrides and New Caledonia, another plan to cut us off from Australia and to invade it. We saw the danger and quickly made a harrowing decision. On August 7, 1942 our Marines began landing at Guadalcanal and Tulagi where they gained ground but four heavy cruisers behind them were sunk by the Japanese and how our forces withstood them was miraculous, isolated as they were. That was a fateful fight and our forces began to arrive by sea and air. The tide turned. Our intelligence
work and our forces were in coordination at last, and Japan was reduced to night air attacks. They would not risk their main fleet. Now at last Japan had forever lost the offensive and the Allies were on the offensive in both Europe and Asia. The Japanese never attempted another major offensive on either land or sea. The Germans fought on desperately after Stalingrad, and the Japanese did the same after Guadalcanal, but though they had gained their empires it slowly began to dawn on them that they could never hold them. It took three years for the war to turn against the Germans and one year against the Japanese. Now we will proceed to the matter of chronology.

Germany re-armed, walked into Austria and Czecho-Slovakia and on September 1, 1939 invaded Poland for which she formed a mock alliance with Moscow to gain time, pretending that she would divide up Poland with Russia.

1939, September 3.

Great Britain and France declared war on Germany. November 30, Russia this time in reality invades Finland. 1940, April 9, Germany invades Denmark and Norway. May 10, Germany invades Holland, Belgium and Luxembourg. May 16 Germany invades France. June 10, Germany's ridiculous ally, Italy, declares war on France and England. October 7, Germany invades Romania. October 28, Italy invades Greece. 1941, April 6. Germany invades Yugoslavia and Greece. June 22 Germany declares war on
Russia but Russia knew Germany's plans more than two months in advance; for we ourselves told them when and where the attack was coming. December 7, Japan bombs Pearl Harbor, declaring war on the United States and Great Britain. December 8, the United States and Great Britain declare war on Japan and China declares war on Japan, Germany and Italy. December 11, Germany and Italy declare war on the United States and the United States declares war on Germany and Italy. 1942, May 22, Mexico declares war on Japan, Germany and Italy and Brazil on Germany and Italy. 1943, Bolivia declares war on the Axis Powers. September 3 after defeating Rommel in North Africa the Allies invade Italy. September 8 Italy surrenders to the Allies. October 13 Italy under Badoglio declares war on Germany. 1944, June 6 the Allies invade the green hills of Normandy. September 3 Romania signs armistice. 1945, February 23 Turkey and Egypt declare war on the Axis. March 27 Argentina declares war on Germany. May 2 after a terrific struggle the German army in Italy surrenders to the Allies. May 8 Germany surrenders unconditionally to the Allies. August 8 as a gesture and for political reasons Russia declares war on Japan. September 2 all her fleet and all her territory gone and two of her great cities, Hiroshima and Nagasaki fearfully blasted with American atomic bombs, Japan surrenders.
Message on page 1.

The reasons why I have not taken up the prelude to Pearl Harbor in more detail are that the stress and strain of that period were so great that I have only a confused memory of them and the details can be found in their essentials in the long published report of the Pearl Harbor Investigation Committee.

In this dispatch we find the first Japanese communiqué to Japanese diplomats abroad concerning the extent and damage of the widely synchronized attack at 1:00 o'clock Washington time. As well as I can recall, this message was fairly accurate.

Message on page 3.

Here we first meet Admiral Darlan. Of all the Frenchmen covered by these Japanese reports to Tokyo, Darlan appears to me really to have been the most anti-Allied in his thought and actions of any other Frenchman.

Message on page 4.

Before wars propaganda begins to flourish at an increasing tempo and once war has started, it becomes so prevalent that it is extremely difficult to distinguish facts from fiction. Perhaps American propaganda regarding the Japanese attack on the Philippines was superficially exaggerated but in spirit it certainly hit near the truth. Perhaps in war any nation or people are cruel in varying degrees, even to civilians, but the histories of the Japanese conquests from the 16th century on are full of
instances of amazing beastliness on the part of the Japanese in Korea and China.

It may not be amiss to remark that the first thing both belligerents accuse each other of is the murder of priests, nuns, ministers and helpless women and children along with the bombing of churches and other holy places. This is exactly what the Japanese Foreign Office is accusing Secretary Hull of doing and he is advising his representatives in foreign countries to deny these accusations immediately.

Message on page 6.

Here Budapest reports that the first accusations of the United States were spreading like wild fire before the Tokyo denial in the English language was broadcast on the night of the 28th of December. The Japanese Minister advises the Foreign Office to listen in to British broadcasts, deny them instantly, and since Tokyo broadcasts are sometimes hard to pick up it will be a good idea to have Germany and Italy broadcast Japanese denials in English to England and the United States.

Message on page 7.

At this point we first run into Spanish Foreign Minister Serrano Suner. We will meet him often. Whether or not he has any redeeming qualities we do not know but he was one of the most cunning, prevaricating, and mercenary men found in these messages. This by the way was the beginning of one of the greatest espionage frauds ever foisted on a nation. The gold-loving
Spaniards struck a good vein of ore in Japan. It reminds you of how Europeans bought hundreds of acres from the Indians with a few pieces of costume jewelry. We do not mean to say, however, that the Japanese got no value whatever from their investments; for throughout the war Madrid was even more important as an espionage center than either Lisbon or Geneva and in the normal course of events the Japanese could not help getting some reports of value. Nevertheless we are safe in assuming, we know in fact, that the false information gotten into their hands by trickery on the part of the Allies by far offset any advantage they had in Madrid.

Message on page 8.

In this message from Helsinki we get the views of the respective Brazilian and Spanish Ministers to Finland. The Brazilian Minister says that his country's relations with North America are economic and that the coming Pan-American Conference will overlook this and end up in a back-slapping farce. He goes on to say that Brazil has a larger territory than all Europe but only some 40 million inhabitants, and will therefore need immigrants from Italy, Germany, and Japan.

In many ways this conference first appeared a failure but it did a great deal gradually to consolidate most of South America against the Axis with the noteworthy exception of Argentina.

The Spanish Minister says that Spain will be delighted now
that the Japanese have seized the Philippines, that Spain is delighted to see the Axis oppose the Bolshevists who in years gone by reduced Spain to a nonentity. He says that these Communist countries and their abettors, England and the United States, are naturally the enemies of Spain who cannot forget the treatment she received at their hands in days gone by although Spain cannot take up arms but only pray for an Axis victory.

It certainly was not the Communists who reduced Spain to a nonentity in years gone by. It was the British and a wind storm. I do not like to speak in generalities about peoples yet there has always, I think, been something very uncivilised about the Spanish people taken as a whole -- something paradoxical. On the one hand they built a culture which in all of its facets is based upon Catholic symbolism. Indeed from Spain have come some of the world's greatest Christians and Christian missionaries. On the other hand the ruling classes of Spain and the military conquerors who have supported them have been a curious mixture of piety and diabolical cruelty. Again among many Spaniards the cleavage between religion and action is so wide that it is hard to see how they can exist in the same person and yet they do.

Some days ago I was talking with a school boy who was reading a history of the conquests of Cortez and Pizzaro. The lad said "those two men were wonderful Catholics. They prayed to God to give them victory over the vicious savages, particularly wicked
old Montezuma." I replied, "you must not get things mixed up. Cortez and Pizzaro were savage Catholics and Montezuma was a civilized savage." The Spaniards were really after gold or its equivalent in colonial possessions.

Message on page 10.

In this fragment of a message Oshima talks with Otto Abetz, German envoy to France, and incidentally not necessarily an unwise or bad man. He always took every opportunity to advise Germany to temper down their increasingly heavy demands on France.

Here he tells the ambitious ex-military men, as delicately as he dares that nothing can ever win Vichy at heart over to the Axis. That was true.

Message on page 12.

Now we meet the press attache to the Spanish Embassy in London, Senor Alcazar Belasco. He has returned home and has a spy net of 21 men and has brought a detailed report from England for the eyes of Franco and Sumer only. Sumer, of course, gives a copy of it to Suma. Belasco is returning to London in a couple of days. Thus begins the long series of TO intelligences, consisting of 90% fabrications sold dearly to the Japanese. In another message Suma describes Belasco as a very shrewd and cavalier-like gentleman "who, if he likes you, will do anything for you and if he does not you had better look out."

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Message on page 13.

This message from Buenos Aires concerning a conversation between Japanese Secretary Usui and a German secretary there. They conclude that American surveillance is so strict that it is going to be very hard to get information of value from the United States, and that they had better get directly in touch with Madrid which obviously would be the best spy center in the world. They conclude that maybe they can get the Spanish Ambassador in Washington to transmit spy reports for them.

Well, Senor Cardenas in Washington with his press man Lucientes and an increasing network of spies (whom we rather easily detected and in most cases won over to our side by fear or by money) did his best to achieve that object. At first for a long time he thought he was succeeding and his disillusionment was finally painful indeed. Then too the Spanish Embassy here thought it was fooling both the Japanese and the Americans, the Japanese by getting fictitious information into their hands and the Americans by fearing to represent the Japanese honestly and at the same time contriving to get spies (infantile as they were) into the United States.

Message on page 15.

On the 3rd of January, 1942 Franco has a dinnerette for European and Asiatic Axis representatives. Franco amid trivialities makes one important statement. First he says that he is glad to see England and the United States have the horrors
of war brought home to them; that now they will understand the spirit of Japan; and that he is sure Singapore will fall soon and the war in the Pacific will be over. But he further states that things in Europe are not looking so good because Russia won't fold up like she ought to do, and Spain thinks Japan may have to wind up the war after all. Franco seemingly in a friendly manner warns Suma however that the Philippines are Spanish historically and culturally, adding that he is sure that the Japanese will understand that.

Message on page 16.

Four days later Surer tells Suma that the news that the Japanese were going to expel the white people from the Philippines caused a great shock. Suma speaks euphemistically, trying to explain it away, but Surer seems dissatisfied. Suma has met Belasco and Surer tells him that it was he who arranged the meeting; that Belasco was first sent to London to establish a spy net with the knowledge of the Spanish Ambassador alone; that the spy net is functioning like clockwork, getting dependable intelligence; but that there is danger and it will be too precarious to let Belasco go back to England right now.

Surer goes on to say that he is getting no important message from the United States yet but three spies have already been sent there. There is further talk about unity between Spain and Portugal.
Message on page 18.

Here we have a fascinating message from Oshima dated the 8th of January, 1942. It is in the most difficult keying of the Japanese Foreign Office's most secure cipher machine (so the Japanese thought). Oshima says that on the 6th Premier U Saw has visited Minister Chiba in Lisbon and that the news was brought him by Secretary Ueno of the Lisbon Embassy. Oshima fears for security but wires Tokyo about the event and U Saw's statement written on hotel stationery.

U Saw simply tells Chiba that Churchill snubbed him and with the help of Japan he intends to free Burma, after which he adds that the following day, January 1, he would head for Burma via Gibraltar, in a British military plane and is to be back home by the middle of January.

In Egypt the British apprehended U Saw (of course we and the British were hourly exchanging translations of these Japanese dispatches) and he was held for sometime. I do not recall the full story of U Saw and his attempt to collude with the Japanese. All I know is that as of the second of August, 1948 a month or so ago he was executed.

Message on page 20.

Here we find either Suner or Franco philosophizing on the death of culture in Europe now that the Anglo-Americans have tied up with the Russians. Russia has always been a center of
unrest since the days of Peter the Great. Here occurs a very revealing sentence: "Culture has not kept up with civilization. Material development has outstripped moral development. We can teach a cannibal to use a telephone or run an automobile but still he is a man eater. Russia is now a magazine of weapons and culture is wiped out. Now the Anglo-Saxons have turned over Europe to these savage hordes."

To us culture and civilization are about synonymous, but in the minds of most Spaniards there is a not very subtle distinction. To them culture means overdone politeness, gaudy icons and glittering baubles. Regardless of what civilization and culture are in Russia, the Spanish idea of culture is entirely devoid of any concept of morality which they rightly attribute to civilization about which they appear never to have known much.

Message on page 21.

This message refers to a French codebook which the Japanese succeeded in copying in Hanoi, a rather difficult code too, involving the superimposition of transposed cipher.

Message on page 22.

Now we come to a very laughable message from poor Mr. Chiba in Lisbon to his chief in Tokyo. So the British have caught U Saw. How in the world did they know he was up to anything? It must have been this way:

When you write with a pen or pencil several pages beneath bear the impression, in fact a number of pages, even though you
cannot see it the molecules have been displaced and the writing can be brought out with chemicals. Young master U Saw went up to the mezzanine in his hotel and wrote out his message to Ambassador Chiba. British spies were standing around and when he tore off a page and left they sneaked up and tore off the page under it, slapped it into some chemical solution and read it. That is the only way they could have learned anything about U Saw's plans and actions.

Well, I suppose that fantastic explanation might have been possible, but I doubt it. These messages speak for themselves and we know perfectly well where the information came from. 

**Message on page 23.**

January 18, 1942 comes and Oshima in Berlin wires Tokyo his conjectures on the German-Soviet war. Oshima expresses chagrin at the startling defeats Germany has met in Russia. Hitler has miscalculated but from the very beginning Germany knew that it would be difficult to keep their supply lines open. The Germans figured on taking Leningrad, Moscow and the Donets basin by late in October or early in November and then the Caucasus. Oshima apparently believes that Germany will win in the next drive.

Beginning September 1, 1939 Germany overran Europe but failed to terrify England into surrender. After the surrender of France June 22, 1940 and after the evacuation of Dunkirk, had Hitler immediately invaded England who had a weak air force and all too
few fighting men left in the British Isles he would have won out, but he hesitated too long and American aid to Britain became greater and greater. Hitler decided to defeat the RAF first. In this the Luftwaffe suffered complete defeat. It was not that the British planes were superior to those of the Germans but that the skill and courage of the British fliers in new, practically untested planes were greater. Hitler simply gave it up too quick and it was too late to invade the British Isles. Then Hitler turned from the British Isles to Central Europe where he won some minor insignificant victories. Meanwhile he kept up the so-called Battle of the Atlantic where for a while he did very well, however, though theoretically neutral the United States ran the blockade marvelously though at great loss. Finally Hitler's submarines and airplanes began to have less and less effect in the Atlantic against our measures to protect the sea lanes to England. Meanwhile Mussolini however got bogged down in Greece and the British were defeating the Italians in North Africa, so Hitler had to go and help the Duce for fear the Allies might win in the Mediterranean. Hitler probably had planned to defeat Russia and then conquer North Africa, the Balkans and the Middle East but he had to move southward. Hungary, Romania and Bulgaria became frightened and immediately surrendered. Yugoslavia resisted him but he defeated her and then attacked the Greeks. The British
were forced to give up their pursuit of the Italians in North Africa in order to put what small poor forces were available into Greece. The Germans drove these forces into the sea. So Germany won the Balkans, the eastern Mediterranean and North Africa but he had paid so dearly for them that he could never again meet the rising war potential of Britain early in 1941. By April 18, 1941 Russia knew fully of Hitler's plan to attack her and she was secretly preparing. Indeed Hitler had not counted the cost. Perhaps he dared not to reckon. In any case for what reason unknown he marched into Russia on June 22, 1941. At first the German soldiers literally chased the retreating Russian armies. The Germans speedily took the Baltic States and hurried over White Russia and the Ukraine. On the north however they were checked at the gates of Leningrad. On the south they entered Rastov and stormed Sevastopol while their great central army headed for Moscow. Hitler's forces drew near their ancient city so that his guns could be heard by its inhabitants. He proclaimed "the Russian power has fallen in the dirt, never to rise again.

Then came the white snows of winter. In their relatively light clothes the Germans almost froze to death; Their airplanes were grounded. The Russians rejoiced and fought harder than ever for they understood winter warfare. Moscow was saved from the invader. Having failed to take Moscow the Germans retired to their winter lines from the Baltic to the Black Sea where they
remained, preparing a new offensive in 1942. Field Marshal von Bock advised Hitler to go back and destroy the Russian reserve concentrated east and northeast of Moscow because he could then take eastern Russia easily. But Hitler did not listen and planning to split Russia in two drove towards Stalingrad where he met a most crushing defeat to the amazement of the world. On November 22, 1942 fresh Russian troops, seemingly infinite in number, started a counteroffensive which never turned back, and from that day forward Germany was defeated.

What Hitler perhaps hardly realized Oshima as yet does not know that the tide has definitely turned against Germany. Field Marshal Keitel is the only one who seems fully to realize what the failure to take Moscow really meant.

Nevertheless in this message we begin to discern a growing uneasiness on the part of Oshima who thereafter was not slow to admit it when Germany suffered reverses.

At this time Oshima was in a very strategic position. His advice to Tokyo became invaluable and he became envied and hated by a number of career diplomats in Europe.

Message on page 24.

Here we have a very interesting circular from Tokyo setting forth the general lines of future Japanese propaganda. Who actually drafted the circular we do not know. From the Japanese viewpoint it seems in all probability a good summary

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for propaganda concerning the projected East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere. But it might well be asked why some of the more educated men in the Foreign Office did not draft a policy more understandable and acceptable to foreign nations, particularly in the Occident. Almost any Japanese career diplomat would instantly have understood that this policy would antagonize far more peoples than it would appeal to.

The policy here described summarizes the superstitions implanted by the rising military leaders in the minds of all Japanese save the most astute. It is this: racially, historically and culturally Japan is divinely destined to lead all the nations of East Asia (why curtail the sphere to this extent? The doctrine was that Japan would eventually rule the world and the Emperor be worshiped universally). The sun goddess and her descendant Yamato had planned it so. They had imbued the Japanese race with the responsibility for this great, divine mission to build a universal empire. They had established the "Imperial Way". But search as you will you cannot find that expression until the 19th century. Thus divinely founded and instructed it was natural that Japan should never have been conquered nor invaded and that her people should not fear any other people or be hostile to them. Truly, Japan was magnanimous, the newly invented old gods had long ago destined her to make the world into one big, happy family. Great character, spirit, ideals, and compassion
are apparent in the Japanese people. Does not the Japanese family system show that?

Next we have a typical Japanese expression "the present Japanese people are founded on an imperial family descended from heaven." That is, from the sun goddess Amaterasuchomikami. More than 2,600 years ago did not the demigod Yamato come from the south conquering and even then amalgamating many of the various tribes? Throughout all of 2,600 years had not the Imperial lines remained unbroken even amid the strife of clans, feudalism and all kinds of vicissitudes? No kingdom or empire ever saw so many of its monarchs overthrown, displaced or murdered. Time and again the line, relatively short, has been completely broken. It is strange how people believe what they want to believe. As Chamberlain well remarks, "even the inventors of Shintoism came to believe in their own creation."

Now the time has come to establish Japanese dominion over East Asia and she will give them the opportunity -- the privilege of being led by the one people on earth who are descended from heaven. As we reflect upon Japanese history we can easily see that her brave and spirited soldiers possessed the ability for this concerted effort. They will spread truth, goodness, beauty, honesty, spirituality, science, art, good government and religion among all the peoples of the Orient. Japan truly personifies these ideals. That is what the Imperial Way means -- nothing but
harmonious unity. There will be no discrimination, no racial or religious prejudice whatever. Japan will simply and sincerely work out a cooperative league for the great undertaking of rebuilding East Asia.

Now you may say that this is something of the same sort of mythology as that of the Aryan peoples from remote times, but I simply answer "no". Then you might say that it is something like the attitude of the Germanic peoples toward the old Aryan gods named somewhat differently in German Anglo-Saxon, etc., but again I answer "no". The Aryan gods are merely symbols representing the accumulated experience of the peoples spawned by India in prehistoric times, representations in myths, literary allusions, or marble of strength, beauty, the sun, sky and stars, death, etc. On the other hand, Shintoism comprises not the old Japanese gods who are not unlike our own, but remoldings of them into enslaving and military concepts.


Now we come to a message from Horikiri in Rome dated February 26, 1942. He has supplanted Amsu who served ad interim. Horikiri senses the defeat of the Axis in Europe. Yet the general commission of the 3-power pact has just met in Berlin and set up a propaganda subcommission. They have already mapped out foreign propaganda for themselves as well as for Japan and Hitler
and Mussolini are going to direct this propaganda. Well now that is something that might have worked perhaps if things had turned out differently but the Japanese have been doing better than the Italians in their share of the war of late. It would be better for Japan simply to cooperate with her partners in Europe than to go on executing her own propaganda. The Japanese must keep their eyes on their condition. It is just a scheme of Ribbentrop to wrest the control of foreign propaganda from Goebbels and to direct it from its seat on the 3-power commission. He and Goebbels are not on good terms.

Had HORIKIRI known it the Germans had done much better than the Japanese were to do; for Germany's war began on September 1, 1939 and she fought on very successfully until October, 1942 a period of three years while the Japanese made headway only for 12 months. They entered war on December 7, 1941 and were defeated on Guadalcanal during August, 1942.

Message on page 27.

The Japanese Ambassador in neutral Stockholm where dwelt the most intelligent of German refugees, if we may so call them, reports their views to Tokyo. They take it upon themselves to insult the Japanese. They figure that Japan is up against a monster in China which she cannot whip and that similarly Germany is up against a monster in Russia, which she has no more chance of whipping. They are unhappy, they do not like to see Japan
grabbing more and more while Europe is carrying on a nonsensical and fratricidal war which ought to be stopped and reconstruction begun. Some of these Germans even say that it would be of very doubtful advantage to Europe for England to be knocked out and to lose too many of her colonies. They figure that Japan is a parasite likely to doom the doctrine of freedom. Not only in India but even over the whole western world.

Here we find an open expression of what the Germans were probably secretly thinking at home at this time.

Message on page 28.

We mention this message merely as an indication of how the appointment of Sato as ambassador to Moscow attracted opinions everywhere. Professor Genov aptly compared Sato's position in Russia with the position of Mr. Nomura and Mr. Kurusu in Washington prior to the outbreak between Japan and the Anglo-Saxons.

Message on page 30.

This is a "Madrid intelligence" stating that Stalin will have heavy demands on the Allies when the war is over because of his superior position in having played a major role in defeating Germany, so London and Washington simply will have to go along with Stalin and try to get him to temper down his desires.

Message on page 31.

Here we have a code message superenciphered in the most secret keying of the Japanese Foreign Office cipher machine which
they thought to be invulnerable to the end. Oshima reports a conversation between himself and Chancellor Hitler. Hitler regrets his failing ability to carry out his plans for building six battleships, four carriers and a fleet to support them between 1940 and 1944. He says that he is sorry to say that it is not working out that way.

In any case Hitler is certainly glad (so he says) that the Japanese are winning so many victories with their excellent navy. If he only had the Japanese fleet instead of the Italian in the Mediterranean the situation there would have already been stabilized. In any case, says Hitler, he is glad that he is doing so well with submarines along the American coast. He hopes that the Japanese will harass her on the West Coast. Then she will not be able to defend her doors any longer. Hitler further says that he is going to continue to build bigger and better submarines.

Message on page 32.

Oshima reports a conversation he had with Chancellor Hitler in the presence of Foreign Minister Ribbentrop. Hitler praises the swift and successful Japanese victories and says that the war has been brought to a decisive stage thereby. Then he unrolls a detailed map explaining the military situation in various places. "I am well satisfied with the war in Russia so far. Nobody but we Germans has ever fought one of those desperate Russian winters and won. I say that because I know that as soon as good weather
comes back we can crush the Red Army completely. We do not want to suffer needless casualties at Sevastopol; so we are now attacking it with unprecedentedly heavy guns and will conquer it soon. We are bombing Malta constantly. Italy could help Rommel out much in Africa if she would but her efforts have been so puny that I doubt very much that she will. She ought to help us get to Egypt and Suez. Italy’s stagnation is really sad to see. It is terrible to have to waste Kesselring and Rommel in Africa when they ought to be in Russia right now. This is an aching wound to Germany. We really are expecting a landing attempt by the British at Cherbourg or Havre. Probably they want to destroy our submarine bases. We have sent seven mechanized divisions to be ready for them. Then too they may fight through Norway but in any case Germany would rather welcome a landing attempt by the British.

Now we come to a statement by Hitler himself about how he sized up the situation regarding Russia when he attacked her. "Never in my life did I make such a great decision, but I knew that if I left Russia alone and continued my fight against England, she would stab us in the back when we were least able to resist. As Fuehrer, I took it upon myself to do my duty and that’s why I began the war against the Soviet Union. From the very beginning I knew that God and God alone knew whether I would win or not; but as I said, it was incumbent upon me as Fuehrer..."
to do what I did. I could not stand to see Germany ruined. If the German people do not have the ability to win and if they are ruined by this struggle, it will be inevitable. The Soviet was stronger than I thought, but that had nothing to do with my decision. I knew that without fighting the Soviet, Germany could never accomplish her plans laid for a hundred years. But, in any case, I have my own reasons for continuing the fight against the Soviet and I must say that I am thoroughly satisfied."

Message on page 34.

Here in Rome on April 2, 1942 we meet the wonderful old Grand Mufti of Jerusalem holding converse with Horikiri. They are discussing bigger and better broadcasts to Greater East Asia. The Mufti’s idea is to thwart the good work of Cripps. He takes a letter out of his pocket and hands it to Horikiri. The letter goes on to say how grateful he is that Japan is delivering the Moslems from the persecution that had filled him with horror, particularly in the Netherlands Indies. Henceforth these Moslems are eager to cooperate by word and action with Japan. They want to further the prosperity of their great deliverer. He is sure that Japan will show special consideration and friendship to the Moslems who constitute the larger part of the inhabitants of the Netherlands East Indies.

We doubt if there was ever any more picturesque childlike figure than the Grand Mufti. Heinous as some of his words and
deeds have often been. Many fancy him a diplomat. This is not so. He has neither tact nor the ability to keep secrets but he does have most of the Mohammedan world backing him up.

Message on page 36.

On March 6 the Grand Mufti indirectly informs Horikiri that he has not yet agreed upon a pact with Germany and Italy but is trying hard to do so. He amusingly states that in order to satisfy India, England will have to place a Moslem high up in the War Ministry. After the war England will have to accord India some dominion status according to her present plans. Now Premier Tojo has already said that while England is fooling India, Japan is trying to get her independence. The Japanese, particularly from the standpoint of the Mohammedans, ought to play that up in their broadcasts to the Mohammedans.

Message on page 37.

We have an early message from Ambassador Saito to Russia. He has asked Molotov frankly for an introduction to Stalin. Molotov replies that Stalin is very high up, very busy and he does not know whether the two can meet or not. Sato says that that is all the more reason, now that he is so high up, why he has no choice but to see foreign diplomats. Sato says that Japanese-Soviet relations are so delicate that he thinks he ought to have this audience. Molotov excuses himself and four days later he
receives a telephone call that Stalin is too busy to talk with him and is very sorry. Again on the 14th Sato begs Molotov to arrange for him to see Stalin but Molotov stalls saying that it is only a matter of time and that Stalin is not putting him off intentionally. Hotly Sato replies "if you think Stalin is busy what do you think Premier Tojo is? It is simply the custom in Japan as everywhere else for the chief of state upon request to grant an audience to a foreign ambassador." Molotov retorted that Russia has no such precedence and that Stalin is simply too busy.

In conclusion Sato deeply hurt, and in this respect typical of all Japanese, concludes "Stalin has seen Kerr when he presented his credentials and so if the Russians do not grant me this interview it will delight London and Washington to see Stalin discriminate against us. They must grant me this interview and if you agree with me use the same excuse and never let the Russian Ambassador in Tokyo darken your door again."

On this occasion and at a dinner held later Sato keenly felt what he conceived to be snubbed but he was usually a very mild-mannered man and well controlled. Then again for all I know perhaps he really was snubbed and had a right so to complain. Message on page 41.

Nanking learns about the bombing of Japan from American fliers captured when one of their planes makes a forced landing.

SECRET
The Americans made it appear that they flew all the way to Japan stopping for a time on an island near Midway.

Message on page 42.

Two days later on April 22, 1942 Nanking discovers the truth about the so-called Shangri La.

Message on page 43.

Maotake Sato here outlines one of his earlier conversations with Foreign Commissar Vassily Molotov, held on April 14, 1942. Sato voices doubt as to the ultimate outcome of the European war; that it is generally thought that the United States and England are affording Russia a great deal of materiel. Molotov answers that Hitler knows that he has met more than his match; that though the Allies are hard pressed themselves they are actively granting Russia assistance to defend her way of life.

Sato reflects that while Russia's strength is increasing German submarines have lately been inflicting heavy losses on Allied shipping off the coast of the United States, and that at this time it will be hard to prophesy what would happen to Europe.

At this point Molotov switches quickly to a very embarrassing question and says in effect "Mr. Matsuoka formed a non-aggression pact with us on his way back to Tokyo from Berlin. Both Ambassador Tatekava and Foreign Minister Matsuoka himself told me that you Japanese knew nothing about the coming German attack on Russia beforehand. I don't believe you Japanese knew
anything about it at all. They even said that Germany's attack on us was contrary to Japan's plans and that Japan had no part in it. But what I don't understand is this: Mr. Matsuoka stayed in Berlin for a long time. He talked with Hitler, Goering and Ribbentrop often and long. You see how things have turned out. No, it is all beyond me." Now of course Molotov knew that the Japanese Foreign Minister had been advised somewhat in detail about the German attack on Russia more than two months beforehand. We suppose that he was trying to find out whether Matsuoka himself knew about it or perhaps just who in the Japanese Foreign Office knew about it. In any case Sato passes lightly over the subject saying that he was not in public life at that time and knew little of the circumstances; that Mr. Matsuoka is ill; that he had no chance to get his version of it; and that he will inquire of Ambassador Tatekawa and let Molotov know what he finds out. Finally Sato says that it is up to both Russia and Japan to keep their relations above reproach since they have a valid neutrality pact and that Russia must not offend the feelings of the Japanese. Molotov agrees and tells Sato that he is glad to know it and will call him any time he needs him.

Message on page 47.

Arriving in Moscow, Ambassador Sato calls for the first time on Foreign Commissar Molotov. They talk for an hour and a half. Sato says that although relations between Tokyo and Moscow appear
calm on the surface they are strained underneath. He expresses concern lest one misstep be made, adding that to maintain satisfactory relations the neutrality treaty must be followed to the letter. Sato goes on to say that Japan feels her responsibility under the treaty and success can be had only if Russia does the same. Then Sato makes an interesting and true statement "this is a strange war. You are on one side and we are on the other. We see only one side of each other's faces. It is necessary for us to prepare for war against you but we do not expect it, nevertheless I must tell you that it all depends on whether or not you give America and England military or naval air bases on Kamchatka or nearby area intentionally or unintentionally. If you do this we must fight you. Once you do this there will be no undoing." Molotov laughs the question off. No Russian is even dreaming of such a thing. "How Mr. Sato you are the most astute diplomat in all Japan. (Molotov was not merely flattering Sato; for he knew that this was true). Russia has no wishy-washy politics. Naturally she has to look out for herself. That is exactly her policy towards Japan. The pact was sincere and Russia will keep her word."

"How splendid. I cannot tell you how happy I am," answers Sato. Then Molotov goes on to say that there are hotheads in Japan, even in government circles, whom he cannot help worrying about and that there are many Russians who say that Germany is using Japan just as she did Italy. Continuing he warns Sato that
the Japanese had better be leery about the Germans and stick to the neutrality pact.

Sato reassures the Foreign Commissar that the Japanese are fighting in their own interests; that many Japanese do not like the Germans any better than Molotov does but that they simply took a stand against what they considered the oppression of the United States and England; and that responsible Japanese officials had no plan to move northward.

This conversation ends on a friendly note and Molotov tells Sato that he will be glad to talk to him at any time, particularly on Japanese-Russian relations.

Message on page 52.

In a circular message Tokyo advises the Asiatic envoys that the recent cabinet shakeup in France happened because the Vichy Government feared that Germany would take strong measures against France in order to close the doors in the west before making another venture into Russia. Vichy also wants to make sure of the possibility of a rapprochement with Berlin after the Russo-German war. In other words, seeing or thinking they saw German success the French leaders took this step in order to ingratiate themselves with the Nazis. Nevertheless, it is not to be assumed that the French people or the Vichy Government have adopted an attitude of complete cooperation with Hitler. Germany herself could hardly hope for that. To the eye it would seem that Franco-German
relations are closer and America and England are already spreading feeling against Laval. It is already rumored that Washington will recall its ambassador to France, Admiral Leahy. America is now playing up to the De Gaulists which will naturally make relations between France and America tense.

Through it all however the French, even the new cabinet, wish to stay on the good side of the United States and unless that country takes drastic measures against her even Vichy will not go over decidedly to Germany.

Now let me again note that from these messages we find little evidence that any Frenchman save perhaps Darlan was ever pro-German at heart. The French leaders simply diverged in their views as to what was best for France. It is probably true that the French had for a long time been wondering if it would be possible to withstand the pressure from the Middle European area with its relatively poor but ambitious population. Furthermore, undoubtedly the French had for sometime been wondering how strong and how permanent an ally they had in England. Furthermore, it is to be observed that since World War I a greater appreciation of German culture had been developing in France. All this does not mean however that the French ever turned Germanophiles to the extent that they would sacrifice French sovereignty. The French are too much imbued with the spirit of Rousseau, Voltaire, Lafayette, etc., to sacrifice their idea of liberty. However, we must not forget that Frederick the Great was greatly
influenced by Voltaire and endeavored to put his ideas into effect in Germany.

Message on page 54.

In what is purported to be a report from the Spanish Ambassador to Washington to the Foreign Minister, workers in arms factories are demanding better pay and if they do not get it are producing sub-standard material. In a certain factory in Michigan they have so much trouble that competent military officials threaten the penalty of death if it is established that deliberate sabotage was taking place.

Strict secrecy is observed in the education of fliers who however consume vast amounts of liquor. This, thinks the Spanish Ambassador was quite in line with the adventurous spirit of America. So many of the youth prefer the air service. An American air officer told him that although the American boys had no experience in actual warfare they did not have anything to worry about. It went well for Germany when she entered the war, but after a few rounds with the enemy she has changed her tune. Her war reports sound a little different now. The German parachute troops, so effective against the English and French, are losing their effectiveness with the broadening area in the east. The Ambassador replied that it did not appear that the United States would have to train any parachute troops but the air officer answered, "well, not only are we in a position to train American..."
parachute troops on a great scale but we have also a great air
arm back of them." This message was a TO intelligence.
Message on page 56.

Oshima wires the Foreign Office that Foreign Minister
Ribbentrop asked him to call on him on the 3rd of May, 1942.
When he presented himself to Ribbentrop the latter said in effect
"both Hitler and Mussolini are confident of what Japan and Italy
can do. Hitler explained to you the other day his plans for
the Russian drive which is getting underway. He is sure that
Germany will get better results this time. At worst before winter
time comes the Germans will have knocked the Red Army out and
then the oils of the Caucasus will be available to the Axis. The
German and Italian leaders plan to redouble their destruction
by airplanes and submarines. All that is necessary is to sink
7 or 8 million more tons of shipping and England will probably
crumples.

By bombing Malta in the Mediterranean, Germany has made her
lines to Africa secure and Rommel's army will fare better.
Ribbentrop himself felt sure at the beginning of the preceding
year that Germany could take Gibraltar but Franco was against it
and Sumer would have no part in it. So this chance was lost and
Ribbentrop fears that Spain will be impotent. Portugal hopes to
maintain neutrality and both Berlin and Rome are supporting her
in this.

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Turkey is holding us in Italy at arm's length but when they see we are winning they will be quick to come in to our side. While we are in the midst of our drive against the Soviet the Anglo-Saxons will of course probably make some landing attempts in the Polar regions. We expect them also to land in Africa but from the northern tip of Norway.

Message on page 52.

In a message of May 8, 1942 Tokyo advises her envoy in Buenos Aires as follows: Now that Corregidor has fallen the southeastern Pacific is completely under our control and the focal point of Anglo-American imperialism in Greater East Asia has been destroyed. In spite of America's boast this proves that her naval power was thoroughly broken at Pearl Harbor and now the Philippine Islands may be used by us as a military basis and our supply lines from the south are completely secure. Also we are now free to wage war in the Indian Ocean and against Australia. When Burma fell the decisive stage in our war was reached. Anglo-Saxon imperialism is a thing of the past and we will build an Asia for the Asians of whom we are the deliverers.

Message on page 60.

Germany is preparing for another attack on Russia -- the thrust that is to finish off the Red Army, defeat Stalingrad and obtain the oil of the Caucasus but at home she is growing noticeably weaker economically. So in this message Ribbentrop pleadingly
explains to the Japanese the Axis need for complete economic cooperation. Not only during the war but also after the war. He goes on to say that Hitler and Mussolini agreed on that at Salzburg. They must each in their respective sphere grant the other preferential treatment. Oshima sensing Ribbentrop's suspicion that Japan proposes to monopolize East Asia and states that some Japanese economists fear that the Germans will invade Asia after the war, rather than England and the United States, therefore, he says there must be an article in the commercial pact being drawn up to eliminate this suspicion. Then the two men argue about concrete articles to be included in or excluded from the treaties. Ribbentrop is clearly looking forward to the day when the war will be over and consequently he favors separate treaties among the several nations in the two respective spheres. Oshima however declares that the idea at the moment is to get a workable treaty between Japan and Germany so that they can win the war and not count chickens before they are hatched. Later on, he says, the details that are worrying Ribbentrop can be settled. Ribbentrop seems convinced.

Pursuing his argument Oshima deplores its stipulations because they reveal bad faith on the part of some German financiers who fear that the Japanese are going to conquer East Asia. He feels hurt and says that if the two nations do not treat each other in absolute good faith the Japanese will get suspicious too.
Wiehl of the German Economic Office is sitting in with them and Ribbentrop nods and says to him, "Wiehl, make a note of that and make haste." Continuing, Oshima says that German merchants in China have been recalcitrant, would not follow Berlin’s policies and have caused many misunderstandings between Ribbentrop and him. He further points out that Germany had been perfectly stopped in the Netherlands East Indies on the Netherlands market. Ribbentrop replies, "well, I have already informed Hitler that it will be necessary to regulate such things as these."
September 15, 1942 and Japan has already established her Department for Greater East Asia. The Italians are having the press withhold comment. It attracted everybody’s attention. The Italians are wondering if Japan’s liberal policy will continue any further. The Japanese Ambassador in Rome is alarmed lest the new department scheme to place all the occupied territory under Japanese administration. If Japan does that they say that all the people of Europe will beg to differ with her. Financial circles are particularly strong on this point. People here say that Japan has been doing so well in her military actions and has made a great hit among the Asiatic folk. Now, if she goes on antagonizing her friends, well, it will be a sad day for her.

In sum, if Japan relinquishes rational diplomacy and adopts a high-handed attitude, other nations will become hostile to her -- nations who have so far rejoiced over her victory. At a time like this when Axis solidarity is so important, these are matters that we cannot afford to overlook.

Well, the Japanese forces have already for one month and eight days been attempting to rally after the American attack on Guadalcanal and Tulagi where, though they knew it not, their defeat had already taken place. Things are not going well with Germany either, therefore, the Japanese Government has already begun to seek for more unity.

Suma again wires Tokyo and Berlin on September 15 an
intelligence purporting to have come from the Belasco spy ring in England. Some British major or lieutenant commander states that Great Britain is far superior to the United States as a fighting nation because the United States is given over to effeminate pleasures. He says that the United States just makes plans but does nothing, but that the British are the ones who get things done. The Americans brag simply to cover up their unpreparedness. After Dunkirk and Dieppe, England has recovered somewhat in morale and material. Fear of invasion has died down for the moment but will rise rapidly again. Then England will try to open up a second front using a few paratroops. Production of field pieces particularly the 25-pounder, the development of the new type cannon which is very secret, a flame-throwing armored yacht equipped with a large gasoline tank, soon to be built, will help England immensely, if realized. Airplanes are being built fast and aviators are being trained but England resents America's bragging of her own product. The British say that their pilots have nothing to learn from the Americans. The British Government and Russian Ambassador Maisky are on bad terms. Maisky told the press that it was beyond his comprehension why Great Britain did not establish the second front. The British Government told him not to make any more statements like that. They are thinking, so it is reported, of cutting short Maisky's Communist activities. The Argentine Ambassador told me so. It seems that the United States is very anxious to drag Argentina into the war and gain control over her. England is in collusion with the United States.
in trying to win over Foreign Minister Ruiz Guinazu; and long the 
Foreign Minister will come to blows with President Castillo.

Beaverbrook rather wants Russia to be defeated. The fall of 
Russia is a foregone conclusion, much to the liking of Beaverbrook. 
Then peace could be made with Germany so that the flags of all the 
white nations could be lined up in a solid front against Japan, 
in order to get back all the territory she has conquered and to 
squench her ambition. In the city (British Wall Street) they are 
scheming to contact Schacht and high German heavy industrialists. 
The likelihood of this will depend largely on events in Russia and 
North China. Who will head the joint general command of English 
and American forces has not yet been settled but it is generally 
accepted that it will be an American, if not, it will probably be 
McNoughton or Paget.

It is a fact that shipbuilding has now surpassed ship sinkings 
and during the coming winter the number of craft constructed will 
increase.

Message on page 6.

September 16, 1942 arrives and Mr. Furugaki of "Asahi", 
Japan's best-known morning newspaper, wires his representative 
Mr. Imai Hosokawa an unhappy message. Before summarizing it, it 
is well to remember that the battle of Guadalcanal is going 
against the Japanese. They fear greatly for their declining number 
of ships and airplanes. The ratio between destruction and con- 
struction has turned immensely in favor of the Allies, as before 
the attack on Pearl Harbor Admiral Sakamoto, of all people,
prophesied it would. To tell the truth Japan's leading diplomats throughout the world, her naval attaches and her high military and naval officials at home now realize that the tide is rapidly turning. They know that the vaster resources of the Occident are coming upon them like a steam roller. The foreign diplomats are almost all convinced that Germany's 14 months of war, already fought against Russia, is about to turn into a fiasco.

In all this we see the sad and senseless spectacle of nations whose defeat is a foregone conclusion continuing what they in their hearts know to be a losing war. In the message at hand we can see how public opinion influences the government in such cases, almost always lagging behind the government in knowledge. Yet for all that the wishful thinking governments themselves when in a desperate condition compel the people to go on by instilling fear far exaggerating patriotism and false hopes.

Furugaki says in effect there is no use in fooling ourselves any longer. We know that the outcome of the war is in doubt now. The government officials want our paper to educate the masses so that they may not only know what to expect but also be ready to face the worst. It really boils down to that. In other words the people should now at this point have it impressed upon them that the striking power of the United States and England has become terrible. Truthful news reports must be published from now on both to educate and arouse the Japanese people.

From Buenos Aires you are getting us excellent material. Continue to do so and if our censors find anything to stop,
preparations have been made for them to do so. So let your mind be at ease.

If there is anything that must be kept absolutely secret let the Foreign Office officials send it for you.

This message was sent through Japan's most secret diplomatic code.

Message on page 7.

On September 21, 1942 Oshima wires Tokyo a conversation he had with Ribbentrop. We have only half of it, the latter half in which Ribbentrop speaks unhappily of the strong counterattacks of the Soviets in the northern sector, he adds, however, that the Germans repelled them very well and the situation is not necessarily unfavorable. Oshima impatiently reminds him that a month or so ago Moscow was to be attacked this year, but that winter is coming on and there seems no possibility of this. Ribbentrop merely replies that Hitler is planning the war on the northern front and that Hitler would inform Oshima about it, thus avoiding a candid answer.

Ribbentrop goes on to say that the Royal Air Force is not really hitting any German military objectives, but is merely doing inestimable harm to German people, thus trying to discourage them by air attacks and propaganda. The German people, he says, are merely shocked at such barbarism and demand blood. Right now Germany cannot strike back, but the time will come when she can,
and when she does, it will be an unforgettable attack. The German Army is already sending much food and cattle from the Ukraine to the front and some of it is coming into Germany, so there is no danger of a food shortage. But, alas, when it comes to oil, the situation is somewhat different. In Germany’s tremendous military efforts, the consumption of oil is enormous, particularly with Italy and some other allies holding on to Germany’s coattails. Still, with what we have at home and what we get from Romania, there will be enough to carry out the fight. Then too there is the bright prospect of getting the oil of the Caucasus which will change the whole situation.

Message on page 9.

On September 26, 1942 Sums gets alarmed in Madrid and wires the Foreign Minister: "Your Excellency has stated that Japanese-German relations are to be strengthened. I expect them to, but I hear rumors that Japan is not going to help Germany fight Russia. I hear that we are trying to mediate and bring about a separate peace between Moscow and Berlin. All in the world we have done for Germany lately is to conclude an economic pact with her. It is our duty to do more than that. How many people are now under the impression that we are turning to the defensive and are trying to hold merely what we already possess. Now I myself don’t know much about this new Greater East Asia Department, but I do know that it is causing Europeans to say that we are going back on our word, deserting our friends, letting them sink while we swim."
"Doesn't the Tripartite Pact say that if Germany goes down we could not win in the Orient, well, people are beginning to be suspicious. They say that for all our big talk we are giving our old friends the slip. The Italian Ambassador, for example, asked me if we do not mean to isolate what we call Greater East Asia. What people actually feel in this part of the world is that Japan's desertion of her allies will go along unnoticed until the European skies begin to darken and Germany and Italy see only defeat ahead of them. They suspect that when we are called upon we won't be there to answer.

"You know that England and America take advantage of all this to sever Japan and Germany by propaganda. I have already told you, cautioned you, that if we go on this way we may get it in the neck too.

"The Anglo-Saxon nations are collaborating more and more effectively day by day. The plans made in the meeting on the Atlantic are being carried out. Everything is going according to schedule. They believe that by the end of 1943 they will have almost surrounded the Axis and be on the offensive.

"The fateful battle of Tulagi is over, and, standing on its soil, the American Undersecretary of the Navy has proclaimed that the American victory there avenged Pearl Harbor. He said that as long, every Japanese soldier on the Pacific Ocean would be wiped off. Another spokesman of the American Navy has declared that this is the way Japan pays the United States back for all the kindness shown Japan at the time of the great earthquake. The same American
spokesman added that what the United States is going to give Japan is a jolt worse than any earthquake. 4

"The Americans praise the bravery of the Soviets who have saved them so much grief and at the end of July Oliver Littleton said that the next 80 days would be fateful indeed.

"In short there is a heightening desire for an offensive by our enemy and along with other places they will strike hard blows at us too."

**Message on page 11.**

October 1, 1942. Japan, already defeated though only a few of her diplomats appear to realize it, now goes ahead and issues an order to the effect that the Filipinos are to speak only Japanese and Tagalog, save in a few special cases.

The Japanese are very sorry. That is all. It is merely too bad that Spain objects.

**Message on page 12.**

On October 2, 1942 Horikiri in Rome wires Tokyo as follows:

1. The Germans did very well in North Africa till the first of September, but now they have been stopped.

2. Dieppe and Tobruk were failures. Next the enemy may try their luck at Dakar or Casablanca, but the Italians feel that it cannot be done this year.

3. Well-informed Italian officials say that when Germany has gained control of the Near and Middle East she will have won the war, however, we must realize that Germany is in an unhappy plight...

*Commenter's note: This literally happened.*
in Russia. She does not control even the Black Sea in the
Caucasus area. She has no supplies at all from the rear. Even
if she reaches the mountains this year, she cannot advance south
till next spring, and the Near and Middle East, according to the
Italians are no push-overs. Of course, a stiff fight was expected
at Stalingrad, but both Italians and Germans here in Rome are
prostrate with grief, saying that just like last winter this
winter will be as bad, no far worse, than the last for the Germans.
Some government officials, who should perhaps know, have a more
optimistic view, however.

Large American bombers are now over Africa and the Mediterranean.
Willkie has visited Ankara, and Taylor, the Vatican. In fact the
Italian officials and people are becoming terribly afraid of the
United States and what they may do to Europe sooner or later. To
put it flatly the Axis now seems pretty much at a standstill. I
actually hear that Italy, as well as Finland, desires a separate
peace. Italy is the weakest spoke in the Axis wheel, and England
and the United States are not lax at all in trying to extricate
this spoke.

Message on page 25.

Here is another of those Eastern intelligences, sent on
October 2, 1942 from Madrid. New Foreign Minister Jordana instructs
the Duke of Alba to get in touch with Anglo-Saxon officials in
London and try to get them to let Spain mediate the fratricidal war.

Spain adheres to an unchanging position of independence and
national integrity.
Spain's policy is one of anti-Communism. That is why she fought the civil war. The Axis helped her to win it, therefore, she cannot give up her friendship for Germany and Italy. Jordana, purportedly continues to the effect that the warring powers did not and could not wish to destroy each other because if they did, the economic reconstruction of the world would be impossible; that Spain would like to mediate the fratricidal conflict; that this is the time to do so, and it would not be very difficult to succeed.

Message on page 17.

October 12, 1942. Most secret. Purportedly sent from Washington on the 10th. In effect Suma says that a message has been handed him saying that Lucientes or perhaps some other Spanish spy in Washington has been informed that his colleague in New York has been jailed in Baltimore because of the interception and reading of one of his suspicious messages to Puerto Rico.

Commenter's note: Is it not possible that this jailed man was one of the several Spanish spies who was forced or paid to work on our side?

Message on page 18.

October 5, 1942. Suma wires the Foreign Office that Lt. Col. Sousa, Private Secretary on Foreign Affairs to Jordana has told Belasco that Taylor and Jordana conversed as follows:

Taylor: "Let us start now to end this war between brothers in Europe. It makes no sense to see civilization ruined. You Spaniards are in a good position to mediate and to work on Hitler so as to help us make a separate peace between America, England, Germany, and Italy. I sincerely hope you will help us."
"But as for Japan we cannot include her. We won't impose cruel terms on her, but her control in East Asia is too strong. We should strike at Japan hard, but we can't with our hands full in Europe. That is why she is beating us. Now if we can just make peace with Germany, we can certainly squash Japan's ambition."

Jordan replied: "I am sorry to tell you that Germany will certainly not make peace on those terms."

Message on page 20.

On October 10, 1942 we have a message from Tani in Tokyo to Bangkok. Guadalcanal has vanished like a dream. Even the Japanese warlords can now sense that the tide is turning. How can it be that so many vessels far out in the Pacific and the vessels in coastal trade can be sunk this way? It is a phenomenon passing strange. Our signal intelligence was now well coordinated and was wreaking its havoc. Pearl Harbor had been avenged at Tulagi.

So Tani informs Bangkok that the Son of Heaven is broken-hearted over the sufferings of the poor Thaisse even to the point of weeping from his tender heart. He is going to send 5,000,000 yen worth of relief materials to aid the flood-ridden country. It will take several ships. The Son of Heaven, however, realizes that this will have a wonderful effect on the morale of Thai in the battle of Greater East Asia, but he knows that these materials are short in Japan; so he won't let it be published in Japan at all. No communications from Thailand concerning the matter will appear in Japanese newspapers. Tani says:
"I told the Thai ambassador that the Emperor told me to
tell him this and he bowed profound thanks for His Majesty's
estee, expressing his own personal gratitude. Therefore, will
you please communicate this to the Thai and, if possible to
Premier Pibul immediately.

"Well, what a pretty penny this is going to cost us Japanese.
It comes out of the pockets of the people who can't afford it. It
wouldn't do to let them know it. Please tell the Thai officials
this in strictest confidence, and see that this news is spread
far and wide over Thai, but that no wind of it reaches Japan.

"Then too, come to think of it, this might do a lot to make
the Thais more cooperative."

Message on page 22.

On October 12, 1942 Tan wares Bangkok frankly what Japan's
attitude toward Thai is. We shall not wade through this long
message the import of which is as follows: We are going to en-
courage and assist the Thai in agriculture, economics, finance,
general production, communications and trade, and then we shall
bleed them dry.

Message on page 23.

On October 12, 1942 Suma sends Tokyo another Eastern or TO
intelligence which supposedly came from Washington on the 10th.

It seems that there is quite a quarrel going on in Russia as
to whether or not the war against Germany should be continued. The
White House has probably heard about it, because there is conster-
nation there, so a high official informs me. He says that the
chiefs of the Soviet appear to have resolved that only on terms that the United Nations will support the Communist form of government and continue sending sufficient supplies, will they continue fighting Germany to the bitter end.

There is also a rumor that the Allies plan to use the brilliant defense of Stalingrad as an entering wedge for a separate peace with Germany. The aforementioned revolution of the Soviet chiefs is the result of Willkie's statement in Russia that any idea of a second front within a year was just a dream. It would seem that Willkie's frank statement of the hidden ideas of both London and Washington has infuriated President Roosevelt.

Commenter's note: It is a fact that at that time particularly the Russian commissars did entertain grave suspicions that we would at the end of the war try to upset their governmental structure, thus undermining Communism in Russia.

The next message purportedly true though probably common knowledge, indicates the same thing.

Message on page 24.

Here we have a message misplaced in order but no matter. It is of March 18, 1942. It begins Madrid intelligence.

"A" the 16th. Eden visits Stalin and they talk.

Eden: "All I want to talk about is the conduct of the war. I have no authority to discuss nor do I wish to discuss political matters. Military matters are enough for me."

Stalin: "Yes, but that is not enough for me. If the Allied
nations win the war, Russia desires certain boundary lines clearly marked. Before the Russian-German war our territory included Latvia, Lithuania, Estonia and most of Poland, although the boundaries were vague. Now all this territory has got to belong to Russia."

Commenter's note. This is a 2-part message and we do not have the second part. Both Stalin and Molotov, in their conversations with the many leading envoys to Moscow all through the war, constantly repeated this sentence: "Our Allies England and America are helping us wonderfully and we appreciate it, but we do hope that they will not interfere with certain of our plans and our way of life after the war is won."

Message on page 25.

Suma wires Tokyo on October 22, 1942 in effect that Sumer had previously agreed sub rosa to permit the use of the Falangist branch chief in New York and Washington in establishing a far-flung spy net. Suma wants funds for the establishment of twenty spies in the United States. In this message Suma refers to a reliable gentleman who is leaving by Clipper plane on the 8th of November to visit Mexico, Peru, Colombia, Ecuador, and Guatemala. He is to help in establishing the espionage net in all these places.

One of the special press correspondents mentioned in some other message is going to sail early in November with Consul Kobbe who will proceed to the West Coast of the United States. The correspondent, however, will be located in Washington, so if you have any word from him you had better wire me back immediately, said Suma. Suma also wants to have Kobbe well instructed.

SECRET
I have forgotten whether our officials left Kobe into the United States or not but I believe they did, because usually such officials could be used to our own ends, knowing, as we did, so much about them beforehand.


I mention this message from Oshima to the Foreign Minister merely to point out at this juncture the terrible difficulties which, not only the Japanese but also other foreigners have had and still have in obtaining visas to pass through the Soviet Union. The Soviet was at times so strict that it would not grant transit visas even on a reciprocal basis one for one. Much has lately been said and written about Russia's traditional isolationism. Having read snatches of Russian history in English, French, and Japanese I know that Russia has always been suspicious of foreigners. It is not a new thing by any means, but rather a deep-rooted national characteristic. It is not necessarily that they hate or dislike foreigners, but probably because they simply are not interested in them. It is only in times of international stress that Russia's so-called iron curtain covers the scene within the country. There have been men who sought to correct this attitude. Certainly long ago Kyriillos and Methodios sought to join Russia with Western Europe in Christianity. Peter the Great occidentalized Russia more than any other Czar in Russian history, bringing in most of Western thought and invention, but, nevertheless, this deeply ingrained nationalistic isolationism has never been eradicated.

I am not by any means speaking in favor of Russia's
dictatorial government, but I do assert that I believe it wrong to consider Russia an essentially Oriental nation. The simple fact is that the true Russians are Aryans, not very distant from the Germans and speak a language which is sister to all the Indo-European speeches of Europe. Furthermore, Russia's novelists, poets, and musicians are perfectly understandable to us. This is not the case in the instances of Japan, China, Manchuria, Mongolia, etc., for they are truly Oriental nations.

Message on page 27.

On October 15, 1942 we have a very secret message from Soma to the Foreign Minister giving the details regarding the principal press correspondents serving as spies.

(A) Augusto Asia, "Ya's" London correspondent, age over 50; married to a German Jewess, education in England. Has deep connections with British officials and the Soviet Internationals; loves England profoundly; was formerly Berlin correspondent for a powerful Barcelona paper called the Vanguard. However, because of his Communist leanings he was deported (three lines missing).

(B) Francisco Lucientes, New York correspondent of "Ya". Age over 40. Became a newspaperman in Paris about 15 years ago; very adaptable; is a realist and makes a very good appearance. That is the reason for his success in America.

(C) Penella de Silva, Guatemala correspondent of the "ABC" Company, 37 years old. Educated in a German university. First became a newspaper writer in Berlin at the time of the Spanish
Revolution; has very little experience as a writer, but keen judgment on international questions. As a patriot he always puts Spain first and consequently is none too welcome in Germany.

I will wire you later about the other correspondents.

Message on page 29.

On October 16, 1942 Suma wires Tokyo the following: Some three months ago Spain decided to establish a consulate in Vancouver. Realizing the importance of that place to us, I had arranged to have a spy placed there in our behalf. I was going to recommend his name to Suma when his reign as Foreign Minister suddenly ended. With the appointment of the new minister my plans were upset, and Kobbe was appointed to that post instead of the spy I was going to recommend. I set about secretly investigating Kobbe. To my surprise, he was suspected of connections with America and England and from the attitude of the minister it seemed that this was their way of putting an end to our activities. Belasco told me that Kobbe would not do at all.

I was going to drop the whole thing, but I found that the consulate in Vancouver is purely for the purpose of looking after Japanese interests. Kobbe had to come to see me on business, and after that I met him on other occasions. I was wrong in my first conclusion. He is on our side, but really what counts with him is money. Belasco told me that he had consented to do spy work, only he does not know that he is Japan's special agent. He has been given a special code for his use alone and he thinks that he is to be the head of a spy ring in Vancouver.

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We will scrape together a large sum of money and hand it over to him.

He leaves aboard the "Marquès de Comillas" for Vancouver on November 1.

Message on page 32.

This message is included merely for amusement. I no longer remember much about the circumstances. In any case it is very amusing to listen to how Tommy struts and boasts of how he talked to the Foreign Minister of Argentina. He concludes that "hereafter he will control himself and refrain from cursing the Foreign Minister to his face."

Message on page 36.

On October 25, 1942 Oshima in Berlin wires Tokyo that on the 24th Gottfriedsen came to see him, saying that he had received a telephone call from Foreign Minister Ribbentrop at high military headquarters. Gottfriedsen told Oshima the following:

Not long ago some Danish volunteers in Russia were given a month's furlough. When they reached home, all manner of fun was made of them and they were humiliated. This seems to indicate that most of the Danes have no use for us Germans. Then too not long ago on the King's birthday, Chancellor Hitler sent him a long flowery message of good will and congratulations and what did the King do? He wired back "Thanks." Not another word. That was an insult. Germany is, therefore, recalling her minister and military commander from Copenhagen and demanding that Denmark do the same.
Allied propaganda, taking advantage of this, is succeeding in convincing many of the Danish officials and people that the war is turning gradually in their favor and that Denmark should renounce Germany for her unbearable harshness. The Danes are coming to believe this more and more. After all Denmark is still tied up with Great Britain, with whom she has blood relationship, showing partiality toward England, and this led us to the conclusion that she was planning to side with our enemies. We Germans, therefore, while we had to crack down on her, still do not believe that she will throw us overboard or that we will have to use military force to keep Denmark in line.

Commenter's note: I was never able, try as I would, to find out exactly who Gottfriedsen was or what his position was. In any case he stood high with Hitler and Ribbentrop.

Message on page 38.

As expected, there was a bad reaction in Spain to Japan's half unconscious efforts to draw away from her European allies and consolidate her gains in her losing war in the Pacific. This plaintext message is an example of Spain's discontent and indignance.

On October 30, 1942 Suma wires Tokyo the following protest from the Spanish Government:

The Spanish Minister in Tokyo reports to the Spanish Foreign Office that Japanese and Tagalog will be the official languages of the Philippines, and that, although English will be permitted for the time being, Spanish is out. It is understood that Spanish may, only when necessary, however, be used in courts of law. The Spanish
Government is outraged. Japan is supposed to be a friend of Spain. The outlawing of Spanish cannot be endured by our government. The culture and customs of the Filipinos sprang from Spain and most of them deeply appreciate their link with the Spaniards. It is beyond the government's understanding why the Japanese would preclude the language of a friend and permit the use of the tongue of an enemy like the United States.

Therefore, the Spanish Government herewith demands that the Japanese Government rescind this ruling and permit the use of Spanish along with Japanese and Tagalog anywhere and everywhere throughout the islands. It is further hoped that no other such incidents will, in any case, occur.

Message on page 39.

On November 1, 1942 Suma wires Tokyo the following dread message:

An influential German whose name I have pledged myself never to mention, even to you, an absolutely reliable man, came and told me on October 31 the following. For the sake of the safety of this man, please forgive me for not mentioning his name.

1. Real winter has not yet arrived, and Germany has already hit dead rock on all fronts. Stalingrad stands. The German Army stands broken before the Caucasus. No oil will come thence. The Germans are hitting the dust in Egypt.

2. Poverty rules completely over the Reich. Patient though Germans be, there is not one solitary house in the Reich which has
not suffered some casualty, dead or wounded. Of course, hope still exists in their breasts, but they are just about ready to shout in unquellable voices, "stop the fight."

3. What a shame! At this dire time Hitler has lost contact with statesmen of experience and ability and other important people in Germany. He spends 95% of his time at the front, leading the fight, paying no attention to home morale, neglecting political activities which after all contribute to military success in the largest measure.

4. With consternation ruling in Germany, England and America are busy with their characteristic schemes. They are going to steal Italy from us. Italy is now demanding a free hand in Africa. They want Rommel replaced by an Italian general. The reason why we took over in North Africa was just because the Italians could not do the job and were falling down. Germany just has to hint that if Italy wants her lost property back she will have to do the fighting on her own strength. This naturally is making the Italians fighting mad.

5. If this goes on it will ruin the Axis. My opinions on what to do are as follows:

A. Germany should set the territory to be occupied at the minimum. She should leave the question of her foreign colonies for the future. She should reassure the unconquered peoples of Europe that she has no intention of invading them. This would win and unite Germany's allies and thwart Anglo-Saxon propaganda.

B. To defeat Russia you Japanese would have to start
fighting with us Germans. But neither of us could do anything
till next spring. I think Germany should stop fighting this
wishful struggle, this losing game. Germany should conclude
peace with the Soviet right away although the Russians would
demand very severe terms. Perhaps though, they would not even
accept any terms at all. On the other hand if the Soviet military
turned against Stalin the cooperation with Japan would be most
excellent.

C. If England and America saw Germany making peace with the
Soviet without any doubt they would extend hands of friendship to
the Axis. Then Germany could discuss with you Japanese the whole
Soviet problem and its vast relationship to the whole picture of
the war.

D. The poor Fuhrer is under these circumstances childish
and simple. He has the oblivious faith of a babe in arms. He
just cannot be disillusioned. I think the best thing we can do
to get anywhere at all would be first for Japan, Germany, and Italy
to hold a conference of their most capable leaders.

Commenter's note: This was one of the most penetrating and
wisest analyses of the military situation at that time.

Message on page 41.

Berne wires Tokyo on November 7, 1942 that though Switzerland
is surrounded by Axis nations, she is proud of the fact that she
is a "démocratie" and her people favor England and the United
States strongly. The government naturally wants to avoid friction
and cautions the papers not to print too prominent pro-Ally
propaganda. In this sort of a government, freedom of the press cannot be hampered. The German Minister here is forever and eternally protesting to the Foreign Office, but he gets no results. I have a very intimate friend in the press office doing censorship work. I have told him to cut out all reports unfavorable to us Japanese. I would not get anywhere with the Foreign Office. Several papers published both our reports and those of the enemy of the battle of the Solomons. Though they did not exactly call us liars, they did add that the American Secretary of the Navy declared that the Japanese statements were "fish stories."

Message on page 42.

In a message of November 4, 1942 from Morishima in Lisbon to the Foreign Minister we have an amusing example of underhandedness. A local understanding has been worked out by the Japanese and the Governor-General of Timor in Dilli. The Governor-General literally signed the understanding surrounded by the bayonet points of Japanese soldiers. Here is the message:

The Portuguese Vice-Premier angrily summoned me and said, "I can understand that the Governor-General of Timor might ask protection for the womenfolk, but for him to ask you Japanese to protect his own person is unspeakable, damnable, against every tradition of Portugal."

Then he clenched his fists, and screamed, "As long as he has a single soldier left, why doesn't he fight!"

So you see we can't let the understanding between the army
and the Governor-General be sent to Lisbon. The Portuguese Government won't believe it. If they read such a thing as that, they would wire back instantly instructions, declaring such an agreement null and void. If that happened the Governor-General would have no power whatsoever, and we would have to deal with Lisbon directly.

You see, I just spoke of protection, because I knew that if I went into any explanations I would just be getting into trouble. Please don't let the understanding in Dilli be reported here. Let us simply consider it a local understanding and act on it as such. I will keep on holding up my end here, while we arrange to have a military man brought from Macao to Timor to look over the situation. Maybe in time we can get them to accept something like our terms.

I cannot emphasize too much the importance of preventing news of the Dilli agreement from being reported in Lisbon.

Message on page 44.

On November 6, 1942 the Japanese envoy to Rome wires the Japanese Foreign Office as follows:

The Axis is failing in Russia and in Egypt. The Italian national economy is shaking. The livelihood of the people is harder and harder to eke out. The mood of the people is infinitely worse than last winter. This doubtless originates from the fact that the Italian people vacillate quickly between rapture and despair.*

*Commenter's note: This is a myth.
On November 7, 1942 Mr. Tani circulated a 9-part circular describing the latest situation in Europe.

1. German supply lines petered out long before Stalingrad was reached, and though things seemed to go pretty well for the Germans at first in this Caucasian drive, it lost impetus. Early in August everybody thought Stalingrad would fall, but, Behold! it stands yet. The probability is that Germany will never get the needed oil fields of the Caucasus, nor is Germany faring well in the Leningrad-Moscow sector. Snow and ice are doing their devastating work on the German forces; so Germany has failed again this year and the Red Army is exultant.

2. Rommel seemed to make a comeback near the end of August, but late in October the British struck. Now Rommel is on the run again. Also, the Anglo-American forces are occupying other parts of Africa fast.

3. Though the neutral position of Turkey, Spain, and Portugal has not changed, the Axis failures cannot help but be reflected there and French cooperation with Germany is jeopardized.

4. Russia has fought the Germans for a year and a half. England and America have done little to help her. Of course, they have raided Germany by air, but that is not enough to satisfy Stalin. Churchill visited him in August and explained that it would be impossible to establish a second front this year, but Stalin was unconvinced. He told pressmen early in October that a second front was a grave necessity and in view of the aid Russia
has given the Allies, the least they could do would be to give more help in the way of a new front. Stalin was worried then, but probably he does not feel so badly now; for the Germans have not done well and his regime still stands. The Red Army will probably never be defeated. Still, we hear rumors of a separate peace between Berlin and Moscow. We do not believe them. Hitler himself has declared or rather implied on September 30, that the possibility, or at least the time, would be determined by the course of events. Winter is already at hand. No drive can be undertaken. Hitler's home reserves are dwindling. The Russian people would not be likely to accept a separate peace. It is pure fantasy to say that Stalin would make a separate peace to spite England and the United States.

5. We hear various rumors that representatives of both nations have conferred in Sweden and Switzerland; that the Pope is exercising a definite peace policy; that a separate peace with Italy will be made; that Myron Taylor's visit to Italy has to do with peace. We do not know what all this means. Probably it does not mean much other than propaganda to influence the neutral nations. Now that the United States is back of England it looks like a war to the finish.

Message on page 49.

November 9, 1942, and Oshima in Berlin wires Tokyo as follows:

I am informed by Ribbentrop to the following effect: We knew that the Anglo-Americans were going to land in French Africa. On the 7th a large convoy of 60 or 70 ships, protected by battleships
and carriers left Gibraltar for the Mediterranean. On the evening of the 8th they faced eastward and the Germans and Italians were certain that this was to fortify the Egyptian front or perhaps to stage a landing on Italian territory. Then suddenly on the evening of the 7th American troops landed at Algiers. Algiers is already familiar. We have no optimism about the situation there. Some troops landed at Morocco but the French garrison there is still holding out.

This is an emergency of great proportions and Germany and Italy have taken measures to send reinforcements to the isle of Sicily and to Tunis; to send submarines there; to block the Tunis strait; and to forestall any landing from the American coast on the Algerian coast and blast all supply ships. Now that French territory has been invaded, Pétain has agreed to let us use Tunis.

Message on page 50.

On November 10, 1942 Mr. Yamagata in Chile wires Buenos Aires and Tokyo the following:

American Ambassador Bowers called on President Ríos yesterday, the 9th. He also called on Foreign Minister Fernández. Presumably to tell them what America's and England's objectives in North Africa are. Mr. Bowers handed Mr. Ríos a private letter from Roosevelt. Mr. Ríos promised to answer it and said that he was in full sympathy with the splendid achievements of the United Armies and highly approved. He also repeated with great favor the desire on the Chilean Government to contribute to the unity of the new world.
Message on page 51.

On November 10, 1942 Rome wires Tokyo as follows:

Yesterday, the 8th the landing of American troops in French Africa was announced. The people are in consternation. The psychological effect has been terrible, but many say that the Italians are so incensed over the unspeakable behavior of the Anglo-Saxons that they will fight on to the end.

In the "Giornale d'Italia" Gayda declares "This invasion is the second front Stalin wanted, but it will not do any good because Russia is already worn out. Italy's role has become very important now and we will fight on dauntlessly along with Germany and Japan till we win the final victory."

However, I felt that Gayda was just showing his grave concern over what is to come, and was simply on the defensive.

Message on page 52.

Tani in Tokyo wires Vichy the following on November 11, 1942:

The occupation of North Africa by the United States forces may ruin everything -- everything! The neutral nations may now side with them. All this may have a decisive effect on the whole world system.

If successful, this invasion will have tremendous effect on East Asia and on the Nanking Government. What France does is now of incalculable importance. Rush immediately to Laval. Come right out and ask him what France is going to do. Ask him whether or not he intends to stick to the Axis through thick and thin.

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Wire me back in detail what he answers. France has colonies and other interests in East Asia and how she acts will determine how we treat her. If you wish, tell Laval that too.

Message on page 53.

On November 11, 1942 Tani wires Buenos Aires the following:

Slowly but surely are the American forces in French North Africa winning out. The French forces cannot stand up against them any longer. As far as Germany is concerned it is either Africa or Russia. Italy can only wring her hands. This battle in North Africa bodes us no good. It bodes us ill. It gives us no joy. The propaganda power this will give to the Anglo-Saxons will be terrific. This will have a stirring effect on the American states, particularly Argentina and Chile. Try to do everything in your power to keep the government officials where you are and in neighboring countries from falling in step with the United States and do your best to guide public opinion.

Message on page 54.

On November 12, 1942 we have the following message from Mr. Yoshizawa in Hanoi, sent to Vichy and Tokyo, and circularized generally:

On the 11th the Governor-General held a farewell party for me and said:

1. On the 11th Hitler informed Petain of the grave significance of the American attack in North Africa and advised him that he would have to send soldiers through unoccupied France immediately. Petain too, realizing the danger, agreed,
2. Now there is no further reason for a French government in Vichy; so it will probably move to Versailles very soon.

3. I am far away from it all, but Tunis is in the hands of the French and if a definite line can be established between Corsica and Sardinia by a French-Axis bloc it will be almost impossible for the Anglo-Saxons to get any decided advantage in North Africa. Doubtless the air force and submarines of the Axis which have already made a stand at Tunis will give them strong opposition.

Commenter's note: Wherever we meet Mr. Yoshizawa we always find him gentlemanly in every way. Lecturing on the West Coast of the United States he pled for peace. In the Netherlands Indies he was tactful, mild-mannered and well-balanced in spite of terrible pressure from both sides. In Japan he always gave the Foreign Office the most excellent legal (he is a lawyer) and political advice, and in Hanoi he acquitted himself well of duties no other man could have faced as well.

Message on page 55.

The Americans now have Rommel in retreat but German and Italian armies have already occupied Tunis and assured for Axis transportation the use of the passage between Sicily and Bizerte (Tunis).

The Axis army has reached Marseilles. They succeeded in their main purpose in this area and Corsica without trouble. The French
Government has ordered all merchant ships to proceed to a port of the French mainland or to Corsica. The French merchantmen in the Mediterranean are of the 20,000-ton class. In view of the shortage of ships, these will be a big help to the Axis.

Message on page 56.

On November 1st, 1942 Tani sends out a circular about developments in the United States:

1. The United States believes that this year will decide the war. She is stressing the offensive and cooperation with England. She is giving England and Russia more assistance. Vaster and fiercer is her drive against us. In the Solomons even now both sides are locked in mortal combat. In a couple of years she plans to descend upon us with all her might. It seems that right now the United States stresses Europe, but nevertheless she certainly considers the Pacific as very important. She is stationing more and more troops and materiel in Australia, making this the main base for her attack on us. She is cooperating more and more with Chiang, and on the other hand, trying to get Russia to close the back door of the Japanese Empire. America now heads the United Nations Command in the Southwest Pacific, and the Pacific War Council is being directed by Washington. In fact, America is now in a strong enough position to wage effective warfare in the Pacific. The height of her attack in this area may be expected in the spring of next year.

2. In June the complete change-over from civilian to military production was completed. Nelson stated in September that
since the beginning of the war military production has increased threefold but has not yet reached its aim. Roosevelt inspected important plants in half the states early in October and says that they are achieving 90% of their capacity and that he is satisfied. Success in building ships and planes is great, and plans for producing a mighty two-ocean fleet are proceeding smoothly. The output of planes is now 5,000 a month. Four million recruits by the end of this year and nine million by the end of next year are expected, now that the draft age is reduced from 20 to 18 years. The United States is handling her manpower problem perfectly satisfactorily, and is expanding its war effort by sending troops everywhere. However, England and other nations are much worried over reductions in supplies from the United States because of the dislocation of skilled and common labor there. Nevertheless the United States is keeping 40 nations supplied with vast amounts of material, sent in many cases very far afield. England is a little jealous of America on this account, and Willkie's statement in the Soviet concerning the second front and Stalin's interview with an AP reporter were embarrassing to London and Washington. Summing all this up, despite their increasing sacrifices, both England and America firmly believe they will win and their morale runs high. Without having to become totalitarian, Roosevelt's position is just as firm as Churchill's. Both are working together and have welded their two nations together and are now leading the combined war effort.
3. The war expense per day amounts to 150 million dollars or more. Prices are 20% higher and this year's inflation gap is estimated at $10,700,000,000. The government makes this up by taxation and controls. The morale of the people, however, is so high that they are willing to cough up.

4. American psychology consists of a desire to see the Anglo-Saxons prevent Germany and Italy from establishing a new order in Europe and to ruin the Japanese Empire's plans for the establishment of a sphere of Greater East Asia. Further, the United States plans to steal a march on England to get complete control over Central and South America and to get virtual control sooner or later over Canada, Australia and India. Washington figures that London has enjoyed this enviable position long enough and now it is America's turn. The recent distribution of arms also makes this motive discernible.

Of course, the United States is beginning to want to rule the world. The Atlantic Charter and all that does not mean anything. The American people are fed with slogans about perpetuating the "American way of life." The people are so much lulled by these winsome slogans that they become dreamy and cannot think in terms of the hard facts of war and real conditions. However, they do not vacillate and the government is guiding public opinion well indeed. In short, the morale of the American people is very high.

The recent election in the United States was not even a show. Everybody was indifferent. Everybody agreed from beginning to end.
and Roosevelt despite some losses in the Senate and in the Congress is in no wise weakened. The Democrats still have the majority in both houses. There is no danger at all that the President's position of leading in the war has been or will be weakened.